DSA May 2011 by Defence and Security Alert

SAARC COUNTRIES : US$ 20 REST OF THE WORLD : US$ 25 MAY 2011

INDIA : ` 120 VOLUME 2 ISSN

ISSUE 8

0976-206X

9 770976 206003

INTERNAL SECURITY Vital Role of Science and Technology

> VOLUME 2 > ISSUE 8 > MAY 2011

Majestic recognition to

Shifting Paradigms

Innovative Solutions

editor-in-chief

he use of drones to attack militant targets in Pakistan, Yemen and in the Gaza stirs high emotions, much resentment and some praise as well, amongst those practicing statecraft or at the receiving ends of the deadly missiles. The debate, for or against the drones, being put aside for the moment, what their use demonstrates is the ability of the State to reach targets that manpower dependent tactics cannot hope to achieve. These are quantum force multiplier, to use a military clichĂŠ. For they use precisely the tactics upon which militants survive, stealth, silence, low manpower and most important of all, surprise. All of which goes to prove their growing induction in professional militaries and security forces.

Governments manage to change the nature of the game by the superiority of the technologies deployed to counter threats.

Manpower dependent tactics are of a finite nature, always dependent on numbers to achieve parity and then domination. Whereas technology is infinite in its scope and application. In the game of security, external and internal, the use of technological innovation has changed the rules of the game. No longer do governments need the militants to make their moves before detection happens and neutralisation follows. Governments now have the options to identify, track, follow, extract greater information and then counteract before the militants can launch their attacks. Surprise and the resultant initiative, is now available with governments. And that game changer is largely because of the use of technology. The relevance of technology is limitless, owing to its inherently dynamic nature. And it is hampered only by the limitations imposed by a lack of innovative thinking. The instinctive inertia of the State is what stands between applying neutralising force through the use of technology and remaining dependent on the habitual manpower intensive tactics. For technology is about viewing options differently and squeezing the best results out of originality.

Humankind has displayed enormous dynamism in its pursuit of innovation and invention. What was unthinkable a decade back is now taken as a matter of routine. All of this is possible only because of the development and induction of technology, at various levels of application. From the overt, the intrusive, to the covert and lethal, technologies exist at differing levels and function. It is for the government to identify what is best suitable in its environment. And it is for the society to adapt to those uses, for there is a cost that technology extracts. Which has nothing to do with pricing, but more to do with privacy. When it comes to matters of security, privacy is a small price to pay. But for that attitudes have to change, both within and outside of government. Rampantly intrusive application is not the need of the hour. What is needed is a change of mindset, for identifying the threats, the technologies needed to counter them and sanctioning their uses. It isnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t simply the technologies that are going to win the battle, but the minds that need use them. And that is the biggest challenge before State and society.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

publisher’s view

announcement

Eradicate corruption, save the nation!

ooner or later each Indian has to act or react to the corruption prevailing in our society. If we do not act against it or react now, our coming generations are not going to forgive us for our cowardly acceptance of this curse. There may be many instances in everyone’s life where he or she has come across some instance or a situation where we have compromised and directly or indirectly supported corruption.

Vo l u m e 2 I s s u e 8 M a y 2 0 11 chairman shyam sunder publisher & ceo pawan agrawal editor-in-chief manvendra singh director shishir bhushan corporate consultant k j singh art consultant divya gupta central saint martins college of art & design, university of arts, london corporate communications tejinder singh ad-sales manish upadhyay creative vivek anand pant administration shveta gupta representative J&K salil sharma correspondent (europe) dominika cosic production dilshad & dabeer webmaster sundar rawat photographer subhash circulation & distribution vijay bhatia ranjeet system administrator vikas e-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscri ption: subscription@dsalert.org online edition: online@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org editorial & business office 4/19 asaf ali road new delhi-110002 (India) t: +91-011-23243999,23287999,9958382999 f: +91-11-23259666 e: info@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org

disclaimer all rights reserved. reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part by any means without permission from Defence and Security Alert is prohibited. opinions expressed are those of the individual writers and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher and / or editors. all disputes are subject to jurisdiction of delhi courts. defence and security alert is printed, published and owned by pawan agrawal and printed at graphic world, 1686, kucha dakhini rai, darya ganj, new delhi-110002 and published at 4/19 asaf ali road, new delhi (india). editor: manvendra singh.

It is easy to comment that our entire system is corrupt and there is no hope of any improvement at all but have we as individuals and responsible citizens ever tried to understand as to how it became as rampant a problem as it is today? Was it of the same level immediately after the attainment of Independence? If India has developed in multifarious ways then we must acknowledge that the level of corruption has also kept pace in the same degree as the general growth of the nation. Have we ever had a scam a day as we have now?

ANNOUNCES JUNE 2011 AS SPECIAL I S S U E O N

Disaster Management

Focusing on CBRN threats, preparedness and management India's disaster management structure Global disaster trends etc. ...

Two important pillars of society that were responsible for the entire planning, execution and control of development and growth of the country in every sector actually went astray and became involved in corrupt practices which has affected the entire country. One pillar is our political system rather, I should say, our political parties – which are solely responsible for this corruption in the country. There is no political party, which is not actively involved in the corruption of the highest order. They have brought rot and ruin to the entire system by involving the other pillars as well. The second pillar is our bureaucracy, which has been an integral part of corruption by choice and by various compulsions. I firmly believe that without their contribution, dedication and commitment to corruption the political pillar could not have succeeded and our country would have really not reached the unenviable list of the most corrupt countries in the world. Neither are all politicians corrupt nor is the entire bureaucracy corrupt but, yes, most of them are and that is the reason why this curse on our country is increasing by the day. There are other pillars as well that wallow with gust in this cesspool of corruption such as the business groups, industrialists and the judiciary too. As a consequence, the worst-affected is national security which, I am sure, none of us has ever evaluated or tried to fathom. Every deed of corruption has led us directly or indirectly to a state that today we all are prone to insecurity in every walk of life. Here I want to quote a former Chief Election Commissioner who had this to say about corruption in India. " Do you know how elections are run in this country? Liquor for the father, cloth for the mother and food for the baby." "What is not corrupt in this country? India's central vice is corruption; the centrality of corruption is election corruption; and centrality of election corruption is the business houses." Unfortunately for us after so many years the corruption scenario has only worsened. If the politicians were not involved in corruption terrorism also could not flourish in the country. Every political party which has been in power over the years is responsible for the present state of affairs. Our people are dying, our security forces are under tremendous pressure and when they are actually quite close to smash the terrorist groups then they are either transferred somewhere else or they are compelled to resign or asked to be away from the scene. This is only because these politicians receive hefty amounts to safeguard the interests of terrorists and their supporters in the country. JAI HIND!

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

Available at all leading bookstores LANDMARK LTD. ODYSSEY

CROSSWORD

contact for subscription: online@dsalert.org

SPENCERS OM BOOK SHOP subscription@dsalert.org

contents INTERNAL SECURITY SPECIAL ISSUE May 2011

contents

Vo l u m e 2 I s s u e 8 M a y 2 0 11

A R T I C L E S

hologrammatic terrorism Dr. Vijay Khare

FMS route: how vulnerable?

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Dr. Mrinal Suman

role of science and technology Ajey Lele

harnessing technology

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Aditya Singh

national stability and integration Lt. Gen. (Retd.) O. P. Kaushik

shield of the future? Kshitij Aditeya Singh

countering low intensity conflicts Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Dr. G. D. Bakshi

6 11 16 22 28 32 38

information dominance: power of the future? 42 Dr. Venkateshwaran Lokanathan

techno-savvy cop!

Indian navy: technology leader

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) V. G. Patankar Cmde. (Retd.) Ranjit B. Rai

demystifying national security Maj. Gen. (Retd.) V. K. Singh

nuclear power: how safe? Dr. Harsh V. Pant

54 57

for online edition log on to: www.dsalert.org

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

remote sensing and national security

sifting information

maritime governance authority

cyber crimes

future force structure

payback time?

innovative policing

technical means as force multipliers

military application of space assets

information secrecy: new challenges?

Dr. Hari Saran

V. Balachandran

V. Adm. (Retd.) Venkat Bharathan Yogesh Rajendra Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Sheru Thapliyal Praful S. Adgale Hormis Tharakan

Dr. Rajendra Prasad

Brig. (Retd.) Dr. Arun Sahgal

Professor (Retd.) K. S. Sidhu

managing multiple threats

104

V. Adm. (Retd.) Arun Kumar Singh

Follow DSA on :

DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Follow DSA on :

DSALERT May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

SECURITY CHALLENGES

Global terrorist organisations have been using high-tech concepts hitherto used by transnational corporations to propagate hidden messages in their commercial advertisements. The projection of sublimnal (beneath the consciousness) images to enhance the terror effect globally using mass media as the medium is a force-multiplier in the hands of these terror organisation. A “this can happen” image as disseminated by the minute by 24X7 media channels becomes transformed into a “this can happen to us” fear which some governments like China and Israel have tried to counter by restrictions on globalised communications network. India, which is a frequent victim of a proxy war conducted through terrorist means contributes to the global fear in this new paradigm of warfare by other means.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

Dr. Vijay Khare

his article deals with how technology revolution is changing conflict and security issues particularly India’s security issues in the age of globalisation. This security also deals with emergence of global terrorism and hologrammatic terrorism as the new threat to global peace and security as well as India’s security issues. Terrorism in the 21st century was caused by a gap in the system of international relations consequent to the bipolar logic of the Cold War and to the fall of the Berlin Wall. That wall kept safe the Twin Towers in New York too. When the first came down, the others did the same. In any case a lack in international relations has always been the reason for the appearance of terrorism. This is the main argument I would like to focus in this article. Many strategic and defence analysts, considered as oracles thanks to the media revolution, focused on the particularities. Terrorism is a political subject that has been present in the modern political dynamics for 200 years.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

SECURITY CHALLENGES

New terrorist groups are reportedly more violent and prone to use new types of weapons. This has thus resulted in fostering new more lethal and dangerous forms of terror which can be called super terrorism, envisaging mass casualties. Super terrorism loosely defined is projected future use of chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological weapons or WMDs by terrorist groups. As per an Israeli terrorism expert, Ehud Sprinzak, super terrorism is based on two propositions, taken in the context of an attack on America but one which may be relevant in the case of India as well, given our propensity to terror strikes Security framework Post Cold War era has witnessed changing trends in security. The traditional concept of security is now being replaced by non-traditional security which stresses upon broader view entailing vast concerns of social, political, economic and environmental issues leading to the comprehensive security which is becoming a more popular version of security. In recent times when the fast pace of globalisation and revolution in technology are complicating the issues being faced by States, the understanding of security has become crucial for the betterment of humanity. If we take the most general meaning of security, it implies being secured from threats. Then how much are the States nowadays secure from the number of threats being faced other than military ones? The concept of security is ambiguous and elastic in meanings. The traditional military oriented security was seen in world politics in 1940s till the end of Cold War, by the then prevalent Realist scholars, who emphasised on attainment of military power. The Realists were the traditionalists who dominated the international relations in 1940s. They believed in ‘power politics’ with States as the main actors, giving stress on attainment of more and more military power. Throughout the Cold War the traditional concept of security remained dominant paradigm as both policy makers and strategic experts strongly adhered to the conviction that international relations are essentially conflictual and that war is the only solution, a bitter reality that cannot be overlooked or denied. State security remained primary concern and objective of the followers of traditional concept of security. For them State is the pre-eminent actor in world politics and all other actors such as individuals, international organisations, NGOs etc. are either secondary or unimportant.

From the Realist perspective, States face security dilemma and national security is achieved through the military means. The core values of traditional concept of security are national security and State survival; foreign policy of any State is formulated around these two basic priorities or values.

New perceptions A growing number of contemporary writers have sought an ‘expanded conception’ of security, including a wide range of considerations. After the end of Cold War, the concept of security became a hot subject of debate, dissection and discourse not only among the scholars but also among the strategists, policy makers and economists. The traditional concept had emphasised the “centrality of State as pivot of political life.” Today we are living in a world where change is intense and swift, knowledge seeks supremacy over ‘the mindless fist’, communication technology has tossed us into a 24–hour society that never sleeps and the transnational boundaries on our globalised planet make us at once interdependent and wary of each other. Security perceptions have also changed, moving on from the mere defence and territory to identifying other areas of conflict where nations can explode into threats to national security. The concept of National Security is being redefined. The gamut of its operations has undergone a paradigm shift. In anticipation of a few years ago, to understand how to distinguish the terrorists was a problem. The classification of subjects of terror could be built on the basis of the prevailing definitions, useful to define the characteristics of some over others. In general the characteristics also indicated the profound connotation, the main motivation, even the political nature of the subject identified. Therefore, the terrorists were identified

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

on the basis of their motivation to act and were identified on the basis of their politics. The criteria for distinction were mainly three: a) A political settlement such as terrorists demand. b) The political connotation of terrorists like Marxists or Fascists, Islamic, Third World or anti-American. c) The parties they politically, terrorists etc.

belong

The terrorist attack typology after the train explosion in Madrid and other parts of the world has finally entered a new phase of transition.

Three terrorist echelons a) Local groups of terrorists: Local groups of terrorists which act in well-defined areas, with actions aimed at addressing the cog of internal power. b) Global terrorist groups: Global terrorist groups which act everywhere in the world to produce major events that will remain in the collective imagination for a long time and will be stored such as historical events in collective consciousness of the world ( 9/11 attack on Twin Towers). c) Glocal terrorist groups: Which act in certain areas of the world with a strategic local action in order to spread global terror such as German Bakery bomb blast at Pune and broadcast through the Internet and media. This third typology of terrorist groups has attracted our attention for two very basic reasons: Because the global structure of terrorist organisations is completely new and it adopts a particular morphology that is connected with analysis called “Skyline Unusual” and it requires

analytical skills totally new because the function of glocal contemporary terrorism cannot happen without the fundamental contribution of communication and the network of the mass media. From the local groups the global cells have taken the technique of urban warfare and the tactic of the political attack planned in time and in space. Local claim has strengthened the presence of global terrorist groups. Glocal terrorist activities are based on local action for global terrorism. This is the hologram of Al Qaeda that appears even when it is not involved covering the international terrorist network that is structured as opposed to the global and democratic west, through a management of terror generated by the partnership between international cell and local groups.

The communicative shock The modern democracies are responsible for the bodies of their citizens and others. Even for the bodies of their enemies. For this reason the long-term military action could become

self-defeating. Errors are more likely to occur and the communicative shock could paralyse us and turn us into preys in the hunt by terrorists. We are becoming the hunted ones. The long term is their time, not ours and the static nature of the military strategy army, police, paramilitary forces and law can become the strategic advantage for the terrorist communication network which is increasingly capable of transmitting fundamentalism, based on the extension of anti-western resentment from the government to the nations, from the nations to the people. The international terrorist network aims to spread panic by using the attack on organisation of airports, railway stations, supermarkets, coffee shops, for getting the global publicity and terrorise the global society. There are six types of communicative shock used in hologrammatic terrorism: 1. The index of violence is the physical state of individuals or groups.

2. The degree of subversion is the index that is attributed to all activities not formalised aimed at destabilising the regularity in terms of governance or the maintenance of political power. 3. Resonance communicative: They are all the terrorist events that have or could be incorporated into at least five to ten national newspapers and on major public and private radio and television newscasts throughout the world. 4. Recurrence of the subject should be selected as potential actors in the terror immediately recognisable and attributable to the overall strategy of the terrorists those individuals already known to have previously acted with a certain degree of regularity during at least 3 years. 5. Significance of the object: The act that characterises the glocal terrorism phenomena are also selected on the basis of the strategic goal to which the attacks are aimed, either directly or indirectly.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

6. The deterrent effect is difficult to determine with mathematical precision, but it is strongly indicative of the attacks aimed to address the political decisions and to spread insecurity and fear in the population in that order.

Projector of hologram A terrorist action can happen in every train station or in every market, against an enemy or an adverse symbol, in a country that could be even our country. And you can see, during the lunch or during the dinner, in the incubation of a room, the crater of an explosion, shattered or bleeding bodies, burned cars, things strewn by the explosion blast wave. This is a terrorist attack, of course but this is also a hologram that appears, visible yet ethereal, overwhelming, in front of perplexed eyes. Later it gets in contact with us such as the evil spirit of the fairytales. Hologram means “entire transfer” in the two–way of a transferred and an overall transfer. The complete meaning of contemporary terrorism can be found in the representation of the transferred image into the western daily distraction. That image is all his content. The terror isn’t in the act, but in the action of imprinting of it in the imagination. The hologrammatic terrorism is a particular type of terrorism that completes the action into the image of his attack. Perhaps it isn’t yet technically a hologrammatic image. But it lives in us and addresses our nightmares, making real the threats and the risks that don’t exist. The hologrammatic terrorist action consists of a political process divided in two phases: Terroristic bombing produces the hologram through media image; the image reflected into the media lets every observer free to generate automatically a terror hologram that is not necessarily projected on terroristic threat.

Mind management In this way the image’s reproduction is responsible for recording of the terroristic presence and for the imprinting on the cognitive structure of the audience. The hologrammatic image is real, different from the traditional journalistic photography. It is real because it lives in the audience mind. The attack is the organisation. And after the attack, the terrorists are total strangers. As images don’t travel on a single television channel, the

internal security

SECURITY CHALLENGES creating of political hologram is due to superimposition. In the process of globalisation the role of information and communication are changing the perception about global peace and security. Information is one sided and communication is two-sided. Terrorist groups use Internet and other resources for achieving their goal. They use Face book, You Tube, Blog, Video game, Mobile TV, for projecting their activities at the global level. Sometimes a few nation-States ban such modern communication within civil society. Israeli and Chinese governments tried to shut down the websites. New terrorist groups are reportedly more violent and prone to use new types of weapons. This has thus resulted in fostering new more lethal and dangerous forms of terror which can be called super terrorism, envisaging mass casualties. Super terrorism loosely defined is projected future use of chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological weapons or WMDs by terrorist groups. As per an Israeli terrorism expert, Ehud Sprinzak, super terrorism is based on two propositions, taken in the context of an attack on America but one which may be relevant in the case of India as well, given our propensity to terror strikes: a. The Capabilities Proposition: This assumes that raw materials and information to construct WMDs are far more readily available than they have been in the past. b. The Chase Proposition: More extremist groups than in the past have a heightened interest in launching an attack on American soil.

India’s security challenges India’s security concerns are defined by a dynamic global security environment and the perception that South Asia region is of particular global security interest. The continuing presence of terrorist and fundamentalist forces in its neighbourhood has prompted India to maintain a high level of defence vigilance and preparedness to face any challenge to its security. The security challenges facing India are varied and complex. The country faces a series of low intensity conflicts characterised by ethnic and left wing movements and ideologies as also the proxy war conducted by Pakistan and various radical jehadi outfits through

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

the instrumentality of terrorism. India is also affected by the trafficking in drugs and proliferation of small arms and the fact that it is surrounded by two neighbours with nuclear weapons and missiles and history of past aggressions and war. There is also the ever present possibility of hostile radical fundamentalist elements gaining access to the weapons of mass destruction in Pakistan.

AMERICAN TRAP

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Dr. Mrinal Suman

Counter-terror infrastructure The country has experienced four major conventional border wars besides an undeclared war at Kargil. India’s response to these threats and challenges has always been restrained, measured and moderate in keeping with its peaceful outlook and reputation as a peace loving country. India has emerged as one of the world’s most consistent targets of Islamist militants. Although the Mumbai attacks of November 2008 attracted the most global attention, they were merely the most recent and dramatic in a series of bloody terrorist incidents throughout urban India. On July 11, 2006, for example, terrorists planted seven bombs on the Suburban Railway of Mumbai, causing the deaths of more than 200 people. The November 2008 attacks, however, brought into clear focus the inability of the Indian security apparatus to anticipate and appropriately respond to major terrorist incidents. As one prominent analyst wrote, the government’s responses to the Mumbai attacks were “comprehensive failures from the point of view of India’s security establishment.” While some Indian analysts and politicians prefer to focus on Pakistan’s role as a haven for a variety of militant groups, it is clear that India needs to dramatically enhance its domestic counter-terrorism infrastructure. Improvement will require significant infusions of resources, policy consistency and political will that are often lacking in India.

The writer is Associate Professor Defence and Strategic Studies, University of Pune, India. He is also founder director of International Forum For Democracy And Peace (IFFDP), Istanbul. His areas of interest include Internal Security, Terrorism, Non-Traditional Security, Conflict Resolution, Peace and Conflict Studies and International Relations etc.

Beggars can’t be choosers. Up to a point. One can understand it if the nation requires a major weapons platform with parameters that are state-of-the-art because of the urgency of the threat. There is no valid explanation for why India has had to return to the US for 155 mm howitzers (ultra light versions) because that is where the problems began nearly three decades ago. India wanted to produce it under licence; the US refused. India got what it wanted from Sweden and suddenly there was a spate of exposes, much of it emanating from America, of allegations of kickbacks and middlemen in the deal. The inflated price for the C-17 heavy lift aircraft and many other such deals is the cost India has to pay for strategic relations with the US. May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

AMERICAN TRAP

wo developments have brought the issue of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) deals under the public spotlight once again. First, there were reports in the press stating that the Army Chief had drawn the attention of the government to serious maintenance problems being faced in the earlier FMS deals. The second development pertains to reported overpricing of Boeing C-17 heavy lift transport aircraft. Press reports allege that the US had pegged the value of the deal at US$ 4.1 billion during President Obama’s visit to India in 2010, at a unit cost of US$ 410 million for ten aircraft. Considering the sale price of US$ 300 million per aircraft charged from Australia, the total package should not cost India more than US$ 3 billion. Worse, while notifying the US Congress, the US has pegged the value of the proposed deal at US$ 5.8 billion. It implies that India will be over-charged by 37 per cent if the package cost is US$ 4.1 billion and a whopping 93 per cent if hiked to US$ 5.8 billion.

Between devil and deep sea India has been increasingly resorting to purchases through FMS route. Starting with the procurement of 8 AN/TPQ-37 Fire Finder counter-battery artillery radars in 2002, India has found FMS route to be a convenient mode to bypass the complexities of the Defence Procurement Procedure. More importantly, being government-to-government deals, they are projected to be above board and free of all extraneous influences. Other major deals signed under FMS route include purchase of six C-130J Hercules transport aircraft for USD 962 million and naval vessel Trenton for USD 88 million. As two major deals for C-17 aircraft for the Air Force and 155 mm Light-Weight Towed Howitzers for the Army are presently under advanced stage of negotiations, it is time a closer look is taken at the intricacies of FMS process.

Attributes of FMS route FMS is one of the two common routes adopted by the US to sell military equipment to foreign countries; the other one being Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), under which defence

manufacturers are free to sell their product to foreign buyers, albeit subject to the licencing regime. Under DCS route, US companies have to compete with producers from other nations to bag orders. Both technical and commercial aspects dictate selection of the winner. Therefore, US manufacturers are forced to price their product very competitively. Thus, DCS is a tough and laborious process – more struggle and less profitability.

conditions of the proposed sale.

■■ The US government supplies the item either from its own existing stocks or after fresh procurement from the producer.

specifically for the US forces, keeping in mind their capabilities, doctrine and envisaged operational exploitation. A buyer country has to accept the equipment as it exists and cannot evolve its own parameters – the equipment may not match its requirements fully. Worse, the US government insists that the buyer nation signs the contract on the dotted lines and does not entertain any suggestions for alterations. It is a ‘take it or leave it’ situation for a buyer.

On the other hand, FMS route provides an ideal opportunity to well-networked US producers to bag orders without much sweat by piggyback riding on US government’s

Pros and cons

An appraisal

For buyer nations, FMS route has both positive and negative attributes. These are summarised below:

This article endeavours to examine FMS procedure to ascertain if FMS deals are really as fair, transparent and

■■ The buying government is required to submit a Letter of Acceptance (LoA) along with the initial advance. ■■

A legal contract is signed.

inroads are made into the decision making apparatus through social networking. Repeated presentations are made to convince the key government officials of the unmatched superiority of the US equipment. All possible stratagems are employed to bring dissenting officials around. Even promises of facilitating grant of green cards to their progeny are dangled. To obtain favourable media coverage, members of think tanks and media are taken to visit their factories and ‘looked after’. Efforts are made to have every important functionary on board (or in pocket) so that no objections are raised at any level once the proposal to opt for FMS route gets activated.

nation is forced to opt for FMS route for its emergent requirements. Has not the case of 155 mm Light-Weight Towed Howitzers followed a similar path?

It is a painstaking and time consuming task but considered highly rewarding by big players.

compare prices of an item available through FMS and DCS routes, thereby getting deprived of an opportunity to opt for the cheaper route. No purchaser can obtain DCS price quote after submitting LoR under FMS. Similarly, all DCS negotiations have to be aborted by a purchaser before submitting LoR. It is a highly unreasonable arrangement and contravenes norms of fair trade practices.

Pricing conundrum Advocates of FMS also claim it to be a cost-effective option as the buyer nation gets equipment at the rate at which it is purchased for the US forces. Unfortunately, it is a misrepresentation of facts. The pricing process is highly exploitative, subjective and cloaked in secrecy. The following points need to be highlighted: ■■

A buyer nation can never get to

India’s much hyped defence procurement procedure is based on the fundamental principle of transparency, free competition and impartiality. Every FMS deal violates the said principle. There is a total lack of transparency as no Request for Information is issued to the environment to let possible competitors know of the impending procurement and facilitate their participation. LoR is sent to the US government without any publicity. In many cases, the information becomes public only when DSCA notifies the US Congress of the possible sale. By then it is invariably too late for other vendors to intervene initiatives. Further, in order to exercise stricter export control, Security Assistance Management Manual provides for designating certain items of critical nature as “FMS only”, thereby increasing incidence of FMS deals.

Designated process FMS is a five stage process, as follows: ■■ Prospective buyer nation submits a Letter of Request (LoR) to the US government’s Defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). ■■ After notifying the US Congress of possible sale, DSCA sends a Letter of Offer (LoO) to the requesting government. It contains all terms and

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

■■ Benefits of FMS Route. Being government-to-government deals, a certain degree of sovereign guarantee is inbuilt in the system and qualitycum-performance parameters are assured. There are no middlemen. As the US government procures the item as per its normal procedures, the buyer nation is saved considerable effort. Further, the US government is in a better position to provide logistic, training and exploitation support since the item is already in use with its forces. It is an ideal route for the US allies who have common operational doctrine and where inter-operability of equipment is an essential consideration.

cost-effective as claimed.

■■ Weaknesses of FMS Route. The equipment would have been developed

First, through a large number of pro-active corporate executives, deep

Probity and manipulation The single most important reason cited repeatedly in favour of FMS route is the total absence of middlemen as transactions are directly between the two governments. This is a most fallacious logic as it totally ignores the activities that precede selection of FMS route by a country. The whole process of coercing a prospective buyer nation to abandon open competition and seek US equipment on a single vendor basis is carried out in an apparently innocuous but surreptitious manner.

Secondly, all efforts are made, both overtly and covertly, to torpedo every attempt at procurement through competitive route. Overt means employed are representations to the government, hard-selling by visiting US dignitaries and seeking intervention of known pro-US Indian officials. Covert means include sowing seeds of doubts about the competitors in the minds of public through planted stories and third-party complaints. The aim is simple – eliminate all competition by having them blacklisted through selective leaks and innuendoes. Slowly a stage is reached when the buyer

■■ The US government imposes additional handling charges for sales negotiations, case implementation, contract negotiation, contract management, financial management and allied expenses. In other words, the final FMS price includes administrative surcharge and contract administration

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

AMERICAN TRAP

services costs. Additionally, Arms Export Control Act requires a charge for a proportionate amount of any non-recurring costs of research, development and production of major defence equipment sold through FMS. ■■ The buyer nation gets to know the final price of equipment only after its delivery. Prior to that, only estimated price and payment schedules are intimated to the buyers. ■■ Under the provisions of Defence Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement of May 1995, the US government allows its defence producers to recover ‘offset costs’ from buyer nations. However, the producers are required to factor it in the unit cost of main equipment and not mention it separately. This effectively hides the true value of offset cost-penalty from the buyers and provides an avenue for undue price hikes.

Contractual blackmail It is a standard trade practice that both the seller and the buyer negotiate various terms and conditions to arrive at mutually acceptable provisions for inclusion in the contract. In the case of FMS, it is a unilateral process. A copy of the pre-drafted contract is handed over to the buyer nation for signing. No questions or changes are entertained. Needless to say, every sentence of the draft is loaded in favour of the US government. Provisions pertaining to offsets and technical support are symptomatic of asymmetrical contractual obligations. Worse, no assurance against future embargos / bans is provided.

Heads I win, tails you lose While proclaiming a hands-off policy with regard to offset practices, the US government allows its producers to recover offset overheads from a buyer nation. Yet, it does not guarantee fulfillment of offset obligations. A purchaser country is advised to negotiate a separate offset agreement directly with the prime contractor. It is a strange way to abdicate responsibility. As payments against the main contract are made directly to the US government, the buyer nation cannot withhold them in case of offset defaults. Two important points relating to

technical support for the equipment sold under FMS have also been a cause of disquiet. One, in the initial package, excessive quantities of support equipment and spares are included. As a buyer country is not fully conversant with the equipment at the time of purchase, it has to accept whatever is included in the package. It is only at a later stage that it realises their futility. The second point is about the lack of guarantee of continued US support. As has been India’s experience with Firefinder radars, backup technical support is not as forthcoming as it should be. Spare parts take unduly long to materialise, keeping critical equipment in off-road state for disquietingly long periods.

The way forward India’s much hyped defence procurement procedure is based on the fundamental principle of transparency, free competition and impartiality. Every FMS deal violates the said principle. There is a total lack of transparency as no Request for Information is issued to the environment to let possible competitors know of the impending procurement and facilitate their participation. LoR is sent to the US government without any publicity. In many cases, the information becomes public only when DSCA notifies the US Congress of the possible sale. By then it is invariably too late for other vendors to intervene. FMS is a non-competitive and single vendor process wherein no tenders are issued to generate competition by seeking techno-commercial bids from multiple vendors. FMS deals effectively circumvent all competition. Apparently, any process in which a single vendor is pre-selected for the placement of orders can never be impartial. It is not that FMS route should be totally shunned. It should be adopted to procure cutting-edge equipment that is unavailable from any alternate source.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

mission

The power of a King lies in his mighty arms…

Security of the citizens at peace time is very important because State is the only saviour of the men and women who get affected only because of the negligence of the State. FMS route also acts as a tool of foreign policy to develop closer strategic synergy with the US. However, India must curb its penchant for resorting to FMS route to circumvent convolutions of DPP and finding an easy way out to affect procurements. Importantly, India must demand a right to negotiate contractual terms to safeguard its interests. Finally, undoubtedly FMS route is cleverly exploited by experienced US manufacturers to bag multi-million dollar deals with the active help of the US government. To coax Indian decision makers to shed open competition and opt for single vendor FMS route requires considerable persuasion skills, networking and even ‘sweeteners’. Non-US companies allege unfair tweaking of procedures and manipulation of policies to their disadvantage. They are convinced that the whole process is not above board.

The writer heads Defence Technical Assessment and Advisory Service (DTAAS) of Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). He did MSc in Defence Studies and Doctorate in Public Administration. He commanded an Engineer Regiment in the most hostile battlefield in the world i.e., the Siachen Glacier. He was awarded a gold medal for being ‘the most outstanding engineer of the year’. He was the first Technical Manager [Land Systems] when the newly created Acquisition Wing was established in the Ministry of Defence in 2001. He has been closely associated with the evolution and promulgation of the new defence procurement mechanism.

— Chanakya

internal security

SCI-TECH INDUCTION

Ajey Lele

Both, the Indian experience in the management of internal unrest as well as the implosive events in the Arab world, have thrown up a cardinal lesson that has universal application: That the method of application and the quantum of lethality has a psychological impact on the political outcome of conflict. Internal security issues can spiral out of hand if the lethality is perceived to be inhuman or out of proportion to the threat. It is out of experience that there have been demands in India that new methods be employed for crowd and riot control. In the search for such means science and technology have a role to play as in the development of the pepper spray and delivery without the use of climate-change inducing chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) to create aerosol effects. 16

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

ost Mumbai terror attacks (26/11) there has been much discussion on requirement of action to improve India’s vigilance to handle terrorism. So far various structures have come into existence and series of measures have been undertaken to improve the current preparedness level to handle threat from non-State actors. Along with terrorism (the so called State-sponsored variety) Indian State is addressing other significant threats like the Naxal violence and religious fundamentalism. Post 26/11, terror incidents like Pune (German bakery) and Varanasi have indicated that Indian and international pressure on Pakistan would have serious limitations. With regard to Naxal violence, states of Chhattisgarh, Bihar, West Bengal and Jharkhand face

a major threat with continuous unrest and frequent increase in the level of violence. The problems in Orissa and Maharashtra are also pretty serious. Issue of terrorism is being addressed at various levels and for Naxal / Maoists problems, number of joint operations by state police forces with the assistance of central forces are being undertaken. Also, it has been found that few new terror groups are getting activated at frequent intervals either with or without covert State support.

Greater coordination For addressing the threat of terrorism, Naxal violence and religious fundamentalism it has become essential to maintain constant vigilance and undertake various other required measures. There is also a need to have

a greater coordination of responses and resources amid the central agencies and other agencies operating at the ground level. It is a known fact that infiltration into India from across the India-Pakistan border has seasonal variations. Terror groups are resorting to new tactics frequently to hoodwink the security agencies. In spite of best of its efforts the Indian security establishment is finding it difficult to “manage” this threat. Probably one area which has remained unaddressed for all these years is the investment in technology. The television images of India’s security establishment using age-old .303 rifles to tackle terrorism and Naxalism are depressing.

Inadequate technical input Over the years Indian establishment

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

SCI-TECH INDUCTION

It is also important to invest in research and development particularly in the field of sensor technologies from the internal security point of view. Also, there is a need to explore the possibility of developing the special standoff weapons for international security requirements. The possibility of innovations in technologies like nanotechnology, biotechnology, composite materials, etc. needs to be studied for their utility in developing various capacities for the internal security usages Technology induction slow

UAVs

No dedicated structure

In any internal security architecture it is essential to undertake technology assessment at various levels. Technology is important from routine day to day policing to strategic intelligence gathering. Even though India is fighting terrorism for last few decades its protection assemblage which could be said to consist of police, paramilitary forces, other organisations created from time to time and intelligence agencies are essentially trained and equipped to undertake routine policing activities. Unfortunately, over the years albeit various structures have evolved to address the issues related with the changed nature of threat, very little has been done to induct matching technologies.

For establishment of any internal security architecture it is important to have a dedicated element dealing with science and technology. In Indian context it could be said that over the years no dedicated structures have been established to address issues related to using technologies to enhance the might of internal security forces. By and large, the focus for induction of new technologies has so far remained at the tactical level and no broad scale thinking appears to have emerged. In case of Indian armed forces DRDO is mandated to provide all form of assistance in regard to the technology matters. No such system exists which is mandated to cater for the needs of the police, paramilitary forces and other concerned agencies. Particularly, in regard to the police forces it is understood that it would be a bit difficult to evolve a technology induction policy at the national level because policing is a state subject. However, at least it could be possible to formulate broad polices and the central agencies could provide the necessary guidance, assistance and training to various state level forces.

At times globally it has been seen that technology induction matches with the overall technological leadership provided by the nation. It becomes easier to induct the domestically-developed technologies. Luckily, for India space technology is one area where significant developments have taken place and these technologies have both direct and indirect applicability for assisting police and paramilitary forces and intelligence agencies. India has various communication and remote sensing satellites which could assist these agencies. Particularly, the satellites in the Carosat (cartographic satellites) have a very high resolution (less than a meter) which helps in identification of smallest objects on the ground. Post-26/11, India has launched a high-precision Israeli-made spy satellite RISAT-2 to gather intelligence. This satellite is capable of giving timely information, including relevant inputs from bordercrossing to information on terror camps and hideouts across the border. Space technologies would mostly have a major focus towards intelligence gathering. However, it is also important to equip the troops on ground too with gadgets likes Global Positioning Systems.

There is need to identify the utility of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to address the internal threats. Presently, such vehicles are available even in miniaturised versions and intelligent use of these could prove very useful. Land and water capable models of such vehicles are available and there is a need to indentify their employability based on the requirements and also giving due attention towards limitations of such vehicles. All such vehicles actually belong to the “mother technology” called robotic technology. For latest few years significant developments have been achieved in this field. Particularly, the western powers have used these technologies in the Afghanistan and Iraq theatres with some success. Since such technologies are used in the theatres where asymmetric conflicts have been fought it is important to note that such technologies are capable of ensuring minimum collateral damage. Also, such technologies are relevant because they help to limit the damage to the security forces too.

has done some investment in technology to boost its internal security infrastructure but it is not enough. The Indian establishment is not yet able to shed the image of a force fighting the 21st century threats with the several decades old technology. What is important at this point of time is to do wise investments in the field of science and technology to strengthen the overall internal security apparatus. Modern day threats demand availability of knowledge products and innovative technology solutions. Particularly, in regard to the internal security problems it is essential to induct innovative technologies because the threats are mostly asymmetric in nature.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

Robotics During last few years the allied forces have used small robots weighing around 15 kg in the South and West Asian theatre with some success. These machines can perform various roles like perimeter security, checkpoint security and the inspection of suspect vehicles. They could operate in rough terrain conditions and also in sewers and drainpipes to detect danger. They could be configured for reconnaissance and surveillance operations and have explosive identification capability. Systems such as these could play a significant role in the urban warfare environment. Even such robots are available which would sniff out explosives like RDX which remain undetected by existing security equipment.

Non-lethal weapons Few months back the Indian prime minister had articulated the need for the use of non-lethal ways to address the issues related to crowd control. Non-lethal weapons like tear gas, rubber bullets are in use for many years almost globally. In Indian context there is need to grow beyond such non-lethal ways. Various modern techniques involving discharge of light rays, generation of electromagnetic signals, sound waves, etc. need to be factored into modern day doctrines for internal security. Also, techniques have been developed to discharge a jolt of electric current to temporarily immobilise the demonstrator so that he / she could be arrested without causing any physical harm. In order to disturb and irritate the rioters / terrorists bright xenon flashlight and isotropic radiators could be effectively used. Also, modern technologies allow development of few chemicals which could restrict the movement of anti-social elements. Few specially designed laser-based weapons could play a limited role to blind the enemy momentarily. High power low frequency acoustic beam weapons like Infrasound-acoustic beam can cause nausea, vomiting and abdominal pains.

Virtual reality tools Artificial intelligence (AI) is another area in the field of counter-terrorism which has various applications from surveillance to pattern recognition. New techniques are getting developed by using technologies like

Virtual Reality which could help to develop the generation of mock-up patterns of actual battlefield scenario. This technology also could be used to develop simulators for training troops in use of various modern riot control equipment. It has been reported that the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) have developed various weapons to address asymmetric threats. Dense Inert Metal Explosives (DIME) is one of them. This new generation explosive is expected to be a small but extremely powerful weapon that detonates with extreme power. This power gets dissipated over a small range of 5 to 10 metres (16-98 feet). This is useful for pointed targeting and minimises any collateral damage. They have also developed ceramic vests and a particular type of helmets for soldiers’ protection.

Information technology From internal security perspective the technology focus should be developed on two levels. One, the investments in platform technologies like weapons mounted vehicles, UAVs etc. and secondly, the support technologies which could be used for improvising the performance of existing hardware. It is also essential to look for intelligent use of communication technologies like satellite communication and induction of modern software tools to enhance the capability of the fighting forces. Various information technology tools could be used towards bringing in sophistication and speed in various

fighting platforms. It is also important to invest in research and development particularly in the field of sensor technologies from the internal security point of view. Also, there is a need to explore the possibility of developing the special standoff weapons for international security requirements. The possibility of innovations in technologies like nanotechnology, biotechnology, composite materials, etc. needs to be studied for their utility in developing various capacities for the internal security usages. Over the years the requirements for fighting against people disturbing the internal security have changed. The internal security problems are gathering new dimensions of complexities and there is a need to address many of these problems by increasing the technology focus. It is important to note that the advances in technologies dramatically expand the options available for the use of force. The overall process of scientific evolution and marrying the technology for internal security needs is a difficult but ongoing task. The induction of technologies in internal security architecture should always remain a dynamic process. The writer is a research fellow at IDSA, New Delhi. He has done his PhD in International Relations from JNU, New Delhi. His areas of interest include issues related to Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), Non-Military Threats and Strategic Technologies. He has recently authored a book titled ‘Strategic Technologies for the Military’.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

Easy Shelters are

Pawitra

International Pvt. Ltd.

Low-cost and affordable

Maintenance free and economical Portable Durable

Easy to erect

Benefits of Easy Shelters Portable Fire retardant Environment friendly Energy efficient Zero maintenance Insulated Customisable design (size and

looks) Highly durable High impact resistance (>8,000 psi) High structural load capacity enhances the life Can hold up to 5,000 litres water tank on top High wind resistant UV proof Light weight Quick erection time: takes 6-7 hrs only to erect 1,000 sq.ft. and 4-5 hrs to dismantle

Wooden texture

Easy to install in terrains

Easy to install at high altitude

Easy Shelters in a jiffy!

Easy to install at coastal areas

prone to high tides Easy to dismantle

Easy Shelters are maintenance free No painting

No rust

No mildew

No weathering

No rot

No termites

No shingles

No deterioration

No corrosion

20 ft. high Auditorium

PAWITRA INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LIMITED, NEW DELHI, INDIA

Usage of Easy Shelters in Government Departments Disaster relief shelters Aircraft hangers Firemen shelters for forests Communication shelters Defence personnel in coastal areas (radio, mobile Defence personnel in mountains and high communications) Transit camps altitude areas Defence personnel in deserts and terrains Storage for agriculture Barracks for the police and security yield Municipal offices forces Railway disaster mobile rooms Old-age homes Police control rooms Schools in remote areas

Primary health

centres Libraries Guest houses for employees Warehouses Cold homes Trade fair stalls Pilgrimage shelters Milk booths

Standard texture

www.pawitra.com

for all queries contact: ceo@pawitra.com

internal security

MODERNISATION

We are one of the most assaulted nations on the globe but we are the slowest to learn new ways of defending ourselves from foreign inspired insurgencies and internal unrests. More and more the threats are not confined to the periphery and more and more states have become victims of foreign-inspired assaults. This should per se encourage a coordinated approach to internal security. Some moves have been made in that direction after the trauma of the 26/11 attack on Mumbai but we are still far away from networking the national security establishment with the rudimentary infrastructures in the states. There is paramount need for greater coordination between the centre and the states (the natural hesitation over turf notwithstanding) and induction of commonality in the technical means that would make internal security holistic and, hence, cost-effective.

f the four kinds of threats to a nation, Chanakya had classified the internal threat externally abetted as the most serious. Even after 2300 years this remains unchanged. More so, as aided by technology, each facet of internal security has assumed a new avatar, made borders irrelevant and the task of law enforcement agencies complex and difficult. The situation is compounded by India's federal structure and free society. Simply viewed, internal security is a policing issue and hence a state subject. However, most states are unable to tackle it effectively. Further it transcends boundaries leaving much to be desired in respect of coordinated response. The centre therefore has to play a role which in some cases, is resented. Thus only some ‘flat world of technology’ option can help solve the impasse.

Tiered structure Ideally internal security can be ensured by a three-tiered structure. The bottom rung comprises the police

stations which primarily cater for law and order. Thereafter is the state armed police or Central Paramilitary Forces which provide prophylactic and mobile forces. At the top would be the well-trained specialist counterterrorist or special operations units. Against the UN standard of 222 policemen per hundred thousand population, India has only 117. This is even below the sanctioned strength of close to 145 per hundred thousand. Given paucity of numbers and increased commitments, training, quality, coordination and effectiveness leave much to be desired.

with coordinating each of these needs. Its role is limited by it's staffing and budget. An initiative called the Centre for Strategic Initiatives (CSI) was launched by the Department of Science and Technology in the wake of 26/11 with its headquarters at the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore. All major scientific institutions in the country including the IIT's were designated as a part of this initiative which aimed to provide technical support to counterterrorist agencies. However there is little in the public domain as to what has transpired.

Post-26/11 “modernisation”

Little technology backing

This gap too, can be bridged by technology however, modernisation of police forces has not kept up with changing needs. Each state has varied requirements. These range from desert policing, coastal security, mega city management, decentralised forensic units, hook up to a national security network et al. Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D) under the Ministry of Home Affairs is charged

Internal security extends far beyond counter insurgency operations and covers every facet of law enforcement. To coordinate their technology and research needs, the armed forces have the DRDO with its 52 or so laboratories. Some internal security requirements fall within these, but a very large number do not. Further there is very little sharing of information between the DRDO, central and state law

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Aditya Singh

harnessing technology enforcement agencies. Thus, other than the BPR&D, which is limited to the Home Ministry or the CSI, there is no agency to provide technical support for the forces which are actually supposed to ensure internal security. Consequently each state and CPMF largely fend for themselves. Except for a limited number of cases, there are no common standards or testing criteria to go by. Thus vendors and purveyors of specialist equipment have a free run selling wares of dubious quality, poor support backup, unsuitable for Indian conditions and most importantly, not user-friendly. As an example are the video surveillance cameras. They require personnel to maintain

a constant watch; a tiresome and monotonous duty. Without technical assistance to identify abnormalities, most stressed policemen prefer to keep the equipment defective and avoid the tedium of constant surveillance.

Standardisation of equipment Given the seriousness of the internal security challenge there is need to develop and infuse technology as also reduce the gap between possessing capability and its use. A focused and concentrated effort is thus required to convert technical capacity into capability. There is also a call for a

national level body to be created to coordinate all internal security-related technology needs. As it would also cover aspects of law enforcement, its ambit will include aspects within the realm of the DRDO, the departments of space, science and technology, communication, finance, information technology (IT), power, transportation i.e., anything which has security implications. Its tasks could include: ■■ Studies to assess security related technology available in the world and gaps, specially in the fields of low intensity warfare, insurgency and terrorism.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

MODERNISATION

In India today harnessing science and technology for internal security lacks a platform. While there are a host of institutions, coordination between technology providers and users remains a chasm. As a result of this void, security and law enforcement agencies suffer and the full power of technology cannot be put to effective deployment. The OSRT or a similar organisation is an urgent need which begs immediate discussion and follow up ■■ Interaction with states and security agencies to identify needs and guide them with respect to relevant and most suitable technologies. ■■ Lay down standards for equipment, identify testing agencies and sustainable support. ■■ Identify gaps and inter-agency projects to technologies.

organise develop

■■ Organise and promote public-private partnerships (PPP) for economy of numbers as also to ensure some commonality with needs of private security agencies. ■■ Identify and fund development of future technologies. ■■ Function as a coordinating body and develop R&D bases amongst various institutions of the country both, public and private. ■■ Provide a forum for exchange of views specially with respect to low-cost ‘Indian solutions’. ■■ Interact with the UN and other nations with respect to security related technologies. The model for this structure must be carefully considered. It has to be a 21st century, proactive, flexible and result-oriented organisation. This in itself poses a challenge and it is essential that examples in other nations be studied before arriving at a recommendation for India.

Other examples Each nation has its own security needs. The call for coordination

amongst all agencies is however, common. The USA has a Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate under the Department of Homeland Security. The S&T Directorate’s mission is to improve homeland security by providing customers state-of-the-art technology that helps them achieve their missions. S&T customers include the operating components of the department as also state, local, tribal and territorial emergency responders and officials.

IT R&D which launched and fuelled the digital revolution, continues to drive innovation in scientific research, national security, communication and commerce to sustain USA’s technological leadership. The NITRD agencies’ collaborative efforts increase the overall effectiveness and productivity of these Federal R&D investments, leveraging strengths, avoiding duplication and increasing interoperability.

The USA also has the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). These provide for consultation, analysis and policy development regarding S&T related to multiple issues of homeland and national security including the development of medical and non-medical countermeasures against weapons of mass destruction (WMD), domestic nuclear defence, engineered threats and emerging infectious diseases, biological and chemical agent decontamination, international collaborations on homeland security-related S&T and a number of other issues.

EU network

There is also the National Information Technology R&D (NITRD) programme in the USA which provides a framework in which many Federal agencies come together to coordinate their IT networking and R&D efforts. The programme operates under the aegis of the NITRD Subcommittee of the National S&T Council’s (NSTC) Committee on Technology. The Subcommittee made up of representatives from each of NITRD’s 14 member agencies provides overall coordination for all activities. Federal

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

The European Union has a Framework Cooperation for Security and Defence. This aims at systematic synchronisation between R&D investment under the European Defence Agency maximising complementarity of civilian security, space and defence-related research programmes. Other nations have similar organisations to cater for their peculiar needs. By comparison, India is woefully lacking in this regard. Given the urgency, potency and seriousness of threat, setting up such coordination structures is considered essential.

Suggested organisation A review of the requirements reveals that there is a need for coordination of all policing and internal security-related technologies required for the Armed Forces, CPMFs, State police, specialist forces as also civilian security agencies. There is also a call to oversee technological overlap of domains for effective inter-ministerial coordination and outreach. This can only come about if the structure draws

strength from the highest office of the land i.e., the Prime Minister’s. As it has security connotations it emerges that it must come under the National Security Council (NSC) and function as a part of the NSC Secretariat. Perhaps time has now come for appointment of a Deputy National Security Advisor (Technology) under the NSA.

Board with technical arm To ensure effective synergy between ministries and departments there is a need for a high powered Board which in turn is supported by an executive arm. The Board should comprise executive heads of all user agencies as also the data and technology providers. The executive organisation must have representation in all states and union territories. This two tiered structure as a part of the NSC could then serve as the basic coordination agency between users and various technology groups for comprehensive exploitation of available and emerging technologies. It would also provide the mechanism for converting national capability into usable, field-deployable security solutions. For purposes of this article let us assume it as the ‘Organisation for Security-Related Technologies’ (OSRT).

Security, Ministry of Home Affairs. ■■ Representative of police forces or BPR&D.

c) Technology Providers ■■

Representative of ISRO.

Conceptually the OSRT is a networking agency for all security related technologies. It cannot and must not assume the role of research, manufacturing, testing, or support agency. The two tiered structure ensures representation and decision making at one level and execution at the other. The apex Board should be chaired by the NSA or Deputy NSA (Technology) as proposed. It could have the following composition:

■■

Representative of DRDO.

a) Intelligence Agencies

■■ The Board should normally meet once in three months and more often when needed.

■■ Director Generals (DG) RAW, CBI and IB. ■■ Representative of National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO)

b) Users ■■ Armed Forces Representative from the Integrated Defence Staff. ■■

Heads of CPMF.

■■

Additional

Secretary

Internal

■■ Representative of Atomic Energy Commission. ■■

Representative of DST/CSIR.

■■ Two or three eminent Scientists/ Technologists by invitation from institutions of repute.

d) Member Secretary

■■ The Board may approve studies, projects, training, adaptation and deployment of security technologies. ■■ DG ORST will ensure secretarial back up for the Board. ■■ The Board may create overseeing mechanisms for inter-agency projects and seek professional help in managing and monitoring of large projects. Such project management may involve user groups.

The OSRT should develop with time and initially be staffed with minimum numbers to meet the needs of coordination. It could mature after review of benefits. Personnel should comprise a mix of those with security and technical background. Staffing patterns must be flexible and ideally it could comprise functional divisions relating to various fields related to internal security as listed. ■■ Surveillance: All aspects of surveillance i.e., terrestrial, electronic, aerial, satellite, day and night vision devices and monitors. Equipment and ‘payload carriers’ like normal or miniature UAVs with mapping and GPS devices. Some of these needs will be common for border management, tackling crime, terrorism as also conventional operations. ■■ Data Management: Collection, collation, analysis, information security, deductions and evidence, dissemination et al. Population data bank, national identity card system, crime records are some aspects which should form part of this. Search engines for security-related needs or, tracking financial transactions could also form part. ■■ Communications and NWs: To cover all means of communication for both, command and control as also surveillance and information gathering. This will include GSM

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

MODERNISATION

and 3G communication networks, also radio, satellite and terrestrial links. Technology for monitoring, jamming or manipulation of links also need to be considered.

be both broadminded and proactive to ensure outreach and interaction. For effective functioning, bureaucratic systems and approach should be avoided and ideally a ‘flat’ structure created.

■■ Information Warfare: All activity in the cyber domain, both defensive and offensive. It will have an overlap with communication and above mentioned networks. Evidence gathering i.e., identification of systems and tracking, as also encryption and decryption could fall within its ambit.

The ORST will provide a coordination forum for all agencies, information providers and users some of whom are shown below. The organisation must remain flexible with participation from both the public and private sector. The network outreach should include the following:

recent reports in respect of poor quality bullet-proof jackets or night-vision devices should become history. Careful thought must be given to setting up the structure to ensure it does not become a bureaucratic hindrance. Freedom in hiring of staff, system of contractual appointments or outsourcing, as also a flat hierarchy are some measures which could be considered. As clarified earlier, this organisation could develop over time based on experience and feedback.

Users

Data Providers

Technology Providers

Defence forces

Satellite data

DRDO

CPMF

Technical agencies

DST, CSIR

Police forces

Central ministries

Department of Atomic Energy

Central and state intelligence agencies

Institutions, e.g., banks, telecommunications companies etc.

Department of Space

More than

5000 security professionals will be there

SOmE Of Our COnfirmED ExhibiTOrS AT ifSEC SOuTh inDiA:

Security. Lifestyle. Technology.

C : 100 / M: 0 / Y:0 / K:0 C : 0 / M: 20 / Y:100 / K:0

Private security agencies ■■ Weapons and Incapacitation: Lethal and non-lethal weapons as also individual and mass incapacitation agents. Some of these would be outside the conventional domain and will include PGMs to avoid collateral damage. ■■ Protection: Physical and electronic protection to include NBC agents. Body armour, jam-proof communications, eye protectors, etc. Equipment for disposal of IEDs or bombs would form part of this. ■■ Life Sciences, Forensics and Psychological: The study of living organisms, behaviour patterns, individual identification and tracking. Mobile forensics for speedy results. The technological domain is thus vast and is bound to demand flexibility in structures. As the Chief Executive, DG ORST will be responsible for implementation. He or she should be a leading security technologist with accomplishments in the field of innovative coordination. The term could be for at least three years under the NSA or Deputy NSA (Technology). The DG would have a multifaceted role of an operational scientist and should

Academic institutions Adaptation of security technologies must be considered in a holistic manner. The ORST does not take away the mandate of existing bodies, but would, based on user needs, analyse technology for various kinds of security requirements and try and bridge the gap. It would coordinate developments and deployment such as multi-agency programmes for space based navigation and surveillance systems. Similarly it could provide for non-lethal chemical weapons of larger reach, laser dazzlers, sound deafeners, radio / mobile jammers or other such requirements for specialist operations.

Covert operations

Private sector In India today harnessing science and technology for internal security lacks a platform. While there are a host of institutions, coordination between technology providers and users remains a chasm. As a result of this void, security and law enforcement agencies suffer and the full power of technology cannot be put to effective deployment. The OSRT or a similar organisation is an urgent need which begs immediate discussion and follow up. Only then can technology for internal security be deployed across the board. Other nations which are less affected, have moved far ahead. Time is therefore long past in this regard.

Can your company afford to Miss out? Book your stand now!

Export Import World Hardware Sanitary Construction World

Tender World Tender World Newspaper Group

Some aspects of OSRT may remain in the covert domain. However, most of the technology development and assessment will involve highest level of technical reviews, open discussion and user involvement. States or union territories must be linked with effective wings located in each capital. Dissemination and sharing of information in respect of technologies, standards, testing criteria, sources of supply, user feedbacks would ensure that any agency requiring information is not reinventing the wheel. The

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

Tender World Newspaper Group

Auto Flash Chemical & Pharma World

The writer retired on 30 September 2007 as GOC-in-C, Southern Command, the largest and senior-most Command of the Indian Army. Prior to this he had been C-in-C, Andaman & Nicobar Command from January 2005 in the aftermath of the Earthquake and Tsunami of 26 December 2004. In this capacity he was also the Vice Chairman and Operational Head of the Integrated Relief Command responsible for the emergency relief and rehabilitation of the ravaged Islands. He now devotes time to strategic and national security issues, looking after educational establishments and building institutions.

Tender World Newspaper Group

Contact: Mr. Nigel Luke Brown, Project Director, T: +91 11 23765554, E: nigel.brown@ubm.com media Partners:

Supported by

Safety & Security World Tender World Newspaper Group

Organised by

Plastic For You Tender World Newspaper Group

www.ifsecsouthindia.com

internal security

NEW CHALLENGES

In an age of Wikileaks and Balkanisation, cohesive nation-States like India can become victims of an, as yet, not clearly understood information warfare. Where nation-States are already under siege by neighbours with religious and geopolitical agendas the need to prevent internal dichotomies from imploding under foreign tutelage needs to be guarded against. Internal insecurity is fast becoming the low-cost option for those who see greater profit in it than direct military conflict. India has hitherto managed to withstand such assaults on its integrity by the strength of its Constitutional institutions but even they are beginning to erode and it is time that national debates identify the problems and seek viable solutions.

n emergent nation like ours, seeking to become strong and self reliant, faces external, internal and externally stimulated internal pressures / threats / subversion and intervention. Every newly emerged nation faced this type of pressure. This was so in the United States after their war of Independence, France after their revolution, USSR in 1917 and Japan in the forties. External pressures on the polity will be directly proportional to our accretion of strength: witness Pokhran 1974, Rohini 1981, cryogenic engine 1992 and pressures being mounted to seek our signatures on infamous Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The threats posed today to our polity are multi-dimensional and multi-faceted in the form of not only aid instruments, but cultural and information domination too. These will continue in the years 2020 and beyond.

Irritants The situation in Kashmir and the north-eastern states, where subversion and insurgency, though contained, will continue causing serious concern. This is because of their geographic location and composition of their population which continue seeking inspiration from abroad and slack policies of the government towards them. Naxalite movement will flare up further: its fast spread during the last 10 years does give a clear indication of existence of divisive forces which can pose a problem to our

national integration. Situation in the Gurkha inhabited areas of West Bengal and some other areas bordering Nepal, though quiet, has potential to resurface on account of spilling effects of Nepalâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s internal situation and ever readiness of our northern adversary to exploit disgruntled elements in those areas. The discovery of hidden weapons by international gun runners in the Andamans has added fresh concerns to the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s already delicate internal security environment and the security of our island territories.

No clear-cut policy Absence of a clear and specific directive by the centre to solve these problems is the single most important reason for Kashmir and north-eastern states simmering for so long. There is no written directive to the security forces what they are supposed to do and achieve in the absence of which there is no planned strategy to deal with these problems. Firmness by police and administration in maintaining law and order, action against background supporters of the militant organisations, isolation of militants by maintaining regular contact with the people by political leaders, sustained psychological operations by using all forms of media and denial of media support to the militants, strict control on flow of state resources reaching the terrorists and of course, firm dealing against external forces aiding and sheltering the terrorists are some

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) O. P. Kaushik

of the measures which need to be taken in dealing with such situations. Nevertheless, the political culture which has developed in the country during the last two decades and exploitation of population for the vote bank interests will not allow any party, whichever may be in power, to adopt these measures. I also feel that by the year 2020 misuse of religious places for political ends will increase and so will be the intervention of courts in military operations thereby weakening the resolve of security forces to tackle these problems.

Migrant problems Illegal migration of nearly five lakh Bangladeshis into India every month has started eating into our vitals. These illegal migrants have already spread large scale destruction and destabilisation in Tripura, Assam and West Bengal. Other north-eastern states are also getting rapidly enveloped by this human locust. Delhi, Kolkata and Mumbai have suffered serious and rampant cases of arson, loot, killings, extortions and bomb blasts where Bangladeshi migrants were involved. It is estimated that three crore of them are already settled in India. This figure by the year 2020 will go up to five crore. Politicians in India have provided patronage to these illegal immigrants which has enabled the latter to acquire land, ration cards and citizenship thereby creating a threat to our national security. Conditions in Bangladesh are

national stability and integration likely to further deteriorate. Islamic fundamentalism and influence of China and Pakistanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s ISI will gain more health and strength in Bangladesh which will result in acceleration of illegal migration from that country to India. A similar problem could arise in the

south from spillover of Tamils from Sri Lanka. They are under serious pressure from Sri Lanka security forces and with the resolve of Sri Lanka government not to give any concessions to the Tamilians which they had promised before

undertaking all out military operations against the LTTE resulting in total liquidation of Tamil military from Sri Lanka. Tamil militants have no other place to go except towards the 55 million Tamils in India with whom they have blood and family relations.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

NEW CHALLENGES

Concrete measures Strict vigil on our frontiers, screening of population in the border areas on regular basis, involvement of local bodies in identifying the illegal immigrants, deportation of all those who are already settled and, as an immediate measure, cancellation of ration cards, deletion of their names from the electoral rolls and prevention of thefts of electricity, deterrent punishment to local collaborators, who assist and harbour such migrants, issue of identify cards to people inhabiting border areas at the earliest and taking help of voluntary organisations in identifying and sending back all those who have entered our country in an unauthorised manner may help in controlling this menace.

Subversion Internal subversion by more powerful nations, who are not very friendly towards us, could cause a big internal challenge to us. War is no longer a viable instrument of policy since gains from it are not consonant with the cost. But internal subversion is. Hence, threat is due to internal subversion by foreign powers. The USSR was disintegrated by the use of such methods by western powers. There are speculations that India could be a target State for such activities as she is viewed as a future competitor in economic, political and military fields. We have had cases of money and weapons coming to political parties, secessionist organisations in the north-east from abroad and covert operations by Pakistan against our country in the form of help and inspirations to the militant organisations in India. Regular devaluation of our currency, mounting foreign debts where 40 per cent of the yearly revenue is required to repay only the interest on borrowings, crushing blow to our industry because of free access to foreign manufactured goods and deliberate onslaught on our centuries-old cultural values by foreign telecasts corrupting the nation’s political leadership thereby creating a lack of faith in them by the masses are some of the ways of diminishing our cohesiveness.

Panacea The nation at large and government machinery in particular have to guard

against this threat. Strict check on flow of money from abroad and on the economy are required. Immediate measures must be taken to control foreign debts and tendency to borrow money on slightest pretext should be curbed statutorily. We have enough money internally as was proved by Voluntary Disclosure of Income Scheme adopted in the past as also the Indian money stashed in foreign banks and keeping in view that every Indian saves nearly 24 per cent of his income. This needs to be harnessed. Constant checks on secessionist organisations and concerted efforts to liquidate terrorists who have foreign connections must be undertaken on priority. Checks must be imposed on foreign television networks and more active and constructive use be made of our media to consolidate our strengths and values. Prasar Bharti must hurry up and get consolidated lest it be too late for it to serve any national purpose.

Caste / sectarian virus Sporadic surfacing of communal, caste and sectarian virus seriously affects national harmony and integration. The nation stands divided on account of casteism as is evident from the selection of candidates by all parties during the elections. The politics of governments during last few years, where in addition to SC / ST, OBCs were offered upto 27 per cent reservations in jobs and educational institutions was not to the benefit of the ostensible beneficiaries but was purely political. Reservation has been exploited for electoral benefits by the political parties at the cost of national stability and integration. This has resulted in caste and religion being exploited by anti-national elements and consistent efforts to revive caste factor, motivated by reservation benefits, have seriously affected the social harmony. Our politicians have shown tendencies to sacrifice greater national interests for short term partisan gains. This rot is dangerous and is further spreading. Politics of reservation has already divided the country and if not checked now it will spread resulting in disintegration of the country. We will have to bring a constitutional provision which shall make economic criteria, both in incomes and occupation of parents, as the sole criteria for reservation. At the

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

same time coaching inputs to upgrade the intellectual levels of meritorious children from the poor strata of society will be highly beneficial to them as well as the nation. We must not allow division of the country on the basis of caste, creed, sects and communities. Erosion of national cohesiveness due to reservation policy needs national attention. This social weakness alone can be exploited by subversive forces operating against our country.

anti-national elements and external powers are also trying to create a negative mise-en-scene. Likely disintegration of India in fifty or sixty smaller states is being loosely mentioned. This is on account of lack of national spirit coupled with turbulent law and order situation and ineffectiveness of administration and policy to control the situation. If powerful USSR could be disintegrated into 15 independent States, a less powerful India needs to be very very vigilant in this regard.

Rampant corruption Corruption in high and low places has eroded the moral values and the very texture of our culture. Political corruption has reinforced the petty organised corruption of low paid bureaucrats and cemented organised corruption even to the extent of selling the nation’s security. We have been adjudged as the 7th most corrupt nation in the world. The political patronage of anti-national elements, as exposed recently, has left the common man helpless and vulnerable. Nexus between the corrupt politicians, bureaucrats and the anti-social elements is the real potent threat to our polity as our leaders and senior bureaucrats who are involved in evolving policies and their implementation are getting subverted by anti-social elements. Criminals have become political leaders which has resulted in lesser respect for the law. History provides naked examples of the fact that corrupt leaders sell their nations and corrupt bureaucrats compromise national security.

Code of conduct A statutory code of conduct for all ministers, legislators and persons occupying any position of power or authority should be drawn up and closely monitored by the judicial authorities. Similarly political parties should be bound by a statute to have a code of ethics. Appointment of ‘Lokpals’ at the centre and states with enough powers for timely, vigorous and ruthless measures to curb corruption in high places, must be implemented. There is a need to inject Gandhian philosophy in the training capsule and code of conduct of our leaders. Stress on simple living will prevent corruption. Family disgrace should be the punishment for the corrupt instead of replacing them by their wives and sons who would have enjoyed the benefits of

corruption. Citizens’ Communities, as watchdogs, to expose corrupt officials should be appointed. Press and other media agencies must also focus their attention on this issue.

Police reforms Law and order is integral to most societies and once shattered must be re-established at the earliest. Because of declining law and order in our country, people have started losing faith in the polity. It is only the police who can bring in proper law and order since it is their first fundamental duty. Attitude to ‘run away’ from the responsibilities is pervading the police organisations. Rather than doing their job they tend to generate new instrumentalities and create new police organisations to deal with crimes. It is an irony of fate that police today numbers one-and-a-half million and is roughly one-and-a-half times the size of the army and yet they depend so much on the army to carry out their first duty. I think culture of doing the job must get permeated in our police force. Reform of police, in terms of better leadership, better equipment, more intensive training, better conditions of service for the policemen and reduced political interference, need to be undertaken immediately. Cleaning of the police organisation, to get rid of those who are involved with anti-social elements is also needed. In order to increase the accountability of police, citizen committees in urban areas and panchayats in rural areas should act as watchdogs on the performance of police. Maximum suffering of the society, today is on account of inefficient, complacent, corrupt and

compromising police force. Rot that has set in the police organisations has to be cleaned and it will take, at least, a decade to do so.

Seeds of discontent Growing aspirations of the people for economic uplift and betterment vis-a-vis inadequate resources available for the same are causing frustration and discontentment among those who feel that they have been left behind. There has certainly been lack of rural development. Even for urban development some states have been favoured continuously and within the states some areas have received most favoured attention. Lack of development is one of the prime causes for fissiparous tendencies prevailing in the north-east, Jharkhand, PWG-influenced areas of Andhra Pradesh, Vidarbha of Maharashtra and some other border areas of the country. Political equality among states, which we achieved, may get blown up due to economic inequality. Eradication of regional disparities in development must be accorded high priority by the government to control and contain the divisive tendencies which have started becoming visible in under-developed areas of the country.

Balkanisation Fragmentation phenomenon in the international sphere, where there are 87 small, mini and micro States, creates an idea in the states of India as to why they cannot be an independent sovereign State and this is specially so in bordering states. Some

At the heart of this problem lies the need to strengthen the unity of our people. Divisive forces, exploiting religion, languages etc., are basically exploiting poverty and ignorance. To curb these forces wide dissemination of the teachings of the common, shared values of all great religions, their fundamental unity, is necessary. The teaching of history giving the secular viewpoint and not the distorted communal interpretation of the Oxbridge historians, will also help. We have to build national spirit and pride based on a composite culture the operative principle of which shall be dignity of the individual and unity of the nation. The value system of our seventhousand-years-old civilised society, which is getting eroded due to material outlook and attack by foreign television programmes, has to be restored. The value system represents the moral core or the inner strength of a society and a nation. The moral values of our nation are derived from Ashoka’s edicts and symbolised in the Dharma Chakra of the Ashoka emblem. In present day context, it beckons us to higher level of public conduct and to devote ourselves to the common good. The government success towards national integration will depend in making the masses aware of their fundamental duties as enumerated in the Constitution. Basic aim of the government should not be survival but national integration. Internally insecure nations cannot develop. Nor can they take sustained decisions. Hence, climate of secured internal environment is needed for all-round development of the nation-State and to provide that is first obligation of any government. The writer was General Officer Commanding in Kashmir Valley and Chief of Staff of the Eastern Command.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

NANO SCI-TECH

To say that with nanotechnology we are entering a whole new world would be only half the truth. Carbon is the basic building block since creation of the universe. It is only now that nations have realised its larger potential in fashioning defensive shields against chemical, biological and radiation attacks and offensive weapons more lethal because of being lighter hence faster with greater kinetic force. Nanotechnology is the science of the arrangement of molecules and because carbon has intrinsic characteristics of strength and lightness it is being chosen for military applications. If the sword of Tipu Sultan was fashioned with this technology it is, like the “lost wax” method of metallurgy of old, only being rediscovered and put to modern-day applications with very impressive results.

Shield of the future?

Kshitij Aditeya Singh

he knowledge of nanoscience and technology in society has been observed since ancient time. The Lycurgus Cup from Roman times (about 4th century AD) contained gold nanoparticles. It changed colour from green to red when light passed through due to the optical properties of gold. The use of Carbon Nanotubes (CNT) in Wootz Steel for the Tipu Sultan sword (17th century AD) has been scientifically validated. The metallurgical technique later spread to sword making in Persia and became widely known as Damascus steel. “There is plenty of room at the bottom,” was the observation of Dr. Richard Feynman, eminent physicist in his lecture of 1959, about manipulation of atoms and molecules. With his lecture Feynman has gently nudged the beginning of modern era enquiry into the field of nanoscience and technology. Eric Drexler subsequently conceptualised the self replicating factories in his book Engines of Creation which provide further thrust to the imagination of researchers.

Novel properties and uses The collective understanding and the body of knowledge about changes in properties and the benefits it has for wide ranging application took an exponential leap in the 1980s with the advent of analytical tools such as Scanning, Tunnelling, Microscopy and Atomic Force Microscopy. The discovery and development of nanomaterials such as fullerenes (hollow spherical cage of carbon atoms), carbon nanotubes (rolled sheet of carbon atoms) and graphene (planar sheet of carbon atoms) have propelled very rapidly over the last two decades. A vast number of other nanomaterials are being investigated for novel properties and applications. ‘Nano’ is derived from the Greek word ‘dwarf’ and represents a scale which is one billionth of a metre. Scientifically, nanoscience and technology has been defined as the understanding and manipulation of materials, structures, processes and devices between a scale of 1 – 100 nanometre (nm). Nanomaterials can have one, two or three dimensions either internal or external in the nanoscale range. As the dimension of the materials changes from sub-micron to the nanoscale, matter starts to behave differently due to quantum effects, significantly higher surface area and dramatic changes in properties of materials are observed. Nanomaterials have enhanced physical, chemical, optical, electronic and structural properties to the same material in the bulk state. Gold for example on the nanoscale acts as a catalyst as opposed to being inert.

Wide application Nanoscience and technology being the convergence of knowledge principles derived from physics, chemistry, biology, engineering, material and medical sciences has a very wide domain of applications. These applications range from structural components, diagnostics devices, drug delivery vehicles, energy generation and transmission, sensing, processing and transmission of information, mobility, communication and environmental. Nanoscience and technology has the potential to create a revolution for humanity addressing the pitfalls of prior technology curves.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

CNT is an example of wonder nanomaterial with one of the most extensive applications. CNT are rolled up sheets of graphene with diameter ranging from a few nm to tens of nm and can be produced by different methods. They come in various forms as single, double or multi walled CNT, each with a differing set of properties. CNT offer phenomenal physical, chemical, optical, electronic, thermal and mechanical properties. CNT have one of the highest tensile strength and Youngs modulus known making it excellent for reinforcing and high integrity applications. It is capable of conducting electrons at ballistic speed dramatically changing the way information is used. The nanomaterial has the ability to be used as a delivery vehicle for drugs to specific targets within the body. It can act as a conductor of heat in integrated circuits, as electrode material in fuel cells and as semiconductor in solar cells. The toxicity of the material is yet not completely understood and is undergoing extensive research.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

NANO SCI-TECH

India announced in 2007 the intention to set up a Nano Mission with an investment of Rs. 1,000 crore over 5 years. At the end of 2010, DRDO announced setting up nanofoundries across the institutions in India with an investment of Rs. 500 crore. The theme of R&D being nano and the battlefield. The research would focus on the use of nanocomposites for making lighter and stronger air frames for Tejas aircraft. The use of nanomaterials for propulsion of missiles, CNT sensors for CBRNE, fuel cell development, nano-based computing are some of the research themes to be followed in the programme Defence and security uses The structures and devices fabricated from nanomaterials have potential for dual use in security and defence. Research and Development (R&D) is being widely conducted across the world with USA and China leading the effort. These are followed in order of publications by Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom, South Korea, Italy, India and Spain. In many cases applications are being prototyped or field tested before moving into niche or mass deployment.

CBR threat detectors Detection of threat agents at the borders and civilian zones is a significant preventive action in minimising damage and loss of life. Threat agents such as chemical, biological, radiological-nuclear devices and explosive devices can be detected at varying distances from land, sea and air. The table below represents some of the methodologies used in detection. Whilst the technology has not advanced as far yet to integrate the detection methodologies into one platform, expert groups are clustering chemical, biological and explosive threat agents into one and radiological-nuclear as another.

Systems integration, accuracy, reliability of detection and reproducibility of measurements are challenges to be addressed. Applications such as Sensor Networks are being developed which would create a ubiquitous grid for acquiring decision making information from conflict zones, coastal and border area networks and civilian zones. Such sensor network and devices associated with them would actively monitor the conditions of zones affecting the internal and external security of the nation. R&D is being conducted in nanotechnology specific to sensory nodes which sense specific parameters, process and store information, communicate with and transfer data to command post and provide continuous power supply.

Transistor storage CNT based transistor development has been observed for high processing capabilities. R&D in CNT and Nanowires are expected to enhance communication and data transfer of sensory nodes. Nanotubes based antenna would change wireless information communication standards. Advances in storage have

been observed in IBM’s millipede technology, carbon nanotubes based NRAM, molecular memory, ferroelectric RAM, magnetic RAM and phase change bridge RAM. These are expected to provide tremendous storage capacity for each sensory node. Research in CNT based supercapacitors, energy harvesting through solar cells made of CNT, quantum dots and polycrystalline thin films are being considered as sources of energy. Visionary developments of harnessing energy through mechanical vibrations using cantilevers and nanowire are also underway. Expert validation has confirmed the importance of global and local trend monitoring and pattern recognition for security and defence applications. Sensor networks have applications in both passive monitoring of zones and in active conflict situation where each member of the security and defence force becomes a sensory node.

Protective materials Security, defence and stability restoration forces have critical roles to play during and after a conflict. Protective gear thus forms a critical part of ensuring the effectiveness of the force. Developments and progress

Table 1 – Methodologies for threat agent detection Sensing Methods

Threat Agent Chemical

Electronic noses, conductive polymers, field effect transistors, piezoelectric sensors, surface acoustic wave sensors, flexural plate wave sensors, sensor arrays, optical fibres, cantilever mechanism, chemiresistive action, chemicapacitive sensing and spectroscopic methods.

Explosive

Electrochemical sensing, mass based detection, optical sensing, biosensors, terahertz detection, photoluminescence, cataluminescence, nanosensors and nanowires.

Biological

Molecular recognition, self assembled bilayers, biosensors, metallic nanowires, terahertz waves.

Radioisotopes

Sensor networks, radiation portal monitoring equipment, cantilever based detection, mass spectrometry, nuclear resonance fluorescence, electronic neutron dosimeter and neutron imaging camera.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

in nanotechnology have encompassed protective gear and equipment. The protective function rendered by nanomaterials acts as a shield against CBRNE species, ballistic projectiles, sharp objects and electromagnetic interference. Nanoparticles, nanocomposite membranes and nanofibres of polymers provide enhanced functionality against CBRNE agents. Multilayer polymer thin films impregnated within protective gear are known to neutralise chemical and biological agents. Nanocomposites as body armour have very promising role as protective materials. Multiwalled CNTs provide excellent damping against projectile impact. They are suitable for extremely light weight and high durability bullet proof vests. Protection of critical infrastructure and technical equipment is of utmost importance in ensuring continuity of operations and order. Assets such as communication and information processing network infrastructure is increasingly playing a critical role in command and control of operational forces. Ballistic impact, shock waves and electromagnetic interference (EMI) have the potential to render critical infrastructure redundant. Nanotechnology based systems have the potential to counterbalance such attacks. The use of metal foams, ceramic composites, vertically aligned CNTs, inorganic fullerenes have

been observed to provide excellent mechanical and shock resistance against ballistic impact. Nanocomposites have also been validated for use as protective materials against fire. Research developments and advances have been observed in the use of polymer nanocomposites, nanoclays, carbon nanofibres, CNT, metal nanoparticles and a range of other nanomaterials in providing effective EMI shielding. Identity, information and communication authentication are important dimensions in the security and defence domain. Intercepted and violated communication and identity can wreck havoc on operational readiness and execution of critical missions. Research advances in polymer nanocomposites are expected to integrate biometric features, visual and signatures for identity verification. R&D in quantum dot based composites, bar codes and optical nanofibres are also expected to increase levels in security labelling. Successful field trials of quantum cryptography have been demonstrated in transfer of critical information over 100 km distances.

Neutralising radiation Developments and progress in nanotechnology have also been made in support functions such as neutralising CBRNE effects, decontamination of vital utility such

as water supply, rendering medical aid and performing forensic analysis. The use of prophylactic antidotes, vaccines, sera and nanomedicines developments have been observed for neutralising chemical and biological weapons impact. Nanoparticle based antidotes and nano enabled diagnostic methods such as molecular imaging, biosensors and lab-on-a-chip are being intensively researched. Radiological and nuclear effect neutralisation has been observed using super adsorbent polymer gels, magnetic sorbent, zircon and silicotitanate. Decontamination of environment specially air and water are of critical importance in zones affected by conflicts. Nanomaterials such as photo catalytic titanium dioxide for air, nanoparticles, nanocrystalline zeolites, silica xerogels for toxic gases, keratin fibres for heavy metals, nanomembranes for particulates in liquid and spores in air, nanoceramics for mercury and nanocrystalline silver for water filtration are examples of decontamination applications being actively developed.

Medical applications Advances in removal of toxins from blood stream using biodegradable nanospheres, nanofibre barriers for stopping bleeding, bone and dental implant of nanostructured titanium, regeneration of neurons using CNTs, nanofibres in tissue engineering,

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

NANO SCI-TECH

nanofibrous membranes for wound dressing are some example of applications being developed. Optical, physical and chemical techniques using nanomaterials such as quantum dots, nanocomposites, nanoparticles of metal have been reported in forensic analysis. The use of microscopy, spectroscopic methods, lab-on-a-chip and DNA biosensors play an active part in forensic studies.

International projects Public financial investment in developing nanoscience and technology capability has been observed across the world. The research and development effort was significantly empowered with the announcement of the National Nanotechnology Initiative in 2001. US has through industry, federal, state and local governments committed spending of US$ 2 billion per annum. Subsequently, other G7 nations made large public funding commitment to understand the field in greater depth. The European Union is one of the largest public investors in this field with multi billion Euros. Visualising the potential for disruptive innovation changes, Scientific and Technological programmes have been initiated in developing countries group of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) nations as well early in the last decade. Applications from research conducted at universities and national institutions have been permeating very slowly into mass use. It is envisaged that products and devices worth multi-trillion dollars will be impacted, even as it remains a topic of considerable debate. Synergy of these publicly funded programmes have been associated with security and defence establishment to understand, research and develop advanced nanomaterials, devices, structures, components and systems directed towards conflict situations. The combined spending in defence has been in the range of US$ 1.4 trillion though it is expected to change with the continuing financial strain.

US US Department of Defense was one of the first to commit funding for Defense related applications of nanotechnology largely managed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects

Agency. The focus of R&D remains fundamental processes, nanomaterials, nanoscale devices and systems, instrumentation, metrology, standards, nanomanufacturing, research and instrumentation acquisition. This would be directed towards enhancing capabilities of war fighters and battlefield systems. The key themes of focus for the US effort are in energetic materials, nanoelectromechanical systems, catalysis, sensors, thermoelectrics, thermionics, and photovoltaics. US has set up one of the flagship centres called the Institute for Soldiers Nanotechnologies.

China

India announced in 2007 the intention to set up a Nano Mission with an investment of Rs. 1,000 crore over 5 years. At the end of 2010, DRDO announced setting up nanofoundries across the institutions in India with an investment of Rs. 500 crore. The theme of R&D being nano and the battlefield. The research would focus on the use of nanocomposites for making lighter and stronger air frames for Tejas aircraft. The use of nanomaterials for propulsion of missiles, CNT sensors for CBRNE, fuel cell development, nano-based computing are some of the research themes to be followed in the programme. These would largely be focused on institutional divisions related to structural, electronics and photonics; actuators, sensors and displays; CBRNE and toxicology; stealth and camouflage; energy; characterisation and modelling.

The changing global scenario in a multipolar world led EU to announce a large framework of funding grant for the security theme with an investment of € 1.4 billion. There is synergy with the nanoscience, materials and processing theme with an investment of € 3.4 billion. European Defence Agency in 2008 announced a Joint Investment Programme to focus on emerging technology such as nanomaterials and structures, remote detection and health monitoring. Some of the key themes being followed are clustered as integrated navigational architecture, nanotechnology applications for ergonomic equipment for soldiers and remote detection of threat agents. Member-States in Europe are also individually investing in programmes. UK Ministry of Defence is conducting it’s work through Defence Evaluation and Research Agency. Other active national programmes are run by the Swedish Defence Research Agency (€ 11 million over 5 years) and the French Military programme known as FELIN for military applications of nanotechnology.

Russia Russia has over the last years also initiated an active R&D programme in nanotechnology and has pledged about US$ 10 billion spending over a mid term period. Russia Nanotechnology Corporation is focused on commercialising application and is funding projects. Russia is committed to conducting R&D for combating CBRNE terrorism through nanotechnology applications. It also intends to leverage its scientific base for armament research.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

China is one the most proactive nations in propagating nanotechnology programmes. It went from no output in 2003 to being second to US within 5 years. The Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for Defence and Chinese Academy of Science are active stakeholders. Israel, Japan, South Korea and Australia are some of countries actively conducting nanotechnology specific R&D for security and defence.

Indian project

Some specific areas of research include photochromic materials for camouflage. Naval application research in decontamination, antifouling, drag reduction and proton exchange membrane fuel cell development. Sensor development would focus on gas and chemical warfare detection. Missile research would be focused on nanomaterials for solid and liquid propellant as well as air frame strength. Soldier specific R&D would focus on sensors in clothing, protective helmet, communication and health monitoring. DRDO also plans to undertake nanomedicine research in diagnostic, sensing, imaging and drug delivery. Synthesis and characterisation of a wide range of nanomaterials would form the bedrock of the Defence programme. The consortium based approach of institutions in setting up the nanofoundry and conducting the

R&D programme will have a lasting impact on the defence and security industrial complex of India.

Strategy and policy The strategic integration of systems enabled by nanotechnology will play an important role for the forces in the 21st century. Nanomaterials and devices fabricated at the same scale have the ability to enable and enhance the capabilities of the defence and security forces. The enhancements are largely categorised as existing, advanced or new. The capabilities enhancement with nanotechnology would take place through integration of embedded devices and structures which would be further integrated into system of system. The capability enhancements are considered in a number of functional groups such as detection, identification and authentication of threat agents; situational awareness and assessment including surveillance of borders, conflict and civilian zones; risk assessment, modelling and impact reduction of a conflict and its scale; positioning and localisation of critical assets and infrastructure; command and control of forces both defensive and offensive; intervention to end conflict; doctrine and operations; incident response to crisis and emergency event;

information management between the lines of defence; communication infrastructure and protocols; training exercise. Technological deployment would witness its direct impact on both internal and external security of India. The functional capabilities oriented towards missions could change the course of a conflict by providing decisive edge. These deployments would add tremendous advantage in military conflict, border protection, fighting insurgency, terrorism, organised crime, protection of critical infrastructure and restoring stability after crisis events. It is thus of paramount importance that policy and strategy associated with defence and security industrial complex and fighting forces must be appropriately aligned. Well-defined paradigms would deliver maximum effectiveness for network centric, effect centric and asymmetric warfare.

Challenges along the way The field of nanoscience and technology is promising and hopes to create disruptive innovation along the technology curve. It is certain to have a tremendous impact on the security and defence establishment. In the age of uncertainity and conflict, superiority in defence is a lasting deterrent against aggression and a stabilising

factor for society. There are many challenges along the way to be overcome before the technology can provide its envisaged benefits. The range of challenges runs across disciplines from technology development and transfer, lean production methodology adoption, integration practice, ensuring financial investment and provisioning, appropriate regulatory framework and compliance, resolving intellectual property disputes, creating visionary policy, sustained human resource development and continual improvements in the security and defence establishment. The nation which deals with all of these in master strokes will undoubtedly become the undisputed security and defence champion of the globe. The changing dynamics of global and regional balance have positioned India favourably to lead the way. It remains to be seen whether Bharat would embrace and stand up to its potential as a powerful State. The writer is an Independent Consultant for emerging technology applications with a focus on security and defence. He has worked in an Observatory for Nanotechnology providing policy and strategy support to the European Parliament as a domain specialist for security. He is an alumnus of Universities of Cambridge and Sheffield.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

HIGH-TECH

We must now pick out the nuggets from our vast experience in counter-insurgency and counter-terror operations in the north-east, in Jammu and Kashmir and now, unfortunately, from the devastating events in the Maoist heartland to set qualitative requirements for weapons and accessories that will turn a manpower-intensive paradigm into a more one-to-one confrontation. Wars have always held unpleasant surprises for contending forces and India in particular needs to be able to handle a combined conventional war / low intensity conflict as a matter of course because India’s enemies are increasingly using unconventional warfare to undercut our known conventional strengths.

rmies generally prepare for wars they would ‘like’ to fight rather than the wars they may actually ‘have to fight’. The US army thus would rather like to prepare for conventional wars with peer group armies like those of Russia or China. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, however, has exhorted them to focus more on the ongoing Low Intensity Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and win them first. The Indian army similarly would like to focus its training, doctrines and armament patterns on fighting conventional wars with China and Pakistan. However, the bulk of the time, it is far more likely to be engaged in Low Intensity Conflicts like the insurgencies in the north-east and jihadi terrorism in J&K. The Maoist insurgency in the Indian heartland is now assuming menacing proportions. The Indian army is understandably not keen to get involved as it will draw it far away from the borders it is tasked to defend and adversely affect its mobilisation timings in case of war. However, if the police and Central Police Organisations do not prove equal to the task – the nation may well have no choice but to employ the army for this tribal insurgency in dense jungle terrain. There is another school of thought which feels that the Chinese threat has become greatly enhanced with the development of rail-road infrastructure in Tibet. China can now induct up

to 30 Divisions in just one campaign season. At a conservative estimate we would need up to four to six additional divisions for the Chinese front. We could raise them now itself – blood them against the Maoists initially and then utilise them for contingencies against China or Pakistan or both as and when these situations arise. Low Intensity Conflict will therefore remain a major preoccupation with our army for the bulk of the time. Combat experience gained in such operations is invaluable for honing basic tactical skills for any army. It ensures that the junior leadership is blooded in live operations and can subsequently mature with greater ease into Senior Combat Commanders.

Enhanced awareness There is an urgent need to upgrade the technologies we use for countering insurgencies in deep jungle terrain or terrorist movements in difficult mountainous terrain. The first need is of enhancing situational awareness. The Americans have used Armed Predator UAVs to fairly good effect in Afghanistan for such operations. We need to invest in four classes of UAVs: ■■ The Predator / Reaper Class: These armed UAVs should be capable of attacking targets with rockets and missiles and have very high levels of endurance. An MQ9 Reaper UAV of the USA can identify the heat signature

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

countering low intensity conflicts

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Dr. G. D. Bakshi

from a human body at 10,000 ft. These class of UAVs should be available at the Army, Field Army and Corps level for high priority command and control targets and missions of strategic value. ■■ The Heron / Searcher / Nishant Class: These should be fielded at the Divisional and Brigade level for surveillance operations and target acquisition tasks. ■■ Hand Launched UAVs: These hand launched UAVs of the Rover class should be available at the level of each Infantry battalion for supporting its operations and enhancing local situational awareness. These are useful for convoy protection tasks as well as for acquiring targets for ground based operations. ■■ Micro UAVs: These should be around 100-300 gms in weight and have an endurance of up to an hour. These should be available at the Company level for a beyond-the-next-hill surveillance capability that would be invaluable for counter-insurgency / counter-terrorism operations at the sub-tactical level.

Enhanced image resolution The key aspect is that our current UAVs are all optimised for regular conventional operations. They can pick up tanks / trucks and vehicles but currently cannot distinguish

between armed / unarmed civilians. This is a critical requirement for CI / CT operations. Searcher UAVs were employed in J&K and these could pick up presence of humans in remote mountains / villages. However it was difficult to distinguish if they were armed. This calls for great enhancement in the image resolution capabilities of our sensor packages. These also have to be made far smaller and lighter

so that they can be fitted even on the micro class of UAVs. Nano-technology could help minimise the weight of these sensor payloads.

Foliage penetration Another essential feature for customising our UAVs for CI / CT operations in dense jungle terrain would be to factor in the ability to see

through dense foliage and even at night / bad weather conditions. This may call for infra red imaging techniques or thermal imaging to pick out body heat signatures of human beings as well as their weaponry in the deep jungles.

Counter IED robotics The primary casualty causing tactic of the insurgents / terrorists relies upon

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

HIGH-TECH

There is an urgent need for the Indian Army, the Army Aviation Corps and the Police and CPOs to focus on Low Intensity Conflicts. We have extensive operational experience and must exploit it to custom design weapons and equipment that suit our conditions and environment. We must create extensive Operational Research and Statistical Analysis (ORSA) data bases on our weapon usage and performance parameters. These will help us in improving our weapon design and performance parameters and field new weapon systems that are custom designed for our requirements Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The Maoist insurgency is characterised by very extensive and lethal use of IEDs. The reason is that a large number of the tribals work in the Iron, Coal and Aluminum mines and have fair expertise in using industrial dynamite and gelatin sticks. They have used huge quantities of explosives (75 kg and more) to blow up heavily armoured Casper Class Mine Protected Vehicles (MPVs). Fortunately, so far, all the IEDs of the Maoists are wire actuated but it would only be a matter of time before they graduate to remotely actuated devices using radio sets and mobile phones. A major technological effort therefore has to be made towards countering IEDs and reducing the casualty effects these impose. Some urgently needed technologies are: ■■ Helicopter Based Radars to detect deeply buried mines / IEDs along roads. For this extensive soil profiling via radar would be an essential preliminary exercise – so that distortions caused by buried explosives could be detected and large tracts of raod could be checked prior to movement of convoys. ■■ Tracked Robotic Ground Vehicles (Unmanned Ground VehiclesUGVs): There is a need to field a family of robotic vehicles to detect and neutralise IEDs. These should be tracked to permit cross country move – even across dense jungle terrain. Their noise signatures must be reduced sufficiently to enable them to lead columns operating in the jungle. These should be able to detect even deeply buried mines and their wires. These could be in varied sizes to suit the terrain and operational configuration of each mission. The larger ones could even carry automatic weapons for prophylactic fire to cover move of columns. Smaller ones could be used for going into deep tunnels / hideouts.

■■ Pocket Sized Robotic Vehicles man packable robotic vehicles that weigh as little as one kg or less could be carried by foot patrols. These could carry sensor packages to detect hostile movement / ambushes as also IEDs and IED wires / explosive substances. These should be tracked vehicles capable of cross country movement in jungle terrain and have very low acoustic signatures. Alternate solutions are to have polyurethane, Yin-Yang style half-wheels that give excellent traction and the tip flexibility to climb stairs, slopes or climb over roots. These should have self destruct capabilities in case these are picked up by the insurgents. These can also act as radio relay stations in operations in difficult terrain.

vehicle can carry the packs of an assault section and move one step behind. It could carry remotely controlled automatic weapons / grenade launchers and could be employed to assist in assaults. These would have to have a very high degree of cross country mobility.

■■ IED Forensics: Most of the energies in our army are expended in trying to neutralise or cause pre-ignition of IEDs. Very little time and effort is devoted to IED forensics. This kind of analysis of the IEDs could help us to pick up the finger prints of the fabricator of the IEDs and other details which can lead to the apprehension of these IED makers / fabricators and examine the type of explosives and trigger mechanisms being used and try to prevent their supply / locate their sources.

Pistols: The 9 mm pistol is largely a decoration piece that has hardly ever been used in combat. Its weight is 900 gms. It could easily be replaced by a machine pistol that weighs just 1.1 kg but can fire in bursts and has 30+ rounds magazine.

Robotic logistics vehicles Exoskeletons: These can help soldiers carry very heavy loads cross country in difficult terrain without fatigue. These can also amplify his power and speed of movement. The Mule: This is an autonomous robotic vehicle that literally acts like a mule and is designed to carry the heavy packs / ammunition of the soldiers in a cross country mode. Autonomous Logistics Support Vehicle: A larger wheeled / tracked autonomous

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

Small arms Carbine: The current Sten machine carbine was found to be grossly under powered and prone to accidents as far back as the Sri Lankan campaign in 1987. It is amazing that over two decades later we are yet to go in for a replacement. We should go for steel core cartridges that can penetrate body armour.

The 5.56 mm Assault Rifle: The INSAS 5.56 Assault Rifle was designed to wound and not kill. It has been found under powered and prone to breakages / stoppages. Troops tend to rely far more on the sturdier AK-47. There is a need to either revert to the 7.62 mm calibre or go in for toppling rounds in the 5.56 class. We need to go in for a Bullpup design and also have the inbuilt capacity to screw on 7.62 mm barrels on to the 5.56 mm weapon (like in the NATO Starlite rifle). Translation Software: There is an urgent need to have a language Translation Software for the Kashmiri, Pushto and north-east Indian tribal languages. This also needs to be developed for the Gondi and Santhal tribal dialects. 3G / 4G Cellular Networks: We need to

field a composite Mobile phone down to each individual soldier which has GPS and situational awareness facilities and permits hands free operations. Mobile towers (on suitably tracked cross country vehicles) should support this cellular tactical network on the battlefield.

Non-lethal weaponry The stone pelting and arson in the Kashmir Valley in 2010 amply highlighted the urgent need for fielding non-lethal weapons for crowd control like: ■■

Water cannons

■■

Rubber bullets

■■

Tasers to inflict mild electric shocks

■■ Masers mounted on trucks to disperse crowds ■■

Chilli powder sprays

■■ Indelible dyes to mark leaders of crowds or those indulging in violence and arson

Pattern modelling computers DNA Based / Quantum Computing / Nano Computers should be employed for pattern modelling of terrorist / insurgent activities to predict / forecast their actions / likely attack modes in terms of location and timing. There is an urgent need for the Indian Army, the Army Aviation Corps and the Police and CPOs to focus on Low Intensity Conflicts. We have extensive operational experience and must exploit it to custom design weapons and equipment that suit our conditions and environment. We must create extensive Operational Research and Statistical Analysis (ORSA) data bases on our weapon usage and performance parameters. These will help us in improving our weapon design and performance parameters and field new weapon systems that are custom

designed for our requirements. Like the Indian navy, the Indian army too must play an active and constructive role in the R&D process and involve itself in the design process right from the inception stage itself. Currently we only spell out the GSQRs and carry out the test and evaluation roles. We need to involve military personnel far more closely from the very outset and become a centre for innovation and excellence like Israel. This will help us to exploit our considerable combat experience. The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in J&K and Punjab. He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Punch districts. He has served two tenures at the highly prestigious Directorate General of Military Operations. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 17 books and over 70 papers in many prestigious research journals.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

INFOTECH

The world is witnessing two simultaneous

revolutions

–

the explosion of information in the public domain and the

destructive

power

information. The possibilities of

mind

control

and

impossibilities of suppressing information

are

hand-in-hand

going Wikileaks

and the events in the Arab world

illustrate.

The

nation-State can no longer prevent

information

from

burgeoning. The technicalities of a computerised world are eagerly

sought

minds,

unfortunately

always

with

young not

altruistic

intentions as hacking shows. It is an extremely useful tool in the growth and development of the human race which the sum of its contradictions cannot obliterate.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

our centuries ago, the English statesmanphilosopher Francis Bacon had pertinently claimed that – “Knowledge is power”. At the start of the 21st century, it is proving correct both in the context of the acquisition and dissemination of knowledge across the world. The world has been confronted with a number of technological developments in the last two decades especially in the field of computers, communications and software. In turn, this has impacted the cost of processing and transmitting information. The key characteristic of the information revolution is not the speed of communications but the enormous reduction in the cost of transmitting information which has become negligible. Hence the amount of information that can be transmitted worldwide has become effectively infinite.

Dr. Venkateshwaran Lokanathan

Hackers and political activism In 1999, 1,500 groups and individuals planned a significant part of their campaign on the Internet and disrupted an important meeting of the World Trade Organisation in Seattle. In 2000, a young hacker in the Philippines launched a virus that spread around the world causing US$ 4 billion to US$ 15 billion in damage in the United States alone. In 2010, Twitter, Facebook and YouTube orchestrated a people’s movement in Tunisia and Egypt resulting in the overthrow of years of authoritarian rule. In India, the expose of the 2G spectrum scam resulting in the arrest of A. Raja, then Information and Telecommunication Minister; the annulling of the controversial S-Band spectrum deal between the Indian Space Research Organisation and Devas Multimedia; the resignation of the Chief Vigilance Officer, P. Thomas, after it was revealed he was charge-sheeted in a multi-crore palmolein oil scam have all occurred over the last six months. In all these instances, the Indian government has been forced into action in the wake of immense public scrutiny. In April 2011, Indian social activist Anna Hazare, launched the latest crusade against corruption, a lonely battle he was fighting since 1969. Again, the State was forced to accede to the demands of creating a committee for discussing the Bill on setting up a Jan Lokpal, an independent body with power to investigate and punish corruption. Interestingly, the significant reason for the State to respond favourably in this instance was the immense support of the people, especially the youth, from all corners of the country for Anna Hazare. There has been growing competition among major powers to achieve both information assurance and information dominance. The State has always controlled information relating to every sphere of development. Hence, traditionally, information has been restricted to the elite within the State. The public has been largely kept out of the decision making. Additionally, there was a lack of communication structure and access to technologies of information and communication which hindered society from taking a keen interest in public affairs.

Freedom of information The dramatic shift in the linked technologies of computing and communications has now posed a new challenge to the existing nature of governments and sovereignty. In the current scenario, it will become extremely difficult for the State to withhold information for a long time. Economies and information networks have changed more rapidly than governments, with their scale growing much faster than that of sovereignty and authority. It has, simultaneously, thrown open new challenges for maintaining secrecy particularly on issues related to

national security. To put it succinctly, world politics has been transformed by the advent of new technology and State policies are now required to accommodate and adjust its interests accordingly.

Globalisation It is remarkable that the rapid technological developments have been ideally complimented by the emergence of a globalised world. Globalisation in the 21st century has distinct characteristics. Thomas Friedman described it as “farther, faster, cheaper and deeper”. India opened its market and liberalised its economic policies in

1991. This has resulted in the growth of worldwide networks of economic interdependence involving people from more regions and social classes. It is obvious that direct public participation in both domestic and global affairs has increased. There is a vast expansion of transnational channels of contact at multicontinental distances, generated by the media and a profusion of non-governmental organisations. The concept of contemporary globalisation has been provided lots of semblance in the on-going information revolution. As the Indian State begins to shape its foreign policy for the 21st century it will have to respond to issues that involve greater complexity, more

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

INFOTECH Effective counter-measures

In India, efforts in the direction of a national cyber security strategy are not visible this far. The government has set up CERT-In as a division of the Ministry of Information Technology which is being nurtured as the nodal security agency. However, there is an urgent need to develop cooperation between different security organisations in such a manner that the national Cyber Space remains secured. If such a collaborative structure is to be built up then there is also the issue of whether it is feasible for the government sector to join hands with the private sector. Effective Public-Private sector cooperation is therefore one of the key challenges in building the national cyber security infrastructure uncertainty, shorter response times and broader participation by groups and individuals.

Non-State actors Another interesting offshoot has been the globalisation of existing problems characterised by inequitable development between the north and the south and the rich–poor divide existing even within countries. The recent surge in protests is, in part, also a reaction to the changes produced by economic integration. Historian Karl Polanyi argued strongly in his study “The Great Transformation” that the market forces unleashed by the industrial revolution and globalisation in the nineteenth century has produced not only great economic gains but also great social disruptions and political reactions. Unfortunately many such reactions have taken a violent form after years of suppressed frustrations. The State, in many instances, has also added fuel to fire by making forceful attempts at crushing such protests which has only fuelled further violence. The violent nature of the Naxal movement in states of central India, the United Liberation front of Assam (ULFA) and the Nagas in Nagaland until recently, characterised by years of neglect towards the larger north-east region, are significant representations. Simultaneously, the presence of global terror networks established by organisations such as the Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, al–Ummah, Hezbollah, Muslim Brotherhood, Harkat–ul-Mujahideen has also created a rapidly deteriorating security environment. Ironically, these organisations have also begun to effectively use ICT and the new media to propagate their ideology which in turn has assisted in the process of indoctrination and increasing

their membership. Thus, in this contemporary environment, the State faces a critical question. How to protect important information that endangers national security from non-State actors?

New challenges The emergence of the concept of Cyber Space in contemporary world politics has created a difficult environment where many nations have been confronting challenges emanating from e-governance and e-commerce from the perspective of their national security. First, a range of individuals and entities, from hackers to large corporations, have the ability to develop the code and norms of the Internet partly outside the control of formal political institutions today. The development of transnational corporate intranets behind firewalls and encryption represents private appropriations of a public space. They have simply added a layer of relations that sovereign States are finding challenging to effectively control. Today, the Internet rests on servers located in specific nations and various government laws affect access providers. The current wrangling between the Indian government and the Canadian owners of the BlackBerry services, Research In Motion, over security concerns is a case in point. Hence, in the age of the Internet, the changing role of political institutions is likely to be a gradual process. Second, there seems to be a worrying trend that has emerged because of the lack of well trained professionals or experts. Deployed technology illustrates a lack of understanding on how to build systems that can be trusted to work correctly despite adversarial action. Nevertheless, more

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

In India, efforts in the direction of a national cyber security strategy are not visible thus far. The government has set up CERT-In as a division of the Ministry of Information Technology which is being nurtured as the nodal security agency. However, there is an urgent need to develop cooperation between different security organisations in such a manner that the national Cyber Space remains secured. If such a collaborative structure is to be built up then there is also the issue of whether it is feasible for the government sector to join hands with the private sector. Effective Public-Private sector cooperation is therefore one of the key challenges in building the national cyber security infrastructure. There is another lurking danger where our critical IT infrastructures such as the missile launching stations, the defense support IT systems could be under threat of an Electronic warfare. It is already speculated that China is training intensely towards unleashing such a war in the foreseeable future.

important processes are being rushed into computing systems. The increase in computing systems’ performance and online storage further complicates matters by providing more systems to protect and greater temptation for those who could abuse those systems. Third, computing is also plagued by the challenges of epidemic-style attacks. Spam makes it hard to read email while denial-of-service (DOS) attacks often brings down critical sites at inopportune times. Viruses and worms continue to plague systems and critical infrastructure (such as ATMs and emergency response systems) that previously had resisted them. Fourth, the challenge is also asymmetric - attackers can be local and they require few resources and entry points, whereas defenders must be global and organised. Hence, as sensitive operations are moved onto networked general-purpose machines, on what grounds can stakeholders trust that the networks can resist dedicated attackers?

Risk management Fifth, the lack of well-founded techniques to evaluate whether enough is spent on security technology, or what the current level of risk is as compared to earlier. Hence, there is an urgent requirement to create a quantitative information systems risk management. This would enable government, industry and consumers to make rational decisions about security investment. Sixth, technology is becoming increasingly complex today. Even an experienced user is having trouble conceptualising exactly what services the machine offers right now on the

network and what pull-down menus and configuration files to change to steer those services into a more acceptable state. This situation will only get worse as we continue to extend the analysis to less savvy users in rural India. Human users will be unable to make rational choices if they cannot understand the systems. Seventh, there should be freedom to choose actions that help manage privacy. Moving activity into a networked computing environment, with machines and software representing many stakeholders makes it much harder to delineate exactly what’s involved in these actions. Where does private information go today? Does one know it was going there? Social values need to dictate our technology and not the other way around.

Cyber crimes Eighth, there is a lack of awareness among law enforcement

agencies about the seriousness and deadly intent of cyber-crimes. Additionally, in the few cases where Cyber Crime cases have been initiated, lack of coordination among these agencies has often hindered speedy investigations. When Cyber Crimes are committed with mobile network, it is often difficult to convince the mobile service providers that they are responsible for assisting the Police in the investigation. Many of them do not even recognise mobile crimes as Cyber Crimes and therefore fail to appreciate their legal obligations. In the private sector, whenever crimes are reported, companies, concerned about their own reputation than public good, do not register a complaint nor enable a proper investigation. Bankers hide any frauds that occur in their network for the fear of losing public confidence. The software developers also contribute in their own measure to the insecurity in the Cyber space by supplying software that has many security weaknesses.

Crucially, there is a need for central agency that will supervise and coordinate the activities of the sub-divisions at the State level. This will include highest priority infrastructure divisions like the security requirements of the armed forces, select installations of national importance such as the nuclear power stations, rocket launching stations, AIR and Doordarshan. All other assets of the government such as e-governance support will come under lower priority infrastructure. There is also an urgent need to educate and create a specialised arm of the police that coordinates and handles investigations into cyber-crimes both at the central and state level. Two independent supervising bodies also need to be established to overlook cyber security in the private sector and even at an individual level. The writer is currently Senior Lecturer in the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations at Manipal University, Manipal, India. He has also worked as a Research Officer at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. His areas of interest include broader contours of International Security Affairs with specific focus on the United States, China and South Asia.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

LIVING WITHOUT FEAR

At the very grassroots of internal security is the policeman. A well-trained local cop with a well-cultivated benign image can, by being a walking, talking, thinking sensor soon become aware of conditions within his locality or beat that are amenable to criminal or anti-national activity. Assisted by a dog trained to sniff out drugs or explosives and backed up by such technical means as closed circuit television he can help sanitise the locality from violence both by pre-emptive action and by deft handling of post-trauma occurances. Unfortunately, over the years the policeman’s role has degenerated to personal security of very important persons. The Commissionarate system, once touted to be the answer to the urban demand for security has not lived up to expectations because of corruption, political interference, communalisation and even criminalisation of the local police force. While expansion in numbers is required there has to be a qualitative improvement of the human resource. 46

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

nternal security essentially implies ensuring a peaceful and orderly environment within the territories of a State so that its citizens can pursue their normal business of life without fear for their lives or properties. It involves maintenance of law and order, dealing with anti-social elements and generally protecting people from harm.

In India, we have a well established system of graded response to any breach of peace and public order by violation or infringement of law. The first respondents in such cases are typically the local beat constables. If need be, they are reinforced by additional police forces till normal situation resumes. The additional forces could include those from the local ‘thana’ (police station) or then going on to state reserve police (armed constabulary in some cases) or even those from central police organisations (such as CRPF). In extreme cases the Army is requisitioned; usually for short durations.

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) V. G. Patankar

Systemic failure A quick review of the situation today would reveal that the system as established does not appear to be working well and is, in fact, found wanting. The reasons for such a state of affairs are many; they range from plain dereliction of duty to failure of governance. A more charitable point of view is that threats have risen in magnitude and dimension and the law enforcement agencies have simply not been able to upgrade their capabilities to deal with them. These excuses sound hollow and no justification can mitigate the stark truth that the State has failed to provide adequate security to its citizens.

New threats There is no gainsaying that threats to internal security have increased manifold. The spectrum now includes substantially greater challenges than those in earlier times; from organised crime and gang wars to terrorist strikes. Anti-social and anti-national elements regularly employ not only sophisticated weapons, ammunition and explosive devices but state-of-the-art computer software and communication equipment. The good news is that modern technology has solutions to overcome most of the threats. What is essential is that such technologies should be placed at the disposal of security forces by leadership at all levels. Leadership should also display a sense of commitment and determination. Modern technology confers several advantages. In the context of its role in maintaining internal security, it can be said that employment of appropriate technology can increase the co-efficient of efficiency of security forces significantly.

Standardisation Security forces should conform to the following principles sequentially: prepare – practice – prevent – pre-empt and protect. In order to ensure satisfactory

Te c h n o - S a v v y Co p ! standard of internal security, a well organised, equipped and trained law and order enforcement apparatus is necessary. It should comprise both passive and active components. While local police, armed police and anti-terrorist squads (ATS) represent the active components, an effective surveillance system, intelligence

network, sound information data base are examples of passive ones. Capabilities of both components could be enhanced considerably by employing the right technology. Preparation for internal security could begin with putting together a sound and comprehensive information

data base. It should include information about the population, infrastructural facilities, communication networks and road map, among others. Modern technology not only makes it possible to store such large information in an organised manner but also to access it speedily and efficiently in the required format. A comprehensive data base

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

LIVING WITHOUT FEAR

could facilitate quickly setting up a surveillance network when required by showing up pattern of population density, known trouble spots based on previous records of disturbances, important choke points to exercise access control, monitoring of ingress and egress and so on.

Surveillance A good, gap-free surveillance system could be set up using appropriate technology. It would typically include surveillance cameras and sensors which could be further enhanced by listening devices, movement detectors and so on in specific situations for limited periods under proper authorisation. When operations are launched, round the clock helicopter cover over the area could ensure aerial surveillance. Information coming in from such systems and devices needs to be synthesised and processed to turn it into actionable intelligence. It involves handling large volume of data over long periods which could pose a major challenge because of limitations of human endurance and abilities. In turn it could affect the quality of intelligence output. Well developed software programmes could do the task tirelessly, efficiently over sustained periods almost entirely eliminating the human fatigue factor.

Simulators for training Internal security forces and their support systems should be well trained. They should carry out regular practices and rehearse specific contingencies. Training systems employing virtual simulation are now available in India. The systems are very effective as they immerse the trainees in virtually live combat situations involving fire and manoeuvre in a variety of complex situations. Another major advantage is that actual locations that are considered sensitive and possible areas for deployment of security forces could be (virtually) created using photographs or films of such areas thus making for the most realistic training. Moreover since trainees do not use live ammunition, it is a safe, low cost, environment friendly and yet an effective methodology for training.

Regular patrolsÂ Security forces should patrol areas

assigned to them regularly. It will have the following major advantages: a. Area familiarisation of all personnel. b. Upgrading data base and relevant technology. c. Instilling confidence among local population. d. Effective deterrent to potential anti-national elements. This way they could even pre-empt any possible terrorist strike in the area or against a potential target.Â

the morale of the force. By taking recourse to appropriate technology and thus improving the efficiency of security forces, we will indirectly ensure that casualties are minimised. In India we have among the lowest ratio of population to police when compared to world average. Even so, it is unlikely that this would improve dramatically in the near future because it would entail large scale recruitment of additional policemen. It is, therefore, more pragmatic to invest in improving the efficiency of existing resources of security forces.

Other vital aspects of good internal security apparatus include unobtrusive surveillance and sharing of intelligence between various national and international intelligence agencies. As situations develop towards possible flash point, additional measures like access control, searching, screening of personnel and scanning and scrutiny of materials moving in and out of the area could be instituted using appropriate technologies so as to minimise inconvenience to ordinary citizens of the area.

Force multiplier is a term that has found its way in the vocabulary of different security doctrines. Wikipedia defines it as a capability that when added to and employed by a combat force significantly increases the combat potential of that force and thus enhances the probability of successful mission accomplishment. Technology can be that force multiplier and enabler to lift our capabilities in creating the desired internal security environment.

26/11 revisited

The writer was the Quartermaster General of the Indian Army before he retired. He is Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. During the Kargil war, he was commanding 28 Infantry Division on the Line of Control in J&K. For the role played by him in that war, he was awarded Uttam Yudh Seva Medal. Later he was the Corps Commander of the prestigious 15 Corps engaged in management of the Line of Control and counter terrorist operations in the Kashmir Valley.

One of the important lessons from the unfortunate episode of 26/11, is that we should do everything to reduce casualties. Casualties among innocent civilians are certainly unacceptable but those among security force personnel should also be a cause of concern. Apart from loss of trained manpower, every casualty is a huge setback to

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

NAVAL SYSTEMS

There is no gainsaying the reality that the Indian Navy has always sought to be a leader in the use of science and technology in maritime defence and security. The fact that it took the lead to innovate on the British design of the Leander class of frigates laid the foundations of the incremental growth in naval shipbuilding first in the Godavari class improvement and most currently in the creation of the Arihant nuclear submarine and the forthcoming sea control platform, the indigenous aircraft carrier. Naval scientists and technicians have helped create indigenous systems and weapons platforms but its most spectacular use of foreign technology will forever remain the missile-boat attack on Karachi on 4 December 1971. Even the Pakistanis admitted that it was “qayammat!”

Indian Navy: Technology Leader

Cmde. (Retd.) Ranjit B. Rai

“S

atellite communication is at the heart of Indian Navy’s vision of future net centric operations in our area of interest … From the operational perspective, satellite communications network ushers in transformational changes … and allows for realtime information exchange in voice, video data etc. which is quite unreliable in HF Communications systems”. (2010)”. Admiral Nirmal Verma, Chief of Naval Staff, a Communications specialist himself.

Sci-tech for domain awareness The advent of space linked communication and geospatial technology has revolutionised warfare. The armed forces that have technological prowess and capability to induct and absorb technology become automatic leaders and India’s Navy is regarded as one of them. The story how India’s Navy achieved this, needs to be recited, but first a preamble. Warfare in the 19th and early 20th century is replete with battles, when a smaller force with superior technology in weaponry and knowledge of the terrain, now called ‘situational awareness’, or in naval parlance ‘maritime domain awareness’ (MDA) was able to defeat a much larger opponent. It was the Duke of Wellington in 1815 who lamented at the battle of Waterloo near Brussels in Flanders, “I wish I could know what lies over the hill and I would deliver a victory blow to the enemy (Napoleon)”. Wellington knew if he had knowledge of the terrain over the hill, which today radars, UAVs and satellites provide, he could accordingly direct his cannon fire, which in today’s warfare are torpedoes and missiles. That very knowledge, technologically and speedily assembled for the Captain to target his weapons is termed net centric warfare (NCW) and NCW ensures the ‘sensor to shooter time’ is reduced. In today’s warfare, every missile is ‘one shot missile’ and is not expected to miss its target.

Technical tweaking The Indian Navy cut its teeth in the 1971 war and was the first to employ radar fitted Russian homing Styx missiles in the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war. They were directed to their targets by powerful Rangout radars on the OSA class missile boats by varying the radar’s power output in bursts, to increase detection ranges without burning out the electronic valves. The Navy scored eight one shot missile hits and sank three ships off Karachi on 4th December, 1971 and two more on 8th December, again off Karachi. One missile hit the Keamari oil tanks and set them on fire. The Navy ingeniously tweaked the ‘range gate’ on the missile, to hit shore targets, having mastered the missiles’ radar technology. This achievement inflamed the Navy to set high standards in warfare with ‘technology as its credo’. Six out of the last nine naval chiefs, including the present CNS Admiral Nirmal Verma are graduates of the Naval War College USA where their exposure to the world’s technology leader stood them in good stead to guide the Indian Navy.

Saga of innovations The Navy’s science and technology story has also been a saga of innovations in many fields, of inducting latest technology on a shoe string budget, by cooperating with DRDO and Indian industry and adopting management systems. A great step was taken in the 60’s to license build Leanders at Mazagon Docks Ltd. which the Indian Navy design teams improved incrementally and today the 6,700 ton Delhi class and the follow on are examples. The ship’s brim with technology and in another step Admiral S. M. Nanda 40 years ago contracted International Computers Ltd. (ICL) to set up large computers in the Naval Dockyard at Mumbai. The navy

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

NAVAL SYSTEMS

was able to train its officers and men to run computers and Naval dockyard was the first military establishment to get all its functions computerised. The speed of ship’s refits and cost of repairs came down. Today the Indian Navy is advanced in computers, sonars and electronic warfare (EW) systems and many other fields. The Navy has collaborated with DRDO and has made strides in sonars, EW and cyber warfare. In the 80s India became the seventh nation in the world to master submarine building technology and the Navy has an advanced indigenous naval shipbuilding programme. It is moving from a ‘Buyer’s Navy to become a Builder’s Navy’, but is still dependent on the west for weapons and engine technology but if the DRDO’s naval gas turbine based on the Kaveri engine which is being tested by the Navy at the Gas Turbine workshop at the Naval Dockyard at Vishakhapatnam succeeds it will be another naval breakthrough. The Navy is also looking for an Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) for its submarines and DRDO has been working on this for many years and it will be another breakthrough.

own seven satellite GPS in the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) and linked to the ships’ CIC computers and will aid missile targeting especially the BrahMos missiles now being inducted in all frontline ships. Currently Indian Navy is one of the first navies to fit UAV control radomes on INS Taragiri and the unfortunate Vindhyagiri for extending the range of its Searcher and Heron UAVs flown from shore for MDA.

Satellite data usage The Navy extensively uses satellite data provided by Indian remote sensing satellites in collaboration with NTRO and DIPAC. ISRO now has the Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) series of satellites, the Technical Experimental Satellite (TES) reportedly financed by Ministry of Defence (MOD), the CARTOSAT 1 and 2 with a spatial resolution of 2.5 m and a swath of 30 km and OCEANSAT 2 provides infra red and electro-optical data from a range of panchromatic cameras and the Israeli built RISAT 2 has a synthetic aperture (SAR) radar and possibly more. Militaries keep their dedicated satellites a secret.

Fully net centric

Atomic platforms

In the near future the Indian Navy will be the first fully net centric arm in India when ISRO launches the Navy’s dedicated GSAT-7/8 satellite with C/KU band nodes into geo-stationary orbit. The ships and their crew have been trained for NCW, having widely operated the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange Internet System–Maritime (CENTRIXS-M) on Indian Navy ships, loaned from the US Navy during the Malabar series of exercises. The Indian Navy techies went on to copy the innovation and experimented with legacy transmitters and receivers and produced the Naval Enterprise Internet Network, called Link-S with HF/VHF slow bit rate Internet protocol for ships’ transfer of digital data. Tata Consultancy contributed and Bharat Electronics Ltd. (BEL) manufactured the hardware with ARCIN-249 standards, employing an Indian modem. Soon all ships will have Israeli supplied dual off set Gregorian terminals in 45 inch radomes for transmission and reception of digital data via the ISRO satellite, which will be linked with India’s

The Indian Navy has always looked ahead and operated aircraft carriers since 1961 and is looking forward to operate MiG-29Ks off INS Vikramaditya next year with a number of indigenous systems on board. The Navy has always hankered to learn about nuclear propulsion and officers were trained at Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) in Mumbai and operated the INS Chakra successfully from 1987-91. The Navy planned for its own home-made nuclear submarine and is the sixth Navy in the world to partner the DRDO and Indian industry to manufacture the nuclear submarine INS Arihant in India. The Navy’s naval constructor branch of 300 naval architects contributes to ship building and is a national asset. Today some 100 former naval architects are gainfully employed in India’s shipbuilding industry, which promises to be India’s sunrise industry.

In-house R and D Much credit must go to Indian Navy’s less known in-house, research

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

and development organisation called Navy’s Weapons Engineering Electronics Establishment (WEESE). It was established in the 70s under the MOD in New Delhi and works in a somewhat civilian atmosphere. It conceptualises, vets and offers scientific and technological solutions for naval warfare and designs prototypes for the Navy. It has a long list of achievements, many classified. Indian Navy’s technological thinking resides with the WEESE. Many may not agree publicly, but it helps Navy audit the DRDO projects in an informal manner. Hence DRDO has scored major successes in naval projects and has designed electronic warfare, communications and command and control systems. WEESE has a laboratory way of working and has the Navy’s best technical brains and many who have completed MTech in IITs and are experienced ship operators work on futuristic technologies like Navy’s Link-S communications and meshing Russian missile firing systems like the BrahMos. WEESE pursues anti-cyber warfare and other classified needs of the Navy and works closely with civilian soft and hardware companies. It also supports the Navy’s drive for indigenisation and a full Directorate has been set up. The software system options of open architecture, Java, Silverlight and Flex and banking softwares like SABRE and such civilian advancements has allowed WEESE to build common operating platforms and is credited with the latest EW and Command Information Centres (CIC) system and a Communications suite now manufactured by BEL for all naval ships. This has saved large foreign exchange. Soon the IN will induct Konsberg Huggins-1000 Underwater Unmanned Vessels (UUVs) on its six 500 ton revolutionary catamaran survey ships being built at Alcock Ashdown Ltd., another technological first.

Innovators The Navy is also strong in science, as it deputes officers for courses and supports PhDs. The navy has produced many scientists but being in uniform and a rigid way of promotion makes many leave the service early. To name a few. Then Cdr. Paul Raj, an NDA product who commissioned as an Electrical officer did his MTech from IIT as a Lieutenant and joined DRDO’s Naval Physical Oceanographic

Laboratory (NPOL) in Cochin in the 80s is credited with making Indian Navy’s panoramic sonars the APSOH which now BEL manufactures in the HUMSA series and are operating on all naval ships. Raj left the Navy and was accepted for theoretical research in mathematics at Stanford in USA, where he resides. In 1970, another young electrical officer, Lieutenant V. K. Jain, having just returned from a course in Britain, started working with the BARC Team on improving sonar signal processing. During 1971, Jain tried out the BARC modification kit at sea. The trials were encouraging and he was working on further improving it when the war broke out in December 1971. Lieutenant Jain prevailed to let him embark with his modification in the ill fated INS Khukri when she sailed for an anti-submarine operation off Diu. During the next two days and until the Khukri was torpedoed and sunk, the modification kit was connected up. The submarine carried out its attack undetected. Paul Raj used Jain’s experiment to help him make the APSOH. Cdr. Subba Rao a brilliant engineer

worked with WEESE to set up a naval communications link and went on to complete a nuclear engineering degree at BARC. He produced a miniature reactor design for India’s nuclear submarine in the late 70s and tried to pick holes in the design produced by BARC scientists then under Dr. Raja Ramanna. Rao fell foul of the atomic scientific establishment and Intelligence Bureau slapped charges on him, which he fought up to Supreme Court and was exonerated.

Technical human resource The list can go on, but the Navy also has a cadre called Artificers, just below officer level and above sailor level almost like JCOs, who are trained intensively at INS Shivaji at Lonavala and Valsura in Jamnagar and run all technical systems on board ships. They become hands-on experts in engineering and electrical systems and have proved to be a boon to the Indian Navy in advancing technology absorption. Many leave service and rise as Chief Engineers on board merchant ships or in industry which is their incentive to do well for the Navy.

It is a well accepted adage, that the tri-pillars of technology, training and intelligence are the three coins of power. The Indian Navy believes another historical reality, that advances in technology have contributed to successive revolutions in military warfare. Large navies world over are three dimensional and operate at sea. Today Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance and the acronym C4ISR is part of all military jargon. Today the decision-making process is being made simpler, by developing knowledge based expert systems. Culture is an emergent system and people establish a pattern of interaction. And once that culture exists, it influences how the individuals in it behave and the culture of the Indian Navy is based on the credo ‘to be a technology leader’ and pass on benefits to the nation.

The writer is a defence analyst, a specialist navigator and former Director of Naval Operations and Intelligence. Presently he is Vice President, Indian Maritime Foundation. New Delhi.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

THE STATE AND THE MAN

The Official Secrets Act has long been a bugbear for the ordinary citizen of India. Its implementation is rampant because the citizen is unaware of the ambiance of the words ‘national security’ but the official has all the tools to suppress information. One very efficacious instrument to undercut the all-pervasiveness of ‘national security’ is the Right to Information but, as has been seen, there are ways and loopholes that permit opacity and these are increasingly being tested in appellate courts. Governments find it a convenient tool and the opacity it provides is a handy cover to include an assortment of acts that are only tangentially connected to national security. If at all.

ecently, the Supreme Court delivered a significant judgment, upholding the right of the government to dismiss an employee without assigning any reason, if doing so affects the security of the State. The case pertained to M. M. Sharma, a RAW officer posted in China who had an inappropriate relationship with a Chinese woman. While the Apex Court cannot be faulted on its reasoning, the judgement has raised many questions. What exactly is national security? Who is to decide what constitutes a threat to national security – the government or the judiciary? Does the citizen have no voice in the matter? Can the State trample over the constitutional rights of its citizens, merely by stating that it is in the interest of ‘national security’, especially when the term has never been clearly defined? Are not our intelligence agencies such as RAW and Intelligence Bureau, which have neither any experience nor expertise in the matter, misleading the judiciary by raising the bogey of national security to justify their capricious actions against innocent victims, depriving them of their liberty and livelihood?

few people – and that includes the judiciary, the bureaucracy and the political establishment – understand the meaning of these terms. It does not help that their definition and meaning has not been explained in any of our statutes. In 1967, the Lok Sabha was debating amendments to the Official Secrets Act of 1923. Mr. V. C. Shukla, who moved the Bill, did not even comprehend the implication of the cleverly worded amendment, which would make it more draconian than it was under British rule. One member who did was Mr. Nambiar, who had been convicted under the Official Secrets Act in 1948. He felt that the new wording of section 3: ‘which is likely to affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State or friendly relations with foreign States’, was very loosely worded. “Who will decide whether a particular disclosure affects the sovereignty and integrity of India”? he asked. The question remains unanswered even today. Of course, the Bill was passed, and the infamous provision became law.

Loosely applied

Sovereignty and national security are closely related. The current notion of State sovereignty can be traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which codified the basic principles of territorial integrity, border inviolability and supremacy of the State. In international law, sovereignty implies that a government possesses

The term ‘national security’ is frequently used by the media, security forces and intelligence agencies whenever a so called mole, terrorist or spy is caught. Sometimes, for good measure, they even add the weightier ‘sovereignty’. Sadly, very

Sovereignty well defined

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

demystifying

national security

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) V. K. Singh

full control over its own affairs within a territorial or geographical area. Some of the basic ingredients of sovereignty are territory, the power to make and enforce laws, currency (money) and recognition by other States. Foreign governments recognise the sovereignty of a State by exchanging diplomats and concluding treaties. Unlike sovereignty, whose basic ingredients are generally agreed upon by most people, the concept of national security remains vague and there is wide divergence of views on the exact meaning of the term. The concept developed mostly in the USA after World War II. The earliest definitions emphasised freedom from military threat and political coercion. With time, these were expanded to include a broad range of ingredients which affect the military or economic security of the nation and the values adopted by the national society. In addition to military security, a nation also needs to possess economic security, energy security, environmental security, etc. Threats to national security emanate not only from conventional enemies such as other nations but also from non-State actors such as terrorist organisations, drug cartels and multi-national organisations. According to some authorities, even natural disasters and events causing severe environmental damage can be considered threats to national security.

Some definitions Walter Lippmann gave one of the early definitions in 1943 in terms of a nation and war: “A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate ínterests to avoid war and is able,

if challenged, to maintain them by war.” A few years later, a similar definition was given by Harold Lasswell, a political scientist, who wrote: “The distinctive meaning of national security means freedom from

foreign dictation.” The United States Armed Forces defines national security of the USA in the following manner: A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

provided by: (a) a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; (b) a favorable foreign relations position; or (c) a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. In India, the concept of national security has been articulated by several establishments dealing with security issues. The 1996 definition propagated by the National Defence College includes most of the basic ingredients. Interestingly, factors such as ‘political resilience and maturity’ also find mention in the definition:

a piece of land where he sets up a homestead. The first thing he does is to build a fence around his property, to keep out wild animals. If that is not enough, he keeps a dog and also buys a gun. To ensure that others living nearby come to his aid when needed, he makes friends with his neighbours. To feed his family, he grows crops on his farm, or keeps a flock of sheep or goats. If he is skilled with his

“National security is an appropriate and aggressive blend of political resilience and maturity, human resources, economic structure and capacity, technological competence, industrial base and availability of natural resources and finally the military”. The Group of Ministers on National Security formed in 2001 tried to define national security and came up with this nebulous definition: National security is a function of a country’s external environment and the internal situation, as well as their interplay with each other. The former is influenced by the major features of the prevailing international order, the disposition of its immediate and extended neighbours and the major powers. The internal situation encompasses many aspects of national life, ranging from law and order to economic fundamentals and from the quality of governance to national cohesiveness.

Confounding confusion Considering the differences in the definitions given by various authorities, one can hardly blame the common citizen if he is unable to comprehend the meaning of national security. This is because most of the important constituents such as military strength, diplomacy, political and economic power are outside the gamut of the understanding of a layman. Perhaps a simple example, which uses elements that everyone understands, can help. Let us consider the example of a man who lives in the wilderness or inherits

internal security

THE STATE AND THE MAN

hands, he becomes a potter, carpenter, or blacksmith. Let us replace the man by a community or a nation. The fence, dog and gun become the armed forces, paramilitary and police which provide physical security from enemies outside and within. The good relations with neighbours are nothing but treaties and agreements with other countries, which is a part of a nation’s foreign policy. The crops, animals and produce that sustain his family are the same as the country’s agricultural production, industrial base and a sound economy. These factors not only provide security but also sovereignty, which means the freedom to take independent decisions and do what one wants without seeking help or approval from others.

Of secrets and secretiveness One may ask, where does intelligence come in the national security paradigm? Though it does not contribute directly to national security, intelligence is important in that it assists in timely assessment of threats to the nation’s

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

security, both external and internal. Unless we have good intelligence, we cannot protect our borders and our people, except at great cost. Intelligence failures almost always translate into loss of life, as happened in 1962 with China, in 1999 at Kargil and on 26/11 at Mumbai. However, the role of intelligence in national security is minor, compared to that of military strength, foreign relations, industrial capacity and economic wellbeing. Then why are intelligence agencies sometimes referred to as secret agencies? I think it has more to do with the secretive manner in which they function, rather than secrets. Take the example of agencies like the National Technical Research Organisation or RAW, which deal with external intelligence. Whatever secrets they have concern foreign countries, whose disclosure can harm them, not India. Unlike the defence forces, Indian Space Research Organisation or the Defence Research and Development Oganisation, they have little that can be of interest to a foreign country. The only reason for keeping such information under wraps is to protect the source. In case such information is made public, accidentally or otherwise, it is only the source which is compromised, with little effect on national security. An example was the tape of the famous Musharraf–Aziz conversation during the Kargil war, which was made public to show Pakistan’s complicity. It did result in the drying up of the source of the intercept, but there was certainly no effect on our national security.

IN THE EYE OF A STORM

Because all concerns post-Fukushima are valid the government of India must waste no time (or even appear to waste time) and conduct a thorough, transparent review of safety systems and procedures in all Indian nuclear plants and spent-fuel storage facilities. AND Dr. Harsh V. Pant MOVE ON. Parameters of civil engineering and systems technology will have to be tested in a simulated worst case scenario where an earthquake of intensity 10 on the Richter scale and a tsunami wave as close to the highest ever (1720 ft at Lituya Bay, Alaska, USA in 1958 which may never be replicated because the terrain was particularly peculiar) to satisfy the Indian public that safety is paramount in modern-day nuclear plants. In any case, quite apart from the raging nuclear debate, the government of India will need to wake up fast to the effects of global warming on peninsular India large tracts of which could disappear if the sea-level rises.

nuclear power: hOW safe?

The dismissal of M. M. Sharma was probably warranted. However, unless it is proved that he was ‘honey trapped’, and passed sensitive information to a foreign national, the reason for his dismissal cannot be ‘national security’. His services could have been terminated by the President as was done in the case of the naval officer who had an inappropriate relationship with a Russian woman during his stint in Russia. The writer served in RAW as a joint secretary for about four years. He is the author of the book, “India’s External Intelligence – Secrets of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)”.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

IN THE EYE OF A STORM

risis at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan is being termed as the worst nuclear accident since the Chernobyl reactor disaster a quarter century ago. Though, after rising initially, radiation levels did plunge soon, panic buttons had already been hit around the world. Tokyo Electric Power has been pumping hundreds of tons of water into four of the six reactors at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station to cool the nuclear fuel in the reactor core and in spent fuel storage pools. While much of that water is evaporating, a significant amount has also been discovered in various parts of the plant, which was crippled by the 9.0 magnitude earthquake and tsunami that struck northeast Japan on March 11. Tokyo Electric Power has said it has little choice but to pump more water into the reactors at the moment, since the normal cooling systems at the plant are inoperable and extensive amounts of radioactive material would be released if the reactors melted down fully or if the rods caught fire. The Japanese government has confirmed that the Daiichi plant may continue to release dangerous radiation into the air for several months.

Panic reactions The nuclear accident, after earthquake and tsunami, has led to anxious questions around the world about the safety of nuclear reactors and is putting the governments in world capitals under intense pressure. In Germany the Angela Merkel government has decided to temporarily shut down seven German nuclear power plants that began operations before the end of 1980 as a three-month safety review of all of the nation’s 17 plants goes underway. Switzerland, where 40 per cent of energy requirements are met by nuclear energy, has suspended plans to build and replace nuclear plants. The European Union has convened a meeting of nuclear safety authorities and operators to examine European preparedness. Some US Senators are also warning of “another Chernobyl” and calling for an immediate suspension of licensing procedures for the Generation-III reactor that is presently under review at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Two major powers, Russia and China, seem to be bucking the trend. While suggesting that it would be studying the Japan

crisis in detail, Russian government has made it clear that it has no plans to revise its ambitious programme of building nuclear reactors. China, which has 11 reactors operating and plans to start construction on as many 10 new ones a year during the next decade, also declared that it will carry on with its plans. The Indian government seems to be following this lead. While it too has ordered a review of all safety features at its nuclear plants, the Indian nuclear establishment has underlined that all its 20 nuclear plants are earthquake and tsunami-proof.

Nuke mart The USA, France, Russia and Japan have been locked in fierce competition to sell new nuclear reactors to India. India is one of the world’s biggest markets for nuclear technology, with plans to reach an atomic power capacity of 63,000 megawatts by 2032, from the current level of 4,560 megawatts. Fuel-hungry India has pushed ahead with its nuclear energy plans since 2008 when the then-US president George W. Bush signed into law a nuclear deal that ended a three-decade ban on US nuclear trade with India. The Japanese crisis has fuelled opposition in India to the construction of what would be one of the world’s largest nuclear power plants in a seismically-sensitive region of Maharashtra, with six reactors providing 9,600 megawatts of combined power. French company Areva has signed a US$ 9.3 billion framework deal to supply the first two of Jaitapur’s third-generation pressurised water reactors, with the nuclear plant scheduled to begin producing power in 2018.

Growing opposition A top Indian scientist and government advisor, backed by more than 50 prominent figures, has called for a moratorium on all future nuclear projects following the nuclear crisis in tsunami-hit Japan. Dr. P. Balaram’s call marks the first direct appeal from within government circles for a temporary stop to nuclear power plans and production and comes a day after Prime Minister Manmohan Singh sought more transparency and accountability from the Indian nuclear establishment. Dr. P. Balaram, director of the prestigious

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore and part of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s scientific advisory council, described the events in Japan as “a wake-up call” for India. In an open letter, signed by more than 50 prominent figures, Balaram states:

could happen if an Internet attack on nuclear reactors were to happen as it did with the ‘Stuxnet’ programme against the Iranian nuclear project. Or if a determined, technologically skilled terrorist group were to seize control of a power station.

■■ “We strongly believe that India must radically review its nuclear power policy.”

Fukushima outdated

■■ “Pending the review, there should be a moratorium on all further nuclear activity and revocation of recent clearances for nuclear projects.” ■■ The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) has “cavalierly minimised (the possibility of an accident) … and declared that Indian reactors cannot undergo serious accidents.” ■■ The Japanese crisis shows “that even in an industrially advanced country, nuclear reactors were vulnerable to catastrophes, in spite of precautions and safety measures.” ■■ The letter urges the Indian government to conduct an independent and transparent safety audit of its nuclear facilities. “In the light of what has happened in Japan … we strongly believe that India must radically review its nuclear power policy for appropriateness, safety, costs and public acceptance and undertake an independent, transparent safety audit of all its nuclear facilities, which involves non-DAE experts and civil society organisations. Pending the review, there should be a moratorium on all further nuclear activity and revocation of recent clearances for nuclear projects,” said Dr. Balaram. He said he agreed to be a co-signatory to a key petition seeking a nuclear moratorium because many of India’s proposed nuclear plants were likely to come up in populated and ecologically sensitive areas.

Attractive option After decades of being ostracised by policy makers, nuclear energy has been coming back to the mainstream over the last few years. Faced with rising oil process and growing concerns about climate change, nations have started giving the nuclear energy option a serious consideration. There is a new

enthusiasm for nuclear energy at a time when concerns about curbing global warming and energy security have become paramount. Even in Germany, there were attempts to have a rethink on nuclear policy as it finds itself caught between its pledge to eliminate nuclear power and its promise to slash carbon emissions. In contrast to coal-fired power plants, atomic reactors produce little in the way of CO2 emissions - which is good news for the climate. In addition, the technology is helpful for regions which may not have natural gas reserves, for example. Nuclear energy means a certain degree of independence and a modicum of political autonomy when it comes to determining energy policy. Furthermore, energy produced from nuclear power plants tends to be cheap, making it popular with consumers.

Always controversial Nuclear power continued to have a public relations problem, however, as its mere mention raises the spectre of another Chernobyl and the Three Mile Island, not to mention proliferation and dirty bombs. But things have been rapidly changing with previous staunch opponents such as Patrick Moore, a founder of

Greenpeace, joining the bandwagon, convinced by the growing evidence that nuclear power is the most efficient energy source around today. There is a growing list of environmentalists who are openly advocating nuclear power today. The “father” of the contemporary global environmental movement, James Lovelock, has been claiming that the challenges of global warming can only be tackled by nuclear energy. The Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change emphasised in its report in 2007 that countries could use more nuclear power as part of a shift away from fossil fuels in order to blunt global warming. An unforeseen consequence of the anti-nuclear movement of the ’60s and ’70s in the West was that it impeded the growth of nuclear power, which, though risky, is the most environment-friendly of energy resources, even as it boosted coal and oil-sourced electricity generation which, it now turns out, has damaged the environment probably beyond repair. Japan’s nuclear crisis might be a major setback to this development. It is already being suggested that faith in redundant, coincidence-proof security precautions has been wiped out by Fukushima. The high-tech democracy Japan has shown what

But a proper perspective is needed if debate on nuclear energy is to proceed rationally. It was an old reactor with a design from the 1960s that got into trouble in Japan. The technology of this type of plant is outdated. Its safety level is significantly below that of modern nuclear plants, they wouldn’t get construction approval these days. The crisis at Fukushima was triggered by the failure of diesel generators that provided electricity to cool the reactors once they were shut down. It is significant that despite all provocations, the containment walls seem to have held. In the new Generation III reactors there is a simplified cooling system where the water circulates by natural convection with no pumping required.

Rational approach The hyper-reaction to the Japanese crisis, though understandable, will not lead to sensible policy outcomes because the costs and risks of nuclear energy need to be rigorously compared against the costs and risks of other energy sources and the long-term costs and risks of global warming. Nuclear power remains an important means of meeting the energy requirements in emerging powers and valuable tool in heading off global warming. As of today, India imports three quarters of its oil, natural gas, and coal and receives only three per cent of its power from nuclear energy. While about one-third of India’s new power supplies have come from natural gas and hydro-electricity over the last decade, the cost of natural gas and the environmental concerns over hydro-dams will force India towards an even greater use of coal in its energy mix. This can be devastating for global environment and so India’s embrace of nuclear power should be viewed as a realistic answer to this problem. The writer teaches at King’s College, London and is presently a Visiting Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania, USA.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

FOREWARNED IS FOREARMED

Satellite imagery and remote sensing have become essential tools for national defence. From these grow a whole range of capabilities that enable a fighting man to deliver a warhead with great precision on targets well over the horizon. Warfare has been transformed by the improvements in remote sensing technology. Nations that have the capability are assured of swift successes on the battlefield. India is one of just six nations that are able to put a remote sensing satellite into space but there are still gaps that need to be filled.

ndeavour to have more information about earth is as old as human history. During 20th century the power of earth observation increased beyond expectation. Now, every movement on the earth can be easily monitored from a very distant and remote place with the help of modern remote sensing technology. Every change can be detected and can be monitored continuously with the help of modern remote sensing platforms. ‘Forewarned is forearmed’ is an old but extremely relevant proverb of strategy. In such a situation, it has now become a compulsion to have a wide variety of remote sensing platforms for national security management. Speed and accuracy in the field of information sweeping, processing and disseminating technology (Geo-informatics) has now become the core element of national security. Former President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam has aptly remarked that ‘Space technology is going to play an important role in the future development of this country.’

James Wallace Black. During American Civil War 1861-65 aerial photos were used in various military applications. (Thomas M. Lillesand, Ralph W. Kilfer, Jonathan W. Chipman, ’Remote Sensing and Image Interpretation’, Fifth Edition, 2009, p. 22).

Rapid developments

Space remote sensing started during the decade of sixties, with the launching of the first US meteorological satellite TIROS-1. Orbiting satellite imageries are capable of providing quantitative as well as qualitative information about objects. Development in the field of electronics such as camera, sensor, scanner and radar has greatly enhanced the capability of earth monitoring, mainly because of its synoptic and repetitive coverage, to gather real time information. High resolution satellites are sweeping the globe regularly.

Hope for more geographical and positional information has gained substantial momentum with the evolution of mankind and various techniques have been developed to gather general and specific information. The first known aerial photography was taken with the help of balloon in 1858 by a French photographer named Gaspard-Felix Tournachon (Nadar). The earliest existing aerial photograph was taken over Boston in 1860 by

The pace of human development and destruction was very fast during the 20th century. It was the most important century of human history, in which about 90 per cent of scientific inventions have really occurred. The invention of airplane by Wright brothers in 1902 provided a great impetus to the emergence of modern remote sensing. Aerial photographs received heightened attention in the interest of military reconnaissance during WW I, when over one million aerial photographs were taken. These photographs contributed effectively to the conduct of war. Since then, the science of photogrammetric and art of photo-interpretation has developed exponentially.

Burgeoning satellite imagery

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

Dr. Hari Saran

More than 1,100 active satellites are orbiting the globe for various purposes. At present NAVSTAR is the only operational GPS system in the world. National security is a very vast subject. States always want to enhance and protect their national security interests. It encompasses all aspects of development, defence and disaster management. For better national security management States need various geographical and positional information. Modern information sweeping and disseminating platforms have made our society a knowledge-based society. Space has played an important role in universalisation of society. Now, it has become possible to gather real time accurate information about the whole globe or a specific area without disturbing or taking permission from any country or world body.

Dual-use Remote sensing technology is a dual-use technology. Remote sensing data are being used in almost all spheres of development such as - all types of mapping, watershed and ground water studies, reservoir sedimentation, river morphology, geology, soil mapping, land use / land cover mapping, crop yield forecasting, city planning, transportation, coastal erosion studies, environmental studies, oceanography, archaeology, ecology, highway and railway engineering, meteorological studies, navigation and coastal and harbour studies etc. Increasing

fire

power

and

REMOTE SENSING AND REMOTE SENSING AND NATIONAL SECUrITY NATIONAL SECUrITY diminishing time have compelled the defence planners and strategists to consider better ways for reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition for combat effectiveness through remote sensing techniques. The art and science of modern remote sensing has transformed the very nature of war and combat by enhancing

the power of intelligence, navigation and target acquisition. The range and lethality of modern weapon systems (smart weapons) have increased manifold in the past decades. The time to hit the target has reduced. Distances in the battle space are no longer constrained by guidance and communication barriers. In a digitised

battlefield, timely access to intelligence can be matched with the operational mobility with great effect. This can be explained by citing various examples from Gulf War 1991, NATO strategic bombing on Kosovo, US war against terrorism - Afghanistan 2002 and second Gulf War 2003. Due to their advanced and sophisticated C4ISR

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

FOREWARNED IS FOREARMED

Although India has made a considerable progress in this field after Kargil conflict, but it still falls short in a number of ways. To meet the future national security challenges, the need of the hour is: ■■High resolution military satellites should be developed and launched at a regular interval of three years. ■■Satellite navigation system should be developed as early as possible along with serious attempts to acquire a meaningful stake in EU Galileo GPS system. ■■Efforts should be made for the acquisition of high altitude long endurance UAVs with night vision and thermal imagining capabilities like US Predator. ■■Serious attempts should be made to acquire AWACS as early as possible. ■■Independent satellites should be provided to all the three arms of armed forces capabilities the US forces won the first Gulf War in 41 days and second Gulf War in three weeks time only. Thus, the use of electromagnetic spectrum has paved the way for the development of modern high-tech war and warfare. Technological superiority in the field of distant viewing has now become the basis of modern warfare. It has both offensive and defensive characters.

Precision-guidance Historically speaking, Gulf War I was the first high-tech war of the post Cold War era. In this war US demonstrated a number of hightech precision weapons of minimal collateral damage, improved means of electronic intelligence system for real time geographical and positional information, surveillance and target acquisition along with communication system. It was the first network centric operation. Up to 10 imaging and signal intelligence satellites regularly covered the Gulf region (three electronic imaging satellites KH-11, three advanced KH-11 and one radar imaging satellite) for ensuring 24 hour continuous surveillance of the battlefield. (Bakshi G. D., ’Operation Desert Storm, Strategic Analysis, IDSA, New Delhi, Vol. 15, No. 4, July 1992, p. 349). The letters KH stand for Key Hole, a code-name given in 1961 to a decision to classify military satellites. KH-11 was a very powerful military satellite. Its real time sensing systems and high resolution cameras enable it to distinguish military from the civilian personnel, while its infra-red

and multi-spectral sensing devices can locate missiles, trains and launchers by day and night and distinguish camouflage and artificial vegetation from real plants and trees. (Andrew Wilson, ed, Intravia Space Directory 1992-93, p. 225). Over the Gulf flew two most powerful information sweeping platforms AWACS and J-STAR. Boeing 707 (AWACS) loaded with computers, communication gears, radar, camera and sensors scanned the war zone sky 360 degree to detect enemy aircraft and missiles and send targeting data to interceptors and ground units. The J-STARs flew a total of 49 sorties, identified more than 1,000 targets and attained 90 per cent success in destroying them. With the help of knowledge powered warfare capability US led allied force became able to destroy Iraq’s resistance in a few days. Thus, it became mandatory to have modern platforms of information sweeping, safe communication network and smart precision weapons to fight war in this century. Information superiority has become a necessary tool to defeat an adversary. Former US President George W. Bush has characterised its armed forces as “… Defined less by size and more by mobility and swiftness … relying heavily on stealth, precision weaponry and information technology.” (Mishra Shitanshu, ’Network Centric Warfare in the context of Operation Iraqi Freedom’, Strategic Analysis, IDSA, Vol. 27, No. 4, Oct.-Dec. 2003, p. 550).

Force multipliers In this century, States have the capability to detect any object on the

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

earth whether it is on the surface or in water. The modern principle of strategy is, ‘Any thing that can move or not be identified and every thing that can be identified, can be destroyed without any failure.’ The only defence against this power is deception. Thus, information dominance has become a powerful force multiplier for modern war and warfare. During the past five decades, the number of countries involved in space activities has increased from two (US and USSR) to one hundred twenty. The global demand for space products is growing day by day. At present one can purchase space imagery from global space market. Currently, the American Worldview-1 satellite (2007) offers the highest resolution imageries that are commercially available. Pentagon has about 2,000 photo analysts and they are using six inch resolution imagery to extract various information. (James N. Rosenan and J. P. Singh, ed., Information Technologies and Global Market, State University of New York Press, 2002. p. 75). Modern remote sensing platforms are aircraft, UAVs, satellites and blimps (stratospheric airships). Developed States still enjoy a significant degree of control over it.

Disaster management tool In case of disaster management, whether it is natural or man-made, aerial photos or satellite imageries of the affected areas are totally convincing. With the help of these spatial data, you can show people a map and they can see clearly that how much damage has been caused, how

many people are in need of assistance, precisely where they are and which way they are going and what local and geographical factors are likely to affect assistance operations. Search and rescue operations need various types of real time information about the human beings. For example, the MQ-9 Reaper, a US drone plane currently used for domestic operations by the Department of Homeland Security carries cameras that are capable of identifying an object the size of a milk carton from altitude of 60,000 feet and has forward-looking infra-red devices that can detect the heat of a human body at distance of up to 60 kilometres. (http://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/surveillance). Such types of platforms are needed in any major disaster. Real time pictures are now being used in disaster management operations. At the time of tsunami disaster 2004, Indian navy has also deployed its UAVs in search and rescue operations.

Indian effort India has made a significant development in the field of remote sensing in the past thirty years and is now sixth nation in the world to have a capability of making, launching and controlling satellites in polar orbit of the space. Here, aerial photography has been in use since 1920 for survey and producing topographical maps. Indigenously developed UAV Nishant went into limited production in December 2005. India has purchased Searcher and Heron UAVs from Israel. Under commercial agreement between Antrix Corporation of India and EOSAT

of US the IRS data is available to users all over the world. All types of remote sensing platforms are being used by the Indian armed forces as force multipliers to improve the combat effectiveness. India’s national security is closely linked to the following problems:

remote sensing and information technology. Although India has made a considerable progress in this field after Kargil conflict, but it still falls short in a number of ways. To meet the future national security challenges, the need of the hour is:

■■ Problem of cross border terrorism and low intensity conflicts.

■■ High resolution military satellites should be developed and launched at a regular interval of three years.

■■ Presence of foreign powers and forces in the region. ■■ Problem of intrusion of arms and men in our territory. ■■ Proliferation of missiles-IRBMs in the region.

ballistic

■■ Proliferation of WMDs in the region. In the years to come, these problems are not going to end. Three things are necessary to tackle these problems: ■■ Armed Forces network-centric capability. ■■ Material-smart system.

with

weapons/supply

■■ Information through modern remote sensing platforms along with ground intelligence network. Now India has become a regional power. So, to cater to future needs relating to national security and to counter the strategic trends of this region effectively, it is now pertinent to enhance our pace in the field of

■■ Satellite navigation system should be developed as early as possible along with serious attempts to acquire a meaningful stake in EU Galileo GPS system. ■■ Efforts should be made for the acquisition of high altitude long endurance UAVs with night vision and thermal imagining capabilities like US Predator. ■■ Serious attempts should be made to acquire AWACS as early as possible. ■■ Independent satellites should be provided to all the three arms of armed forces. Only then in the coming years, will India be able to cater to its national security requirements and have a great impact in regional affairs also. This is not a distant dream or utopian thinking as we have the potential. The writer is Professor, Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, DDU Gorakhpur University, Gorakhpur, India.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

INTELLIGENCE NUGGETS

Around the world counter-terrorism is on a learning curve. Successes in prevention of terrorist attacks are largely exceptions in a “hit or miss” scenario. There is no dearth of information, it is the intelligence that is buried in the mountains of daily telecommunications intercepts that escape the human mind. Yet there are ways of narrowing down the possibilities of “intelligence failure” through joint training programmes for those at the very grass-roots of criminal investigation. Technical means of surveillance and intelligence gathering are useful only for post-mortem examinations if they are not backed up by a concomitant system of sifting and exchange of the tidbits thus gathered among all the preventive agencies in the field. US drone attacks on terrorist targets in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border like India’s Armed Forces Special Powers Act are under attack precisely because of the successes they have achieved through painstaking intelligence gathering and execution.

ll over the world the traditional intelligence collection methods have undergone vast changes with the onset of jehadi terrorism. In the traditional pattern, only national intelligence agencies like the Intelligence Bureau or Research and Analysis Wing used deep cover techniques to collect intelligence from disruptive segments while State Police gathered immediate law and order intelligence. As Stella Rimington, the first woman MI-5 chief said in “Open Secret” (2001): “A KGB officer, if tailed doesn’t turn around and shoot you”. Bruce Berkowitz, author of “Best Truth—Intelligence in the Information Age” (2002) said that intelligence targets in pre-9/11 era were all fixed and had only “incremental variations”. In May 2003 I was requested to present a paper at a high level seminar by the National Advisory Council for South Asian Affairs, Washington DC for assessing steps taken by US agencies on terrorism after 9/11. In my paper “Better Intelligence Management of Terrorism - A blueprint for the National Commission” I said that the Western agencies who had taken lead role in

fighting Communism found themselves inadequate “in meeting the terrorist threats, which was a new phenomenon of contrarious national or transnational politics using the tradecraft of organised crime. This needed experience in crime investigation, which the foreign intelligence personnel lacked or could not perform due to ‘cover’ constraints. National crime investigation and enforcement agencies like FBI and DEA started placing their own officers abroad because of this”.

argument was sound but empirically very difficult. The killing of Wall Street reporter Daniel Pearle in 2002, despite the assailants being aware of his status as a journalist also showed that such “penetration” can be extremely risky. Hence all intelligence services try to use technical means to gather intelligence on extremist activities especially from foreign territories to supplement limited human intelligence.

Humint vs techint

However this method also has several difficulties. The old method of technical intelligence was telephone or fax interception. But extremists seldom used phones. Even during the pre-fibre optic or Internet era it was difficult to extract actionable intelligence through technical means. The volume of intercepts always needed a huge staff for hearing or transcribing. During the Second World War Britain’s monitoring and cipher station at Bletchley Park deciphered 2 million words a day coming from Germany alone. Experience so far indicates that no intelligence agency has been able

Soon after 9/11 attack I had an argument with a “Christian Science Monitor” reporter on the difficulties of using human intelligence to penetrate extremist modules. When I told him that normal rules did not work while infiltrating extremist groups he said that CIA with all its resources could have penetrated Al Qaeda like how American youngster John Walker Lindh was accepted by Osama bin Laden in 2001 at Kandahar after converting to Islam in 1997 with a new name of “Suleyman al-Faris”. Theoretically this

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

Nuggets lost in chaff

V. Balachandran

REMOTE SENSING AND NATIONAL SECUrITY sifting information to transcribe or hear more than 20 per cent of the intercepted material because of staff shortage or linguistic skills. That was how the LTTE tapes hinting Rajiv Gandhi assassination remained unread by our intelligence agencies. FBI while investigating Jewish extremist Meir Kahane’s shooting in New York

in November 1990 found some papers in Arabic indicating plans to blow up World Trade Center which were not deciphered due to shortage of Arab knowing staff. The plans were known only after the first attempt on World Trade Center in February 1993 by Ramzi Yousef.

The arrival of fibre optic method of communication and later Internet completely threw even Western countries out of gear due to the sheer volume of data intercepted. In December 1999 noted US journalist Seymour Hersh wrote “The Intelligence Gap” highlighting how NSA, the

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

INTELLIGENCE NUGGETS

We have a tendency of trying to meet this challenge merely by importing foreign-made equipment for counter-terrorist operations. Gen. Meir Dagan who occupied senior position in Israeli counter-terrorist operations had said: “Investments in intelligence are invisible whereas increased security is visible and often wasteful”. This has been UK’s experience too. In May 2009 BBC’s science magazine “Focus” quoted a senior London Metropolitan Police officer that the CCTV system in England, the largest in the world, was “utter fiasco” as they were not able to identify images clearly premier US interception agency had completely gone out of tune with post Cold War staff reductions and absence of technological up-gradation. In 2000 the European Union (EU) constituted a Committee of experts to study ramifications of an alleged Anglo-American secret project named “Echelon” in monitoring global communication network, possibly targeting European corporate bodies for commercial espionage. This report quoted German Federal Intelligence Service (FIS) saying that it could “filter” (transcribe) only 10 per cent of the 10 million international communications intercepted every day in 2000. In 2007 Mike McConnell, then American Director of National Intelligence told the Council of Foreign Relations, New York that 16 US intelligence agencies under him intercepted one billion pieces of information every day.

Institutionalised dialogue Thus all Western countries which expanded intelligence activities after 9/11 were flooded with an overdrive of information ending up with the same situation as before - difficulties in extracting the grain from the chaff. Even before 9/11 CIA tried to improve information processing in 1999 by tapping IT talents from Silicon Valley including some Indian Americans by setting up a venture capital firm named “In-Q-Tel”. The task given to them was automating the translation and retrieval system. A June 2001 published report said that 5 technologies and services were given to the agency but cautioned that the “the current structure for integrating new IT into the Agency seems extremely complicated and time consuming” because of security constraints. Another report said that as of 2009 “In-Q-Tel” had delivered more than 240 technology solutions to the CIA and other intelligence agencies. While the final results are confidential,

published information suggests that automatic bulk translation was achieved but retrieval of data through “key words” still remained a problem. US authorities have tried to overcome this problem by experimenting with a nationwide alignment of anti-terrorist methodology through institutional dialogue by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

Insulation counter-productive The bedrock of US intelligence system used to be “competitive intelligence” in which different agencies worked on parallel track without much coordination. In this process vital intelligence pointers collected by some agencies were not shared with others. After the September 11 attack wholesale reorganisation of intelligence processing was undertaken. A new post of Director of National Intelligence was created to coordinate between 16 intelligence agencies. In 2004 USA set up the multi-agency National Counter-Terrorism Center under DNI to pool and integrate available intelligence and forewarn implementing agencies including the local police. The basic philosophy of this arrangement is that intelligence already available with different federal agencies and local police should be pooled together to evolve a holistic picture and be made available for all those tasked to “detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to and recover from” terrorist attacks. In the new scheme private sector was also given a key role. The Department of Homeland Security implements this through interactive 24 hour “Fusion Centers” located at 72 places. These Centers continuously update State Police and local security agencies on inputs from NCTC besides receiving local intelligence and transmitting them back to DHS and NCTC. DHS also collates data from 35 federal, state and local

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

agencies and even from private sector. This two way traffic helps widening intelligence coverage on terrorism. Twenty-seven of these Fusion Centers have access to classified information “on line” from NCTC. “Homeland Security State & Local Community”, a new intelligence group assembling about 1,000 key members from 45 (of the 50) states, national capital and 6 federal departments collaborate through conference calls or Internet for aligning thinking and strategy on terrorism. They also have a “Steering Group” to advise DHS on State or local issues affecting terrorism. All legally empowered agencies including the FBI’s 106 counter-terrorism task forces carry on their own independent activities with coordination effected by DHS. The same pattern is more or less followed in UK for their counter terrorism strategy (CONTEST). The multi-agency Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) under MI-5 integrates terrorism intelligence from different agencies including national and territorial police.

India outdated Unfortunately in India we have not attempted to alter our traditional method of collection of intelligence on terrorism. We still follow the post World War II methodology. During our enquiry into 26/11 terror attacks on Mumbai we found that available Central intelligence was not explained to the “cutting edge” level in the City. There was also no two-way traffic or “meeting of the minds”. Our Union Home Minister’s announcement in December 2009 of setting up a National Counter Terrorist Centre (NCTC) for intelligence processing has not yet been implemented. I suspect that it may have been due to the ambitious charter for NCTC unveiled at that time. The Home Minister wanted NCTC to have “overarching responsibility”

to “perform functions relating to intelligence, investigation and operations” for preventing, containing and responding to terror attacks. This model does not exist anywhere. In US and UK versions the NCTC and JTAC have only responsibility of intelligence integration without any investigation or operational role. I had therefore cautioned on March 2, 2010 in a piece in a national daily that it would be extremely difficult to implement this charter. Even with a limited charter American NCTC failed integrating intelligence on the Christmas “under wear” bomber Abdulmutallab travelling to Detroit on Christmas Eve in 2009. His worried father had alerted the CIA station in Abuja on November 19 that year about his son’s extremist leanings. CIA in turn had alerted NCTC. Somehow his passport details were not put on “No Fly List” by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). DNI Dennis Blair had to pay the price for this after a series of such incidents culminating in the May 1, 2010 Times Square bombing attempt by Shahzad Faisal, an American of Pakistani origin.

Public-private partnership Western countries have also been trying out another method of widening intelligence base through public-private partnership. DHS’s “Infrastructure Protection Office” in 18 critical sectors manages public-private sector partnerships before, during and after such incidents. In India despite several key areas of infrastructure moving from government to the private sector no attempts are made to enlist their services. Here private sector and the public are mere spectators. Our entire counterterrorism responsibility is on the overburdened local police. “NYPD” Shield in New York City assembles nearly 3,000 private security managers who get briefed almost on a daily basis on intelligence and on follow up measures after an alert is sounded. The City of London Police with only 800 men (not to be confused with London Metropolitan Police) guards their financial hub of about 450 international banks in cooperation with private security. In Los Angeles (LAPD) such partners

are called “First Preventers” compared to local police and FBI who are “First Responders”. At the operational level these private sector partners work hand-in-hand with local law and order authorities. Institutional joint training is given in LAPD’s National Counter Terrorism Academy for police, fire services, civil defence and private security officials. In Singapore I was taken round their “Home Team Academy” in April 2009 during my lecture visit on terrorism to their senior police officers. This well equipped school jointly trains their police, civil defense, coast guards, municipal officers and Emergency Management sector in meeting joint responsibility on urban terrorism. We have not thought of setting up any such school. All we have are some Army schools for training “stand alone” commandos.

Wasteful import of sensors On the other hand we have a tendency of trying to meet this challenge merely by importing foreign made equipment for counter-terrorist operations. Gen. Meir Dagan who occupied senior position in Israeli counter-terrorist operations had said: “Investments in intelligence are invisible whereas increased security is visible and often wasteful”. This has been UK’s experience too. In May 2009 BBC’s science magazine “Focus” quoted a senior London Metropolitan Police officer that the CCTV system in England, the largest in the world, was “Utter fiasco” as they were not able to identify images clearly. It took several hours for hundreds of staff to scan through more than 90,000 CCTV tapes to identify the Mercedes used in 2007 June Hay Market car bombing. The then Maharashtra Home Minister had declared after 26/11 that Mumbai city would purchase 400 CCTV cameras immediately. In 2 years this would be increased to 4,000-5,000. Did we satisfy that this was the latest technology keeping in mind the British experience? It was only on April 8, 2009 that a leading national daily had accused Mumbai police of selecting outdated weapons without field trials.

The writer is former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat and member two-man “High Level Committee” appointed by the Government of Maharashtra to enquire into Police response on 26/11 terror attacks.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

SENTINEL

Maritime Governance Authority V. Adm. (Retd.) Venkat Bharathan

There is no gainsaying the fact that with its pre-eminent geographical position in the Indian Ocean, India should play a major role in the maintenance of security and the rule of law on the high seas and along the littoral. It is a significant participant in the international effort to curb piracy at sea. Closer home there is an imperative to have a robust institution to manage Maritime Governance, create seamless coastal defence and maritime security arrangements. This apart, there is also an urgent need to create credible maritime disaster management policies and processes.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

magining, imaging, infusing maritime India is the catalyctic need to sustain and accelerate the present growth rate of India. Indian dependency on the seas is complete, critical, across the span of trade, commerce, development, ocean exploration, fisheries, security and maritime access. Present maritime arrangements, existing regulations and compartmentalised activities of the various stakeholders and maritime players result in endemic inefficiencies, considerable fiscal shortfalls, significant security gaps, disjointed crises coordination and sub-optimal decisionmaking. The Indian maritime domain and activities therein need priority top down and bottom up review.

Present statusÂ The governments both centre and state, the Indian Navy, Coast Guard as well as other agencies have made changes as well as progress and

improvements in the overall maritime domain. It is understood that a national committee of secretaries with suitable participation from the Navy and Coast Guard has been instituted. This is a welcome move. However the immensity of the maritime scenario, the functioning patterns, traditional practices, organisational behaviour and turf protectionism involuntarily create piecemeal unlegislated reactive solutions with short term advantages. Creation of a legislated dedicated statutory authority with autonomy, accountability, organisation and reach is the imperative need of our completely ocean-dependent nation. The Directorate General of Civil Aviation, National Disaster Management Authority and the NSA are good examples that must be followed for Maritime Governance. The former, though exemplary in conception and functioning do have operational / operating limitations.

These typically have to resort to liaison and coordination rather than through a much needed dedicated authority. The paragraph below is perhaps self explanatory in terms of what would happen if we do not have organised authority.

Wakeup call The sea-borne attack on Mumbai on November 26, 2008, has starkly highlighted the reality of a disorganised maritime India. Horrific though it was, it could have been actually worse if the attack was made on Butcher Island in the inner reaches of Mumbai harbour. The bigger and unspoken scare is that such an attack could have taken place everywhere and anywhere, in any major port, the Andaman and Nicobar group of islands, or offshore oil platforms. The same goes for a major environmental disaster or a natural calamity notwithstanding the Indian Navyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s yeoman service in the last tsunami.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

SENTINEL

There is an outdated stipulation “No prosecution shall be instituted against any person in respect of any offence under this act or the rules made therein without the prior sanction of the Central Government or such officer or authority as may be authorised by that Government by order in writing in this behalf”. How can maritime governance be implemented?... The absence of any legislation for coordination of security enforcement has not even drawn the attention of the central government due to the compartmentalised nature of the present arrangement wherein each stakeholder has a distinct role with no overlap In both the short and long term we are, not, optimally prepared nor organised to manage any major contingency that may occur in our waters. Consequently the system tends to be reactive rather than be responsive as behoves a Nation of our stature and strengths. The Indian Ocean is one of the busiest in the world daily traversed by tankers and cargo ships. This keeps the world ticking. The powerful navies of the world are permanent, proactive tenants of the Indian Ocean. They trade, negotiate, woo, coerce, control and coordinate with every littoral on their own terms. It is enigmatic that the Indian Ocean littorals do not know each other well. Legacies of historic / cultural / commercial / hegemonic differences still persist. European powers, China and Russia seem to be very much in the minds and thoughts of these nations alongside lasting geopolitical changes that have reshaped sovereignty and governance in most Indian Ocean States. India is astride the Indian Ocean. It has geography, centrality and reach

in the waters round it. It has gained international recognition as a secular democracy. In the last decade the Indian maritime spread has been significant and yet non-threatening. At the same time the Indian Ocean is a maritime common that is the focus of great interest by several countries, USA, China among a host of others are our maritime neighbours in presence and influence. Our response apart from being diplomatic has to be in the maritime arena. The Indian Navy does enjoy considerable reach with long sea legs. The Coast Guard and the merchant marine are continuously expanding. These all augur well. What is needed is only focused optimisation through dynamic coordination

Exclusive Economic Zone, the right of hot pursuit, free passage, piracy at sea, seabed exploration, fishing rights / limits and maritime boundaries would be properly interpreted, promulgated, monitored and coordinated.

Span and scope

■■ The Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939.

A broad outline on the span and scope of Maritime Governance Authority (MGA) is necessary to understand the import, importance and impact it would have for the sustenance of a sovereign India. Maritime governance is about knowing, monitoring ‘order and disorder’ at sea in a constant, timely, coordinated responsive, responsible manner. It also calls for proactive participative, optimal response to search and rescue, disaster management situations of varying scales. The primacy of MGA would not be, to replace the role and functioning of the various stake holders but to bring to bear on them holistic maritime domain awareness and understanding the significance of their participation with synergy. It’s equally important task would be to spread systemic processes in dealing with various regulatory requirements both current and futuristic. United Nations Convention on Law of The Sea / International Maritime Organisation-ratified agreements would form part of this. Coordinating the activities of the various stakeholders including national readiness to deal with matters maritime both in peace and war would be its primary charter. India’s complete dependency on the sea being a given, it is imperative that sea lanes of communication are continuously kept open both in peace and war. The Indian Ocean is the “lifeline” between the Occident and the Orient. The definitions of contiguous zone, territorial sea,

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

Update legislation Review of the existing Acts and their updating is an onerous overdue task that would get focused priority of the MGA. The list below is only an illustrative sample: ■■ The Passport (Entry into India Act) Act, 1920. ■■

The Emigration Act, 1922.

■■

The Merchant Shipping Act, 1958.

■■

The Customs Act, 1962.

■■

The Passport Act, 1967.

■■ The Code of Criminal Procedures, 1973. ■■ The Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act, 1976. ■■ The Maritime Zones of India (Regulation of Fishing by Foreign Vessels) Act, 1981 (MZI Act, 1981) and The Maritime Zones of India (Regulation of Fishing by Foreign Vessels) Rules, 1982. ■■ Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Maritime Navigation and Fixed Platforms on Continental Shelf Act, 2002. ■■ The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. Matters maritime would perforce have to be a central subject. At the same time the role and interests of all coastal states are also paramount. This calls for well considered long term and large format agreed-upon policies and ocean going practices across the span of security, commerce and centre-state coordination.

Information management Creation of a robust management

information system is the need of the hour for effective national governance. Information in time is the key. Utilising it intelligently in responsive decision making is a necessity. This aspect becomes that much more crucial in maritime affairs considering the invisible nature of incidents at sea beyond the horizon. The creation of MGA by an act of parliament would give it the needed permanency as well as political consensus. The government of the day needs to make this happen. The Cabinet Committee on Security needs to be sensitised by the Indian Navy and Ministry of Defence. MGA would in essence, also cater for Maritime Domain Awareness. The Indian Navy alongside the Coast Guard would be the lead agency in creating, setting up and monitoring this. Coastal surveillance would be integral to MDA. Peace time as well as war time actions and contingency planning would all be factored. It is understood that efforts are being made in this direction. The formation of the MGA would be both opportune and optimal. Single point authority would be able to monitor, coordinate and report to the CCS / NSA on matters maritime regularly. This in turn would spread awareness and synergy among all decision-makers as well as the maritime stake holders. Broad tasks are enumerated below:

Merchant vessel reporting systems and Automated Identification of all commercial traffic would form part of the MDA. Shipping companies / stevedores / agents and port authorities would be required to upgrade existing reporting chains. Port management including compliance of various international and national requirements would be the charter of the concerned port and coastal authority. The aspects of International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS), Container Security Initiative (CSI), internal security arrangements and disaster containment measures need to be reviewed, standardised and exercised annually to assess readiness. MGA would be the central authority to ensure this. Hinterland operations would fall under the local commercial / policing authority who would also be represented in the MGA organisation at the state level. Port infrastructure development would also be monitored. The Ministries of Defence, Shipping, Home and intelligence agencies would have suitable representation in the MGA both at the central as well as regional / state echelons. Existing systems only need tweaking up to cater for this. The CCS through the aegis of the National Security Adviser would be the apex body accountable for maritime governance.

Monitoring Legislation would have to be ensured to enable continuous monitoring of all ocean activities. This would enable creation of data bases, monitor cargo movement, regulate traffic and bring to bear the importance and advantages of maritime management. The MGA would provide a unifying standard for coastal states. The coastal state would be very much integral to the MGA set up in that region. This would ensure: Formalised link ups with Department of Fisheries to set up operating patterns, fishing areas, trawler / boats AIS systems, issue of biometric cards to fishermen, organising local watch groups, storm warning, exercise alerts and training. Creation of networks linking all fishing villages, ports and jetties to marine police stations and Navy / CG Operations Centres. Oversight of coastal surveillance infrastructure and integrating this with the National grid. Infusion of marine police with standardised equipment, training, joint exercises with all sea going entities should also be included.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

Following standardised processes in handling merchant vessels, management aspects, cargo handling, customs, excise enforcement, harbour and waterway security, emergency and contingency planning and monitoring activities. Training and exercises for various stakeholders to assess state of readiness and preparedness. Making all Indian ports ISPS compliant. There should be a single point agency for registration of all sea faring vessels. Embedded RFID and positive identification of ownership should be mandated.

Remove lacunae The Indian Navy and Coast Guard are oriented towards maritime security. Yet there are lacunae in current regulations which need to be corrected. Examples are:

jurisdiction. Additionally no prosecution for an offence under this Act shall be instituted except with the prior sanction of the Central Government”. ■■ The absence of any legislation for coordination of security enforcement has not even drawn the attention of the central government due to the compartmentalised nature of the present arrangement wherein each stakeholder has a distinct role with no overlap. ■■ There is a perplexing anomaly between the Customs Act, 1962 which is applicable up-to 24 nautical mile i.e. the contiguous zone of India and the Code of Criminal Procedures, 1973 which is applicable only up-to 12 nautical mile i.e. within the territorial waters of India. ■■ The Offshore Areas Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act again empowers only the Coast Guard. It must become participative.

■■ The Marine Fisheries (Regulation and Management) Act, 2009 empowers Indian Coast Guard but not the Indian Navy. Resultantly the Navy is hamstrung when investigating suspicious fishing vessels in the absence of authority.

The above lacunae militate against maintenance and monitoring of good order at sea. These Acts should not be subject to narrow interpretation and dated practices. An authority like MGA would be able to give focused attention to imperatives of maritime governance.

■■ The IN and CG officers are not vested with powers under the Emigration Act, 1922. Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939 Passport (Entry into India Act) Act, 1920, Passport Act, 1967.

The Central Government needs to carry out a review of the existing maritime scenario and initiate setting up of the Maritime Governance Authority. A beginning needs to be made in right earnest and at the earliest. It needs to be driven by empowered authority to be held accountable to ensure optimal, effective Maritime Governance in the years to come. India’s future hinges on this.

■■ Neither the IN nor the CG officers are empowered to act against violations of ISPS Code. ■■ The Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act, 1976. There is an outdated stipulation “No prosecution shall be instituted against any person in respect of any offence under this act or the rules made therein without the prior sanction of the Central Government or such officer or authority as may be authorised by that Government by order in writing in this behalf”. ■■ The Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Maritime Navigation and Fixed Platforms on Continental Shelf Act, 2002. “Coast Guard is empowered while the Indian Navy which is a security enforcing force has no

internal security

SENTINEL

Our horizon India and the Indian Ocean are integral to each other in spirit, ethos and economics. India being astride and Indian Ocean being central are both geographic realities. The latter is the waterway connecting the east and west. The former is the springboard of a secular non-aligned democracy destined to play a stabilising role in the international arena. Sea power of India in the broader sense of an all inclusive maritime management needs direction. Maritime Governance through a legislated and

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

PHISH AND FRUSTRATION

empowered mechanism is the answer for sovereign India. A few priority areas would be: ──Creation of a robust maritime domain awareness system. ──Setting up an effective networked coastal surveillance set-up alongside coordinated interagency interaction.

Yogesh Rajendra

──Review of ports / harbours and hinterland infrastructure with suitable fifteen year, five year and annual review plans.

Constituting the MGA The above would require nomination of a Maritime Governance Authority. Any senior and experienced leader with maritime management experience would fit the bill. What is perhaps more important and essential is to create workable and pragmatic higher decision making trees at the centre as well as coastal state levels. The charters, roles and processes once set up would progressively evolve as the MGA gradually establishes itself. The senior management in the government is aware as well as conscious of the need to imagine, image, infuse maritime India. Setting up of committees while welcome would perhaps result in incremental improvements. The MGA would help the government to get constant holistic strategic operational, commercial and situational overview. It would also improve and accelerate decision making and bring in muchneeded synergy. Most importantly and relevantly there are already existing systems and organisations that can be reorganised to assist in the creation of the MGA structure. India responds well to authority. The MGA would bring in salutary effects in the overall maritime management domain. We owe this to ourselves to cherish and use the Ocean given to us for sustenance and prosperity. Our future is predicated on how well we maximise the use of the Hind Mahasagar (Indian Ocean). Jai Hind!

The writer is former Vice Chief of Naval Staff. He also served as Indian Naval Attache in Washington DC, USA.

CYBER CRIMES The computer was the harbinger of the information revolution but it carries within itself the seeds of the destruction of the very culture it helped create depending on the hand that strokes the mouse. But the realm of cyber-crime is a house divided between the bad hacker and the good hacker. Totally in keeping with the adage “set a thief to catch a thief” governments are using hackers to stymie the growing tribe of bad hackers. The former are ethical beings dedicated to the scientific and peaceful uses of computational science to create firewalls against penetration of computer systems by criminals on the one hand and inimical governments wishing to win a war without firing a shot. May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

PHISH AND FRUSTRATION

n India most people use Internet for their social, economical, sports, cultural, educational, commercial and scientific purposes. People have become addicted to Internet and IT infrastructure. It has given rise to new challenges and opportunities in every field that we have been thinking. Like other great inventions Internet also has its own advantages and disadvantages. Most harmful and unnoticeable disadvantage is cyber crime i.e. illegal activities committed by unlawful people. The Internet connects people to the cyberspace but people are unaware of the security risk. Computers today are misused for illegal activities. Criminal activities in the cyberspace are on the rise. As the cyber crime grows, there is a growing need to prevent them.

Mushroom growth Organisations like government, semi-government, private, banking, educational institutes, universities provide IT infrastructure to their staff and students, to gather information, publish information, purchasing and communication. Internet offers great advantages to the society and also offers new and highly complicated technological tools to advance their criminal activity. People on the Internet have their own mindsets; some use it for creative work and others use it for intentionally cracking codes and passwords. Any criminal activity that uses a computer either as an instrumentality, target or a means for perpetuating crimes comes within the purview of “cyber crime”. Cyber crime is the latest and perhaps the most complicated problem in the cyber world. “Cyber crime” may be said to be that species, of which, class is the conventional crime and where either the computer is an object or subject of the crime.

New breed The person who is intentionally involved in cracking the system and wants to gain unauthorised access to the system is called a “hacker”. The process the hackers use to crack the system is called “hacking”. The subculture that has evolved around hackers is often referred to as the computer underground. Computer hacking is most common among teenagers, adults,

older hackers as well. Many hackers are true technology specialists who enjoy learning more about how computers work and consider computer hacking a “culture” form. They often enjoy programming and have expert-level skilfulness in technology. For these individuals, computer hacking is a real life application of their problem-solving skills. It’s a chance to demonstrate their abilities, not an opportunity to harm others. There are two faces of cyber crime that need to be understood. The first one is generation side in which people with criminal mind involved in generating threat. And the other side are the victims in which people that are unaware about cyber crime use computerisation for daily use. The mapping should be done on the basis of how many crimes committed and how many cases registered by victimised persons. But in reality there is no one-to-one correspondence, one crime may affect many victims, or multiple crimes may affect one victim. There are some crimes that have no identifiable victims.

Who are the actors? 1) Advanced cyber states 2) Industrial states 3) Criminal enterprises 4) Terrorist networks 5) Developing states 6) Hacker groups 7) Individuals

What are the threats? 1) Viruses: A computer programme that has ability to reproduce itself. They often interrupt your computer system or damage your data. Viruses are usually received by email attachments, data travellers must be careful when opening anything from a doubtful source. They infect computer programmes to do their tasks. Use antivirus programmes as antidote. 2) Spyware: This is information stealer that sends information about you and your computer to the persons who want to misuse it. Spyware may

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

send the addresses of sites you have visited or worse still, transmit personal information. With today’s concerns about identify theft this is a real worry. 3) Trojans: It appears that genuine computer programmes that are really intended to disrupt and damage computer activity by sending information, possibly even passwords onto a third party without your knowledge.

taking anything away from you. All you have to decide is when you want to use a computer and when you don’t, you’re still in complete control of your life. Yes there are threats galore but there are also different ways to counter them in an efficient way and without becoming frustrated.

Real life example

When you click on CLICK HERE TO RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM it will bring you to a fake site where you will see the same look and feel of the SBI site. When you enter your ID and password it will be diverted to scamsters’ database.

Cyber security can be achieved by combination of technical mechanism developed for Internet and legal provisions of cyber law. The people should become aware of cyber threats and the policies to counter them.

Following is the example which I want to share with you. I used to do my transactions over Internet banking service of State Bank. One day I received one mail saying a problem has arisen in your Internet banking

account. It instructed me to click on the link forwarded in mail and solve the problem. As, I have been dealing with such insidious mail for some time I ignored it. The content of the received mail was:

4) IP spoofing: In this technique persons gain unauthorised access to computers, whereby the intruder sends messages to a computer with an address indicating that the message is coming from a trusted host. 5) Spam: Unwanted mail often promoting products of a doubtful financial or sexual nature. Don’t leave your email address on websites and Internet bulletin boards as they are picked up by spammers. 6) Phishing: Is a way of attempting to acquire sensitive information such as user names, passwords and credit card details by camouflaged entity. 7) Adware: Puts advertisements on your screen. These take many forms including popup, advertisements that appear later, even if your browser is closed. Some are sent using the Windows Messenger service which allows a spammer to direct an advertisement straight to your computer by sequentially sending messages to IP addresses. Always frustrating, they are also often of a pornographic nature. 8) Cyber stalking: Is the use of the I n t e r n e t or other electronic means to s t a l k or harass an individual, a group of individuals, or an organisation. It may include false accusations, monitoring, making threats, identity theft and damage to data or equipment, the solicitation of minors for sex, or gathering information in order to harass. The question arises that do you kill computerisation which is amenable to such criminal activity? If life with computers is so wonderful, how do you leave it alone? Simply flip a switch and everything will shut down and you cannot explore the wonders of the outside world. Computers are only tools that can save time and effort without

The writer is Programmer YC-NISDA, University of Pune, Pune, India. He specialises in networking, cyber security, data compression and cryptography. He has published more than 10 research papers in various National and International Conferences.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

MOUNTAIN WARFARE

We may be close to closing the loop in the triad of nuclear capable weapons platforms but do we have a clear picture of the ground realities? The implications of the nexus between China and Pakistan in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir appear to be lost on our strategic community. If we allow that link to grow to full fruition both our conventional forces and the minimum nuclear deterrent will be rendered infructuous in the emerging geopolitics in the mountainous terrain of the Himalayas. Unlike as in 1962 we must be clear in our directions to the Armed Forces of who is the enemy and how to deal with it.

ndia has a unique distinction of having two nuclear armed adversaries in the neighbourhood. There is always a possibility of collusive scenario in the event of a conflict. This should have initiated a debate in the media, among the intelligentsia and in the strategic community of evolving a force structure suited to cater for this changing strategic scene. Sadly everyone seems to be hooked on to various scams and political slugging that is going on all the time leaving no time to worry about national security.

Nuclear overhang We are beset by the Pak inspired terrorism and a near proxy war that is showing no signs of abatement. While the bleeding hearts continue to clamour for a dialogue, our defence establishment must think of restructuring the armed forces to meet the emerging challenges. Everyone of consequence admits that growing Naxalite and Maoist menace is our greatest security threat even more than the external one. While Pakistan is single-minded in its zeal to balkanise India, China is continuing its strategic encirclement of India on land and its string of pearls strategy on India’s western, southern and eastern sea boards. The nuclear dimension of twin threat needs no elaboration. The

security scenario is therefore bleak.

Mountain warfare While evolving a force structure of the future, we need to remember that any future war is more than likely to be in the mountains. This is for two reasons. The entire 4,000 Km border with China is in the high altitude terrain. As far as Pakistan is concerned, 745 Km of Line of Control is in the mountains. Secondly in the context of the two adversaries, the border dispute is in the mountains. As far as our plains sector is concerned, built up areas are getting more and more in numbers restricting employment of mechanised forces. That leaves only the desert sector where classical mechanised operations can be carried out. But the nuclear dimension has nearly put a stop to a deep thrust in this area. So the conclusion reached is that we need to enhance our capability for operations in the mountains. Improvement of infrastructure in border areas must be an integral part of this. Our continued neglect of this aspect is going to prove very costly for us in the event of a conflict.

Restructuring Indian armed forces were evolved by the British and these continue to remain same by way of organisation, equipment, training and logistics. These

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

need to be restructured to cater for changing threats, terrain imperatives and out-of-area contingencies that may arise in the future. However this does not mean that we implant the Western model of revolution in military affairs (RMA) in our context. In the Indian subcontinent, any future war will be limited in nature, in time and space and comparatively of low technology. Then there is the question of the nuclear shadow which will always loom over the conflict. So what we will need is a well-thought-out man-machine mix catering to our peculiar security scenario. No Iraq or Kosovo model of Western weapon systems, technology and tactics can be replicated here. Our modernisation and procurement strategy needs to cater for our conditions and security challenges. It is saddening to note that even after six decades of independence, we are still importing nearly ninety per cent of our defence equipment requirements and have not been able to develop an indigenous capability. In a conflict situation, dependence on foreign equipment and technology can be dicey because the pipeline may be closed anytime. Therefore evolution of a future force structure needs to factor in this aspect.

Countering nuclear threat As mentioned earlier, we have a unique security situation where two

future force structure

nuclear armed adversaries are ganging up against us. Of the two, Pakistan poses a greater nuclear threat to us because of various reasons. Its unstable polity, growing fundamentalism, State protection and encouragement to terrorist organisations and the fact that it is the military that calls the shots makes for a volatile combination. Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine caters for tactical nuclear weapons which can be used in the event of a conflict with India when the very existence of Pakistan is threatened. We on the other hand believe in a credible second strike capability which looks good on paper but is extremely difficult to implement on ground. It poses a moral dilemma. Why should innocent people of Karachi or Lahore be vaporised just because Pakistan has used a tactical nuclear device on our leading mechanised

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Sheru Thapliyal

elements which are headed for depth areas. Besides this, intervention by UN, US, Russia, China and human right activists will make it well-nigh impossible for us to launch a strategic nuclear strike in response to Pak tactical nuclear strike. As far as the Chinese are concerned, by deploying nuclear capable missiles in Tibet, it poses a threat in being. How to counter this is our greatest security challenge. It has been more so by the fact that our armed forces have been kept aloof from not only decision making loop but also our nuclear decision making even while they are the end users. How and when they will be integrated into the nuclear capability is anybody’s guess. Our policy makers don’t seem to understand that a nuclear response needs to be in realtime and

last minute integration of the armed forces into the response mechanism is not possible. A future force structure therefore needs to cater for a response mechanism that will be thrust on the armed forces at the last minute.

Envisaged roles A credible and workable force structure can only be evolved when we are clear about the roles that we envisage for our armed forces in the future. These are likely to be as under:

Army ■■ Should be prepared for a wide spectrum of conflict ranging from low intensity operations to a conventional war under a looming nuclear shadow.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

MOUNTAIN WARFARE

PAYBACk

■■ It should be prepared for out-of-area contingencies in conjunction with navy and air force. ■■ It should control all ground based missiles. ■■

tIME?

Be a part of the nuclear triad.

Navy ■■ Surveillance operations in our seaboards and safe-guarding of exclusive economic zone and sea lanes of communications. ■■

Assist in out-of-area operations.

■■ Choke off adversary shipping in Indian Ocean. ■■

Be a part of the nuclear triad.

Air Force ■■

Assist ground operations.

■■ Assist army and out-of-area operations.

navy

■■

Control operations in space.

■■

Be part of the nuclear triad.

Future force structure Our future force structure will, therefore, need to be evolved keeping in mind the factors discussed earlier. The key issues that have emerged are as follows: Navy will be the most important service of the future. We need to learn from history. British have been the greatest imperial power in the world for over two centuries due to the powers of the Royal Navy. Lack of navy resulted in European powers securing a foothold in India one after the other. navy’s domination of the Indian Ocean will be a key factor in paralysing our adversaries. Our air force should be so structured that it is capable of dominating space. This is specially so in the context of giant strides made by China in space. Since a future conflict will be mountain-centric, army needs to have greater capability of mountain warfare while mechanised elements need to be reduced. Army needs to

COUNTER-MEASURES

have a structure capable of net-centric warfare. It must be prepared to fight a wide spectrum of warfare ranging from low intensity conflict to nuclear war. Armed forces need to be so structured that they can meet the demands of out-of-area contingencies befitting a great power. Armed forces to be integrated into our nuclear scheme of things. Armed forces to be fully prepared by way of doctrines, organisations, capabilities, equipment, training and logistics. It is only to be hoped that powers that be take note of a fast changing strategic

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

scenario and take steps to evolve force structures accordingly. Unfortunately in our country, views of professionals and strategic experts count for very little. Ultimately whatever changes need to be brought about will be done by the bureaucrat and the politician – both ignorant of matters military and to boot pompous. Their single point agenda is emasculation of armed forces and if in the process our armed forces remain what they were a hundred years ago, so be it. Amen. The writer is working for a multinational information technology company after his retirement. He is PhD in Sino-Indian Relations and contributes regularly to magazines, periodicals and newspapers on Strategy, Security and Defence related issues.

Praful S. Adgale

To be one jump ahead of the terrorist or the criminal, law enforcement officers must be able to anticipate the likely methodology of attack based on all available means of destruction. Though it would take a particularly rabid frame of mind to be able to tell that someone would use a plane full of people as a flying bomb as happened on 9/11 but it must be admitted that all evidence and spoors leading up to that incident were either missed or ignored. Ditto with the 26/11 attack on Mumbai. For that reason science and technology can help in retracing the trail and build a knowledge bank for law enforcement officers.

he rise of India as a super power in the 21st century will be more victorious with the major focus on the development in the field of science and technology and its application in social, political, economic and security fields. However, with the rapidly increasing urbanisation, economic liberalisation and criminal activities followed by the global menace of terrorism and other internal security threats at different levels of the society in India, there is an apparent need to rethink and upgrade our security policies and consider the implication of the use of science and technology by today’s criminal and terrorist groups.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

COUNTER-MEASURES

All available means In order to understand the role of science and technology in countering terrorism one has to first analyse and determine how today’s use of technology by terrorists and criminals is a major impediment in framing an effective counter terrorism policy to prevent future attacks either by defensive or offensive means both at land and sea. The use of technology by terrorists or criminals is not a new phenomenon, as noted by David Rapoport ‘technology does not cause terrorism: the Zealots-Sicarii, the Assassins and the Thugs used whatever primitive technology was available to them. It can be no surprise then that modern terrorists continue to employ extant technologies to achieve their goals. For more than a century, terrorists have fantasised about weapons that could obliterate large portions of the earth. Karl Heinzen, the mid-19th-century German radical philosopher who thought prizes should be given for inventing new poisons and explosives, fantasised about weapons like “rockets, poison gases and landmines, that one day would destroy whole cities with 1,00,000 inhabitants”. Secondly, today’s use of modern technology by the terrorists has made them ‘Super techno-terrorists’, which can be seen by the ready use of available technologies easily accessible to both criminals and terrorists. The use of Internet which is the first and foremost tool required to spread propaganda, raise funds, incite violence, hacking, understanding the geographical locations for field study and planning of attacks on any territory. Terrorists also cooperate with criminals for these activities to be more successful and effective. Criminals along with terrorists are using technology to accomplish their unjust demands, which has been proved in case of 9/11 + 7/7 + 26/11 blasts. The other factor responsible for linking of the developed and developing world in the technological area is globalisation that has provided financial benefit to multinational corporations as well, including the rise of greater international mobility of men and material (logistics) and the proliferation of information technology throughout the world has facilitated the

growth of both transnational crime and terrorism. It has been practised during the attack by the hijackers of 9/11 who were aware that it requires separate warrants to tap each phone in the three jurisdictions of the Washington area and they exploited their knowledge to use different cell phones in different jurisdictions to prevent detection of conversation and monitoring. Similarly in the case of 26/11 in India where terrorists used satellite phones, Voice over IP (VoIP), GPS and sophisticated weapons in the attacks.

Computers in criminal hands The similar techniques are also used by organised criminals as drug traffickers use encrypted messages to direct their operations. Terrorists use the anonymiser feature of computers to coordinate their activities across countries. Websites facilitating all forms of transnational crime, for example dissemination of child pornography or recruitment sites for terrorist organisations, are often posted in developing countries without the law enforcement capacity to bring down these sites. The revolution in information technology has facilitated covert banking, more efficient underground banking, electronic fund transfers and the use of debit and credit cards. Piracy and counterfeiting of goods, facilitated by information technology, are important financial sources for criminal groups globally. Most common use of Internet is for raising funds by hacking the systems, cyber squatting, cyber deformation, phishing-vishing, money laundering and all other means. The threat posed by digital terrorism, which includes both information warfare and cyber-terrorism, has frightening possibilities for crippling economic, social, government infrastructure has dramatically increased in recent years by using the Internet to successfully attack critical infrastructure, such as water, power and communication systems, increases the lethality of the weapons with the use of light weight machine guns as SLRs, carbines, sten guns, crude bombs, sophisticated assault rifles, telescopic sniper rifles, LMX, RDX, time pencils, electronic timers, UAVs in use by (LTTE) are available to today’s terrorists. In case of cyber attacks, recently, India is the third most affected country by Stuxnet’s

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

virus whose ultimate objective is to manipulate physical equipment attached to specific industrial control systems such as nuclear power plants, dams, water treatment facilities and other factories causing the equipment to act in a manner dictated by the attacker and contrary to its intended purpose.

Illegal banking In the case of India, more than 17,000 Suspicious Transaction Reports were generated by the financial intelligence wing of the government with the maximum reports of such transactions being received and reported by the banking channels of the country. The magnitude of the problem in case of India is the illegitimate use of democracy where transportation of men and material, communication, used by terrorists and criminals is wide and complex due to their established networks. The nexus between insurgents and Naxalites with the terrorist groups for their operational and planning purpose are being proved by the reports published in Stratfor, a think tank in US as well as by Indian authorities. As per the reports published by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India has been the largest importer of arms for securing its internal security challenges is a major threat for proliferation of small arms in hands of criminals and terrorists. As per the reports published by the Norton Cybercrime Report over three-quarters (76 per cent) of Indian web surfers have fallen victim to cyber-crimes, including computer viruses, online credit card fraud and identity theft, making India one of the most victimised nations, second behind China. India, which currently shares 3.6 per cent of global homeland expenditure, is also set to become largest security market by 2020 as stated by Assocham-KPMG study.

Sci-tech in criminal justice If technology provides new methods and tactics for criminal and terrorist groups, it does prove more challenging for prevention and detection of crime. The criminal justice system is entering a new era transformed by advances in science and technology. The society is experiencing new changes due to the latest strides in the fields

of science and technology. This clearly indicates how effectively science and technology is used by today’s illegal groups to pursue their objectives and ideology. However, the time has come that science and technology should not be ignored and should be utilised in more effective ways. How and where in counter-terrorism do science and technology play a powerful role? In prevention or countering any threat that emanates from terrorism or other activities it is important to first detect and analyse the threat either from land or sea. Secondly, it can respond using both human and technical assistance to minimise the attacks. Application of science and technology helps in forensic analysis and research and development as it helps in collection of evidence and information vital in the court of law. Lastly, use of deterrence in countering-terrorism is being practiced and implemented at strategic, tactical and operational levels. Any counter-terrorism policy without deterrence is ineffective. As use of radiation-detection system at ports helps to prevent and detect the weapons and radioactive substance being smuggled; the use of closed circuit television cameras (CCTVs) are used on

large scale in both public and private places. However, these surveillance systems require human intervention for monitoring the behaviour of people, checking unwanted or suspect objects, etc. Currently, global positioning system (GPS) tracking system is also used for monitoring and location of objects. It is a tracking device to determine the positions or locations of a vehicle or a person to which it is attached. The technological equipment that our police and other law enforcement agencies use should be very advanced. Awareness about the new face of technology is needed in crime prevention. Sufficient government funding is also needed for the new initiatives in this regard. Without the linguistic capacity or the intelligence capacity to intervene in these groups, technology can be used to ever greater advantage.

Profit motive and crime Legitimate civil liberties concerns in many countries may curtail or limit monitoring of information technology. Because most information technology is controlled by the private sector, it is their primary concern to protect their customers rather than to counter transnational crime or terrorism. As cooperative as information technology companies may be, once

a risk is defined, their initial interests are to make a profit rather than to prevent a crime or a terrorist act. The constitutional protections existing in countries which now enjoy information technology dominance place a premium on the privacy and rights of citizens. Therefore, the possibilities for information gathering are limited. Future threats to India’s security are bound to happen with the use of technology by terrorist and criminal groups, however it is our policies that will decide and delimit those threats with the use and application of science and technology in protecting our land and sea borders. The use of electronic radars and satellite and surveillance systems will be effective to some extent however these groups will find other means to attack on our soil. The focus should be on military capabilities that make maximum use of modern electronics and computers to improve combat capabilities at modest cost. The writer is a PhD Research Fellow working in Yashwantrao Chavan National Center of International Security and Defence Analysis (YC-NISDA). He has written a Paper on Implication of 26/11 on Internal Security: India’s new Counter Strategy. His areas of specialisation are European Studies, National Security, International Relations and Terrorism.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

TECHNOLOGY TOOLS

It is a truism that counter-measures tend to lag behind the innovativeness of the criminal mind. Sometimes it verges on the criminal in how obvious panaceas are ignored by the powers that be in both in national security and what has now come to be known as homeland or internal security. It took years of dogged journalism for both the military and the police forces to acknowledge the superiority of the dog’s sense of sight and smell to help in both patrolling and the detection of explosives and narcotics. Decades after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and Beant Singh it is good to see that sniffer dogs have become “standard equipment” in crowded locales like railway platforms, market places and areas visited by VVIPs. It is only now, after the death of a hundred demonstrators, that the efficacy of the pepper spray for mob dispersal and colour dispenser for identification in the Jammu and Kashmir context is being accepted. If the Bureau of Police Research and Development in the Ministry of Home Affairs had done its homework there would have been no nation-wide outcry against the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. 82

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

ver the decades, several technological tools have been introduced into police work. Some of these tools have now become so commonplace that we take them for granted. For instance, photography, telephone, telegraph, two-way radio and patrol vehicles were all new technologies when they were adopted by the police. There is no doubt that these innovations have greatly facilitated the work of the police. When I joined the police in 1968, there were still many police stations in Kerala without vehicles or telephones. There were also at least some stations without electricity. In fact, when we managed to provide vehicles and phones to all the police stations in the state, (I think this happened towards the end of the seventies), there was great jubilation all round.

Quick communications Today, in many states, mobile phones have been officially supplied to all the Station House Officers, if not all constables. Looking back on the seventies and eighties, when mobile phones were unheard of, one wonders how one’s contemporaries managed to run the districts and Ranges entrusted to their care. All that we had was what is now known as the landline. We, as senior police officers, had the privilege of booking what were known as “important calls” which took precedence over all other types of trunk calls. However, even these calls sometimes took several hours to materialise. The other important tool of communication that we had was the police wireless. The VHF was by and large dependable and by having a series of relay towers located at high points we could cover the entire state. This speedy mode of communication, though it was a one-way mode, helped the police to have a definite edge over criminals. That advantage has now been lost with the introduction of mobile telephony. The criminals can now communicate as quickly as policemen do.

Hormis Tharakan

I n n o v a t iv e p o lic i n g

Techno-savvy terrorism The neutralisation of this technological advantage coincided with the spread of terrorism and the advent of the techno-savvy terrorist. There was a time when it was presumed that it was the uneducated, unemployed and underprivileged people who were attracted by terrorism. Whereas this may be true in the case of cadres attracted by Left Wing Extremism, things seem to be somewhat different where terrorism arising out of religious extremism is concerned. Marc Sageman’s well-known study of 400 terrorists showed that the vast majority of them were well-educated and most of them had technical degrees. Whether because of this factor or not, terrorists have been taking tremendous advantage not only of the facilities provided by mobile telephony but also of technological advances in other fields of communications, like the Internet with its tremendous outreach. Other technological innovations that aided the criminal and the terrorist were advanced weapons, often far superior to those possessed by the police, powerful explosives which were

difficult to detect and the Geospatial Information System. The terrorist attacks which took place in Mumbai on November 26, 2008 made use of all these technological innovations.

Mumbai 26/11 paradigm The current thinking on internal security in India has been influenced

to a great degree by those attacks in Mumbai known by the term 26/11, just as the debate on what the Americans call homeland security had been shaped by the terrorist attacks in the US in September 2001, referred to by the term 9/11. The issues that 26/11 highlighted were the want or inadequacy of intelligence, the lack of co-ordination amongst intelligence,

police and defence Services, the need to strengthen coastal security, the need to have well-trained, adequately equipped first response teams in every state and the need to build capacity in state police organisations. Linked to these issues were those like the division of powers between the central and the state governments and the need for terrorism-focused legislation which

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

TECHNOLOGY TOOLS the Prime Minister at the Conference of Directors-General of Police in 2005 which could have addressed many of the technology requirements of the Police has been marked by a singular absence of missionary zeal.

What the police in India sorely lack is a proper research facility dedicated to developing technologies for their specific requirements instead of having to rely on products developed by foreign, mostly western firms. As the foregoing analysis shows, there is a crying need for research into developing technologies for internal security in several areas like technologies for materials detection video surveillance and video analytics; large scale data mining; information security and sensors for security etc. would enhance the legitimate powers of the state and its agencies in tackling terrorism.

Detecting suicide bomber The Mumbai attacks, as well as the spate of terrorist attacks which took place in India earlier that year, set in motion a great deal of thinking about the various modi operandi that the terrorists could use to breach India’s defences. Many an experienced security official recalled that the VVIP security cordon that India’s security agencies had been proud of, something which they thought they had perfected over the years was breached in 1984 by personnel from the Prime Minister’s own security detail to assassinate Indira Gandhi. In 1991, the then novel method of suicide bombing was employed to breach the security of Rajiv Gandhi and later, in 1995, of Beant Singh. Since then, we in India have mercifully been spared the spectre of suicide bombing. However, we need to take note of what is happening in our neighbourhood. A suicide bomber drove a vehicle into our Embassy gates in Kabul two years back killing a few of our finest. In Pakistan, suicide bombing has become a daily occurrence. Let us also not forget that a suicide bomber, a Bangladeshi, killed himself and luckily none but himself, outside the Police Commissioner’s office in Hyderabad in 2005. Hence, the emergence of the suicide bomber requires to be factored into our counter-terrorism planning in India. The suicide bomber makes the earlier modes of security precautions, based on the premise that the terrorist would try his best to escape, meaningless. Other emerging concerns are about terrorists adopting innovative methods of improvising explosive devices and concealing them in public places. These are all valid concerns which need to be addressed. But we must not overlook the need for technical up-

gradation and capacity-building for basic policing tasks. We must not lose sight of the fact that police is basically meant to protect the people of India from crime of all varieties and not merely terrorism. Hence the need for upgrading technology is a need which is equally applicable to the humdrum everyday police-work as it is to the more exciting task of fighting terrorism. In fact, even if we are looking at the issue primarily from the terrorism point of view, it is important that the first responders are empowered. As Mumbai, and countless other terrorist incidents have shown, the primary responders are the police and the fire services. Hence, there can be no two views as to the importance of empowering the men and women at the cutting edge.

Minimum force tools The core responsibilities of the police in the states can be broadly divided into three heads: maintenance of law and order, investigation of crimes and regulation of traffic. Collection of intelligence to support the discharge of these responsibilities is another major area of work. Technology can be used to improve efficiency in all these aspects of police work. As far as maintenance of law and order is concerned, crowd control is one task that the police are most often called upon to perform. The principle of the use of minimum force is the one that guides the police deployed on crowd control duty. Hence we need to equip them with weapons or tools compatible with that principle. After 26/11, there has been much talk about upgrading the weapons capability of the police. However, the real need or at least an equally important need is to have weapons which will cause less damage when dealing with our own people. This was highlighted by the violent street-protests in J&K last year in which over a hundred people got killed. Those protests were triggered by the

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

unintended killing of a Kashmiri youth by a supposedly non-lethal tear-gas canister.

Post-event management Yet another area where technology can contribute is that of post-event management of crime scenes, especially scenes of terrorist attacks, in order to preserve clues vital for successful investigation. There had been criticism that the scene of the terrorist bombing at the German Bakery in Pune last year had been overrun by surging crowds before the investigators could have a proper look at it. In Bali, Indonesia, there was similar criticism when the first terrorist bombing took place in 2002. However, the Indonesian police had improved their skills with the help of their counterparts in Australia before the second Bali blast in 2005 and the improved techniques led to better preservation of the crime scene, which yielded vital clues to the investigators, which in turn led to early apprehension of the perpetrators. Similarly, technology can be of immense help in the investigation of crimes. The spread and advance of technology which criminals and terrorists are taking advantage of have also made them more vulnerable in many ways. While the mobile phone has enabled the terrorist to communicate quickly, it also leaves enough footprints which a clever investigator can follow to good effect. Similarly, the use of Internet by criminals for perpetrating cyber-crimes and by terrorists for networking and planning offers vast investigative opportunities.

Malpractices in police work There are two priority areas, apart from that of counter-terrorism, where possibilities for more effective use of technology need to be explored. These are the drive against corruption and the drive against malpractices in

1. Technologies for materials detection police-work including extra-judicial detention and illegal methods of investigation. Can we use technology for more efficient patrolling? Admirable work done at the University of Indiana by a team of scholars including former IPS officer Arvind Verma in Computational Criminology shows that it can. We should encourage such studies in the Indian context. We must also use technology to develop better methods of interviewing (interrogating) witnesses and suspects. A study by Sudhanshu Sarangi, a serving IPS officer has shown that an appalling number of Indian police officers know little more about interviewing techniques than the people whom they interview do! Another area in which technology can help is in developing more efficient methods of guarding VIP’s. Is there no better way of ensuring VIP security than to put up our men in tents outside VIP residences and Embassies without basic facilities?

Analytical tools I mentioned earlier the important role that intelligence plays in supporting the core responsibilities of the police in the states. At the central level, intelligence plays a crucial role in counter-terrorism operations and in all aspects of maintenance of internal security. As far as intelligence is concerned, technology can contribute not only in the collection of what is known as TechInt or Technical Intelligence, but also in developing analytical tools to aid the Intelligence

Analyst and to help him in large-scale data mining.

Detecting explosives There are several other aspects of counter-terrorism operations or precautions to which technology can contribute. We need technologies that would help us to detect explosive material in public places like markets, railway stations, bus stations, cinema theatres etc. We also need to look at developing architectural techniques that would cater for anti-sabotage checking in buildings and places frequented by the public. Thinking ahead, we must also have technologies that can spot a suicide bomber at a distance and neutralise attempts at carrying out bioterrorist or dirty bomb attacks.

National Police Mission There is a great deal that the government of India has done in this direction already. The Modernisation of Police Forces Scheme under which state police forces have received substantial central funding from 2000 onwards has helped several states to provide better living accommodation, better police station buildings, better vehicles and better equipment to the police. The CCTNS Project, meant to keep track of crimes and criminals all over India which was carried forward in a mission mode is about to be commissioned. However, it is a matter of regret that the National Police Mission, announced by

2. Video analytics

surveillance

and

video

3. Large scale data mining 4. Information security 5. Sensors for security

Coordinate R and D The Bureau of Police Research and Development in the Ministry of Home Affairs does not at present have the requisite financial or material resources to carry out or sponsor research into these areas. There is an urgent need for the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Science and Technology to coordinate their efforts, exploiting the talent available in India’s premier scientific and academic institutions like the Indian Institute of Science, as also the dynamism and quest for innovation prevalent in the private sector in an endeavour to find solutions to the problems that face Indian police, the first responder that the nation depends on as it readies itself to foil any attack on its internal security.

The writer was Secretary (R) in the Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India and Director-General of Police, Kerala. Currently, he is a Member of the National Security Advisory Board and is also a Visiting Professor at the Department of Geopolitics, Manipal University. He writes on strategic issues and police reforms.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

SCI-TECH

Even as internal security is a manpower intensive operation, more and more the human element needs to be supplemented by technical means like sensors, sniffers, low-light detection equipment and motion detectors. Experience has shown that both, the human element as well as the technical means, are interdependent in that monitoring of equipment cannot be dispensed with. The absence of a human backup could leave a loophole for terrorists and anti-national elements to exploit with impunity. The barbed wire fence along India’s international borders have been effective where the sensors and night-vision devices are backed up by instantaneous human intervention when danger is detected. Yet the dangers are so multifaceted that there is constant need for upgradation and refinement of the technical means if the human element is to be able to fulfil the requirement of internal security with any degree of certainty and efficiency.

n the 21st century geo-political and geo-economic architecture, multi-dimensional threats and challenges to the internal security of India and across the world are multiplying. In its long journey of over six decades as an independent nation-State, India is faced with a series of low intensity internal conflicts of various shades and modes, including communal clashes, insurgencies, separatism, religious-ethnic violence, illegal migration across the land and territorial waters, domestic and trans-national terrorism, proxy war supported by external actors like Pakistan, organised crimes and nexus with terror, drug trafficking and money laundering, corruption and white-collar crimes, cyberspace insecurity, increasing Naxalites’ onslaughts in over a dozen Indian states, followed by a number of non-traditional threats to Indian security, natural and man-made disasters etc. These threats and challenges are just like a lurking snake, which must be dealt with full readiness and, crippling blows as and when required.

Sci-tech in security apparatus In dealing with the dangers of internal security, India must utilise its scientific and technological competence as ‘internal security force multiplier’.

The trends and potency of scientific and technological sophistication acquired and manipulated by the terrorists and criminals – cyber criminals and otherwise are also alarming. Detection, identification, prevention and responses to them require the support of a broad range of technologies, cutting across various areas needed for internal security management. India needs to be adequately prepared to face these challenges and its internal security system be properly galvanised to integrate the broader perspectives of scientific and technological know-how and tools for public safety and security in the fast changing and globalising world. Thus, internal security management encompasses an important domain of responsibility in India’s policy framework and needs multi-dimensional approach across all sectors of security and development seen as two faces of a single coin. It requires bringing together the government, security experts, solution providers, industry and strategic analysts from the academic world to deliberate upon strengthening India’s internal security system with the help of technological interventions to provide advanced and intelligent solutions to the growing needs of internal security forces. They must examine the entire gamut of threats and identify the role

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

Dr. Rajendra Prasad

of technology in public safety and security as well as protection of private or corporate-owned physical assets created through modern industrial processes.

Manpower intensive Going by traditional accounts, India’s national security spectrum has involved large-scale employment of armed manpower rather than extensive use of technology. But, with the passage of time, it is irrevocably required that India’s internal security services and agencies procure and utilise state-of-the-art technology and products and all its research and development activities must be geared up to bring about new changes best suited to the technical and operational requirements of these security services and agencies. Also, a reservoir of technically trained manpower must be maintained and fresh bands of technical personnel be recruited for internal security duties in the near future. The major task of internal security services is essentially one of safeguarding the lives of civilians and their assets against the selective and indiscriminate violence inflicted by insurgents, separatists, domestic and trans-national terrorists and criminals, trying to weaken, destabilise or topple the authority of the government in

technical means as force multipliers power and germinate the seeds of disruptive trends to achieve their premeditated goals. In dealing with these challenges, India’s internal security services and agencies require a broad range of cutting-edge technology, products and sophisticated equipment for early detection, warning, identification and surveillance of these acts and their perpetrators, coupled with the neutralisation of explosives, anti-personnel mines and other destructive devices. Especially, electronics, computers, databases, optical and thermal devices, etc. are required for nabbing criminals, prevention of white collar crimes, control of industrial espionage, illegal entry of harmful materials, etc. To accomplish all these tasks, security services need to be fully modernised through intensive and extensive

introduction and use of science and technology in various roles. Keeping in view various technological needs of internal security services and agencies in a low intensity conflict or terrorist environment, India needs to have special focus on the following areas through the optimum adoption and utilisation of science and technology:

1. Equipping internal security forces for low intensity conflicts (LICs) Low Intensity Conflict has emerged as a serious threat to the internal security of India. For about four decades, India has been faced with the brunt of insurgency, terrorism, Naxal threats and the like. In such circumstances, our

internal security forces are required to be trained and confident about their weapons and other technical needs well in advance. Technology and products which are immediately required, can be made available by customisation of existing technologies. Future requirements have to be visualised. Today when India is in the vortex of LIC in various shades and modes, its Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has geared up its endeavours to provide technology and different range of weapons and devices required by the forces which are deployed to fight in these conflicts. LIC requires superior quality, portable and accurate guns for close quarter combat. DRDO-developed modern submachine carbine is best suited for this. DRDO has also prepared a compendium of Technology and products available

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

SCI-TECH

with industry for our internal security forces.

2. Effective policing and border security management for preventing intrusion by terrorists and criminals, etc. Peninsular India needs to prevent the intrusion of terrorists, criminal elements and illegal migrants across its far-flung geographical frontiers, porous boundaries, territorial waters, exclusive economic zones. It requires effective policing and adequate border security management through intensive adoption of science and technology. Such efforts would incorporate the large-scale use of seismic, thermal, infra-red and electronic sensors, optical equipment for long-distance surveillance, satellite surveillance, tamper-proof documentation, radiographic examination of visas and passports at various checkpoints and border posts and computerised access control systems, including portable radiocomputer terminals, etc. In addition to equipment and devices, we need sufficient technical manpower to perform various tasks assigned to them.

3. Prevention of the entry of hazardous materials into one’s territorial limits and sea frontiers. Evidently, metals, explosives, toxins, drugs, gases and other hazardous substances have been inducted and diffused in so many quarters of India by illegal trafficking through Golden Crescent and Golden Triangle routes, germinating serious internal security risks against India as a result of nexus of external agencies, cross-border terrorism and organised crime. Efforts should be made to prevent the entry of harmful materials into our territory through land, sea and air routes. This will involve large–scale use of various detectors on all important entry and exit check-points to identify metals, explosives, drugs, poisons, gases and other harmful biological and chemical materials.

4. Prevention of sabotage, subversion and other disruptive activities. Over the years, the destructive potency of insurgents, criminals and domestic and trans-national terrorists has increased substantially to inflict

large-scale sabotage, subversion and disruption in any part of India. To prevent the menace of these hazards, Indian security services and law enforcement agencies must go ahead with adequate use of accesscontrol systems, various types of detectors, arson control systems, etc.

5. Transportation security Modern means of transportation, such as cars, buses, trains, aeroplanes, ships, etc. are the boons of science and technology, which are easily prone to disruption caused by the terrorist activities. Protection of these means of transportation and their infrastructures has become a highly challenging responsibility, along with the safety and security of the stations, airports and sea ports, etc. To insure transportation security on land, sea and air from the attacks of terrorists, we have to take lessons from the hijacking of Indian Airlines plane IC-814 and 26/11 terror onslaught in Mumbai by engaging specialised technical manpower and systems supporting human behaviour. These may include perimeter intrusion and detection system (PIDS), explosive bomb detection devices and dog squads, etc. Specialised units and service groups of the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), marine commandos and aviation security groups have to perform their duties well to meet any future contingency.

6. Control of industrial espionage. At present, technology is at the heart of India’s rapid economic and industrial growth. To keep pace with these trends, Indian industry and corporate sector need masterly approaches and state-of-the-art technology to prevent industrial espionage through large-scale adoption of national technical means, like data detection equipment, sophisticated access control systems, direction finders and sweeping devices, behavioural science techniques to detect moles and derelict individuals and anti-eavesdropping devices to prevent bugging, telephone tapping, fax interception, etc.

7. Detection of explosives and neutralisation of bombs, mines, etc. Detection of explosives is a highly

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

technical and challenging task and is largely based on sensors. India has developed several important sensors and others are under development. Work on laser-centric technology for standoff detection from a distance of 20 metre to detect trace quantity of explosives is underway. Presently, hard-wired buried explosives have emerged as a big hazard, as they are difficult to detect. India is now planning to use land penetrating radars, which are capable of generating large data base to quantify detection. As estimated by the DRDO sources, within two to three years, the system would be commercially available for its use by the Indian security services. In addition to explosives detectors, India has to focus on the neutralisation of explosive bombs and mines, along with disruption detection equipment and devices. Remote Operated Vehicles developed by DRDO are going to play a crucial role during the deployment of internal security forces in Low Intensity Conflicts (LICs). It can also be used for mine detection, once its sensors are developed and operationalised.

8. Public safety and security and protection of physical sssets. Going by the demographic data of 2011, India has reached the figure of 121 crore population. Due to growing dangers of selective and indiscriminate terrorist violence, widespread availability of small arms, light weapons and other modern means of destruction to insurgents, Naxalites, criminals and saboteurs, India should pay special attention and utilise its technological competence and technically trained manpower for public safety and security and protection of physical assets anywhere and everywhere according to the exigency of the time. To insure internal security and protection of common people, VIPs and VVIPs at workplaces, offices, special gatherings, market-places and in the streets, etc. India’s internal security system requires the leverage and cautious utilisation of technological support, like advanced ICT devices, CCTVs, alarm systems, electronic fence systems, bullet-proof jackets and bullet-proof cars, detection of incendiary devices, advanced technical systems to neutralise electronically and radio-controlled explosive devices and the many rudimentary means of violence presently being used by

terrorists, organised criminals, etc. Securing any economic installation or physical infrastructure needs case-specific safety and security arrangements. Therefore, as part of perspective planning and programming for physical security, ‘security audit’ must be properly done to evaluate the security needs of all important industries, plants, refineries, depots, etc. on case by case basis.

9. Prevention of white-collar crime and economic and financial insecurity. India has been faced with the problems of corruption, financial irregularities, money laundering and a number of scams and white-collar crimes in the age of liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation (LPG). LPG has broken all the barriers of national security, technology transfer, trade and investment, currency etc. To prevent white-collar crimes and economic and financial insecurity, India needs to use in a big way tamper-proof systems, built-in safeguards in credit cards and account transfers, technical investigation to identify malfunctioning of mechanical devices dealing with national and international money transactions. Alarmingly, terrorists, organised crime planners and other vested interests have exploited such situations in the past to collect funds through various channels and perpetrate their unlawful activities in India and across the globe. But, with large-scale adoption of science and technology, the past should not be allowed to mar the present and foreseeable future.

10. Cyberspace security Protection of the cyberspace is now as important as the geographical boundaries of a nation-State. For India, cyberspace security encompasses a wide range of technological endeavours “… for protecting information, equipment, computers, communication devices and information stored therein from unauthorised access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification or destruction”. The defacement of government websites by hackers, like that of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) in 2001 and other events in

the recent past are most alarming. It is high time when cyberspace security should be prioritised in our national security discourse, without losing sight of the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model of cyberspace security through the large-scale adoption and utilisation of scientific and technological potential of India. For our defence services, a unified cyber command must be created at the earliest.

11. Technology against nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) terrorism Given the situation in a nuclearised South Asia, followed by a wide variety of fragile political, social, economic, technological reverberations and motivations, the probability of nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism against India cannot be ruled out. The trans-national network of terrorist organisations may boost the diffusion of these technologies, products and training across the international frontiers in unprecedented ways. The infamous Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadir Khan’s connection with this kind of diffusion of nuclear technology has already drawn attention to the worst case scenario. Also, there is the probability that, unlike Plutonium and highly-enriched Uranium for making a nuclear bomb, radioactive materials used in radiological bombs, which are popularly known as ‘poor men’s atomic bombs’, can be procured by motivated terrorists either through black-marketing channels or thefts from the civilian nuclear sites and military sectors across the world. The International Atomic Energy Agency has already recorded about 15 cases of such thefts. So far as biological and chemical technologies and their usable devices are concerned, they have some natural edge over nuclear devices and technologies and as such in case of any chemical-biological terrorist onslaught, their detection would be difficult

by traditionally available sensors. According to DRDO sources, India has already developed and delivered to our armed forces a variety of sensors for detecting nuclear radiation, pathogenic agents and toxins. Still, more work is needed in the area of developing new sensor systems to detect biological-chemical terrorism. Visualising the probability of NBC threats caused by terrorists, no matter how small, India needs long-term and large-scale adoption of technology and “Money, Machine and Manpower” planning, programming and budgeting as part of its preparedness to meet any catastrophic terrorist situation in the unforeseen future.

The road ahead To meet all present and future threats and emerging challenges against its internal security, India needs a new technology vision and public-private partnership for comprehensive internal security set-up. To safeguard India from LIC and asymmetric threats of trans-national terrorism and many emerging non-traditional security challenges of harmful magnitude, we have to revamp our existing systems. There is need to integrate the homeland security and defence sectors with a priority on internal and border security, cyberspace security, maritime security and over-all resource security requirements through intensive adoption and utilisation of science and technology as force multiplier.

The writer is Professor in the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies (DDSS) and Dean, Faculty of Science, DDU Gorakhpur University, UP, India.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

SPACE WARS

Brig. (Retd.) Dr. Arun Sahgal

Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s demonstrated anti-satellite (a-sat) capability has turned the focus on the military uses of space. Even as every major nation of the world talks glibly of non-militarisation of space as a paradigm of global peace and tranquillity. Every civilian application in space launch vehicle and satellite technology carries within it the seeds of military uses as well. Dual-use is intrinsic to space technology and is inseparable and cannot be ignored. India is aware of the threats posed by space-based technologies to its aerospace security.

nlike many other space faring nations, Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s space programme began and largely continues with strong civilian developmental roots. The use of space technology primarily for human and societal development has been the Indian policy from the very beginning. This approach has been wholeheartedly backed by Indian political leadership. Keeping with this policy, India has placed large number of assets in space to carry out a range of applications from service to scientific sectors from meteorological observations, telemedicine, remote sensing and weather forecasting, search and rescue operations, DTH television services among others. The INSAT space segment has approximately 24 satellites with ten in service providing 200 transponders for use by business communities.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

Military application

of space assets Multiple uses Indian Earth Observation Satellites or the Remote Sensing Satellites that provide imageries in different spatial resolutions, spectra bands depending upon the kind of applications â&#x20AC;&#x201C; agriculture, water resources, urban development, mineral development, ocean resources and disaster management among others. With nine IRS satellites in operation it is the largest such constellation in the world. Of these satellites some are reported to have spatial resolution of one metre and below which can be used for military application as well. For instance with synthetic aperture radar from Israel, can provide day and night all weather one metre resolution adequate to track activities in its neighbourhood. It needs to be understood that space activities are essentially dual use. Even a purely civilian programme will normally have military spinoffs as an example space launch vehicle such as PSLV or GSLV can be used as a ballistic missile, only the payload has to be changed together with re-entry technology. Similarly, earth observation satellites, can be used for intelligence gathering through ELINT payloads, surveillance or reconnaissance. Also, navigation satellites can be employed for navigation, positioning and targeting.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

SPACE WARS

It needs to be underscored that while thus far India was satisfied by purely ISRO driven space programme - and there were good reasons for this primarily owing to crippling sanction regimes by US under which large number of ISRO and DRDO entities were under sanctions. With the rapid militarisation of space and it becoming part of country’s strategic space, exploitation of space to enhance defence capability by providing realtime information, sensor integration as also providing data overlays with decision support systems to create what can be truly called network centric warfare architecture has become an imperative Military component Fundamentally it needs to be noted that space has become a strategic frontier that is looked upon by all major powers as a component for enhancing their national power. Exploitation of space has become part of grand national strategic objective. Consequently space and security issues are getting increasingly intertwined. Two aspects merit attention. One as mentioned earlier all elements of space technology come under dual use, hence countries attempt to hide their military programmes under this dual use rubric even as they pursue active policies for militarisation of space. Second, space assets are getting increasingly interlinked to the national defence capabilities and becoming an essential part of overall command, control, communications, computation and Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture of any modern military.

China as case study Let us take the example of China. Chinese space activities span the entire spectrum that include research, development and well developed manufacturing base which produces everything from launch vehicles and satellites, to an extensive ground segment that oversees space launches backed by extensive telemetric and tracking control network. It possesses ten different types of launch vehicles and producing a new vehicle that could put 25 ton of payload in low earth orbit and 15 ton in geo-synchronous orbit. Its indigenous satellite capability includes communication, meteorological, navigation and positioning, as also remote sensing and ELINT etc. What is important and noteworthy is that the entire programme is seen as strategic with no firewalls between civil and military.

Civilianised Commission on Science and Technology in Defence (COSTIND) sits at the apex but is manned by PLA Generals and remains responsible to the Central Military Commission through the General Armament Department (GAD) of the PLA on whose behalf it coordinates activities of the major aerospace holding companies, principal research academies and the industrial organisations. China National Space Administration (CNSA) essentially is a civilian front both for liaison between military and defence industry as also for international cooperation.

entire detection-to-engagement chain will have significant operational consequences for India. Second, expansion of Chinese military capabilities with space as the catalyst could lead China centric balance of power in Asia, opening the region to coercion or bandwagon with China. Third, the growth of asymmetry in comparative military balance could lead to China flexing its muscle underscoring the role of space based military assets and capabilities not only as tools for coercion but significantly for power projection.

Importantly space based systems are seen as an important construct of overall operational military capability. As a result China is methodically working towards developing military space capability and integrating these assets into its war fighting doctrines. What is even more important and significant is the fact that, China is not only engaged in developing space assets for ‘Force Enhancement’ or support missions, but is gearing up for more ambitious ‘Space Control’ and domination. Resultantly in addition to developing military space systems for C4ISR, navigation, imagery, communications etc., is focusing on developing Anti-satellite System, co–orbital satellite constellations and BMD and DEW programme involving both laser and high power microwaves. Despite assertions of peaceful use of space, China’s space programme is an essential part of its “informationised war doctrine”.

Indian space capabilities

Strike capability It is important here to highlight the strategic significance of Chinese space programme. First, China’s space and counter-space programmes increase their strategic reach, through 24/7 ISR cover and long-range precision attack capabilities. Space assets are increasingly becoming critical to its

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

Main application missions flown by India are through GSLV and PSLV launch vehicles. These are essentially configured for sun synchronous 600-1000 km polar orbit and Geostationary Transfer Orbit (GTO). In terms of payload PSLV can lift 1,500 kg in Low Earth Orbit while GSLV can place nearly 2,500 kg in GTO. A new launch vehicle called GSLV MkIII is reportedly under development which will be able to lift a payload of 4-4,500 kg into GTO. PSLV has been used for launching Chandrayaan 1 and GSLV will be used for Chandrayaan 2 mission. ISRO is presently involved in developing reusable launch technologies. India has 10 communication satellites with 200 transponders bulk of which are being used by ministries and government departments. Two recent consecutive failures of GSLV has led to failure to launch 24 additional transponders. There is single satellite Kalpna providing meteorological services. India has the largest constellation of nine remote sensing satellites in civilian domain providing imageries in variety of resolutions, spectra bands and swaths.

Ground enviro-systems In terms of ground infrastructure India has a launch complex at Sriharikota, ground stations, tracking, telemetry command network. This means that India too like China has end to end capability starting from concept to flight systems for both satellites and launch vehicles. Forthcoming satellite missions include remote sensing mission for optical imaging and microwave control remote sensing and seven communication satellites. In addition following technology demonstration missions have been planned: a. Reusable launch vehicle technology demonstrator b. Human space flight mission in 2015 -16 time frame c. Space capsule recovery experiment d. Chandrayyan 2

Military space project Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is responsible for strategic space programme. It has over a period developed capabilities for both strategic missiles that can reach targets from 600–3,500 km with experiments underway to reach medium / intermediate range capabilities from 5,500 to 8,000 km in terms of ballistic missile defence interception at the endo-atmospheric region (15 km) and exo–atmospheric region of around 40 kms have been demonstrated.

Where does this leave India in terms of its security needs? The issue is gaining additional significance with demonstrated Chinese offensive space capability. ASAT capability has the potential of disabling our navigation, ELINT or GPS satellites all operating in LEO. The fact that Chinese were indifferent to debris created and have also developed number of micro and nano satellites that could impact or deface our satellites is a real challenge.

Vision 2020 To deal with this issue it is learnt that an Aerospace Vision has been developed which attempts at laying down a well thought out road map for exploiting space as part of India’s overall military and force application strategy to deal with threats and challenges in the time frame 2005-2025. The intention is to develop space based capability to ensure overall space control in the area of interest. This path breaking perspective aims at shifting the onus of intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and force application perspective from the present ground based sensors to increasingly space based sensors. It fundamentally acknowledges the fact that exploitation of space is imperative for Indian future force development strategy.

Multiple scenarios Space vision is predicated upon three possible scenarios that can be visualised in the above time frame, for development of space based capabilities.

■■ Status Quo / Benign Scenario: This essentially envisages an environment of managed asymmetry in balance of power and incremental improvement in the immediate security environment in terms of resolution of outstanding conflicts or trade and diplomacy overriding current situation of standoff with our principal adversaries. In such a scenario, vision document highlights exponential increase in space based capabilities is not envisaged, except for normal enhancement, to ensure increased degree of ISR and other capabilities such as GPS or geo-information technologies. Here the primary aim is to use available civil capabilities with limited military investments for force enhancement i.e. improving military force and system capabilities for optimal task and mission fulfilment. ■■ Deteriorating Regional Situation: This scenario takes cognisance of increase in threats and challenges, particularly in terms of demonstrated strides being taken by China in developing space assets and its growing space domination posture coupled with increase in ground based sensors as part of its fast developing integrated C4ISR network. Perception that such a threat could become the function of unmanaged asymmetry by 2020-25 is fundamental in this scenario. Blueprint of the space vision document supports defence modernisation strategy in terms of aerospace requirements and capabilities to meet overall dissuasive defensive strategy. Essentially it entails integration and synergisation of space and military capabilities so as to create network of system architecture capable of combining the cumulative

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

SPACE WARS

potential of military forces with space systems. This scenario takes cognisance of increasing military capabilities of India’s two principal challengers and aims at exploiting space in concert with network centric capabilities to ensure marked information capacities from near to realtime and C4ISR infrastructure that markedly enhances the sensor to shooter timings as also allows data fusion. ■■ Hostile/Regional Aspiration Scenario: This scenario relates to growing Indian strategic space in concert with its economic and political interests. Aspiritaional in nature alludes to India playing larger strategic regional role. In this scenario which replicates shifting bias from continental construct to more maritime and projectionist orientation of Indian strategic thinking, IOR and space become critical. This requires obvious translation of developing defence capability to meet these aspirations. It is in this scenario of force projection and security of maritime interest’s that space exploitation becomes critical.

Three-tier roadmap Towards dealing with the above threats and challenges a three tier roadmap aimed at developing space capabilities in terms of Space Asset Domination (SAD) has been suggested. This is aimed at domination of specific areas at specific times to enhance ISR and precision engagement capabilities. Broad developmental phases are as under: ■■ Phase 1 relates to creating “specific area and time capability” for space asset domination of existing areas of interest (including gradually extending the area of coverage), by deploying satellite and other assets that aim at providing near or realtime ISR. This is a short term phase and could cover period upto 2015. Broad capabilities that are proposed during this phase include: • Launching of additional satellites to cover additional areas • Create minimum revisit capability of once a day • Post strike capability

damage

assessment

• Allow C4ISR and data fusion

specific areas of interest

• Software package to disseminate imagery data in near real time

• Chain of sky wave and surface wave Over The Horizon radars linked with satellites to enhance maritime domain awareness

■■ Second phase of the road map envisages development of what can be termed as development of sectoral capability i.e. real or near realtime picture of, for example, India’s eastern borders. This phase implies Space Asset Domination (SAD) to allow degree of pre-planned output in real time to allow precision engagements and PSDA over complete area of interest and / or Indian Ocean, in sectoral terms as per defined satellite coverage. Intended capabilities to achieve above coverage include: • Near 4-6 hours

realtime

inputs-within

• Capability to place minimum number of satellites during the warning period to cover specific area of interest • Upgradation of Early Warning and ELINT capabilities • Provide near realtime surveillance on demand • Creation of satellite redundancy • Data fusion and creation of satellite command centre • Developing assets

space

domination

■■ Third phase can be termed as development of one front capability, which is essentially an extension of Phase 2. It envisages enlargement of the Phase 2 model to encompass entire strategic space including the Indian Ocean. Entails developing Space Asset Domination of complete area to provide realtime picture and credibly enhance air space management through data fusion and ability to exploit space assets on as required basis. In addition to above capabilities this phase is expected to provide: • Enhance the existing base of satellite coverage to provide realtime information • Improve Circular Error Probable (accuracy of missile / projectile to 5-10 metres • Sub-metric resolution on demand of

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

Secure North 2011 EXPO

It needs to be underscored that while thus far India was satisfied by purely ISRO driven space programme and there were good reasons for this primarily owing to crippling sanction regimes by US under which large number of ISRO and DRDO entities were under sanctions. With the rapid militarisation of space and it becoming part of country’s strategic space, exploitation of space to enhance defence capability by providing realtime information, sensor integration as also providing data overlays with decision support systems to create what can be truly called network centric warfare architecture has become an imperative. While the proposed road map which aims at tri-service integration of resources in a Joint Command looks to be an ambitious project its future no doubt depends upon how rapidly the government allows it to develop. This entails changes in the mindsets within the establishment notably ISRO and the national security management apparatus. The need is to ensure military space requirements are factored adequately in ISRO’s space launch plans. A fundamental issue is whether there is a need for a separate military launch facility. Equally important is developing indigenous software for data fusion, dissemination and host of other technical requirements. Yet another aspect is developing military space weaponry like Kinetic attack Loitering Interceptor (KALI), Directionally Unrestricted Ray-gun Array (DURGA) together with proto laser weapon technology among others. India cannot lag behind in this field which has the advantage of technological leapfrogging.

The writer is Consultant with IPCS and Founder Director Net Assessment, Integrated Defence Staff and former Member National Task Force on Net Assessment and Simulation.

Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), organised Secure North 2011, a three day expo-cum-conference from April 4 at CII Convention Centre, Sector 31, Chandigarh. Secure North 2011, was inaugurated by H. E. Shivraj Patil, Governor of Punjab and Administrator, UT Chandigarh. Lt. Gen. S. R. Ghosh, AVSM, SM, GOC–in–C, Western Command, Indian Army and Mr. R. M. Khanna, Immediate Past Chairman, CII Northern Region, many senior government, defence and police officials and captains of industry also graced the occassion. Theme of the conference was: Security Challenges and Solutions for North India Secure North 2011 was the first of its kind B2B focused exposition in North India displaying the latest trends and technologies on safety and security. This premier exposition showcased most advanced technological Solutions for Internal, Homeland, Industrial, Residential, Cyber Security and Fire Safety etc. Focus areas ■■ ■■ ■■ ■■

Safety and Security Solutions ■ Vehicle Tracking and Screening Solutions ■ Mobile Forensics Softwares and Hardware CCTV and Alarm Solution ■ Cyber Security ■ Fire Safety Equipment ■ Search, Rescue, Safety Tools and Equipment Major Accident Management/Emergency Response Equipment ■ Disaster Relief and Assistance, Shelter and Tenting Emergency Medical Services (EMS) ■ Wireless Communication

Secure North 2011 was attended by more than 150 delegates representing Policy Makers, Police Officials, Defence Forces, Research and Development wings, Crime Consultants, Private Security Agencies, IT Industry, Banks, Researchers etc. Defence and Security Alert (DSA) was media partner for Secure North 2011. DSA stall was visited by H. E. Shivraj Patil and many other senior officials from Defence and Security forces and the corporate world. DSA magazine was highly appreciated by professional experts and general visitors alike.

Secure North 2011 EXPO

internal security

CHOKE POINTS

Information security is both a drill and a state of mind. More and more information per se is worth its weight in gold and that is why governments, companies and secret agents seek it out or try and prevent its misappropriation and misuse by extremely imaginative methodologies – to name one, the embedding of software in oil pipeline technology to ensure that if stolen the consequences of its use could trigger massive destruction both identifying the thief and wreaking condign punishment on him.

he word Security is derived from Latin “Se-curus”- “Se” meaning without, and, “Curus” meaning care. Therefore, Security relates to a state, feeling or being without anxiety or care or being safe. To put in another way, it is the safeguarding or protecting one’s interests or assets from inimical forces. Security is the condition of being protected against danger or loss. In the general sense, security is a concept synonymous with safety. The nuance between the two is an added emphasis on being protected from dangers that originate from outside. Individuals or actions that encroach upon the condition of protection are responsible for the breach of security. The risks posed by cultural change, globalisation and weakening infrastructure are becoming more serious than ever.

Security concepts Certain concepts recur throughout different fields of security. a. risk - a risk is a possible event which could cause a loss. b. threat - a threat is a method of triggering a risk event that is dangerous. c. countermeasure/control - a counter measure is a way to stop a threat from triggering a risk event. d. defence in depth - never rely on one single security measure alone. e. assurance - assurance is the level of guarantee that a security system will

behave as expected. Heads of State and military commanders have long understood the importance and necessity of protecting information about their military capabilities, number of troops and troop movements. Such information falling into the hands of the enemy could be disastrous. Governments, military, financial institutions, hospitals and private businesses amass a great deal of confidential information about their employees, customers, products, research and financial status. Ever since the early days of writing, Heads of State and military commanders understood the significance of information and that it was necessary to provide some mechanism to protect its confidentiality and to have some means to detect tampering. Persons desiring to secure communications used some type of sealing devices to indicate the authenticity of documents, prevent tampering and ensure confidentiality of correspondence to prevent the secret messages from being read in case a message falls into the wrong hands.

Classified information Gradually substantial advancement was introduced in information security that resulted in its professionalisation. It also witnessed the introduction of formalised classification of data based information and classified access to the information. By the end of the 20th century and early years of the 21st century, rapid advancements in telecommunications, computing hardware and software

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

information secrecy: new challenges?

Professor (Retd.) K. S. Sidhu

and data encryption were introduced. The availability of smaller, more powerful and less expensive computing equipment made electronic data processing within the reach of small business and the home user. These computers quickly became interconnected through a network generically called the Internet or World Wide Web. The rapid growth and widespread use of electronic data processing and electronic business conducted through the Internet, along with numerous occurrences of international terrorism, fuelled the need for better methods of protecting these computers and the information they store, process and transmit. The academic disciplines of computer security, information security and information assurance emerged along with numerous professional organisations - all sharing the common goals of insuring the security and reliability of information systems. Information security, therefore, may be defined as the process of protecting data from unauthorised access, use, disclosure, destruction, modification, or disruption. The terms information security, computer security and information assurance are frequently used interchangeably. These fields are interrelated and share the common goals of protecting the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information; however, there are some subtle differences between them, which lie primarily in the approach to the subject, the methodologies used and the areas of concentration. Information security is concerned with the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data

regardless of the form the data may take: electronic, print, or other forms.

Risk management Risk is the likelihood that something bad will happen that causes harm to an informational asset (or the loss of the asset). Vulnerability is a weakness that could be used to endanger or cause harm to an informational asset. A threat is anything (man made or act of nature) that has the potential to cause harm. The likelihood that a threat will use a vulnerability to cause harm creates a risk. When a threat does use a vulnerability to inflict harm, it has an impact. In the context of information security, the impact is a loss of availability, integrity and confidentiality and possibly other

losses. It should be pointed out that it is not possible to identify all risks, nor is it possible to eliminate all risks. The remaining risk is called residual risk.

balance between productivity, cost, effectiveness of the countermeasure and the value of the informational asset being protected.

The risk management may be defined as the process of identifying vulnerabilities and threats to the information resources used by an organisation in achieving business objectives and deciding what countermeasures, if any, to take in reducing risk to an acceptable level, based on the value of the information resource to the organisation.

Broadly the risk management process consists of:

There are two aspects in this definition; process of risk management is an ongoing iterative (repetitive) process to be repeated indefinitely, countermeasures (controls) used to manage risks must strike a

1. Identification of assets and estimating their value, including people, buildings, hardware, software, data (electronic, print and other) and supplies. 2. Conduct a threat assessment, including acts of nature, acts of war, accidents and malicious acts originating from inside or outside the organisation. 3. Conduct a vulnerability assessment and for each vulnerability, calculate the probability that it will be exploited.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

CHOKE POINTS

To sum up, the purpose and role of Information Security tends to establish its significance. Only timely and serious consideration and steps can enhance its value. There seem to be no second chances in losing information, the impact of which may be, some times, so serious that the very basic purpose of information is completely defeated, especially if the information is related to issues of external or internal dimension of national security. With the changes in technology, the apparatus to generate information is getting sophisticated and so are the means to have access to it by means other than legal Evaluate policies, procedures, standards, training, physical security, quality control and technical security. 4. Calculate the impact that each threat would have on each asset by applying qualitative or quantitative analysis techniques. 5. Identify, select and implement appropriate controls to provide an adequately proportional response. Consider productivity, costeffectiveness and value of the asset. 6. Evaluate the effectiveness of the control measures in order to ensure the controls and provide the required cost effective protection without discernable loss of productivity. Information security is based on three key concepts, which form the core principles of information security: confidentiality, integrity and availability.

Confidentiality Information that is considered to be confidential in nature must only be accessed, used, copied, or disclosed by persons who have been authorised to access, use, copy, or disclose the information and then only when there is a genuine need to access, use, copy or disclose the information. Confidentiality is the protection of information in the system so that unauthorised persons cannot access it. It is of most importance to military and government organisations that need to keep plans and capabilities secret from potential enemies. Confidentiality must be well defined and procedures for maintaining confidentiality must be carefully implemented.

Threats to confidentiality ■■ Hackers: A hacker is someone who bypasses the system’s access controls by taking advantage of security weaknesses that the systems developers have left in the system. In addition, many hackers are adept at discovering the passwords of authorised users who fail to choose passwords that are difficult to guess or not included in the dictionary. The activities of hackers represent serious threats to the confidentiality of information in computer systems. Many hackers have created copies of inadequately protected files and placed them in areas of the system where unauthorised persons can access them. ■■ Masqueraders: A masquerader is an authorised user of the system who has obtained the password of another user and thus gains access to files available to the other user. Masqueraders are often able to read and copy confidential files. Masquerading is a common occurrence in companies that allow users to share passwords. ■■ Unauthorised user activity: This type of activity occurs when authorised system users gain access to files that they are not authorised to access. Weak access controls often enable unauthorised access, which can compromise confidential files. ■■ Unprotected downloaded files: Downloading can compromise confidential information if, in the process, files are moved from the secure environment of a host computer to an unprotected microcomputer for local processing. While on the microcomputer, unattended confidential information could be accessed by authorised users. ■■ Local area networks (LANs): LANs present a special confidentiality threat because data flowing through a LAN can

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

be viewed at any node of the network, whether or not the data is addressed to that node. This is particularly significant because the unencrypted user IDs and secret passwords of users logging on to the host are subject to compromise as this data travels from the user’s node through the LAN to the host. Any confidential information not intended for viewing at every node should be protected by encryption. ■■ Trojan horses: Trojan horses can be programmed to copy confidential files to unprotected areas of the system when users who have authorised access to those files unknowingly execute them. Once executed, the Trojan horse becomes resident on the user’s system and can routinely copy confidential files to unprotected resources.

Confidentiality models Confidentiality models demonstrate the actions must be taken and tools to be used to ensure and achieve the confidentiality of information. The most commonly used model for describing the enforcement of confidentiality defines the relationships between objects (i.e., the files, records, programmes and equipment that contain or receive information) and subjects (i.e., the persons, processes, or devices that cause information to flow between the objects). The relationships are described in terms of the subject’s assigned level of access or privilege and the object’s level of sensitivity. In military terms, these would be described as the security clearance of the subject and security classification of the object.

Integrity In information security, integrity means that data cannot be created, changed, or deleted without authorisation. Integrity is the protection

of system data from intentional or accidental unauthorised changes. The challenge of the security programme is to ensure that data is maintained in the state that users expect. Although the security programme cannot improve the accuracy of data that is put into the system by users, it can help ensure that any changes are intended and correctly applied. An additional element of integrity is the need to protect the process or programme used to manipulate the data from unauthorised modification. A critical requirement of both commercial and government data processing is to ensure the integrity of data to prevent fraud and errors. It is imperative, therefore, that no user be able to modify data in a way that might corrupt or lose assets or financial records or render decision-making information unreliable. Identification and authentication of users are key elements of the information integrity policy. Integrity depends on access controls, therefore, it is necessary to positively and uniquely identify all persons who attempt access.

Shielding against threats Integrity can be compromised by hackers, masqueraders, unauthorised user activity, unprotected downloaded files, LANs and unauthorised programmes (e.g., Trojan horses and viruses), because each of these threats can lead to unauthorised changes to data or programmes. For example, authorised users can corrupt data and programmes accidentally or

intentionally if their activities on the system are not properly controlled.

Integrity models To implement the information integrity policy there are three goals of integrity: 1. Prevent the unauthorised users from making modifications to data or programmes. 2. Preventing authorised users from making improper or unauthorised modifications. 3. Maintaining internal and external consistency of data and programmes. The first step in creating an integrity model for a system is to identify and label those data items for which integrity must be ensured. Two procedures are then applied to these data items. The first procedure verifies that the data items are in a valid state. The second procedure is the transformation procedure or well-formed transaction, which changes the data items from one validate to another.

Availability The concept of availability means that the information, the computing systems used to process the information and the security controls used to protect the information are all available and functioning correctly when the information is needed.

Choke points in security The Internet is a valuable source

of information, an important communication tool and an important facilitator of electronic media. Where the Policy is not explicit or where there may be any questions about the appropriateness of an Internet site, the employee will inquire with a supervisor or manager before accessing the site. Accessing or distributing inappropriate or offensive material causes damage to the workplace environment and may harm the organisation’s reputation. Internet access is provided for occasional or incidental personal and business purposes conducted with a sense of responsibility. The privilege must not be abused. User conduct is subject to organisational policies, as well as, statutory legislation. Each day newspapers carry sensational reports about labyrinthine networks of spies methodically passing on sensitive information to enemy countries or to interested powers that would gladly exploit such information to their advantage. Security of personnel and vital information is as important as safeguarding one’s own existence. Increased use of modern scientific devices for bugging and espionage has made the problem much more complex. It has become extremely difficult even to detect the leakage before the damage is done. Micro-cameras in wrist watches, telephone bugs, laser monitoring devices, transmitters in ballpoint pen, etc., have posed the greatest threat to the personnel and information security. It is impossible to know the exact amount of leakage and the damage done due to

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

internal security

CHOKE POINTS

such devices. Ace intelligence agencies of all advanced countries are spending millions of dollars per month to collect vital information about other countries. In view of this universal practice, no management official should remain complacent about his own undertaking’s security status, which should be a subject matter of constant review. In public undertakings and government organisations, usually the following security grading is given to important documents: Top Secret This classification is given only to those papers that are of vital importance to the very existence of the undertaking or the organisation. Matters relating to Defence or Defence Production, Security of the State, Trade Secrets, important and sensitive drawings, blue-prints, plan documents, some important chemical formulae or production documents are included in this classification. The industrial policy papers concerning management’s interaction with the trade unions and intelligence reports are also sometimes given top secret classification. Secret This classification is earmarked for documents containing sensitive information, the leakage of which may cause adverse effects on the interest or prestige of the undertaking / organisation and embarrassment to the management / government. Minutes of the meetings, future expansion programmes, sensitive decisions regarding the functioning of the organisation, business deals, list of important customers, papers relating to some loans / debts, case matters, etc. are included in this classification. Confidential This classification is for documents containing information that will not endanger the survival or prestige of the undertaking / organisation but these may cause considerable administrative inconvenience or embarrassment to the organisation, which may be exploited by the adversary. This classification is used for the documents, which are meant for the personal attention of a limited number of selected persons

100

who have direct concern with the subject matter contained in that paper. Annual Confidential Reports, trade union activities, special inquiry reports, vigilance reports, etc. are given this classification.

competitors on a regular basis. These factors are extremely important as they relate to the corporation and its personnel practices. A newly hired programmer or security analyst, whose ethical outlook is largely unknown to management, may quickly have access to extremely sensitive and confidential information and trade secrets. Unauthorised release of this information could destroy the corporation’s reputation or damage it financially. An employee who has just accepted a position with a major competitor may have access to trade secrets that are the foundation of the corporation’s success.

Personal This classification is given to those documents that are sent to the member of public wherein it is desired that the contents of the letter should not be published. Usually, there is a tendency of giving higher security classification to a document than is actually desired. This creates not only unnecessary dislocation of work at all levels but also dilutes the importance of such documents. It is, therefore, necessary that the competent authority should make periodical review of the classified documents and the classification downgraded or upgraded according to the requirements. Computer security Nowadays computers are being used very extensively by executives in industry and business and by technocrats, scientists as also the security related departments to process and store vital information and data, while the versatility of the computers has proved a great boon, they are also easy targets for manipulation by spies. Information about processes, formulae, knowhow, manufacturing and marketing plans, that lay stored in computers, have been stolen by rivals using technology as a tool. There is, therefore, a great need to create awareness among the computer users, in general and the executives in particular. They must always be live to the fact that preventive measures require to be taken to protect the information stored in computers. It has been proved time and again that computerised information has been tampered with. On some occasions, due to hostile interference, the computers stopped working altogether when stored data and the computerised communication systems were most needed.

the normal business routines of the organisation, there exists a category of especially sensitive information related to Special Projects. A Special Project is an organisation’s endeavour with a clear beginning and end and a predictable duration that involves sensitive information the release of which could cause serious damage to the interests of the organisation. Threats Experience has shown that some organisations will make extraordinary attempts to acquire Special Projects Information (SPI). These attempts have included: ■■ Subversion of project staff and support staff, many of whom have considerable access to sensitive information. ■■ Theft of sensitive information as a result of gaining unauthorised access to document waste, filing cabinets and unattended proprietary materials. ■■ Theft of sensitive information stored and transmitted on computers and telecommunication systems, such as fax and telephone. Information has been leaked by carelessness such as:

Special projects

■■ Sharing of information with others whose need to have the information is questionable.

In addition to the sensitive information generated, processed, in

■■ Discussing information in public places like hotel lobbies, bars, aircraft.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

■■ Leaving sensitive papers in waste baskets, printers, fax machines and photocopiers. ■■ Improper setting of information technology access controls so that passwords are ineffective and protection against unauthorised access is insufficient.

Conference security These procedures provide direction on protective measures at organisation-sponsored conferences and meetings. The primary focus of protection is upon its employees and other participants. The secondary focus is upon protection of organisation’s information and property.

Mobility and info-security The information systems and information security professions are a vibrant and exciting industry that has always operated under a unique set of conditions. The organisations rely on the unquestioned need for absolute confidentiality, security and personal ethics. An organisation and its reputation can be destroyed if its information security procedures are perceived as being inadequate or unsatisfactory. Yet, misuse or outright theft of software and confidential information can be relatively easy to accomplish, is profitable and is often difficult to detect. Innovations can be easily transferred when an employee leaves the corporation and information systems personnel have always been particularly mobile, moving among

Human factor is probably the greatest single source of risk, including both human error and failure. It is difficult to detect or estimate the exact losses due to leakage of vital information, but the fact remains that adversaries are always ready to pay huge amounts for getting small bits of classified information. The operations of well-entrenched espionage rings are very well known. The recent spurt in crimes like espionage, sabotage, extortion, kidnapping and terrorism has created serious security hazards to all sensitive organisations. The security managers will have to use their initiatives and employ all possible scientific devices to safeguard and strengthen the information-flow channels. In the past few years, the corporate world’s image of the personnel function has undergone a significant change. An organisation’s employees are now considered a corporate resource and asset, requiring constant care and management. Changing legal conditions affecting personnel practices have underscored the need for clearly defined and well-publicised policies on a variety of issues. The corporation and the employee have specific legal and ethical responsibilities to each other, both during and after the period of employment. Hiring and termination criteria, trade secrets and non-competition clauses are all issues that can cause serious legal problems for a corporation and its employees. to

The personnel issues related information systems security,

particularly hiring and termination procedures, methods to protect both the corporation and the employee from unnecessary legal problems and problems regarding trade secrets and non-competition clauses have serious implications which have been discussed below.

Types of controls In the process to mitigate a risk, one or more types of the following controls are implemented. Administrative controls are comprised of approved written policies, procedures, standards and guidelines related to conduct of day-to-day operations. Administrative controls form the basis for the selection and implementation of logical and physical controls, which are manifestations of administrative controls. Logical controls (also called technical controls) use software and data to monitor and control access to information and computing systems such as passwords, network and host based firewalls, network intrusion detection systems, access control lists and data encryption are logical controls. Physical controls monitor and control the environment of the work place and computing facilities. They also monitor and control access to and from such facilities, such as doors, locks, heating and air conditioning, smoke and fire alarms, fire suppression systems, cameras, barricades, fencing, security guards, cable locks, etc.

Information valuation An important dimension of information security and risk management is recognising the value of information and defining appropriate procedures and protection requirements for the information. The information classification is to identify a member of senior management as the owner of the particular information to be classified. Subsequently, develop a classification policy to describe the different classification labels, the criteria for information to be assigned a particular label and list the required security controls for each classification.

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

101

internal security

CHOKE POINTS

Common information security classification labels used by the business sector include public, sensitive, private and confidential. Common information security classification labels used by government comprise unclassified, sensitive but unclassified, confidential, secret, top secret. 1. The classification system evaluates information and determinants to be applied may include the following: 2. Restricted information is that the unauthorised disclosure of which could cause serious damage to operations. 3. Confidential information is of such value or sensitivity that its unauthorised disclosure could have a substantially detrimental effect on operation. 4. Personal information is that an originator determines how should be limited in its disclosure. Information owners and originators of information are responsible for assigning the appropriate classification. De-classification of information has to be carried out in the manner, prescribed by the laid down information security standards.

Policies Handling and marking Classified information in documents, electronic form, or both will be marked, distributed, copied, mailed, handled off premises, stored and destroyed only in accordance with prescribed company standards, which are specified in the information security standards. All employees in the organisation must be trained on the classification schema and understand the required security controls and handling procedures for each classification. The classification of a particular information asset should be reviewed periodically to ensure the classification. Access control The purpose of access control is to provide a safe and secure work environment for employees, contractors and visitors. Access control is specifically directed toward preventing harm to people, preventing the loss of assets and preventing disruption to operations from criminal,

102

hostile, or malicious acts. Access to protected information must be restricted to people who are authorised to access the information. The computer programmes and in many cases the computers that process the information, must also be authorised. The sophistication of the access control mechanisms should be in parity with the value of the information being protected - the more sensitive or valuable the information the stronger the control mechanisms need to be. The foundation on which access control mechanisms are built, start with identification and authentication by different ways and means. To be effective, policies and other security controls must be enforceable and upheld. Effective policies ensure that people are held accountable for their actions. Cryptography Information security uses cryptography to transform usable information into a form that renders it unusable by anyone other than an authorised user. It is used in information security to protect information from unauthorised or accidental discloser while the information is in transit (either electronically or physically) and while information is in storage. Cryptography provides information security with other useful applications as well including improved authentication methods, message digests, digital signatures, non-repudiation and encrypted network communications. Cryptography can introduce security problems when it is not implemented correctly. The keys used for encryption and decryption must be protected with the same degree of rigour as any other confidential information. They must be protected from unauthorised disclosure and destruction and they must be available when needed. Defence in depth Information security must protect information throughout the life span of the information. There are many different ways the information and information systems can be threatened. To fully protect the information,

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

each component of the information processing system must have its own protection mechanisms. The building up, layering on and overlapping of security measures is called defence in depth. The strength of any system is no greater than its weakest link. Using a defence in depth strategy, should one defensive measure fail there are other defensive measures in place that continue to provide protection.

Protective measures Awareness Programmes will be implemented to ensure that all employees are advised of their responsibility for protecting company classified information. Careless talk Careless talk about plans, strategies and so forth will be avoided both at and away from the job. Clean desk All employees must adhere to clean desk practices. During non-business hours or when a workplace is unattended, sensitive information will be secured in accordance with the laid down information security standards. Disclosure of information If, in the course of business, consultants, contractors and other outside parties must have access to classified material, they must sign a confidentiality agreement. They are to receive only such information as is necessary to comply with their contract.

Monitored information security Managing computer and network security programmes has become an increasingly difficult and challenging job. Dramatic advances in computing and communications technology during the past few years have redirected the focus of data processing from the computing centre to the terminals in individual offices and homes. The result is enhanced monitoring of security on a more widely dispersed level. These changes are continuing to accelerate, making the job of security increasingly difficult. The information security manager must establish and maintain a security programme that ensures three requirements: the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the company’s information resources. Some security experts have also added utility and authenticity (i.e., accuracy). Functions a. Protection of telecommunications networks and systems from unauthorised access by persons, acts, or influences and b. Perform many sub-functions, such as creating, deleting and controlling security services and mechanisms; distributing securityrelevant information; reporting security-relevant events; controlling the distribution of cryptographic keying material; and authorising subscriber access, rights and privileges. Security management entails the identification of an organisation’s information assets and the development, documentation and implementation of policies, standards, procedures and guidelines.

addressed. We should also consider the political, legal, economic, sociocultural and technical macro-economic factors that will have an impact on the level of risk to which organisations have to be exposed in the coming years. Human behaviour is recognised as a major problem in the implementation of information security practices in organisations. Employees are often found to be careless and are often unaware of security directives, failing to comply with organisational information, security policies and procedures. This may be caused by organisations possessing weak information security culture, which refers to “shared values, beliefs and behaviours that shape and direct members' attitude and behaviours in organisations”. It also means “the totality of patterns of behaviour in an organisation that contribute to the protection of information of all kinds.” Managing information security culture is becoming more challenging today because people are both a cause of information security incidents as well as playing a key part in the protection of organisational assets.

Responsibilities Assignment of responsibilities refers to the person or department that is responsible for ensuring the compliance of information security policies. Information security polices need to clearly delineate the responsibilities of everyone in the organisation to protect organisational information.

Although publication of scholarly or research material is permitted, after obtaining required clearances, proprietary information must not be compromised in such material.

Management tools such as information classification, risk assessment and risk analysis are used to identify threats, classify assets and to rate system vulnerabilities so that effective control can be implemented.

Information security policy may be one of the most important controls to protect organisational information. The main objective of security policy is to influence and direct the actions and behaviours of organisation members. Organisational culture support is needed for its development, implementation and compliance. Their findings show the importance of ISC in the context of security policy enforcement towards achieving an optimal level of compliance.

Public / press relations

Challenges

Security awareness

The public affairs department should be solely responsible for dealings with the press. The originators must carefully assess the significance of information to be released beforehand.

Rather than look at information security risks from a purely technical standpoint, there is an urgent need to have a holistic view of the threats to business and how they need to be

Security awareness is not training. Awareness programmes teach employees to be conscious about information security policies and procedures. Although security

Publications

awareness is widely accepted to raise employees’ consciousness in security matters, however, recent research still found that employees are not aware of security policies and procedures.

Training Security training is important in order to raise the awareness of organisational information. Organisational members must be trained to handle security problems.

Allocation of security budget Information security managers have always found it difficult to get adequate funding from senior management. Organisations are inclined to treat security spending as a cost and often struggle to gain funding for security implementation. There is a need for security managers to educate and convince senior management that without sufficient allocation, it is almost impossible to have effective information security practices in place.

Security training Every new employee must go through an induction programme within a specific period of joining the organisation. To sum up, the purpose and role of Information Security tends to establish its significance. Only timely and serious consideration and steps can enhance its value. There seem to be no second chances in losing information, the impact of which may be, some times, so serious that the very basic purpose of information is completely defeated, especially if the information is related to issues of external or internal dimension of national security. With the changes in technology, the apparatus to generate information is getting sophisticated and so are the means to have access to it by means other than legal, humanistic or otherwise for negative thinking people, demanding viable protective means to such a vital information and its source. The writer is former Head, Department of Defence and Strategic Studies and former Registrar, Punjabi University, Patiala, India. He specialises in Indian Security and the Indian Ocean / South Asia region. He has authored five books and 45 research papers and articles.`

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

103

internal security

DISRUPTIONS

V. Adm. (Retd.) Arun Kumar Singh

was on a lecture tour to Muscat, the capital of the oil and gas exporting Sultanate of Oman from 12 to 15 March 2011. Though my hosts, the Royal Navy of Oman, were basically interested in the impact of “regional geopolitics on naval strategy”, questions were also asked about Japan’s March 11, 2011, civil nuclear power plants disaster, involving four to six plants. By March 13, when news channels were still analysing Japan’s nuclear emergency and hoping that the efficient Japanese would “contain the situation”, I explained to my host audience that this was a major nuclear disaster, though I am deeply saddened at being subsequently proved correct. The basic reason for the nuclear disaster was the delay in utilising sea water cooling, after the main and standby cooling systems had failed.

Disrupted coolants Since there are numerous lessons for India, let me first explain that the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) of the type that was in the news in Fukushima (Japan) uses Uranium Oxide (UO2) as fuel and this fuel heats up water in a “closed loop” to drive a steam generator to produce electricity. The UO2 fuel has a melting point of about 3,000 degree centigrade. The UO2 pellets are put in sealed Zircalloy tubes (which

104

have a melting point of 2,200 degree, centigrade) and these tubes form the “reactor core”. The “core” is put inside an RPV (reactor pressure vessel) which can withstand high temperatures and pressures of the boiling water (which is pure demineralised water, to prevent metal corrosion and thus ensure a reactor life of about 50 years), which is converted to steam and the steam drives the steam turbines to produce electricity. This “closed loop” steam is subsequently “externally cooled” by sea water in a vessel called the “condenser”, which converts the steam into water and the pure water is then pumped back into the RPV to cool the core and become steam again in the closed cycle. If the fuel in the reactor core, is not constantly cooled by pure water, the Zircalloy tubes can melt in about 45 minutes, followed thereafter by the UO2 fuel, resulting in a “core melt down”. This scenario is known as LOCA (Loss of Cooling Accident).

Multiple accidents Should the reactor core “melt down” due to “ water cooling failure”, then the fuel is prevented from coming into contact with the atmosphere by a “containment vessel”. The explosions one saw on TV at the Japanese nuclear plants were basically hydrogen

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

explosions outside the containment vessel. Due to the 8.9 earthquake the reactors (designed to withstand 8.2 earthquakes) immediately “shut down” due to the safety rods coming down into the core and stopping the UO2 chain reaction. However, the reactor core had byproducts like isotopes of Cesium and Iodine, which though “fast decaying”, require water cooling for a few weeks to enable the reactor core temperature to come down to about 70 degree centigrade. Since the reactor was stopped, standby diesel generators “kicked in” and commenced “core cooling”, using water pumps. Unfortunately, the tsunami which came about 15 minutes after the earthquake made the standby generators non-operational, resulting in standby batteries being used to operate the water pumps to cool the core for about 8 hours. When the batteries were exhausted, the engineers, pumped in Boric acid (Boron absorbs the neutrons and hence aids in core cooling) and then apparently delayed the decision to use sea water cooling (which would have resulted in the reactor becoming permanently unusable), resulting in the “core melt down”, which fortunately has been prevented from reaching the atmosphere by the RPV and the containment vessel (unlike the Chernobyl disaster of 1986, where the graphite moderated reactor exploded

managing multiple threats

The Japanese crisis and the West Asia political tsunami have brought home to India the implications of such natural and man-made disruptions. Japan has shown up the inadequacies of the Indian tsunami warning system and the multiple disasters that can occur simultaneously and test to breaking point the disaster management system. India stands in the middle of the Indian Ocean-Pacific Ocean Region and can be buffeted by developments on either flank. The economic effect of the evacuation of Indians from Libya and West Asia is going to be felt immediately in households deprived of remittances in India. A review of an economy thus assaulted must begin immediately and both financial and infrastructural provisions be made to tackle multiple disasters. and the burning graphite and UO2 fuel were exposed to the atmosphere, due to failure of the substandard containment system). However, rising steam pressures in the RPV had to be vented out to the atmosphere to prevent the

RPV from exploding, and this resulted in some radioactive leaks, as also the dramatic hydrogen explosions (the steam was broken up into oxygen and hydrogen when oxidised by the RPV cladding material) which

fortunately occured outside the RPV and outside the containment vessel. However, the massive “radiation spike” of 27 March 2011, indicates a possibility of “containment vessel leak” in Fukushima reactor

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

105

internal security

DISRUPTIONS

No. 2. The impact of the Japanese nuclear emergency has been felt globally not only for the impact on fossil fuel prices, but also on worries about radioactive material entering the human food chain. Perhaps the world and India, will invest more heavily in renewable sources of energy like solar power and wind energy.

Disaster management I have visited Japan and have been impressed by their Tsunami Warning System (which gives a warning within three minutes of the earthquake occurring, unlike the “30-minute” Indian system). Japan also has a very efficient institutionalised disaster management system unlike India’s, which has failed repeatedly during earthquakes, floods and even during the Bhopal gas tragedy. India, which has 23 reactors and is now poised for building some two dozen imported nuclear power plants, needs to do a transparent reality check, as a nuclear core meltdown in over-populated India will result in the equivalent of a dozen Hiroshimas and Nagasakis. Nuclear power is important for India, but let us diligently and transparently examine the safety aspects else we may be setting ourselves up for a “trillion dollar hara-kiri”. The Nuclear Liabilities Bill, must not be diluted under foreign pressure. While the Japanese economy may go into a recession, as it concentrates on rebuilding (at an estimated cost of US$ 310 billion) and Japan (along with the industrial world) may gradually start using non-nuclear power plants (possibly gas-based), India must learn the appropriate lessons.

Naval activities In Muscat, I felt proud as an Indian to see the Indian Navy’s First Training Squadron (comprising Indian Naval Ship Tir and Indian Coast Guard Ship Veera) on a goodwill port visit at a time when there is a lot of unrest in West Asia. Three more Indian Navy warships are returning from Libya, after evacuating Indians, while another Indian warship is on anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden. The Indian Navy’s March 14 action in neutralising a Somali pirate mothership (Vega-5) off our west coast and capturing 61 pirates showed how

106

widespread this menace is (shipping insurance rates have increased 300 per cent in the Arabian Sea). Nations have traditionally used sea power for activities ranging from deterrence to war, to anti-piracy and relief operations, as demonstarted during the tsunamis of December 26, 2004 and March 11, 2011 and the evacuation of Indians from Lebanon (2006) and Libya (2011). However, Indian sea power, notwithstanding its time-tested efficiency, is only one instrument of the Indian State and it is important that the Indian government takes a holistic view of the emerging scenario and has contingency plans in place.

recently entered Bahrain, is a mixed force comprising units from Saudi Arabia, UAE and Oman (the six nation “Gulf Co-operation Council” maintains a combined military-cum-police force in Saudi Arabia, for any regional emergencies).

Disastrous impact

Energy disruption

The unfortunate fallout of the present West Asian crisis may be a period of chaos, since some of these nations may become failed States (e.g. Yemen, located opposite Somalia in the Gulf of Aden) or come under fundamentalist rule. One can imagine the disastrous impact on the Indian and global economy if sea-borne trade (and oil flow) is disrupted in the straits of Hormuz and the Gulf of Aden.

The West Asia and Gulf nations are different in many ways. Some are geostrategically very important as they are located at choke points through which global sea commerce flows, while others produce oil and gas, which drives the global economy. Unrest in one country has the potential of quickly creating unrest across many.

India, whose economic rise continues despite poor governance and corruption, needs to factor in the increased terrorist threat, which may emnate from some of the collapsed regimes in West Asia, as also the ongoing implosion in Af-Pak region and the piracy threat from Somalia.

The convulsions in West Asia and Gulf are of great significance, given the impact of disrupted oil supplies on the global economy, which is already under pressure from recession, terror, piracy and the recent Japanese nuclear disaster.

Given India’s marginal increase in this year’s defence budget (from Rs 1.51 lakh crore to Rs 1.64 crore, a mere 1.83 per cent of our gross domestic product), I am not sure if South Block has yet factored in the rapidly changing scenario ( political upheavals, natural and man made disasters ) in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and the Asia Pacfic Region (APR).

The current unrest in West Asia has global ramifications with crude oil prices rising to US$ 115 a barrel (the highest since 2008) and even inspiring a pro-democracy jasmine movement in China, which is facing a massive food shortage. The March 19, UNO sanctioned operation ‘Odyessy Dawn’, ostensibly for humanitarian reasons, is also meant for “stabilising” oil rich eastern Libya, to ensure that oil supplies are maintained without interruption. Contrast this with the unwillingness of any nation to intervene and “stabilise” Somalia which has no oil, but is the home of piracy! In Egypt and Tunisia, the political changeover is being “overseen” by the military, while Iran and Saudi Arabia — the two regional heavy weight powers — are making their own moves to gain influence in areas like Iraq and Bahrain. I learnt in Muscat, that the 1,000-strong Saudi force, which

May 2011 Defence AND security alert

Indeed, given the almost equitable flow of Indian and global sea-borne trade to the East and the West, the IOR and APR are interlinked and are now being referred to as “IPR” (Indo-Pacfic Region). Hopefully, Indian Parliament, which is busy in solving scams, will find time to ensure security and safety of India, its people and its economy.

April

2011

Subscribe Now ! Cover Price Tenure 1 year 2 years 3 years Discounted Price Tenure 1 year 2 years 3 years

Issues 12 24 36

For India ` 1440 ` 2880 ` 4320

For SAARC Countries US$ 240 US$ 480 US$ 720

For Rest of the World US$ 300 US$ 600 US$ 900

Issues 12 24 36

For India ` 1296 ` 2448 ` 3456

For SAARC Countries US$ 216 US$ 408 US$ 576

For Rest of the World US$ 270 US$ 510 US$ 720

Yes, I would like to avail the Subscription of DSA 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years I would like to subscribe for Gift a Subscription Name (Personal).........................................................................Organisation.................................................................Sex................. Education / Qualification Graduate Post-Graduate Professional Any Other Profession...................................................................................Organisation....................................................................................... Billing Address.......................................................................................................................City........................................................... Shipping Address...................................................................................................................City........................................................... State.........................................Pin..............................................Tel......................................Mob......................................................... Your Birth Date........................................................................... Marriage Anniversary........................................................(Optional) DD / Cheque No..........................................................................Dated.................................Drawn on................................................. for `.............................................................................................in favour of OCEAN MEDIA PRIVATE LIMITED, Payable at New Delhi Or Please Charge `................................(in words).................................................................................through my credit card to my: Choose any one: Credit Card No............................................................................Expires................................Signature of CC Holder............................

The writer retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Vishakhapatnam. He was Director General of the Indian Coast Guard during the Tsunami of 2004 and Commander-in-Chief of the Tri-Service, Andaman and Nicobar Command. He is also a prolific writer on maritime, strategic and nuclear issues.

* Please attach your ID proof with your signature in case of credit card payment. * Please add ` 50 for all outstation cheques. All payments in favour of Ocean Media Private Limited, payable at New Delhi. * Condition applies. Terms and Conditions: Minimum subscription is for one year (12 Issues). Your subscription will start with the next available issue after the receipt of your payments. DSA will be despatched through Postal / Courier Services. Packing and forwarding charges will be borne by DSA. Online edition of DSA shall be complimentary to all subscribers of Print Edition for single user. Please mention your subscription ID in all your future communications. Please forward us the completed subscription form with all the required details. DSA will not be responsible for any miscarriage or delay, if postal address is incorrect. Please inform our subscription department non-receipt of your copy latest by 15th day of the month, failing which the request for re-despatch will not be entertained. This subscription form supersedes all the previous. Please address all your subscription related queries through Email:subscription@dsalert.org or call us at: +91-011-23243999, 23287999, or fax at: +91-11-23259666 or write to us at: Subscription department, Ocean Media Private Limited, 4/19 Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi - 110002 (INDIA) F o r a l l d i s t r i b u t i o n a n d s u b s c r i p t i o n q u e r i e s p l e a s e c o n t a c t : + 9 1 9 9 5 8 3 8 2 9 9 9 . The terms and conditions may change without any prior notice. This offer is for new subscribers only. Subscription form can also be downloaded from our portal www.dsalert.org

GLOBAL DEFENCE AND SECURITY EVENTS / SHOWS May 2011

Sunday 8th May 2011 – Tuesday 10th May 2011 Armoured Vehicles UAE Armed Forces Officers Club and Hotel, Al Ain, United Arab Emirates

Thursday 19th May 2011 – Saturday 21st May 2011 CIPATE Beijing Exhibition Center, Beijing, China

Monday 9th May 2011 – Wednesday 11th May 2011 Global Space & Satellite Forum Abu Dhabi National Exhibition Centre, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

Monday 23rd May 2011 – Thursday 26th May 2011 GridWise Expo 2011 Santa Clara Convention Center, Santa Clara, USA

Tuesday 10th May 2011 – Thursday 12th May 2011 SpecOps West American Lake Community Center, Fort Lewis, USA

Monday 23rd May 2011 - Wednesday 25th May 2011 Irregular Warfare Summit 2011, Washington DC Metro Area, Washington, DC, USA

Tuesday 10th May 2011 – Friday 13th May 2011 IDEF Tüyap Fair Convention and Congress Center, Istanbul, Turkey

Sunday 23rd May 2011 – Friday 27th May 2011 IEEE Radar Conference Westin Crown Center, Overland Park, USA

Tuesday 10th May 2011 – Friday 13th May 2011 IDET - 10th International Exhibition of Defence and Security Technologies Trade Fairs Brno, Brno, Czech Republic

Wednesday 25th May 2011 – Friday 27th May 2011 ICCNS - International Conference on Computer Networks and Security Holiday Inn Tobu Narita, Chiba, Japan

Tuesday 10th May 2011 - Thursday 12th May 2011 ITEC 2011 Koelnmesse, Cologne, Germany

Wednesday 25th May 2011 – Friday 27th May 2011 Electronic Warfare Berlin Estrel Convention Center, Berlin, Germany

Wednesday 11th May 2011 – Friday 13th May 2011 IST - Information Security Expo Tokyo Big Sight, Tokyo, Japan

Thursday 26th May 2011 - Friday 27th May 2011 Xpo 112 - Fire Protection and Rescue Fair Kortrijk Xpo, Kortrijk, Belgium

Wednesday 11th May 2011 - Friday 13th May 2011 International Military Helicopter, Olympia Conference Centre, London, United Kingdom

Thurday 26th May 2011 – Saturday 28th May 2011 OPTIROB The InterContinental Hotel, Sydney, Australia

Wednesday 11th May 2011 – Thursday 12th May 2011 European Security and Safety Meetings Lyon, Lyon, France

Monday 30th May 2011 – Tuesday 31st May 2011 Military Helicopter Asia 2011 Amara Singapore, Suntec City, Singapore

Sunday 15th May 2011 – Wednesday 18th May 2011 Geospatial Intelligence Middle East Fairmont Bab Al Bahr, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates Monday 16th May 2011 - Thursday 19th May 2011 IFSEC 2011, NEC Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom Tuesday 17th May 2011 – Thursday 19th May 2011 Safety & Health Expo The NEC, Birmingham, United Kingdom Tuesday May 17th 2011 – Friday 20th May 2011 Integrated Safety & Security Exhibition All Russian Exhibition Center, Moscow, Russia

Courtesy: Pawitra International Private Limited, New Delhi www.pawitra.com

Pawitra

International Pvt. Ltd.

International representation of products, technologies and services in Defence, Security and Renewable energy in India

PAWITRA INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LIMITED, NEW DELHI, INDIA www.pawitra.com

write to us: info@pawitra.com +91-9811079666

SAARC COUNTRIES : US$ 20 REST OF THE WORLD : US$ 25 MAY 2011

INDIA : ` 120 VOLUME 2 ISSN

ISSUE 8

0976-206X

9 770976 206003

INTERNAL SECURITY Vital Role of Science and Technology

> VOLUME 2 > ISSUE 8 > MAY 2011

Majestic recognition to

Shifting Paradigms

Innovative Solutions