DSA May 2013

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May 2013

VOLUME 4 ISSUE 8

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editor-in-chief “T h e c o u n t r y c o m e s f i r s t – a l w a y s a n d e v e r y t i m e ” .

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aoist violence peaked in the years between 2004-2010. In fact 2009 and 2010 were the peak years when we had the highest SF casualties (317 in 2009). The overall casualties also peaked in these years around the 1,000 mark. This was when former Home Minister Chidambaram finally mobilised a national response in terms of massive use of Police and CPO forces for Op Green Hunt. The CRPF took horrific casualties to start with because of its lack of organisational and training preparation for the conflict. Then thanks to an intrepid and courageous CRPF Chief who led from the front, this force finally got its act together and came out of the shell it had gone into after its initial shock.

How successful has Operation Green Hunt been so far? Its primary success has been in targeting the city based leadership of a tribal and subaltern caste insurgency. Top leaders like Koteshwar Rao (Kishenji), the deputy Leader of the Odisha region and Kobad Ghandy etc have been neutralised. That is a major positive. For the rest, the Maoists have largely rolled with the punch. Doctrinally they will not stand up and fight but move to less threatened areas. This displacement effect is visible whenever troop density is increased in a given area. The success of the Greyhounds in Andhra Pradesh merely pushed the Maoists into Chhattisgarh and Odisha. The current pressure in these areas has seen a sharp rise of insurgency levels in Jharkhand. In the first few months of this year, Jharkhand has witnessed 40 per cent of the overall countrywide incidents and suffered 58 per cent of the casualties. The Naxals are trying to extend their areas of operations into the Karnataka portion of the Western Ghats (Malnad area), into Assam and the other north-eastern states. It is heading towards the north-east to establish contact with China supported insurgent organisations to establish supply lines for arms and explosives.

The Ladakh intrusion. The Indian Army has been totally marginalised from the Internal Security Process. We should have used this opportunity to raise and blood some five to six mountain divisions which would have come in so handy against China and Pakistan. Mountains simply eat up troops. Instead the army has been forced to outsource even the external defence of our Himalayan borders to the External Affairs Ministry and the Home Ministry now wants the ITBP to fight a private war against the Chinese in Ladakh to corner the glory. The seeming irrelevance of the Indian armed forces in the National Security Process is now complete with all the other Ministries pitching in to claim new turfs ceded largely by the MoD. Why do we have to complicate the entire border management tangle in Ladakh so much? Why should three ministries be involved? Why can’t the ITBP be placed under the army’s op control? Why can’t all government functionaries speak in one voice? Why must the discourse be reduced to the level of acne and fashion parades? Ladakh is very much part of Indian territory and every inch of it is sacred. It can not be dismissed as a local incident in an area where no grass grows. The Ladakhi herders graze their Yaks and sheep in its pastures. They are Indians and their rights must be defended. By all accords, a matter of intrusion has to be dealt with by the MoD and the armed forces first. Why is the External Affairs Ministry seeking tactical control of our posts?

The simple fact is that it was only the strong outrage expressed by the Indian people and Opposition that stiffened the spine of the government and forced it to take a tough stand. This alone made the Chinese back off. Why did the government want to grovel at first? Because it was clear that it had failed badly in timely acquisition of defence equipment and creation of the badly needed infrastructure. The Chinese have completed their preparations and are now doing their best to forestall and disrupt ours.

This situation is likely to continue over the next few years and we could expect many more such intrusions. That does not mean we should grovel and kowtow as a reflex action. This is not 1962. The Indian Army has come a very long way since then. It is the Chinese Army that hasn’t fought since 1979 – when it did rather poorly against Vietnam. Its overconfidence may therefore, be a bit misplaced. How many countries will China fight simultaneously? It has serious maritime border disputes with Japan, Vietnam, Philippines and Malaysia. The Korean peninsula is restive. Why should the onus of being reasonable only be on India? We should be firm in the defence of our sovereign territory. The whole of Asia is looking up to India as a likely counterweight to China. We cannot afford to act in a pusillanimous manner and the mandarins of the Foreign Ministry should stop fainting at the first sign of conflict. Intrusions should be handled in a seamless manner with the MoD in the lead role for it may involve a clash the next time around. Now that the writing on the wall is so clear – will our MoD kindly get its act together at long last and get the armed forces their long overdue laundry list of weapons and ammunition and for god’s sake get the roads we should have completed some 50 years back. When push comes to shove, the Red Panda is not as important as the Red Army.

Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

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founding editor

publisher's view

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TM

n May 1967, Charu Mazumdar and Kanu Sanyal started an agrarian uprising in West Bengal against the atrocities of the landlords on the villagers which actually has turned out to be an unremitting menace in the last few decades and the situation has become perilous in vast swathes of our country. The small local problem against a few of the local landlords has mutated into a movement that has engulfed large parts of the Indian peninsula. It has grown in proportions far beyond anything its progenitors had envisaged in 1967.

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Vo l u m e 4 I s s u e 8 M a y 2 0 1 3 chairman shyam sunder publisher and ceo pawan agrawal founding editor manvendra singh editor-in-chief maj gen (dr) gd bakshi SM, VSM (retd) director shishir bhushan corporate consultant kj singh art consultant divya gupta central saint martins college of art & design, university of arts, london business development shaifali sachdeva pr and communications arpita dutta creative vivek anand pant representative (USA) steve melito correspondent (Europe) dominika cosic representative (J and K) salil sharma production dilshad and dabeer webmaster sundar rawat system administrator mehar dogra photographer subhash circulation and distribution rahul gupta and anup kumar e-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscription: subscription@dsalert.org online edition: online@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org editorial and corporate office 4/19 asaf ali road new delhi-110002 (India) t: +91-011-23243999, 23287999, 9958382999 e: info@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org

disclaimer all rights reserved. reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part by any means without permission from Defence and Security Alert is prohibited. opinions expressed are those of the individual writers and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher and / or editors. all disputes are subject to jurisdiction of delhi courts. defence and security alert is printed, published and owned by pawan agrawal and printed at graphic world, 1686, kucha dakhini rai, darya ganj, new delhi-110002 and published at 4/19 asaf ali road, new delhi (india). editor: maj gen (dr) gd bakshi (retd).

The people handling this movement, described generically as Maoists or Naxalites have, in recent times made contact with anti-India terrorist groups like the Pak-supported Lashkar-e-Taiba or Hizbul Mujahideen, the China-supported United Liberation Front of Asom in the north-east and the Nepal Maoists. The violent activities adopted by these organisations include grabbing arms and ammunition from security and police forces and using local sources of country-made weapons. They have become extremely well-organised both in their political skills as well as in their fighting prowess as the ambush of 76 members of the CRPF at Dantewada in 2010 showed.

Two factors that played a major role in the overall progress of the Naxal movement in the past ten years were: Involvement of criminals in their groups to generate more funds and nexus with the other terrorist outfits to collect sophisticated weapons.

Two new states were crafted in India, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand respectively from Madhya Pradesh and Bihar. These states were rich in mineral resources and the coal and ore mining industries thrived at the cost of the agrarian economy thereby severely affecting the landless labour and the tribals whose forest lands became subsumed to the mining mafias that flourished beyond imagination. The deprived became easy prey to the Maoist and Naxal ideology.

The Naxals inspired the local small and big criminal elements to join them to generate more funds through ransom, dacoity, drug peddling and exchanging narcotics for arms and ammunition from the international drugs and arms syndicates. This was a new dimension added to this movement in the past ten years which gave a new boost to their operations. They equipped their cadres with sophisticated arms and ammunition and telecommunication systems which made them more deadly in their operations.

The second and the more important transformation was the nexus of the Maoists / Naxals with the other anti-national outfits active in all parts of the country such as Ulfa in the north-east of India, LeT, Hizbul Mujahideen and many others.

The above two factors have contributed to the effectiveness of their operations. The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), AK-47s, hand grenades, wireless systems and night vision devices were heavily procured by the Naxals in the past three years.

Now the point is that when the Naxals are operating with such sophisticated devices and arms and ammunitions then is it not the immediate responsibility of the centre and the state governments afflicted by the menace to equip their security forces with the best counter-insurgency / counter-terror equipment available in the world market? It is seen that the Naxals have trained their cadres so well that they are proving to be the best trained anti-national elements in the country. And it’s high time that our security and police forces are also trained in a radically different manner to how they have been trained till now.

I feel that if we really have to fight this menace then we need to boost the morale of our security and police forces; provide them the best equipment and train them to fight these Naxals who are actually now operating more and more as a military force than a guerrilla outfit. We must understand the difference between their operational tactics and their resources first and then equip our security and police forces to confront them on all fronts.

I hope our policy and decision-makers take immediate note of these important aspects and bring peace, harmony and happiness in the areas affected by the Naxal activities through effective counter operations which must also include necessary social reforms among the people of the affected areas.

O

n 16 April an important encounter took place in Chhattisgarh. A joint operation involving the CRPF and the state police was successful in eliminating nine Naxals in the Dandakaranya region of Sukma district. This is the area of Chhattisgarh where the Maoist Naxals are extremely active and have caused many casualties amongst policemen and other security forces. So in that sense it was an extremely important encounter and a successful one at that. What, however, is as important and maybe even more so in the long run, is how a UAV was used during the operation. Due to the nature of the counter-Naxal campaign there is a serious requirement for the use of UAVs. In a surveillance mode they are extremely useful for tracking Naxal groups on the move and in camps. Despite limitations imposed by the forested terrain UAVs have been known to provide excellent surveillance imagery of the area. The successful campaign of the Sri Lankan armed forces against the LTTE in 2009 is a case in point, where the limitations imposed by the forest cover were overcome with great success.

In the latest case the UAVs were extremely successful in keeping track of the Naxals, during the operation and after. Which makes it a rare happenstance. Naxals and their sympathisers, are prone to making the wildest allegations against police and the security forces. Brutality and violation of the human rights are of course the most prominent amongst them. So when UAV footage is available on a real time basis and which shows the Naxals using women and children as human shields while on the run from security forces, it is an invaluable asset. That footage should be made public at the earliest opportunity to blow apart the image of the Naxals as saviours of the poor peasants. Naxal sympathisers and overground workers are the first to blow their own trumpet on this matter and would be the first to be quietened by deft use of such UAV footage.

Technology is a game changer in every field of life now. But in the realms of defence and security technology is also a life saver. Enhancements in technological prowess is essential for military and security forces to increase potential and save lives of innocents and soldiers. Besides the use of UAVs, security forces also need to look at other technologies that can augment their combat capabilities. In a Naxal scenario where most of the combat is likely to be in jungles the ability to see, hear and accurately target Naxals is the most important aspect of the conflict.

So it is vital, therefore, that besides UAVs the security forces also have Hand-held Thermal Imaging devices which will allow them to accurately see the Naxals on the move. These have been a tremendous success on the Line of Control.

It is also important for the security forces to be able to listen in on the conversations of the Naxals operating there. Man portable interception technology exists that allows for this critical capability. And last of all, troops operating in the jungles must be given weaponry that is as agile as the task, as accurate as the best can be and as powerful as is required.

Government of India and the affected states must raise the stakes in order to win an unequal campaign. And raising the technological stakes makes most sense.

manvendra singh

Jai Hind!

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pawan agrawal May 2013 Defence AND security alert

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

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contents

Maoism: Militarisation Of The Conflict, Latest Gadgetry To Counter Terrorism

Special Issue May 2013

TM

A R T I C L E S Status of Naxalism: Strategic options Lt Gen VK Ahluwalia PVSM, AVSM**, YSM, VSM (retd)

c o n t e n t s

06 An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Magazine

Vo l u m e 4 I s s u e 8 M a y 2 0 1 3

Lack of co-ordination hampering counter-terrorist operations 10 Sankar Sen IPS (retd) Impact of demographics on the Indian internal security scenario 12 Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) Maoism: Militarisation of the conflict – usage of air power Wg Cdr AN Hanfee Vr C (retd)

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Maoist problem and national security V Balachandran IPS (retd)

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Maoism: Militarisation of the conflict VK Deuskar IPS (retd)

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Technology: Behavioural complexity on the battlefield Dr Rupali Jeswal and Damien Martin

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An approach to solve problem of Maoism / Naxalism Lt Gen OP Kaushik PVSM, AVSM, VSM, Mi-in-D (retd)

32 F E A T U R E S

Defence personnel worldwide find transcendental meditation 34 to be an effective tool in combating stress Dr David R Leffler, Gerald Geer, Col SP Bakshi (retd) Role of science and technology to counter terrorism Prof (Dr) Arvind Kumar

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Indigenous technology solutions for low intensity conflicts 44 Ravi Kumar Gupta and Manoj Bali Critical infrastructure protection and hazardous material threats 46 Robert L Domenici and Steve Melito Indian state versus the Maoists: A protracted battle Nitin A Gokhale

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Community policing: An alternative method S Banerjee IPS (retd)

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The beguiling arms trade treaty RSN Singh

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Skills and counter-skills Cecil Victor

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Gadgets and Indian security K Kanakaraju

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India’s brahmaastra: The Brahmos Debalina Chatterjee

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Sri Lanka: Counterproductive UNHRC resolution Gaurav Dixit

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Book Review – The Inside Story of Jammu & Kashmir State Dr SP Bakshi

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Book Review – Black Money Brij Bhardwaj

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maoist menace

PRAGMATIC ASSESSMENT

Status of Naxalism: Strategic Options

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oing by the statistical data of last seven years and recent spate of successes achieved by the SF and the state police in the naxal-affected areas give an indication that the movement has reached its plateau. Some experts are of the view that it actually has started to decline due to loss of their main stronghold in Telangana, inadequate volunteers to join the cadres and the reverses suffered in various operations. Jharkhand has recorded the highest Naxal violence in the first quarter of this year. It accounts for over 40 per cent of the country’s incidents and 58 per cent of the deaths in the first three months of the year. However, the writer warns that it is the Maoist endeavour to wear out the security forces and the government machinery by spreading the violence to widely separated remote areas of the country.

They would withdraw when they are weak and strike at a place of their choosing. While there has been an overall decline in the Naxal violence, there has been no appreciable improvement in the confidence levels of the investors in the region.

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he level and intensity of Naxal violence had increased manifold since 2001 and peaked around 2009 and 2010, which left a huge trail of death and destruction.1 Latest in the series was an attack on the CRPF personnel in Karkatiya forests at Latehar (Jharkhand) on 7 January 2013, in which the Naxals used brutal tactics to booby trap the bodies of the slain soldiers, with improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Further, the Naxals employed the most inhuman tactic: they placed 2.5 kg of explosives inside the stomach of one of the martyred soldiers.2 Perhaps, the aim was to create fear psychosis and to show their presence to the local populace and the SF alike. On the other hand, the Naxals too have accused the SF of not following any ‘rules of war’; and hence, they have stated that they would also go beyond the rules.3 As per the latest figures released on April 20, 2013, Jharkhand has recorded the highest Naxal violence in the first quarter of this year. It accounts for over

40 per cent of the country’s incidents, and 58 per cent of the deaths in the first three months of the year. The figures of violence for Chhattisgarh are much lower than Jharkhand. Jharkhand had recorded much higher incidents of violence in 2012 in comparison to Chhattisgarh. It appears that the Naxals have shifted their focus to the mining and industrial areas of western Jharkhand, to retain their control on the revenue earning centres, among other reasons.

An analysis of some of the raids or attacks by the Naxals suggests that they studied their intended targets in detail, obtained specific and real-time intelligence from their network of sources and executed the operation boldly. On the SF side, besides the operational, training and leadership issues in general, these attacks underscored the sensitivities and weaknesses at the bi-junctions and tri-junctions of the LWE-affected states.

Consequently, there has been

substantial improvement in the standard of training, weaponry, surveillance and communication systems of the CAPF. The article aims to essentially discuss the current status of Naxalism, effect on security and economic growth and the strategic options available to the Naxals.

High civilian casualties As per available data, it is evident that the violence has always caused large casualties among the innocent civilians. The Naxals have been carrying out repression against some of the civilians by branding them as police informers.

The attack on the Gyaneshwari Express on May 28, 2010, indicates that they have deviated from their original ideology, which states that people are centre of gravity of the armed struggle by the masses.

Their support is most vital to carry forward an insurgency. As per the MHA report (from their website), the Naxals have killed 5,467 civilians

1. Some of the prominent examples of violence and bloody attacks were the Dantewada jail (2007), Nayagarh (2007) and Rani Bodli Post in Dantewada district (2007). Besides the killing of Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) MP Shri Sunil Mahato at Jamshedpur (2007), two other deadly attacks were the “Water ambush” in the Balimela Reservoir (Odisha) in which 35 Greyhounds were killed (2008) and the Chintalnar incident (Chhattisgarh) in which 76 personnel of the Security Forces (75 CRPF and one police man) were killed on 06 April 2010.

2. VK Ahluwalia, “Reds use brutal tactics to create fear psychosis,” The Times of India, January 19, 2013.

3 Mohua Chatterjee, “Reds will repeat tactics of using jawans’ bodies as booby traps”, The Times of India, February 11, 2013.

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May 2013 Defence AND security alert

Lt Gen VK Ahluwalia PVSM, AVSM**, YSM, VSM (retd) The writer was the Army Commander, Central Command prior to his superannuation. He is a graduate of Staff College, Higher Command Course and National Defence Course (NDC) Dhaka (Bangladesh). With a balanced command, staff and instructional profile during his service, he has commanded the brigade, division and corps, all in the intense operational environment of Northern Command. As the Army Commander Central Command, he has analysed the Naxal problem, the ground realities and strategic challenges towards conflict resolution.

and destroyed 281 schools from 2001 to 2011. The civilian casualties have been high since 2003 and have consistently maintained high figures until 2010. The Indian Maoist’s ideology is predominantly based on the thoughts of Mao Zedong of China. During the 8,000 miles long march, Mao could connect better with the local population, as a result of which he and his supporters gained power and prestige nationwide. From 1935 to 1949, some of the principles followed by Mao to win the support of the masses and to strengthen the revolution were “simple administration, reduce bureaucracy, send intellectuals to the villages, reduce rents, oppose landlords’ oppressive activities, cooperative agriculture etc.”4 The peasants and the poor people fully supported Mao, due to which he gained control of China in 1949. However, it does not appear to be true of the Naxals, who have been taking actions repressive against the civilians themselves. In the long term, they would lose the support of the local populace.

Tide turns The SF has progressively turned the tide in their favour from 2011 onwards.

Refer the Graph, “Naxal violence in India: 2006-2010”. A close look at the graph suggests two important aspects. First, there has been an increase in the incidents and killings – of both the civilians and the SF – from 2006 to 2010. By then, the PLGA had fully honed their skills in guerrilla warfare and the SF was still in the process of capacity and capability building. The net result was that, between 2006 and 2012, the SF suffered the highest number of casualties (317) in 2009 and the second highest in 2010. The number of civilians killed was also among the highest during these two years. However, by 2011 and 2012 the SF had become reasonably proficient in anti-Naxal operations. They reversed the trend of casualties in favour of the SF, so essential to bolster their motivation and morale.

Going by the statistical data of last seven years and recent spate of successes achieved by the SF and the state police in the Naxal-affected areas give an indication that the movement has reached its plateau.

Some experts are of the view that it actually has started to decline due to loss of their main stronghold in Telangana, inadequate volunteers to join the cadres

4.“The victory of the Communist Chinese Revolution, 1927-1949”, accessed October 01, 2012, ocw.mit.edu/ courses/history/21h-001..revolution…/lecture12.pdf..

The violence and killing by the Naxals has adversely affected the security environment and the economic growth of the country.

The Naxals have links with transnational drug and weapon smuggling mafias and links with other militant organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Nepal’s Maoists and militant outfits in the north-eastern states of India.

An insecure and uncertain environment, due to large scale destruction of economic infrastructures, crime and extortion, has resulted in loss of confidence among the corporate houses and the industry to invest in the conflict ridden areas

On the SF side, besides the operational, training and leadership issues in general, these attacks underscored the sensitivities and weaknesses at the bi-junctions and tri-junctions of the LWE-affected states. Consequently, there has been substantial improvement in the standard of training, weaponry, surveillance and communication systems of the CAPF

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

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maoist menace

PRAGMATIC ASSESSMENT

and the reverses suffered in various operations. These opinions are based on the analysis of incidents of Naxal violence and the resultant casualties to the civilians, the SF and the Naxals.

Spate of recent successes achieved by the SF against the rebels must not lull the government into a false sense of complacency SF too have conducted a number of successful operations against the Naxals, specially from 2011 onwards. Elusive Maoist top leader Koteswar Rao alias Kishenji, a Maoist politburo and CMC member, was killed in a well planned operation by the joint forces at Burisole forest in West Midnapore district of West Bengal on 24 November 2011.

Similarly, the deputy leader of Odisha’s Maoist party was killed by the police in an encounter in Karanjadua forest in Gajapati district on 11 March 2013.5 Gadchiroli police shot dead eight Naxals near Bhatpur village on the Maharashtra and Chhattisgarh border on 4 April

2013 (The Hindu, April 5, 2013). The Greyhounds of Andhra Pradesh, CRPF and the state police killed nine Maoists in Sukma district astride Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh border on 15 April 2013 (The Times of India, April 17, 2013). From the locations of the operations, it is evident that the Naxals are focusing on the sensitive inter-state boundaries. Likewise, a number of their leaders including Kobad Ghandy have been arrested. There has also been progressive increase in number of surrenders at different places.

Pragmatic assessment A word of caution before we jump to any firm conclusions. It would be worthwhile to remember the basic principle of the strategy and tactics of the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA). It states, ‘The guiding principle of the PLGA strategy must be to prolong the war, as time is required for preparing the masses for the war and the spirit of prolonged self-endurance should be upheld as the people’s war is torturous and arduous.’ Another

important principle states, ‘The people are the eyes and ears of the army; they feed and keep our soldiers. It is they who help the army in sabotage and in battle. The people are the water and our army the fish.’ It is their endeavour to wear out the security forces and the government machinery by spreading the violence to widely separated remote areas of the country. They would withdraw when they are weak and strike at a place of their choosing, after carrying out detailed analysis based on real time intelligence inputs.

Therefore, statistical figures of two years should not be the benchmark to draw firm conclusions. The situation on ground will only improve if security, development, empowerment of local bodies and perception management takes place simultaneously. In addition, creation of job opportunities for the youth should be explored by way of imparting training on job related skills.

The violence and killing by the Naxals has adversely affected the security environment and the

5. Sandeep Mishra and Hrusikesh Mohanty, “ Top Maoist deputy killed in Odisha,” The Times of India, March 12, 2013.

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May 2013 Defence AND security alert

economic growth of the country.

The Naxals have links with transnational drug and weapon smuggling mafias and links with other militant organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba, Nepal’s Maoists and militant outfits in the north-eastern states of India.

An insecure and uncertain environment, due to large scale destruction of economic infrastructures, crime and extortion, has resulted in loss of confidence among the corporate houses and the industry to invest in the conflict ridden areas. The problems of the mega industries have been further aggravated due to substantial delay in decision-making and a number of other reasons. While there has been an overall decline in the Naxal violence, there has been no appreciable improvement in the confidence levels of the investors in the region.

because the Naxals have apparently applied this concept based on their experience of the armed conflict in China, with the Japanese forces (1937-1945) and between the nationalists and the communists in the pre-revolutionary phase in the 1930s and 1940s. Over the last eight decades, there has been a marked difference in the political system, the prevailing security environment and the strength of the forces involved in India. Much as the PLGA would like to graduate to mobile warfare, the probability of achieving it is remote, if not impossible.

It is well known that the effect of security operations could be visible earlier than the completion of development projects, due to their long gestation periods involved. Therefore, the recent spate of successes by the SF needs to be followed up by development initiatives and perception management campaign to turn the tide in favour of the state, in real terms. Simultaneously, a concerted drive needs to be launched to create job opportunities and to recruit the youth into military, paramilitary forces and central and state services

First, they could continue with the current state of “lowering the ante with sporadic brutal attacks to create fear psychosis to show their presence and relevance to the local populace”. They would continue with intermittent violence and attacks against two prominent targets: first the state machinery and the SF and second, against their sources of revenue, who do not comply with their instructions.

They would aim to strike at places wide apart, to keep the reaction of the SF divided and to weaken them over a period of time. As on date, the areas that continue to remain in news with Naxal activities in Gumla, Latehar, Palamu, Lohardaga, Simdega, Garhwa (Western Jharkhand), Sukma, Bijapur, Dantewada (Chhattisgarh), Malkangiri, Koraput, Nuapada, Bolangir (Odisha).

Gadchiroli (Maharashtra) and the border areas of Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. There is a strong possibility that the Naxals could utilise this period to rest, recoup and re-emerge stronger, if the current tempos of security operations are not maintained.

Strategic options The strategy of the Maoist states that the protracted people’s war will pass through three strategic stages: strategic defensive, strategic stalemate and strategic offensive.6 It is based on their experience of revolutions in China, Vietnam and a few other countries.

In theory, the concept of three strategic stages may sound logical.

However, it has a serious flaw,

Spate of recent successes achieved by the SF against the rebels must not lull the government into a false sense of complacency. While the Naxals have a number of strategic options available to them, three have been discussed briefly.

Second, the Naxals, while continuing with their operations, could aim to reach out to the sympathetic external powers to get support in propagating their ideology and get funds, weaponry and equipment. Simultaneously, make inroads into the northeastern states, urban areas and the industrial hubs of the country.7 This will help in widening the mass base, increase catchment areas for recruitment and induct adequate volunteers into their cadre. They would thereafter wait for the right opportunity to strike against bigger objectives. This is an option with fairly high probability, because it gives the Naxals greater flexibility and operational freedom.

Third, as it has been observed in some of the insurgencies in Latin America and in South Asia itself, on not achieving their political objectives, the main organisation or the party could break up into more violent cum terrorist form of smaller organisations to further enhance the extortion, crimes and acts of terrorism to make easy money. However, a few hard core ideologues could continue to propagate the ideology and maintain their strongholds in the remote areas.

It is well known that the effect of security operations could be visible earlier than the completion of development projects, due to their long gestation periods involved. Therefore, the recent spate of successes by the SF needs to be followed up by development initiatives and perception management campaign to turn the tide in favour of the state, in real terms. Simultaneously, a concerted drive needs to be launched to create job opportunities and to recruit the youth into military, paramilitary forces and central and state services.

This will help to wean away the youth from the Naxals.

6. As the insurgents grow in strength, they aim to transform their forces to regular armies, capable of fighting the regular forces of the government in conventional battles. There are numerous examples in which the insurgents in China, Vietnam and Sri Lanka have achieved such capabilities.

7. According to their document, “ urban perspective plan” of the Naxals, they have already identified their target urban areas and the industrial corridors.

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

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internal security

HAMSTRUNG?

LACK OF CO-ORDINATION HAMPERING COUNTER-TERRORIST OPERATIONS W

e have witnessed the strange spectacle of more than one cabinet minister decrying Batla House encounter in Delhi in which a brave officer of Delhi police was killed as a false encounter. Some states have also undermined counter-terrorism initiatives on narrow partisan and electoral considerations. Some states have refused to act within the ambit of law against banned organisations such as Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) on narrow electoral considerations.

States also must recognise that contemporary terrorism with global ramifications and capacity for unleashing catastrophic violence constitutes a challenge that was not envisaged at the time of drafting of the Constitution. The scale and magnitude of terrorist violence that the country faces now was beyond the comprehension of the founding fathers.

M

eeting of the Chief Ministers in New Delhi on 5th May, 2011 once again exposed lack of a cohesive strategy in combating the menace of terrorism.

Absence of coordination between the central and state governments has often seriously hamstrung effective counter-terrorist operations. It seems the situation has further worsened.

Many of the Chief Ministers of states strongly criticised the Union government for encroaching on the jurisdiction of the states and disturbing the federal structure of the Constitution. They voiced strong opposition to the formation of National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) which has been conceived as India’s primary agency to assess terror threats. Mamata Banerjee, Chief Minister of West Bengal, not only opposed the very concept of NCTC but demanded withdrawal of the executive order creating it. Other Chief Ministers of non-Congress states like Gujarat, Orissa, Bihar, Tamil Nadu and Tripura joined the chorus. This lack of coordination coupled with mutual distrust is a matter of great concern at a time when the country faces unprecedented threats to its security and when the centre and states must act in concert to foil the designs of the forces of disruption.

While making a strong pitch for the formation of a counter-terror

10

body both the Prime Minister and the Home Minister sought to allay the fears and misgivings of the state governments. Stating that NCTC will supplement the counter-terrorism capacities of the state governments and not supplant them, the Prime Minister further added that “the government’s intention was in no way to affect the distribution of power between the centre and the states that the constitution provides”.

US security officials in their testimonies to the Senate Committee have said that India’s response to the Mumbai terrorist attack was hamstrung by lack of co-ordination between the different levels of the government and due to local police’s lack of training and powerful weapons Indian Constitution prescribes that the Union government shall be responsible for the defence of India, control and the development of the armed forces of the Union and protecting the state governments against external aggression and internal disturbance.

Correspondingly, the Constitution prescribed that the state shall be responsible for public order, police, criminal procedure and administration of justice. There has been no dispute so far regarding Centre’s role in protecting the states from external aggression,

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

but regarding the Centre’s role in protecting the state against internal disturbance, sharp differences of opinion are often surfacing.

To the credit of the former Home Minister Chidambaram it has to be conceded that after taking over charge of the Home Ministry he tried to live down the legacy of his predecessor Shivraj Patil and initiated a number of steps to revamp the counter-terrorism architecture. First, he decentralised the deployment of National Security Guards and created the National Investigation Agency (NIA) to ensure speedy and thorough investigation of terrorist crimes. Second, he also speeded up the implementation of the GC Saxena Committee’s recommendations for multi-agency centre which was in the doldrums under his predecessor.

Third, after his visit to USA he decided to set up NCTC on the pattern of the US counterpart. According to the official order NCTC will “integrate intelligence pertaining to terrorism, analyse it, pursue or mandate other agencies to follow up the leads and coordinate with the existing agencies for effective response”. While his other steps like creation of NIA did not encounter opposition from the states, his NCTC proposal stirred up a hornet’s nest.

His decision to give it independent powers of search and arrest without knowledge of state police was a major encroachment on the powers

Sankar Sen IPS (retd)

of the state police and was done without concurrence of the state governments. There was naturally strong opposition from the state governments. The formation of NCTC has now been on the back burner. Chidambaram strongly felt that (as he said to the Members of the Consultative Committee of the Home Ministry) that the threat perception of terrorism in the country continues to be high and NCTC delay will increase the terror risk. Indeed, the need for a powerful NCTC cannot be overstressed. It is an excellent idea which suffered a setback because of lack of consultation and mistrust between the centre and the state governments.

Though, many of the state governments are crying foul their own record in maintaining internal security and order is poor. This has happened due to a variety of reasons. The state Chief Ministers who are assailing the centre should do well to remember that the state governments pathetically depend upon the centre for containing minor law and order problems. State police chiefs at the drop of a hat seek the help of central paramilitary forces to deal with situations arising out of various agitations. Their poorly trained armed police reserves are not much of help. Further police forces in most of the states are politicised and in a poor state of health. Intelligence agencies in many of the states are packed with people who are picked up on considerations other than merit and deployed on duties like political surveillance etc. The central government also provides financial and logistical support to the states to modernise the police forces. Though the Union government can issue directions to the state government under Article 256 of the Constitution, it has so far been hesitant to do so and has just issued advisories to the state governments for dealing with emerging lawlessness and disorder.

Mumbai carnage (26/11) exposed the deplorable lack of coordination among the multiple security agencies. It was a case, as a security expert has put it where

“every individual agency has all the materials to defend itself but collectively very little to defend the nation”.

US security officials in their testimonies to the Senate Committee have said that India’s response to the Mumbai terrorist attack was hamstrung by lack of co-ordination between the different levels of the government and due to local police’s lack of training and powerful weapons.

The fact of the matter is that no counter-terrorism policy can succeed without the closest cooperation between the centre and states. Close cooperation is also a sine qua non between various central armed forces, investigating and intelligence agencies.

This cooperation and coordination cannot be sacrificed if the country is to win the war against terrorism. During the last few years mistrust and lack of coordination between the centre and states has become more serious and the solution has to be found at the political level. We have witnessed the strange spectacle of more than one cabinet minister decrying Batla House encounter in Delhi in which a brave officer of Delhi police was killed as a false encounter. Some states have also undermined counter-terrorism initiatives on narrow partisan and electoral considerations.

Some states have refused to act within the ambit of law against banned organisations such as Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) on narrow electoral considerations.

States also must recognise that contemporary terrorism with global ramifications and capacity for unleashing catastrophic violence constitutes a challenge that was not envisaged at the time of drafting of the Constitution.

The scale and magnitude of terrorist violence that the country faces now was beyond the comprehension of the founding fathers. There is perhaps need for closer consultation and discussion among the stakeholders to evolve a common strategy to deal with the menace.

Mere blame game will not do.

The writer is former Director of National Police Academy and DG of National Human Rights Commission. Presently, he is the Senior Fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences, New Delhi. He is a recipient of the Police Medal for Meritorious service as well as President’s Medal For Distinguished Service.

This lack of coordination coupled with mutual distrust is a matter of great concern at a time when the country faces unprecedented threats to its security and when the centre and states must act in concert to foil the designs of the forces of disruption

The need for a powerful NCTC cannot be overstressed.

It is an excellent idea which suffered a setback because of lack of consultation and mistrust between the centre and the state governments

State police chiefs at the drop of a hat seek the help of central paramilitary forces to deal with situations arising out of various agitations. Their poorly trained armed police reserves are not much of help. Further police forces in most of the states are politicised and in a poor state of health

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

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internal security

CRITICAL DRIVERS

IMPACT OF DEMOGRAPHICS ON THE

INDIAN INTERNAL SECURITY SCENARIO

I

n India, South Asia, Middle East and Africa there is currently a massive youth bulge in the population. In the past such youth bulges had led to revolutions in France, Russia and China. However in recent times (1960-1990) a youth bulge in the East and South East Asian populations resulted in a major economic growth spurt in these countries. The Tiger economies were able to educate and skill their population and hence reaped the youth dividend. One school of thought is that if the working age population (15-65 years) rises at a much faster rate than the dependant population (0-14 years age group and the elderly people above 65 years) it would lead to a rise in the savings rate and an expansion of the productive capacity of workers.

Covale and Hoover (1958) and more recently Harvard economists Bloom and Williamson (1998) have reaffirmed that such a demographic transition could contribute significantly to economic growth. The caveat, once again, is the ability of the state to skill its population and generate the requisite number of jobs that can enhance overall productivity. Lack of gainful employment however could create huge armies of unemployed youth whose impact on society can be highly destabilising and generate conflict and social tension. In quantitative terms the adult population in the working age group (15-65 yrs) is expected to rise from 604 million in 2000 to 942 million in 2025. This translates into an overall increase of some 338 million new job seekers into the job market in India. If the current employment shortfall is factored in, we are already short of some 145 million jobs today. The aggregate number of jobs India really needs to generate is almost in the region of 483 million. As a sobering fact all the jobs that our liberalised economy was able to generate from 2004 to 2010 were just 1.3 million. The shortfall explains the Maoist movement.

T

he most critical drivers that could shape the Internal Security scenario in India would be the Key driver of the Demographic structure, size and distribution of the Indian population. The Indian population is currently experiencing a huge youth bulge which will peak by 2020. This should theoretically result in a more favourable ratio between the working age population and dependant population. In fact such a youth bulge had helped the Tiger economies of East and South East Asia to rise significantly in the period between 1965 and 1990. In such a scenario, the savings rates go up and the productivity of the work force rises, even as expenditure on pensions and healthcare for the aged and retired population falls. There is however a critical proviso for this to happen – the state must be able to educate and skill its population and generate the required number of additional jobs in its economy. A failure to do so could have a very adverse impact as a very large population of uneducated and unemployed youth can have a highly destabilising impact on the polity and lead to a sharp rise in levels of violence,

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crime and internal conflict. In the past, many countries like France, Russia and China have experienced violent revolutions in such periods of a demographic youth bulge. In India a failure to skill its youthful population and provide it useful employment could lead to a spurt in violent insurgencies, terrorist movements and industrial unrest and societal violence. We already have a raging Maoist insurgency in some 20 states of India encompassing some 230 districts, out of which 35 are most seriously affected, in as much as the writ of the Indian state has ceased to run in these areas. These constitute the famous Red corridor from Pashupati in Nepal to Tirupati in the south. The Maoists are now trying to infiltrate into the industrial heartland of the Golden Quadrilateral in Maharashtra and Gujarat and spread their insurgency to the Western Ghats in Karnataka.

Any Net Assessment regarding the future Internal Security scenario in India will therefore be shaped more by key drivers like Demography and

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

governance issues like Identity politics and Integration of Tribal populations in the national mainstream. The next most critical driver of course will be the performance of the Indian economy.

Will it be able to grow at a rate that is able to generate a trickle-down effect for the poorer sections of society, generate jobs and lead to equitable growth?

Governance factors would most seriously impact our internal security scenario. Is our economic growth equitable and sustainable, does it pull people over the poverty line? Does it ameliorate the lot of our Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes? Does it improve our indices of human development and develop the capacities of our people in terms of education and healthcare? Are we able to manage the vast rise in our urban populations?

Can we provide enlightened and “visionary leadership that is not tempted by short-term political payoffs rather than long-term sustainability. India’s growth story is not inevitable. It will not materialise in the absence of vigorous and purposeful structural and governance reforms”. So said the Governor of the Reserve Bank of India.

Identity politics today is badly splintering

Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

our polity on the fault lines of caste, creed and religion. This in turn is being encouraged by the first past the post system which enables a candidate to win with just 10-15 per cent of the total vote. This encourages segmented mobilisation along caste and creed fault lines and serves to deepen the divisions in society.

In India a failure to skill its youthful population and provide it useful employment could lead to a spurt in violent insurgencies, terrorist movements and industrial unrest and societal violence. We already have a raging Maoist insurgency in some 20 states of India encompassing some 230 districts, out of which 35 are most seriously affected , in as much as the writ of the Indian state has ceased to run in these areas. These constitute the famous Red corridor from Pashupati in Nepal to Tirupati in the South. The Maoists are now trying to infiltrate into the industrial heartland of the Golden Quadilateral in Maharashtra and Gujarat and spread their insurgency to the Western Ghats in Karnataka The next set of factors would be the Ecological drivers of acute water stress and food scarcity caused by depletion of ground water, a melting of Himalayan Glaciers leading to drying up overtime of our major rivers and extreme weather events. India and South Asia are likely to experience acute levels of water scarcity in the coming decades. Per capita water availability in South Asia will decline to just 1,340 cubic meters per annum by 2025 (The global availability today is 4,400 cubic meters per capita per annum). This in itself could be an acute stressor leading to inter and intra state conflict.

The Global and Regional scenarios will have a more indirect impact. Key external influence factors could arise from whether India is able to secure a peaceful periphery for its sustained economic growth or it is impelled into conflicts with its neighbours. Such conflicts could be a

severe drain on its economic resources and act as a major retard on economic development.

Derailment of the economy would precipitate serious internal security problems largely arising from a massive increase in the numbers of unemployed youth. Another key factor will be the level of external support available to insurgencies / terrorist movements in India.

Why and where these will arise, would more be a function of the Demographic, Economic and Governance drivers which merit very detailed analysis in the Indian context. In this article we will focus in detail about the Demographic Drivers of India’s Internal Security.

Demographic drivers of internal conflict In 1947 the Indian population was 350 million at the time of Independence. By the time of the 2001 census, it had grown to 1,027 million.

Thus during the latter half of the 20th century, India’s population had risen by a staggering 650 million. The key question for analysis and forecasting therefore are: How much will be the growth of the Indian population in the first quarter of the 21st century?

What will be the geographical distribution of this growth?

What changes are expected in the age and sex structure of the population?

The component method of projection is generally used to make fairly accurate forecasts of population that are determined by an extrapolation of fertility rates, mortality and migration rates. As each of these forces have distinct age and sex profiles, it becomes possible to mathematically extrapolate from a base year figure to any future date. Generally such forecasts remain fairly accurate in a 20-25 years time horizon.

The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab.

He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Poonch districts.

He has served two tenures at the DGMO. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 24 books and over 100 papers in many prestigious research journals. He is Editor-in-chief of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine.

Can we provide enlightened and visionary leadership that is not tempted by short term political payoffs rather than long term sustainability. India’ growth story is not inevitable. It will not materialise in the absence of vigorous and purposeful structural and governance reforms

This implies that by 2025, India will have to create an additional 278 million new jobs in the country if rising unemployment is to be checked and societal harmony maintained. The actual number of jobs really needed are in the region of over 480 million.

This is a mind-boggling figure and we have just one decade in which to deliver. Our national response has to be on a war footing. This implies the vital need to educate our population and skill our workforce. These new workers will have to be shifted largely to the industrial or manufacturing sector because the agricultural sector is incapable of absorbing more workforce

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

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internal security

CRITICAL DRIVERS

Forecast: Demographic scenario 2020

Total Population in 2020 – 1,331 million (1.33 billion)

Based upon mathematical extrapolation carried out using the DEMPROJ computer programme of the Futures Group International, there are two basic estimates for the Indian Population in 2020. These are:

Population density / Sq km – 405

Optimistic scenario: This assumes that India will be able to achieve the demographic goals of the National Population Policy 2000 which sets a Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of 2.1 children per woman and an Infant Mortality Rate of 30 per 1,000 by 2010. This projects a population of 1,305 million (1.3 billion) by 2020.

Realistic scenario: Many experts feel these TFR and Infant Mortality rates are overly optimistic and project an overall Indian population of 1,331 (1.33 billion) by 2020. In fact by 2025 the realistic forecasts assume that India will have a population of 1.4 billion (1,403 million) and overtake the population of China.

The next most critical driver of course will be the performance of the Indian economy. Will it be able to grow at a rate that is able to generate a trickle- down effect for the poorer sections of society, generate jobs and lead to equitable growth?

There is a general unanimity in the forecasts made by different agencies for Indian population growth. Thus the under-mentioned agencies predict following population figures for India in 2025.

Females per 1,000 males – 950 Percentage population in working age group (15-65) – 66.3 per cent Median age – 27 Years Dependency Ratio: Child (0-14) and elders (65+) – 51 per cent The adult population in working age group (15-65 years) is expected to rise from 604 million in 2000 to 942 million in 2025 (ie from 60 per cent to 67 per cent). This represents an overall increase of 338 million in real terms.

Regional growth differentials: North and south India What is important to note is the large differential in the population growth rates in north and south India. Thus in the year 2000, the overall population in north India was 450 million and that of south India was 220 million. The sharper decline in the comparative Total Fertility Rates (TFR) in north and south India is tabulated below.

Thus the population Year of north India will 2000 grow from 2010 450 million 2025 in 2000 to 700 million in 2025.

o ­World Bank 1994

- 1,370

o UNO 1998

- 1,330

o Visaria and Bhat

- 1,999

o Population foundation (1999) - 1,400 o Dayson and Hanchate

Relevant statistics about the projected Indian population in 2020 are summarized below for the realistic scenario of this computer forecast.

14

It would be useful to summarise state wise population growth trends in India to try and understand the varying geographical impact indices.

BIMARU states: (Bihar, MP, UP, Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Uttaranchal). would account for a population growth of 250 million between the year 2000-2025 and account for 50 per cent of India’s overall population in 2025. Of this UP alone would account for 22 per cent of the population share.

Southern states: (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu) the population will grow by some 45 million between 2000-2025 and reduce from 22 per cent of the overall Indian population to just 19 per cent in 2025.

The population

Maharashtra’s population would be 10 per cent of the total.

These forecasts range from a low of 1,330 to a high of 1,400 million

of south India in turn will grow from 220 million in the year 2000 to just 265 million in 2025 – making it 19 per cent of overall Indian (a decline from population 22 per cent now).The population density in north India will rise from 319 per sq km in 2000 to

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

State wise population growth trends

North South India India TFR TFR 4.4 2.3 3.6 1.9 2.7 1.8

- 1,381

Demproj computer programme forecasts

496 per sq km in 2025. The population density in the southern states will rise from 345 per sq km in 2000 to 417 per sq km in 2025. The population in south India will begin to age by 2025. The median age would rise from 26 years in 2000 to 34 years in 2025. 9 per cent of this would be over 65 years of age. In contrast the north would have a much younger population with a median age of only 26 years and only 4 per cent in the elderly age group of 65 and above. Hence there will be pressure for migration of workers and population from north to south India.

Given the high population densities in south India already and the language / cultural differences, this is likely to engender social tensions and conflict.

West Bengal’s and Gujarat’s population would be 5 per cent each.

Delhi NCR would have a population of 4 per cent of the overall population.

Security implications regional imbalances population growth

of in

The decline in fertility rates in south India will account for a disproportionate rise in the population of north India.

This could lead to pressure for migration of the local labour from north to south India. Given the already high population densities in south India and

ethnic and linguistic differences, it could lead to social tensions and conflicts.

The inordinately high population rise in UP (22 per cent of India’s total population by 2025) could lead to social tensions and conflicts between the castes as also a rise of recruitment by Jihadi / fundamentalist organisations.

A large proportion of IM cadres have been recruited from UP and Bihar. This trend could see a rise.

The inordinate rise of population in the BIMARU states of north India could also lead to a rise in the levels of Maoists insurgency and violence.

Maoist infiltration of trade unions could lead to violent agitations and overall industrial violence levels will rise.

This could presage a rise in the levels of criminality and gang warfare in north India.

Demographic youth bulge: Age structure of population The most decisive driver for growth and conflict lies in the age structure of the population. In India, South Asia, Middle East and Africa there is currently a massive youth bulge.

In the past such youth bulges had led to revolutions in France, Russia and China. However in recent times (1960-1990) a youth bulge in the East and South East Asian populations resulted in a major economic growth spurt in these countries. The Tiger economies were able to educate and skill their population and hence reaped the youth dividend. One school of thought is that if the working age population (15-65 years) rises at a much faster rate than the dependant population (0-14 years age group and the elderly people above 65 years) it would lead to a rise in the saving rate and an expansion of the productive capacity of workers.

It reduces the welfare, health and pensionary expenditure for the retired population and increases the productive workforce. Covale and Hoover (1958) and more recently Harvard economists Bloom and Williamson (1998) have reaffirmed that such a demographic transition could contribute significantly to economic growth. Population projections can help to pinpoint such a demographic bonus period. The caveat, once again, is the ability of the state to skill its population and generate the requisite number of jobs that can enhance overall productivity.

Lack of gainful employment however could

create huge armies of unemployed youth whose impact on society can be highly destabilising and generate conflict and social tension.

The inordinate rise of population in the BIMARU states of north India could also lead to a rise in the levels of Maoists insurgency and violence. Maoist infiltration of trade unions could lead to violent agitations and overall industrial violence levels will rise India is poised for a significant youth dividend. From 2000-2020 its population will exhibit a marked youth bulge. Its median age in 2000 was just 26. By 2020 this will go up to 27. The percentage of people in the working age group will increase as shown over the years.

and skill our workforce. These new workers will have to be shifted largely to the industrial or manufacturing sector because the agricultural sector is incapable of absorbing more workforce.

The Indian Planning Commission in its Vision Document 2020 envisions adding some 200 million new jobs largely in the small scale and medium scale enterprises by 2020. It is noteworthy that China had created a 100 million new jobs by its rapid industrial expansion from 1978 onwards – when it became the world’s workshop for low end manufacture.

India’s economic growth so far has been due to an expansion of it’s service sector and manufacturing in the private sector. Unfortunately the Indian liberalisation of the economy, has created the miracle of jobless growth. A number of private companies enhanced their output and quality by automating their plants. This Year Percentage population in working age group (15-65) in fact reduced the work force. Thus Optimistic scenario Realistic Scenario Tata Steel had 2000 59.8 per cent 59.8 per cent 80,000 workers in 2005 62.0 per cent 61.6 per cent it’s Jamshedpur steel plant in the 2010 65.0 per cent 63.6 per cent sixties that used 2015 65.0 per cent 65.2 per cent to produce one 2020 68.7 per cent 66.3 per cent million tons of low grade steel 2025 68.3 per cent 67.2 per cent for the domestic In quantitative terms the adult market. In the 1990s it automated population in the working age it’s plant, reduced the workforce to group (15-65 yrs) is expected to rise 40,000 and began to produce some from 604 million in 2000 to 942 million 5 million tons of high quality steel for in 2025. This translates into an overall export to Japanese car manufacturers. increase of some 338 million new job The plans are to increase the output to seekers into the job market in India. 10 million tons of steel annually and If the current employment shortfall is reduce the workforce to just 20,000. factored in, we are already short of some This would be excellent for profits and 145 million (664 - 459 million) jobs. The productivity of the Tatas but could create aggregate number of jobs India really a disaster in a demographic situation needs to generate is almost in the region that calls for massive job creation, not job of 483 million. reduction. Like China, India will have to go for labour-intensive industries Employment generation like shipbuilding.

This implies that by 2025, India will have to create an additional 338 million new jobs in the country if rising unemployment is to be checked and societal harmony maintained. The actual number of jobs really needed are in the region of over 480 million. This is a mind-boggling figure and we have just one decade in which to deliver.

Our national response has to be on a war footing. This implies the vital need to educate our population

Vocational training shortfalls There are ambitious plans in India to train some 50 million youth by the end of the 12th Five Year Plan in vocational skills that enhance their employability.

In fact the Indian central budget set a target for skilling 9 million youth by 2013-14 in vocational skills. This target has slipped badly and only some 14 lakh youth were skilled in the first 10 months of 2012 as against a target of 85 lakh for this period. The government

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

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internal security

announcement

CRITICAL DRIVERS

blundered by raising the overall costs of vocational skilling by bringing the National skills development companies under the ambit of Service Tax (12.36 per cent plus educational cess of 3 per cent). Currently there are some 95 firms involved in training youth under the National Skills Development Corporation (NSDC). The Corporation has set itself a most ambitious target of skilling some 500 million Indians by 2022 by fostering and funding private sector skill development initiatives (eg the Gram Tarang Development Employment Training Services which trains people in the Maoist affected areas). Sadly most of these programmes are running well behind schedule.

Besides, even generating skills by itself does not guarantee employment. That would depend more upon the capacity of the economy to generate jobs.

Edward Luce, in his insightful book, In spite of the Gods wrote that all the jobs in India‘s public and private sector, including the organised and the unorganised sector, amounted to some 470 million jobs. Of this only 35 million or 7 per cent were in the organised sector (21 million, direct employees of the government and 14 million with the organised private sector). All the remainder were in the unorganised economy. Adding 278 million new jobs by 2025 would amount to a need for a virtual doubling of the economy. India would have to grow at over 9 per cent per annum growth rates for this kind of job generation.

The caveat, once again, is the ability of the state to skill its population and generate the requisite number of jobs that can enhance overall productivity.

Lack of gainful employment however could create huge armies of unemployed youth whose impact on society can be highly destabilising and generate conflict and social tension A failure to skill our population and create some 480 million new jobs by 2020 could have disastrous social consequences in terms of the rise of violent movements like the Maoists insurgency. In any case, even if India is able to generate so many jobs, it will, like China, entail an unprecedented migration from the rural spaces to the cities – leading virtually to a breakdown of highly stressed metropolitan infrastructure, creation of huge slums which tend to accentuate levels of violence and criminality in society.

Industrial unrest In the years to come trade unions will be infiltrated by Maoist organisations – leading to violent agitations that could entail fatal attacks on the management and destruction of property and arson.

The strikes in Maruti plant at Manesar in 2012 indicated the onset of this new and dangerous Labour Ministry’s Report

Year

Regular / salaried workers (millions)

Casual labour (millions)

Self-employed (millions)

2004-05

69.7 mn

129.7 mn

258.4 mn

2009-10

75.1 mn

151.3 mn

232.7 mn

Increase / Decrease Per cent increase / decrease

5.4 mn (+) 1.2 per cent (+)

The Labour Ministry’s report of 2012 vintage provides some authentic / official data on the actual employment generation in India between 2004-2010.

The statistics are cause for genuine alarm.

In this virtually a decade long period India has been able to add just 1.3 million jobs against the badly needed 280 million plus.

In percentage terms the job increase works out to a paltry- 0.3 per cent. It shows that the Indian economy has produced the miracle of jobless growth for almost a decade of our economic reform period.

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21.6 mn (+)

25.7 mn (-)

4.7 per cent (+)

5.7 pre cent (-)

trend of Industrial violence.

Sociologically, the conflict accentuated between the shop floor supervisors and workers.

The brutal murder of the managers throws up the rising vulnerability of this class and the ambiguity of the rules of engagement for the security staff and even the police that were on site. There were clear indications of the infiltration of Maoist elements in these trade unions.

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

Risk survey 2013 The FICCI and Pinkerton India Risk Survey for 2013 pointed out that Maruti Udyog Limited at Manesar was plagued by labour unrest at its Manesar plant for over a year. This led to a production loss of 83,000 cars or some Rs 2,500 crore. The risk survey has put industrial unrest as the highest risk factor for Indian industry at 10.42 per cent. The next is Political and Governance instability factor at 10.03 per cent, followed by Information and Cyber security at 9.64 per cent and corruption and bribery at 9.48 per cent.

The traditional Fire hazard is ranked next at 8.45 per cent and crime at 8.41 per cent. Terrorism and insurgency are ranked seventh at 8.33 per cent.

This is followed by Business espionage (8.04 per cent), Accidents (7.29 per cent), IP Theft (7.25 per cent), Natural hazards (6.95 per cent) and the survey places workplace violence and sexual harassment at the end at 5.72 per cent.

Companies having HQs outside India however, put terrorism and insurgency as second highest risk and even government and PSU undertakings tended to rate terrorism as the highest risk factor. It may be recalled that in the 26/11 attack on Mumbai, the Taj Hotel not only suffered a loss of revenue and people but also a sharp dip of nearly 17 per cent in their share price of Rs 40.20 marking a new 52 week low at that point of time. As per the Regulatory and Development Authority, structural damage amounted to Rs 500 crore and also took its toll on the insurance industry.

Financial Total losses incurred due to Mumbai attack were 457.8 mn over US$ 800 million.

459.1 mn Overseas investors took out 13.5 billion 1.3 mn (+) from Indian stocks 0.28 per cent (+) immediately after the incident in 2008 causing the benchmark BSE index to slip to 56 per cent. Terrorist attacks on our industrial and business sectors still remain a major high-impact but low-probability scenario. The very scale of its impact implies that Corporates will increasingly have to divert far greater resources towards protecting their establishments from such terrorist attacks and the government agencies will have to enhance manifolds their response capabilities.

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maoist menace

AERIAL ADVANTAGE

Maoism: Militarisation of the conflict

Usage of Air Power

Wg Cdr AN Hanfee Vr C (retd) The writer served IAF for 23 years and handled command and staff assignments.

He was also Deputy Director of helicopter fleet of IAF in Air HQ. He is a graduate of Defence Services Staff College and an MBA from University of Pune.

A

n excellent analysis of the role of Air Power in the ongoing anti-Maoist operations. The use of Air Power here has to adapt itself to minimising collateral damage during offensive operations on one hand yet create a militarily advantageous situation for ground forces on the other. Resorting to operations such as precision bombing, aerial reconnaissance, medical evacuation and induction of troops in denied areas are the operations which would result in undermining the ability of Maoists to wage war against state in quickest possible time. At present BSF has 6 Mi-17 and 6 Dhruv medium lift helicopters available for anti-Maoist operations, strength considered sufficient to meet the requirement. Helicopters have emerged as preferred aerial platform for counter insurgency operations. They fly low and slow and carry direct-fire, low-yield weapons, which make them ideal for operations against foes that choose to fight in close proximity to civilians. But their effectiveness is constrained by higher long-term costs and greater attrition rates.

I

n the month of January, 9th battalion of the Chhattisgarh Armed Forces (CAF) was ambushed in Chintagufa area while on a road opening exercise. Head Constable Besuram Mandawi lost his life and Platoon Commander Nandkishore Bhadoriya was injured. The state police called an IAF Mi-17 helicopter from Jagdalpur airbase to evacuate the injured. While landing at the Temelwara helipad, it came under heavy fire from all sides from members of the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army, forcing it to make an emergency landing in the densely forested Sukma district. A bullet also hit the police wireless operator on board the helicopter. The two IAF pilots then abandoned the helicopter and the injured wireless operator and scurried to the safety of a nearby police camp. The injured wireless operator was fortunate to have survived till his evacuation four hours later.

The incident received overwhelming media attention and triggered an ugly row between MHA and MoD. But more importantly, it brought into sharp focus the manner in which Air Power is being used in such operations.

Challenges for air power in counter insurgency operations Low

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intensity

conflicts

are

political-military

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

confrontation below level of conventional war but above the level of routine law and order challenges, between a state and groups challenging its sovereignty.

It frequently involves struggles of competing principles and ideologies. Air forces all over the world face unusual challenges when confronted with counter-insurgency wars because doctrines for using Air Power in conventional contexts are less applicable in such scenario. Air Power has inherent characteristics of speed, range, manoeuvrability and mobility of large payloads. These characteristics yield operational capabilities central to the conduct of air war. Air forces thereby provide the opportunity to gain perspective over the entire battle space and to apply power directly against enemy’s resources, regardless of their location thereby provide an element of superiority and necessary leverage for favourable negotiations to the state. Recent advances in technology have further increased effectiveness and lethality of weapons delivered from air.

Air power has inherent characteristics of speed, range, manoeuvrability and mobility of large payloads.

These characteristics yield operational capabilities central to the conduct of air war Likewise, the counter-insurgency scenario in India

Low intensity conflicts are political-military confrontation below level of conventional war but above the level of routine law and order challenges, between a state and groups challenging its sovereignty

The fact that the insurgents use unconventional tactics such as many unrelated small, surprising, seemingly spontaneous yet intense strikes or IED bombings all over troubled sectors, presents a kind of challenge, the armed forces are usually not prepared for. These tactics are extremely wearisome, frustrating and challenging for counter-insurgency forces, especially for air forces

also presents a different kind of challenge.

What started as an armed struggle against local landlords in 1967 after the killing of Bimal Kissan by landlords of Naxalbari, has now snowballed into a full scale armed rebellion against the state of India and spread to 83 districts in 9 states. Their estimated strength is 20,000 armed and 50,000 unarmed, well indoctrinated, trained and well led cadre with a significant local

population sympathising with their cause.

These Maoists or Naxals do not possess high value industrial or economic targets, the destruction of which by Air Power would change the outcome of war in favour of security forces overnight. Nor are they distinguishable from the civilian population to be targeted from air, which puts civilians at risk of being collateral damage, the extent of which could be politically significant.

Availability of accurate information about Maoists movements, assessment of topography and many other such details has enabled our security forces to yield better results

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

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maoist menace

AERIAL ADVANTAGE

Therefore options like close air support and interdiction which ordinarily prove highly effective during conventional warfare, are not available against homegrown insurgents. The fact that the insurgents use unconventional tactics such as many unrelated small, surprising, seemingly spontaneous yet intense strikes or IED bombings all over troubled sectors, presents a kind of challenge, the armed forces are usually not prepared for. These tactics are extremely wearisome, frustrating and challenging for counter-insurgency forces, especially for air forces. It is not feasible for air force to maintain persistent presence at every place where they might be needed at very short notice. Identifying hostile elements and discriminating between them and the civilians around them, is extremely difficult from the air. Even with the best communication networks their ability to convey the information to aircraft with sufficient positional and discriminative advice and to keep the enemy held in place until aircraft arrive, more often than not, insurgents have dispersed by the time aircraft arrives.

Resorting to operations such as precision bombing, aerial reconnaissance, medical evacuation and induction of troops in denied areas are the operations which would result in undermining the ability of Maoists to wage war against state in quickest possible time The use of Air Power here has to adapt itself to minimising collateral damage during offensive operations on one hand yet create a militarily advantageous situation for ground forces on the other.

Resorting to operations such as precision bombing, aerial reconnaissance, medical evacuation and induction of troops in denied areas are the operations which would result in undermining the ability of Maoists to wage war against state in quickest possible time.

Best suited aerial platform With the role of fighter aircraft ruled out in such conflicts, helicopters have emerged as preferred aerial platform for counter-insurgency operations. They fly low and slow and carry direct-fire, low-yield weapons, which make them ideal for operations against foes that choose to fight in close proximity to civilians. But their effectiveness is constrained by higher long-term costs and greater attrition rates. Operating and maintaining helicopters are expensive because they require more specialised maintenance than fixed wing aircraft. They are also relatively vulnerable to rockets, man-portable missiles and small arms fire.

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at par with failing states like Pakistan. The government of India made a conscious decision not to use armed forces against the Maoists. Loss of innocent lives as collateral damage was an unacceptable political risk.

With the armed forces out of scenario, the onus of confronting Maoists fell upon Ministry of Home Affairs and its paramilitary forces, led by CRPF and police forces of affected states which are embedded in prototype of keeper of law and order. The total number of paramilitary personnel deployed under Integrated Action Plan for anti-Maoist operations has crossed well over one lakh with CRPF having deployed 82 battalions, BSF 11, ITBP 6 and SSB 2. However, this deployment by itself is proving to be insufficient, given the nature and size of terrain and a large section of the alienated population, which sympathise with Maosist cause as a result of 50 years of sustained indoctrination.

This also implied that air assets of IAF would either not be available to these forces or be available on a limited scale in non-offensive roles, making the task of fighting superior enemy, even more daunting.

MHA air power Air wing of BSF holds the air assets of MHA. On its strength, they have fixed wing aircraft such as Embraer-135, Avro HS-748, B-200 and ALH Mi-17, Chetak and Cheetah helicopters. They were tasked for providing Air Power to anti-Maoists forces. A fleet of medium lift Mi-17 and Dhruv helicopters were added to their strength for this task. These helicopters are used for air logistics, troop induction and medical evacuation. At present BSF has 6 Mi-17 and 6 Dhruv medium lift helicopters available for anti-Maoist operations, strength considered sufficient to meet the requirement.

The capability of MHA air power, however, is severely restricted due to lack of experience of handling air power in combat situations and resultant lack of clarity about the employment philosophy by its controlling authority

Operating and maintaining helicopters are expensive because they require more specialised maintenance than fixed wing aircraft. They are also relatively vulnerable to rockets, man-portable missiles and small arms fire

The capability of MHA Air Power, however, is severely restricted due to lack of experience of handling Air Power in combat situations and resultant lack of clarity about the employment philosophy by its controlling authority. Fleet readiness has been poor due to unresolved maintenance and training issues. The organisation operates different fleets under different operating regulatory framework. While the Mi-17 helicopters operate under military flying rules, Dhruv helicopters operate under civil aviation requirements. The organisation oscillates from IAF to HAL to private companies for their operational and maintenance needs. The experiments with outsourcing still continue without yielding desired results and an underutilsed fleet.

Based on the assessment that the use of offensive Air Power within our own country against our own citizens even if they are threatening war is considered to be a harsh and escalatory step which would put India

The helicopters operate under restrictive regulatory and operational environment, reducing their effectiveness in combat areas. Helicopters are also not equipped for offensive operations and extremely

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

vulnerable to hostile ground fire. The existing procedures for safe operations require a high level of trust and co-ordination between the forces on ground and the forces operating Air Power, which is not evident at present. Hence, troops fighting Naxal violence continue to be denied the technological edge already paid for by the government.

other such details has enabled our security forces to yield better results. However, dual control over the organisation, lack of manpower and their inability to move out of Hyderabad has restricted their effectiveness severely. In fact in 2012, out of 110 requests placed by CRPF for UAV flights, NTRO was able to provide only 26 flights.

Notifying anti-Naxal operations as special operations or paramilitary operations with well-defined rules of engagement can be a starter. Doing away with dual control over UAV assets would be another parallel measure to be implemented without any further delay

Air Power has been an integral part of armed forces allover the world even when they combat counter-insurgency. For Air Power to be effective, its has to be employed following the basic principles such as centralised control of assets. Long induction phases of aircraft and equipment, maintenance and training require a high degree of accurate planning. This is a task best left to air force. Unusual situations require unusual solutions. The BSF air wing, which is the nodal agency for MHA air assets, needs to be made autonomous and their dependence on IAF and HAL for their training and maintenance needs to be minimised if the organisation is to function effectively. Notifying anti-Naxal operations as special operations or paramilitary operations with well-defined rules of engagement can be a starter.

Doing away with dual control over UAV assets would be another parallel measure to be implemented without any further delay.

UAV assets Unarmed Aerial Vehicles is another element of Air Power which provides vital surveillance, command and control options. The National Technological Research Organisation (NTRO) is the organisation created under MHA but reports to National Security Advisor. Their Israeli-made HERON UAVs, flown and controlled out of Begumpet airport, relay live images of Maoists affected areas back to the control room with the help of a high-resolution camera and satellite networking, which is then shared with the troops.

Availability of accurate information about Maoists movements, assessment of topography and many

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

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maoist menace

AGENDA FOR THE GOVERNMENT

Maoist Problem And National Security A

fter the Japanese ended their occupation in Philippines (1942) 6,000 sq miles of the richest rice growing area in Luzon, called as “Huklandia” came to be dominated by the Hukbalahap (Huks for short), a united front of Communist peasants. At the peak of their rebellion they commanded 15,000 guerrillas and 1,00,000 clandestine members. In 1951 Ramon Magsaysay was appointed as Secretary, National Defence under American advice as Overall Commander of the army and police and development activities. He organised small combat teams (BCTs) which penetrated more effectively into Huklandia, denied food supply to insurgents, built 300 miles of new roads, dug 2,000 wells in 4 years, exchanged good officers between army and police, raised a dedicated intelligence corps, suspended habeas corpus in conflict areas, offered handsome rewards and resettled surrendered families with lands. By 1953 the number of Huks who surrendered to the government (15,866) was larger than the numbers who were captured (4,269) and killed (9,695) combined.

T

ucked away in a corner was a news item in our dailies (April 10, 2013): “13 acquitted in Maoist attack case”. For the visual or print media this disappointing result was not as newsworthy as the triumphant entry of Chief Minister Narendra Modi into Kolkata.

Publishing the Court verdict in one of the worst Maoist massacres at Chingawaram in Dantewada district on May 17, 2010 in which 31 persons including 15 security personnel were killed in a passenger bus would not have earned the visual media so many Television Rating Points (TRPs). Also unnoticed was that the same Dantewada judge had acquitted 10 accused in January this year in “Tadmetla” massacre in which 76 security personnel were killed on April 6, 2010. Chingawaram killing came barely 40 days after Tadmetla when private bus operators refused the Maoist order prohibiting carrying security personnel as passengers.

Then came the Dhauri massacre (Narayanpur District) on June 29 in which 27 CRPF men were killed. As many as 43 witnesses turned “hostile” during Tadmetla trial indicating the level of Maoist terror in the region.

A newspaper recently said that insurgents have been showing the Tadmetla attack video films in remote tribal villages “to flaunt their military power” for more recruitment.

Another report (April 8) said that

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Naxals had trained 4 batches of 30 to 35 trainees in combat operations, military intelligence and assaults.

Thus fancy solutions advocated by our “arms chair” experts, far removed from the dismal ground reality, can be of no use to thousands of our valiant CRPF jawans and local police who are fighting lone battles.

Experience in other countries The problem is that much of this type of experience we can study was during an era when human rights bodies did not breathe down the necks of security forces as is now happening. Secondly in all other experiences, whether Hukbalahap in Philippines, Malayan, Mau Mau or Colombia, the success was achieved with unified command of security forces which in India is difficult to achieve with the present trust deficit between the centre and states who are already on the 2014 poll mode.

This squabble permeates down even security professionals as we saw between the Chhattisgarh DGP and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) which was too shameful for any comments. The third lesson we would learn from other countries is that this overall commander for security operations should also be incharge of development activities, which is unimaginable in Indian conditions.

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

After the Japanese ended their occupation in Philippines (1942) 6,000 sq miles of the richest rice growing area in Luzon, called as “Huklandia” came to be dominated by the Hukbalahap (Huks for short), a united front of Communist peasants.

At the peak of their rebellion they commanded 15,000 guerrillas and 1,00,000 clandestine members.

In 1951 Ramon Magsaysay was appointed as Secretary, National Defence under American advice as Overall Commander of the army and police and development activities. He organised small combat teams (BCTs) which penetrated more effectively into Huklandia, denied food supply to insurgents, built 300 miles of new roads, dug 2,000 wells in 4 years, exchanged good officers between army and police, raised a dedicated intelligence corps, suspended habeas corpus in conflict areas, offered handsome rewards and resettled surrendered families with lands. By 1953 the number of Huks who surrendered to the government (15,866) was larger than the numbers who were captured (4,269) and killed (9,695) combined.

The only time when some organised activity was witnessed was when Home Minister P Chidambaram (2008-12) had initiated firm measures through DG Vijay Kumar who was incharge of CRPF

V Balachandran IPS (retd) The writer is a former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat.

He was also part of the 2 man “High Level Committee” appointed by government of Maharashtra to enquire into the police performance on 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks.

The Malayan Communists (CPM-Communist Party of Malaya) also followed the Indian Maoist classical doctrine of war in three stages: Lightening attacks, “Liberated Zones” culminating in “Mobile War” by hitting high quality targets with the ambitious plan of capturing the country. They wanted disruption of economy by paralysing rubber cultivation and mines. Malayan Peoples’ Liberation Army (MNLA) with a strength of 8,000 killed 1,865 security forces and 2,479 civilians (1948-1960). MNLA suffered 6,711 casualties, 1,289 were captured while 2,704 surrendered. However there were several dissimilarities between these two cases. Unlike Indian Maoists who indoctrinated original residents like Adivasis and villagers, CPM’s pool was the migrant Chinese labour imported by the British for rubber / palm oil plantations and tin mines from 1877. This was an advantage for the colonial administration as they could use the original residents against the Chinese.

When Japan invaded Malaya in December 1944 they killed 80,000 Chinese and pushed them into forest as squatters. In 1945 Japanese were defeated and CPM started secretly planning to take over Malaya. In the beginning British also downplayed its seriousness like our former Home Minister Shivraj Patil. They described it as “Emergency” not to upset London commercial insurance rates on which Malayan commerce and industry depended.

Do we want to eradicate the Maoist menace and bring the whole country under the rule of law?

Or do we want the Colombian situation where the federal government has tacitly acknowledged FARC’s rule and ceded territory?

The administration used “Briggs Plan” and “Templer Plan” to tackle this problem.

Briggs Plan was (a) denying food to insurgents

provided by Chinese squatters; (b) resettling 5,00,000 squatters; (c) raising an aboriginal force “Senoi Pra’ak” to kill insurgents; (d) building landing strips and police posts in remote areas and (e) issuing National Identification and ration card system to isolate insurgents. By 1952 they had resettled 4,23,000 Chinese squatters in 410 new villages.

They ceased to supply food to insurgents as they became property owners. This “resettling” was copied, albeit poorly, by Chhattisgarh government.

High Commissioner Sir Gerald Templer increased police strength by 700 per cent, recruited 20,000 Home Guards with shot guns, opened schools, clinics and police stations and achieved massive village electrification. He also punished those who helped insurgents by cutting their rations, closing schools and ordering curfew. Psy War was used with great efficacy. “Information Services Department” kept Malayans informed of Communist atrocities. They replicated CPM strategy of indoctrinating villagers by jumping ahead of them. Before CPM could reach a village this staff would go and explain what the government was doing. 6 million leaflets were circulated every month to counter CPM propaganda. The most innovative scheme was using high powered loudspeakers (Stentor, Magnavox and Thunderer amplifiers on armoured vehicles with 2-3 miles range) to boom into the jungles. Mark 4 Auster aircraft and Dakotas with 4 loudspeakers 500 watts would boom into the jungles with great effect since the “Thundering” from the sky had delirious effect on villagers. Like in Philippines the British fought insurgency using a unified strategy. No martial law was proclaimed. In 1948 police deployed 12,000 men assisted by army’s 5,000 men. The total number went up to 40,000 later. Military officials were drafted into the Special Branch.

Change the present constitutional arrangements which hinder effective centralised operations. The present squabble over centre-state on policing should stop. If a Maoist affected state achieves better law and order with central help, the result will be for the benefit of the opposition ruled government too

Overall commander for security operations should also be in charge of development activities, which is unimaginable in Indian conditions

This cannot be achieved unless there is a political agreement that the present character of state administration in insurgency prone areas needs to be recast at least temporarily to establish an administrator who will be in overall command of policing and development activities. What is needed is statesmanship and not petty egos which is now hindering national security

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

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maoist menace

AGENDA FOR THE GOVERNMENT

Mau Mau rebellion which was provoked by the British land grabbing went through different stages: First they used repressive tactics through the heavily armed 24,000 strong Home Guards, who used to shoot at sight, burn the villages and deny food. All Kikuyu, Embu and Meru were forced to shift to concentrated villages, near Home Guard bases.

This was changed in 1954 when dialogue with Jomo Kenyatta who was in prison started. It resulted in good outcomes. That was not the case in Colombia. The situation which was showing some hope when President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) had put National Police in charge of counter-terrorist operations, is now causing a lot of worry. The deadly Civil War (La Violencia) of the 1940s led to the Communist insurgency by FLN and FARC while AUC, the landowners’ right wing militia opposed them. Drug cartels started helping the insurgents from the 1980s. In the 1990s government was combating 107 rebel fronts or 20,000 insurgents. FARC had nearly 18,000 armed men in 2010. In 2008 they were controlling nearly 30-35 per cent of land area especially the 5,00,000 sq km of jungles. The problem is that FARC, which is considered a terrorist organisation by Colombia, USA and European Union, is not treated so by Colombia’s neighbours like Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador and Nicaragua.

Like our Maoists who want all police operations to cease in their “areas”, FARC has succeeded in bringing about international pressure to compel the present President Santos to recognise that there is “an armed conflict’ in the country. Effectively the country is divided between the zones controlled by the government and by FARC. This is not a model for us to copy.

Conditions in India How do we go from here? First, we have to admit that we have no effective Maoist policy except sound bytes beginning with our PM’s address to the state DGPs on November 4, 2004 that ““Maoists constituted an even greater threat to India than militancy in Jammu and Kashmir and North-east”.

The only time when some organised activity was witnessed was when Home Minister P Chidambaram

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(2008-12) had initiated firm measures through Director General Vijay Kumar who was incharge of CRPF. Some of the recent steps are sanctioning Rs 280 crores for raising elite anti-Naxal forces in Bihar, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Odisha states on the lines of the Andhra “Greyhounds” and deployment of UAVs. While this is good news I was also saddened by another report that in Jharkhand most of the police officers, including IPS officers “cannot shoot straight” as revealed during a recent firing practice. The report also said that “thousands of police personnel in the state have not fired a single shot in four years”. It is learnt that UAV Predators, described as “game changers” to locate Maoists in the jungles, have not yet been used.

Even if they locate the targets, how do we deal with them when we cannot rush through the hills and jungles to engage them, as by the time the Special Forces reach, the insurgents would have vanished? We cannot replicate the US drone strategy of using remote controlled missiles fitted to drones to strike at targets.

Recommendations Now that all political parties are in the 2014 election mode, I would recommend the following agenda for the next government: Do we want to eradicate the Maoist menace and bring the whole country under the rule of law? Or do we want the Colombian situation where the federal government has tacitly acknowledged FARC’s rule and ceded territory?

We should abandon the fiction that development, to be carried out by other agencies, will go hand in hand with police action. As long as the Maoist cadres are able to strike unseen terror, they will allow no such activities unless there is a unified command for both.

A political consensus should be arrived at between all parties that we need an agreement to change the present constitutional arrangements which hinder effective centralised operations. The present squabble over centre-state on policing should stop. If a Maoist affected state achieves better law and order with

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maoist menace

ELIMINATING THE ROOT CAUSES

central help, the result will be for the benefit of the opposition ruled government too.

We should abandon the fiction that development, to be carried out by other agencies, will go hand in hand with police action. As long as the Maoist cadres are able to strike unseen terror, they will allow no such activities unless there is a unified command for both This cannot be achieved unless there is a political agreement that the present character of state administration in insurgency prone areas needs to be recast at least temporarily to establish an administrator who will be in overall command of policing and development activities. The agreement should be to implement the essence of recommendations in Chapter IV (Internal Security) by the NDA’s Group of Ministers (GOM-February 2001) on Emergency Provisions under Article 352, 353, 355 read with Punchi Commission’s (Second Commission on centre-state relations) recommendations to amend Articles 355 and 356 “to bring specific trouble torn areas under its rule for a limited period” and “localising Emergency Provisions – either a district or part of a district” instead of the whole state. No ego will be bruised since the GoM’s recommendations were made when the present opposition NDA was in power.

Similarly the Congress led UPA will be happy that the recommendations of Punchi Commission set up by them would be followed. The new government could copy some of the provisions of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1958 and empower the central forces in the specified area. A political agreement should be arrived at making this a temporary measure to bring civil administration and law and order in the concerned areas under an overall commander who could even be a nominee of the concerned state government. The opposition ruled states need not fear central encroachment in their states since the rest of the areas, not affected by the insurgency would be ruled by them.

MILITARISATION OF THE CONFLICT

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he very fact, that the police forces lose their lives again and again, in the same manner, making the same tactical mistakes, speaks volumes of their lack of training and tactical skills. It will require a well trained force with good equipment with expertise in strategy and tactics to be able to deal with the Maoists. The only available force of this kind with us is the army. They will however require an efficient intelligence set up to be provided to them from local sources. Therefore militarisation seems to be the only solution to the problem unless of course we are able to raise a separate specialised force for this purpose alone. The question is can we, or are we, in a position to deploy that much army, say 2 or 3 Divisions for a prolonged period in the area, say for a couple of years.

VK Deuskar IPS (retd) The writer is former DGP, Andhra Pradesh. He conducted research for National police Academy on organised crime and impact of Evaluation of IPS Training. He also served as principal of CISF Training College. Before joining IPS, he was with Gorkha Regiment for 5 years.

The aims and objectives of the Maoists are entirely different from the aims of the cross border, ISI backed terrorists. Their main aim is to create terror and disrupt the government functioning and weaken the system. They want to keep us continuously in a terrified state and always on high alert thus diverting our energies away from beneficial channels like development. They want us to spend a high percentage of our budget on defence. They wish to weaken our economy by pouring in counterfeit currency into circulation and add to the inflation

The response of the government to the Maoist problem has been slow, aimless and of the knee jerk variety.

Nobody seems to know what is to be done. This is no way to combat an organised and determined movement

What is needed is statesmanship and not petty egos which is now hindering national security.

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

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maoist menace

ELIMINATING THE ROOT CAUSES

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remember it all started in the forties when I was in school. It was the Communists, as they were known in those days, who started the movement against the landlords who were exploiting the poor farmers in Nalgonda district of the old Nizam’s Hyderabad state. Then came the Naxalbari incident which hit the headlines and the Communists became Naxalites. Today they are the Maoists, insurgents / terrorists. The movement was originally started against the exploitation of the peasants by the landlords and after the landlords disappeared it became an anti-government movement because of their mismanagement and corruption and disregard for the tribal area’s welfare.

The response of the government to the Maoist problem has been slow, aimless and of the knee jerk variety. Nobody seems to know what is to be done. This is no way to combat an organised and determined movement which was clear right from the start. It is now rather late in the day to find a simple solution to the problem except to put it down with a firm hand along with eliminating the root causes for the creation and growth of the menace The use of the word ‘Terrorism’ in respect of the maoist insurgency in the forested areas of Andhra, Maharashtra, Orissa and Bihar would amount to a misnomer.

The aims and objectives of the Maoists would determine which word would be appropriate to describe their movement. After all what are they doing? They are trying to establish themselves in the backward and undeveloped areas as the authority to dole out justice, bring about proper utilisation of government funds for development, prevent exploitation of the tribals and their forests.

They also want to win the support of the local tribal and backward communities of the area because they know that they cannot succeed without it. Eventually they want to overthrow the government and establish an order of their liking and based on their ideals. Whatever one may say, they have succeeded

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to quite some extent in their efforts and have spread their influence into vast areas in these four states, thanks to the mismanagement, corruption and exploitation by the government agencies working in these areas. To assess the extent of correctness of these allegations we just have to look at the budget allotments for development of tribal areas in the above four states in the last twentyfive years and take stock of the actual development work successfully completed and how far they have been successful in bringing about improvement in education, healthcare, road and rail communication, industries, employment etc. This simple exercise will explain the cause for the growth of the Maoist movement. The people in these areas have completely lost faith in the government and hope that the Maoists will be able to bring about some change. One must realise that no movement of this kind can ever be successful without public support.

It is now rather late in the day to find a simple solution to the problem except to put it down with a firm hand along with eliminating the root causes for the creation and growth of the menace The aims and objectives of the Maoists are entirely different from the aims of the cross-border, ISI backed terrorists. Their main aim is to create terror and disrupt the government functioning and weaken the system. They want to keep us continuously in a terrified state and always on high alert thus diverting our energies away from beneficial channels like development. They want us to spend a high percentage of our budget on defence. They wish to weaken our economy by pouring in counterfeit currency into circulation and add to the inflation. They want to increase the percentage of minority population to gain advantage in the electoral process. Finally they want to separate Kashmir and if possible some other parts of the country in retaliation to the formation of Bangladesh. The day Kashmir is handed over this terrorism will cease. Therefore we would

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

be making a grave mistake if we clubbed together these two under the common heading of terrorism.

The deployment of the army alone will not serve the full purpose as there is likely to be a relapse once the army is withdrawn.

The deployment will have to be accompanied with the application of the mantra of development.

The means adopted by the Maoists to achieve their aims are definitely questionable. The use of torture and killing of suspected informers, recruitment of minor boys and girls into their ranks, extortion of funds from the public and prevention of developmental activities in their area of influence are definitely reprehensible actions. But to survive against police action they cannot afford to allow informers to function.

They need more manpower, more money and more weapons and equipment to expand their activities to achieve their ultimate aim. In providing quick and correct justice they have been fairly successful in many areas. From my personal knowledge I would like to cite an example. I had a constable working under me who was summoned to a Naxalite Court in his village. When advised by me not to take a risk his reply surprised me very much. He said that “The justice meted out in Naxal Courts is far better than what was given by the High Court. I am not afraid of the Naxals as I have done no wrong”. The constable’s faith in the functioning of these courts set me thinking. Where have we gone wrong in dealing with the tribal areas. Why have we lost their faith?

A three pronged effort will have to be made for this. It will involve 1) creation of good rail and road communication linking the backward areas to the developed surrounding areas; 2) setting up of an industrial base both small scale and large scale and ancillaries to provide employment to at least 25 per cent of the employable population and 3) provide adequate and good education and medical facilities that are easily accessible to all the people in the area

We Indians have a peculiar habit of ignoring a malady and allowing it to grow till it becomes life threatening. We are also adept at creating Frankensteins and permit them to go out of control and attack us. Bhindranwale, Tamil Tigers, Naxalites, Bangladesh infiltrators and Kashmir are all examples of our Frankensteins. The Maoists in their respective areas have become so powerful that now it is not possible to eliminate this movement by using the police or paramilitary forces. They have you by the throat.

Police forces are ill-equipped and untrained in dealing with this kind of a problem. Unless drastic changes are made in their training and equipment it will result only in the loss of more police lives.

The Maoists have superior tactics, intelligence sources, planning and a system of analysing and correcting their mistakes which is lacking in our forces. The very fact, that the police forces lose their lives again and again, in the same manner, making the same tactical mistakes, speaks volumes of their lack of training and tactical skills. It will require a well trained force with good equipment with expertise in strategy and tactics to be able to deal with the Maoists. The only available force of this kind with us is the army. They will however require an efficient intelligence set up to be provided to them from local sources. Therefore militarisation seems to be the only solution to the problem unless of course we are able to raise a separate specialised force for this purpose alone. The question is can we, or are we, in a position to deploy that much army, say 2 or 3 Divisions for a prolonged period in the area, say for a couple of years.

They also want to win the support of the local tribal and backward communities of the area because they know that they cannot succeed without it. Eventually they want to overthrow the government and establish an order of their liking and based on their ideals The deployment of the army alone will not serve the full purpose as there is likely to be a relapse once the army is withdrawn.

The deployment will have to be

accompanied with the application of the mantra of development. A three pronged effort will have to be made for this. It will involve 1) creation of good rail and road communication linking the backward areas to the developed surrounding areas; 2) setting up of an industrial base both small scale and large scale and ancillaries to provide employment to at least 25 per cent of the employable population and 3) provide adequate and good education and medical facilities that are easily accessible to all the people in the area. Initially areas will have to be earmarked and made sterile by the presence of the armed forces and the above development works be taken up on a time bound programme without accepting any delays. Each earmarked area may be about 2,500 sq km (about 50 km X 50 km).

The use of torture and killing of suspected informers, recruitment of minor boys and girls into their ranks, extortion of funds from the public and prevention of developmental activities in their area of influence are definitely reprehensible actions Small scale efforts are likely to be counterproductive. The deployment of about one division of the army would be required for each such earmarked area. It is quite a tall order. For containing or eliminating the Maoist units, a different system of search and destroy tactics will have to be adopted. Whenever the police goes on the offensive the dalams withdraw and vanish. When the police relax they come back with redoubled force. It is they who choose the time and place for an encounter not us. The main problem for the police today is lack of correct and pinpointed timely information about the dalams. The second problem is to transport the troops safely and quickly to engage the dalams. Normally by the time the troops reach the area the Maoists would have moved out. These two problems can be overcome by using technology or gadgetry. The location of the dalams can be done by aerial means by use of aircraft, helicopters, balloons

with cameras and by satellites. On locating the dalams arrangements need to be made and kept alert to airlift the troops to the location and drop them in three or four viable groups around the dalam each group a couple of kilometers away from them on three different sides. These groups form a ring encircling the dalam, forcing them to surrender or to face an engagement with the army. Needless to add that the army groups should get deployed within an hour of locating the dalam. Delay will mean failure of the whole exercise. The use of gadgetry in the backward forested area is bound to be limited. I wonder how far it would be possible to use camouflaged CC TV cameras to record movement of dalams for identification purposes. Use of micro-cameras and micro-transmitters by informers for early information of movement by the Maoists. Use of Electronic beepers to keep track of the dalam’s location. Do we have the machinery? The response of the government to the Maoist problem has been slow, aimless and of the knee jerk variety. Nobody seems to know what is to be done. This is no way to combat an organised and determined movement which was clear right from the start. It is now rather late in the day to find a simple solution to the problem except to put it down with a firm hand along with eliminating the root causes for the creation and growth of the menace as mentioned in earlier paragraphs.

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

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maoist menace

EXACERBATING INSTABILITY

Behavioural complexity on the battlefield

Dr Rupali Jeswal The writer is an Intelligence and Terrorism Analyst, Clinical Psychologist and Clinical Hypnotherapist based in South-East Asia. She has also received training in specialised areas including counter-terrorism, intelligence and tactical operations.

She specialises in cognitive learning processes and neural pathway response and how these factors apply to specialised trainings.

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aoist soldiers have been known to utilise TRX, AK-47s, INSAS rifles et al, but are now obtaining more and more sophisticated weaponry. Implementing sophisticated weaponry speeds up the conversion from Guerrilla zone to their so-called: “Liberated Zone”. Adding new technological variables to their existing equation not only reinforces their ability to reach goals faster; it provides a greater challenge for existing governments to combat them.

Volatile, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous (VUCA) – is the global environment. Professional efficacy of Security Forces must be cognizant of Instinct, Intuition and Intelligence – in this strategic environment.

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echnology can be defined, as something that improves results and nowhere is technology used more than in military conflicts.

The human species’ use of technology began with the conversion of natural resources into simple tools and exponentially grew outwards. One of the constant threats facing security forces is Technology.

In part, technology mimics human behaviour and others supplement the limitations of our species. On the battlefield it is used to enhance positioning, infiltrate with accuracy, track troops on the ground via satellite and strike specific targets over long distances. If insurgents have the same capabilities how useful is technology?

Technology is a conundrum, whereby it is directly linked to behavioural science. Hypothetically, if both sides are technologically equal, what could influence success or failure?

The benefits of technology outweigh the absence of it, however, what are the behavioural by-products? There are opportunity costs associated with the adoption of technology. A direct result of utilising advanced technology could be that natural skills would not be relied upon. These skills would inevitably fade over

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time causing the subsequent loss of natural tools through attrition. How important is Instinct, Intuition and Intelligence in relation to technology?

Unfortunately, technology may have already begun to obscure pre-existing abilities as reliance grows.

Rural areas in India generally have less government presence and this provides fertile ground for Maoist activities to thrive. What better way to fuel the People`s War, than to control less inhabited areas first and progressively work inward to densely populated towns and states Human behaviour is at the core of technological innovation, processes and utilisation. Battlefield technology is based on instinct, fuelled by intuition and run on intelligence.

Human intervention and technology should be treated as one obstacle.

Man has developed warring as an art form and technology in warfare has historically been revolved around distance. Being farther in distance from the enemy whilst inflicting damage is the key. Progressing from hand-to-hand combat to the use of weapons such as swords, spears, projectiles and more recently, assault drones and LRBM (long-range ballistic missiles), there has been an underlying theme of distance.

Instinct tells us not to get close when engaging in conflict. Intuition on the other hand calculates that if we get close we get injured and that’s not good. Intelligence enters the theatre

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

She is an expert in the field of non-verbal micro and macro expression for deception and detection and also using non-verbal assets for psychological self-assessment in conjunction with Emotional Intelligence to enhance the human mind, personality, image and spirit.

and advises us to build weapons that increase the distance to be harmed whilst sufficiently annihilating the threat.

Everything has a cycle The twentyfirst century is a crossroad between the old and the new world. The speed at which innovation occurs now is rapidly creating a level playing field across the global arena. As more third world countries develop their economies they receive and create newer technology. When insurgents have access to newer technology, the utilisation of that technology can increase volatility or exacerbate instability of a region. In evaluating the impact of technology we need to comprehend asymmetric warfare in relation to human behaviour and the cycles that convene around it.

Being armed with new INSAS rifles would not yield a better result than if an AK-47 was used for example.

However, intuition indicates that supporters to the cause may view the new weapons as a motivating factor.

On evaluating the implementation of new technology gauging the impact is crucial. The effect of newer technology isn’t simple to evaluate, yet when new technology is introduced it should not be solely assessed on output.

What of the disparity between levels of technology in different countries with consideration to the innovation and development

cycle? Developed countries’ technology tends to travel economically downstream when obsolete or EOL (End of Life).

The equipment or information is often pawned-off to the highest bidder that happens to be a less developed nation / state or group. With limited regulation, technology falls into the wrong hands and contributes to the “blowback loop”.

A continuous presence somewhere is better than a fleeting presence everywhere. As the people begin to believe that the security will be lasting and not just temporary, they are more likely to provide intelligence and turn against the insurgency The insurgency in India has the essence of Focoism merged with urban guerrilla warfare and the declining communal harmony, requires that the strategic leaders switch from “observation” models and start assessing the “blowback loop” (If the security forces have a negative effect due to collateral damage, local communities become dissatisfied with the government, giving rise to new potential insurgents, lack of population support also

hampers intelligence collection reducing the combat efficacy. Detaining and eliminating insurgents creates more insurgents.) It is significant to know and understand what is our qualitative superiority, which could offset our quantitative inferiority and critical vulnerabilities in relation to technology.

“Foco Theory” was a revolutionary doctrine to be applied for successful revolutions in South American states. It originated from lessons that Ernesto “Che” Guevara (a prominent guerrilla fighter) drew out of other literature and the events that took place during the Cuban Revolution. His extended essay entitled – “Guerrilla Warfare: A Method” and “A Message to the Tri-continental.” provides much thought on unconventional warfare.

His summarisation of the lessons were: a) Popular forces can win a war against the army. b) until

It is not necessary to wait all the conditions for making

She is a member of ICPA (International Corrections and Prisons Association), IACSP (International Association for Counter-Terrorism and Security Professionals), APA (American Psychological Association), APP (Association of Professional Psychologists), FPRI (Foreign Policy Research Institute) and UK Certified Hypnotherapist and General Hypnotherapy Register.

Damien Martin The co-writer is an IT and Security professional, Counterterrorism and Combatives expert based in Japan for the last 10 years. He specialises in cyber threats, social engineering and corporate security and a regular keynote presenter for ASIS and OSAC. Currently he is the Director for the IACSP Japan and an Associate Professional with the OPSEC Society and a Certified Master Anti-terrorismSpecialist.Heistheonly PDR (Personal Defence Readiness – Tony Blauer’s SPEAR system) coach in North East Asia.

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

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maoist menace

EXACERBATING INSTABILITY

revolution exist; the insurrection can create them. c) In underdeveloped Latin America, the countryside is the basic area for armed fighting.

Points (b) and (c) have led to a distinctive revolutionary theory referred to as the Foco theory.

Foco (focus in Spanish): The central principle of this theory was, that cadres of fast moving paramilitary groups could provide a focus for popular discontentment against a sitting regime leading to insurrection.

Che’s theory however did not lead to the success but many Foco ideas had been adapted into the urban guerrilla warfare movements by the late 1960’s.

The insurgency issue has become a violent PR campaign with support found around the world. This campaign will prove to be fatal to maintain the stability of India, which is already struggling with weak porous borders and transnational terrorism issues Strategic leaders must maintain a proactive view of asymmetry and the planning process must include how these factors will influence operational art as decisions at a tactical level will further influence operational level activities. Technology plays a part in this however the introduction of the latest technology is generally overrated. As a rule, innovation requires education and training to be of substance. There is no set or tactical rules or tactic checklists for asymmetric warfare, strategic leaders and commanders need to assemble “table-top” exercises where a variety of possible situations and solutions are created and then to understand and learn the art of quick adaptation to the circumstance at the point of engagement.

This point of engagement is contextual-oriented.

To counter asymmetry a multiple number of options can be incorporated. There could be a combination of options never used before or new and avant-garde ones created.

Balancing the Inductive, Deductive and Abductive reasoning methods in conjunction with the idea of technology offers clarity to a systemic

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issue. Deduction is certainty for the conclusions but it is not productive and is not context oriented, Abduction is less than a certain form of conclusion but it is productive and relies on contextual ruling and is productive. Abductive reasoning uses intuition, whereas deductive adopts intelligence.

“It is through science that we prove, but through intuition that we discover.”

– French Mathematician Henri Poincaré Battle lines of asymmetric warfare are not linear, the human component is ever more critical now and needs intense scrutiny, for accuracy of information-fusion and intelligence.

The core of all “happenings” is based on human values and human behaviour; the human dimension is constantly shifting back and forth from “Alert”, “Adapt” “Assert” or “Attack” mode, interchangeably.

There are known knowns; there are things we know we know.

We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say, we know there are some things we do not know.

But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we don’t know.

– Donald Rumsfeld

new technological variables to their existing equation not only reinforces their ability to reach goals faster; it provides a greater challenge for existing governments to combat them.

Man has developed warring as an art form and technology in warfare has historically been revolved around distance. Being farther in distance from the enemy whilst inflicting damage is the key Technology is a tool and a target; as evolutionary patterns are showing it is going to be a tool leading to total destruction of humanity if the exploitative human element is not controlled. Emergent battlefield – Cyberspace, is the new high ground, technology merges human space and cyberspace giving dual dimensions to the design of warfare. Long-gone are the days of MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) to secure peace.

Utilisations of DEW’s (Directed Energy Weapons) offer a multitude of possibilities through hybrid systems. A keen eye on keeping the evolutionary process in technology is imperative, as advanced weaponry reframes scenarios where IED’s, VBIED’s, RPG’s give way to incidents of thermobaric explosives, internal body bombs, combined firearms and laser arms providing “soft kill” and “hard kill” capabilities.

All wars are conclusively fought by humans and not Youth and the role of by technology intelligence as a continuous Rural areas in India generally process, in this environment have less government presence becomes a tactical primer and this provides fertile ground for Maoist activities to thrive.

What better way to fuel the People’s War, than to control less inhabited areas first and progressively work inward to densely populated towns and states. Operating in rural areas relatively unchecked also provides time to accrue financial independence. Allowing time for opium and hemp crops to grow and ideal locations to educate, train and practice with new technology.

Maoist soldiers have been known to utilise TRX, AK-47s, INSAS rifles et al, but are now obtaining more and more sophisticated weaponry.

Implementing sophisticated weaponry speeds up the conversion from Guerrilla zone to their so-called: “Liberated Zone”. Adding

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

A common tactic in encouraging supporters of a political movement is the nation’s youth. Coincidentally, it is youth that is also attracted to and proficient at new technology.

To counter asymmetric warfare C-IED operations must be part of the planning process. C-IED operations do not focus on the devices themselves, but on the population.

Better intelligence enables surgical strikes that will prevent the worst facet of the “blowback” loop. A company-sized element that moves into villages adjacent to a primary IED engagement area and remains there for an extended period, habitually interacting with the villagers and conducting key leader engagements, should begin to see security gains in

the form of local national tips and turn-ins. In some cases, a lack of available manoeuvre units can limit combat power for such operations, forcing commanders to attempt to cover large areas and reducing the number of possible engagements with the people. However, in the end, a continuous presence somewhere is better than a fleeting presence everywhere. As the people begin to believe that the security will be lasting and not just temporary, they are more likely to provide intelligence and turn against the insurgency (Counter-IED Strategy in Modern War, Captain David F Eisler, US Army, MILITARY REVIEW January-February 2012).

When insurgents have access to newer technology, the utilisation of that technology can increase volatility or exacerbate instability of a region An excerpt below, from last year’s International Conference in Hamburg, in support of the People’s War in India, stated: “Another important feature of the Conference was the great number of youth who participated, not only as participants but also as part of the organising structures. This aspect, together with the truly internationalist character of the event, gave it a very vivid and dynamic character …“ “… As a result of the Conference concrete steps have been made in the Coordination of the forces who support the People’s War in India. This without a doubt will have very real impact on the international work and lead to a stronger international campaign …”

“… When we wrote the Call to the Conference we stated that we wanted it to be a vivid expression of proletarian internationalism. It was. From the Hamburg Conference sounds a cry that says: We stand with our comrades in India!

Victory to the People’s War! “ [International Committee to Support the People’s War in India League against Imperialist Aggression (Hamburg, Germany) (speeches and messages) November 24th 2012] The affair is hanging by the hinge!

These words above are of non-lethal nature; they are words of a group with collective consciousness coming together for a common belief and purpose, yet there is immense power, which belies these simple collective thoughts. The immense power is the collective belief, the collective support and the “new” support in the form of youth, the common vision and the determination to move forward in line of that vision.

Simplicity is essential in dealing with crisis, knowing how to do something is half the equation, knowing “when” to do is the question to be answered. Insurgencies are a developing situation, which is time-competitive and action is time-sensitive. Initiative, adaptation and improvisation are and should be the components of the planning process. Advantages of the action must be discerned before the actual combat begins. Reinstating Instincts, Intuition and Intelligence into the planning is a necessary step in

understanding the affect of newer technology. Are we lacking cohesive planning? And let’s not forget the old adage “Planning is everything, plans are useless.”

The tool can change but the human being doesn’t necessarily follow suit. For victory it is important the intended action and the potential action capture instinct, intuition and have a keen sense of what tool is brought into play and this is done only through behaviour modification.

The “slips-and-capture error” – where the practiced behaviour takes over when a similar situation is presented but less familiar action was executed. Therefore, with many tech tools going on – the only guarantee that no slip and capture error will occur rests with the behaviour of the human element.

A parallel view toward technology and behavioural science is imperative for competent leadership and direction. Deliberate or by default, low or high risk, discrete or integrated, material or psychological? Is it exploitation of the weakness of the government, that is being used as an advantage or is it gaining advantages due to perceptual or factual differences? Whatever the case, the issue of insurgents receiving and employing improved weapons needs to be addressed. The insurgency issue has become a violent PR campaign with support found around the world.

This campaign will prove to be fatal to maintain the stability of India, which is already struggling with weak porous borders and transnational terrorism issues.

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

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maoist menace

SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIDDLE?

AN APPROACH TO SOLVE PROBLEM OF MAOISM / NAXALISM T

he writer recommends a two track approach to tackling the problem of Maoism. First, we should identify and solve socio–economic reasons due to which these problems have arisen. Second, we need well equipped, well officered and well trained paramilitary forces. Local police should be used only for providing bases and local intelligence. Maoism / Naxalism is another form of war. It has to be tackled and fought like a war and not like the police methods of establishing law and order. Unlike the BSF and ITBP, state police is organised and equipped only for routine police duties. To fight expert insurgents, like the Maoism / Naxalism, either the army or the paramilitary forces – BSF / ITBP / Assam Rifles can only succeed. Even the CRPF Units, who are being regularly sent to these areas after a few day training in counterinsurgency methods and practices, have greatly suffered at the hands of Naxalites and Maoists. The approach suggested by the writer is in sharp contrast to the approach of those who recommend a Greyhound type model.

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eath of five policemen in a gunbattle with Maoists in Jharkhand on 04 April 2013, is a clear indication of the fact that Maoism in 276 districts of India continues to proliferate unhampered and without any restraint. Incidents of this nature have become a part of daily life in these affected districts.

It is, indeed, surprising that policemen trained only in maintenance of law and order duties are being made to indulge in encounters with Maoists who are not only equipped with sophisticated weapons but are also well trained in the art of guerrilla and insurgency warfare. State police force are neither trained, officered nor equipped with gadgetry to fight the Maoist insurgents.

Officers posted to Naxal affected areas should be put through a short orientation course to make them aware of propriety of conduct and good behaviour with the tribal people Maoism / Naxalism is another form of war. It has to be tackled and fought like a war and not like the police methods of establishing law and order. Unlike the BSF and ITBP, state police is organised and equipped only for routine police duties. To fight expert insurgents, like the Maoism / Naxalism, either the army or the paramilitary forces – BSF / ITBP / Assam Rifles can

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only succeed. Even the CRPF Units, who are being regularly sent to these areas after a few day training in counterinsurgency methods and practices, have greatly suffered at the hands of Naxalites and Maoists.

Ministry of Home Affairs has BSF and ITBP over five lakh in numbers.

These forces are also posted with courageous and well experienced officers. Need is to provide them latest weapons and equipment and impart them with intensive counterinsurgency training like the army. Paramilitary forces planned and prepared in this manner will be a winning force against the Maoism / Naxalism. These Units will also be available for employment in counterterrorist operations in Kashmir and the North-east.

Intelligence organisations are also an important instrument for fight against terrorists / Maoism / Naxalism. Incident that occurred in Jharkhand on 04 April 2013, clearly points out to failure of our intelligence organisations. Not only in Jharkhand but in all other states also, which are afflicted with the problem of terrorism and Maoism, intelligence is a major weakness.

National intelligence Agency (NIA), formed a few years ago, is not fully functional as yet and doubts have started being raised about the Agency being misused for political purposes.

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

We have a dozen of intelligence organisations functioning in the country: some under the centre and others under the state governments; but unfortunately, they all suffer from lack of coordination and more often do not share information with each other.

Maoism / Naxalism has enveloped 276 districts of nine states which include Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra and West Bengal.

These militant organisations have established links and bases in China, Nepal and Bangladesh. It will take many years to contain them and finishing them all together appears to be a very very difficult task. It is unfortunate that the country’s political leadership adopts a complacent and unconcerned attitude towards these problems. Whether it is the north-east, terrorist activities in Kashmir or Naxalism / Maoism, political leadership has always shunned away their responsibility to tackle these problems in real earnestness. It is because of obliging attitude of political leadership which assists militant organisations to gain roots and proliferate.

Maoism / Naxalism is purely a political philosophy and has little connection with socio-economic development.

It

Lt Gen OP Kaushik PVSM, AVSM, VSM, M-in-D (retd) The writer has been the Chief of Staff of the Eastern Command, Indian Army and a former Vice Chancellor of Maharshi Dayanand University, Rohtak, Haryana.

believes in inciting discontented villagers against the administration and propagate anti-government feelings among the tribal people. Hence, to tackle this threat, we need efficient, courageous administrators who are not influenced by bribery and have a genuine and friendly concern towards the tribals of the area. Generally, civil service officers in these areas are serving punishment postings.

They are corrupt and compromising with the capitalists in exploiting the local resources and the people. As a result, local population has no faith in them and they get drawn towards Naxalites whom they consider as their protectors against exploitation and cruel and tainted administrators.

Undoubtedly, socio-economic conditions of villages, which are under the influence of Naxalism, are deplorable. Government declarations for economic development have remained only on paper and very few have been implemented. Exploitation by profiteers, forcible grabbing of tribal lands by rich people, tyrannical attitude of forest contractors and low level administrative officers have caused unbearable oppression on the tribal people. Hence, problem is more political / administrative in nature and police action cannot resolve it.

To grapple with Naxalism we need to adopt two pronged strategy. First, we should identify and solve socio-economic reasons due to which these problems have arisen. Second, we need well equipped, well officered and well trained paramilitary forces. Local police should be used only for providing bases and local intelligence.

In Naxalism affected areas, answer to socio-economic problems lies in eliminating ‘Benami ownership’ of lands, distribution of surplus and vacant lands to landless people ensuring laid down minimum wages are paid to the labourers, supply of essential foods to poor people at cheap rates, making sure that tribals are allowed to collect from forests items of daily necessities without any restriction and eradicating the custom of bonded labour.

There is also an urgent need to improve communication, vocational training for youth to enable them to earn their livelihood while staying there, improvement in medical and drinking water facilities. To implement these schemes, we should appoint specially related officers of proven honesty and efficiency and such officers should be given a free hand to implement improvement plans in a time bound programme. These officers will have special responsibility towards unemployed youths in these areas in getting them jobs in local police, forest department and agricultural schemes.

Officers posted to Naxal affected areas should be put through a short orientation course to make them aware of propriety of conduct and good behaviour with the tribal people. Police also need to be extra careful to avoid custodial deaths and fake encounters. There should also be training packages for police to make them aware of essentials of battle of hearts and minds. Police has a constitutional obligation to protect human rights. Help from the villagers in getting information about the Naxalite organisations will be possible if police succeeds in winning the hearts and minds of the locals through their friendly and helping attitude.

Maoism / Naxalism has enveloped 276 districts of nine states which include Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Maharashtra and West Bengal.

These militant organisations have established links and bases in China, Nepal and Bangladesh

Exploitation by profiteers, forcible grabbing of tribal lands by rich people, tyrannical attitude of forest contractors and low level administrative officers have caused unbearable oppression on the tribal people.

Hence, problem is more political / administrative in nature and police action cannot resolve it

Police has a constitutional obligation to protect human rights. Help from the villagers in getting information about the Naxalite organisations will be possible if police succeeds in winning the hearts and minds of the locals through their friendly and helping attitude

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

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maoist menace

STRESS FREE TROOPS

Defence Personnel Worldwide Find Transcendental Meditation To be an Effective Tool in Combating Stress

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tress is a very major degrade factor on combat performance.

Troops of the Army, CPOs and Police deployed in CI / CT operations must cope with high levels of stress. The article presents a solution in terms of TM. The TM technique is the most thoroughly researched and successful meditation practice in the world.

Over 350 research studies published in leading, peer-reviewed scientific and medical journals have confirmed that TM practice produces wide-ranging, measurable benefits, including increased intelligence, creativity and mental clarity; reduced stress and improved health; and more fulfilling and harmonious interpersonal relationships. These studies have been conducted at more than 200 independent universities and research institutions in 30 countries. This stress-busting approach has been taught worldwide for the past 44 years and today over 6 million people in 180 countries have learned the practice.

T

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oday’s military personnel are constantly pressured to push beyond the ordinary limits of human performance.

The ever increasing complexity of high-technology weaponry and the speed and accuracy of those weapons demand that military personnel using them continuously perform at optimum levels. Service personnel must remain physically strong and mentally clear even when their duties require strenuous and protracted hours; they are challenged to maintain heightened alertness, comprehension and mind-body coordination even under duress during arduous missions. If they fail to do so, the consequences can be tragic in both combat and non-combat situations.

of stress can further reduce the fitness, effectiveness and operational readiness of individuals. Military personnel worldwide are beginning to realise that if they can reduce their high stress levels; they could eliminate performance-limiting behaviours and perform more dynamically. Lower levels of stress provide a strategic advantage that would lead to more successful missions.

health. To help assess the impact of stress, the social sciences have developed the Social Readjustment Rating Scale, which ranks 43 life crises on a scale of Life Change Units (LCU; see Table 1). The ratings were arrived at by researchers who used in-depth interviewing techniques on an international sample of 5,000 people from Europe, the US, Central America and Japan.

The writers urge more military leaders worldwide to follow the lead of Latin American militaries and examine a scientifically validated solution that will reduce the high levels of stress in the military today – the Transcendental Meditation (TM) programme.

For all these reasons, stress among today’s military personnel is reaching epidemic proportions.

The increased stresses of modern military duty can take their toll by leading to such problems as Post-Traumatic Stress (PTS), poor health, discipline problems, spousal abuse, jumps in suicide, marital discord and divorce, as well as the increased use of tobacco, alcohol and drugs. Such manifestations

First, we will examine the impact of stress on military personnel and then consider how TM practice can resolve this critical issue, including a review of key research findings.

The supporters contend that there is a direct correlation between Annual Life Change Units and stress-related illness. One of their studies found that with a “mild” stress level (150 to 199 LCUs in a single year), health problems increased by 37 per cent above the average; with a moderate level (200–299), the increase was 51 per cent; and with a high level (300 and up), the increase was 79 per cent. The researchers noted that what counted was the cumulative total, not whether the life changes in themselves were positive or negative.

Stress and its impact in daily life The epidemic of stress in today’s society creates profoundly damaging effects on individual and public

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

The total LCU score for life events regularly affecting military personnel is a formidable 565 (see Table 1). This high stress level directly jeopardises military health.

Table 1: Rank life event LCU value 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43

Death of a spouse 100 Divorce Marital separation Jail term *Death of close family member *Personal injury or illness Marriage Fired from job Marital reconciliation Retirement Change in health of family member Pregnancy Sex difficulties Gain of a new family member Business readjustment *Change in financial state *Death of a close friend *Change to a different line of work *Change in number of arguments with spouse Mortgage over US$ 100,000 or more Foreclosure of mortgage loan *Change in responsibility of work Son / daughter leaving home *Trouble with in-laws *Outstanding personal achievements *Wife begins or stops work *Rejoin or end school *Change in living condition *Revision of personal habits *Trouble with boss *Change in work hours *Change in residence *Change in schools Change in recreation *Change in religious activities *Change in social activities Mortgage or loan less than US$ 100,000 *Change in sleeping habits *Change in number of family get-together *Change in eating habits *Vocation Festivals Minor violations of the law

73 65 63 63 53 50 47 45 45 44 40 39 39 39 38 37 36 35 31 30 29 29 29 28 26 26 25 24 23 20 20 20 19 19 18 17 16 15 15 13 12 11

* Life events having the greatest impact on military personnel.

Additional stressful situations of service personnel The list in Table 1 does not include many other unique sources of stresses in military life, such as: Military service in inhospitable terrain (deserts, jungles, high altitudes) Isolation (staying alone on pickets for long duration) Emergency duties (floods, earthquakes etc) Insurgency duties (controlling insurgency and violent law and order problems) Long separations from families and resulting domestic and personal complications Military service during time of war

The writer received his PhD in Consciousness-Based Military Defense (Invincible Defence Technology – IDT) from The Union Institute & University in Cincinnati.

He was a member of the US Air Force for nearly nine years. He served as an Associate of the Proteus Management Group at the Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College. He now serves as the Executive Director at the Center for Advanced Military Science (CAMS) and teaches IDT.

Dr David R Leffler

The co-writer is director of publications at the Institute of Science, Technology and Public Policy and assistant professor of literature and writing at Maharishi University of Management in Fairfield, IA. A graduate of Harvard University, he teaches academic courses on the development of higher states of human functioning and has been a teacher of the Transcendental Meditation programme for over 40 years.

Gerald Geer

The co-writer MA, MEd has 28 years of distinguished commissioned service in the Indian Army. He has taken part in two wars with Pakistan in (1965 and 1971).

He has served during insurgency in the North-eastern state of Nagaland and high altitude areas in Sikkim facing International border with China, in the assignment of Intelligence and Field Security officer. After a decade of soldiering as an infantry officer, he switched over to Army Education Corps.

Presently he is Director, MVM group of Schools, Bhopal, MP.

Col SP Bakshi, (retd)

Transcendental Meditation technique is strongly recommended for all military personnel to help them maintain a high level of proficiency despite the rigours of their job. TM practice can bring a new peak level of performance to individual military personnel and their units by improving physical, psychological and team productivity

Stress remains the cause of chronic tension, ill health and dissatisfaction. Tension, apprehension, shortness of breath, chest pain, heart palpitation, dizziness, trembling and easy tiring characterise anxiety neurosis. Psychic stress can further aggravate those conditions, causing constriction of blood vessels and increased oxygen consumption by the heart

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maoist menace

STRESS FREE TROOPS

Implications for defence The transcendental meditation personnel and paramilitary technique forces Considering that the maximum LCU value is 100 and the minimum 11, if even 50 points to each are allotted to the above stresses, another 300 points would have to be added to the total of 565, making a grand total of 865 LCUs, which is far beyond the breaking point for any health afflictions due to stress. Even though military personnel will not necessarily experience all these events, they are at greater risk to experience many of them than are most civilians.

Effects of stress on the human physiology Recent research has revealed a number of psychological imbalances underlying man’s present problems.

Stress remains the cause of chronic tension, ill health and dissatisfaction.

Tension, apprehension, shortness of breath, chest pain, heart palpitation, dizziness, trembling and easy tiring characterise anxiety neurosis. Psychic stress can further aggravate those conditions, causing constriction of blood vessels and increased oxygen consumption by the heart.

The TM technique is an effortless process, based on the mind’s natural tendency to move in a direction of greater charm. To ensure maximum results, the technique is always taught by a fully trained teacher in a step-by-step method of instruction with proper feedback

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In 1957, the acclaimed Vedic scholar Maharishi Mahesh Yogi introduced to the world the simple, natural and effortless technique of Transcendental Meditation (TM). His goal was to unfold the full creative potential of higher consciousness that is latent in every individual.

The Transcendental Meditation technique existed 5,000 years ago, but had been lost over the long expanse of time. It was rediscovered and revived by Maharishi.

The TM technique is the most thoroughly researched and successful meditation practice in the world. Over 350 research studies published in leading, peer-reviewed scientific and medical journals have confirmed that TM practice produces wide-ranging, measurable benefits, including increased intelligence, creativity and mental clarity; reduced stress and improved health; and more fulfilling and harmonious interpersonal relationships. These studies have been conducted at more than 200 independent universities and research institutions in 30 countries. This stress-busting approach has been taught worldwide for the past 44 years and today over 6 million people in 180 countries have learned the practice.

When people become stressed, they lose access to their inner resources. Their minds become weak, limiting the power and clarity of their thinking. They cannot provide sufficient organising force from within to engage in effective activity. Direction is lost because of failure to fulfill their desires.

The breakdown of mind-body coordination is a vicious circle leading to increasing frustration, suffering and despair.

This simple, effortless TM technique is practiced sitting comfortably in a chair with the eyes closed for 20 minutes twice a day. Through the profound physiological rest provided

by TM, deep-rooted stresses in the nervous system are dissolved, and practitioners experience more dynamic and fulfilling activity after meditation as a result. These benefits are measurable: in the United States, the National Institute of Health has given over US$ 25 million in federal grant funding for research on the TM technique. As the research shows, TM practice reduces anxiety, develops mental potential and leads to more enjoyment and success in all aspects of a life.

However, a solution to these issues has been repeatedly confirmed by scientific research – and has now been implemented in military institutions around the world.

The TM programme is systematic, repeatable, with verifiable results and therefore scientific in character.

During the practice one experiences finer and finer levels of the thinking

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process until thought subsides and one experiences the source of thought, one’s own core reality: a field of unbounded awareness, pure consciousness, the Self – an infinite source of energy, intelligence and creativity within, from where all the laws of nature conduct and govern all processes of individual life. Modern physics calls this level of life the unified field, the ultimate source of both mind and matter – the basis of all forms and phenomena and the most concentrated level of energy and intelligence at the foundation of the universe. Maharishi, the founder of the TM technique, calls this reality Transcendental Consciousness.

EEG research shows that during TM practice, the brain gains a state of global EEG coherence: across the entire brain, brain waves come into synchrony, indicating a much greater degree of integration and communication within the brain.

Higher brain wave coherence has been scientifically correlated with rising IQ, increased intelligence, increased creativity, improved academic performance and learning ability, increased moral reasoning, improved psychological stability, increased emotional maturity and improved alertness and reaction time This process of transcending thought during TM practice and thereby experiencing the core of one’s own existence – the unified field of consciousness – completely reorganises brain functioning. EEG research shows that during TM practice, the brain gains a state of global EEG coherence: across the entire brain, brain waves come into synchrony, indicating a much greater degree of integration and communication within the brain.

Higher brain wave coherence has been scientifically correlated with rising IQ, increased intelligence, increased creativity, improved academic performance and learning ability, increased moral reasoning, improved psychological stability, increased emotional maturity and improved alertness and reaction time.

Everything good about the brain is based on its orderly functioning and TM practice develops this improved functioning and allows it to become stabilised in daily life.

TM compared with other techniques of meditation TM is not a religion or system of beliefs, but rather a scientifically verified technique that produces predictable positive benefits, regardless of one’s language, education, cultural group, religion or lifestyle. Historically, meditation has often been understood in terms of concentration, contemplation or attempts to control the mind; it was difficult to do and the goal of meditation was considered to be unrelated to the practicalities of life. In contrast, the TM technique is an effortless process, based on the mind’s natural tendency to move in a direction of greater charm. To ensure maximum results, the technique is always taught by a fully trained teacher in a step-by-step method of instruction with proper feedback.

Research has also shown that regular TM practice decreases most of the major risk factors for heart disease and stroke, including hypertension, anxiety and depression.

The cost savings in healthcare alone would justify implementation of the TM programme by the military during these times of reduced financial budgets Not surprisingly, meditation practices that use concentration or contemplative approaches produce different effects on brain functioning than the TM technique and therefore lead to different results. Meta-analyses published in peer-reviewed journals have shown that TM practice results in higher levels of self-actualisation, greater decreases in anxiety, reduced high blood pressure, physiological relaxation, improved psychological outcomes and decreased use of drugs, alcohol and cigarettes in comparison with other self-development programmes.

During TM practice the entire process by which the mind settles to more silent levels is completely spontaneous and involves no effort or manipulation.

As mentioned above, the research conducted on the TM technique shows significant effects on psychological measures – creativity, cognitive flexibility, coping, problem solving and improved moral reasoning; improved health

The increasing demands of military life are reflected in many stress-related problems, including psychosomatic disease, high suicide rates, high divorce rates, reduced life span and increased disciplinary problems.

The holistic Transcendental Meditation programme eliminates these stress-related problems and unfolds the warrior's full potential.

– reductions in blood pressure and in hospitalisations; and significant improvement in social interactions.

A fourth major state of consciousness Research confirms that waking, dreaming and sleeping states of consciousness each have their own distinct physiological markers – characteristic styles of functioning of the nervous system. TM practice produces a unique fourth state of consciousness, different from waking, dreaming or sleeping. During TM practice, as the senses turn inward, the physiology gains deep rest – metabolic rate is significantly reduced – while simultaneously brainwave functioning becomes increasingly coherent, leading to increased mental clarity and inner wakefulness. Scientists have described this experience as “restful alertness” – a profoundly refreshing experience, both physically and mentally.

Accumulated fatigue and tension, which hinder efficient functioning of the nervous system, are dissolved in a natural way. The result is increased energy, more inner stability and improved clarity of perception at all levels of experience.

Scientific experiments have found that during the period of TM practice, oxygen consumption, carbon dioxide, cardiac output, heart rate and respiratory rate significantly decrease. The metabolic rate is reduced by an average of 18 per cent.

This physiological evidence, together with measurement of galvanic skin resistance, blood chemistry and brain wave patterns, shows that an individual gains a profoundly deep state of rest, while the mind remains awake and able to respond to stimuli.

These natural effects distinguish the TM technique from all other

s e l f - d e ve l o p m e n t t e c h n i q u e s .

Maharishi has explained that true mental health has its foundation in the integration of mind and body gained through regular experience of the fourth state of consciousness during TM practice.

Deeper rest is the basis of more dynamic activity. Deep rest to the physiology releases deep-rooted stress, which is the cause of psychosomatic diseases (which amounts to 85 per cent of human suffering). Stress is eliminated through the regular TM practice as both body and mind gain a profound state of restful alertness.

Practical implications of TM practice for military personnel The Transcendental Meditation technique is strongly recommended for all military personnel to help them maintain a high level of proficiency despite the rigours of their job.

TM practice can bring a new peak level of performance to individual military personnel and their units by improving physical, psychological and team productivity.

As noted above, stress-related problems can ultimately undermine mental and physical health. TM practice increases mind-body coordination, thus making the individual more resistant to stressful environments and better able to maintain health, satisfaction and improved job performance.

Worldwide military personnel need – and deserve – every opportunity to regain and / or sustain optimum health. Research shows that TM practitioners gain a higher level of overall physical and psychological

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maoist menace

STRESS FREE TROOPS

wellness. For instance, a pioneering 1987 study in Psychosomatic Medicine, a mainstream medical journal, monitored for five years the medical care utilisation of 2,000 people who regularly practiced the TM technique.

The findings: 50 per cent fewer doctor visits and hospital admissions than among non-meditators of comparable age, gender, profession and insurance terms.

Research has also shown that regular TM practice decreases most of the major risk factors for heart disease and stroke, including hypertension,

programme was recently published in the American Journal of Health Promotion (2011, Sept–Oct; 26(1): 56–60). The study found that people with consistently high healthcare costs experienced a 28 per cent cumulative decrease in physician fees after an average of five years practicing the stress-reducing Transcendental Meditation technique compared with their baseline.

Studies documenting the benefits of the TM programme show that practitioners also gain a competitive

focus, increased stability of spatial orientation, broader comprehension and increased resistance to distraction as compared to controls.

In other words, TM practitioners gain a greater ability to maintain awareness of the whole situation while simultaneously focusing on a critical aspect of it – without being distracted.

Other research has measured greater ability to assimilate and structure experience; improved memory and learning ability; increased creativity; and greater autonomic stability.

psychological tests of intelligence, moral reasoning and personality (References to the above mentioned research are available in an online paper originally published by India Defence Consultants).

TM programme offers a scientifically verified, long-term solution to help PTSD sufferers conquer this affliction: a study published in Military Medicine shows that US veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan

"All that we need to do is to add a new kind of drill – 20 minutes morning and evening

“The increasing demands of military life are reflected in many stress-related problems, including psychosomatic disease, high suicide rates, high divorce rates, reduced life span and increased disciplinary problems. The holistic Transcendental Meditation programme eliminates these stress-related problems and unfolds the warrior's full potential.” anxiety and depression. The cost savings in healthcare alone would justify implementation of the TM programme by the military during these times of reduced financial budgets.

A study on the healthcare cost-effectiveness of the TM

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and strategic edge. One study showed that speed, agility, reaction time, coordination, endurance and perception improve after learning the TM programme. In other studies, subjects practicing the TM technique for three months significantly increased in field independence, ie, they gained increased ability to

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

Among the improvements are enhanced neurological efficiency, faster choice reaction time, improved self-confidence, increased self-reliance and greater inner control. Holistic growth has been indicated by psychophysiological means, such as measures of increased global EEG coherence and ­­­through

– to military life and to all military training programs."

– Maharishi

All the above outcomes demonstrate the powerful impact that TM practice could have on military preparedness and effectiveness.

In addition, the TM programme could help military personnel suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). PTSD has become alarmingly prevalent in recent years, especially among military personnel.

Conventional modalities to treat this condition are often unsuccessful and frequently sufferers receive only temporary relief from symptoms. The

wars experienced a 50 per cent drop in PTSD symptoms after just four weeks of TM practice.

Implementation of TM practice at Norwich University

in the US, recently implemented the TM technique at Norwich as a preventive measure and to increase the performance of his cadets. According to a recent article published in The Boston Globe, retired US Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R Sullivan, an influential booster of the TM programme at Norwich University, commented, “It is a way to get out in front and expose them, in a prophylactic way, to help them handle stress before the fact.” Sullivan heads the influential Association of the United States Army in Washington.

Rear Adm Schneider agreed with Sullivan’s assessment. He commented, “We owe it to them to give them the very best tools to win and I think this is one of those tools.”

To find out more about the scientific research conducted on the TM programme, visit: http:// www.tm.org/research-onmeditation.

Due to the positive stress-reducing benefits of TM practice, as confirmed by this extensive scientific research, Rear Adm (Retd) Richard W Schneider, president of Norwich University, the oldest private military college

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internal security

REDEEMING MECHANISM

Role of Science and Technology to Counter Terrorism

N

ation states defending against terrorism need to enhance and augment their intelligence gathering capabilities with the help of various technologies. The probable weapons used by the terrorists in the foreseeable future include fissile nuclear materials, tactical nuclear weapons, radiological materials, pathological organisms (human, plant and animal), toxic chemical weapons, inflammable, toxic and explosive chemicals, cyber attacks and electromagnetic pulse (EMP), attacks on electronic targets, transportation including fuel oil and nitrogen fertilizer (ammonium nitrate). Fissile material protection, accounting and control (MPAC) need to be strengthened by the respective states. The US intelligence had mentioned in its report on global trends that the use of nuclear weapons will grow increasingly likely by 2025 AD. The report has highlighted that the terrorists are likely to use nuclear or biological weapons in the next five years.

A

ny analysis on the role of science and technology to counter terrorism will be incomplete unless and until the nature of threat which the nation state like India has been confronting especially from the non-state actors for the last two decades in particular is articulated and explained. The evaluation of the nature of the threat would reflect the emerging vulnerabilities of targets in civil society. The terrorists would always be on the look out to exploit the situation and wreak damage on the society and nation. Whether the science and technology can play any role in countering terrorism has been a major part of discourse in the twentyfirst century.

Whether the strategic assets including the nuclear and fissile material stocks in Pakistan are safe is a matter of debate among the members of the international community. It is only because Pakistan is in internal turmoil and has become the victim of its own state policy. It has also emerged as an epicentre of terrorism India is highly vulnerable to terrorist attacks. India has been the victim of terrorism. Pakistan has been working with a single-minded aim to destabilise India. Pakistan’s policy of cross-border terrorism has impacted negatively for India’s national security. Pakistan’s policy of cross-border terrorism has seen wider ramifications as far as India’s internal threat perceptions are concerned. In most of the cases as far as India is concerned, the terrorists have used conventional small arms weapons plus explosives against

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individuals in an attempt to put political pressure on a government that has proved intransigent regarding the political objectives of the terrorists.

There will always be a possibility that the terrorists would like to attack vital critical infrastructure. Such attacks would be characterised as catastrophic terrorism.

Through catastrophic terrorism, the terrorists wish to draw attention to their cause and inflict maximum damage.

The nature of threats has changed significantly. The actions of the terrorist groups are largely unpredictable. The terrorists have some other advantages like having covert residence within the societies they plan to attack. These groups also appear to be very patient and decide when they will strike.

Hence, the nation state cannot afford to be complacent and would be required to be alert at all times. The other important point to be emphasised here is that the terrorists may have international bases of operations. There are some states, which sponsor terrorist activities. The Taliban government of Afghanistan was acknowledged as such a state.

There are various instances where Pakistan has been both covertly and overtly sponsoring terrorism.

However, those nation states defending against terrorism need to enhance and augment their intelligence gathering capabilities with the help of various technologies. The nation states tend to formulate their counter terrorism efforts in cooperation to each other. The cooperation to an extent has yielded some desired result by keeping the terror networks off balance by

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damaging some of them and interferes with their communication and money flows. Such action only will help in impeding the designs and plans of the terrorists groups.

Undoubtedly, the terrorist groups will have all the available means to promote their interests. It is generally believed among the members of strategic community that Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) are generally the most lethal. These weapons of mass destruction are not easily accessible unless and until the state institutions those have it work covertly with them. However, it is well known that the terrorists who attacked the World Trade Centre in September 2001 created mass destruction but the weapons used (fully fuelled aircraft) were technically not characterised as WMDs. The probable weapons used by the terrorists in the foreseeable future include fissile nuclear materials, tactical nuclear weapons, radiological materials, pathological organisms (human, plant and animal), toxic chemical weapons, inflammable, toxic and explosive chemicals, cyber attacks and electromagnetic pulse (EMP), attacks on electronic targets, transportation (Systems used as delivery systems for weapons and various other types of explosives extracted from a number of sources) including fuel oil and nitrogen fertilizer (ammonium nitrate).

It is generally believed that the terrorists seem to be absolutely equipped with the scientific knowledge

Prof (Dr) Arvind Kumar

and they will always be on look out for obtaining fissile material. Hence, those nations, which have a huge amount of stockpile of fissile materials would require to safeguard fissile material and these nations would also require to blend down stocks of highly enriched uranium.

The nature of radiological threats must be understood in the context of the possibility of the use of radiological dispersal devices (RDD) or the threats emanating from damaged nuclear electric power plants.

There is no doubt in saying that the technical task of detecting fissile materials shipment to a target state may be a tough and complex task.

But, at the same time, there are certain initiatives at the political level like the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) led by the United States allows for the interdiction of the shipment of the WMD material. These initiatives certainly do not have the legal basis.

The developments in the field of high-technology sensors have so far not been able to help in detecting the movement and shipment of fissile materials. Hence, in the current context a number of efforts have been made both at the unilateral level especially in India’s case and multilateral level in the case of joint programme led by both the United States and Russia on Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme to control and account for the fissile material at the source itself. However, whether the strategic assets including the nuclear and fissile material stocks in Pakistan are safe is a matter of debate among the members of the international community. It is only because Pakistan is in internal turmoil and has become the victim of its own state policy. It has also emerged as an epicentre of terrorism.

There are also probable scenarios where the non-state actors may like to work with Pakistan’s establishment covertly and get the relevant and required material, which would be completely disastrous for humanity.

The fissile material protection, accounting and control (MPAC) need to be strengthened by the respective states and own the responsibility.

The technical safeguards employed by the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) need to assure that the diversion of the nuclear material does not take place and hence the source of supply itself can be controlled.

It will help in the legitimate use of the nuclear materials.

There are a number of existing analyses and discourse, which suggests that there are biological threats which might emanate from the terrorist groups. There seems to be a consensus worldwide among the members of the strategic and academic community that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been the greatest danger to the global security and it also poses challenges to India’s national security. The nuclear, biological and chemical weapons are commonly characterised as the WMDs. The real challenge before the international community has been to contain the proliferation of WMDs. The rise of non-state actors and their networks worldwide has made the current international security situation worse. It is generally believed that the non-state actors might have been trying to acquire any one or all the components of WMDs or might have already acquired the WMDs. The assertion that such things are not possible or difficult to acquire may not be true. The possibility of acquisition of WMDs by terrorist group more particularly by the al-Qaeda networks cannot be ruled out.

The US intelligence had mentioned in its report on global trends that the use of nuclear weapons will grow increasingly likely by 2025 AD. It has been clearly highlighted by the US intelligence that such possibility exists because of the growing persistence of the terrorist groups and rogue states. The report has highlighted that the terrorists are likely to use nuclear or biological weapons in the next five years. The time span mentioned in the report that the use of nuclear or biological weapon is most likely in the next five years by the terrorist groups in particular has once again reinvigorated the ongoing debate on the global security environment.

The writer is Professor and Head of Department of Geopolitics and International Relations at Manipal University, Manipal, India.

The nation states tend to formulate their counter terrorism efforts in cooperation to each other. The cooperation to an extent has yielded some desired result by keeping the terror networks off balance by damaging some of them and interferes with their communication and money flows

Pakistan’s inability to contain and eradicate terrorist links and networks has made the whole globe a dangerous place for humanity

The need of the hour is to urgently tighten security in domestic bio-sphere institutes and laboratories. The mushrooming of biotechnology sector across the world has made this area highly vulnerable

Cyber terrorism is a type of information warfare and the future wars are most likely to be fought in this theatre. The science and technology certainly has a dominant role to play in countering terrorism

Pakistan’s inability to contain and eradicate

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internal security

REDEEMING MECHANISM

terrorist links and networks has made the whole globe a dangerous place for humanity. The report clearly has highlighted the degree of vulnerability emerging from Pakistan and to quote from the report, “were one to map terrorism and weapons of mass destruction today, all roads would intersect in Pakistan”. Hence, it is a well accepted fact and the inference drawn from the bi-partisan commission that Pakistan has been supporting the terrorist networks and the United States itself might become a victim one day.

The commission report has highlighted that the terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain biological than nuclear weapons, with anthrax as the primary mode.

It is a well known fact that the terrorists have already tried chemical and biological weapons – nerve gas in the Tokyo subway, anthrax mailed to US public figures. So far, the nuclear weapons and materials have been left out. However, it is most likely that the al-Qaeda group and the other terrorist networks must be trying to procure and obtain such nuclear materials. They have definitely expertise available with them to build at least a crude nuclear device or may like to use radiological material in the form of the so called dirty bombs. The most difficult step in making a nuclear bomb is obtaining the fissile materials either plutonium or highly enriched uranium. There may be several routes for the terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. The first option might be to make an attempt in stealing one from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons in nexus with the security. The second option would be to buy from a country if that country is in dire crisis and overtly supporting terrorism. The other route would be to buy or steal from some other sub-national group that had obtained it one of these ways.

From a bioterrorism perspective the bi-partisan commission report has cautioned the US in particular and the international community in general that the possibility of getting hold of biological weapons and its use by the terrorist group will always be high. Biological weapons employ viruses, bacteria and other germs to produce diseases, which kill people in large numbers and do not destroy the infrastructure. The serious concerns relating to biological weapons use have

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been reflected in the report. The US and Russia possess almost the entire worldwide stockpile of biological and chemical weapons, which is approximately 60,000 metric tons.

It can wipe out 60 billion people but the whole world currently has 6.5 billion people. Anthrax spores occur naturally around the world in soil and certain animals and they can be easily used for biological warfare. The need of the hour is to urgently tighten security in domestic biosphere institutes and laboratories.

The mushrooming of biotechnology sector across the world has made this area highly vulnerable.

Hence, the research on pathogenesis of infectious agents and more particularly on means for early detection of the presence of such pathogens in the atmosphere is warranted and important. The various nation states may have been stockpiling the vaccines against known diseases – but the threat of genetic modification would require a vigorous research effort to find solutions for detection, evaluation and response.

Unfortunately, there is a lack of epidemiological response capability for possible biological attacks on agriculture and farm animals, which might be destabilising for the society and the nation. Hence, the nation states have to evolve sufficient measures to protect the food supply and to provide decontamination after an attack. The role of technology in decontamination will be paramount.

With regard to the probable use of toxic chemicals and explosives by the terrorist groups, the possibility certainly cannot be ruled out. There are highly lethal chemicals available and it becomes a great source of concern for the nation state. The availability of industrial chemicals are source of great concern to the members of international community.

The movement and shipment of these chemicals create vulnerability for the nation state. These chemicals during transit should be tracked and identified electronically. The role of encryption becomes important from science and technology point of view. The development in the field of encrypted electronic identification helps the nation state to secure the movement of lethal chemicals.

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The sensor networks would also be required to detect and characterise lethal materials. The research and development in the field of both active and passive sensors needs to be augmented commensurate with the requirements.

It seems that over the years, the terrorist networks have become increasingly adept in the use of science and technology for promoting their interests. The terrorist organisations have a number of members having science or engineering backgrounds.

Osama bin Laden himself was an engineer. One suspect in the Bali bombing held a doctorate in Chemistry from a very prestigious British University and Abu Zubaida – who was supposed to be very important in al-Qaeda hierarchy was an expert in computer technology. Hence, their base is being strengthened among the various terrorist groups.

Despite all these challenges, the Science and Technology will have to play a much greater role in the future than in the past because of the extraordinary reach and the tremendous potential for destruction caused by terrorism. The most important contribution of science and technology to terrorism prevention is in respect to communications. The states need to have effective technology to intercept communications. The interception of communication by the states will prevent acts of terrorism. It must be emphasised here that the more terrorists use science and technology, the more vulnerable they are to detection and neutralisation by the state and the less they use technology, the more difficult it is for the state to detect and neutralise them.

The likely challenges will keep accruing in the domain of information warfare. Cyber terrorism is a type of information warfare and the future wars are most likely to be fought in this theatre. The science and technology certainly has a dominant role to play in countering terrorism. However, this alone will not be sufficient to control or contain the growing menace of the terrorist activities and mushrooming terrorist networks. The nation states would require working in tandem and cooperating in significant manner in ­­ countering terrorism.

maoist menace

DRDO TO THE RESCUE

Indigenous Technology Solutions

For Low Intensity Conflicts L

ow Intensity Conflicts have many unique features that differentiate them from conventional warfare. Handling of such new class of conflicts necessitates evolution of tailor-made technology solutions. Many technologies applicable to conventional warfare, with necessary adaptations, have relevance to handling of Low Intensity Conflicts. A wide range of sensors providing day and night vision assistance that have been developed for the services, have potential applications in LICOs. Equipment designed and developed for regular armed forces have capabilities far in excess of what is needed for operations related to LICO. Thus, down-scaling such items with some efforts achieve significant reduction in size and weight, resulting in operational advantage, while making them more cost effective and affordable. The cost factor is especially important when the items are required in large numbers.

Ravi Kumar Gupta and Manoj Bali

C

onsistently rising incidents of terrorism and organised crimes against humanity have led to emergence of a new dimension of national security. While importance of preparedness for facing conventional war remains high, handling of sub-conventional or asymmetric warfare and Low Intensity Conflicts (LICO) is assuming increasing significance.

Low Intensity Conflicts have many unique features that differentiate them from conventional warfare. These conflicts do not follow any given set of rules or norms. Nor do they have a predefined theatre, boundaries or limits. Handling of such new class of conflicts necessitates evolution of tailor-made technology solutions. Collateral fratricide and non-state players are the new factors to be considered.

Many technologies applicable to conventional warfare, with necessary adaptations, have relevance to handling of Low Intensity Conflicts. Thus, the systems, equipment and material that have been developed and produced for the regular armed forces and being used by the three services can be used after suitably adapting them for the security forces Nevertheless, many technologies applicable to conventional warfare, with necessary adaptations, have relevance to handling of Low Intensity Conflicts.

Thus, the systems, equipment and material that have been developed and produced for the regular armed forces

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and being used by the three services can be used after suitably adapting them for the security forces. Aware of the situation, DRDO has followed a focused, two pronged approach with the aim of evolving technology solutions to help our forces handle this emerging and dynamic dimension of national security.

As a first step, items already developed and led to production for armed forces have been identified for management of situations involving such conflicts.

These are the items that are being used by the services, are in regular production and cover areas such as Surveillance and Reconnaissance; Enhancing Day and Night Vision Capabilities; small arms and ammunition, detection and identification of explosives and their neutralisation; secure communication and jamming adversary’s communication; protective gear and equipment for combat support.

A wide range of sensors providing day and night vision assistance that have been developed for the services, have potential applications in LICOs. The equipment is in regular production by designated production agencies. For example, a hand-held thermal imager operating in the infrared region of electromagnetic spectrum provides high resolution vision in darkness covering a range in excess of a kilometre. A Helmet Mounted Thermal Imaging Camera with un-cooled sensors operating in mid-infrared region and capable of providing wide area coverage upto a distance of over 100 meters through smoke and darkness, is a versatile device

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

offering hands free operation. Similarly, a Rifle Mounted Thermal Sight with un-cooled optics offers excellent night fighting capability over the range of INSAS rifle. A latest addition to a long list of devices that provide day and night fighting capabilities to our forces is a lightweight integrated multifunction sight that combines capabilities of five versatile instruments into one compact device, including thermal imager, video recorder, GPS, digital compass and a laser range finder (that instantly and precisely measures the distance of an object).

DRDO has followed a focused, two pronged approach with the aim of evolving technology solutions to help our forces handle this emerging and dynamic dimension of national security.

As a first step, items already developed and led to production for armed forces have been identified for management of situations involving such conflicts Detection and identification of explosives and their safe neutralisation is one area where equipment developed for military application is finding wider use. An explosive detection kit allowing fast, on the spot detection and analysis of most of military explosives used in bomb blasts is in production. The technology has also been given to a US firm.

ROV- ‘Daksh’, a remotely operated vehicle that can handle hazardous materials and suspected objects, with versatile reach and capable of climbing stairs is in production. Equipped

with rechargeable battery, continuous operation up to 3 h and payload lifting capability upto 20 kg with the help of a robotic arm, a portable x-ray device and an explosive based water jet disrupter, it offers comprehensive solution for handling of suspected explosive / hazardous devices. It can also be equipped with radiation measuring equipment, portable gas chromatograph and mine detector.

Besides, a range of communication equipment, jammers, protection gears, Emergency Survival Ration, life detection device, ‘HeliNet’ for transporting heavy payloads by helicopters in under-slung condition, plastic bullets, oleoresin grenades (chilli bomb), blast protection suites etc are finding applications for handling LICO.

Thus, development of radars that can sense through the foliage or that can detect objects buried below the ground surface, or can get information behind the walls are under development Another approach is to fine-tune the existing items / technologies for LICO. In many cases, the equipment designed and developed for regular armed forces have capabilities far in excess of what is needed for operations related to LICO. Thus, down-scaling such items with some efforts achieve significant reduction in size and weight, resulting in operational advantage, while making them more cost effective and affordable.

The cost factor is especially important when the items are required in large numbers. An example is the radars

developed for the armed forces, wherein the long-range and other capabilities of these systems are not required in LICO scenarios. Battlefield Surveillance Radar (BFSR), the ‘two men portable’ radar equipped with video camera and night vision device, is being used by services in large numbers. The standard version developed by DRDO and currently manufactured by a defence PSU is capable of detecting person walking three kilometres away and heavy vehicle moving as far as 13 kilometres away. It can simultaneously track large number of targets and can be installed within few minutes. Being indigenous, features and capabilities of this powerful equipment can be tuned to retain those that are sufficient to fulfil the needs of internal security forces.

DRDO has developed a range of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance applications. For example, Nishant was developed as a multi-mission UAV with Day-Night capability, to fulfil Indian Army’s specific need for a mobile, easily deployable UAV system for battlefield surveillance / reconnaissance, target tracking and localisation and artillery fire correction, that could take off and land without the assistance of a runway. It is launched from a highly mobile all terrain hydro-pneumatic launcher and recovered using a parachute, thereby enabling its deployment in remote areas.

It is made of composites and is powered by an indigenous rotary engine also developed by DRDO. Nishant UAV is controlled from a user friendly Ground Control Station through a jam resistant

command link incorporates a fully digital fly-by-wire system and has autonomous flight capabilities. The electro-optic payloads are mounted on a stabilised steerable platform. A sophisticated image processing system is used for analysing the images transmitted from the UAV. Netra, a Quad rotor UAV of ‘3 Idiots’ fame, is equipped with multiple onboard, sensors (Gyroscope, Accelerometer, Magnetometer, Pressure sensor, Temperature sensor, GPS).

Weighing just about 1.5 kilogram, it has a flight endurance of about 30 minutes, is equipped with a rechargeable Lithium polymer battery, onboard Video Camera, wireless video transmitter and has autonomous operation including take-off and landing.

Then there are emerging requirements arising out of situations faced by our security forces. Development of technologies for such situations is taken up by DRDO to strengthen the hands of our forces. Thus, development of radars that can sense through the foliage or that can detect objects buried below the ground surface, or can get information behind the walls are under development.

Thus, DRDO is not only providing state-of-the-art strategic systems (like Prithvi and Agni series of strategic missiles, BO5 under water launched missile), indigenous 4th generation plus combat aircraft (LCA Tejas), modern main battle tank (MBT Arjun) weapon systems and combat support equipment for the services, but is also providing technology solutions for handling the Low Intensity Conflicts.

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internal security

CONSTANT VIGILANCE

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

AND HAZARDOUS MATERIAL THREATS T

wo experienced American Security Professionals offer sound advice on the terrorist threat to critical infrastructure and potential attacks using Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT). Leaders must remain vigilant against all types of threats and the citizens in our democracies must lobby them to do so. To lead and advocate effectively, it’s important to understand all aspects of critical infrastructure protection. India must also ensure the security of its key assets, especially its industrial and manufacturing base. Power transmission systems, air and ground transportation networks and telecommunications networks are also vital to a robust economy. For international investors, however, India’s internal security could become a matter of concern unless leaders at all levels of the government are committed to protecting critical infrastructure beyond just government buildings and military installations. As India grows its economy, many companies will need toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) and toxic industrial materials (TIMs) that can also be used as weapons of war. As the US military learned in Iraq, terrorists can combine TICs such as chlorine gas with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in attacks that pose both a blast and a chemical hazard.

A

sia is a powerful engine of global economic activity.

Although much of the world’s attention has been focused on China, India is an emerging economic powerhouse and regional military power. With these changes comes the need to fully understand security threats that could adversely affect India’s rightful place on the world stage. These include potential attacks on critical infrastructure as well as hazardous materials (HAZMAT) terrorism.

As readers of DSA magazine well know, India faces numerous internal security challenges. Here in the United States and especially in the aftermath of the tragic Boston Marathon Bombings, our defence and security community is strongly focused on Islamic radicalism, both internally-sponsored and home-grown. India faces these same challenges, too, along with a serious threat from Naxalite terrorists who espouse Maoism instead of jihad.

Economic and psychological dimensions When a nation becomes a global power, its leaders must understand the full spectrum of threats and the importance of internal security. As the world learned on 9/11, terrorist attacks have both economic and psychological dimensions. New York’s World Trade Center wasn’t just an office building, but a symbol of America’s economic might. Clearly, al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden wanted to collapse not just our buildings but our sense of invulnerability.

India also understands the economic and psychological effects of international terrorism. In 2008, members of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistan-based organisation, staged coordinated shooting and bombing attacks in Mumbai, the nation’s largest city. Two hotels, the Taj Mahal Palace and Tower and the Oberoi Trident, were targeted both for their

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May 2013 Defence AND security alert

economic value and their symbolism. Other terrorist incidents included attacks on taxis, bars and restaurants – places where consumers spend money and expect to feel safe.

For international investors, however, India’s internal security could become a matter of concern unless leaders at all levels of the government are committed to protecting critical infrastructure beyond just government buildings and military installations. Given the experiences of 9/11 and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, US and Japanese manufacturers may look very closely at the resiliency of India’s manufacturing base, utilities and transportation networks Today, terrorist organisations have an even greater understanding of how they can harm leading nations such as India and the United States. Criminal organisations do, too. The spectrum of threats varies by country, of course, but we can learn from each other as we combat and defeat domestic and international terrorism. Leaders must remain vigilant against all types of threats and the citizens in our democracies must lobby them to do so. To lead and advocate effectively, it’s important to understand all aspects of critical infrastructure protection.

Critical infrastructure manufacturing

protection

and

The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines critical infrastructure as the backbone of America’s economy, security and health. Examples include telecommunications and electrical power systems, gas and oil storage and transportation, water supply systems and emergency services such as police, fire, medical and rescue personnel. Critical infrastructure also extends to virtual assets such as data stored in government and private computer systems.

Robert L Domenici

As a regional power that is rapidly becoming a global one, India must also ensure the security of its key assets, especially its industrial and manufacturing base. Power transmission systems, air and ground transportation networks and telecommunications networks are also vital to a robust economy. In addition, the health and safety of government officials, industry leaders and the general population must be protected, especially against the possibility of HAZMAT attacks.

India deserves to be recognised as a regional military and economic power that is poised to take its place on the world stage. Leaders from across the government must recognise the scope of the nation’s critical infrastructure, however and how HAZMAT terrorism could threaten the nation’s economic progress and growing confidence For any industrial nation, even a minimal disruption of critical systems can hurt domestic productivity, undermine business confidence and halt international trade. For example, an attack on the electrical grid would darken not just homes but also office buildings and factories.

An attack on the water supply to a chemical processing plant could take that facility off-line and affect other companies that need industrial chemicals for their manufacturing operations.

Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster wasn’t the result of a terrorist attack, but the 2011 earthquake and partial meltdown illustrates the far-reaching economic effects of damage to critical infrastructure. With so many of Japan’s nuclear power plants, factories, seaports and airports severely damaged or inoperable, Japanese industry was unable to supply wings and landing gears to Boeing, or semiconductor components for Apple iPads.

Disruptions to the global supply chain included the suspension of automotive production at Toyota, Nissan, Honda, Mitsubishi and Suzuki. Japan’s economy had just begun to recover from 20 years of deflation

and recession, with economists optimistic about increased gross domestic product (GDP) in 2010. Once seen as an economic powerhouse that could rival the United States, Japan is now inwardly focused and engaged in costly rebuilding efforts.

Aerospace, automotive and semiconductor manufacturing in India Like Japan and the United States, India has strong manufacturing capabilities in the aerospace, automotive and semiconductor industries. To protect and grow the nation’s economy, India must secure not just its factories and facilities, but also the utilities and transportation networks that support them. As profits increase and more Indian companies become multinational firms, terrorists could expand their target list and disrupt the nation’s progress.

The Indian aerospace industry offers one such example. Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) is now a major player in global aviation, with design and manufacturing expertise in jets and helicopters as well as engines and avionics systems. BRAHMOS Aerospace builds supersonic cruise missiles for the Indian military, but some of these military technologies may be available for export. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), another important player in the aerospace industry, launches sensing and communications satellites that many depend upon.

The writer, is the former Commander of the 2nd Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Civil Support Team (CST) and led his unit during its deployment to New York City in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. He is the Managing Partner of Strategic Response Initiatives (SRI), the President of Defense and Security Networks (DEFSECNET) and the founder of DEFSECNET’s first vertical website, the CBRN Resource Network.

Steve Melito The co-writer is the Director of Content Development for DEFSECNET and the Managing Editor for the Responder Rundown, a digital publication from the CBRN Resource Network. He is also a Strategic Business Development Partner for Strategic Response Initiatives (SRI) and the US Business Development Representative for Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine.

As a regional power that is rapidly becoming a global one, India must also ensure the security of its key assets, especially its industrial and manufacturing base. Power transmission systems, air and ground transportation networks and telecommunications networks are also vital to a robust economy Tata Motors, India’s largest automaker in terms of sales, is also an engine of the nation’s economic growth. Here in the United States, consumers await the

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

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internal security

highly-affordable Tata Nano, a micro car which will be sold for just US$ 3,000.

From its headquarters in Mumbai, the multinational automaker works with manufacturing and assembly plants in Dharwad, Pune, Pantnagar, Lucknow, Sanand and Jamshedpur. Tata Motors is also important to worldwide manufacturing, with factories in Argentina, South Africa, Thailand and the United Kingdom.

For any industrial nation, even a minimal disruption of critical systems can hurt domestic productivity, undermine business confidence and halt international trade. For example, an attack on the electrical grid would darken not just homes but also office buildings and factories. An attack on the water supply to a chemical processing plant could take that facility off-line and affect other companies that need industrial chemicals for their manufacturing operations Like India’s aerospace and automotive companies, the nation’s semiconductor manufacturers are also part of a global network. Today, the Indian Electronics and Semiconductor Association (IESA) has nearly 200 members. Through networking events and partnerships with trade groups in other countries, IESA is now promoting India’s semiconductor design and chip fab capabilities.

Already, Panasonic has begun training Indian technicians, an investment in the future that could pay dividends in terms of increased semiconductor production.

For international investors, however, India’s internal security could become a matter of concern unless leaders at all levels of the government are committed to protecting critical infrastructure beyond just government buildings and military installations. Given the experiences of 9/11 and the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, US and Japanese manufacturers may look very closely at the resiliency of India’s manufacturing base, utilities and transportation networks.

Chemical manufacturing and hazardous materials As India grows its economy, many companies will need toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) and toxic industrial materials (TIMs) that can also be

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internal security

CONSTANT VIGILANCE used as weapons of war. As the US military learned in Iraq, terrorists can combine TICs such as chlorine gas with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in attacks that pose both a blast and a chemical hazard.

As history also shows, chemicals on traditional battlefields aren’t the only threat to large populations.

Historically, exposure to TICs and TIMs resulted from accidental releases, such as the Bhopal disaster of 1984, a gas leak incident that is also considered to be the world’s worst industrial disaster. As DSA readers may recall, over a half-million people were exposed to methyl isocynate gas and other industrial chemicals from a Union Carbide pesticide plant. Estimates of the death toll and number of injured may vary, but the magnitude of this tragedy is indisputable.

The spectre of terrorists gaining control of a chemical processing plant is a nightmare scenario, but one that leaders must not discount.

Oilfields can also pose a danger to military and civilian populations.

During preparations for Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, US military planners answered tough questions about how to safely secure Iraq’s “sour gas” oilfields. With their high concentrations of hydrogen sulfide (H2S) gas, Iraq’s northern oilfields could not be secured using even small amounts of explosives.

IEDs contain small amounts of explosives, of course and have been used with devastating effect as roadside bombs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Typically, the terrorists targeted well-armed military vehicles that were either fully armoured or retrofitted for additional protection.

In India and the United States, however, the trucks and trains that transport industrial chemicals are neither armed nor armoured.

Security precautions are aimed at preventing an accidental release or minimising the effects of an accident – not stopping terrorists.

TICs and TIMs are also found in wastewater treatment plants, chemical storage facilities, laboratories, fuel depots and large transportation centres. In urban environments like New York and

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

bOOK REVIEW

D

New Delhi, hazardous materials (HAZMAT) are present and plentiful in everything from computers to cleaning supplies. There are also contaminants in crushed cement, fibres from carpets, broken glass and other materials that are pulverised in an attack.

Training, development and commitment To protect critical infrastructure and minimise the effects of HAZMAT terrorism, India must invest in the training and development of a professional force of first responders.

A centralised national training programme and consistent set of standards will help ensure readiness in all parts of the nation, especially regions that terrorists are most likely to target for maximum economic and psychological effect.

Although standards development should be centralised, training should be decentralised for efficiency and ease of delivery. Today, many industrialised nations use this approach. Once an institutional training programme is established, a responder force will maintain and increase its viability.

Properly equipping this force is critical and must be accomplished in conjunction with the development of national equipment standards.

Equipping a responder force can be challenging and costly, but there are ways to mitigate the difficulty and the expense. In addition to standardising equipment, government agencies should acquire multi-functional products that can address multiple threats. When interviewing suppliers, ask about equipment that can function in a wide range of environments and in multiple threat scenarios.

India deserves to be recognised as a regional military and economic power that is poised to take its place on the world stage. Leaders from across the government must recognise the scope of the nation’s critical infrastructure, however and how HAZMAT terrorism could threaten the nation’s economic progress and growing confidence. Through cooperation and collaboration, Indian can learn valuable lessons and also teach other nations based on its experience.

Title

Author Publisher

ISBN No Year of Publication

: The Inside Story of Jammu & Kashmir State : Dr SP Bakshi : Knowledge World Publishers, New Delhi : 978-93-819-0404-6 : 2012

r SP Bakshi was formerly the Chief Education Officer of the J&K State Forces in Maharaja Hari Singh’s time.

He was very close to the Royal Family and as such was a first hand witness to the monumental events that led to the invasion of Kashmir by Pakistan sponsored raiders and its subsequent accession to India. Dr Bakshi has given a graphic account of the heroic stand of the J&K State Forces against heavy odds and how Brig Rajinder Singh MVC, the Chief of Staff of the J&K State Forces personally blew up the Uri bridge. In the process he laid down his life but gained the crucial 48 hours that allowed India to fly in troops. He documents a little known fact that it was a messianic saint called Mahantji – who had gained inordinate influence over the Maharaja. This Rasputin of Kashmir filled his head with delusions of grandeur.

This made Maharaja Hari Singh vacillate over the decision to accede till it was too late.

The brutality of that invasion was horrifying.

The tribals were brought in primarily on the promise of loot, rape and plunder. This they did in good measure. Their complete lack of discipline cost them their final prize of Srinagar.

Dr Bakshi cites Field Marshal Manekshaw’s personal account of how the decision-making for accession was done at the Indian end and the decisive but behind the scenes role of the iron willed Sardar Patel. He was clear headed and firm where Nehru lectured and vacillated.

This is an excellent account of the invasion and accession of Kashmir and throws some new light on that much studied episode of South Asian history. It unmasks a lot of Pakistani deceit and subterfuge and helps separate facts from fiction and propaganda hype. It is Pakistan which has primarily failed to implement the UN Resolution asking it to withdraw its forces from PoK. Dr Bakshi’s work is topical and timely and he brings his analysis of the situation right upto the present including the stone pelting intifadas from 2008-2010. We have won the war in J&K. Now we must hold firm and not lose the peace. What we need is a firm display of political will – for it is the core principle of secularism that is at stake in J&K. He reminds the world of the tragic plight of over 4,50,000 Kashmiri Pandits and cites this as a horrific example of deliberate ethnic cleansing by Pakistan. A must read for all security analysts and laymen alike.

Reviewed by Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi, SM, VSM (retd) Editor-in-chief of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine.

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maoist menace

ON THE EDGE OF A PRECIPICE?

INDIAN STATE VERSUS THE MAOISTS

A PROTRACTED BATLLE

Nitin A Gokhale

T

he Maoist problem, according to one view, is a result of the state abdicating its role as a guarantor of welfare. The solution to this, therefore, must lie in addressing the socio-economic development deficit. And, insomuch, the Maoists can partner the state in addressing the deficits. The view from the right, however, looks at the Maoist movement as necessarily a challenge to the manner in which politics and governance is organised in India and therefore, needs to be addressed as enemies of the state are – militarily, without sympathy. This crucial division in placing the Maoist movement in proper perspective has reduced India’s ability to address the issue effectively. The state’s ambiguity has resulted in a stalemate in the crucial fight against the creeping progress of the Naxalite movement in the country.

“Our aim is to overthrow this ‘democracy’ and ‘parliamentary rule’, which are nothing but means for the dictatorship of the feudals and comprador bureaucratic bourgeoisie, which stand in complete opposition to 95% of the population’s interests, using armed force, to establish a new people’s power.

We feel it is a wonder of wonders to say that these elections and the Parliament are sacred and that the present rule is the highest form of democratic rule (sic) (CPI (Maoist) manifesto, 2008).

“CPI (Maoist) philosophy of armed struggle to overthrow the Indian State is not acceptable in our parliamentary democracy and will have to be curbed at any cost” (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2011).

Over the past decade, Maoist activity has grown in its scope, breadth and intensity. Of the 28 states and 7 Union Territories that constitute the Republic of India, Maoist rebels now control and run a parallel government in as many as 10 states. Over the last few years, beginning 2007, more people have died as a result of Maoist insurgency than due to any other kind of militant movement in India.

Despite India’s remarkable growth story over the past two decades, it faces serious challenges: A big question mark looms over its ability to sustain 8 to 9 per cent growth and development in the future years.

And the movement’s front organisations – those that covertly or overtly support it – are present in all states. India’s effort to accelerate economic growth and reduce poverty is and will be, determined by how well it is able to handle the Maoist insurgency. The current Maoist movement, though different in its nature and level of maturity, is on a continuum generated by its previous avatars.

The greatest possible threat to its progress is posed by Naxalism – a violent Maoist movement – spread

If the era between the 1950s to the mid-1970s can be termed as the first phase of the Maoist movement

T

hese two statements sum up the extent of the Maoist problem that India faces today.

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across the eastern and central areas of the country. The Maoist rebels of course earn the name ‘Naxals’ or ‘Naxalites’ from the Naxalbari movement of the late 1960s.

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

in India, the years beginning from 1975 till about 1990 form the second phase of the movement. The second phase was dominated by splits and counter-splits, reflecting divisions of ideology. Nonetheless, it wasn’t without gains for the Maoist movement. It moved from believing that people would spontaneously join a revolution without the party having to exert itself to a thought process that says people will have to be organised to revolt against the state.

The aim of Maoist movements – earlier and now – remains the same: overthrow the Indian state, seize political power through an armed revolution and install a ‘new democratic revolution’, or a ‘people’s dictatorship’ through a ‘protracted people’s war’ Mupalla Laxmana Rao aka Ganapathy, general secretary of the PWG, on the eve of the formation of the CPI (Maoist) – of which he would later become general secretary – in an interview published in the party magazine, said “However, in this long period, the revolutionary movement has developed and expanded and the People’s Guerrilla Army / People’s Liberation

The writer, a veteran journalist with 30 years of experience in reporting and analysing conflicts in Indian sub-continent, is the co-author of a forthcoming book on Maoist insurgency in India.

Over the past decade, Maoist activity has grown in its scope, breadth and intensity. Of the 28 states and 7 UTs that constitute the Republic of India, Maoist rebels now control and run a parallel government in as many as 10 states. Over the last few years, beginning 2007, more people have died as a result of Maoist insurgency than due to any other kind of militant movement in India

Guerrilla Army (PGA / PLGA) got formed and guerrilla zones have been set up with the perspective of establishing Base Areas”.

In the period beginning 1991 and lasting till about 2003, the Maoist movement in India went through a process of rediscovery, consolidation and amalgamation. It was during this decade that the PWG, MCC and the CPI (Party Unity) together emerged as the main Maoist front in India. The PWG, set up by Kondapalli Seetharamaiah, an old Charu Mazumdar acolyte,followed the philosophy of classannihilation and took up largely agrarian and tribal issues – starting in the Telangana, Karimnagar and Khamman areas of Andhra Pradesh and slowly expanding into the adjoining states of Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa. The MCC and the CPI (Party Unity), grew to entrench themselves in Bihar. However, the movement in Bihar was as much along caste lines as it was along class lines. By the late 1990s, both the Maoist parties were under pressure to sink their differences and come closer. On October 14, 2004, the two parties merged to form the CPI (Maoist).

The Maoists’ strategy The aim of Maoist movements – earlier and now – remains the same: overthrow the Indian state, seize political power through an armed revolution and install a ‘new democratic revolution’, or a ‘people’s dictatorship’ through a ‘protracted people’s war’.

They were and are, committed and draw heavily upon Mao Zedong’s ideology.

But, in contrast to the earlier phases of the movement, the strategy of the current CPI (Maoist)-driven enterprise is much more refined and sophisticated. The biggest difference is that the earlier naive belief that people in India will spontaneously revolt without being organised, or that armed revolution will be successful in overthrowing parliamentary democracy, is completely shunned by the CPI (Maoist).

The Maoist strategy to overthrow the Indian state revolves around the simple yet lethal idea of exploiting the contradictions in the polity, economy and society. The protracted people’s war to realise a ‘New Democratic Revolution’ is to be fought by exploiting and deepening the contradictions

India’s effort to accelerate economic growth and reduce poverty is and will be, determined by how well it is able to handle the Maoist insurgency

While the previous phase of Maoist movement can easily be termed as enterprise of romantic hotheads, pursuing a dream

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maoist menace

ON THE EDGE OF A PRECIPICE?

of a class-less society, the current leadership seems to believe in a much more staggered path to revolution. The leadership of the CPI (Maoist) today puts much stress on organising people on economic issues and doesn’t follow the path of class annihilation as the most effective means to overthrow the Indian state.

The CPI (Maoist) document, ‘Strategy and tactics of the Indian revolution’, issued by the Central Committee of the CPI (Maoist) in 2004, clearly says that the path followed by Lenin in Russia – that of “capturing the urban area ... establishing revolutionary authority in the urban area and thereafter, capturing the villages and establishing the revolutionary authority in the whole country,” isn’t suitable for India.

Rather, it says that the Indian revolution will have to start in just the opposite direction – from the far-flung backward villages towards cities. The idea of building bases in the rural areas and then encircling cities is a well-known tactic advocated and adopted by Mao Zedong. But, what is different in this movement, is that, unlike Charu Mazumdar, who in 1971 famously said that the “Indian liberation” would happen in just four years – “by 1971”, the present leadership of the CPI (Maoist) advocates a protracted people’s struggle that will stretch over decades, going through these phases: “stage of strategic defensive”, “stage of strategic stalemate” and “stage of strategic offensive” – indicating a much more pragmatic and meticulously planned approach.

How to overthrow the Indian state?

The Maoist strategy to overthrow the Indian state revolves around the simple yet lethal idea of exploiting the contradictions in the polity, economy and society. The protracted people’s war to realise a ‘New Democratic Revolution’ is to be fought by exploiting and deepening the contradictions.

For the Maoists, there are four

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major contradictions or chasms in Indian society: (a) The contradiction between imperialism and the Indian people; (b) The contradictions between feudalism and the masses; (c) The contradictions between capital and labour; (d) The internal contradictions among the ruling class. The first stage of the people’s war comprises establishing ‘liberated zones’ in the countryside and then moves towards a gradual expansion till cities are surrounded, followed by a final push into urban areas. It is to this end that the Maoist strategy says “The revolutionary war has to begin in those regions that are relatively more backward and where the social contradictions are sharp.” Not surprisingly, therefore, the primary concentration of the CPI (Maoist) is on poor rural communities in remote areas and the tribal populations that predominantly stay within or on the fringes of the forests.

“The inadequacy of the transport and communications system and isolation of the remote countryside” also make them an ideal base for a nascent Maoist guerrilla army.

If the disconnected rural areas of India form the initial setting for the Maoists’ agenda, contradictions found in the urban centres provide the second stage. And supporting the many separatist movements in India based on identity, religion and caste politics is their third area of concentration. The Maoists, for instance, have supported the separatist movement and separatist groups in Kashmir and the dozen-odd insurgency movements in the seven north-eastern states of India. In fact, the 9th Congress of the CPI (Maoist) passed a resolution saying “This Unity Congress – 9th Congress – unequivocally supports the right of self-determination of all the oppressed nationalities, including their right to secede from the autocratic Indian state.”

Support for separatist and insurgent movements, for the Maoists, also translates into sharing military and technical know-how. Despite denials (“We shall certainly defeat the government”, analysts believe that the CPI (Maoist) has received considerable weapons-training from the LTTE. On the other hand, linkages between the CPI (Maoist) and the

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur (insurgent movements in Manipur seek to secede from India), is well documented and growing.

The recent arrests of PLA and Maoist cadres have revealed that the Maoists are using the PLA to source weapons and are also enlisting it for training.

The urban programme, front organisations The current Maoist movement is pivoted on “three magic weapons” (Strategy and tactics of the Indian revolution, 2004, p. 78). The first two are: a) Party, or a strong organisation and (b) the army, or a body of fighters. The third is the ‘United Front’. It stands for the alliances and linkages of the Maoists and groups that would facilitate its ultimate goal – overthrowing the Indian state. The United Front aims to unite disparate disgruntled groups in the urban areas to “build-up a broad struggle against the ruling classes.”

A more comprehensive understanding of the nature and role of the United Front emerged with the arrest of Kobad Ghandy in Delhi in September 2009.

Ghandy’s past is as striking as his present activities. Born in a rich Parsi family in Mumbai, he had studied at the elite Doon School and earned a Master’s degree from the United Kingdom. He was also a member of the apex body of the CPI (Maoist); he was associated with the central committee and in-charge of building coalitions with disgruntled elements in urban areas.

Interrogations revealed that he was functioning out of New Delhi, liaising with revolutionary parties in Belgium, Peru, Philippines, Turkey, Germany and Nepal and, most importantly, building-up the Maoist movement in the urban areas of India. Ghandy was also a key member of the secretive Tactical United Front (TUF) and was engaged in forming coalitions with groups opposed to the state and willing to oppose it through ‘peaceful’, political means. He was also involved in broadening the group’s support base. At the time of his arrest, Ghandy is believed to have told his interrogators that he was coordinating and directing

about a dozen such alliances. These included workers in the telecom and power sectors, most of who were migrant labourers. Interestingly, one of his most important tasks was to identify and create a group of sympathetic lawyers who could then be used to fight legal cases in the courts.

Shocked at the manner in which the Maoists had crept into the national capital and were using perfectly legal organisations deviously, the Ministry of Home Affairs changed the law to include suspected Maoist front organisations in the list of banned terror outfits under the Prevention of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 2006. The TUF functions directly under the Sub Committee on Mass Organisations (SUCOMO), which is a subset of the all-powerful Central Committee of the CPI (Maoist).

The TUF is mainly engaged in expanding the “over-ground cadre strength” and incorporates them into organisational work, mainly in urban areas; and also acts as “a good cover” to evade the state’s net. The Maoist front organisations can be categorised as secret revolutionary mass organisations, open and semi-open revolutionary mass organisations, open legal mass organisations, which are not

directly linked to the CPI (Maoist).

In an 800-page chargesheet against Ghandy, the Delhi Police said that at least three well-known civil rights organisations – the People’s Union of Democratic Rights (PUDR), the People’s Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL) and the Association for Protection of Democratic Rights (APDR) – were guilty of helping Maoists. KPS Gill, one of India’s most well-known counter-terrorist practitioners, writing about the front organisations, observed that “civil rights groups have been transformed into weapons in the hands of various terrorist and insurgent formations in India, engaging in a campaign of harassment and disruption, undermining the capacities of state forces and often paralysing the state’s agencies …” In essence, the key aim of the United Front is to set up a web of organisations with the aim to harass and subvert the state at every possible front.

Crippled by contradictions The biggest hurdle before the Indian state is perhaps its inability to determine the nature and scope of the Maoist movement. The Indian establishment analyses the problem through two contrasting lenses – the Nehruvian compact of a welfare state and the market view.

The first one – subscribed to by a large section of the civil society, political leadership and a portion of the government as well – sees the Maoist movement as a result of the state’s failure. Seen from this angle, the Maoist movement is nothing but a reaction to the lack of social and economic development arising from deprivation, loss of livelihoods, lack of employment opportunities and abject poverty.

The Maoist problem, according to this view, is a result of the state abdicating its role as a guarantor of welfare. The solution to this, therefore, must lie in addressing the socio-economic development deficit. And, insomuch, the Maoists can partner the state in addressing the deficits. The view from the right, however, looks at the Maoist movement as necessarily a challenge to the manner in which politics and governance is organised in India and, therefore, needs to be addressed as enemies of the state are – militarily, without sympathy. This crucial division in placing the Maoist movement in proper perspective has reduced India’s ability to address the issue effectively. The state’s ambiguity has resulted in a stalemate in the crucial fight against the creeping progress of the Naxalite movement in the country.

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internal security

proactive approach

COMMUNITY POLICING:

AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD

S Banerjee IPS (retd)

F

The writer is former DGP (ACB), Gujarat and is the recipient of the President’s Police Medal for Distinguished Service.

riedmann defines Community policing as “a policy and a strategy aimed at achieving more effective and efficient crime control, reduce fear of crime, improve quality of life, improve police services and police legitimacy, through a proactive reliance on community resources that seek to change crime causing conditions. This assumes a need for greater accountability of police, greater public share in decision-making and greater concern for civil rights and liberties.” The writer analyses the community policing experiments in Kerala and Punjab.

P

olicing in India inherently suffers from a number of problems.

Historically speaking, the system that now operates is based on the Police Act of 1861 which was framed by the British after the events of 1857. The system was based on the Irish Armed Constabulary and catered to the colonial needs of the British, which was to keep the Indian “subjects” in check. The system, therefore, provided for an adversarial relationship between the police and the citizens. It did not seek to provide for, or develop a sense of trust between the two which, as time went on, became more pronounced.

This lack of trust led to much of the problems that the police face today all over the country. In the first place, it led to a lack of communication between the two. This in turn led to a lack of understanding of the problems of the people by the police.

After independence, when the whole situation became different, the police, instead of becoming “friends” of the people, continued to be governed by the Police Act of 1861 and, therefore, perpetuated the adversarial relationship that continues to plague the police administration. While the people aspired for a system that would meet the democratic aspirations of the society, the police system essentially confined itself to the maintenance of law and order.

The societal demands required the

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police to act with understanding of its various needs and help the people.

In other words, people expected the police to act with sensitivity and understanding. Thus the police, while dealing with student problems needed to act with understanding of the problems of the students and not treat these as if they were dealing with a “law and order” problem.

Then again, if they were dealing with issues concerning women, then they would require to deal with it with a different kind of sensitivity.

Therefore, different situations would require different handling and different types of solutions.

The police would, therefore, require completely different “approaches” while dealing with different societal needs. The recent event of the rape case in Delhi on December 16, led to a nationwide outcry against the lack of protection by the police of women in Delhi. There was also a demand to develop a foolproof system of protecting the victim and the witness.

The current system lacked sensitivity to these problems which perpetuated the schism between the police and the public. This led to a lack of trust between the two giving rise to the basic problem.

There is, therefore, a crying need for introducing a new system that would meet the aspirations of the people and, at the same time, develop a trust between the police and the public. The

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

concept of community policing offers a suitable alternative in this regard.

It consists of two complementary elements, community partnership and problem solving. To develop community partnership, police must develop positive relationship with the community, must involve the community for better crime control and prevention and must pool their resources with those of the community to address the most urgent concerns of its members.

Problem solving is the process through which the specific concerns of the community are identified and through which the most appropriate remedies to address these problems could be found.

It may be useful to fix the area of a police station as the geographical limit. It would also be useful to develop a feedback mechanism so that the senior officers can assess the work and take corrective measures wherever necessary Community policing could, therefore, be defined as “a policy and a strategy aimed at achieving more effective and efficient crime control, reduce fear of crime, improve quality of life, improve police services and police legitimacy, through a proactive reliance on community resources that seek to change crime causing conditions. This assumes a need for greater accountability of police,

greater public share in decision-making and greater concern for civil rights and liberties.”

[Friedmann]

To achieve the aim of proactive policing, the police must develop close relationship with the community and must involve it so as to enable it to have better control over crime and take preventive steps so that crime does not occur This definition of community policing embraces a comprehensive perspective which aims at achieving much more than just crime control. It includes non-traditional issues such as fear of crime, quality of life, improved services and police legitimacy. Under this system, the focus on crime produces conditions which actually reduce crime. In order to achieve these objectives, some fundamental changes are necessary in the structure of policing.

Firstly, it needs to be more decentralised to allow better deployment in the community and better use of its personnel in response to citizens’ requirements and building the network relations with the community.

Secondly, the command structure in the police needs to be so reorganised as to break the relatively rigid chain of command and have an improved flow of information. It is necessary to enhance interaction between all levels of the command structure and with the community in order to improve the response of the police personnel with the community. This method is essentially proactive. This envisages that the police and the community act together in order to prevent crime in society. To achieve the aim of proactive policing, the police must develop

close relationship with the community and must involve it so as to enable it to have better control over crime and take preventive steps so that crime does not occur. The police must also pool in their resources with those of the community in order to tackle the most urgent concerns of the latter. With closer relationship between the police and the community, the gap between the two would become narrow and a trust would grow between them which would bring about greater transparency, openness and improve the image of the police.

This would enable the force to interact with greater confidence with the community.

Such interaction would discourage criminal behaviour because of (a) better understanding between the two and (b) the trust built between the two would enable the police to gather better information / intelligence to control crime. Once the two conditions above are met, it would enable the police to detect crime and criminals more quickly and easily.

Community policing on the basis of the police community partnership can identify and analyse problems, develop suitable responses and assess the effectiveness of these responses. Once the public realises that the police are their partners in crime prevention and in solving the local problems, they will give information to the police regarding crime and criminals and thus prevent future crimes.

The community’s participation in identifying and setting priorities of the problems will lead to effective problem solving efforts by both the police and the community. This would reinforce trust, facilitate the exchange of information and lead to the identification of other areas that could benefit from the mutual attention of both

The police would, therefore, require completely different “approaches” while dealing with different societal needs.

The recent event of the rape case in Delhi on December 16, led to a nationwide outcry against the lack of protection by the police of women in Delhi. There was also a demand to develop a foolproof system of protecting the victim and the witness. The current system lacked sensitivity to these problems

With closer relationship between the police and the community, the gap between the two would become narrow and a trust would grow between them which would bring about greater transparency, openness and improve the image of the police

Another positive result of the greater trust and effective partnership between the two is that it would lead to greater satisfaction with the services provided by the police which

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proactive approach

would enable the force to allocate their resources in the best possible manner. With the perpetual resource crunch that is faced by the force all the time, the fact that this will help it to allocate its resources in the optimal manner would be very welcome. This level of trust would lead the community to consider the police as a “friend” and not as a “foe”. Further the trust between the two would enable both to identify and analyse problems more effectively and thereby tackle the problems better.

This lack of trust led to much of the problems that the police face today all over the country. In the first place, it led to a lack of communication between the two In order to bring about a greater trust between the police and the community, it is important to include in this system the relevant NGOs, local youth groups, particularly the students, senior citizens, retired government servants, ex-servicemen and selected local politicians who would be helpful in solving the local problems.

It must also make effective use of the various methods of Information Technology like the blogs, twitter, facebook etc which have a significant effect on the community. This functional group should be of the optimum size depending upon the need and the type of the local issue.

The reliance on the community itself is an important basic need of community policing. This would include partnership between the police and other agencies, legislative enactments to streamline and systematise the community policing scheme and citizens’ review boards which could look into the question of police accountability. Another important aspect is the replacement of the Police Act of 1861 by a new Police Act. It will also be essential to incorporate the system of community policing as a part of this new Police Act so that this becomes mandatory at the relevant levels. This would also prevent the ad hocism that exists in various parts of the country wherever this concept has been introduced. This would provide a window of opportunity to both the police and the community to work together with the realisation that crime is too big for any one agency to control.

Fig. 1 indicates that trust is an important input in this system of policing. In order to build this trust, the police must treat people with respect and sensitivity. The use of unnecessary force and arrogance, aloofness, or rudeness will deter the members of the community from cooperating with the police. The effective mobilisation of community support requires different approaches in different communities, depending on the nature of the problem.

Fig. 2 indicates that problem solving is another important aspect of community policing. The

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community’s participation in identifying and setting priorities of the problems will lead to effective problem solving efforts by both the police and the community. This would reinforce trust, facilitate the exchange of information and lead to the identification of other areas that could benefit from the mutual attention of both.

It is important to note that community policing needs to be there on a long-term basis and needs to be thoroughly planned.

It is equally important that the people operating the system should be convinced of it and not pay mere lip service. It is also important that it should have the support of other external factors like the law so that nobody could interfere with the laid down system.

Given this method, how would it be relevant in solving crimes like rapes in cities and elsewhere? This method would be helpful by its very nature of close relationship between the police and the community. The trust built between the police and the community would help the former to get information about the

bad elements in the local areas and would help it to nab such people and thereby prevent crimes.

the senior officers can assess the work and take corrective measures wherever necessary.

In order to achieve a better rapport with the community, the police forces need to operate more like open systems. The structure of police departments need to be more decentralised to allow better deployment in the community, more effective use of the personnel and build network relations with the public. This will lead to proactive initiatives and decentralised decision-making. It is important that those who take decisions are held accountable for their actions. Further, there should be a fixed geographic area in which the system should operate. The internal communications between the hierarchies should be so organised as to break the relatively rigid chain of command so as to improve the flow of information.

It is important that the police force should be deployed in a proactive, preventive and community-oriented manner instead of following a policy of just reactive policing. It is also equally important that both the proactive as well as the preventive reactive policing needs to exist together to tackle situations which have turned violent and serious. The most appropriate example of this type of situation would be the serious riot situations when the police would need to use force in an effective manner to tackle the situation.

In order to bring about a greater trust between the police and the community, it is important to include in the community policing system, various segments of the society like the relevant NGOs, the local youth groups, particularly the students, senior citizens, retired government servants, ex-servicemen and selected local politicians who would be helpful in solving the local problems.

The community police must also make effective use of various methods of Information Technology like the blogs, twitter, facebook etc which have a significant effect on the community. These functional groups should be of the optimum size depending upon the need and the type of the local issue.

In order to make this type of policing successful, it would be necessary to recruit personnel with a higher educational background as well as better IQ level so that they can take crucial decisions properly.

Training is another important input and must include interpersonal skills and community oriented actions. It would be useful if selected members of the public are also included in such training programmes before they are put together with the police for the purpose of community policing.

While considering the introduction of community policing it may be useful to fix the area of a police station as the geographical limit.

It would also be useful to develop a feedback mechanism so that

The Stanford Police Department in the University of Stanford, United States, have devised a unique method of dealing with the students, which is worth considering for being adopted in our country. In the 1960s and 1970s, the University faced several instances of violence because of the demonstrations relating to civil rights issues and the Vietnam wars.

This led to a massive breakdown in the law and order. The University thereafter recognised the need for a professional Police Department in the campus that went beyond the existing Department’s functioning as security guards Various forms of community policing have been applied for some time now all over the world. In India too it has been introduced at various places for various purposes depending on the particular needs of that community. In Delhi Special Police Officers (SPOs) have been appointed to control property offences, by educating the public in this regard, verification of the domestic servants and their registration, setting up patrol parties and colony visits. In Maharashtra, this programme is used to obtain information from alert citizens, from joint patrol teams for crime prevention, medical health check-up, setting up of libraries etc. In Jammu and Kashmir, village defence parties have been set up to promote

positive interaction between the police and the public, organise citizens’ participation in crime prevention and detection, setting up surveillance units for suspicious persons, collection of information on drug addicts and counselling as well as organising groups to resist militants. Various other efforts by different states have also been made. Of the different efforts, special mention may be made of the Janamaithri Scheme in Kerala and the Saanjh Project in Punjab. In these two states, the government has backed the schemes by budgetary allocations and such efforts have led to their success.

Kerala: In 2006 the government of Kerala had appointed Justice KT Thomas Commission to bring about police reforms. It recommended that the government should implement community policing on an experimental basis in order to prevent crime, bring about co-operation between the police and the community in security matters and to ensure mutual co-operation of the members of the public with the security agencies.

The project was approved which established the system of (a) beat officers; (b) Janamaithri Suraksha Samithi; and (c) Janamaithri Kendrams.

The beat officers and the women police constables form a team to perform the duties in a police station relating to patrolling, process servicing, servicing of complaint boxes etc. The beat constables are specially trained and expected to know their beats thoroughly for the purpose of patrolling. They are provided with bikes and are expected to maintain a register regarding their daily activities.

The Janamaithri Suraksha Samithi is formed in each police station and comprises corporation / municipal ward counsellors, representatives of active residents’ associations, NGOs, local media representative, nominees of high schools, headmasters, college principals, reputed persons of the locality, retired police personnel, ex-service personnel, senior citizens, women and weaker sections of the society.

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The Samithi inter alia performs the following activities: Formulate security plans; Identify the need of the disabled, aged and weaker sections of the population and revise plans to ensure security; Give training to the youth in first aid and trauma care; Organise victim support cells; Organise legal aid / counselling etc to women and students; Provide for improved traffic safety.

The Janamaithri Kendrams function as information centres and help the people to interact with the police. This interface helps the police to serve the community in a better manner.

This kind of police-community structure would be helpful especially in getting prior information about the bad elements and dealing with them in an appropriate manner. It would also be especially helpful to the women and youth who have special difficulties in dealing with the regular police. The presence of the women police personnel would also help in dealing with the problems of women better as they can relate their concerns to women personnel much better than male personnel.

Punjab: The concept of community policing – Saanjh Project – was launched in Punjab in 2010. It has a 25-member State Advisory Committee at the Police Headquarters and is headed by the DGP and includes academicians and police personnel.

The principal features of Saanjh Kendras are as follows:

the

These extend to 27 districts, 140 sub-divisions and 359 police stations in the state.

A Community Affairs Division headed by an IGP at Police Headquarters supervises the Saanjh Kendras all over the state while the Zonal IGPs and Range DIGs supervise their activities at the intermediate levels.

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proactive approach All Saanjh Kendras are registered as autonomous registered societies under the Registration of Societies Act 1860.

Every Saanjh Kendra is run by a Police Public Committee comprising police officers, representatives of government departments, NGOs, professionals and civil societies etc.

A statewise IT platform, with a centralised server at the police headquarters with links to every Saanjh Kendra, enables centralised data uploading and access, providing citizens with copies of FIRs, untraced reports, No Objection Certificates etc immediately and in a time bound fashion. Every Saanjh Kendra provides all services of the police department to the public under the Right to Service Act, from a single window.

The Saanjh Kendra provides the platforms for the police-community partnership in planning and implementing community oriented projects and for resolving disputes with the help of lawyers and other experts.

The Kendras also serve as information centres for access to specialised services such as legal aid, victim relief centres, women shelters and NGOs working for the weaker sections.

All personnel, both police and public, who deal with these Kendras, have been specially trained for this purpose.

The police stations provide all services to the Kendras at the sub-divisional as well as the police station levels.

So far as the students are concerned, it is important that they be handled with special care. The incident of December 16 unleashed naked anger among the youth, quite a few of them students, against the current system of meting out justice to the culprits, the present laws and the ways in which these are implemented. It is imperative that unless there are very compelling reasons, the normal police methods of controlling the students, like lathi charge, firing and other coercive methods, have exactly the

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bOOK REVIEW

M

r Brij Bhardwaj is associated with FICCI CASCADE, a committee set up to fight counterfeiting and smuggling hurting Indian economy. He is a journalist of long standing having worked with The Indian Express and The Hindustan Times covering insurgency affected states like Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and Assam. He has covered war in Afghanistan and developments in Pakistan.

He has also served as a member of the Press Council of India from 1991-1994.

opposite effect on the psyche of the students and bring about a feeling of revulsion in them against the police.

It would not be out of place to state that such revulsion against the law enforcement agencies lasts for a long time, even into their adulthood.

The Stanford Police Department in the University of Stanford, United States, have devised a unique method of dealing with the students, which is worth considering for being adopted in our country. In the 1960s and 1970s, the University faced several instances of violence because of the demonstrations relating to civil rights issues and the Vietnam war.

This led to a massive breakdown in the law and order. The University thereafter recognised the need for a professional Police Department in the campus that went beyond the existing Department’s functioning as security guards. The University would instead of calling in the normal police who would beat up and arrest the students because of rioting, wanted to establish a more sensitive system that involved a deeper understanding of the students. This was not something which could be done easily.

The University hired a person who was very passionate about policing values. He insisted that the Force should not be armed and that the police should look at all students as their “clients” including those they arrested. When arresting students who were drunk, they would tell the students that this was being done for their own safety, transport them to the hospital and send them home when they had recovered. Thus the University had an integrated approach to policing which had adopted a different method of problem solving than the ones done by the normal police.

The examples given are only illustrative. Community policing includes methods which must be adopted to suit particular situations in different places. This should be done in addition to the police reforms as directed by the Supreme Court.

This holistic approach would make it a success and would meet the needs of the society.

For years Indian newspapers and news channels have been awash with reports about Indian money kept in Swiss banks and other tax havens. This gave Mr Brij Bhardwaj the idea about a book on Black Money. He has done full justice to the subject, analysing with facts and figures how black money is created through smuggling and counterfeiting to fund terrorism and how India is struggling to manage this menace.

Title

: BLACK MONEY

Author

: Brij Bhardwaj

Publisher

: Har-Anand Publications

ISBN No

Pvt Ltd, New Delhi : 978-81-241-1732-3

The US based Global Financial Integrity states that between 1948 and 2008 there was an outflow of some US$ 213.2 billion from India as Black Money. The International Monetary Fund estimated the outflow between 1971-1997 as US$ 88 billion. The Indian Government’s White Paper has dismissed these allegations. It states that the total quantum of black money has come down from Rs 23,373 crore in 2006 to just Rs 9,295 crore in 2010. The White Paper concedes that real estate is the biggest generator of black money. However it suggests that most of the black money may have come back to India as FDI flows routed through low tax countries such as Mauritius, Singapore and via hawala and stock market transactions involving participatory notes and global depository receipts. This study by Mr Brij Bhardwaj, warns that black money, counterfeiting and smuggling are hurting national economy and is in turn financing anti-national activities like terrorism, criminal gangs and drug mafias.

A key component of our counter terrorism operations is tracking the financial networks via hawala transactions and black money that fund these attacks. For the professionals as well as the laymen interested in the subject, this is a thoroughly well researched book.

Reviewed by Maj Gen (Dr) GD Bakshi, SM, VSM (retd) Editor-in-chief of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine.

Year of Publication : 2013

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The Beguiling Arms Trade Treaty

T

he recent UN legislation on International treaty to combat arms trade was passed by 154 votes in 193 member UN General Assembly. Ostensibly and beguilingly, the treaty seeks to regulate trade and transfer of weapons so as to constantly monitor its end use in order to prevent war crimes, terrorism or human rights violations. Signatory countries would have to report and verify sales to other countries to a UN body. Most contentiously, the draft treaty prohibits transfer of conventional weapons if it promotes ‘acts of genocide’, ‘crimes against humanity’ and ‘war crimes’. It enjoins that a country contemplating to transfer arms, must evaluate whether it would be used to violate ‘human rights’ or undermine ‘peace and security’. The country, however, most impacted by the ATT is India, being the highest importer of arms in the world. 12 per cent of global arms imports are to India. This is the price we are paying for lack of indigenisation of our arms industry.

N

icaragua abstained from the recent voting on the Arms Trade Treaty on 02 April this year in the UN General Assembly. The abstention has reasons rooted in the past. The clandestine US$ 19 million military aid by the US to Contra rebels to fight the Communist Sandinista regime in the early 80s is well documented.

It was Iran under the aegis of Israel that served as the conduit following a top secret National Security Decision Directive 17 (NSDD-17) to the CIA. This unthinkable happened when the US-Iran and Israel-Iran relations, if not more, were as much inimical.

Nothing has changed In the third week of April 2013, the US Secretary of State John Kerry announced that the US would double its aid to Syrian rebels, ie from US$ 125 million to US$ 250 million, to overthrow the Bashar-al-Assad government. All this while, the US administration has been drumming its emphasis on ‘non-lethal’ supplies, even while citing stiff opposition by Obama’s advisors. In that the spin-doctors evoke President’s concern that ‘lethal’ supplies may fall into the hands of Islamic militants. Such posturing is merely for public consumption.

The truth as reported by New York Times (Arms Airlift to Syria Rebels Expands, With Aid From CIA, dated 24 March 2013) is that the Syrian rebels are being supplied by the CIA through Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, involving some 160 military transport flights. The report further suggests that the CIA has facilitated large weapon procurement by Arab governments from Croatia.

The weapons include M-79 Osa rocket launchers and RBG-6 grenade launchers. There are numerous militias fighting against the Syrian government, which ironically include al-Qaeda linked al-Nusra and the Syrian Islamic front led by Slafis. Analysts attribute many reasons for the US desperation to overthrow the Assad regime by arming the Syrian rebels, the chief being to break the anti-American and anti-Israel, Iran-Syria-Lebanon (Hezabollah) – Palestine (Gaza) axis in West Asia.

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This is an example in being and serves a stark warning as to why India should view the Arms Trade Treaty hammered at the UN Conference (18-28 March 2013) with a fist of salt.

The treaty The recent UN legislation on international treaty to combat arms trade was passed by 154 votes in 193 member UN General Assembly. Ostensibly and beguilingly, the treaty seeks to regulate trade and transfer of weapons so as to constantly monitor its end use in order to prevent war crimes, terrorism or human rights violations. Signatory countries would have to report and verify sales to other countries to a UN body. The other laudable argument behind initiating this legislation was the dire necessity to frame set of rules to govern trade in conventional weapons as in most other areas of world trade. It covers tanks, APCs, large calibre artillery, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships and importantly small arms and light weapons.

the same year the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) by a resolution established an Open Ended Working Group to meet in six sessions between 2009 and 2011. Later in 2009 the UNGA passed a resolution by which the Open Ended Working Group was converted into a Preparatory Committee (PC). The PC had number of deliberations between 2010 and 2012.

Loopholes in the treaty

It is pertinent to note that when the drafting process was initiated in 2006, the Bush administration voted against the resolution.

Even now the Republicans and few Democrats are against the Treaty as they perceive it is a tool to undermine and circumvent the gun laws guaranteed by the Constitution by the Obama dispensation. The NRA (National Rifles Association) a powerful organisation in the US has vowed to stall the ratification of the Treaty in the US Senate. It is imperative for 50 UN members to ratify the Treaty to be put into effect. In theory only those countries which sign on the Treaty will be bound by it.

The ATT in its present form may yet emerge as even more formidable tool to leverage, circumscribe and subordinate India

The draft treaty, which significantly seeks to regulate US$ 70 billion global arms trade, was circulated by USA’s close allies Britain, Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Finland and Japan. There are however countries who smell a rat in this entire business. Some of them like Syria, Iran and North Korea voted against; and

The opponents see too many loopholes in the draft treaty, the most glaring being the absence of the provision of banning sales to ‘armed groups’. They also feel that it is overwhelmingly loaded in favour of arms exporting countries such as the US and the UK.

Most contentiously, the draft treaty prohibits transfer of conventional weapons if it promotes ‘acts of genocide’, ‘crimes against humanity’ and ‘war crimes’. It enjoins that a country contemplating to transfer arms, must evaluate whether it would be used to violate ‘human rights’ or undermine ‘peace and security’. The opponents of the treaty feel that these terms are subjective and are designed to restrict their influence and strategic manoeuvre space in regional and international arena, thus providing further fillip to the developed world.

Exporters versus importers A comparison between the world’s largest exporters and importers of conventional weapons to large extent indicates the stakes of some countries:

Therefore, and rightly so, those opposing the ATT find the treaty to be loaded with ulterior geopolitical and commercial considerations The draft treaty was arrived at after 10 years of deliberations. The precursor of ATT is the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in 2001. It resulted in the adoption of a non-legally binding “Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects”.

The journey towards the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) has been incremental. In 2006, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution by which the views on ATT regarding its feasibility scope and draft, was elicited from the member states. In 2007, more than 100 states submitted their views.

The next year 2008 a Group of Governmental Experts met thrice between February and July. Subsequently in

Note: This is the first time UK does not figure in top five since 1950.

23 countries, which notably include Russia and China, for diplomatic reasons registered their reservations by tactfully abstaining. The latter also include India’s neighbours Myanmar and Sri Lanka which have been vilified by the West dominated international order for human rights record. Probably the undoing of the regimes is that they managed to preserve the integrity of their respective countries in face of onslaughts by most vicious insurgent and terrorist groups.

The chart above explains the voting pattern in the UN General Assemly. While US and the European countries, who constitute more than 60 per cent of the world’s global arm market have voted in favour, their main competitor Russia and China have abstained. Moreover in countries like US and UK there are strict parliamentary controls over arms exports which puts them at disadvantage compared to other exporting countries by restraining their

RSN Singh The writer is former Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) officer and has authored books on strategic and military aspects.

It may be mentioned that 50 per cent of Pakistan’s arms are presently sourced from China. There are also reports of existence of AK-47 manufacturing facility provided by China to the Kachins from where the Maoists in India are also sourcing. The draft treaty fails completely to address the Indian security concerns.

Moreover, India being the largest importer of arms with little indigenous capability will in effect be hamstrung in influencing the security discourse in the region if it were to adopt the treaty

The country, however, most impacted by the ATT is India, being the highest importer of arms in the world.

12 per cent of global arms imports are to India. This is the price we are paying for lack of indigenisation of our arms industry. This has not only negated our potential for extending geopolitical influence but has been manipulating dispensations and influencing governance of the country. In the dirty world of arms trade, politics and arms have a symbiotic relationship

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export potential. The ATT may thus be a device for creating a level playing field.

The sheer volume of arms import by China and India explains the concerns with regard to the motives of the draft treaty, as each of these countries are regional powers in their own right having respective spheres of influence.

In theory only those countries which sign on the Treaty will be bound by it The countries, which oppose feel that the final text of the treaty suffers from imbalance between ‘rights and obligations’ of exporters and importers. It is much short of unambiguity in addressing ‘terrorists and unlawful non-state actors’. No country in the world has been subjected to unremitting terrorism for more than three decades, as a tool of proxy war by its nuclear neighbours, as India. The Indian threat perception with regard to terrorism is therefore acute. The implication of the treaty is that these sponsor states of terrorism will have no accountability and enjoy relative impunity while indulging in clandestine arming of terrorist groups by their respective governments. Terrorist outfits like LeT or Hizbul-Mujahideen will continue to bleed India under the strategic umbrella of their sponsor Pakistan with the same or enhanced degree of deniability.

Indian concerns Brazil and South Africa which are closely aligned to India by virtue of economic groupings like the BRICS, IBSA and also some non-aligned countries failed to appreciate India’s concern and voted in favour of ATT. Some observers also opined that the Indian stand may adversely impact on India’s growing international status and its chances of sharing the high table as ‘Permanent Member of UN Security Council’. The high table, however, cannot be at the cost of security of the country.

Undoubtedly if the ATT was to be universally adopted and religiously adhered to, it would entail reduction in levels of violence in states suffering from internecine war. But this is a utopian proposition. For instance it is known that China has been supplying arms, both indigenous and otherwise, of various categories to insurgent groups including the Maoists.

Even Pakistan sponsored terrorist groups are being equipped with Chinese made arms. It is impractical, rather absurd to expect that China would reveal the details of its arms supplies to Pakistan. It may be mentioned that 50 per cent of Pakistan’s arms are presently sourced from China. There are also reports of existence of AK-47 manufacturing facility provided by China to the Kachins from where the Maoists in India are also sourcing. The draft treaty fails completely to address the Indian security concerns. Moreover, India being the largest importer of arms with little indigenous capability will in effect be hamstrung in influencing the security discourse in the region if it were to adopt the treaty.

Therefore and rightly so, those opposing the ATT find the treaty to be loaded with ulterior geopolitical and commercial considerations.

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Geopolitical mischief There is an element of geopolitical mischief in the treaty, as it vests the exporting countries with the unilateral discretion to assess whether the exported arms would undermine ‘peace and security’. The exporting countries are bound to interpret this as per the vicissitudes of their geopolitical interests. For example, the Americans justify arms supply to Pakistan on the plea that it serves to maintain ‘balance of power’ in an otherwise hostile region. The same provision can be applied to deny weapons to countries like Syria and Iran.

It is for this reason that Syria, Iran and North Korea voted against ATT. These countries constitute the flash-points, nuclear or otherwise, in East Asia and West Asia. Iran feels that the ATT will further debilitate its self-defence capability, which has already suffered much because of sanctions. Iran’s ambassador to UN Mohammad Khazaee said: “Despite serious demands by many states, the requirements of the inherent right of states to self-defence, namely the right to acquire conventional weapons to defend against aggression and preserve their territorial integrity, has not been addressed”. Similarly, Syria which has been in the throes of a civil war for past two years, which has claimed 70,000 lives, feels that the ATT has been designed to cause the collapse of the regime. Its ambassador Bashar Jaafari to UN lamented that the treaty did not allow exceptions for arms transfers in the case of “crimes of aggression’’.

Some observers also opined that the Indian stand may adversely impact on India’s growing international status and its chances of sharing the high table as ‘Permanent Member of UN Security Council’. The high table, however, cannot be at the cost of security of the country Countries which oppose the ATT are also apprehensive that the exporting countries, armed with such provisions are bound to use it arbitrarily without any compensation, monetary or otherwise.

The most mischievous provision is the scope of the manoeuvre space given to the exporting party to consider ‘jointly developed programmes’ or ‘confidence building measures’ to mitigate risks of ‘undermining peace and security’ or ‘human rights violation’. These are beguiling provisions that can result in interference in the geopolitical interests of the importing countries. Moreover, there are no compensatory cost-imposing obligations towards importing countries in case exporting countries decide to suspend or cancel arms export arbitrarily.

Voting pattern The map on next page depicts the countries which voted in favour and against, as also those which decided to abstain due to their security concerns.

The general voting pattern of respective countries in the UN General Assembly reflects their geopolitical and security concerns and suggests the following: The countries in the western-hemisphere have overwhelmingly voted in favour and most of them in

the eastern-hemisphere have either abstained or voted against. It may be reiterated that most arms exporters are in the western-hemisphere. China’s share in exports is only five per cent while it is still dependent on imports for state-of-the-art equipment. Pakistan sources 50 per cent of its equipment from China and North-Korea is entirely dependent on the latter. These two countries are strategic proxies of China and therefore much of the arms supplies to them by China are not transparent. Therefore it did not hurt Pakistan to vote in favour of ATT, as it will continue to benefit from the opacity of arms supplies from China, while still receiving arms from the US, by citing the exigency of latter’s geopolitical interests in Afghanistan, Central Asia and West Asia. North Korea, whose very survivability is predicated on clandestine arms supply from China had no option but to vote against.

The negation or reservation to ATT in the eastern-hemisphere, is because it is in the throes of intense geopolitical flux and contains some of the most incendiary flashpoints, ie the Korean peninsula, Af-Pak region, North-African region, West Asia to include Israel, Iran and Syria. The geopolitical churning unleashed by the so-called Arab Spring has unsettled the entire North African region and West Asia. Syria and Iran probably view the ATT as means by the Western powers to ensure their collapse and that is why they have voted against.

The eastern-hemisphere also has the Indian Ocean, the ocean which is now critical for energy supplies and health of the Western economies. Therefore, the countries in this hemisphere see the ATT as a tool to perpetuate the Western dominance of the IOR. Russia is the main competitor to the US and Europe in the global arms market and probably sees the ATT as a device to curtail its export share and geopolitical

influence. It is for these reasons that it must have decided to abstain.

Conclusion The country, however, most impacted by the ATT is India, being the highest importer of arms in the world.

12 per cent of global arms imports are to India. This is the price we are paying for lack of indigenisation of our arms industry. This has not only negated our potential for extending geopolitical influence but has been manipulating dispensations and influencing governance of the country. In the dirty world of arms trade, politics and arms have a symbiotic relationship.

Countries for which the military industrial complex is vital to the economy have always been desperate to preserve, rather expand their export share in the global arms market. The rivalry between them has been intense.

If one were to go by the WikiLeaks, at one point of time, two sons of the then prime minister were actively involved in lobbying for two separate firms for purchase of fighter aircraft. The money involved in the deal was more than 1,500 crore, a whopping amount in the 70s.

Such is the reach and influence of the arms lobby. It is for this reason that vital procurements are sabotaged even in the closing stages. Indian armed forces have been victim of this phenomenon and continue to be deprived of rudimentary necessities like replacement of MiG-21s and 155 mm artillery guns.

The ATT in its present form may yet emerge as even more formidable tool to leverage, circumscribe and subordinate India.

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internal security

MILITARISATION OF INSURGENCY

Skills and counter-skills T

here is a co-relation between the number of guerrillas in a given area and the number of security forces that would be needed to neutralise them over time.

Chairman Mao Zedong of China and the charismatic Ernesto Che Guevara who used guerrilla tactics to attain their geopolitical objectives put down their methodologies in empirical studies which, later became textbooks in counter-insurgency schools.

These studies brought forth, through converse logic, that it would take as many as fifty security personnel to neutralise one guerrilla. The British, however, managed to achieve a neutralisation of the insurgency on the Malay peninsula with a ratio of 20 security personnel against one guerrilla. This ratio is the product of modern facilities and tactics and new skills adopted by the security forces.

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eports that the Maoists / Naxalites have shot down a helicopter comes as a bit of a shock but it is the very nature of this kind of asymmetrical warfare that the surprising should be taken as the norm. India has long been involved in counter-terror / counter-insurgency operations in various parts of the country in various types of terrain over the entire span of its independent existence from 1947 (beginning with the Naga rebellion in the north-east) where jungle warfare was the hallmark of the conflict.

Area control and area denial were, in hindsight, laughably simple in their content and execution. The ubiquitous bamboo, found anywhere and everywhere in the Naga hills could be fashioned into a weapon not just in the normal bow and arrow format but in sharpened staves buried in jungle pathways that could rip through boots and maim a combatant, severely enough to put him out of action for a long time if the staves were not poisoned.

It has been noticed, and it is in fact part of the logic of every insurgency that if it is to attain its political objectives in toto – the displacement and replacement of the extant nodes of power and control – it will have to, over time, convert itself from a guerrilla force with hit-and-run tactics into a force capable of capturing and holding ground in very much the conventional military way Even the adventures of Robinson Crusoe were nowhere as

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exciting as real-life jungle warfare that Indian security forces – the Indian Army, the Central Reserve Police Force and a host of other Central Police Organisations – that have had to be created to deal with the very special kind of warfare that terrorism and insurgency have engendered.

Jungle warfare skills Steeped in mores and practices that had been in existence for centuries the Nagas put their skills in jungle combat, created for inter-tribal warfare, to good use but through trial and error security forces learned how to detect such booby traps, disarm them and be able to maintain a momentum in hot pursuit in jungle terrain that soon came to match the skills of the aboriginal practitioners.

Over the years, the lesson learned began to pay off and eventually, the Naga insurgency has been brought to a point where it has had to come to terms (not altogether satisfactory at present) with the central government.

Particularly disconcerting among the Naga tactics was the heavy log attached to a noose fashioned from local creepers. When a person stepped onto the noose it would close around the leg and unbalance a log of heavy wood carefully camouflaged.

The log would fall to the floor and the man would be jerked a dozen feet into the air. By the time colleagues cut him down and made sure that there were no more booby traps along the jungle trail the guerrillas would vanish.

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

Cecil Victor The writer has covered all wars with Pakistan as War Correspondent and reported from the conflict zones in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in South East Asia as well as from Afghanistan. He is author of India: The Security Dilemma.

Manpower intensive warfare Over the years, through personal experience and the experiences of other armed forces involved in counter-insurgency operations by guerrilla groups like the Mau Mau in Kenya who, under Jomo Kenyatta, were fighting the British for their freedom, it became clear that there is a co-relation between the number of guerrillas in a given area and the number of security forces that would be needed to neutralise them over time. Chairman Mao Zedong of China and the charismatic Ernesto Che Guevara who used guerrilla tactics to attain their geopolitical objectives put down their methodologies in empirical studies which, later became textbooks in counter-insurgency schools. These studies brought forth, through converse logic, that it would take as many as fifty security personnel to neutralise one guerrilla.

Governments that have had to fight terrorism and insurgency have, by and large, worked on the basis of the above ratio. The British, however, managed to achieve a neutralisation of the insurgency on the Malay peninsula with a ratio of 20 security personnel against one guerrilla.

This ratio is the product of modern facilities and tactics and new skills adopted by the security forces.

Craft of ambush Given this background and the wealth of experience that India has gained in counter-insurgency operations over the years it is

exasperating to see the Home Ministry begin operations in new sectors with both inadequately trained and insufficient numbers of those deployed to counter the “red menace” which Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has described as the most serious threat to internal security. This became obvious when 76 personnel of the CRPF were ambushed at Dantewada in central India a couple of years ago. There have been sporadic increments in security personnel in the several Central Police Organisations involved in internal security duties. Trained troops should first be made aware of the lay of the land in which they are to be deployed with special accent on spaces where ambushes can be laid against oneself and where the most effective ambushes can be set to get as many insurgents as possible.

The art and craft of laying an ambush is a combination of achieving surprise and managing to ensure that the enemy is bunched together and caught in a crossfire from men hidden in a semi-circle or L formation. That the one in Dantewada was sprung to perfection showed in the number of security forces killed.

Clearly, they were unable to execute one of the actions recommended by military textbooks – counter-attack frontally or try a bypass to get behind the entrenched ambusher.

Dog squads Ironically, the column of CRPF personnel were on an “area domination mission” which

essentially means sanitisation of a given area to ensure free movement and safety from attack in that it should result in the Maoists / Naxalites moving away from the area. What happened in Dantewada was that the CRPF patrol walked into the area and out again along the same route. Nearly 1,000 extremists were waiting for them on the way back. I have noticed that there is a marked reluctance on the part of the security forces to include dogs as part of their force. This is true of the army and all paramilitary forces even though they have conducted studies that prove the efficacy of the animal to see and detect human beings in the dark from a distance. The reluctance is seen in the inadequate number of dog squads even after decades of setting up breeding and training facilties by the Army, the Border Security Force and the CRPF. That there were no dogs in the CRPF patrol at Dantewada is obvious from the fact that the jawans had no idea that they were walking into a trap. A dog would have given warning of “something in the bushes” well before the party entered the “killing zone”. Many would have been able to fight their way out of the ambush after inflicting greater damage to the attackers (only eight Naxalites were killed in the return of fire by the CRPF). These are not “new tactics” and battle drills. These are procedures as old as warfare itself. Hence the suspicion that the men were inducted into the battlezone after inadequate training and incorrect means of executing their duties.

Given this background and the wealth of experience that India has gained in counter-insurgency operations over the years it is exasperating to see the Home Ministry begin operations in new sectors with both inadequately trained and insufficient numbers of those deployed to counter the “red menace” which Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has described as the most serious threat to internal security

Before the insurgency takes on other dimensions the government of India needs to re-vamp its counter-insurgency / counter-terror network by improving its intelligence gathering systems; giving the security forces greater flexibility by improving the manpower deployed for such operations (to acquire a favourable manpower ratio) that will slowly but surely reduce the area of operations of the red brigade in various parts of the country

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

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internal security

MILITARISATION OF INSURGENCY

Dogs, for example, are known to be able to execute military tasks ranging from patrol to sniffing out explosives, guard duties and giving chase to intruders / infiltrators. They are a totally underutilised asset in the Indian scheme of things. As the blast outside the Delhi High Court premises a couple of years ago showed that the sniffer dogs were brought in after the blast had taken place. A sweep of all areas known to attract crowds of people (as is being done in the railways) should be a mandatory part of the counter-insurgency / counter-terror operations.

Shooting helicopters Returning to the incidents of shooting of Indian Air Force helicopters by the Maoists / Naxalites, this too is not a new phenomenon. It is part of the normal drill imparted to infantry units to try and interfere with enemy air activity in their immediate vicinity. Troops are given (or should have been given) training how it could be possible for soldiers on the ground to either shoot down or inflict damage on aircraft and helicopters engaged in strafing them.

For aircraft and helicopters traversing the battlefield the standard operating procedure is for the soldiers on the ground to take aim at the airborne platform then pivot the rifle to a point about 100 meters ahead of the aircraft and opening fire in the rapid mode. The reason why this is done is that if the man on the ground fires at an aircraft where it is, the bullet will miss because the aircraft would have moved ahead. Hence he should shoot ahead of the aircraft to enable the bullet to fly into the flight path of the aircraft if it is within rifle or heavy machine gun range.

Recently, reports have come in that they are now experimenting with rockets. It needs to be remembered that China has distributed the technology of making multiple rocket launchers with four, six and twelve barrels that can be dismantled and carried by three or four persons to all insurgent groups under its influence In warfare aircraft have been hit by such unconventional methods.

Some of them have managed to return to base riddled with bullets.

Some crashed enroute. Some that

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have ingested bullets into the engine have left trails of black smoke, much to the delight of the shooters on the ground. Some have crashed on site.

Helicopters are more vulnerable than fixed wing aircraft because a shot on its rotor blade could splinter it and thus cause an imbalance in the angle of air displacement causing the helicopter to go out of control and crashland. This too has been borrowed by the insurgents from military handbooks.

Militarisation of insurgency It has been noticed and it is in fact part of the logic of every insurgency, that if it is to attain its political objectives in toto – the displacement and replacement of the extant nodes of power and control – it will have to, over time, convert itself from a guerrilla force with hit-and-run tactics into a force capable of capturing and holding ground in very much the conventional military way.

A study of the evolution of the military capabilities of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) showed how it used its military means to achieve political ends. Among the first of its achievements was the radical change it brought about in improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to make it impervious to normal detection devices like metal detectors.

By packing the IEDs in wood the LTTE used an abundant supply from the forests it controlled to surprise government troops.

It had converted some of the boats it had acquired into marine IEDs that could be exploded by ramming into a naval vessel. During the final sweep by Sri Lanka government troops through its strongholds, it was discovered that the LTTE was working on submarines to be able to dominate the seas around the island-nation. Its air force had bombed airfields near Colombo indicating the level of sophistication it had achieved in the creation of military equipment for its war of liberation.

Indian red menace Much the same process is underway in the Indian context. The Maoists and Naxalites have already learned how to neutralise the so-called

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

“mine protected vehicles“ acquired from South Africa. It has used remote controlled devices to explode up to 50 kg of explosives to destroy these vehicles killing or badly wounding all the occupants. The vehicles are built to withstand only up to 15 kg of explosives.

Recently, reports have come in that they are now experimenting with rockets. It needs to be remembered that China has distributed the technology of making multiple rocket launchers with four, six and twelve barrels that can be dismantled and carried by three or four persons to all insurgent groups under its influence.

Before the insurgency takes on other dimensions the government of India needs to re-vamp its counter-insurgency / counter-terror network by improving its intelligence gathering systems; giving the security forces greater flexibility by improving the manpower deployed for such operations (to acquire a favourable manpower ratio) that will slowly but surely reduce the area of operations of the red brigade in various parts of the country. It is said that Karnataka has largely been rid of the Naxal menace. It is from there that the state governments and the Central Police Forces should reap the acquired advantages and execute counter-insurgency operations in ever-widening circles so as to retrieve control of large areas of Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, Chhattisgarh and West Bengal where the Maoists / Naxals are holding sway.

Once government forces are able to show effective control and area domination there will be a whittling away of local support to the red brigade which can then be enlarged using traditional counter-insurgency logic.

Despite being able to effectively use landmines and IEDs and attack vulnerable helicopters the Indian insurgents have not reached that level of militarisation to be able to declare a “liberated zone” with any level of credibility. If, indeed, there are such zones they should be identified and engaged before their military capabilities are enhanced to a level where “no go” areas become permanent structures.

Diverse fringe programmes add to exhibiting and visiting experience

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he 16th edition of Secutech was held from 24 – 26 April 2013 at Taipei Nangang Exhibition Center, Taiwan and attracted 25,807 visitors from 100 countries and regions. Organised by Messe Frankfurt New Era Business Media Ltd, the three-day show is an annual international exhibition and conference for the electronic security, info security, fire & safety sectors. This year, 510 exhibitors from 19 countries and regions displayed products and services which included surveillance, access control and integrated security solutions.

Commenting on the show, Mr Parson Lee, the organiser’s Managing Director said: “Secutech is a trade event that security industry people don’t want to miss. I am happy that the show attracted visitors from nearby countries and regions such as China, Japan and Malaysia, as well as Russia and South Africa which are far away from Taiwan.” He added that the top 10 visiting countries and regions outside Taiwan were Japan, China, Malaysia, Korea, Singapore, US, Thailand, Hong Kong, Philippines and Indonesia.

Axxonsoft Asia Pte Ltd, a video surveillance and security solutions provider from Singapore has exhibited at Secutech for the past three years. Mr Durairaj Gireraj, the company’s Asia Pacific Director said: “Our target customers are not only from Taiwan and Asia and Secutech really gives us exposure to international visitors. As a leading brand in the industry, we see the need to be at this show.”

Chinese surveillance manufacturer, Zhejiang Dahua Technology Co Ltd, also uses Secutech as a platform to meet customers.

The company’s Vice President, Mr Michael Chen said: “This is the meeting point where we mingle with existing customers, meet new customers and learn new trends.” This year, Zhejiang Dahua Technology met visitors from Austria, Israel, Malaysia, Russia, Singapore, Turkey and the UAE. Having exhibited at the show for the past six years, Mr Chen is very positive about the market as he believes security and safety is important for government and individuals. He added: “I am happy with the fair and will participate again next year.”

In order to help exhibitors expand their businesses, the organiser of Secutech arranged business matching services. One of the participating exhibitors was Chuan Yen Tech from Taiwan. Mr Dennis Chang, the company’s President said: “The business matching programme connected us with a professional buyer from Brazil. He has great interest in one of our firefighting products. I think it is a good medium to establish new contacts.” As an annual industry event, Secutech offers comprehensive sourcing opportunities. To bring more professional visitors to the show, Secutech organised buyer delegations from Europe and Japan, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey and Vietnam. In addition, “Star Buyer” meeting rooms were available for buyers to hold private meetings.

Vietnamese visitor Mr Tran Dinh Nghiem, Director for TDN Co Ltd was able to find products at Secutech. “I am currently working on a smart city project in Hanoi and I came here to look for security solutions including access control and fire alarm for my project,” he expained. “I have met 15 suppliers and I am confident that I can find good suppliers for my project.” First time visitor from South Africa, Ms Jenny Reid, was impressed by exhibition’s scale and product quality. She said: “It is amazing how big the show is and it is nice to see quality products here.” Ms Reid is the Director of iFacts, as well as President of the Security Association of South Africa.

“I will definitely consider visiting Secutech next year as I think the relationships we have formed here are long lasting,” she said.

Mr Charles Chen, Product Manager for Taiwanese company Gorilla Technology Inc, visits Secutech every year to keep up-to-date with the latest products and services. Commenting on the HD SDI Demonstration Hall, he said: “I think it is a good idea to set up this demonstration area, then I can compare the performance of various products.” One of the show attractions was the Secutech Award display area which was visited by many buyers who were invited to vote for the best IP camera and NVR camera. The winning IP cameras were produced by Dahua, Everfocus, Lilin, Panasonic, Sony and Vivotek while the winning NVR cameras were from NUUO, Qnap and Synology. Commenting on the award display area, first time visitor Mr Nidhal Jerbi, Manager for Tunisian company Multicom said: “The display provides different product information and also the ranking so I can compare and choose the product I want.”

Secutech 2013 offered 22 seminars with 131 sessions and the topics included surveillance, security components, fire & safety as well as info security. This year’s highlight was Global Digital Surveillance Forum (GDSF), which was presented together with Security 50, the top 50 industry company ranking based on revenue. Surveillance specialists from several leading brands gave advice on CCTV upgrades, an upcoming challenge for the industry.

Dr Steve Ma, Executive Vice President for Vivotek, Taiwan, was one of the GDSF speakers. He said: “This year we introduced our panoramic camera at GDSF as the event offers a good opportunity to interact with the audience.” Commenting on the Security 50 ranking, he added: “It is an important index for visitors to know our position in the industry. It is our pleasure to be on the ranking every year.” Another speaker, Mr Sunny Kong, Director of Sales for Milestone Systems Pte Ltd from Singapore said that participating at GDSF helped attract more visitors to the booth. He explained: “It is a platform for us to meet with our partners and end users. It is important to show our IP video management software so that users can experience and better understand our products.”

The next edition of Secutech will be held from 19 – 21 March 2014 at the Taipei Nangang Exhibition Center. For more details about the show, please visit www.secutech.com, or contact Ms Lois Lee at +886 2 2659 9080 ext 358, or by email at lois.lee@newera.messefrankfurt.com.

maoist menace

TECH ADVANTAGE?

Gadgets and Indian Security

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arious groups subscribing to the Maoist ideology have their pockets of influence in 20 states across the country and that over 2,000 police station areas in 223 districts in these states are partially or substantially affected by the menace.

Maoists have come up with a new modus operandi to attack security forces by planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in trees. Foliage penetration is a key problem in Anti-Maoist operations in dense jungles. The writer highlights some possible solutions.

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he Maoist Movement in India has experienced a fascinating journey encountering numerous organisational upheavals and conflicts of thoughts and ideas. The Maoist (or left-wing extremism, as the government likes to call it) influence has gradually extended over large parts of the country. Addressing the police chiefs of the country on 15 September 2009, the prime minister said that “left-wing extremism is, perhaps, the gravest internal security threat our country faces.” The home minister, speaking at the same gathering, stated that

Maoists have come up with a new modus operandi to attack security forces by planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in trees prompting the CRPF to train its personnel with the help of army in detecting and defusing them. “The IEDs are kept on such trees which have thick foliage thereby concealing their presence. Such IEDs bring about deadly injuries on the head and upper torso of police personnel. Similar to the precision strikes of the LTTE in its battle against Sri Lankan soldiers before being wiped out. It has become a “double trouble” for the troops as they now have to be alert about explosives embedded in the ground as well as on trees. Hit by the

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May 2013 Defence AND security alert

The writer is the Technical Director for System Controls Technology Solutions Pvt Ltd., Bangalore. He is responsible for design, development, deployment and sustainment of solutions.

He brings his vast experience in the domain of Electro-Optics and Instrumentation. He is the recipient of Aeronautical Society of India (AESI) award for his contribution towards indigenisation of Aeronautical equipment. Some of the key systems developed for Spacecrafts and Aircraft under his guidance were infrared scanning systems, hot wire anemometers, Fibreoptic gyros (FOG) m 3 axis magnetometers, data acquisition system for temperature, pressure acceleration etc.

impact of these IEDs, the CRPF has recently tied up with the army to train its personnel in detecting and defusing them.

With advanced technologies like foliage detection it is possible to counter the plans of Maoists. Government should speed up the process in more encouragement towards indigenous production of these gadgets through Indian R&D institutions, public sector and private sector industries.

Courtesy: www.tester.co.uk various groups subscribing to the Maoist ideology had their pockets of influence in 20 states across the country and that over 2,000 police station areas in 223 districts in these states were partially or substantially affected by the menace.

K Kanakaraju

Object detection along with accurate target identification in battlefield environment is important.

Ground vehicles and objects can be detected with airborne or satellite mounted radars and cameras.

However obscurants such as trees, foliage or camouflaged will degrade image clarity. Long wave radars can penetrate foliage at the expense of resolution. Presently a new state-of-the-art laser imaging radar is being developed with innovative software high resolution 3D images can be generated from systems mounted on aircraft platform of military vehicles heavily covered or camouflaged. The sensor system generates short laser pulses and receives return signals to measure time of flight of the object. The receiver is a focal plane array of avalanche photo diodes with independent processing electronics to measure distance of each element of object.

With proper optics coupled to sensor system 3D imaging can be obtained.

Similar to the precision strikes of the LTTE in its battle against Sri Lankan soldiers before being wiped out. It has become a “double trouble” for the troops as they now have to be alert about explosives embedded in the ground as well as on trees. Hit by the impact of these IEDs, the CRPF has recently tied up with the army to train its personnel in detecting and defusing them Theory of operation is angle-angle time of flight range data points logged from various direction look angle of sensor optics system.

These data points are combined to view the surface feature of object through different obscuration ports. Large number of images collected are combined with image processing to create high resolution 3D image of the foliage object. In operational environment a ground location identified with suspected object as GPS location is logged on to aircraft mounted sensor and tracks the location as aircraft hovers over the region from sufficiently high altitude and collects large number of images.

Onboard electronics collects raw 3D formats and fast image registration algorithms provide high resolution clear images. As the sensor FOV is small due to complexity of sensor and

electronics elements a high speed risley prism scanner is attached to optics system to cover wide area of object. 32X32 focal plane array with 10 milliradians resolution provided 7.5 cm resolution of 200 meters object.

Risley prisms rotating in counter rotating direction create high resolution scan patterns to image angle-angle time of flight measurements. Laser detector array transmit /receive optics and laser source assembly is shown in the figure above. Laser source used is microchip technology passively Q switched Nd:YAG laser to generate short pulses of 300 pico seconds at a pulse rate of 16 Khz at wavelength of 532 nm.

As the terror activities are causing more problems for many countries around the world many R&D institutions including our organisation System Controls is contributing in the development of latest gadgets to counter terrorism.

With advanced technologies like foliage detection it is possible to counter the plans of Maoists.

Government should speed up the process in more encouragement towards indigenous production of these gadgets through Indian R&D institutions, public sector and private sector industries

Ground vehicles and objects can be detected with airborne or satellite mounted radars and cameras

Reference: Internet, E-Journals.

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

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defence preparedness

INvINCIBLE DETERRENT

India’s Brahmaastra: The BrahMos W

ith a 290 km range and a 2.9 Mach speed, the BrahMos missile is presently inducted in the Indian Army and in the Indian Navy (INS Rajput and INS Ranvir). The submarine launch version of BrahMos is also being developed. This would enhance the Indian Navy’s ability to effectively conduct forward presence missions and also enhance their crisis response ability. The cruise missile can overwhelm any missile defence in the world.

The supersonic speed might not require the BrahMos to carry heavy warheads as due to high kinetic energy and the incendiary effect of residual fuel they could cause serious destruction even with lighter warheads. The 40th Artillery Division is incharge of the missile. The three BrahMos missile regiments raised so far have been deployed against Pakistan in the western sector.

In October, 2011, government of India gave a green signal to the deployment of BrahMos cruise missiles in the Arunachal Pradesh borders against China. India also planned to provide the BrahMos to Vietnam to strengthen its position in the South China Sea as a component of its “Look East” policy. China sees the transfer of BrahMos missile to Vietnam as a strategy of encirclement around China, a similar strategy which the Chinese have implemented against India.

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he PJ-10 BrahMos is a joint venture of New Delhi and Moscow named after the Brahmaputra and the Moskva rivers. With a 290 km range and a 2.9 Mach speed, the missile has been a much awaited relief for the Indian military in the field of cruise missile development. According to Ria Novosti, a Russian newspaper, the cruise missile can overwhelm any missile defence in the world. The ramjet engine in the missile would enable the missile to achieve a supersonic speed.

The present The missile would enhance both land, aerial and sea based deterrent. The missile is presently inducted in the Indian Army and in the Indian Navy (INS Rajput and INS Ranvir). This would enhance the Indian Navy’s ability to effectively conduct forward presence missions and also enhance their crisis response ability. The BrahMos cruise missile is an anti-ship missile. The supersonic speed might not require the BrahMos to carry heavy warheads as due to high kinetic energy and the incendiary effect of residual fuel they could cause serious destruction even with lighter warheads. The missile it

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is reported can be cold launched from Vertical Launch Systems for ground and ship based roles.

After the testing of BrahMos by India, Pakistan too tested its nuclear capable Ground Launch Cruise Missile, the Babur in order to prevent the stability-instability paradox in the region from being jeopardised The BrahMos has given the Indian Army’s Artillery Division a much awaited relief. The 40th Artillery Division is incharge of the missile. In October, 2011, government of India gave a green signal to the deployment of BrahMos cruise missiles in the Arunachal Pradesh borders against China. The three BrahMos missile regiments raised so far had been deployed against Pakistan in the western sector. The cruise missile is expected to reach up to the Tibet Autonomous Region.

The BrahMos would not only be able to hit land targets but also sea based targets without having to make any change in its hardware. The Indian military planned to build silos and road mobile platforms in order to enhance its survivability. The

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

submarine launch version of BrahMos is also being developed. India plans to use the BrahMos as a precision guided weapon or as ‘smart weapons’.

The inertial guidance or INS/GPS is provided at the midcourse phase against ship targets and land targets respectively. However, for terminal guidance, active / passive radar can be used. Though many analysts claim that it is the stealth technology in the missile which would enable the missile to evade a missile defence, this is partly true. It is actually the supersonic speed which would make any defence system impossible to intercept the missile. The missile would carry conventional payloads which include High Explosives SAP and sub-munitions. Sub-munitions would further enable the missile to evade the missile defence systems due to its low radar signatures.

India also planned to provide the BrahMos to Vietnam to strengthen its position in the South China Sea as a component of its “Look East” policy.

In fact the range of the BrahMos has been restricted to 290 km to comply with the MTCR norms so that the missile can be sold to friendly foreign countries.

Debalina Chatterjee The writer is Research Associate at the Centre for Air Power Studies, Western Air Command. She is MA in International Studies from Stella Maris College, Chennai and PG Diploma in International Humanitarian Law from NALSAR, Hyderabad, India.

Pakistan reacts After the testing of BrahMos by India, Pakistan too tested its nuclear capable Ground Launch Cruise Missile, the Babur in order to prevent the stability-instability paradox in the region from being jeopardised.

The Babur is reported to have a higher range than the BrahMos. Its range is 470 miles which means that the missile need not be launched from near the borders and was built with Chinese assistance. Defence Analyst Usmaan Shabbir had stated that the Babur could be intercepted by airborne interceptors and successfully shot down.

China reacts The fourth regiment of the BrahMos would be India’s first “offensive tactical missile” deployed against China. China has been worried about the BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles. This is because, the BrahMos is claimed to be faster and more sophisticated than even the US Tomahawk cruise missile.

India also planned to provide the BrahMos to Vietnam to strengthen its position in the South China Sea as a component of its “Look East” policy China is also annoyed at the fact that India had offered the missile to Vietnam as part of India’s strategy of encirclement against China. China had made it clear that it would not allow any other power to dominate the East China Sea. China sees the transfer of BrahMos missile to Vietnam as a strategy of encirclement around China, a similar strategy which the Chinese have implemented against India. It should be noted that the BrahMos

cannot be intercepted by any given missile defence in the world given its ability to be manoeuvrable and also because of its stealth technology as has been mentioned above.

The missile would enhance both land, aerial and sea based deterrent. The missile is presently inducted in the Indian Army and in the Indian Navy

The technical limitation The supersonic cruise missile has only 290 km of range due to the fact that both India and Russia had to abide by the provisions of the Missile Technology Control Regime. A higher range could have given India a better chance to strike even deeper into enemy’s territory.

The future India has plans of developing the BrahMos hypersonic cruise missile. For this there is a plan to fit in scramjet engines in order to give them hypersonic speeds with longer ranges.

There could be an improvement on trajectory design and the missile could be modified to fit in miniaturised warheads.

It has been reported that the INS Teg would be fitted with the BrahMos. It is reported that INS Chakra would be fitted with BrahMos. The submarine launched version of the BrahMos would be a step ahead for the Indian Navy to acquiring of blue water capabilities as the submarines would allow the Navy to take the enemy by surprise which might not be possible in warships. The Sukhois are now being upgraded with stealth technology and upgraded radars. It is reported that the Sukhoi would carry the missile on a centre fuselage pylon initially. Fitting the BrahMos in the Sukhois would not only enable the missile to solve tactical purposes but even strategic purposes as the missiles could then travel to a greater range.

It is actually the supersonic speed which would make any defence system impossible to intercept the missile. The missile would carry conventional payloads which include High Explosives SAP and sub-munitions. Sub-munitions would further enable the missile to evade the missile defence systems due to its low radar signatures

China is also annoyed at the fact that India had offered the missile to Vietnam as part of India’s strategy of encirclement against China

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neighbourwatch

PERENNIAL STRIFE

Sri Lanka: Counterproductive H

UNHRC Resolution

armony within the various ethnic groups in a country is a pre-requisite for the proper functioning of the state and institutions. It helps to promote, build comprehensive peace process between governments and their people.

Instead of International intervention, a local intervention should be promoted taking into consideration the idea of shared identities. Finally, honest and continuous effort is required for evolution of a satisfactory relationship between Singhalese and Tamils. There is all possibility that the UNHRC 2013 resolution can turn into a counterproductive move for the reconciliation process in Sri Lanka. Government too needs to understand that the speedy implementation of the various recommendations and policies aimed at reforms for the Tamils, in turn, is also meant for the larger good of the nation. A house divided against itself cannot stand for long.

S

ri Lanka’s war nightmares, after recently won war against the Tamil Separatist militants, are yet to end. The war has ended but its aftermaths are yet to be dealt in a positive manner. The country is facing charges of human rights violations and war crimes in the war zone. The western countries want Sri Lanka to step up its effort to complete various post-war reconciliation initiatives. However the process of advising Sri Lanka has taken a sharp political turn, as United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) has passed a resolution against Sri Lanka to implement its actions of reconciliation. The resolution is recommendatory and not enforcing, it still makes the island nation liable to UN strictures. The western countries, have certainly been unable to grasp the reality on the ground, as well as the ascent of nationalistic sentiments in Sri Lanka against external supervision of its internal issues. There is all possibility that the UNHRC 2013 resolution can turn into a counterproductive move for the reconciliation process in Sri Lanka.

UNHRC resolution and its impact in Sri Lanka The channel 4 TV has come up with new photographs of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) supremeo Prabhakaran’s son Balachandran Prabhakaran, sitting in a towel and a short, not comfortable,

72

yet alive in two of the photographs.

The final photograph shows him lying on the field with bullet wounds on his body. The channel claims photographs depict a horrible aspect of war – war crimes; as it testifies to the fact that boy was not killed in course of war, but was appropriated and killed by Sri Lankan Army. Digital image analysis expert has given clean chit to the images, confirming it to be ‘accurate representation of the events depicted.’ The picture created a huge uproar among various western nations calling into question Sri Lanka’s claim in this matter.

On the line of last year’s events, United States brought a fresh resolution to the UNHRC March 2013 session, in a bid to force Sri Lanka to do more on the accountability issue.

The UNHRC passed the resolution on March 21, 2013 with 25 countries voting in favour, 13 against and with eight abstentions. According to US resolution, Sri Lanka has not addressed the issue of accountability comprehensively, which is pre-requisite to reconciliation and investigating the war crime allegations. Similarly, all necessary steps were not taken to fulfill its relevant obligations and commitment to initiate credible and independent actions to ensure justice, equity, accountability and reconciliation for all Tamils.

Earlier, Sri Lanka in its Universal

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

Periodic Review (UPR) report submitted at the 14th session of the UPR in Geneva from October 22-November 5, 2012, clearly mentioned their progress on the IDPs, which according to the officials were the primary obligation taken for the further reconciliation process.

In fact 99 UN member countries applauded the action taken by the Sri Lankan government to resettle IDPs and bring development in the conflict areas. US, Britain and Canada called on the Sri Lankan government to improve the remaining concerns, but showed satisfaction on the work done. Sri Lanka also supported 20 recommendations made during the UPR session, which were mainly related to the protection and promotion of human rights.

With the last batch of 1,186 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), resettled in their villages in Mullaitivu, Northern Province on 24 September 2012, the government has resettled a total of 2,42,449 IDPs. It also marked the final phase of resettlement and there are no more IDPs or IDP camps in Sri Lanka. Apart from IDPs, government has reintegrated 11,375 former Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) cadres into society. Less than 200 cadres are left which are soon to be reintegrated.

Government has also increased the amount provided to the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Prison Reforms to provide loans to the rehabilitated

Gaurav Dixit The writer is an independent observer on peace and conflict in South Asia.

former LTTE cadres from LKR 300 million to LKR 500 million. However, issues related to demilitarisation of North, investigation of cases of disappearances and abductions and Power devolution in Northern and Eastern provinces are yet to be finalised. These are both political as well as security issues, which have to be handled with immense responsibity and any fast and lackadaisical response from government could be devastating. The pro-Eelam sentiment is still prevalent in various local groups and Tamil diaspora.

They might use the opportunity to re-initiate a political, if not military war against Sri Lanka.

The US resolution at UNHRC against Sri Lanka on the issue of human rights violation will not be welcomed back in Sri Lanka. UN, which is marred by the allegations of being a failure during the final stage of war, will be morally incompetent to press Sri Lanka to address the questions raised in the resolution. According to Internal Review Panel (IRP) Report on Sri Lanka, UN's actions and inactions in Sri Lanka in 2009 or known as Charles Petrie Report clearly mentioned the failure of UN system to meet its responsibilities to protect civilians during the final days of war The US resolution at UNHRC against Sri Lanka on the issue of human rights violation will not be welcomed back in Sri Lanka. UN, which is marred by the allegations of being a failure during the final stage of war, will be morally incompetent to press Sri Lanka to address the questions raised in the resolution. According to Internal Review Panel (IRP) Report on Sri Lanka, UN’s actions and inactions in Sri Lanka in 2009

or known as Charles Petrie Report clearly mentioned the failure of UN system to meet its responsibilities to protect civilians during the final days of war. It endured worldwide opprobrium for the international organisation assigned to protect Human Rights.

UNHRC resolution: nationalism

Rise

The country is yet to come out of the post-war phase. A political transformation for a future development of the region will depend on cultural and political assimilation of Tamils. External efforts and strategies for cultural and political reconciliation of Tamil minorities must comply with the ground realities in order to contribute in resolution of the conflict

of

The last year’s resolution against Sri Lanka in UNHRC session in Geneva was summarily rejected by the Sri Lankans.

Contrary to expectations, it played negative role in fuelling nationalistic fervour among Sri Lankans. In Sri Lanka, the UNHRC resolution against the nation was seen more in terms of politicalisation of human rights by the western nations, than a meaningful attempt to resolve Sri Lankan ethnic crisis. Sri Lankans took it as a challenge to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a democratic country.

The resolution nurtured anti-Tamil sentiments among majority Sinhalese, especially against pro-Tamil political parties. The problem, herein, lay with the question of accountability on the side of Sri Lankan state, which was seen by western nations, especially US and its allies, as not ‘meaningfully’ addressed. However, Sri Lankans felt that accountability issue either dealt or not in a meaningful way by Sri Lankan state as purely an internal issue of Sri Lanka and no country has right to intervene in its matter.

In fact 99 UN member countries applauded the action taken by the Sri Lankan government to resettle IDPs and bring development in the conflict areas. US, Britain and Canada called on the Sri Lankan government to improve the remaining concerns, but showed satisfaction on the work done.

Sri Lanka also supported 20 recommendations made during the UPR session, which were mainly related to the protection and promotion of human rights

As the Sri Lanka President’s special human rights envoy Mahinda Samarasinghe speaking at the UNHRC 2012 session warned, “This resolution if adopted will not add value to the implementation process in

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PERENNIAL STRIFE

Sri Lanka; on the contrary it may well be counterproductive.” He further said that the public sentiment can affect the whole process of reconciliation and rehabilitation after the resolution. It happened as feared, resolution gave Mahinda Rajapaksa a popular image, he lacked since end of Eelam War IV, legitimising his actions on implementing Lesson Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) recommendations.

Majority of Sri Lankans unanimously supported Rajapaksa’s proposal for homegrown solution to its ethnic problems instead of following international recommended guidelines. Critical issue like 13th amendment aimed at devolution of power to provincial level was left unresolved by the government citing lack of political consensus.

UNHRC 2013: World repeats the same mistake The UNHRC 2013 resolution against Sri Lanka might again press the same nationalistic sentiments among Sri Lankans. It might also give President Rajapaksa the popularity he has lost after the impeachment of Chief Justice of Sri Lanka. Resolution against Sri Lanka will be seen as a move against the victory of the long fought Tamil War. The issue is deeply related to nationalistic sentiment of Sri Lankans. The whole UNHRC episode might again cause a temporary setback to reconciliation process, as it could add to the existing anti-western and anti-Tamil sentiments among the Sri Lankans.

It might also increase the chances of reverse escalation of peace process.

External intervention and conflict resolution The external interventions for a potential conflict resolution depend on various factors – intervening actors, timing and regional social and political environment. UN and the US both have lost their legitimacy to be an external force to recommend human rights norms and values to Sri Lanka. UN has lost its legitimacy due to inappropriate handling of the Sri Lankan war as well as various resolution issues right from Israel Palestine dispute to Kashmir issue and even the North Korea crisis.

The US is itself marred by allegations

74

of war crimes and human rights violation in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Their attempt to enforce human rights values in Sri Lanka would be seen as a symbolic gesture and intervening into the internal issue of a country.

However, issues related to demilitarisation of North, investigation of cases of disappearances and abductions and Power devolution in Northern and Eastern provinces are yet to be finalised. These are both political as well as security issues, which have to be handled with immense responsibity As far as timing and regional social and political environment is concerned, the country is yet to come out of the post-war phase. A political transformation for a future development of the region will depend on cultural and political assimilation of Tamils. External efforts and strategies for cultural and political reconciliation of Tamil minorities must comply with the ground realities in order to contribute in resolution of the conflict. External intervention must consider the importance of social actors along with political actors.

The rise of conflict in Sri Lanka was due to ethnic differences; therefore unless and until the dynamics of conflict based on alienation and detestation is sorted out the process of consistent reconciliation would be impossible. After all reconciliation is both a political as well as a social process. Harmony within the various ethnic groups in a country is a pre-requisite for the proper functioning of the state and institutions. It helps to promote, build comprehensive peace process between government and their people. Instead of international intervention, a local intervention should be promoted taking into consideration the idea of shared identities. Finally, honest and continuous effort is required for evolution of a satisfactory relationship between Singhalese and Tamils.

The international community instead of pulling out resolution against Sri Lanka should all be rooted for the government efforts to bring peace and justice for the Tamils in Sri Lanka through proper negotiations and dialogues. The

May 2013 Defence AND security alert

TM

international community could provide excellent expertise and monetary support to enhance the whole process of implementations of various reconciliation recommendations. It in turn could be a partner and a stakeholder in the development process. Meanwhile UN needs to mend its own house so that no further human rights violation goes unnoticed and unanswered by any party in Sri Lanka. The ultimate aim of UNHRC is to charter its responsibility. Any political lobbying pro or against any group will ultimately hamper the peace process in Sri Lanka, which has been won after three decades of bloody war.

It equally needs all the stakeholders to work together to come over horrors of war consequences.

Therefore, Tamils and Sinhalese hold an important role in the whole reconciliation process, their perspective on range of issues is very important; but, fuelling any kind of ethnic prejudices will hamper their involvement in the process. We have seen it last year and we don’t want it to continue. Government too needs to understand that the near future implementation of the various recommendations and policies aimed at reforms for the Tamils, in turn, is also meant for the larger good of the nation. A house divided against itself cannot stand for long.

The fact that in a war ravaged, Tamil dominated North and East, the enormity of task of the rehabilitation and resettlements of Tamils were no less wearisome than the enormity of the task of handling the Tamil rebellions.

Undeniably, resettlement of civilians, IDPs as well as former LTTE cadres is commendable in every sense.

Evenly, there are many unresolved issues which need government’s commitment. Most of political as well as non-political activists are skeptical over government’s commitment on resolving key issues.

However, it would be too early for the international community to judge Sri Lanka as the government’s reconciliation efforts are yet to be valued in depth; nonetheless, it seems that new UNHRC resolution may draw backward meaningful solutions to ethnic problems in Sri Lanka.

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VOLUME 4 ISSUE 8

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> VOLUME 4 > ISSUE 8 > MAY 2013