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rying to source a declassified copy of the Henderson-Brooks report on the 1962 Indo-China war is the spot on way of unravelling official India’s mind-set towards its large eastern neighbour. Official histories of wars prior to and those since 1962 have been declassified. But not 1962, for it is the war that continues to haunt India, plague its psychology and colour its decision making. Official India will say that releasing the report will ‘affect our relationship with China’.

Preposterous as it may seem in the 21st century, but that is how the Government of India believes that a limited war of the early 1960s continues to wield disproportionate influence on the country’s thinking. How an essentially after-action report of a restricted military campaign continues to impact on political relations between two neighbours is an idea that has long done its time.

But then that lies at the core of India’s relations with China, for they are driven by an attitude that has ceased to reflect the dynamism of the country today. India of 2010 is not in the least bit the same as what it was in 1962. That official India refuses to learn and budge, from its reticence is the essence of its policies towards China.

China remains a bugbear in India’s foreign and defence policy planning. The country must first admit to that failing before it can address the more mundane issues of ‘why’ and ‘what now’. Every initiative India seems to take has this shadow of the dragon hanging over it, an unfortunate and an entirely unnecessary phenomenon. Dragons didn’t exist in Indian philosophical tracts, but they seriously seem to feature in the policy makers’ minds whilst dealing with China. How New Delhi bends backward in accommodating an imagined wrath of Beijing is the epitome of this fear.

Only when the country admits to this failing, alas, will it come to overcoming the ‘why’ of this phenomenon.

India and China are the last civilisational States in the world, where the ethos of the State is still deeply rooted in its past. But that is where the similarity ends, for the ethos of the two neighbouring civilisations has always been dramatically different.

One has always been globalised in thought, while the other borders on the xenophobic. India maybe insular in many ways, but in ideas assimilated it has always been global. Whereas the emperor and the plebian in China have always had the middle kingdom way of believing and behaving. But for China, the rest is a murky world of the uncivilised. Not unlike the goyim of Hebrew and Yiddish. And so the rest of the world is treated in that manner, dismissingly. Global rules and regulations on non-proliferation are precisely that, for the world and not for China. So violations are acceptable, for they serve a purpose when it comes to India.

There is a special place in China for India, if only the Indians knew it. Despite being neighbours, it is only India that has had an impact on China, in terms of philosophy and beliefs. At a security seminar in Beijing, in the last decade, a serving officer of People’s Liberation Army remarked that India had occupied China for a thousand years without sending a soldier. In the mind, he added. Well now it seems that the reverse has happened, long after the guns of 1962 have fallen silent.

Understanding China, warts and all, is essential to India becoming a responsible global nation, with much to offer to all.

Sans an attitude.

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

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publisher’s view

Volume 2 Issue 2 November 2010 chairman shyam sunder publisher & ceo pawan agrawal editor-in-chief manvendra singh director shishir bhushan corporate consultant k j singh art consultant divya gupta central saint martins college of art & design, university of arts, london corporate communications monika kanchan ad-sales manish upadhyay vivek ojha admin & coordination gunjan representative J&K salil sharma creative vivek anand pant correspondent (europe) dominika cosic production dilshad & dabeer webmaster sundar rawat photographer subhash circulation & distribution vijay bhatia ranjeet, virender system administrator vikas e-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscri ption: subscription@dsalert.org online edition: online@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org editorial & business office 4/19 asaf ali road new delhi-110002(India) t: +91-011-23243999,23287999,9958382999 f: +91-11-23259666 e: info@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org

disclaimer all rights reserved. reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part by any means without permission from Defence And Security Alert is prohibited. opinions expressed are those of the individual writers and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher and / or editors. all disputes are subject to jurisdiction of delhi courts. defence and security alert is printed, published and owned by pawan agrawal and printed at graphic world, 1686, kucha dakhini rai, darya ganj, new delhi-110002 and published at 4/19 asaf ali road, new delhi (india). editor: manvendra singh

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W

hen the whole world is applauding and sharing the fruits of India’s booming economy and prospects of unprecedented growth, some hidden and some not so hidden forces with ulterior motives are trying their best to disturb and destabilise its peaceful progress directly and indirectly.

India has a history of many millennia and has seen many invasions in the past, but has preserved its unity and unique character. The invasions gave us insights about two phenomena: Of Jaichands and of Chanakya. There are Jaichands operating in the corridors of power and the moment is ripe for a Chanakya to emerge from the shadows to chart a course through the dangers posed to the nation from outside as well as from within. Chanakyan sagacity, foresight and statecraft are the needs of the hour and a long term strategy is required to steer the country out of the present quagmire.

We may not be a super power but we have the potential to become one and our neighbours – China and Pakistan – are wary of that potential. There is always an element of competition among humans and between nations, but that does not condone the use of malicious and nefarious means and machinations of destabilisation. We have seen Pakistan use terror as a tool of State policy from the moment of its illegitimate birth and in recent years the veil has lifted from China’s employment of proxies to hurt and destabilise India. The use of terror by these proxies is known to China and is not just condoned but encouraged by it.

As a matter of fact India has never sought to prove that it is well on its way to a super power stature. But it is so self-evident a truth that it disturbs both Pakistan – that is sliding into chaos and political and economic abyss by the day – and China whose rulers know that its millions will sweep them out of existence once they savour the fragrance and joys of democracy and freedom and once their finite resources dwindle and disappear.

One can clearly see that China is working on a long term strategy to attain super power status based on twin pillars – military power and economic power – complementing and sustaining each other. China might have become the second largest economy in the world but it has retrogressed in humanity and human relations as is evident in its rabid opposition to the Nobel Peace Prize being conferred on Liu Xiaobo for the year 2010 by the Norwegian Nobel Committee. This shows how insensitive and ruthless the Chinese government is with its own citizens. Liberty, equality, peace and harmony are the hallmarks of a responsible member of the comity of nations and it is high time China paid attention to these tenets of a responsible nation.

DSA condemns the opposition of the Chinese government to the award of the Nobel Peace Prize being given to its citizen Liu Xiaobo. I am sure every human being who believes in human rights and human dignity and values peace and harmony in the world will join me in condemning the Chinese stand.

The last edition which was the first anniversary issue of DSA was well received by the experts as well as the common readers and I thank you all dear readers for your overwhelming response. DSA China Special is in your hands and I am sure you will enjoy going through this issue also. We will be offering many more special issues in the coming months. So book your copies now or write to our subscription and circulation department directly.

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November 2010 Defence AND security alert

contents

CHINA SPECIAL ISSUE NOVEMBER 2010

Volume 2 Issue 2 November 2010

A R T I C L E S

bloody nose to China! twice!!

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) V. K. Singh

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China’s global clout Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli

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Sino-US equations: implications and consequences

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China and India: economics vs geopolitics

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India vs China: contest of the century?

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aggressive China: India over-cautious?

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India China: eternal enemies or future allies?

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power projection

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NATO: global role?

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China in Afghanistan

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Sino-Indian relations: trust deficit?

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China’s "string of pearls": India's options

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Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra Dr. Ravni Thakur

Dr. Sanjeev Bhadauria

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) G. D. Bakshi

Prof. Tej Pratap Singh Dr. B. R. Deepak Dominika Cosic

Manvendra Singh

Dr. Sudhir Kumar Singh

Brig. (Retd.) Rahul Bhonsle

for online edition of Defence And Security Alert (DSA) log on to: www.dsalert.org

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November 2010 Defence AND security alert

contents the dragon stirs

63

China-Japan-India axis: challenges and opportunities

66

China-Myanmar: burgeoning kinship

73

nobel Chinese!

77

Cecil Victor

Prof. Rajendra Prasad Rahul Mishra

Pawan Agrawal

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DSALERT November 2010 Defence AND security alert

5

Chinese guise

Bloody nose to China!

BELLIGERENCE

Twice!!

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November 2010 Defence AND security alert

There are lessons to be learned from every skirmish, every battle. The one that stands out again and again is that if you have a claim line then you must be prepared to defend it. Fallback plans can turn out to be geopolitical minefields.

Vacating posts in winter is another bugbear—we left a 60 km x 10 km salient unmanned in the Kargil-Dras sector and the Pakistani troops occupied it. They did not seem to think that it is too cold to grab territory.

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he Chinese dragon is spewing fire again. Recently, China had objected to the construction of a road by India near Demchok in Ladakh. In August, it was reported that thousands of Chinese troops had been stationed in the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir.

In September, China refused a visa to Lieutenant General B. S. Jaswal, GOC-in-C Northern Command, on the ground that he was responsible for the defence of Jammu and Kashmir, which is considered disputed territory

by Pakistan. These belligerent moves have revived memories of the traumatic events of 1962, when India suffered humiliation at the hands of the Red Army. However, it is well to remember that the debacle in 1962 was the result of poor political and military leadership and lack of preparedness, rather than any deficiency in the fighting prowess of the Indian soldier. Just five years later, in skirmishes at Nathu La and Chola in Sikkim in 1967, Indian troops gave the Chinese as good as they got.

In fact, that is the only time the Chinese got a bloody nose from the Indians.

Accepting Chinese diktat?

During the 1965 war between India and Pakistan, China served an ultimatum demanding that India withdraw her posts from Nathu La and Jelep La in Sikkim, which was then held by 17 Mountain Division. The main defences were at Changgu, while Nathu La was only an observation post. In the adjoining sector, manned by 27 Mountain Division, Jelep La was also considered an observation post, with the main defences located at Lungthu. In case of hostilities, the divisional commanders had been given the authority to vacate the posts and fall back on the main defences.

Accordingly, orders were issued by corps headquarters to both divisions to vacate Nathu La and Jelep La. Major General Sagat Singh, who had proved his credentials as a military commander four years earlier by liberating Goa within 24 hours, was in command of 17 Division. (He was destined to perform a similar feat in 1971, when his brilliant crossing of the River Meghna hastened the liberation of Bangladesh). Sagat did not agree with the views of the corps headquarters.

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) V. K. Singh

Faulty fallback plan Nathul La and Jelep La were passes on the watershed, which was the natural boundary. The McMahon Line, which India claimed as the international border, followed the watershed principle and India and China had gone to war over this issue three years earlier. Vacating the passes on the watershed would give the Chinese the tactical advantage of observation and fire into India, while denying the same to our own troops.

The passes were also important because they were on the trade routes between India and Tibet and provided the only means of ingress through the Chumbi Valley. Younghusband had used the same route during his expedition sixty five years earlier and handing it over to the enemy on a plate was not Sagat’s idea of sound military strategy.

He also reasoned that the discretion to vacate the posts lay with the divisional commander and he was not obliged to do so, based on instructions from corps headquarters.

Position of strength In the event, 27 Mountain Division vacated Jelep La, which the Chinese promptly occupied. However, Nathu La remained in Indian hands. When the Chinese became belligerent and opened fire, the Indians also opened up with guns and mortars, though there was a restriction imposed by higher headquarters on the use of artillery. The Chinese had installed loudspeakers at Nathu La and warned the Indians that they would suffer as they did in 1962, if they did not withdraw. They made threatening postures, such as advancing in large numbers, but on reaching the border, always stopped, turned about and withdrew. They also did not use any artillery for covering fire, which they would have certainly done if they were serious about capturing any Indian positions. Indian defences at Nathu La were strong. There were

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

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Chinese guise

BELLIGERENCE

artillery observation posts on adjoining high features called Camel’s Back and Sebu La, which overlooked the Yatung valley for several kilometres and could bring down accurate fire on the enemy, an advantage that the Chinese did not have. It would have been a tactical blunder to vacate Nathu La and gift it to the Chinese, as the Indians did with Sela in 1962. Ultimately, Sagat’s fortitude saved the day for India and his stand was vindicated two years later, when there was a showdown at Nathu La.

Nathu La - 1967 During the crisis in 1965, the Chinese had occupied Jelep La, but had gained nothing in the sector under 17 Division.

to them. Patrols which walked along the border often clashed, resulting in tension and sometimes even casualties.

Intrusion / psychological ops.

In the first week of August 1967, the border outposts (BOPs) at Nathu La were occupied by 2 Grenadiers, under Lieutenant Colonel Rai Singh, relieving 18 Rajput. Major Bishan Singh took over as ‘Tiger Nathu La’, as the company commander holding the pass was generally known, with Captain P. S. Dagar as his second-in-command. 18 Rajput took over the BOP at Yakla while those at Chola were occupied by a company of 10 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles. Even while 2 Grenadiers was in the

to stop. One strand of wire was laid that day and two more were added over the next two days. This led to an escalation in Chinese activity. On 23rd August at about 2 pm Major Bishan Singh reported that about 75 Chinese in battle dress carrying rifles fitted with bayonets were advancing towards Nathu La. They advanced slowly in an extended line and stopped on reaching the border extending from Four Poles area to Mao Zedong’s photograph on South Shoulder. At 2.30 pm they started shouting slogans which the Political Commissar read out from a red book and the rest repeated after him. Indian troops were ‘standing to’, watching and waiting. Nothing happened for another hour. After standing on the border for about an hour the Chinese withdrew

The skirmish at Nathu La lasted six days. The spectre of the Chinese attack of 1962 still haunted the military and political leadership in India.

This was the first time the Chinese got a bloody nose, and the myth of their invincibility was broken. The skirmish at Chola lasted just one day. The Indian casualties were four dead, The Chinese casualties were eight dead and nine wounded. Like they had in Nathu La, the Chinese once again got a bloody nose. Having learned their lesson, the Chinese did not incite the Indians again This was galling and they continued their pressure on the Indians. In December 1965 the Chinese fired on a patrol of 17 Assam Rifles in North Sikkim, at a height of 16,000 feet, killing two men.

The patrol was in Indian territory, but the Chinese claimed that it had crossed over to their side. They made regular broadcasts from loudspeakers at Nathu La, pointing out to Indian troops the pathetic conditions in which they lived, their low salaries and lack of amenities, comparing these to that of officers. It was a form of psychological warfare in which the Chinese were adept and had to be countered. Sagat had similar loudspeakers installed on our own side and tape recorded messages in Chinese language were broadcast every day. However, the GOC was not satisfied with this and kept looking for a chance to avenge the death of the Indian soldiers who had fallen to Chinese bullets. Throughout 1966 and early 1967, Chinese propaganda, intimidation and attempted incursions into Indian territory continued. The border was not marked and there were several vantage points on the crest line which both sides thought belonged

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process of taking over the defences at Nathu La, Chinese activities increased.

They were noticed repairing their bunkers on North Shoulder and making preparations to construct new ones.

On 13 August the observation post at Sebu La reported that the Chinese had arrived on the crest line and dug trenches on our side of the international border. When challenged, they filled up the trenches and withdrew. On the same day they added eight more loudspeakers to their already existing 21 speakers on South Shoulder. Due to this the volume of their propaganda increased and could now be heard at Changgu.

and all was calm and quiet again.

Defending crest line

On 1st September the corps and divisional commanders visited Nathu La. The visibility that day was rather poor. They went to Centre Bump first and then to South Shoulder. Then they walked along the border to Four Poles area, where they crossed the border and went a few steps inside. At once, the Chinese Political Commissar came running up to them, shouting “Chini, Chini”, indicating that they have crossed the border into China. The two generals immediately withdrew, but the Chinese kept on grumbling.

Soon a photographer came and took photographs of their footprints across the border.

Sagat discussed the problem with the corps commander, Lieutenant General J. S. Aurora and obtained his concurrence to mark the crest line.

2 Grenadiers was ordered to lay a threestrand wire fence along the border from Nathu La towards the North Shoulder.

However, as soon as work began on the fence on 20th August, the Chinese became agitated and asked the Indians

Next morning Sagat again went to Nathu La. He directed that the border from Right OP to Camels Back must be patrolled. Immediately a patrol of two officers, one junior commissioned officer and 15 other ranks was sent out under Major Bishan Singh. As soon as the patrol reached the U Bump near Tekri, the Chinese surrounded them.

Bishan tried to explain to the Chinese

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

officer that they had not crossed the border and in fact it was the Chinese who were in Indian territory. However, the Chinese did not budge. Bishan and his men then pushed their way through the Chinese and returned to Nathu La. Colonel Rai Singh was watching all this from South Shoulder.

Chinese trickbook On 4th September Sagat again went to Nathu La. He directed that the wire fence be converted into a Cat Wire Type 1 obstacle, using concertina coils. The task was assigned to 2 Grenadiers. A platoon of 70 Field Company Engineers under Major Cheema was allotted to assist them.

On 5 September work started at 5 am but the Chinese objected. There was an argument between Rai Singh and the Chinese Political Commissar as to alignment of the border. The work was stopped at 8 am. However, work on Chinese defences on North and South Shoulder continued. During the night the Chinese came up to the Bump and cut off one shoulder so that if water was poured on the other shoulder it would flow into China. Next morning when our men went to straighten out some wire a few Chinese came running up to the border with a bucket of water and poured it on the Bump indicating the watershed.

On 7th September work started again

on laying the wire. This time about a hundred Chinese came to the fence and there was hand to hand fighting between the troops. Realising that they were unequal to the Jats, the Chinese withdrew and began pelting stones, the Grenadiers responding in the same manner. Because of all this fighting there was not much progress in the laying of the wire. The Chinese suffered a few casualties in wounded and we had two wounded. During the next two days things were relatively quiet but the Chinese continued work on their defences.

By now Sagat’s patience had been exhausted and he was determined to complete the work before he proceeded on leave on 12th September. On the night of 10th September he held a conference at the brigade headquarters in Changgu, where he personally briefed everyone on how the operation for laying the wire was to be carried out next morning. Additional resources in men and material were moved for this purpose. One company of 18 Rajput was brought in to reinforce the defences. An ad hoc force of 90 men was organised into a protection party to charge the Chinese positions if they opened fire. Major Bishan Singh was in charge of the work with Captain P. S. Dagar as his assistant. Apart from the platoon of 70 Field Company, a pioneer platoon was to assist in the construction of the fence.

11 September 1967 As soon as work commenced on 11th September, the Chinese came up to the fence and tried to stop it. There was a heated discussion between the Chinese commander, who was accompanied by the Political Commissar and CO 2 Grenadiers. Sagat had foreseen this eventuality and told Rai Singh not to expose himself but remain in his bunker, where the brigade commander, Brigadier M. M. S. Bakshi, was also present. But Rai Singh did not heed this advice and with an escort, came out in the open to stand face to face with the Chinese officers. As the arguments became more heated, tempers rose, with both sides standing their ground.

Suddenly, the Chinese opened fire, causing several casualties among the troops working on the wire fence. Rai Singh was hit by a Chinese bullet and fell down.

Six-day battle The skirmish at Nathu La lasted six days. The Indian casualties in the action were just over two hundred - 65 dead and 145 wounded. The Chinese are estimated to have suffered about 300 casualties. Though the action taken by Sagat, in marking the border with a wire fence, had the approval of higher authorities, the large number of casualties suffered by both sides created a furore. The Chinese had

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

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Chinese guise

BELLIGERENCE

already announced that it was the Indians who started the conflict and the large number of Indian bodies and wounded Indian soldiers in their possession seemed to support their claim. However, Sagat was not perturbed. For the last two years, the Chinese had been instigating him and had killed several Indian soldiers. The spectre of the Chinese attack of 1962 still haunted the military and political leadership in India and had prevented them from taking effective action against them. This was the first time the Chinese got a bloody nose and the myth of their invincibility was broken.

Chola Incident The incident at Chola, another post located to the north-west of Nathu La, occurred a few days afterwards. The post fell under 63 Mountain Brigade, then under the command of Brigadier Kundan Singh. It was occupied by 10 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles, which was being relieved by 7/11 Gorkha Rifles during the last week of September 1967. On 1st October, there was a scuffle at Point 15,450, which had been taken over by the Gorkhas on the previous day. There was boulder at the post and Chinese and Indian sentries usually stood on opposite sides. Since the Indians were new to the post, the Chinese staked claim to the boulder, leading to heated argument between the two post commanders. During the argument, the Gorkha JCO rested his

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right foot on the boulder. The Chinese kicked his foot away. The JCO then put his foot back on the boulder and challenged his Chinese counterpart.

morning and the position recaptured by the Gorkhas. The battalion was awarded two Vir Chakras during the incident.

The Chinese had already decided to escalate matters and taken positions.

The Chinese soldier bayoneted the Gorkha JCO, injuring him in the arm.

The Gorkhas retaliated by cutting off the arm of the Chinese with a kukri.

The Chinese opened up with all they had, with the Indian responding in like fashion. The Gorkhas charged the Chinese positions and there was hand-to-hand combat, the kukris flashing repeatedly. The officiating CO, Major K. B. Joshi, was on his way to Point 15,450 when the incident started.

He was at Rai Gap, which was still held by 10 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles and could see the post being annihilated.

The position at Rai Gap also came under heavy fire and was attacked by the Chinese, but held on.

The skirmish at Chola lasted just one day. The Indian casualties were four dead. The Chinese casualties were eight dead and nine wounded. Like they had in Nathu La, the Chinese once again got a bloody nose. Having learned their lesson, the Chinese did not incite the Indians again.

The news of the firing was conveyed to HQ 63 Mountain Brigade by Major Nair, the second-in-command of 10 Jammu & Kashmir Rifles. Brigadier Kundan Singh, who was also officiating as the divisional commander immediately ordered the rest of 7/11 Gorkha Rifles to move up from Tamze.

He himself moved up to Twin Huts, to see things for himself, where he met Major Joshi, who requested permission to recapture Point 15,450, which was granted. The attack was launched next

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

(This article is based on personal knowledge of the writer, who was then serving in the divisional signal regiment; his interviews with Late Lt. Gen. Sagat Singh in 1998-99 in connection with his biography; personal inputs of Lt. Gen. S. R. R. Aiyengar and Col. N. C. Gupta, the Signals officers of 63 and 112 Brigades in 1967; and the regimental histories of The Grenadiers (Col. R. D. Palsokar); The Rajput Regiment (Lt. Col. Mustasad Ahmad); and The 11th Gorkha Rifles (Lt. Col. Gautam Sharma).

The writer served in the Army for 35 years, his last appointment being Chief Signal Officer of the Western Army. In November 2000 he joined the Cabinet Secretariat, (R&AW), where he served up to June 2004, when he retired from government service. He has authored five books including India's External Intelligence - Secrets of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in 2007.

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mission

The power of a King lies in his mighty arms‌ Security of the citizens at peace time is very important because State is the only saviour of the men and women who get affected only because of the negligence of the State.

— Chanakya

Chinese guise

PUISSANCE

China’s

Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli

global clout

There is a scientific theory that states that every action has an opposite and equal reaction. It can be applied to the China of today. Chairman Mao Zedong of the enigmatic smile and pregnant handshakes had ingrained in the Chinese psyche the parable of the dog with its tail firmly between its legs. The current generation of Chinese leaders have had enough of that and have chosen to behave like the iconic enraged gorilla in Universal Studios 1933 movie that climbed the Empire State building – the highest point on the planet at the time.

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

13

Chinese guise

PUISSANCE

M

ao Zedong, the then supreme Chinese leader, used to caution his comrades-in-arms not to let loose the tail and that it should be always kept folded between the legs – suggesting that the Chinese should not assert. Deng Xiaoping, the second generation of the leadership, likewise suggested that China should remain calm, hide its capabilities and bide for time. The third and fourth generation of leaders of China appears to have thrown such prudence to the winds. As the fifth generation of political leadership is being groomed to take over the reins of China in 2012, a number of countries in the neighbourhood are already feeling the heat of China’s rise and high-handedness.

Stoking instability The scale of current rise of China is unprecedented and is affecting global strategic, political and economic balance. This is reflected in the ongoing global military and diplomatic re-alignments as with the global market for goods, services and investments.

Foremost, the impact of the rise of China is reflected in the newfound assertiveness in the leadership which is reinforced with the rising nationalism among the Chinese.

Major issues recently are related to Japan, South China Sea, India and South Korea in which China is creating

14

“security dilemmas” all across the landscape. On all these issues – with most related to sovereignty disputes – China’s assertiveness is driving all the concerned together into a common platform.

Issues with Japan In early September this year intruding Chinese trawler near Senkaku Islands (claimed and physically controlled

by Japan since 1890, while claimed by China from the 1970s) was impounded by the Japanese coast guard vessel, leading to the arrest of the 15 crew members and the Chinese demands for apology, release and compensation.

While Japan subsequently released all the crew, it refused to apologise or pay compensation. In 2004, during the Chinese Han-class nuclear submarine incident when it surfaced close to Okinawa, the Chinese note to Japan was considered by the latter as an apology – the first such apology by the Chinese after the 1902 Boxer Uprising. The Chinese navy had been conducting “research” activities closer to the Japanese controlled areas and these are fuelling tensions between the two, in addition to the dispute related to the energy-rich Chunxiao Islands. Although both premiers met to de-escalate tensions at the Asia Europe Meeting at Brussels in first week of October, fresh troubles are brewing with public protests against Japanese

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

businesses in China.

Pacific sea route Earlier this year, China had mentioned that South China Sea is its “core interest”. This position is a departure from what Deng Xiaoping suggested – postpone the dispute and mutually exploit resources. This changed China policy came on the heels of rapprochement between Beijing and Taipei over cross-Straits relations. The Chinese government also demanded that the South China Sea region should be changed from maritime “commons” to the exclusive territory of China. The implication of the latter is more serious as this position challenges the free trade and shipping principles and restricts trade in the region, specifically that of Japan, South Korea, ASEAN or that of India, besides the US which has nearly US$ 1 trillion in goods and services passing through the region. This is the backdrop for the renewed US interest in the region, which vacated the Subic Bay in the 1990s after the Soviet disintegration.

China’s filling up the power vacuum in the region, without global or regional commitments to safe maritime practices, has become a matter of concern. In March 2009 the Chinese naval vessels trailed USS Impeccable.

Later, China was critical of US Secretary of State Clinton’s July 2010 statement

in Hanoi on support to “collaborative diplomatic process by all claimants”.

Again, in September 2010, China was critical of the US President Obama and ASEAN members joint declaration on “the importance of peaceful resolution of disputes, freedom of navigation, regional stability and respect for international law, including in the South China Sea”.

Contratemps with S. Korea Although China-South Korea relations appeared to have improved recently, fresh trouble is brewing between the two as China refused to put pressure on its military ally Pyongyang for the latter’s alleged torpedoing (possibly with CH02D)

Christchurch meeting of the Nuclear Supplies Group two more nuclear power plants at Chashma in Pakistan.

This is of concern given the A. Q. Khan revelations in February 2004 about the nuclear / ballistic missile transfers between China, Pakistan, North Korea and Libya. India is also concerned with the Chinese assertiveness in the Indian Ocean region. It was reported last year that the US Admiral Keating was told by the Chinese naval officer on dividing the Pacific Ocean – with east of the Pacific remaining in the US hands, while the Chinese intending to hold sway over the west Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

Economic miracle

countries.

Impressive paradigms Other related figures are also staggering. China today has over 300 million netizens, although the State control over the internet is severe as Google, Yahoo, You Tube and other portals were to realise. As a result of relative prosperity, nearly 50 million Chinese travelled outside in 2008.

Another major area is the resurgence of the stock-exchange, with more than 150 million stockholders showing enthusiasm.

As a result of the economic growth rates, by June 2010, China had amassed US$ 2.45 trillion in foreign exchange

The concept of “Chindia” was advocated, which brought both countries together in the multilateral fora such as at Doha rounds or at the Copenhagen climate change proposals last year. Yet, “security dilemmas” were cited in New Delhi with the view that Beijing is actively striving for marginalisation of India in several areas and regions and that New Delhi should offer not a stop-gap “enough space in Asia” for both to strive but an active policy of self-development of South Korean corvette Cheonan in March this year that killed more than 40 sailors. Some Koreans think that China is imposing a kind of Monroe Doctrine in the Yellow Sea, by objecting to the US-South Korea naval exercises. With pressure from Beijing, the US moved the area of exercises to a different place.

Harrying India Another area of Chinese assertiveness as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said at the US Council on Foreign relations late last year is India.

Relations between the two countries have witnessed set-backs with both sides beefing up border defences – with China already developing military logistics and deployments in contiguous areas. More significantly, while previously China considered Kashmir issue as disputed and bilateral between India and Pakistan, it had been investing heavily in the hydro-electric projects, roads, railway and troop deployments between Hindu Kush Mountains and Kunjerab Pass, in addition to aiding Islamabad in weapons of mass destruction. China has also sought to push through the

Also, while several international actors have benefited, China’s rise in the economic field is also being viewed with consternation by several small and big economies. Although still in transition, the economy of China is growing substantially with near double-digit economic growth figures in the last two decades, knocking in the process the nooks and corners of the world. For instance, in 1978, when reforms were unleashed by Deng Xiaoping, China’s gross domestic product was about 5 per cent of the global figures. In 2010, the country has become the 2nd largest economy in the world (by purchasing power parity figures). Nobel Laureate Robert Fogel of Chicago University, writing in the Foreign Policy journal, argued that by 2040, China’s economy is to reach 40 per cent of the world’s GDP – surpassing that of the United States (14 per cent) and the EU (5 per cent). Today, China has become the largest trading partner for all the major economies of the world including the United States, European Union countries, Japan, South Korea, ASEAN, India and others – often with substantial favourable balance of trade position vis-à-vis these

reserves. While these are in the custody of State Administration for Foreign Exchange, a new sovereign wealth fund China Investment Corporation (CIC) was established with an initial amount of US$ 200 billion. In addition to the CIC, several State-owned enterprises started investing abroad as a part of the recently launched “go out” policy in energy and raw material resources (such as in Central and West Asia, Africa, Australia and South America), dredging projects closer to strategic sea lines (Egypt, Greece and others), or through mergers and acquisitions (such as in the US, EU or Australia).

Strategic reserves China today is the sixth largest direct investor abroad with about US$ 48 billion in investments abroad in 2009 (a figure closer to the net inflows into China a year). Cumulatively, this figure is expected to reach US$ 500 billion by 2013. The contrast with the then Soviet Union is stark.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it was estimated that nearly US$ 20 billion was stashed away

by Russians in the Swiss banks a

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PUISSANCE

year on which hardly any interest accrued. On the other hand, China’s outflows are contributing to the rising political profile of the country, besides increasing returns.

dividends by reducing the threat of Taiwan independence forces or free trade area proposals with the ASEAN blunting any opposition to China in this region.

Geely or others. While UK, France and Germany have investment review mechanisms, no European Unionlevel institution exists to review such challenges.

Explosive influence

Worrying trends

European acquisitions

China’s investments in the US Treasury Securities (to the tune of more than US$ 1 trillion) or diversifying investments into the Euro or Saudi petrodollars or bailout packages for the dwindling economies in the aftermath of the global financial crisis are some of the boldest initiatives. Apart from pledging several billions of dollars of aid for Russia, Central Asia, Africa and other countries, China is also entering the European Union, specifically Greece. In June 2010, China’s shipping giant COSCO concluded a 35-year lease for the control of major container port in Piraeus. COSCO intends to conclude arrangements with Greek State-businesses to facilitate sale of Chinese products not only in Greece bit for the whole of Balkans in the future.

At the same time, China also concluded deals to invest in construction and telecommunications sectors of Greece.

China is also planning to develop plots in Athlone, in central Ireland with about 2,000 Chinese workers.

All these are expected to provide rich political dividends to a rising China in the future. Already, the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement with Taiwan is providing rich political

However, even though some countries benefited out of these inflows, concerns abound about the unabated Chinese investments. Specifically, as some of these investments are tinged with possible political goals, a number of countries are concerned about such Chinese investments, in addition to lack of transparency in corporate governance in China. China’s policy of “divide and rule” is also cited as detrimental to any unified response by investment recipient regions. Three countries - such as United States, Japan and Australia - have well-established practices to monitor investments by other countries, specifically in sensitive security areas. The US Committee on Foreign Investment (1975) and the Foreign Investment and National Security Act (2007) is considered to be effective in screening investments from abroad and their potential challenges to national security. The failed bidding of the Chinese energy giant CNOOC in taking over Unocal or Chinalco’s failed bid for Rio Tinto are cases in point, although several “private” Chinese companies have been actively entering this sector as is seen in the bidding for IBM by Lenovo, Volvo of Ford by

However in Europe as well, China is gradually acquiring stocks of major companies such as British Petroleum, R&D Centres in Colon, etc. In India, a few years ago, the National Security Council had identified four countries, viz China, Taiwan, Pakistan and Bangladesh - whose investments in the security related fields are to be closely monitored. Following these observations India reportedly blocked Chinese bidding for the dredging projects at Mumbai Port Trust (which is closer to the sensitive naval dockyard), hydro-electric projects near India-China border areas (specifically as the border dispute resolution between the two remains elusive despite nearly three decades of discussions on the issue) and others. It should also be mentioned that China had blocked investments which it thought may affect their security. For instance, it was reported that when the Tata Consultancy services bid for the software up-gradation of Shanghai Stock Exchange, China denied such access citing aspects of sensitive financial intelligence.

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

G-2 hegemony China’s assertiveness at the strategic

levels is unnerving several countries.

Its anti-satellite test in January 2007 had intimidated several space faring nations for the destruction this could cause for the global communications systems.

More significantly, the emerging concept of G-2 (Group of United States and China) is a concern for several capitals across the world today. In 2006, the idea of G-2 was proposed by some US academicians and by January 13, 2009, Zbigniew Brzezinski mentioned this during the conference organised

by Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs and Kissinger Institute on China at Beijing on the eve of 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and China.

Although no formal initiative or format had been proposed or initiated in this regard, there is a realisation in the US that G-2 could be an effective solution of addressing global and bilateral issues of mutual concern, including on resolving India-Pakistan differences. However, there are also significant differences between the two countries and are expected to coalesce in the Washington Consensus vs Beijing Consensus format in the economic and political fields or in any military alliances.

Having outlined the above concerns, as China is rising, it is also forced to adapt to the international system. While China had made an angry outburst for the Nobel Peace Prize awards to the Dalai Lama in 1988 and to Liu Xiaobo

in 2010, it is also experimenting with elections at the village levels, although the communist party’s hold is from the county level upwards. Increasing global criticism (with India recently joining this club during President Patil’s visit this year to Beijing where she raised the issue of market economy status) about the State monopolies and subsidies on the market are expected to yield results, although Yuan currency full convertibility is still a sticky issue. Again, China is adapting to the multilateral institutional demands as well and modifying its previous acute shrill tone on national interests.

Options for India China’s new-found assertiveness is creating concerns in New Delhi as the Prime Minster and his colleagues have said on many an occasion in the last one year. While India had followed an independent foreign policy through the non-alignment processes, China’s rise is knocking at the Indian gates from all directions. This is generating support to the idea that India should actively strive for balancing Beijing from Central Asia through South, Southeast and East Asian region. On the other hand some argue for expanding diplomatic and military cooperation with the United States to ward off challenges from Beijing. Previously, both New Delhi and Beijing sported Hindi Chini bhai bhai in the 1950s which

ended in the border clashes between the two in 1962. Others have suggested controlled engagement with Beijing for mutual benefits in trade and other related fields. The concept of “Chindia” was advocated, which brought both countries together in the multilateral fora such as at Doha rounds or at the Copenhagen climate change proposals last year. Yet, “security dilemmas” were cited in New Delhi with the view that Beijing is actively striving for marginalisation of India in several areas and regions and that New Delhi should offer not a stop-gap “enough space in Asia” for both to strive but an active policy of self-development.

While India has been expanding relations and cooperation with Tokyo, Seoul, Hanoi, Ulan Bator and other countries, it is imperative on the part of New Delhi to spend resources in self-rejuvenation, including in acquiring its own conventional and strategic deterrence capabilities.

The writer is Professor in Chinese Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is also an Honorary Fellow at Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi and Research Associate at Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa. He learnt Chinese language at Beijing Language & Culture University and was a post-Doctoral Visiting Fellow at People’s University, Beijing from 1996-98. He has published two books, two monographs, co-edited two volumes and several articles in edited books and in national and international journals and newspapers.

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INSOLENCE

What lies ahead is a multipolar world with the declining power clinging on for dear life and a rising power trying its best to impose its will on the world.

Those on China’s periphery who have lived under the American nuclear umbrella will find out that the US conventional weaponry will not deter China as recent episode in the Yellow Sea highlighted though the nuclear deterrent may work. India, the new major pole on the world stage will have to set in place its own network to counter-balance an increasingly assertive China.

C

hina’s growing insolence in conducting its relations with the US and other major powers is indicative of a new kind of political, military and strategic discord between the resident global super power and an aspiring super power.

US horns clipped There are increasing numbers of issues where the strategies divergences between Washington and Beijing are periodically cropping up. These differences appear to be short-term frictions, but they are slowly piling up and will most likely contribute towards a new kind of US-China relationship that would not replicate the Cold War climate but would be a certainly stark reminder of the dreadful old days of the Cold War. Some of the differences constitute the legacies of the Sino-American Cold War and have not ended despite the end of the Cold War and growing economic partnership between the two countries. The issue

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of Taiwan, for instance, bedevils the political ties now and then, especially when some Taiwan leaders speak of independence or Washington decides to sell weapons to Taiwan.

President Barack Obama’s decision to sell sophisticated weapons to Taiwan was fiercely resisted by Beijing that described it as external interference in its internal affairs, while the Obama Administration defended the arms sale under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.

Tibet irritation Tibetan issue and Dalai Lama’s interactions with the US officials is yet another major irritant in their relationship for decades. Despite the best of efforts by Beijing to prevent the US leaders have from time to time met the Tibetan spiritual leader making China fume and whine. President Obama refused to meet with Dalai Lama before his China visit, but he did meet with him after his return to the US, considerably infuriating the

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

Chinese government. More recently, the currency issue between the two countries has generated considerable heat in the relationship. Reeling under the adverse effects of recession on the US economy, persistent high unemployment rate in the country, despite billions of dollars worth of stimulus packages. The Obama Administration has been asking China to increase the value of its currency in the exchange market. By keeping the value of its currency low, China not only acquires undue advantages for its low priced exports but also discourages imports from the US and other countries. China’s willingness to do so only at the pace and time of its own choice has angered the Obama Administration to a point visible enough for everyone to see.

Trade imbalance China’s consistent economic growth at the time of America’s economic woes and the prolonged trade surplus

Prof. Chintamani Mahapatra

Sino-US equations:

implications

and consequences

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INSOLENCE

enjoyed by the Chinese vis-à-vis the US threaten to spill over into other areas of bilateral relations. China also has bought billions of dollars of US treasury bonds turning itself into America’s number one banker.

The Obama Administration and the Corporate America finds it difficult to digest that a Communist-ruled State, which prospered under an international monetary system constructed by the US, holds the key to stabilise the crisis-ridden American capitalism.

American largesse It was the United States that took unprecedented initiatives to open up China and normalise its relations with that country in the late 1970s. The initial idea was to end the Vietnam War by discouraging China from supporting

China overtakes America!

Thus, it was partly the US in a way responsible for the Chinese economic miracle. But today, China threatens to replace the US as the largest economy in the world. Trend analysts around the world believe that in not-so-distant future, China will be the largest economic power in the world.

While such predictions have been made for about a decade, the global recession since 2008 makes such forecasts even more credible. The current recession in the US has brought back the memories of the Great Depression when some American billionaires were seen selling apples on the road-sides. While the scale and intensity of the current crisis is nowhere near the 1930s depression, even after two years of hard struggle, including nationalisation of some

around the world are quite bubbly about the future of the Chinese economy and downbeat about the

But neither will the world be governed together by a declining super power and a rising super power. The declining one will leave no stone unturned to retain its status and power. The rising one will find it hard to replace the existing super power, but will adopt every possible means to enhance its abilities to break the status quo and make its will prevail North Vietnam and to build up China as a counterweight to the former Soviet Union. But Chinese leaders sought to make the best use of the new relationship with the United States to strengthen the Chinese economy.

The economic reforms instituted by the Chinese Government in late 1970s aimed at making the country’s economy one of the best in the world.

The Chinese leaders found the US market as well as technology attractive and useful to fulfill the economic goals.

The United States has always seen in China a huge market for its products. When China undertook its economic reforms, Washington was too happy to encourage it and extend its cooperation. Soon the US became one of the largest foreign investors in China’s growing economy and also became one of the largest markets for the Chinese products.

When the Sino-US normalisation took place, all traditional American allies in Europe and Asia followed the American foot-steps and began to compete with one another for doing business with the lucrative Chinese market.

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companies, massive stimulus packages, increased government spending and certain protectionist measures, the US unemployment rate remains high, the growth rate is pathetic and the country has emerged as the largest debtor nation in world history. The economic forecasts for the US are not at all encouraging.

In contrast, China’s economy has been relatively insulated from the financial crisis of the West. Like the Americans and the Europeans, the Chinese also experienced a slowdown in the real estate, found their export markets significantly shrunk and the overall rate of growth come down; yet about US$ 2 trillion of foreign exchange reserves made it the globe’s strongest economy in terms of liquidity. Although its rate of growth has declined, it is still the envy of many around the world.

Its budget surplus is in wide contrast with the US budget that has run into unprecedented level in its economic history.

US in descent More

significantly,

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economists

US economy. While the US will most likely remain ahead of China in terms of its capabilities in the field of science and technology, innovation, education etc., the US is already perceived as a declining power by many American and non-American analysts. China is widely observed as a rising super power. America’s economic problems and China’s economic successes have made American version of capitalism less and less attractive, while China’s authoritarian capitalism is being identified as a model. The economic decline of the US will automatically reduce the US influence around the world and the Chinese influence in Africa, Latin America and Asia has been consistently expanding.

Co-domination?

There are analysts who are predicting the end of an era of American unilateralism that began in the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. But what would be the new international system? Some are of the view that there could emerge a G-2 world dominated by the United States and China. The continuing super

power - the United States and the new super power - the People’s Republic of China will establish a global condominium and together rule the world. Such a scenario will be far from the four decades of Cold War when the two largest world powers clashed in different regions of the globe to spread their respective influence to the exclusion of the other.

China and the US today account for about one-third of the global output. They have joint ventures in about a thousand different areas of

manufacturing; they have mutual trade and investment relations to an extent of peaceful co-existence or painful co-destruction. Both China and the US have substantial awareness of the cost of cold-war-type relations. Both will rather cooperate to a large extent and tolerate each other where they cannot, rather than suffer yet another round of complex cold war.

Scenario-II The second scenario is the negation of the condominium theory. According to this school of analysts, two most powerful State entities cannot live together in complete harmony and peace. The US represents liberal democratic values and commercial capitalism. It is not going to abandon its ideals and values and rather will seek to protect and promote them in the face

of challenges from Chinese values of authoritarian governing structure and State-directed economic system. Under such a scenario, old cold war paradigm of international relations will not recur.

But neither will the world be governed together by a declining super power and a rising super power. The declining one will leave no stone unturned to retain its status and power and, if necessary, find out ways and means of warding off the challenges. The rising one will find it hard to replace the existing super power, but will adopt every possible means to enhance its abilities

Bilateral and multilateral alliances of today will increasingly become irrelevant and new ad hoc arrangements consisting of major powers in diverse permutations and combinations will be the order of the day.

to break the status quo and make its will prevail. Neither of the scenarios will be beneficial for other countries of the world, including India. The US-China condominium will be resisted by other powers, such as Russia, Germany, Japan, Britain, France, South Africa and Brazil to name a few. China and the US under the second scenario will soon discover that other countries will just refuse to take sides in a clash of interests between them.

unipolar phases of world politics. China is unlikely to replace the US as the global hagemon. The US is unlikely to be able to sustain its current hegemony.

Scenario-III The third scenario that is desirable for many and most likely is the emergence of a truly multi-polar world. Such a world will be governed by a handful of major world powers that will certainly seek to promote their respective national interests, but will refrain from forming or remaining in permanent alliances.

Low intensity conflicts A multi-polar world will not necessarily be a peaceful world. But nor will it be marked by wars among major powers. Competition, cooperation and controlled conflict will continue but will not be like the ones during the bipolar or

And the complex interdependence among nations in a globalised world will witness the management of international relations by a complex network of major powers. India will be one among the major powers.

The writer is currently Chairman, Centre for Canada, US and Latin American Studies and Professor at the School of International Studies of Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.

He was a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Delaware, USA, Commonwealth Scholar at the University of London, Foreign Policy Fellow at University of Maryland, USA, Salzburg Seminar Fellow in Austria and a Visiting Fellow at the Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra.

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EAST ASIA THEATRE

China and

economics vs

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November 2010 Defence AND security alert

India: Dr. Ravni Thakur

Where does the concept of “Greater China” fit into the emerging geopolitical landscape is the subject of intense study. If there is to be regional and global inter-dependence what should be the basis of that interaction, equalism or asymmetrical? Recent Chinese assertiveness all along its periphery illustrates one thing clearly that its economic and political clout created during the “peaceful growth” phase is now, increasingly being sought to be enforced by a baring of its fangs.

B

ilateral ties between India and China are not merely limited to their mutual relationship. Their ties with other countries also impact and reflect their foreign policy imperatives.

The Sino-Indian relationship in East Asia, especially within the ambit of ASEAN deserves special attention.

Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN has, as a cooperative and cohesive economic institution, surpassed all expectations. Today it consists not just of its original ten partners but also 3 + 3. It is a stable and important part of the world economy and has served as a meeting place between regional and international leaders.

At the theoretical level, this article hopes to intervene in the debate that has in recent years broadened the realist paradigm of the balance of power in international relations to argue that economic inter-dependence can effect a new framework for bilateral and multi-lateral ties amongst nations. Liberal frameworks also argue that transparency and democracy internally leads to better international and cooperative arrangements. They

have argued that transparent internal systems of accountability are best able to deal with the issues of regionalism, internationalism and national interest.

They are best able to balance the many contradictions. Realists argue that ideology and compromise have no place in the decisions that nation States must make to further and preserve their national interest and it is only a balance of power that will keep peace in a region.

Collective security?

This article will argue, that increasing trade intensity and economic interdependence does not necessarily lead to a notion of collective security.

It can however, serve as the basis on which such a programme can be put forward. This becomes especially important in the context of a region like East Asia where the very success of East Asian economic integration has led to a greater clamour by other regional countries for partnership and engagement. We have seen the growth of multilateral and regional groupings working together for collective gains.

The European Union and ASEAN and

their expanding membership are a case in point. But have these regional economic groupings really led to a doctrine of collective security? It is here that we see the importance still exercised by historical legacies that influence bilateral ties.

Look east The last twenty years have been a progressive chart of India’s growing engagement with East and South East Asia, especially if we keep in mind that during the Cold War, India had practically no relationship with this region. Initiated in 1991, when our current Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh was Finance Minister, India’s Look East Policy is today a major cornerstone of India’s foreign policy for both economic and security reasons. A recent addition to India’s Look East Policy has been the linkages that can be drawn with India’s own North-eastern region with ASEAN countries such as Thailand and Myanmar with whom land routes for trade and travel can be created. We already have a friendship road with Myanmar and an

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India-Myanmar-Thailand highway project is under consideration, although progress is slow.

The initial push in the nineties certainly came from India, but by the late nineties and the beginning of the

Strategic partnership Apart from an economic relationship, India has also worked at an expanding political and strategic partnership with this region. India has conducted military exercises

a market for East Asian products. At the security level, ASEAN sees India as contributing to a balance of power in Asia, just like it continues to want an American involvement in the region.

Thus, ASEAN’s relations with India are multifaceted and multilateral.

When we speak of interdependence, what sort of interdependence? Is it an equal interdependence or an asymmetrical interdependence in trade and security?

As our foreign secretary recently said the sensitivity to each other’s interest cannot be ‘one sided’. Rhetoric must be matched with action so that it leads to a reduction in the trust deficit that still exists both between member States of the ASEAN region with regard to the South China Seas and where India is concerned, its own border dispute with China 21st century, the success of India’s own economic reforms was visible enough to make India seem like a worthwhile economic ally. Its nuclear prowess and since 2005, its acceptability at the high table of the G-20, has further added to India being seen as a ‘swing partner’ that could balance any new emerging power politics in the region.

Growing synergy India became a sectoral dialogue partner in 1992, a full dialogue partner in 1995 and an ARF member in 1996.

Summit meetings with ASEAN are held annually since 2002. The signing of the 2009 FTA with ASEAN has been a culmination of one aspect of this relationship.

Currently negotiations are on to put in place a treaty covering Trade in Services.

India sees East Asian economies as natural and complementary partners. And the economic statistics speak for themselves. Overall trade between India and China jumped from US$ 30.7 billion in 2006-7 to US$ 45.34 billion in 2008-9.

The ASEAN region is today one of India’s strongest trading partners and expected to remain so in the foreseeable future.

The Prime Minister’s participation in the seventh India-ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) summit to be held in Thailand will be his first since the signing of the Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN in August 2009.

Nevertheless, its economic engagement with the region is still far below that of China, Japan or Korea, other countries who have joined this regional grouping through similar alignments.

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with Singapore, Vietnam, Japan and South Korea. These naval exercises have been largely carried out with a view to cooperatively guarding the sea routes of the straits of Malacca through which the oil of Asia flows.

Cooperation in anti-terrorist activities has also been initiated. We have also put in place forums to encourage greater cultural and people-to-people contacts with the region through forums such as the Mekong-Ganges River Cooperative Project between India and ASEAN 5 (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar and Thailand).

This project is designed to improve cultural contacts and tourism within the region. India has also initiated another project addressing this region through its BIMSTEC agreement that covers Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Again, the idea is to build strong track II ties along with greater and increasing economic engagement.

The India ASEAN relationship could be characterised as one that has moved from diffidence and disinterest on the part of India during the seventies and eighties to one of growing engagement through the nineties. Today, India is a much more reliable economic and international player, focused on pressing forward with both bilateral and international engagements.

ASEAN, in turn has responded positively to India’s growing economic and international stature. As it moves into a different economic stage with China, where it is now seeing larger imports from China than exports to China and as China itself moves up the production ladder, India is also seen as

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

Chinese geo-economics China is today the second largest economy in the world, definitely en route to being a significant world power. It is today also the largest trading partner for most countries. China’s goals towards East Asia inevitably changed since 1978 and further with its full fledged acceptance of the economic processes of globalisation. China’s relationship with ASEAN started with an economic relationship and China made strong commitments to the East Asian region by inviting initial investment from this region and directing trade and investment towards the region. The role of the overseas Chinese business community from Hong Kong, Malaysia and more importantly, Taiwan and their international networks also played a great role in China’s initial rapprochement with international trade and capital.

There are three distinct aspects to China’s relationship with the ASEAN region. One is strategic and this focuses on its bilateral ties with the United States and to a lesser extent Japan and India. The second is to create a greater economic interdependence in its neighbourhood. The third is of course China’s response to how ASEAN itself views this relationship.

For example, Niu Haibi speaks of the four competing conceptions within international circles about ASEAN and its relations with China. He speaks of the Greater China concept being balanced

by ASEAN’s own approach, one that is based on consultation and cooperation and describes ASEAN’s relationship as one of ‘positive engagement’.

Trade-security balance Yet, I would agree with Ashley Tellis when he argues that the overall framework of engagement in the region has been one that hopes to contain security issues without foregoing a trading relationship. As he points out, despite increasing and strengthening economic interdependence ASEAN has failed to evolve a joint security structure. Here again, the major bilateral disputes of all East Asian countries are with China. The South China Sea issue is a case in point. China has consistently refused to deal with these disputes with ASEAN as a bloc, a request by Vietnam for example. The growing land and sea connectivity between China and its near and far neighbourhood and simultaneously its investment in ports around East Asia and South Asia, its blue water navy has led strategic commentators to the conclusion that power is shifting inexorably towards China in the region.

Other scholars have pointed out how China seems to be pursuing a subregional policy using both its monetary and military wherewithal to influence policy to extend its influence. Myanmar, North Korea, Cambodia are examples

in the case of South East Asia while Nepal and Sri Lanka are examples in South Asia.

This sub-regionalism is part of China’s policy towards India as well, as it expands its economic and strategic relationship with Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Pakistan has always been its all weather friend. China’s expansion outward has till now been economic interdependence, where it is now the largest resource user of fossil fuel, steel, etc. It is often the end place for this global chain of commodity production today. It has also invested in ports, railways and land routes to ensure that nothing stands in its way with respect to resource reach or its gradual rise to eminence. Way back in 1985, Hu Yaobang, following Deng, is supposed to have said China will be a super power in 2049. Till then China should hedge its strength.

Containment fears China’s initial disinterest and even opposition to including Australia, New Zealand and India as part of the institutional network, have led some to argue that China wants to

maintain itself as the dominant party in East Asia and prefers a two tiered structure that would result in an East Asian version of the SCO. It had at one point argued for this, supported by Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand.

Australia, India and New Zealand were seen by China as fronts for America and the continuing attempt of what it has always called, America’s policy to contain China. Similarly, China’s perspective on India’s relationship with East Asia is well brought out by Zhao Hong. He points out that one of the reasons for India’s interest in East Asia is to counter China’s growing clout internationally and in the region.

According to him, China too was initially worried about other countries playing a role in ASEAN and saw it as interference and an attempt to balance China by India. He says: “Considering India’s past history and intention of pursuing status of regional hegemony in South Asia, ASEAN countries are cautious about its ambitions and expansionist policies”.

Security factors Today, I would argue that China is more comfortable with a greater

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Indian presence and is most definitely the dominant partner in East Asia.

Nevertheless, unlike India, China faces direct security challenges to its dominance in the region. China shares land and sea borders with the region and has historically seen itself as the primary economy and civilisation in the region. Similarly, America has once again started to make its presence felt in East Asia. The fact that security is in the minds of the USA, India, Japan and China once again is visible in the recent confrontations between both the US and Japan with China over its territorial waters in the South China Sea. China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean and its deep water navy has also caused concern in India with regard to its motives. Vietnam’s improving relations with the USA has also fuelled misgivings in China as to America’s motives.

Thus, I would argue that China’s relationship with East Asia is constantly complicated by its own past histories with the region and its troubled relations with America. Its constant need and search for resources as far afield as Latin America and Africa and its growing economy has led America to reevaluate its strategies towards China and its own role in East Asia. The strategic community of the USA feels, for example, that the PRC’s export led growth conceived and directed by a purposeful State is centered fundamentally on creating the wherewithal to support China’s rise as a traditional great power with the full panapoly of political, economic and military capabilities. This economic interdependence with the USA and East Asia is China’s strategy to keep Washington from stalling China’s rise. Tellis and Swaine call this and China’s overall strategy towards the world as “A Calculative Strategy”, designed to enhance and smooth China’s rise as a world power.

How the Sino-US relationship plays out in the future will be important for the way other countries work within the framework of ASEAN+3+3. We are aware that China sees America as the main challenge to its future rise and emergence as a super power. It is also aware of the fact that economic interdependence with the United States is a double edged sword and has not stopped either country from trying to maximise its security advantages and strategic depth.

Conclusion

zero sum game and in fact it would be counter productive for each party. This is where, I come back to my theoretical problem. When we speak of interdependence, what sort of interdependence? Is it an equal interdependence or an asymmetrical interdependence in trade and security?

As our foreign secretary recently said the sensitivity to each other’s interest cannot be ‘one sided’. Rhetoric must be matched with action so that it leads to a reduction in the trust deficit that still exists both between member States of the ASEAN region with regard to the South China Seas and where India is concerned, its own border dispute with China.

In this article, I have attempted to sketch a broad picture of the dynamics involving India and China’s relationship, both bilaterally and with the ASEAN bloc. In conclusion, the China-ASEAN relationship is a complicated relationship since China shares a near neighbourhood and also historical and boundary disputes. India on the other hand, does not suffer from any old legacies of dispute. Instead it shares with East and South East Asia its past of a spiritual and socio-religious relationship. It is also not known as an aggressive power. Sino-Indian relations on the other hand, do colour India’s perspective on China’s motives in East / South East and South Asia as a whole. In the last two years, like Japan and Vietnam, India too has witnessed a more aggressive China on the issue of boundary disputes. Its changed position on Kashmir is only the more recent of such moves. This year has seen China and the United States, China and Vietnam, China and India and China and Japan come into confrontation. We are thus, seeing a new and increasingly vocal and confident China and the region as a whole will have to work with this.

This means the discourse of Asian regionalism too needs to be deconstructed and assessed against the real contradictions that can arise within nations. This is especially true with the way religious and nationalist sentiment can impinge upon supranational institutions. This is as true for the European Union as it is for ASEAN and its complex +3+3 structure. This is also true for growing Chinese nationalism and its opinion of other countries and nationalities. Within democracies too, for example, nationalist sentiment can create difficult negotiating positions for bilateral ties. But at the same time, this very open structure creates transparency, consensus and longevity to any decision that is taken. The balance between domestic sentiment and international compromise is the hallmark of democracies and reflective of consensus and consultation that ASEAN calls the ASEAN way.

Transparency is where, perhaps China’s decisions and statements lead to a trust deficit. Perhaps both countries can learn from the ASEAN way.

However, where South East Asia is concerned, the Sino-Indian relationship should not be seen as a

The writer is Reader for Chinese Studies at Delhi University and Director of the Euro-Asia Institute, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, India.

Chinese guise

POWER STRUGGLE

If there is one lesson that India should have learned from the Chinese invasion of 1962 it is that if China is looking for a fight; there will be a fight. That it is looking for a fight is obvious in the way it has forced Japan to back down on the trawler issue and the US to backtrack on the naval exercises in the Yellow Sea. It has, by its book of bullying, proved that they are nothing but paper tigers. That is what it wants all the world to know.

A

t the outset it is useful to mention one thing about India’s security practice. Ever since Nehru’s brief stint with his romantic notion of building an alternative paradigm of “dynamic neutralism’ (which later became the Non-Aligned Movement), India has been a hesitant practitioner of the ‘power balance’ and the Realist thinking that has recently crept into its security and foreign policy making. While attention has been focused on the rise of China and its impact on relationships in Asia, the emergence of India is now attracting increased attention and there is growing concern of the possibility of strategic competition between China and India and its possible impact on the region.

Sino-Indian dynamics In recent years, the ‘rise of China’ has become a frequently evoked term of reference, as has the ‘rise of India’.

There may still be debate over exactly how far both have risen and about their precise Great Power status, but

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one can say that their’s is a significant relationship and they are significant powers as well. Both have widening geopolitical hori­zons, yet as adjacent major States they both strive to stamp their authority on the same region.

Geopolitics starts off here in its straightforward ‘classical’ sense, the way in which geography affects politics, or rather international politics.

It is important for understanding Sino-Indian dynamics; overlapping territory and loca­tion are at stake; strategic space matters for them and hence something of a ‘Power Struggle’ seems to be at play between these two rising powers where the concept of ‘Power Struggle’ is referred to as competition in influence, hegemony and profits.

Land-sea rivalry Such competition is at stake in the current Sino-Indian relations - and it is in this sense that their relationship can be described as another great contest.

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From India’s viewpoint, the current challenge posed by China’s tight grip on Tibet and her growing influence in Asia and close land links with Pakistan are of utmost importance, The Oceanic elements are also a geopolitical factor in the Sino-Indian relation­ship, evoking Mahan and his emphasis on sea-power enabling power projection and control of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs).

Struggle for power As States on the rise, China and India face each other in the interna­tional system, spatially and power-wise. The Sino-Indian relationship presents attitudes of optimistic cooperative engagement and of pessimistic antagonistic containment which are discernible in both countries.

The government rhetoric currently stresses cooperative dynamics, yet we notice an image of competition and rivalry. The media has been rife with speculations almost every day in the recent past covering areas like

China:

century?

Dr. Sanjeev Bhadauria

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POWER STRUGGLE

military-security, economics and diplomacy. It would be pertinent to analyse whether globalisation has replaced regionalism and where does geo-economics stand vis-à-vis geo-politics while dissecting the issue at hand.

and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity” with New Delhi in 2005. This latter development signals an important upgrade in relations between the two countries and a sign that Chinese officials recognise India will become a significant Asian power.

and Dong Feng 21 ballistic missiles, thus helping it bridge its military capability gap with its Indian rival.

All three of Pakistan’s first nuclear plants, in Kahuta, Chasma and Khushab, were built by the Chinese.

China has not only supplied Islamabad

The stakes are high as both have similar need for securing access to energy resources for their economicsled rise to ‘Great Power’ status along with ‘pursuit of primacy’ in geopolitical sense. On the political front, India like any other rising State, desires to be recognised as a great power in the international order.

The two nations share a desire to see the interna­tional sphere transition to a multi-polar structure in which each country has an increased voice in global affairs. Military relations between the two neighbours have also steadily improved, with an agreement in 2006 to begin undertaking joint military exercises, as well as high-level exchanges between their respective armed forces.

with nuclear and missile components, it has given it the technology to allow it to indigenise these weapon systems.

The three Ts viz Taiwan, Tibet, Trade and currency are major irritants between China and USA and India could emerge as the swing State in the global balance of power. It will have an opportunity to shape outcomes on the most critical issues of the twenty-first century and to play a key role in the great struggles of the coming decades

Chinese challenge India’s unresolved territorial and boundary dispute with China and an un-demarcated Line of Actual Control (LAC) on the India-Tibet border do not augur well for long-term peace and stability between these two Asian giants. Though the border is relatively stable, a future border war with China, though improbable, cannot be ruled out. China’s carefully orchestrated plan aimed at the strategic encirclement of India is evident from its unjustifiable opposition to India’s nuclear weapons programme; its strong military support to the ruling regime in Myanmar; its diabolical assistance to the LTTE in Sri Lanka; its increasing proclivity to build and acquire ports in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea – the so-called “string of pearls” strategy; its attempts to isolate India in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and to prevent India’s entry to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO); and, its relentless efforts to increase its influence in Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. Clearly, China’s growing power and influence in Asia poses a long-term strategic challenge to India as a competing regional power.

Positive developments On the political front, having fully normalised relations in 2003, Beijing entered into what it calls a “Strategic

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Dumping ground?

On one hand, economic cooperation and enhanced political ties benefit both nations: bilateral trade between the two Asian giants stands at nearly US$ 60 billion which the two are expected to do with each other this year (230 times the total in 1990). China has recently displaced the United States as India’s largest trading partner while India is China’s ninth-largest market. China may have replaced the US as India’s number one trading partner, but India is a secondary source of commerce for China when compared with the United States, Taiwan or Japan. Moreover, the trade relationship is profoundly unbalanced and increasingly a source of anxiety in the Indian business community. This is due to India’s soaring trade deficit with China, India’s economic weakness vis-a-vis China may actually spark conflict rather than dampen it.

Sino-Pak entente Despite improving relations with India, China has not been less warm towards Pakistan; if anything their ties have grown stronger. China actively assisted Pakistan with its nuclear programme from the late 1980s onwards and has provided it with ready-to-launch M-9, M-11

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Potential for discord Balancing these positive developments, however, is the long-standing friction: Their 1962 war inflicted a humiliating defeat on India and created an unresolved border dispute. Such security tensions are not helped by China’s on-going military buildup. Further­more, China has been a principal supplier of weapons technology, both conventional and nuclear, to Pakistan, India’s South Asian bete noire. In July 2007, Beijing deep­ened this “all-weather friendship” when it signed a free trade agreement with Islama­bad. But of far greater concern to India are China’s gestures of support for Pakistan in its periodic confrontation or conflict with India.

Indian Ocean foray China’s ambitions in the Indian Ocean are another source of worry to India which has been seen as ‘China’s next frontier’. According to an American Pentagon study, General Zhao Nanqi, Director of the General Logistics Department of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) issued a top-secret memorandum that disclosed the PLA’s strategy to consolidate Chinese control over the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. He noted: ‘We can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as only an Ocean of the Indians’.

Energy demands The potential for discord between the two countries can also be clearly seen in the energy sector. Beijing is desperate to secure hydrocarbon

resources for its expanding economy, while India is increasingly reliant on similar energy sources. In recent years, China has beaten India in head-to-head competition for oil assets in Kazakhstan, Ecuador and Nigeria. Despite the pledges of future cooperation in pursuit of energy supplies, it can be argued that India is in a fundamentally competitive if not conflictual relationship with China in their joint quest for energy resources. China’s efforts to secure its access to overseas energy resources have brought it into India’s backyard.

Oil from East Africa and the Persian Gulf must cross the Indian Ocean to make its way to the market in China.

In an effort to secure its interests, China has helped establish a network of ports and partnerships with countries in the littoral region - including several nations that have traditionally been hostile to India.

Improving economics The two countries are seen as serious long-term rivals—especially if India continues to tilt towards America. As recently as the early 1990s, India was as rich, in terms of national income per head. China then hurtled so far ahead that it seemed India could never catch up. But India’s long-term prospects now look stronger. While China is about to see its working-age population shrink, India is enjoying the sort of bulge in manpower which brought sustained booms elsewhere in Asia. It is no longer inconceivable that its growth could outpace China’s for a

Parallel to its strategic alignment with the US, India has been engaging ASEAN States as well as Australia and Japan. Adhering to the age-old precept of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” India has been stepping up its military ties with countries traditionally wary of China’s power in the region, such as Vietnam and, looking even further afield, to Mongolia. New Delhi has also managed to create, after a decade of painstaking groundwork, a sub-regional organisation, BIMSTEC, or the Bangladesh-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation, which effectively links South Asia to Southeast Asia.

Conflictual relations As China and India rise in tandem, their relationship will shape world politics. It is a shame they do not get on better. These two Asian giants, which until 1800 used to make up half the world economy, are not mere nation-States but in terms of size and population, each is a virtual continent.

As for changing the ‘power balance’, the People’s Liberation Army’s steady upgrading of its technological capacity, its building of a bluewater navy and its fast-developing skills in outer space and cyberspace do not yet unnerve India. Its humiliation at Chinese hands in a brief war nearly 50 years ago still rankles. A tradition of strategic mistrust of China is deeply ingrained. India sees China as working to undermine it at every level: by pre-empting it in securing supplies of the energy both must import; through manoeuvres to block a permanent seat for India on the United Nations Security Council; and, above all, through friendships with its smaller South Asian neighbours, notably Pakistan.

India also notes that China, after decades of setting their border quarrels to one side in the interests of the broader relationship, has in recent years hardened its position on the disputes in Tibet and Kashmir that in 1962 led to war. This unease has pushed India strategically closer to America - most notably in a deal on nuclear co-operation.

considerable time. It has the advantage of democracy—at least as a pressure valve for discontent. India’s army is, in numbers, second only to China and America. India does not threaten the West; it has powerful friends both on its own merits and as a counterweight to China.

India looks eastwards The Indo-US strategic partnership is still very much in its infancy and one needs to give it more time to mature and evolve before delivering any definite prognostics. A strategically enhanced ‘Look East Policy’ is an attempt to counter Chinese preeminence in Asia.

Noose vs necklace It would be worthwhile to analyse how far has China succeeded in encircling India with its “string of pearls” and how has India responded with its “necklace of friendship”. Over the past two decades, New Delhi has undertaken a concerted effort to direct its foreign, economic and military policies eastward. What began as economic coopera­tion with the nations of Southeast Asia has expanded into full-spectrum engagement with the major powers of East Asia, such as Japan and the United States. India’s expanding role in the Asia-Pacific has been facilitated by countries such as

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Chinese guise

POWER STRUGGLE

Singapore, Vietnam and Indonesia that look to the South Asian giant to help hedge against Beijing’s growing regional influence.

India and Asia-Pacific A steadily expanding economy, paired with a growing partnership with key regional actors and an increasingly capable Navy, posi­tions India to have an impact on the emerging security architecture of the Asia-Pacific.

India’s emerging influence in East and Southeast Asia is driven by a host of factors including geography, economics and historical ties. Nevertheless, in understanding India’s push towards the Pacific Ocean, it is difficult to ignore the role played by its northern neighbour. India’s relations with China have become complicated.

Indian Ocean Strategic experts suggest that the goal of this so-called “string of pearls” strategy is to secure access to locations that could be used to project Chinese power into the Indian Ocean. Regardless of whether or not the “string of pearls” is an accu­rate characterisation of Beijing’s Indian Ocean strategy, China has certainly been active in the region and Hambantota is the latest jewel in a so-called string of pearls that will pave the way for China’s rapidly expanding navy to operate routinely in the Indian Ocean from secure bases in the region.

The aim would be to challenge US and Indian naval dominance in the area and ensure that China itself could protect vital trade and energy supply lines instead of having to rely on potentially hostile powers. However, it seems highly unlikely that the commercial port facilities China has helped to build at Hambantota and Gwadar will be converted into bases for the Chinese Navy.

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is little doubt that the phenomenal growth of China has served to spur India into action.

bet for who reaches the finishing line on top by 2099 will look very different than it does today.

In terms of resources, India also appears to hold some aces. Its available workforce is now double that of China, and is crucially growing younger. Its birthrate is nearly three times that of China, suggesting that future cheap global labour requirements and labour intensive industries will start to migrate. What used to be China’s main economic driver – the provision of cheap labour to service global demand – is being whittled away.

The genesis

India’s richer resources That goes hand in hand with natural resources. India possesses 8,00,000 square kilometers more usable arable land than China and 10 times the natural fresh water resources. This has huge implications for the agricultural and textile industries. If India is smart and manages these resources properly, it will begin to emerge as a highly competitive player in these global markets. This will affect India’s domestic demand as well – increased demand for Indian agriculture will lift hundreds of millions of Indian farmers out of poverty and into meaningful consumption and wealth creation models.

Improving infrastructure

Future prospects

Much has been made of India’s lack of infrastructure and again, when held up against the current Chinese systems it looks ramshackle. A currently miserable 70,000 kilometers of highway (express routes) pales against China’s 1.4 million kilometers. India has plans however to develop and invest significant amounts into building a national highway system and these are currently well underway. This is expected to double India’s available highways in length in the next five years.

The rise of India has been greatly overshadowed by what has happened in China over the past twenty years.

If the development in China had not occurred, then it would be India that would be considered the new darling of global growth. To some extent, that has enabled India to commence its own growth curves without the media attention that has been focused on China. In other ways, however, there

By 2030, hopefully based on current trends, India would have overtaken China in terms of population and almost certainly in GDP growth rates.

With double the amount of available workforce, a younger population and a consumer economy of its own of about half a billion people in its new middle class, India’s tortoise against China’s hare would have caught up significantly. When that happens, the

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

Sino-Indian relations present a mixed picture. In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, much of the debate on security in the Asia-Pacific was dominated by how geo-economics would emerge as a dominant theme as opposed to geo-politics. In fact the opposition is too forced; geopolitics at times involves geo-economics when it comes to questions of how easily or difficult a state might find it to access resources, especially in the energy field. Sea Lines of Communication are not only a question of geopolitics, but also of geo-economics. Trade and investment patterns are not necessarily global; they remain at times much regionalised. Geopolitics remains an important vehicle for analysing both powers. Such dynamics of interstate tensions in Asia continue to be defined most accurately in geopolitical terms.

Mackinder-Mahanian paradigms on land-maritime power projection remain relevant for understanding India and China’s drive and responses to each other.

Mutual sensitivity The simultaneous emergence of India and China as Asian and global powers in fact makes it imperative for them to be sensitive to each other’s interests and aspirations and they should work together to mutually support their rightful place. The only trouble is that the immediate spaces in Asia where they are going into, i.e., Southeast Asia and Central Asia and their respective backyards of East Asia and South Asia, are ones where their interests are involved and often in diverging rather than converging ways.

China’s ‘string of pearls’ geopolitical projection cuts across India’s SLOC, whilst India’s ‘necklace of friendship’ with countries like Singapore, Vietnam and Japan can seem more like a choker for China. Probably, in the coming years, a major realignment of forces is likely to take place that may pitch India against China, as the two leading Asian heavyweights.

Minimal equilibrium?

China

has

probably

established

a more comprehensive encirclement of India than has India of China. China’s ability to directly threaten the heartland of India from its adjacent base of Tibet is unmatched by any comparable Indian land position. China’s links with Pakistan and also Myanmar, are not matched

by India’s land presence in Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Mongolia, either in terms of depth or size.

However, there are some countervailing trends, where India’s links with Japan and most of all with the United States make India a worrisome factor for Chinese strategists.

India as the premier rimland power will have to quickly consolidate its comprehensive military strength and choose its options wisely in order to play the key role of system balancer and stabiliser, whose support can tip the balance for or against the mainly maritime US in its tussle with the prospective Eurasian heartland giant, China. The three Ts viz Taiwan, Tibet, Trade and currency are major irritants between China and USA and India could emerge as the swing State in the global balance of power. It will have an opportunity to shape outcomes on the most critical issues of the twenty-first century and to play a key role in the great struggles of the coming decades.

Contending Great Games Faced with each other, both China and India have similar policies. India’s ‘Great Game’, its Grand Strategy in effect, vis-a-vis China is a hedging strategy, one of ‘coengagement’, with elements of containment along with USA and Japan while trying to retain and further consolidate its pre-eminence in the Indian Ocean.

China’s Great Game with India is a similar hedging one, i.e., containment (through encirclement and ‘strategic proxies’) as well as engagement, whilst driving for pre-eminence in Pacific Asia. Both are hoping to gain enough resources and time to complete their respective peaceful rises by the mid-twenty-first century. As two rimland powers, they may over time emphasise a Mahan path to the oceans

and to sea power, or they may seek a Mackinder path to establish land power and pre-eminence inside Asia. Conflict or cooperation remains possible in either direction. Geopolitics and ‘the logic of geography’ remain relevant for these two emerging Great Powers from, in and around Asia.

Renewing benign ties Collectively, India’s expanding economic ties, its growing partnerships with key regional actors and its increasingly capable navy will have an important impact on the evolving regional order in the Asia-Pacific. After nearly half a century of “confinement” to the sub-continent, India is increasingly making its presence felt across Asia’s various sub-regions, reprising a role that it played in centuries past. While this conclusion generally concurs with the thrust of recent assessments of India’s foreign policy goals in Asia and its potential role in shaping the region’s future security architecture, it is somewhat more circumspect about India’s present level of influence in the Asia-Pacific. In the near term, India’s presence and influence will be felt most strongly in Southeast Asia; however it has clearly signalled an ambition to play a leading role in the international politics of the broader Asia-Pacific region. Although it will be some time, if ever, before India’s power projection

and political influence match the full extent of its regional ambition, it is clear that India is much more than a State that merely “interacts with the Asia-Pacific in various ways”.

Both India and China have huge list of internal problems. They would do themselves immense good if they can focus their energies in fighting poverty, over-population, diseases, poor infrastructure, imbalanced development, corruption and human rights violations. Both countries have neighbours who share antagonistic relations with them. Conflictual relations will benefit the minions who won’t mind largesse from both sides and play up for short sighted benefits. Asian values should drive the governance in both countries and together they should ensure that the twenty-first century truly belongs to Asia.

Time will tell exactly how the relationship will mix competition and cooperation. These two nations both aspire to “first-world” status— and economic gains could be the incentive for a more tightly allied Asia.

The two countries are not mutually dependent.

The writer is Associate Professor, Dept. of Defence and Strategic Studies, Allahabad Central University, Allahabad, India.

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ANTAGONISM

Aggressive

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November 2010 Defence AND security alert

China: Maj. Gen. (Retd.) G. D. Bakshi

India over-cautious?

We had been politically blinkered in our approach to Chinese diplomacy in the runup to the attack in 1962. Something similar has happened in the past decade when we have practically parlayed our sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir for the billion dollar increase in trade with China little realising that the corridor along the Karakoram Highway will be worth trainloads of gold both commercial and strategic.

I

Meltdown bonanza

super power-hood in three stages. The first stage was to end in 2010 and would prepare China to tackle any moderately sized adversary in Asia (Chinese lexicon for Taiwan, India and Vietnam).

By 2020 China wished to see itself on par with Russia, Japan or Europe. By 2050 it would be a full fledged super power. However, the global financial melt-down seems to have caused a paradigm shift in Chinese perceptions.

Iraq and Afghanistan seem to have bogged the US down and highlighted the limits of its military power. The Beijing Olympics were China’s coming of age party. Far more significant were a series of military exercises (including Stride–2009) to test and showcase Chinese military capabilities.

China had accordingly designed a perspective plan to achieve full fledged

In 2010, Chinese State behaviour has shown an alarmingly aggressive

n the year 2009 and 2010 we have seen a dramatic pattern shift in China’s behaviour as a State. The peaceful rise theory has been jettisoned in favour of a far more assertive and aggressive approach. China had consciously sought a peaceful periphery since 1978 to effect its four modernisations.

Deng Xiaoping had cited the period of the ”Warring Kingdoms” in the Third Century BC era of Chinese history, as a close parallel to the emerging multi-polar world order today and had advised the Chinese to “Shun brilliance and Nourish Obscurity” or in more prosaic terms to “hide your capabilities and bide your time”.

streak – not just against Asian rivals like India, Vietnam and Japan but against the US itself. China declared the Yellow Sea and South China Seas as its latest core areas of interest and forced the US to back off from a naval exercise in the Yellow Sea. The US was forced to oblige. So was Japan forced to climb down a little later on the issue of the arrest and trial of the Captain of the Chinese trawler apprehended in the disputed Senkaku Islands.

Counter-weight strategy As regards India – the Chinese strategy has been to exert major pressure by building Pakistan into a regional counter-weight that will perennially box in India into the South Asian firewalls. China has given Pakistan unprecedented levels of support to

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Chinese guise

ANTAGONISM

build a nuclear and missile arsenal and strengthen its conventional military capabilities to deter any Indian reaction to Pakistan’s asymmetric offensive in J & K and the rest of India. The levels of Chinese proliferation support to Pakistan are simply unprecedented in the annals of world history. Strangely, even though this nuclear and missile proliferation support seriously hurts India’s national security interests, India has never made this an issue with China.

Divisions. The PLAAF can deploy upwards of two Air Divisions (six Air Regiments). In a crisis China can fly in 3-4 PLA Divisions in a matter of less than a week (airlift up to 15,000 plus troops in 48 hours, paradrop a Brigade and bring in two battalions in a single lift via helicopters). It has deployed hundreds of CSS-6 and 7 short range missiles in Tibet and has now inducted the DF-21 medium range solid-fuelled missiles.

While from 1988 onwards, India was making major peace overtures to China, Beijing (while mouthing platitudes) was seriously engaged in building up Pakistan as a military counterweight to India. It has primarily been Chinese nuclear and military support which has encouraged Pakistan to launch an all out asymmetric war against India without any fear of retaliation. While China ensured a peaceful periphery for itself, it ensured that India did not get the same through an implacably hostile Pakistan.

There are initial indications of China’s efforts to supply arms to the Maoists.

A close analysis of Chinese media posturing had focused our attention on to Tawang. Militarily Tawang is a stone wall where it may not be easy for China to make major inroads. This must be well known to the PLA. China’s media hype on Tawang therefore could well be a strategic deception plan.

China eyeing Kashmir?

China is seeking an outlet to the “warm waters” of the Persian Gulf via a major rail-road cum pipeline artery from the Karakoram to Gwadar. This is a critical component of China’s “Malacca Bypass Strategy” to circumvent the naval choke point through which its energy supplies have to pass. This greatly enhances the strategic significance of J & K for China and explains China’s recent tilt towards Pakistan on Kashmir. The first signals came with the stapling of visas on to the passports of Indian citizens from J & K. The surprise came with China’s refusal to give a visa to the Indian Army Commander in J & K. This shift in stance has ominous implications which do not seem to have been thought through by us. Besides China is aggressively trying to box in India via its string of pearls strategy and making major inroads into Nepal, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and the Maldives.

The most alarming development this year has been its forays into Gilgit and PoK, where its menacing military presence has become all too visible.

China has invested massively in improving its military infrastructure in Tibet. It can now induct 20-25 Divisions into TAR in just one season.

Other estimates put it higher than 30

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The recent inroads in Gilgit point to Ladakh and J & K as being a likely centre of gravity of Chinese military operations. In J & K China can put military pressure on India in concert with Pakistan. The Op-logistical ability to bring 30 divisions in Tibet means that China can activate the entire India-China border with a massive and multi-pronged onslaught.

The operational focus on J & K becomes ominous in the light of the current internal security situation there. India needs to take this joint Sino-Pak threat very seriously indeed. It has grave implications for our territorial integrity and national security.

Response options What then are India’s response options? The first and foremost requirement is to urgently enhance the pace of our military modernisation.

Instead of a distant modernisation timeframe set for completion by 2025, we will have to rapidly accelerate the pace of our weapons induction.

Primary importance will have to be given to airpower. By 2020, the Chinese Air Force will have some 2,300 combat aircraft of the fourth or fifth generation (to our 750). The Air Chief recently highlighted that 50 per cent of our air fleet is obsolescent.

The Indian artillery has been desperately seeking to standardise itself around the 155 mm calibre now for over two decades. So far we have

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

failed to get a suitable 155 mm gun to replace the aborted Bofors deal. The tank fleet is still 70 per cent night blind.

Our entire air defence inventory is of the 1960s and 70s vintage and in urgent need of replacement. The Infantry basic weapon systems need an overhaul.

The key question is by when will this get done? There are gaping voids that we must fill urgently to avoid opening serious windows of vulnerability. The pace of our military build-up cannot be seen in isolation. It has to be viewed in tandem with the rate of weapons systems acquisition by China and Pakistan.

Force restructuring The Maoist threat gives us the rationale to raise five to six additional Infantry / Mountain Divisions. These would be so very useful in containing the Maoist upsurge now and could subsequently be used against China or Pakistan if the need arises. (The indiscriminate raising of such large numbers of CRPF battalions has proved to be a national waste of scarce resources). We should be able to field minimum two Mountain Strike Corps against China. This translates into a requirement for six additional divisions. Six additional Divisions could yield great dividends in a conflict with Pakistan. Their raising by itself could deter further Pakistani adventurism and provide much needed jobs. We must develop a credible Air Assault Capability to carry us over the Himalayan hump and we must ensure qualitative superiority in air power and not allow the quantitative mismatch to reach levels that could prove dangerous. The Indian Navy must ready itself for the forays of the Chinese Navy into the IOR and generate littoral power projection options to target the Chinese mainland / islands and seriously address Chinese sea lanes of communication (SLOC) vulnerabilities in case of war.

Operation Falcon III Operation Falcon had been conceived

by Gen. K. V. Krishna Rao in 1980.

It envisaged a forward defensive posture in the Himalayas instead of the pathetically passive response of holding defence lines deep in our own depth areas. This conceded a virtual walkover to China in the initial phase of any conflict and underscored

our failure to outgrow the post-1962 mindset of timidity and over-caution.

What was far more important was the fact that in a short war scenario, this foreclosed any counter offensive / counter-stroke options. This posture was to be implemented gradually over a 15-year period. It gained momentum in 1986/87 with the Sumdorong Chu incident.

However in 1988, Rajiv Gandhi visited China. To appease China we thereafter completely wound down Op Falcon. The Chinese used this period to overhaul their logistical infrastructure in Tibet by extending a railway line to Lhasa and upgrading their road arteries and building major airbases while we were so carried away by the gush of our own peace initiatives that we put a complete halt to all our infrastructure development plans in the border areas.

(In fact some of the infrastructure already created also deteriorated due to lack of regular maintenance in this extended interregnum).

History repeating itself?

India thus lost almost two critical decades. We now urgently need to upgrade our logistical support infrastructure to simply catch up with China and make up for two lost decades in the Himalayas. (If need be we will have to choose between the Red Panda or the Red Army). Let us not lose sight of history. In 1962 we had lost because China had methodically spent a decade to build up its operational-logistic infrastructure in Tibet while we sang “Hindi-Chini bhai bhai” psalms! One prays that it is not already too late and history will not repeat itself. The pity is that the Chinese military and civilian sectors speak in two different voices.

In India on the pretext of maintaining civilian supremacy, the Armed Forces are cajoled not to speak plain facts of military threat assessments. They are often coerced to fall in line with the peace rhetoric and take it so very seriously that they renege on their primary duty of keeping the Government informed of their objective threat assessments and concomitant response options.

This had precisely led to the disaster of 1962. Mercifully things are a little better now and the humiliation of 1962 had given the civilian elite plenty of reason for not exhibiting certitude bordering on hubris. The attack of 1962 had sensitsed them to the dire need to heed

professional military advice and analysis.

This had stood us well thereafter in the decade of the 1960s through to the 1980s.

From the 1990s onwards, h o w e v e r , the pre-1962 certitude of the infallibility of soft power and diplomacy as the panacea for all security problems has been replaced with an overwhelming reliance on economic power alone as the sole mantra for solving all problems. This should not again generate civilian hubris of the type that had resulted in the 1962 disaster.

Strategic Asian alliances An assertive and aggressive China calls for abundant caution. Even while we strengthen our military capabilities and close the gaping windows of vulnerability, we need to reach out to countries in Asia that are equally threatened by China. We must build a very close strategic partnership with Vietnam, Japan and South Korea.

India must offer assistance to Vietnam for a civil nuclear capability and provide more meaningful assistance in conventional military terms. It will pay China back in its own coin for its unprecedented proliferation support to Pakistan.

China’s aggressive behaviour makes the USA a natural extraregional balancer. India and the USA share a commitment to democratic values. However these have not proved adequate in the past to ensure strategic congruence between the two democracies. It would now be very logical for the USA to build India into a military counter-weight to China. It must do so in the manner in which the USSR did the same in the 1970s. The Soviet military sales were at friendship prices (the cost of bananas) and they demanded no intrusive inspections and logistic support agreements etc. That

relationship was built on mutual respect and complimentarity of interests and therefore was built to last.

The complimentarity of strategic interests with the US is now equally high. President Obama’s forthcoming visit therefore presents a golden opportunity that both sides could leverage. The best way to kill it would be if the US seeks to pressurise India on the issue of Kashmir. It could then become a PR disaster of the highest magnitude. The USA cannot be seen to be ganging up with China and Pakistan to put pressure on India to settle the Kashmir issue to Pakistan’s satisfaction at a critical time when the internal security scenario in Kashmir has become so grim. One is fairly certain that this hyper-sensitive issue will not gain much traction in the forthcoming Indo-US strategic dialogue which should rightly focus on the rising threat from China and concrete measures to contain the same. India gifting Kashmir for a veto-less permanent seat in the UNSC is a rather bizarre joke to bring to the table in such a crucial strategic dialogue.

The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in J&K and Punjab. He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Punch districts. He has served two tenures at the highly prestigious Directorate General of Military Operations. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 17 books and over 70 papers in many prestigious research journals.

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India

eternal enemies There is no way that one can read the tea-leaves in the cup and come up with a clear prediction that at a particular point in time and space the two Asian giants will clash over competing aspirations. There are possibilities that if they so decide the two can shape an “Asian Era�, both sharing the limelight, both garnering its benefits. If they can dump the baggage of history, what can be seen today as points of conflicts (as at the India-China-Pakistan triangle; and the India-China-BangladeshMyanmar quadrangle) can be converted into platforms for global geopolitical transformation.

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November 2010 Defence AND security alert

China:

or future allies?

N

apoleon famously said, “Let China sleep, for when China wakes, she will shake the whole world”. This also applies to India. For almost two hundred years, China and India seemed to follow Napoleon’s instruction, staying dormant and serving as arena for rivalry among great powers. China in 1979 and India in 1991 began the process of coming out of long slumber and world began shaking.

China and India’s reawakening is reshaping the global economic and political landscape. Economic growth also means that China and India become more assertive, casting a larger shadow on the region and the world.

Ancient baggage

Despite a growing sense of competition, India is actually moving closer to China in a certain respect, one that relates to the two countries’ entries onto the global stage. India has moved away from the non-alignment to multi-alignment and also from the self-righteousness of the Nehru era as well as the combativeness of Indira Gandhi’s years.

For the first time in more than half a millennium, India and China are simultaneously marching upward on their relative power trajectories. Both

Prof. Tej Pratap Singh

see Asia’s rise on the world stage as bringing about the end of Western dominance. Both have a long history of bitter rivalry and an unresolved border dispute. Both are plagued by domestic linguistic, ethno-religious and politicoeconomic faultlines that could be their undoing if not managed properly.

Wide divergences Regarding Sino-India relations, there are two major schools of thought, one overly pessimist and other overly optimistic. “The Eternal Enemy School”, paints a very gloomy picture of Sino-India relations. China’s

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ASIAN GIANTS

all-out support to Pakistan’s ambitions of strategic parity with India and China’s consistent effort to undermine Indian influence in its immediate (South Asia) and extended neighbourhood (Southeast Asia and Far East). These are well thought out Chinese strategies to thwart and delay the rise of India as a significant global power in Asia and compel India to accept China as the hegemon that must not be engaged in

on the west. Here in these forums both unite in the name of third world solidarity against the first worldimperial west. In Copenhagen Summit of December 2009, the world took notice of close Sino-Indian cooperation. This brightened the prospect of improved Sino-Indian relations. It has been described as Copenhagen spirit. Brazil and South Africa have also joined China and India and thus forming a

distribution of power is shifting to Asia.

This process of shifting of power from the west to the east can be expedited by the close partnership between these two Asian giants.

Sino-Indian rivalry Beijing aspires to have command over vital sea lanes between the Indian and Pacific Oceans through a string

China hates being compared to India as India hates being compared to Pakistan. India wants to be de-hyphenated from Pakistan but loves to be hyphenated with China and China loves to be hyphenated with the United States. Whereas the US hates to be compared with any nation and wants to maintain its pre-eminent global position the regional competition. “The Chindia School” is too optimistic and indulges in wishful thinking. The cooperation between these two Asian giants will hasten an end to the American and European domination of the world and usher in the much awaited Asian Century or Asian renaissance.

Sino-India cooperation will shift the centre of gravity of the world power from the occident to the orient and will herald the emergence of the era of oriental powers.

Since India’s independence in 1947 and advent of communist regime in China in 1949, both the Asian giants have been involved in the great game of engagement and containment. Because of globalised world it has become imperative for both the nations to engage each other for trading and commercial reasons and because of Asian geopolitics they are bound to contain each other.

Rising China and India are finding it difficult to accommodate the interest of each other despite Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s repeated remarks that world is vast enough to accommodate the interests of both India as well as China. Despite being together on several global issues, they often end up at loggerheads on bilateral and regional issues.

In multilateral forums like multilateral trade talks called Doha round of talks, G-20 summits and climate change talks such as the Copenhagen Summit, both India and China get along well and they coordinated their strategies to take

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powerful bloc of developing countries against the developed countries. In Doha round multilateral trade talks, India and China are cooperating on the contentious issues of agriculture subsidy and non-agriculture market access (NAMA). The same Sino-Indian cooperation has been witnessed in G-20 summits also.

Nehruvian dialectics Nehru courted China, seeing it as a benign neighbour that had, like India, emerged from the ravages of colonialism. New Delhi even opposed a discussion in the UN General Assembly in November 1950 on Tibet’s appeal for international help. Nehru was also offered permanent membership of the Security Council from Asian quota, which was given to China but then was being held by Nationalist China (Taiwan). Nehru declined the offer and urged the US to give it to Communist China, which was the true successor State of China and not Taiwan. But because of geopolitical reality of Asia, Nehru’s vision of the close Sino-Indian ties could not make much headway and Nehru later regretted his trust on China.

Asian centurians However, despite several setbacks including Sino-Indian war in 1962, there is a large group of scholars both in India and China, who advocate close partnership between the two, for the rise of Asia and ushering in of the Asian Century. North America and West Europe are declining and global

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of bases, naval facilities and military ties. This has been described by the strategic community as “String of pearls” strategy. China has built or is in the process of building ports at Sittwe in Myanmar, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Gwadar in Balochistan of Pakistan.

Chinese security agencies operate an electronic-intelligence and maritime reconnaissance facility on the Coco Islands in Myanmar. Coco Islands was transferred by India to Burma (Myanmar) in 1950s, which then was leased to Beijing in 1994. All these are neighbours of India and all have some sort of bilateral differences with India.

China being extra-regional power and hostile to India, India’s neighbours have roped in China in their hedging strategy against India. The emergence of Chinese facilities on each flank of Indian peninsula represents a major challenge to India’s command of the sea in its own backyard. China critics have accused China of pursuing the policy of encirclement against India and so India should also pay back China in the same coin by forging close strategic partnerships with Japan, Vietnam, Taiwan, Mongolia and countries of ASEAN who are feeling threatened by the rise of Chinese power. China’s strategy for a forward naval presence in places like Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Pakistan represents a direct challenge to India’s national security interests in the Bay of Bengal, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean - all critical areas for world trade and oil shipments.

Rise of China has alarmed the

countries of Southeast and East Asia and so countries of these regions want the presence of the US and Indian Navy to counterbalance the Chinese power.

They do not feel threatened by the Indian Navy. Moreover, India also has enormous goodwill and soft power in these two regions. India’s “look east policy” has also helped in bringing India closer to the countries of this region. Over the years Japan, Singapore and Vietnam have emerged as the great supporters of increasing Indian naval presence in the region.

However, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar have denied that deep sea ports being built by the Chinese are military ports. China has claimed that it has no strategic interests in these sea ports and has rubbished the whole idea of string of pearls or encirclement of India. This is canard spread by the anti-Chinese strategic community both in India and the US, who still suffer from cold war mindset and cannot think beyond the strategy of containment and encirclement.

Pakistan factor Pakistan is a time tested “all weather friend” of China and a vital link in China’s new communication chain connecting the oil-rich Persian Gulf, Middle East and Africa. On top of all this, Pakistan is a sanctuary for Islamist militants from Xinjiang. Security cooperation with Islamabad has assumed highest priority for Beijing.

Indian strategic community tend to view Sino-Pak relations in a zero-sum game perspective. China’s plans to build two more nuclear reactors at Chashma and proposed rail link from Kashgar in China’s Xinjiang region across the Karakoram Mountains to Havelian in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province are causing concern in India. This railway line will run parallel to the Karakoram Highway, built with Chinese assistance.

India has voiced concerns over China undertaking infrastructural projects in Pak-occupied Kashmir (PoK). New Delhi’s argument is that by carrying out infrastructure projects, China is affirming its support to Pakistani claims over land it views as disputed. China has opposed infrastructure projects funded by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in Arunachal Pradesh on the similar grounds, arguing that the

ADB was legitimising India’s claims to the state, which China considers as disputed territory.

Sino-Pak relations have withstood the strain of shifting international relations for more than 60 years.

However, it is by no means a problemfree relationship. There have been differences over alleged training camps for separatist Xinjiang militant groups in Pakistan’s North West Frontier region. But Sino-Pak friendship has solid foundations and India must recognise that it cannot alter the dynamics of the Pakistan-China relationship to suit its own strategic interests.

“Three evils” syndrome China has officially identified “religious extremism, terrorism and separatism” as “the three evils”. These three evils are also greatest threat to the unity and integrity of India. These three are threatening India and China in equal measure. There are an estimated 20 million Muslims in officially atheist China. China has launched a campaign against these ‘three evils’ since the outbreak of violence in Xinjiang and Tibet in July 2009, by the ethnic Uighurs and Tibetans against the Han - the main ethnic group of China. Uighurs and Tibetans have accused China of changing the demographic composition of their regions by promoting large scale Han migration into their region, which is threatening their distinct cultural and religious identity.

Source: There are no Chinese official statistics on different religious groups. However, ethnic groups’ official data is available. Table is based on an article by Ananth Krishnan titled “Faith against odds”, Hindu, August 8, 2010.

Xinjiang of China and Kashmir of India are facing almost similar secessionist problem. Both provinces have been rocked by violence

inspired by the religion and in both the cases terrorists have training camps in Pakistan. Both India and China expect Pakistan to take tough measures against the terrorists based in Pakistan. Probably keeping possible future Sino-Indian collaboration in the field of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism in mind, China and India have held joint military exercises called “Hand-in-Hand” to fight against religious extremism and separatism.

Dragon vs elephant China hates being compared to India as India hates being compared to Pakistan. India wants to be de-hyphenated from Pakistan but loves to be hyphenated with China and China loves to be hyphenated with the United States. Whereas the US hates to be compared with any nation and wants to maintain its pre-eminent global position. Chinese find the growing global tendency to compare their country with India as offensive and demeaning. Chinese claim that their country is competing with the US and not India. China has never looked at India as an equal nor can Beijing comprehend the idea of India being China’s equal in the future.

Chinese are dismissive of India’s claim as the world’s largest democracy. From the Chinese point of view, India is an emerging South Asian regional power rather than a potential global player.

Beijing’s attitude towards the expansion of the UN Security Council and India’s nuclear programme is an indication that China will not countenance the emergence of an Asian peer competitor.

Why should China’s rise cause “concern” to the rest of the world while India’s ascent does not? The commonly heard argument is that India’s policies and practices are far more “transparent” than those of China. The mystique of Beijing’s short but studied comments is often mistaken for a mystery. Global community feels more comfortable while dealing with India because of its democratic and transparent political system, whereas the non-democratic and opaque Chinese political system causes concern.

Global cooperation Rise of China and India has provided newer areas for cooperation and Copenhagen was not just a

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one-off incident. India and China are working together with other emerging economies to ensure that developing countries must have a greater involvement and say in global economic and financial matters. The emergence of the G-20 as a significant global financial forum overshadowing the G-8, where emerging economies deliberate with the world’s richest economies and where India and China have major say on all vital financial issues that affect the global economy, is an indication of how this Sino-Indian cooperation can work in the future. India and China worked together in advancing decolonisation and independence movements in the world in the 1950s and now both can work together in restructuring the discriminatory and West-dominated global economic and financial order.

in the stiff competition to march ahead of the other and to achieve this objective they have also tried to contain and counter-balance each other. The weaker of the two has also roped in the extra regional powers to counter-balance the rival. Precisely because of this reason, India is trying to rope in the US against China in its hedging strategy. These arguments of the realist perspectives make India and China ‘eternal enemies’ and there exists no possibility of Sino-India rapprochement or cooperation. On all bilateral issues, India and China have adopted diametrically opposite positions, which precludes any possibility of meaningful cooperation between the two Asian giants.

Eternal enemies?

However, if historical baggage is abandoned and if both are governed by the possible future benefits which will accrue from their partnership then India and China can be “future allies”.

If the logics of liberalism are applied to the present Sino-Indian relations, then the second viewpoint of ‘future ally’ can be proved. Rising trade, commerce and investment rule out any possibility of war or conflict. Market forces compel the nations to maintain peace and stability, which is conducive to trade, commerce and prosperity. Any dispute between them will adversely affect their rapidly growing trade, which will harm the interests of both the nations. Moreover, India exports mainly natural resources

From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that the diametrically opposed theses “eternal enemies” and “future allies” can be proved. If one is obsessed with the historical baggage, which is full of betrayal and breach of faith, then, of course, India and China are ‘eternal enemies’ and both can never overcome the trust deficit in their bilateral relations. Both have perceived each other in the zero-sum-game prism. Geopolitical logics of realism also makes them ‘eternal enemy’. In history, two rising regional powers have never been on good terms. They have always engaged

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Future allies?

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

needed by the Chinese industries and imports finished products from China, promoting Chinese industries at the cost of indigenous industries as per classical ‘dependency theory’ of the international trade. If this is the scenario then why China will unnecessarily provoke any conflict with India to vitiate the present atmosphere of peace and stability?

Convergences On global issues such as climate change talks, restructuring of global economic and financial structures, multilateral trade talks (Doha Round), G-20, etc.

Sino-Indian interests converge. Both are major stakeholders in these vital global issues. India-China cooperation is not only in their interest but it is also in the interest of the whole third world. The developing countries are looking towards China and India to provide leadership to the third world and forcefully defend the interests of developing countries in the multilateral forums. If Sino-India relations are analysed from this perspective then India and China are ‘future allies’ and not the adversaries or ‘eternal enemies’.

The writer is Associate Professor, Dept. of Political Science, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, India. He has been awarded Faculty Research Fellowship by Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute, (SICI) and Charles Wallace Visiting Fellowship by Cambridge University. He is also Salzburg Global Seminar Fellow.

Chinese guise

PLA AIR FORcE

Power

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November 2010 Defence AND security alert

projection

Dr. B. R. Deepak

In the march to military modernisation there will always be a segment of the force that has equipment that is old but still useful. It is true of China and it is even more true of India.

However, having said that, force projection in support of national interests is a state of the mind and it is this that Indians need to scan with great attention to detail. Claims that the PLAAF force projection capabilities are counter-terrorism tools need to be taken with a pinch of salt. It’s a joke. If anything, it is in support of terrorism of the Pakistani kind.

T

he modernisation of the PLA has been going on a feverish scale, especially since the Gulf War and has been termed as the Third Modernisation of the PLA. The sole aim is to win an informatised warfare and fully display the comprehensive integrated joint operational capabilities of the PLA. These include: 1) The information operational capability in terms of C4I2SR; 2) precision strike capability; 3) rapid deployment capability; and 4) support and logistic capability. The ultimate goal of the PLA acquiring these capabilities is to win a global war according to Professor Han Xudong of the National Defense Academy, Beijing. Han outlines four broad options for China in order to fight a “global war” on the lines of the US global war strategy as: 1) China must look for military allies; 2) China must establish overseas military bases; 3) China must use military means to solve the ‘problem’; and 4) China must participate in international military efforts so as to enhance the combat capability of the PLA.

Honing skills It is in the face of these objectives and challenges thrown by integration of forces in informatised warfare, China has been carrying out various joint military exercises in recent years. Various ‘Peace Mission’ joint military exercises between China and members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation countries are just one in the series. There are others in which China has been showcasing its informatised capabilities.

‘Grind Soldiers 2008’, ‘Joint 2008’, ‘2009 Chengdu Division large scale air exercises and emergency transportation to Tibet exercises’, ‘Stride 2009’ that included four major divisions from Shenyang, Lanzhou, Jinan and Guangzhou military regions involving nearly 50,000 troops etc. have been aimed at enhancing the integration of the PLA and joint operational capabilities.

The latest ‘Peace Mission 2010’ held at Matybulak in Kazakhstan between September 9 and 25 marked

a new beginning for the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), for it demonstrated for the first time its precision strike capabilities, the kind demonstrated by US Air Force against Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The 1,000 strong contingent of the PLA troops were commanded by General Ma Xiaotian, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the PLA. For the first time six aircraft, four H-6H bombers and two J-10 escort fighters, supported by an early warning aircraft took off from Urmuqi in Xinjiang, were refuelled in mid-air, even though the refuelling was not required and returning after conducting precision strikes in Kazakhstan.

According to Major-General Meng Guoping, the Deputy Commander of the PLA forces participating in the exercise, the ‘Peace Mission 2010’ was an opportunity to test the integrated operational capabilities of the PLAAF. ‘Bombs weighing hundreds of kilograms demolishing the enemy targets in precision strikes from 700 meters above ground’ was pronounced as ‘historic breakthrough’

by Chinese press. The integrated

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PLA AIR FORcE

exercises according to the PLA daily were a clear demonstration of China’s growing capability to rapidly intervene during a future crisis in Central Asia.

Counter-terror facade Even though Gen. Ma Xiaotian described the exercises as purely a strategic action against terrorism not directed against any country, however, it is visible that the PLAAF has successfully converted itself from a limited territorial defence force to a more flexible and mobile force capable of operating off-shore in both defensive and offensive roles. The foundation of PLAAF’s anti-access and areadenial strategy is the ‘Joint Anti-Air Raid’ doctrine, which calls for attacks against enemy’s air and naval bases even though the doctrine has been pronounced as ‘defensive.’ It has been primarily formulated to counter the US in the South China Sea, especially in the event of a forceful reunification of Taiwan, however, the capability could be utilised against India in future conflicts especially over unsettled border. It may be of little use against the so called ‘three evils’ of’ terrorism, separatism and religious extremism’ inside Chinese territories, especially in urban warfare.

Force levels In terms of weapons and equipment, the PLAAF currently has approximately over 700 modern fighter jets. According to Xu Qiliang, member of the Central Military Commission and PLAAF commander, China successfully designed and reproduced its J and F series fighters on the basis of the Russian fighter aircraft. According to the General, ‘in 1963, China replicated MiG-19 and successfully produced J-6 fighters; the fighters were decommissioned only in August 2006.

Later, China developed J-8I, F -7III and FT-7 trainers. Subsequently, on the basis of F-8 and F-8I, China developed J-8II aircraft.

Incremental growth In the 1990s, China imported from Russia Su-27 and Su-30 fighters and in the spring of 1998 based on these models, successfully designed third generation fighter planes J-10 and J-11.

It is believed that the decommissioned J-6 has been remodelled and is being

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used for information warfare training.

The current inventory is composed primarily of third and fourth-generation fighters and bombers, including 800-1,000 J-7 (MiG-21 Fishbed) and J-8II fighters, 76 Russian built Su-27 fighters, 95-116 Chinese assembled J-11 fighters, 76 Russian Su-30MKK multirole fighters and some 60-80 Chinese indigenous J-10 multi-role fighters according to sicodefense.com.

Strategic air assets As regards building a strategic PLAAF, China purchased IL-78 refuelling aircrafts, before and after the year 2000; it is planning to procure between 16 and 24 of these aircrafts.

However, in 2002 after inducting 4 such aircrafts the plan seems to have been suspended. The plan is likely to resume anytime in near future.

The IL-78 aircrafts will expand the reach and combat capabilities of the Su-27 and Su-30 up to 3,000 kms. In its modernisation drive the PLAAF is planning to introduce more than 3,000 new aircraft to replace its obsolete fleet.

The core force will be composed of 190 SU-27SK or J-11B, 100 SU-30MKK/MK2, 150 J-10A, 390 J-8, 580 J-7, 235 Q-5, 130 JH-7A, and 160 H-6 bombers along with Chinese indigenous fighters according to Lotta Danielsson-Murphy edited

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book The Balance of the Air Power in Taiwan Strait (2010).

Military experts, however, are of the view that at present China does not have military capability for rapid deployment, forcible entry and force sustainability, for it does not have requisite transport aircraft which are indispensable for such an operation.

However, with its growing economic muscle, huge defence outlays and plans to roll out its first aircraft carrier by the year 2015, China’s power projections are sure to create great consternation in India, especially when our own Air Chief Marshal is saying that 50 per cent of the Indian Air Force systems and equipment are obsolete and that the force was facing a shortage of around 600 pilots. Under such circumstances the comments such as “the IAF was ready for a multi-front war and multi-dimensional war” and that the neighbour’s military modernisation drive was being ‘watched with caution’ is a foolhardy thinking and will lead the nation to an extremely perilous situation.

The writer is an Associate Professor of Chinese Studies in Centre of Chinese and Southeast Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He is also the Managing Editor of THINK INDIA Quarterly.

Solidarity

Interventionism

NATO: global role?

Dominika Cosic

After the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics NATO became a magnet for those nations that wanted to break the shackles of Communism. Because of the accession of these nations NATO’s territorial influence spread eastwards till a consolidation of the Commonwealth of Independent States and of the Russian Federation occurred. After the experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan NATO member-nations are cogitating its future military role. Not all are comfortable with its interventionism.

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Solidarity

Interventionism

D

uring the upcoming NATO Summit in Lisbon (Portugal) in November 2010 a New Strategic Concept is expected to be adopted. The previous one was adopted in 1999, in the shadow of NATO intervention in Yugoslavia. The new one has been prepared in the haze of the mission in Afghanistan and seeks to explain the new role of the Alliance in a changing world with new threats and new challenges.

NATO evolution Nobody doubts that compared to the former Strategic Concept the new one is a different document in keeping with the changed times and situation. Eleven years ago the Concept was prepared just after NATO’s intervention in former Yugoslavia. The most crucial question was: What is NATO and in which cases should it decide on military intervention and on what legal basis?

The terroristic attack of September 11, 2001 on the US and the consequent war against the Taliban in Afghanistan turned geopolitics on its head. The United States proclaimed that it was an attack not only on American territory but also on NATO as an alliance and so attracted the application of the famous Paragraph 5 (when one member-State is attacked, other members should respond to it). A few years later the attack by Russian hackers on the Estonian cyber space showed that there is a new emerging threat – cyber security.

New strategic concept Two years ago, just after NATO Summit in Bucharest, former Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer had announced that a Group of Wise Men, headed by former United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, would be preparing a New Strategic Concept. After months of debate the Group released in May 2010 a 46-page report with recommendations for NATO’s strategic goals for the next decade. The report, titled “NATO 2020: Assured Security: Dynamic Engagement”, recommends that NATO engage dynamically with countries and organisations that are outside the Euro-Atlantic region. There was also a proposal to incorporate NATO forces into the larger United Nations military structure, allowing NATO to conduct operations all over

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the world, possibly in partnership with other countries (Russia, China?).

However, the document written by Group of Wise Men in fact was only a base for the next document, prepared

by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. He has presented his proposals during a conference organised by German Marshall Fund in Brussels, in the beginning of October. Draft proposal of Rasmussen is much shorter and less controversial.

Diplomats accredited to NATO comment that it will be accepted by all member countries during the Lisbon Summit.

What is NATO? Still the most general and primary question, which of course creates other questions, is “what is NATO Strategic Concept? And what is and what should be NATO”?

Answer is not so easy as it was before collapse of the Iron Curtain. Now NATO is an alliance of 28 countries and – as Mr. Rasmussen has repeated several times - the most successful, peaceful movement in the world. Enlargement of NATO was a great success and historical event but it has opened new conflicts. After the war in Iraq in 2003 NATO has been the most divided in its history. New member countries (mostly former communist block countries like Poland, Czech Republic or Hungary) together with Spain and Italy have strongly supported United States and on the contrary France, Germany or Belgium have been against this war. It was a symbolic conflict between “New Europe” and “Old Europe” which means “Old Europe” against America and American domination. We have to say openly that NATO is not a monolith, it is an edifice created from such different countries like Turkey, Canada and Netherlands. And what is obvious, this diversity enriches the organisation, but also often creates internal tensions and conflicts.

Contradictions within Unfortunately there are problems inside the Pact: For instance different positions towards its mission.

Netherlands even before last parliamentary election (in June 2010) had decided to withdraw all troops from missions in Kosovo, Bosnia and

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Afghanistan. The government is very skeptical about the expeditionary function of NATO and not only does it not want to participate in such missions but also does not want to support financially in covering costs of this part of its activity. Belgium is also a little bit skeptical, the same with Greece and Portugal. Italy gives contradictory signals: On the one side the prime minister promises that Italy will reinforce its military presence in Afghanistan, but at the same time it proclaims that Italy will withdraw its troops next year. Again the universal question: what will be NATO’s missions? Should NATO engage in military missions? Where and why?

Only in neighbouring countries? And what should be the character of such missions? Who will pay for it? Should they be only military missions or maybe also civil missions? France is not very happy with pushing civil character of alliance missions – Paris would prefer to keep this part of activity for European Union, to reinforce European Union.

Other very complex problems are linked with Turkey. It impacts on relations of NATO with European Union (members of EU are Cyprus and Greece which have very difficult relations with Turkey. And on the one side Cyprus is blocking admission of Turkey into the EU and on the other Turkey is doing the same inside NATO towards Cyprus.

Solidarity Hopefully there is at least one point which has common position of all member countries. Everybody is agreed that core function of NATO is and should still be to protect its members. The famous Paragraph 5 will be the central point in New Strategic Concept. But there are again questions: what should we understand to be an attack on a member country? Should only direct military attack be considered as an attack or also other kinds of aggression? Modern world and globalisation process creates new kinds of threats like of course terroristic attack. But it is also cyber security. Few years ago Estonia has survived attack of Russian hackers.

NATO was then in a very difficult situation – between solidarity with member country and thinking about good partner relations with Russia. Few years later even the US was attacked by hackers.

What about nuclear power? Two biggest European countries: France and Germany find themselves on completely different positions. France is without any doubt a nuclear power and treats its nuclear arsenal as an attribute of power, high global position and almighty. And of course it uses the atom as a source of energy. Germany, after the experience of the Second World War has grave objections towards nuclear power. Specially now, with new coalition in government. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Guido Wersterwelle is liberal, very well known as a strong enemy of nuclear power. One of the crucial points of his global political agenda is total de-nuclearisation.

Even more complex situation is with Ukraine. New government of Azarov and president Janukovitch – contrary to their predecessors – is not enthusiastic about the idea of membership in NATO. So NATO should not push Ukraine into a situation where Ukraine does not want to be. In the draft proposal the Secretary General has underlined the idea of “open doors” – all countries which fulfill conditions and have the political will to accession could be members of NATO. It is not sure yet which countries will be mentioned by name in a final text of New Strategic Concept.

Open doors

A very important issue is relations with Russia. There are few potential tensions between Moscow and Brussels – for instance the military; Russian experience near the border with Poland and Lithuania; relations with Ukraine and specially Georgia and of course missile defence. The Secretary General has recently expressed the opinion that the leaders of 28 NATO countries should invite Russia to take part in a project to create a missile defence system in Europe. Rasmussen told journalists in Brussels that the invitation should be made at November’s NATO Summit in Lisbon. A Russian politician has been already invited and it is expected that Russian president Mr. Medvedev will attend. The New Concept draft underlines partnership with Russia especially in peacekeeping missions.

Next question – enlargement of NATO. There are a few countries waiting for membership – Serbia, FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia) Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and also Georgia and Ukraine. Every single country has its own specific situation.

FYROM Macedonia has to solve the problem of an official name – Greece is protesting against using historical name “Macedonia”, but government in Skopje does not want to change name of the country. So problem is still not solved. Georgia after a war with Russia and secession of Abkhazia has problem with borders and relations with neighbouring countries.

Mr. Rasmussen recently has repeated that he hopes that in the future Georgia will become a member country.

Relations with Russia

But Russia of course is not only one

partner of NATO. Diplomats from Headquarters express the opinion that one of the important agendas of the alliance should be positive relations with external partners like India and Japan.

Last but not the least, New Strategic Concept will include future reforms in military structure of the Alliance.

Because of financial problems there is an expectation of a reduction of employees in certain departments of NATO. These are the most important problems which should find solution in New Strategic Concept. NATO is an organisation of 28 countries, it means 28 governments having sometimes different business and point of view.

And all important decisions are taken by consensus. So a compromise is necessary but difficult. Recent voices are hopefully rather optimistic – draft proposal of Mr. Rasmussen is considered as quite moderate, compromising and possible to adopt by member countries. But the final test will take place in November 2010 during upcoming NATO Summit in Lisbon.

The writer is European correspondent of Polish weekly magazine Wprost. She specialises in NATO and European Union affairs and also the Balkans issues. She is correspondent (Europe) of Defence And Security Alert (DSA) magazine from India.

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Chinese guise

MEDDLESOME

China in China knows full well that Pakistan is using the jihadi terrorists as tools in its foreign policy implementation be it for “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, or to attack India in asymmetrical warfare, or hamstring the rival for global domination, the US. It serves Beijing’s purposes very well. In its shortcuts to global domination, its shortsightedness created its own Uighur Frankenstein. If the Taliban-Al Qaeda combine returns to Kabul after the US withdraws the jihadis will rip through Pakistan to establish lebensraum for the new Caliphate (remember Swat?). The former Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union will follow suit. The Uighurs then will be just one right turn away. What goes around will come around.

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November 2010 Defence AND security alert

Afghanistan

Manvendra Singh

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

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Chinese guise

MEDDLESOME

A

fghanistan has a remarkable ability to periodically drop in on the world’s centre-stage.

Despite having little to offer in any of the parameters that are usually taken as prerequisites, a landlocked Afghanistan has a clockwork-like knack of appearing in a major starrer.

The role cast on Afghanistan is almost always uninvited, but then so are the other starrers. Afghanistan has the propensity of finding itself as the cynosure of global attention. The absence of any of the parameters is replaced by a geographical location that beckons, an attraction unique anywhere in the world. Geography and the multiplicity of absences, episodically magnetises the freebooter,

the riches of India, or so it was thought in the hyper living rooms of London.

The conspiracies were centred around Afghanistan and how control over it was essential to prevent the Slavs entering India. The Great Game began in the debating rooms of London before a shot had been fired anywhere in the region most at stake. The Russians preferred to call it Tournament of Shadows.

of silence and a long backstage role, Afghanistan was once again thrust into the global limelight with the arrival of Soviet troops at the end of the 1979. In the effort to evict the Soviet occupation, the nature of the Great Game changed, as did some of the characters in the Tournament of Shadows; but the essence of a 19th century competition came to be relived with the use of modern weaponry and proxies.

Meddlesome foreigners

Dance of the proxies

In what was to set the stage for an Afghan tendency, the British returned Shah Shuja to the throne of Kabul in 1839 riding the gun barrels of the Royal Artillery, thus ushering in the era of regime change. It was the first military

The Soviets departed and then ceased to exist, but the proxies continued in their preferred profession. As is their wont, the proxies too changed sides over time and ultimately unleashed the most audacious terrorist attacks

China makes a distinction between those Islamist groups that threaten it, the TIP etc. and those that target India and the others. And this policy is discernible enough for the trained observer; ‘China has pursued a strategy of decoupling them from other Islamists, rather than treating them as part of a continuum of threat that needs to be addressed collectively’. And this belief enables China to pursue a policy that virtually condones Pakistan’s links with the terror groups the adventurous and the conspiracies.

Indo-Afghan pre-history India’s relationship with Afghanistan began long before the country had come into being as it is known today.

Traders and pilgrims traversed this rough terrain, each in search of his own nirvana. The Mughal Empire strode down its routes to conquer India and over time Afghanistan became an important posting for a general, a brother, or a son of the Emperor.

There was predictability to this relationship that came to be shattered once new entrants came into the picture, through different routes of Europe. India and Afghanistan would both change as societies and with that so would their ties of millennia. It was only after the British Empire had crept across India that a greater urgency came into the relationship. And this was on account of an even more rapid expansion of the Russian Empire. As it raced southwards to warmer climes, the Russian Empire would inevitably come into a clash with the British. The spoils at stake were the control over

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intervention with the specific task of changing the king while keeping the country independent, so to say.

But like all such ventures, it soon met the resistance of the population and as was to be repeated a number of times in the 20th and 21st centuries, irregulars under the leadership of Dost Mohammed Khan began to harass the regulars and eventually overrun the capital. The First Afghan War ended in an unmitigated disaster when an uprising in 1842 led to a withdrawal and a slaughter. The image of the lone rider appearing at the gates of Jalalabad was to remain embedded in the psychology of British policy makers for decades to come. Lady Elizabeth Burton’s painting ‘Remnants of an army’ truly captured the tragedy in all its elements, in its title, and its imagery of defeat.

It was only with the Third Afghan War that a semblance of order came into the relationship between British India and Kabul. And a post-1947 India maintained, nay renewed, this relationship with Afghanistan, which now receded from the headlines of the world, largely in isolation, but for an occasional flutter. After decades

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

humankind has ever known. The die was cast and Afghanistan once again unwittingly arrived at the centre stage of global attention. Its inflicted isolation was shattered by the far-away events of 11 September 2001. Proxies of an era gone by returned to haunt their supervisor with their nihilist dreams.

And humankind witnessed the end of the recently proclaimed new world order.

Enter China During the 20th century China’s relationship with Afghanistan was marked by a palpable sense of distance.

Although neighbours, albeit through the sliver of a Wakhan Corridor, the two countries barely registered on the radar of the other. That distance was breached only when the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan began in end 1979.

Beijing’s perennial phobia of being ‘encircled’ became the buzzword in policy circles, as analysts jumped over each other to declare the invasion as an act aimed at China’s interests over its periphery. The ‘middle kingdom’ was sought to be breached by the Russian hordes, or so thought those at the core

of China’s policy-making circles. The notion that those not so friendly with China are always trying to ‘encircle’ Beijing is the fulcrum around which a significant portion of foreign and security policy planning is subjected to. There is a palpable sense of being constricted that Chinese rulers have always demonstrated and expressed.

From the Confucian to the Communist, and today’s neo-capitalist, the ruling elite of China has been brought up on ‘encirclement’ almost as a staple diet. And so it was a reminder of that phenomenon when the Soviet army walked across the Amu Darya to invade Afghanistan.

of the Uighur radicals. The broker of the deal was, of course, Pakistan. And while the Taliban ruled Afghanistan they implemented their side of the deal, but as with all else, the Al Qaeda had its own agenda. And that agenda was centred on a global plan, a nihilistic vision for society.

China did not feature in Operation Enduring Freedom to rid Afghanistan

Afghanistan are now dominated by two factors, business and security.

The opening up of various business sectors in Afghanistan to foreign investments led to the first direct Chinese interests in the country.

The Ministry of Communications in Afghanistan established a joint venture with two Chinese companies, ZTE and Huawei, to provide about 2,00,000 digitised telephone subscriber lines

Jihadi bedfellows In one of the lesser-known episodes of the anti-Soviet jihad, China played a role so active as to be on the same par as that of Pakistan and the United States.

From funding the mujahideen groups to arming them, China did everything.

More Chinese weapons made their way to Afghan mujahids than from any other country. Albeit mostly in the form of small arms, Chinese weapons nevertheless proved invaluable in the campaign against Soviet occupation.

And the same weapons continue to plague Afghanistan, but between then and now China once again withdrew from the scene. Once the last Soviet troops crossed the bridge back across the Amu Darya, China too departed from the Afghan battleground.

Leaving the policy options on hold, so to say. China shared the shock of 11th September 2001, as did most of the world.

Uighur radical threat In the years prior to that tragedy, China had seen the emergence of a similarly radicalised population within its western borders, in Xinjiang with its restive Uighur people. The East Turkestan Islamic Movement and its successor, the Turkestan Islamic Party, has been at the forefront of this anti-Chinese campaign. Radicalised by the anti-Soviet jihad and a feeling that alien Chinese rulers subjugate them, the Uighurs have sent scores of young men into the jihadist training epicentre of districts along the Durand Line. A number of violent incidents later, the Chinese authorities made peace in 1996 with the then Taliban rulers of Afghanistan, so as to curb the activities

of the Taliban-Al Qaeda terror duo. It stayed on the sidelines of the campaign, a keen observer of military tactics and equipment. But nothing more than that.

And it was to remain that way for some years after that.

In the global list of aid donors China would feature way down the order.

In fact annual Chinese aid to Afghanistan is less than what the International Committee of the Red Cross spends in that beleaguered country. At this stage China’s policy on Afghanistan was, in essence, outsourced to Pakistan. Which is to say it could also be classified as duplicitous. While aid was sent for the people of Afghanistan, there wa`s also a sustained supply of weapons to the Taliban fighting the regime protecting the same people.

This was an issue that repeatedly came up in discussions between American and Chinese officials, but there was always an excuse to pass it over.

Flag follows business China’s

role

and

interests

in

in the country. Some construction projects came to be done by Chinese firms, including those contracted by the European Union. Irrigation, health, water and roads are some of the sectors that have seen Chinese investments. But none more dramatic than the splurge in the mineral sector.

Minerals for home industry There are some who believe that the Chinese presence in Afghanistan was largely in order to facilitate an entry into the lucrative business of mineral extraction. And none more so than the Aynak copper mine in Logar province, not far from Kabul. An easy to develop mine since the copper field is at a very shallow level, Aynak is reputed to be the largest untouched such quarry in the world. It is supposed to contain 240 million tons of ore. China Metallurgical Construction Group won the contract in 2007 at a price of roughly US$ 3.5 billion, supposedly more than a billion more than the next highest bidder. Making it the largest foreign investment ever in Afghanistan, since it even involves a coal fired thermal power plant and

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

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MEDDLESOME

a railway line connecting Tajikistan and Pakistan. Besides millions in taxes and employment in the thousands, the mine project is expected to deliver almost US$ 400 million as royalty per annum. The Chinese success, though, was not without controversy, as allegations flew about bribes and other underhand methods as reported by the Washington Post.

Fuel for growth ‘There are plenty of factors suggesting that China is set to increase its investments in Afghanistan in the near future. Afghanistan has unexplored reserves of oil and natural gas in the northern parts of the country. The Afghan oil reserves were recently upgraded 18 times by a US geological survey, estimates standing at a mean of 1,596 million barrels, while Afghanistan’s natural gas reserves were upgraded by a factor of three, standing at a mean of 15,687 trillion cubic feet (Tcf)’. Besides the well-known and much publicised reserves of precious and semi-precious stones there are also significant iron ore and gold deposits in Afghanistan. Overall, ‘Afghanistan has large energy and mineral resources, particularly in copper, but they should at the same time not be exaggerated.

China is likely to emerge as a large investor in the country, for better or worse and Beijing’s interest in Afghanistan is likely to increase’.

It is in the realms of security interests that Afghanistan features ever larger in the Chinese radar. There is, of course, the factor of Xinjiang and its restive Uighurs.

Pan-Islamist sentiments are anathema to Beijing’s tight fisted rule in the western borderlands of the middle kingdom. And ‘concerns about Islamist militancy on its western border have only heightened since the Uighur riots of July 2009 and are likely to increase as the United States withdraws… In September 2003, Hasan Mahsum, then the TIP’s leader, was killed in South Waziristan by Pakistani security forces supported by Chinese intelligence officers. In February, a US drone strike killed Abdul Haq alTurkistani, the TIP’s most recent leader, in North Waziristan.’ There is, in this, an element of disquiet for the Chinese security and political leadership. On the one hand it is suffering from a syndrome of jihadist terror like many other countries of the world. But on the

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other hand it is not something in which the Chinese envision, or demonstrate, much cooperation with those countries that are victims as well.

It is really a question of China hedging its bets for the long run and with the knowledge that western forces will one day, sooner rather than later, withdraw from Afghanistan, Beijing would not like to be seen to be aligned with them en toto. For in terms of local perceptions they are, after all, foreign

Treaty Organisation across its western border, it is equally disturbed by the role of India in Afghanistan.

Far from investing in mines and any other means of extraction, the Indian presence in Afghanistan is marked by a significant social sector outlay, fittingly culminating in funding the construction of a new parliament building in Kabul.

Popular perceptions toward this kind of funding have generated significant goodwill in the citizenry. So much so that India is now in the top five aid providing nations to Afghanistan.

forces and not being associated with them is seen as sensible in Chinese policy circles. This belief also enables China to make a distinction between those Islamist groups that threaten it, the TIP etc. and those that target India and the others. And this policy is discernible enough for the trained observer; ‘China has pursued a strategy of decoupling them from other Islamists, rather than treating them as part of a continuum of threat that needs to be addressed collectively’. And this policy belief enables China to pursue a policy that virtually condones Pakistan’s links with the terror groups, ‘Far from wanting Pakistan to cut its ties with extremists, Beijing sees such ties as vital to its own security interests’.

This presence has gone against the plan put in place by China in the region that it considers its sphere of influence. ‘In recent years, Beijing has deepened its relations with India’s neighbours, including Bangladesh, Myanmar (Burma) and Pakistan and sought to pull Nepal and Sri Lanka away from their traditional Indian-centric foreign policies.

Now, from Beijing’s perspective, India appears determined to leapfrog this cordon sanitaire by building up its ties with Afghanistan’. This is now an arena for the next big Sino-Indian contest and in which New Delhi has no options but to compete to win.

Even as China is uneasy with the presence of more than 1,00,000 troops of the North Atlantic

The writer is Editor-in-Chief of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine. He is a well known defence journalist and columnist. He was member of Indian parliament till 2009 from one of the largest constituencies in Rajasthan.

Jihadis as proxies

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

Chinese guise

POST 9/11 TRENDS

Dr. Sudhir Kumar Singh

Sino-Indian relations:

deficit?

The trend in Sino-Indian relations since the 9/11 jihadi terrorist attack on the US has, to put it mildly, been disturbing. China has been more assertive and its u-turn in Arunachal Pradesh from claims only to the Tawang tract to the whole of the state has shocked Indians. The intent and purpose is clearly provocative and appears to replicate how things deteriorated between the two countries prior to the 1962 attack.

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Chinese guise

POST 9/11 TRENDS

R

ight from Keshore Madhubani to many important pundits of the international relations have stressed that 21st century will be of Asia.

The first decade of 21st century is already over and the hegemony of the United States continues in the international system. Sino-Indian relationship will determine the future of international politics. China and India fought war in 1962 and still this baggage of history prevails. First Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru accepted Tibet as an integral part of China through 1954 treaty. It was the Himalayan blunder.

Tibet card Tibet is still boiling against the Chinese rule and remains a useful leverage for India. After the 1962 war SinoIndian bilateral relationship remained frozen till the December 1988 Beijing visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

Again Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao visited China during his tenure [1991-1996] and further accelerated the process of engagement in economic and to some extent strategic arenas.

In June 2003, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China. It was a path-breaking visit because both parties expressed their desire to expedite the boundary disputes and appointed senior officers to lead the negotiations.

Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh has also visited Beijing in December 2008.

Encirclement of India Since long, China has adopted the policy of encircling India within South Asia. Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Burma (Myanmar) have emerged as pawns of China in this balance of power game within South Asia vis a vis India. China conducted a study on India in 2005 at the behest of the Chinese leadership’s Foreign Affairs Cell and drew a recommendation that China should take all measures to maintain its strategic leverage in terms of territory, membership of the exclusive Permanent Five and Nuclear Five Club, diplomatic advantages and economic lead over India. In this changing power dynamics, South Asia is becoming an extended battleground between China, India and the United States. China has already sustained nuclear cooperation with Pakistan despite an imminent possibility of its capture by the terrorist and jihad network. In Myanmar and Bangladesh too, China has taken over

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important space to monitor India. In Nepal, China is playing its cards very carefully to defame India. New places are Maldives and Sri Lanka.

Arunachal surprise In January 2009 Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh visited Arunachal Pradesh. Chinese Ambassador in Delhi held a televised press conference and condemned his Arunachal Pradesh visit without prior permission of China, which perceives AP as Eastern Tibet under illegal occupation of India.

In August 2010, China has done a provocative act to not allow Lt. Gen. B. S. Jaswal to visit Beijing because he is representing Northern Areas Command under which Jammu and Kashmir also falls which is considered as a disputed territory by China.

It is u-turn of Chinese attitude because they had adopted a positive line on Kashmir during Kargil crisis [1999] and even suggested Pakistan to resolve the issue bilaterally with India. This move of China is extremely provocative because in August 2009, Lt. Gen. V. K. Singh, currently the Army Chief and then the GOC-in-C Eastern Command had visited China for a similar high level exchange. If territorial sensitivity was the issue with China, then Singh’s visit should have been even more problematic because, as head of the Eastern Command, he had jurisdiction over Arunachal Pradesh, a state that is claimed by China. It simply indicates that growing Indo-US bonhomie, Indo-Japan grooming relations, India-Vietnam relationship and such other relationships in Asia have irritated China because China feels that these relationships have been forged to encircle her within Asia.

Sino-Pak N-deal It is an open secret that Chinese have extended all possible support to Pakistan to develop their nuclear capacity despite knowing their vulnerable proliferation record. In the middle of year 2010 they have inked a nuclear deal under which the Chinese will provide more support to the Pakistani nuclear programme.

China is already developing Gwadar port of Baluchistan as another watch post against India in a very strategic place at the mouth of the Persian Gulf.

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

However during Kargil crisis [1999], China changed its traditional anti-India policies and advised Pakistan to settle bilateral issues with India through negotiations.

Kashmir is the core zone of conflict between India and Pakistan. Pakistan was initially uneasy with Chinese advice to settle the discourse on bilateral level.

The Chinese have persuaded Pakistan that the international community has little interest in getting involved in the conflict over Kashmir. At the same time, China continues to maintain strong relations with Pakistan and tries to get India to accept the fact that improvement in Sino-Indian relations should not come at the expense of Sino-Pakistani relations.

Chinese fears India mooted Look East Policy in 1991.

But the Chinese felt that it was Indian response of their ‘policy of encirclement within South Asia’. Now India has extended this policy not within ASEAN but to the entire Asia-Pacific. India has engaged Australia and other countries of the Pacific as well in recent years to expand the canvas of its national interests.

India and China are old civilisations.

Both countries have had historical linkages but they never accepted each other as their friends. Buddhism spread in China and became a bridge between India and China. After many decades of the spread of Buddhism in China, Han Yu, an anti-Buddhist intellectual in the 9th century (who became one of the harbingers of Confucianism), put the issue starkly in his ‘Memorial on Buddhism’ written in 819 AD; “The Buddha was of barbarian origin. His language differed from Chinese speech; his cloth of a different cut; his mouth did not pronounce the prescribed words of the Former Kings; his body was not clad in the garments prescribed by the former kings. He did not recognise the relationship between prince and the subject, nor the sentiment of father and son.”

Balance of power Few years back, eminent American Scholar, Samuel P. Huntington had stated that if United States wanted to sustain its uni-polar status then it has to accommodate Japan and India as

two important partners. He stressed that Japan will contain China from the east and India from the west. It is the manifestation of the traditional notion of balance of power. According to the Neorealist thinker Kenneth Waltz “Because the future is uncertain, States are more concerned about relative gains and how gains will be divided. For this reason, cooperation is hard to achieve in international relations. The basic nature of the international relations is therefore essentially conflictual.”

After Pokhran-2 [1998] Prime Minister Vajpayee wrote a letter to United States President, Bill Clinton, which was leaked to the New York Times. In this letter, Vajpayee didn’t mention name but indicated that due to the hegemonic behaviour of a big neighbour India was compelled to explode atomic devices. His Defence Minister, George Fernandes made a statement two days before the blast that China is our enemy number one, which really upset the Chinese. Since then relations have been normalised, and further consolidated with the high profile bilateral visits by both sides.

The bilateral trade volume was US$ 260 million in 1990, which has crossed US$ 50 billion in FY 20092010. They need energy to sustain this progress. Both need to prevent piracy and ensure safe route to their energy supply through Indian Ocean to sustain their rapid progress.

Top Indian and Chinese military and political leaders are now thinking positively and perceive more benefits in cooperation and devastation in conflict.

Both countries are nuclear powers and could devastate each other within few days in case of a war.

Military expenditures

China had covertly opposed India in the NSG Waiver meeting before 123 nuclear treaty with the United States and felt offended after its passage. China must understand that it cannot deter the rise of India as an emerging power in the international system. Instead both countries will gain in absolute term if they will really cooperate. Sino-Indian relations have achieved considerable progress in the field of economic cooperation but on border settlement and other strategic issues, both countries still perceive each other in a different manner. There is trust deficit and that needs to be narrowed down.

Terrorism, poverty elimination and providing basic amenities to their citizens are a few focal agendas of China and India in the next few decades. Both countries are allocating huge amounts as defence expenditure.

For the durability of their development they need to strengthen the notion of human security and for that they have to relocate resources from defence to welfare schemes. Cooperation, Conflict and Competition are the new cardinal principles of the foreign policy in the post 9/11 scenario. Both stand to gain tremendously in cooperation and lose huge in conflict. But present state of Sino-Indian relationship has a different tale to tell. They are living under the cloud of mutual suspicion. As Adler and Barnett note, “Neorealist theories … stress the notion that while war does not take place all the time, like rain, it is always expected.”

Mutual accommodation

Sino-Indian turbulence

Chinese experts have insisted that China should not treat India as the United States did China. China cannot prevent India from rising and becoming a great power. Neither can India affect China’s rise and growth. The best way is to foster economic relationship between both countries. Both countries have made excellent progress towards fostering a constructive relationship of mutual cooperation and development.

The most important post 9/11 trends in Sino-Indian relations have been growing balance of power game within Asia-Pacific. I must recall Kautilya when he insists in his famous Mandala Theory that two big neighbours cannot be friends. There is a clash of national interests too. India wanted multi-polar Asia and global system but China continues to be interested in a uni-polar Asia with its dominance but

Trust deficit

multi-polar international system. Japan has a similar stand as that of India, therefore Japan-India relationship has grown considerably and has reached a comfortable stage. In the first week of October 2010, for the first time Indian Defence Minister was invited to attend ASEAN meeting along with the United States and China in Hanoi. In East Asia and other important summits, India is getting more recognition. The Chinese simply did not like it. China perceives that US power is shrinking in post 9/11 scenarios but in reality the US has already started diversifying their relationships in Asia. After independence few American Presidents have visited India but after 2000, third American President in coming in November 2010. There are other indications, which insist that China is not keen to resolve boundary issue with India and needless to say that without resolving this issue, no real progress could be made.

The post 9/11 trends have been turbulent. It could be positive only with equal urge from both sides.

India at this stage of international politics keeps certain important cards and Chinese must understand this reality otherwise both countries will be engaging themselves into a new Doctrine of Prisoner’s Dilemma and it would be adverse for the smooth development of both countries in general and Asia-Pacific in particular.

The writer is Assistant Professor, Dayal Singh College, University of Delhi, New Delhi, India and has written many books and articles on the thematic issues related to foreign policy. He did his PhD from School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi, India.

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

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STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

China s

string of pearls':

India's Options

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November 2010 Defence AND security alert

It is no hyperbole to suggest that India needs to carefully readjust its strategic thoughts and actions particularly in the context of the two pincers of road-rail-pipeline connections on either flank and the ‘string of pearls’ along its maritime frontiers. In fact it is long overdue in the light of Selig Harrison’s report of thousands of Chinese in the Gilgit-Baltistan salient of J a m m u a n d K a s h m i r.

C

hina’s rising economic power has been a reality for over a decade now. Replication of the “miracle” of Chinese economic progress

by India in terms of GDP growth has led to a debate on the influence of rise of the two Asian giants on global polity in the years ahead. While India’s ascent is seen with a benevolent eye, China has created a sense of uncertainty if not insecurity across world capitals particularly in Asia. Skillfully using a large capital base for generous investments for aid and infrastructure Chinese State-run enterprises have spread their influence across the developing world constructing ports, roads and convention centers. A corresponding growth in China’s military particularly naval power has raised concerns of latent Chinese intent of creating a malign sphere of influence.

Noose A combination of these trends led to the conception of the Chinese, “String of Pearls” strategy which simply stated is a chain of bases and diplomatic relationships stretching from Hong Kong to the Middle East traversing the Indian Ocean and passing through South East and South Asia. The term first appeared in a classified report for the US Department of Defense, “Energy Futures in Asia,” produced by defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton in 2005 and has been vigorously debated for the last half a decade or so.

As one of China’s most proximate and larger neighbours with a legacy of antagonism, an unresolved boundary dispute and a congruent area of influence from the Bab el Mandeb to the Straits of Malacca, manifestations of the “String of Pearls” strategy will directly impinge on India’s sphere of interest. In the light of the same, this article is an attempt to dissect the myth and reality of the “string of pearls” strategy and options for India to ensure protection of its national interests.

Strategic objectives The Booz Allen Hamilton Study, highlighted Chinese strategy of protecting its energy interests through a mix of “defensive and offensive positioning,” with an expanded interest of, “securing broad strategic objectives.” The “pearls” or bases and diplomatic relationships were identified as Gwadar in Pakistan, where electronic eavesdropping posts were reported to have been set up to monitor traffic in the Persian Gulf. Chittagong in Bangladesh, Islands in the Bay of Bengal in Myanmar (Burma), Cambodia where a railway line was being built from southern China, South China Sea and Thailand through funding of the Kra Isthmus were the other points of interest. These interventions were expected to be used as a springboard for any offensive ventures in the region and thus assumed high significance.

United States Air Force Colonel,

Brig. (Retd.) Rahul Bhonsle

Christopher J. Pehrson expanded on this concept in a monograph for the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College published in July 2006 entitled, “string of pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power across the Asian Littoral,” Pehrson raised alarm by stating that the “String of Pearls” is more than a naval or military strategy or even a regional strategy, “It is a manifestation of China’s ambition to attain great power status and secure a self-determined, peaceful and prosperous future”.

Pehrson saw historical legacy in Chinese forays in the seas going back to the Ming Dynasty wherein the 15th century Emperor Yongle’s fleet of 62 ships, some of them largest of the times were despatched for trading.

Geopolitical nexus Pehrson defined a pearl as a port, area or a country which is part of the overall geopolitical nexus that China is planning across the sea lines of communications to include Hainan Island, with recently upgraded military facilities, an upgraded airstrip on Woody Island in the Paracel archipelago, container facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh, deep water port under construction in Sittwe, Myanmar and of course the Gwadar port and navy base.

These provided China forward presence to safeguard trading interests and energy flows across the waterways.

This is also believed to address three key domestic concerns, survival of the government and the party, ensure territorial sovereignty and finally avoid internal strife by ensuring uninterrupted economic growth.

Trends indicating the strategy were flagged as development of military power with a shift in focus from the People’s Liberation Army to the Navy, increasing regional assertion and a willingness to confront opposition seen at divergence with its national interests.

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

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Chinese guise

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Malacca dilemma The debate on “string of pearls” has been progressed with additional “pearls” as Hambantota in Sri Lanka, plans to develop highways, oil and gas pipelines to Gwadar in the West in Pakistan and Yangon in the East in Myanmar linking mainland China, thereby creating a land based garland of highways and energy pipelines, obviating the need of passage through the circuitous route south of the Indian peninsula or through the Straits of

balance of power has been an important facet of Chinese bilateral and multilateral relations. Post Communist Chinese history reveals that Mao’s oft-repeated dictum, “power flows through the barrel of the gun,” was successfully employed by Beijing to consolidate hold on Tibet and Xinjiang, geographically the two largest autonomous regions. Marching of the boots was followed by a vast army of construction workers on numerous projects to assert Han influence, as many of these permanently settled

workers and entrepreneurs. The result is evident with Chinese workers spreading across Asia and Africa.

Chinese influence The simple economic dimension is supplemented by a complex national strategic one of extending Chinese influence. The South Asian region was seen ideal by Beijing for outside intervention, with a power vacuum, economic penury, governance deficit, protracted ethnic and

These pearls are also believed to address three key domestic concerns, survival of the government and the party, ensure territorial sovereignty and finally avoid internal strife by ensuring uninterrupted economic growth. Trends indicating the strategy were flagged as development of military power with a shift in focus from the People’s Liberation Army to the Navy, increasing regional assertion and a willingness to confront opposition seen at divergence with its national interests Malacca. President Hu Jintao had called for a new strategy to overcome the “Malacca Dilemma” thereby firming up conclusions on the debate.

in these provinces. The internal consolidation was completed by the time Deng Xiaoping assumed a central role in the decision making hierarchy.

The firm foothold that China has gained in Pakistan through long term nuclear and military cooperation and if reports by noted columnist Selig Harrison are to be believed physical presence of the PLA in large numbers in the Northern Areas (Now called as Gilgit Baltistan) could be seen as strengthening the string. China’s recent assertiveness in the South China Sea and the clash in Senkaku Islands between a Chinese fishing trawler and Japanese Coast Guard in East China Sea may also suggest congruent pathways of subtle power projection.

Future power matrix

New assertiveness Thus there is a distinct shift from Deng’s 24 character strategy of “Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; never claim leadership; make some contributions,” to assertion of economic and, in the days to come, possibly military power.

An overview of Chinese debates on national power denotes a mix of traditional as well as constructivist realist approach to security. Thus

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Deng propagated the concept of Comprehensive National Power or CNP, which quantitatively measured all elements of national power such as economy, science and technology and military of States of interest such as the USA, Japan, Russia and India to arrive at the current as well as future power matrix. The CNP Index is believed to have facilitated Deng to drive his four modernisations, agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology which has seen unprecedented growth of China over the past three decades. Deng also believed in the need for a peaceful neighbourhood for development and China had been following classic isolationist policies in the final decades of the 20th century.

The post Deng leadership known as the Fourth Generation led by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao have possibly abandoned the cloak of “peaceful rise” and instead articulate Chinese intentions as, ‘non-hegemonistic,’ as they foray across the world in search of energy, markets and jobs for hundreds of Chinese

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inter-State conflicts. Thus beginning of the 21st century the Chinese have been most active in the region with forays in countries where they had very limited interest such as Sri Lanka and Maldives, while having expanded their influence in Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Myanmar.

Similar expansionist designs have been reported in Central and South East Asia. However given the dominance of Russia and the United States / Japan in these regions respectively, China is facing resistance there.

Simultaneously the military component of the strategy is evident as the Chinese employ the three classic stratagems proposed by the American Naval strategist, Alfred Thayer Mahan, maritime trade, protected by a strong naval fleet and a chain of bases. The latter is seen by many as manifestation of, “string of pearls.”

The fulcrum The growth of the PLA Navy has supplemented this perception as it has emerged as the largest Navy fielded by an Asian State which includes 60 submarines, six of which are nuclear attack, Seventy-five principal combatants and a host of large and medium amphibious and missile patrol craft.

China is also employing peace keeping, defence diplomacy, counter terrorism and anti-piracy as tools for expanding presence globally.

The Chinese surprised many by not just sending three ships for an anti-piracy role off the waters of Somalia but also claiming leadership in the SHADE coordination mechanism there. China regularly holds exercises and training events with Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) partners, Pakistan and other countries though those with India are currently on hold.

Co-prosperity?

While there is no official substantiation of Chinese designs for establishing global or regional dominance, the 2008 Defence White Paper highlights the world view of the leadership thus: “China has become an important member of the international system and the future and destiny of China have been increasingly closely connected with the international community. China cannot develop in isolation from the rest of the world, nor can the world enjoy prosperity and stability without China.”

How will the next generation of Chinese leadership pursue this with a changeover due in 2012 remains to be seen. Will the likely successors, Vice President Xi Jinping and Vice-Premier Li Keqiang move a step ahead of Deng’s exhortation to “never claim leadership” to seek a world with a distinct Chinese imprint needs deliberation?

Rumsfeld doctrine While the “string of pearls” debates can be faulted for the neo-conservative paranoia in the era of Donald Rumsfeld, then American Secretary of Defense, who had initiated the Booz Allen Hamilton study, implications of an expansionist Chinese vision in South Asia and Indian Ocean will pose very grave diplomatic and security challenges for India, which cannot be overlooked.

Creating client States?

Developments

post-2005,

when

the “string of pearls” term was first articulated denote that China may be moving beyond, ‘pearls’ to establish an, “orbit of satellites,” particularly in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, expansively using tools of aid, trade, infrastructure development, diplomacy, political support and military assistance to advantage. Some of the key indicators are summarised as per Table 1 below. While in some cases China seems to have been effectively rebuffed as in Myanmar where the military government has made no bones of determination to protect territorial sovereignty, others as Pakistan seem to be complicit by illegally ceding the Shaksgam Valley of Jammu and Kashmir. Increasing access to the Northern Areas on the plea of improvement of the Karakoram Highway to provide access to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea is another indicator in the same direction. Who will control Gwadar is also emerging as a key question, the Pakistan Navy is asking for a stake in the strategic port.

Some South Asian countries such as Nepal and Bangladesh regularly use Beijing as leverage to extract more and more concessions from New Delhi to good effect. There are indications that Afghanistan and Sri Lanka who have been recipients of Chinese largesse lately may not be averse to a similar approach.

Balancing acts Moreover the internal politics of South Asia is far too complex with most countries vibrant if somewhat chaotic democracies. Nepal is a classic case which has not had effective government for many years now, with the past few months [from June to October 2010] under a caretaker prime minister and without a running national budget. Bangladesh is evolving a new political paradigm of a secular Islamic republic though the Iron Ladies of Dhaka, Sheikh Hasina and Begum Khaleda Zia continue to play petty politics over seat adjustment in parliament or vacation of cantonment house of the latter. Myanmar has been deftly playing both China and India as the visit of the Senior General Than Shwe to New Delhi in last week of July 2010 was followed by one to Beijing in September.

So far the Chinese seem to be getting the better end of the bargain but Beijing is used to linear relationships as with North Korea or Pakistan and may find it increasingly difficult to handle the complex politics in South Asia. Thus it is unlikely that Beijing will find the going easy to graduate from a ‘string of pearls’ to operate an ‘orbit of satellites.’

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Chinese guise

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Country

Chinese Influence

Myanmar

Diplomatic, economic and military support, energy relationship with transportation corridors.

Pakistan

“All Weather Friendship,” implying strong strategic alignment with close diplomatic, economic, nuclear energy and military support, with transportation corridors

Bangladesh

Strong economic, trade and development relations. Military arms sales and assistance, possibility of a transportation corridor.

Sri Lanka

Growing economic, trade and aid relations. Military arms sales and assistance, ports and infrastructure.

Afghanistan

Growing economic relations, large mining project at Aynak with other opportunities for extraction.

Nepal

Developing political and economic relationship.

Extending rail transport link from Lhasa to the Sino-Nepal border could provide added advantage to Beijing.

Maldives

Developing economic aid.

Table 1

Vulnerabilities China’s strategy of expansionism in the Indian Ocean region has its pitfalls.

Beijing is not as strong as the United States, the differential in economic size in terms of GDP remains substantial.

China does not have the strategic culture of ‘hegemonism’ as Beijing’s leadership seems to repeatedly assert, moreover the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) capacity is largely uncertain, with no recent metrics for measuring effectiveness. The doctrines of, “active defence,” “anti access” and, “self defence counter attacks” are driven by clichés. A networked battlefield today with high density fire power requires exceptional level of integration of operations the capability for which has not been demonstrated so far.

An overreach may also raise a host of challenges from a “circle of States,” hostile to China forcing Beijing to back off. Already there are indications in South East Asia where Japan and the United States have been sought after of late by some of the ASEAN countries like Vietnam. When stretched across

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the seven seas, China’s string of pearls can become a chain of vulnerabilities.

India’s strategic options Whatever be the case, India cannot ignore Chinese strategic, diplomatic, military and infrastructure forays in the periphery. A carefully considered strategy would have to be evolved by New Delhi to ensure that its national interests are met without raising the ante of a confrontation with China.

New Delhi cannot afford, “News Room Hype,” as a strategy in dealing with a rising China and rationally contest expansion by building its own relationship with its neighbours, employing growing economic strength effectively to support friends and maintain a balance. India essentially has three broad options which have been summarised below with many permutations and combinations: (a) Strategic Confrontation: Strategic confrontation is an either-or strategy with States in the region provided an option either directly or indirectly to opt to partner New Delhi or Beijing.

This strategy seems to be playing out in Nepal, where Kathmandu’s attempt to proximate relations with China is being tacitly but fiercely contested by India.

This approach may lead to a political, diplomatic or a military confrontation with China and adoption of the course would be determined by our capability to withstand the likely reaction.

India adequate hedging options against rising Chinese influence globally as well as regionally.

Core option An attempt has been made here to put into perspective the trajectory of the “string of pearls” debate outlining Chinese expansionist plans. A confrontation with China is least desired by India even though Beijing is striving to keep New Delhi in a state of, “low equilibrium,” as Dr. Manmohan Singh is reported to have said recently to a group of editors.

India is at that point in its development curve when any interruption will prevent the next stage of propelling our mass of underdeveloped multitudes to the benefits of a middle class. To continue to grow without an external military challenge till 2020-2025 is of paramount interest for India.

For this concomitantly developing diplomatic and security relationships in the neighbourhood remain the core option to challenge the “string of pearls.” India can also gainfully employ its overarching geographical advantage astride the Indian Ocean, bridging West and South East Asia to advantage.

Improve defences

(b) Strategic Accommodation: India could go for a strategy of seeking accommodation with Beijing by a cooperative approach where each would continue to develop relations with other States without clashing.

In the economic field, Indian and Chinese companies could jointly bid for infrastructure and mining projects where both seem to be competing only adding to the host States coffers.

This requires nuanced caliberation to ensure that Beijing does not exceed the red lines that have been mutually established.

Military capacity is a sine qua non to this paradigm and New Delhi will do well to concentrate energies on developing a viable long term strategy for modernisation of defence. The present paradigm comprises only of a set of procedures for procurements such as the Defence Procurement Procedure useful to streamline the process of acquisitions rather than expanding capacity to meet emerging challenges.

Moreover human resources remains the biggest challenge for the military of tomorrow. Unless we get some of the best and the brightest to join the armed forces or have a well established programme for talent development, India will continue to perceive itself vulnerable to Chinese ‘pearls’.

(c) Strategic Balancing: Strategic balancing would involve establishing a chain of relationships with States who perceive China as a challenge including the United States, original proponent of the, “string of pearls”, Russia, Japan, South Korea and South East Asian States like Vietnam. This will provide

The wrter is an army veteran presently Director of Sasia Security-Risks.com Pvt. Ltd., a South Asian security risk and knowledge management consultancy. His most recent book is, “Securing India: Assessment of Security and Defence Capabilities”.

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Chinese guise

LAND GRAB

Cecil Victor

The dragon stirs Geopolitics in the 21st century is being sought to be anchored in the Chinese concept that power grows out of the barrel of a gun. We are seeing it in the operation of the current phase of Chinese assertiveness.

India can give the world a new mantra of co-prosperity and peaceful coexistence implicit in the Manmohan Singh doctrine of “irrelevance of borders�.

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Chinese guise

LAND GRAB

A

t the first signs of resurgent Chinese belligerence there was a flavour to it that indicated, unambiguously, that China now means business and is preparing to teach someone on its periphery a “second lesson.” With Russia, the Ussuri River island issue had been settled long ago so there was no likelihood of hostilities breaking out up there. With Vietnam whom China taught its “first lesson” in 1979 with a massive attack all along the northern border though counter-claims on the Paracel and Spratley islands in the South China Sea are still simmering there was no recent provocation to justify an attack. Then the Chinese faced down the US and forced it to shift the joint naval exercise with South Korea out of the Yellow Sea, and warned Japan of retaliatory action if it did not release the Chinese Captain of a trawler that rammed two Japanese Coast Guard ships off the disputed Shenkaku island in a portion of the East China Sea known to be rich in gas deposits which both countries had agreed to jointly develop.

Tension ratcheted up That left India who was taught its first lesson in 1962. Relations had become marred by what Prime Minister Manmohan Singh described as China’s greater “assertiveness” – the claim to the whole of Arunachal Pradesh; objection to his meeting the Dalai Lama; the pasting of visas on a separate sheet for residents of Jammu and Kashmir; the refusal to give a visa to an Indian General and, most ominously , the publication of a monograph on a “limited war” with India. So trouble was expected. Where and when was a matter of “actionable intelligence”.

Unfortunately, it came not from Indian intelligence agencies but in a leak by the US Central Intelligence Agency to journalist Seymour Hersh who reported in an American journal that several thousand Chinese were involved in setting up infrastructure in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in the Northern Areas now known as GilgitBaltistan. These included tunnels and roadworks leading southwards.

Coercive diplomacy The Chinese have struck in a manner intended to test Indian political and military reactions. This is an area where

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the Chinese have long ago laid down the Karakoram Highway that enters the territory of the former Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir through the Kunjerab Pass in the extreme north.

Now they are preparing the ground for a railway link and oil and gas pipelines from the Gwadar port on the Balochistan coast and Iran, respectively.

It is reported that the local population is not being allowed to enter the area of Chinese operations.

The numbers of Chinese personnel in the area is said to be around 11,000 which is about a brigade strength in military terms. These are not labourers but troops from engineer regiments of the People’s Liberation Army acclimatised to high altitude warfare.

The reason for this camouflage is that some time ago the local population had opposed the presence of the Chinese on their territory and had blocked and stopped repair work on the Karakoram Highway. Chinese engineers both here and at damsites in the North West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa) were kidnapped and killed by jihadi terrorists operating in sympathy with their Uighur Muslim brethren in Chinese Xianjiang province.

Indian options The absence of Indian reaction would be, like the other recent events on the Chinese periphery, an acceptance of the paramountcy of Chinese National Power (CNP) and the impotence of the only “Super Power” on the globe to come to the aid and assistance of those who believe that it can be a countervailing factor vis-à-vis the growing Chinese hegemony. The consequence for India is that it would have accepted what Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has described as “low equilibrium” and insignificant regional power status.

India has reacted somewhat more strongly than before through its External Affairs Minister S. M. Krishna that Jammu and Kashmir is no “disputed territory” as is being sought to be made out by Islamabad and Beijing; that it is an integral part of India. There has been talk of reciprocal stamping of visas on a separate sheet for anyone travelling to the Tibet Autonomous Region. It is moot whether anyone is allowed to travel to Tibet but, yes, this one act would undo India’s acceptance of Chinese suzereignty in Tibet and set

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the stage for follow-on steps.

Stronger actions However, India needs to take stronger action. For one, a strongly-worded demarche to Beijing about the presence of Chinese in the Gilgit-Baltistan segment of Jammu and Kashmir is an absolute necessity to put India’s position on record. This should be followed immediately by appropriate steps in the Asian Development Bank to stop all loans to China for projects inside China as long as it makes investments like the Karakoram High widening, the rail link and pipelines through what Beijing says is “disputed territory” – the same argument China used to try and stop ADB funding for Indian projects in Arunachal Pradesh.

How can the ADB disburse loans to a nation that is diverting huge sums from its own resources to encourage separatism and illegal occupation by Pakistan? It needs to be recalled that it is Pakistan that is in violation of UN resolution calling on it to withdraw its troops from Jammu and Kashmir.

Confusing position Most Indians are thoroughly confused over what exactly are we negotiating with Pakistan and China. With Pakistan, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has spoken of “making borders irrelevant”. Irrelevant as in having 11,000 Chinese troops disguised as labourers in the Gilgit valley of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir? They are upgrading the Karakoram Highway and broadening it. They are laying the foundations of a railway line and a gas and petroleum conduit connecting Chinese Xianjiang to Gwadar Port in Pakistan and Iranian oilfields, respectively. When these are completed it is India that will become irrelevant.

With China we have been trying to settle the Himalayan border through talks. The only “progress” that has taken place is that China now claims the whole of Arunachal Pradesh not just the Tawang tract and they are painting their names on rocks in the central sector along the UP border. Which makes us wonder where are the Indian border guards while this happens? We have been made to believe that if we put the border issue aside and improve

trade and other links there will be peace and tranquillity between the two nations. We have been left sucking that lollipop and gazing at our own reflection in the incredible blueness of the Panggong Lake in northeastern Jammu and Kashmir while the ground is being dug away from under our feet.

Baldfaced aggression Even as Pakistan and its catspaw in the Kashmir valley, the Hurriyat Conference are demanding that India should declare that Jammu and Kashmir is “disputed territory”, Minister of External Affairs S. M. Krishna did finally reiterate that the whole of Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India. That can only be small consolation for Indians because one never knows the true meaning of “making borders irrelevant” or what was going on with untrustworthy interlocutors through “back channels” and track II diplomacy over the past decade when General Musharraf was whispering sweet nothings into our ears and the Chinese were marching down towards Gwadar port and wrapping a “string of pearls” around our neck.

transit agreement with Afghanistan allowing Afghan goods access to India but not Indian goods to Afghanistan.

India also needs to raise in world forums China’s direct endorsement of terrorist activities both in the North-east where it has given training and financial facilities to the United Liberation Front Asom (ULFA) as has recently been revealed after arrest of several of its top leaders in Bangladesh and also in Jammu and Kashmir as confirmed by former President and military dictator General Pervez Musharraf in his admission that Pakistan had set up training facilities for terrorism in J & K.

of borders” doctrine enunciated by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

If borders are to be irrelevant then India must assert its right to passage across the Karakoram Highway to the Wakhan panhandle for direct access to Afghanistan with which the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir shared about 100 km of border before Pakistan invaded it in 1948.

This would be a dramatic gamechanger if ever there was one. We would have moved from being satisfied with the few billion dollars increase in bilateral trade with China while

We came back from Shram-el-Sheikh grinning from ear to ear after accepting the odium of sponsoring terrorism in Balochistan! If we are involved in Balochistan then we should do a better job and go wholehog and execute another Bangladesh. Or do we have to rue the passing away of Indira Gandhi every minute of our lives?

While Pakistan and China regularly complain of what we do in Jammu and Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh we have not raised a squeak about what the Chinese are doing to Tibetans in Tibet or the Uighars of Xianjiang or the construction activity in Pakistanoccupied Kashmir. Pakistan openly threatened to use nuclear weapons against us to prevent us from dislodging the Pakistan Army Northern Light Infantry from the Kargil-Dras salient overlooking the Line of Control in 1999.

Change the script It is time we changed the script. India needs to make some gesture in Jammu and Kashmir that goes beyond mere pro forma reiteration of “Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India” Recently Pakistan signed a trade and

It needs to be recalled that Musharraf was in Beijing when the Pakistani intrusion into the Kargil-Dras segment was discovered. Therefore, Musharraf had the full backing of the Chinese in his misadventure.

Zone of co-prosperity However, in the interest of peace, tranquillity and mutual development in the entire Asian region stretching from the former Central Asian Republics of the Soviet Union (now Commonwealth of Independent States) down to the Arabian Sea a modus vivendi can be agreed by India, Pakistan and China to allow India also to utilise the Karakoram Highway and also build a road-railpipeline extension through PoK’s border with Afghanistan. That would, more truly, represent the “irrelevance

being cheated in the pricing of our natural resources by a deliberately suppressed Yuan-dollar exchange rate to sharing in the trainloads of gold that mutual connectivity for transfer of energy resources could bring for all stakeholders.

The European Union would have a land-bridge to the ASEAN and this type of connectivity between the two economic groupings could give to globalisation a more universal benefit than it has done so far. At the fulcrum would be India, China and Pakistan.

The writer has covered all wars with Pakistan as War Correspondent and reported from the conflict zones in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in South East Asia as well as from Afghanistan. He is author of “India: The Security Dilemma”.

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STRATEGIC TROIKA

China-Japan-India challenges and

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November 2010 Defence AND security alert

axis:

opportunities

Prof. Rajendra Prasad

It has to be recognised that the prognostication of an Asian Century presupposes a mutuality of interests and a commonality of strategy to attain that most coveted of objectives among Asians of every hue. One generation has elapsed but the baggage remains. The one redeeming factor is that there is general recognition that multipolarity need not be conflictual. China is on a trajectory that in the foreseeable future only India can match. Japan’s technological skills can be the yeast to sustainable regional growth.

I

n 21st century, the political entities of the international system in general and Asia in particular are passing through testing times on account of prevalent crises and uncertainties on one side and prospective hopes of recovery on the other. In strategic and political circles, it has been profoundly visualised that 21st century is going to be projected as the Asian Century. By and large, such a view has gained prominence on account of two major Asian powers - China and India. In terms of rich culture, tradition, critical mass (population+territory), booming economy, military prowess, energy and resource base, the two Asian giants figure as significant as, if not greater than, the rest of the comity of nation-States cumulatively, at least for the near-term future.

Japanese prism The response to these two Asian powers continues to be closely watched and scrutinised. Japan, an economic power, has tried to develop powerful linkages to its trade and investment with both China and India. But, unlike India, China’s rise has been seen by Japan with a strategic sense of suspicion due to historical quandary and underlying irritants. China’s rise was not just an economic factor; it was coupled with formidable military modernisation and expanding arena of political influence.

Viewed in historical perspective, Beijing’s successful hosting of the 2008 Olympics, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders’ meeting, and accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) did much to

consolidate China’s status in the global arena. Now China is taking substantial steps to augment its influence in Asia.

The biggest factor is China’s economic rise. The Chinese economy has become ever more integrated with a number of Asian countries, fostering pace with its phenomenal growth. China’s neighbours are, on the one side, worried about the inadequacies of their indigenous economic, industrial and military prowess. On the other side, they are keen for cooperation with China on account of its ever-growing economic competence.

Trinity of growth In such circumstances, can we think of promoting China-Japan-India trinity for peace, security and development in the world in general and Asia in

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STRATEGIC TROIKA

particular? Moreover, what are the prime challenges and opportunities in the near future? These are the main discourses highlighted through this article.

China, Japan and India need clear-cut and compatible grand strategic visions for Asia setting its status as the new global “centre of gravity.” Currently, the relations among China, Japan and India, that is, the Sino-Japanese, Sino-Indian and Japanese-Indian relations, are generally improving, but very often simultaneous competition and cooperation are being circumscribed in limiting their interests; sometimes germinating the seeds of unstated suspicions and divergences.

order. Trade flows from China to the United States and Europe, bilateral trade disputes, worries in the West about outsourcing of jobs, stress on currency valuations, alarm of Chinese overture to Western companies and the expanding global competition for energy and raw materials all point to basic shifts occurring in the global economic domain.

ASEAN too Following their paths to progress, India and China’s economic dynamism has re-energised Japan and other Asian economies as well, most notably the ASEAN States, activating their integration into the global market and making Asia the rapidest developing

Significantly, as part of rising needs for new sources of energy, questions loom large over financing of an appropriate infrastructure to deliver Russian energy as a viable alternative to East Asia as well as competition between China, Japan and S. Korea for this Russian energy. In such circumstances, the strategic and security implications are bound to be enormous, especially in the context of the planned construction in East Asia of large number of nuclear power plants of a highly sophisticated nature, the location of major energy fields and possible contested rights as well as possible threats to pipelines, issues dealing with the safety and security of the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) and so on.

Pending the solution of problems and existing frictions, Beijing-New Delhi and Beijing-Tokyo need to implement confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) to reduce anxieties, adversarial overtures and mis-perceptions about each other’s intensions, defence posture and military activities and, at the same time, promoting programmes of military-to-military contacts / exchanges / high-level strategic and security dialogues that enhance interactions among senior defence officials and a deeper understanding of each country’s strategic intentions and defence priorities China-India factor India and China are success stories of phenomenal growth in terms of economic and military potentialities.

With their ample supplies of low-cost labour, possession of natural resources and highly educated elite, India and China have not only attained speedy economic success over the last decade, but are also rising as two of the world’s most powerful economies. Interestingly, India and China have attained this growth by adopting drastically different economic models and development strategies. While India has engrossed private business, large investments in information technology and a mounting knowledge-based service industry, China has relied on pricing power, a massive manufacturing sector, a flourishing export industry, foreign direct investment and enormous gains in currency reserves. More prominently, China’s powerful growth during the past decade is exercising a formidable impact on the world’s economic

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region in the world. The on-going economic growth in Asia, particularly in China and India, caused an urgent and ever greater demand for energy.

Emerging challenges from the rise in Asian energy consumption can be viewed through a variety of prisms strategic, economic, environmental, and security.

Energy efficiency East Asian countries are increasingly worried about developing or getting new and secure sources of energy.

Development of new technologies for coal, more extensive utilisation of natural gas, laying of pipelines, construction of nuclear power plants and hydro-electric plants, as well as green and renewable energy sources are among the major initiatives underway. On another level, demands on industrial sector to use its energy more efficiently and to design more energy efficient products continue to rise.

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India-China challenges Despite their economic achievements, however, India and China are faced with formidable future challenges.

Environmental concerns, shortages of skilled labour and industry-specific talent, the inability of education systems to meet the demands of an ever increasing workforce, the needs of rural populations and the stark realities of geo-political and historical legacy and geo-economic competition are all raising questions about the sustainability of such rapid growth.

In addition, pending Sino-Indian boundary dispute, China’s continental diplomacy and encirclement of India, support to Pakistan’s continuous military build-up, nuclear and missile development remain as major irritants and intractable factors between these two Asian powers.

Japan-India mutuality Japan today is at the cross-roads in terms of revisiting its strategic, political

and economic permutations and combinations within the domain of its foreign and security policies. Japan and India are discerned to be natural allies for Asian stability and security. Time is ripe to signify that in the Japanese formulation of selective traditional and non-traditional security imperatives India can figure prominently and should be given a partnership or cooperative responsibility. However, for India to attain credibility in these fields it needs to be more accommodative in articulating its

and security policies continue to be galvanised by the “Balance of Power” criterion. India, on the contrary, maintains considerable aversion from this stand and gives leverage to the “Balance of Interests” criterion. The marked differences between these two criteria are likely to have an impact on the substantive quest of strategic cooperation between Japan and India. Japan and India are both at the edge of a historic need in their political realisation, coupled with contemporary global and regional strategic and

account of India’s geographical location in the middle section of the strategic sea route that facilitates frequent maritime accessibility. Notably, Indian Ocean provides the sea-routes linking the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean for the traffic and transportation of oil and petroleum products. India enjoys its force projection into more than 1,600 kilometers of the Indian Ocean, thus sounding a unique strategic position.

While properly tackling mutual relations with the sole Super Power - the United States, China, Japan and

readiness. India must not hesitate to generate and multiply large strategic commitments if it intends to achieve a major power status globally. Japan and India, aspiring for major international roles, would have to concentrate on strategic and security issues figuring on the global scale, along with finetuning their cooperative framework.

Both countries would have to come out of their regional security frame of references in order to attain the aspired status. The remnants of the Cold War thinking would need to be abandoned and extra-regional cooperation in the relatively larger strategic context is to be prioritised for mutual benefits.

security developments to approach each other for strategic proximity and cooperation.

India can gain all “win-win” situations of being on the alert and getting into cooperation with one another with regard to maritime traffic security.

They can join hands to deal with Non-Traditional Security (NTS) threats such as terrorism and rampant sea piracy, involving major strategic choices to be adequately insured.

Balancing power / interests

Although Japan and India are geographically far away from each other, they have good transportation links on

Most prominently, Japanese foreign

Nothing substantial is discernible in terms of South Asia policy shifts as Japan continues to pursue the US line on Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Independently, Japan has not rationalised its Pakistan policies even when it stands known that Pakistan provided technical know-how and actively assisted North Korea in producing nuclear bombs - a direct threat to Japan’s homeland security.

Indian Ocean archway

Successful engagement Viewing Japanese calculations of strategic benefits, it is highly speculative that it develops its profiles of strategic, security, political and economic cooperation, largely in the similar way as its relationship with USA takes turning steps. India has been desirous of having an economically attuned cooperative relationship with Japan and it would

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continue to greatly welcome the inflow of Japanese business investments and technology. Notably, India has attained substantial success during the past decade in constructively engaging Japan and other key countries and regional organisations in the Southeast Asia and East Asia. This has been made feasible as India ventured consistently to transform its economic potential into actual performance and embarked upon the path of pursuing strong national security policy orientations.

At this stage, there is a strong case for India and Japan to broaden and deepen their economic and political engagements to enhance strategic depth and leverage. The two countries had envisaged “global partnership” in 2000 and it is time to give greater substance to it. That India is the single largest recipient of Overseas Development Assistance is a strong signal from Japan, but it needs to be complemented by more robust economic and political cooperation on the issues of mutual interest.

More importantly, products trade between India and Japan has been comparatively sluggish since 1997-98 amounting to approximately US$ 4 to 4.5 billion. Contrary to it, India-China trade has accrued in positive directions.

In services trade also, India-Japan trade has not been very encouraging.

There are 265 firms from Japan which have invested in India, with total FDI stock of only US$ 2 billion. This is in sharp contrast to Japan’s FDI stock of US$ 50 billion in Southeast Asia, and US$ 40 billion in China. This large imbalance can be replenished by adopting viable steps in all these fields.

It is to be observed by the Japanese government and business companies that India ranks third in the world in FDI attractiveness. India’s FDI policies are more attractive than China’s, though India needs substantial marketing and soft skills to translate these into actual investments.

South Korea initiative Maintaining sharp distinction from Japan, its traditional rival, South Korea, has been proactive in representing substantial manufacturing presence in India. At current rates, India’s trade with South Korea is set to overtake its trade with Japan in the near future.

It can be argued that the primary

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responsibility of why many “win-win” opportunities have not been realised lies with the mindset of Japanese policy and business establishments and with opinion-makers and researchers.

They have not been cautious to monitor adequately India’s unilateral liberalisation and rapid integration with the world economy. The sluggishness of the past should not be allowed to mar the present and the foreseeable prospects.

Japan’s China perception China figures prominently in Japan’s current strategic and economic calculus. Historically, China is the common factor in East Asia’s major conflictual flash points extending from the Korean Peninsula in the North, to the Taiwan Straits and to the South China Sea territorial disputes in which Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia are pitted against China’s claims to exploit the energy deposits that lie in the South China Sea area. Japan and China have long-drawn territorial dispute over the ownership of a chain of unpopulated islets in the East China Sea, referred to as the Senkaku Islands in Japan and the Diaoyu Islands in China, especially relating to the islets’ offshore natural gas and oil resources. China and Japan are still fighting over offshore oil rights and not fully reconciled over the row related to the historical atrocities during World War II. The Japanese also worry about the tension between China and Taiwan and are afraid of being dragged into any conflict that may occur between the two. There are fears, above all in China, that Japan is gradually upgrading its military profile in preparation for developing offensive military capabilities.

Security paradigm Retrospectively, Japan’s “New National Defense Program Guidelines for 2005 and After”, as well as the “Mid-term Defense Program Fiscal Years 2005-2009” both have been indicative of a thorough restructuring of the Self Defense Forces to make them able to respond effectively to new threats, such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, as well as provide a more proactive Japanese policy with various initiatives to improve the international security environment.

These are formidable factors that the Japanese consider necessary to counter

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

the larger threat in the long-term, especially the rise of China.

On nuclear issue, Japanese officials and security experts don’t trust China’s NFU (No First Use) policy and desperately need “US nuclear umbrella”. In the absence of the US extended deterrence and retirement of the Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles/ Nuclear (TLAM/N) in 2013, Japan may go to create its own deterrence(?).

As explained by James Schlesinger in the testimony of the Report of Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States of America on 6 May 2009, following is noteworthy: “Japan is the country that has perhaps the greatest leaning, amongst the 30 odd nations that we have under the umbrella, to create its own nuclear force and therefore, intimate discussions with the Japanese, I think, are mandatory at this stage”.

In the economic arena, China’s rise as the “world production centre” as well as the “world’s major manufacturing base” is posing direct challenges to Japan’s economy in Asia. Whereas Japan’s economy has stagnated for the past decade, China has continued to move ahead and has already become the second largest economy of the world. Now, with China still growing on average at about 8 per cent a year and Japan shrinking, commentators in Japan have conceded to admit that the shift will likely discern even sooner in the economic field. Also, the two neighbours share a lot in common in facing up challenges to energy security: ranging from securing undisrupted oil supply with reasonable price to safety of sea-lanes communication. Japanese suspect that the Chinese will not abide by international rules and that their growing power performance will mark receding Japanese influence.

China’s implacable rise China’s growing role in the world economy is unquestionable. After more than two decades of exportdriven economic growth, China is today the second largest economy in the world, the largest exporter in the world and the largest lender to the US. Accordingly, the global order is shifting and the profile of power and the operational parameters that have characterised the international system

over the past half century are becoming transformed. Recent developments reflect this shift and substantiate that China is now regarded as a near equal power to the US. Probably, by the end of 2010, China will account for an amazing 30 per cent of global consumption growth. Japanese, who have hitherto concentrated more on economic linkages with the US and

assign great leverage to the primacy of relations with the United States.

Therefore, they need to give great importance to the mutual relations with one another rather than letting oneself become a pawn of the US - a super power - outside Asia in containing one of the countries within the region. This is of paramount importance in case of revisiting the Japan-US alliance under

What is unusual and admittedly epoch-making is the fact that the relationships between the US, Japan and China are all improving simultaneously since September 11, 2001: China was prompt enough to side with the US, albeit with certain reservations. Japan moved forward to provide rear area support in the global war on terrorism (GWOT), an attempt welcomed in

Europe, are ultimately bound to realise that they would do well if they get hold of the realty in this situation.

the present government in Japan.

Engaging China

Almost simultaneously, the 9/11 attacks pushed forward new dynamics to bring about changes in the US policy towards Asia in general and Japan-China relations in particular. In making anti-terrorism coalition and partnership, the US has shifted its unilateralist approach in its foreign policy and now embarks upon the path of international cooperation. This policy shift is seen relatively lower in areas unrelated to fighting terrorism and the US still lends importance to its own requirements. Nevertheless, the terrorist attacks have brought about a focused approach towards changes, adjustments, re-adjustments and shifts in the relations between the US and rest of the world.

Washington and not opposed in Beijing. In reality, the anti-terrorism cooperation cannot erase the basic differences of values and normative approaches adopted by the US, Japan and China on so many issues of global concern, such as climate change and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Concern about China’s increasing military capability has further strengthened the case for having it engaged in a stable reciprocity, where one country’s richness and strength are not marked as detrimental to the vital national interests of others. Chinese policy-makers and strategists are largely aware of the fact that China’s neighbours perceive it as a threat - both militarily and economically - and are making ventures, by extending support to regional political and economic structures to minimise worries about its strategic ambitions and over-all interests.

China,

Japan

and

India

each

Dynamics of terrorism

US as fulcrum Yet the new trilateral relations could provide a window of opportunity to accelerate fresh steps towards integration and stability in Asia. Notably, if JapanChina relations are tension-prone, building regional economic and securityrelated structures can be difficult, if not impossible. Positive US relations and engagements with Japan and China today are the fulcrum of strengthening the broad understanding that it is in the US interest for making East Asia to become more mature and integrated,

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

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Chinese guise

STRATEGIC TROIKA

regardless of US membership.

Appreciating China’s interests in Asia, the task for India will be to skillfully modulate its ties and ‘engage’ with China, which it is already doing.

India should also garner the sentiments of countries like Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and Japan, all of which wholeheartedly perceive India’s role as of critical significance to East Asia.

More the support India enjoys from the ASEAN, China’s surrounding nations and Japan, stronger will be the position of India to demonstrate transparency and to erase China’s doubts on “India’s Look East policy”.

Eventually, the resultant of a more effective engagement policy needs a better appreciation of how China’s calculative strategy might emerge over time as China’s capabilities multiply, to influence the mode and intensity of both China’s cooperative and assertive behavioural performances.

Dichotomy of ambitions Above all, it is paramount to signify Japan’s and India’s ambitions to which they aspire, that is - the engagement of China should not be a policy prescription intended to promote the accretion of Chinese power so that it may eventually eclipse India and Japan in Asia, even if peacefully. Rather, engagement must be initiated and designed to boost a more cooperative China, while also supporting Indian and Japanese profiles in geo-political and geo-economic terms, especially in critical military and economic fields, to encourage conditions for both regional and global order and economic richness.

In addition, the variables of engagement should also focus on exposing Beijing’s admission that generating harmful challenges and threats against Japan and India would be both onerous and expensive and, hence, not in China’s long-term interests.

In general, so far as Beijing refrains from the use of force in resolving its territorial disputes with either India or Japan and functions peacefully to both accommodate and redraw the contours of prospective international order, the most destabilising consequences of growing Chinese power will be minimised and the international order might even be able to eschew the worst effects of traditional security dilemmas and the use of force in regional

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international relations in Asia. The historical antecedents suggest that the challenges to the fulfilment of this goal are likely to be “enormous” because the structural impediments superimposed by competitive international politics will interact with the unstable domestic processes in these countries.

Most probably, China’s ambitions would produce either its adversarial interaction with Japan, India and other major entities at the heart of the global system or a convergence of vital national interests could emerge in the foreseeable future.

Statesmanship China, Japan and India all need to develop meaningful cooperative relationships. In fine-tuning their relations, they should design constructive mechanisms for healthy competitiveness and permissive links, while at the same time enhancing the spirit of mutual understandings among them.

Historically, there are some unresolved problems and frictions, which include Sino-Indian boundary dispute, Sino-Japan dispute over the ownership of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea and rift over offshore exploration of oil and gas, Sino-Japanese row over conflicting versions of history, China’s negative attitude on the UN Security Council for permanent membership of Japan and India, North Korea’s WMD tangle, competitive energy security and the like.

Promoting confidence To overcome the inherent intricacies, the three countries should build a new transcending platform to improve their respective relations through the creation of new tri-lateral and / or multilateral Asia-centric institutional framework. Efforts should be made to resolve the territorial disputes and other contentious security issues at an early date. Pending the solution of problems and existing frictions, Beijing-New Delhi and Beijing-Tokyo need to implement confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) to reduce anxieties, adversarial overtures and mis-perceptions about each other’s intensions, defence posture and military activities and, at the same time, promoting programmes

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

of military-to-military contacts / exchanges / high-level strategic and security dialogues that enhance interactions among senior defence officials and a deeper understanding of each country’s strategic intentions and defence priorities. Measures to increase defence transparency on China’s part, such as publishing more detailed military budgets and defence white papers, would help to allay India’s as well as Japan’s worries to a great extent. They need consistent efforts towards increasing economic inter-dependence, adopting strong national will to avoid strategic, political and economic impediments and restraining conflictual attitudes and bilateral frictions.

Non-traditional security Developing and enhancing cooperation among Japan, China and India for non-traditional security (NTS), especially in the areas of counter-terrorism, counter-sea piracy, maritime sea lanes security, disaster risk reduction, energy security and environmental security, etc. are needs of the hour. Given Japan’s national will, wealth and technological sophistication, it can be the forerunner in the area of non-traditional security cooperation, which is a promising route to wider international recognition and appreciation - and a reputation mounted on soft power (e.g. cultural appeal, social values, style of leadership), rather than hard power (use of military power). In this way, it can win substantial credence and confidence of both - India and China, in dealing with non-traditional threats of harmful magnitude. East Asian governments have largely preferred to use the non-traditional security mechanisms in dealing with the challenges of public security against the terrorist events, safety through disaster relief activities and maintenance of order against the challenges of piracy and organised crimes with regional and international nexus. Especially after 26/11 terrorist attack in Mumbai - the economic capital of India - a fresh look is irrevocably required, when the possibility of further terror strikes from the sea side is not ruled out.

The writer is Professor in the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies (DDSS) and Dean, Faculty of Science, DDU Gorakhpur University, UP, India.

Chinese guise

COLLUSION?

China-Myanmar:

burgeoning kinship

Rahul Mishra

Myanmar’s location has been fully exploited by China to fulfil several objectives. The foremost is its paranoia over the closure at the Malacca choke point. The facilities in several locations in Myanmar will allow for overland transfer of its eastbound cargo and energy supplies. As a flanking facility the road-cum-rail link will allow China to approach ASEAN from two directions. The same applies to India. If G-2 ever becomes a reality this is what will enable a division of the Pacific and Indian Ocean between China and the US. November 2010 Defence AND security alert

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Chinese guise

COLLUSION?

T

he historic and unfortunate incidents of Tiananmen Square massacre in China and the 1988 slaughter in Myanmar are popularly referred to as examples of the nastiest acts of naked use of State force and brutality against the democratic rights of the civil society. However, these incidents could be considered as the watershed events in the context of China-Myanmar relations. The countries which had a bitter relationship for more than twenty years, suddenly found each other on the same page of history as both had to face scathing criticism from all quarters of the world in the aftermath of these incidents.

‘Siblings’ Since China’s Cultural Revolution of 1967, the bilateral relation was marked by neglect if not mutual hostility, which was so significant that China, in 1967, termed the Ne Win government of Burma as ‘Fascist’. Within a year since 1988 (8/8/88) and 1989 incidents in Myanmar and China respectively, the two countries called each other ‘Paukphaw’ which in Burmese means; ‘siblings’. Interestingly, Myanmar never used such a term to define its relations with any other country at any point of time in its history. It is intriguing, therefore, to understand the why and how of China-Myanmar relations.

China’s strategic outreach China, today, is the most important country for Myanmar in terms of foreign policy formulation. It is Myanmar’s biggest trade partner. Myanmar too figures prominently in China’s scheme of things for several politico-military and economic reasons. According to the 17 October 2010 report of Xinhua, Myanmar has planned to construct a railroad that will link a deep-sea port, Kyaukpyu, in western Rakhine state with Kunming, southwest of China.

The Kyaukpyu-Kunming railroad is targeted to be finished in 2015. The railroad will pass through Rakhine state, Magway Region, Mandalay Region and Shan state in Myanmar. The railroad project is divided into such sections as Kyaukpyu-Eann-Minbu, MinbuMagway-Mandalay-Lashio-Muse and Muse-Jiegao trans-border railroad.

After the project is implemented, Myanmar’s Shan state and China’s Yunnan province can be connected directly and the railroad will mainly

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facilitate the goods flow from China.

Meanwhile, China has also planned to invest in a special industrial zone to be established in Kyaukpyu. This is just one of the several projects going on in Myanmar which is aimed at greater connectivity and faster communication between China and Myanmar.

India in pincer This bonhomie has, of late, caught attention of both Indian and international media and foreign policy pundits and the reaction thereof have been mixed. While some view China’s improved relations with Myanmar as an example of symbiotic relationship without any harm meant to anyone; the other set of argument is that it has led to strengthening of military junta of Myanmar and also emergence of disturbing security issues for India.

Adding to this line of argument is the point that China is engaging Myanmar to encircle India as part of what has been called as the ‘String of Pearls’ strategy.

New interests One cannot say, with certainty, as to which makes more sense. Nevertheless, one thing is certain and that is the fact that China’s relation with Myanmar has improved by leaps and bounds in recent years and the two countries are going from strength to strength in terms of bilateral cooperation and there is a remarkable mutual understanding between the two countries and therefore one needs to carefully understand why Myanmar needs China and vice-versa.

The brutal repression of prodemocracy protest on 8 August 1988, led to a range of political, diplomatic and economic problems for Myanmar.

The sanctions imposed by countries across the globe added to Myanmar’s problems.

International isolation, necessities of economic sustenance and regime survival left no option for a hopeless Myanmar but to look up to China and the latter didn’t miss the opportunity in bringing Myanmar into its fold.

Breaking isolation Internationally, Myanmar needed a country which could support its case at forums like United Nations General Assembly and the United

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

Nations Security Council. China suited most to the Myanmar’s interests on that front. Evidently, China has supported Myanmar’s case regularly in the UN meetings. For instance, in 2007, China repeatedly defended the Myanmar military junta, leading to serious criticism from international community. On 12 January that year, China and Russia jointly vetoed the US sponsored resolution in the UNSC, demanding that the Myanmar military government release political dissidents, hasten democratisation and stop attacking other ethnic minorities. When the Myanmar military government suppressed the massive but peaceful demonstrations in Yangon in late September, China again proclaimed its non-intervention policy and opposed any economic sanctions towards Myanmar. Strengthening of diplomatic ties yielded to closer cooperation in all areas of mutual interest of China and Myanmar.

Chinese weapons Myanmar heavily relies on China for its arms procurement. In 1989, the first military delegation arrived in Beijing to negotiate the purchase of arms. A deal was struck worth about US$ 1.4 billion.

Besides the supply of arms, China also agreed to train Myanmar’s air force, military and army personnel. One of China’s motives for arming Myanmar was to help safeguard the new trade routes through its potentially volatile neighbour. In the 1990s Myanmar acquired weapons at a discount or through barter deals or interest-free loans. Military hardware delivered by China included 100 Type 69II medium battle tanks and more than 100 Type 63 light tanks (of which only around 60 are thought to be serviceable); 250 Type 85 armoured personnel carriers, multiple-launch rocket systems, howitzers, anti-aircraft guns, HN-5 surface-to-air missiles, mortars, assault rifles, recoilless guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and heavy trucks; Chengdu F-7M Airguard jet fighters, FT-7 jet trainers, A-5M ground-attack aircraft and SAC Y-8D transport aircraft; and Hainan-class patrol bombs, Houxin-class guided-missiles, fastattack craft, mine-sweepers and small gunboats. In 1994, Myanmar bought about US$ 400 million worth of arms.

October 1996 visit of army chief general Maung Aye to Beijing resulted in further military and intelligence

cooperation between the two countries.

China’s intention to seek closer strategic alignment and economic cooperation with Myanmar could be seen from the visit to Yangon of a high power delegation of about 100 members led by Li Peng and his counterpart, General Than Shwe agreed to reaffirm and further strengthen the closer relationship between the two countries.

Between the years 2004 and 2007 China supplied Type-344 Fire control radar and C-801/CSS-N-4 Sardine Anti-ship missile among other things.

Of late, Myanmar has purchased weapons from Russia, United Kingdom and North Korea as well in order to diversify the procurements. However, China still stands as the principal

of its strategy to develop impoverished landlocked regions of southwest China, it has been using Myanmar as the land-bridge. China also wants to revive its southwest silk route from Yunnan and Sichuan to Myanmar, Bangladesh and India as well.

Access to Myanmar’s ports helps China get access to the Indian Ocean, thereby not only providing additional trade outlets but also help realising The Two Oceans Objective. Hak Yin Li and Zheng, Yongnian opine that in terms of strategic interests, Myanmar’s location at the north-western part of Indochina peninsula, close to the Bay of Bengal, makes it an emergency transport route for China if the Malacca strait were to be blocked. Myanmar also acts as a buffer

of Indian Ocean and no wonder India feels insecure, especially if it is coupled with China’s ‘String of Pearls’ strategy.

Slow builtup China has been getting militarily engaged with Myanmar with a long term plan. In 1994, Japanese sources reported that China had completed construction of radar and electronic surveillance facilities on the Coco Islands, which were on lease to China.

There was also a report that China and Myanmar were interested in jointdevelopment of deep-water port at Kyaukpyu on Ramree Islands in the Bay of Bengal. Furthermore, the alleged military installation at the Zadetkyi Island on Myanmar’s southern tip of

In 1994, Japanese sources reported that China had completed construction of radar and electronic surveillance facilities on the Coco Islands. The installation at the Zadetkyi Island on Myanmar’s southern tip close to Indonesia’s Sabang Island, raised suspicions about China’s future maritime ambitions in the Indian Ocean. Thus China’s strategic alignment with and inroads into Myanmar could have a long-term serious security implications not only for Indonesia, Thailand and ASEAN as a whole, but also for the strategic interests of India, Japan and the US partner of Myanmar on arms trade.

So, all in all Myanmar finds in China a large friendly neighbour which provides moral support to the Junta, a rising super power which protects it in UNSC, a key investor country and prime economic partner.

Detour Malacca straits For China, on the other hand, Myanmar is important for strategic and economic reasons. Myanmar shares more than 2,000 km border with China which separates southwest China from eastern Myanmar. Myanmar is strategically placed at the tri-junction of China, south and southeast Asia. As part

against international intervention in China’s backyard.

Long-range reach Chinese access to Myanmar’s ports, which arguably is related to its plans to establish blue water navy in coming years, has heightened India’s security concerns. China has been focusing on its maritime prowess for the past more than two decades. It was in 1987 to be precise when China put forward its vision of making blue water navy in the next 50 years. What seems as a major breakthrough in its policy is the ‘forward sea defence policy’ launched of late. The forward sea defence will have profound impact on the politics

its territory close to Indonesia’s Sabang Island, (off northern Aceh in Sumatra) raised suspicions about China’s future maritime ambitions in the Indian Ocean.

Thus China’s strategic alignment with and inroads into Myanmar could have a long-term serious security implications not only for Indonesia, Thailand and ASEAN as a whole, but also for the long term strategic interests of India, Japan and the US. In this emerging scenario, Myanmar might find itself in a difficult situation as both India and China are wooing it to safeguard their respective interests. As Robert D. Kaplan argues, “Myanmar is a feeble State abundant in the natural resources that China

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

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Chinese guise

COLLUSION?

desperately needs. China and India are competing to develop the deepwater port of Sittwe, on Myanmar’s Indian Ocean seaboard, with both harbouring the hope of eventually building gas pipelines running from offshore fields in the Bay of Bengal.” Of course, whether one agrees or disagrees on the so called ‘String of Pearls’ theory and the Chinese motives, it is very much clear that China-Myanmar nexus could prove lethal to India’s security objectives if China chooses to threaten India.

Regime change?

So, how does the future of ChinaMyanmar look like, particularly in the light of the fact that Myanmar is going to witness elections on 7 November 2010, after a long gap of three decades? From Chinese point of view, it would be in China’s best interest that the candidates supported by the military junta win

emerge a long transition phase as it would not be easy to transfer power in an ethnically fragmented country where the central government, even today, is extremely weak.

The local warlords, particularly in the bordering far flung areas might attempt to break away from the centre and such secessionist movement might lead to spillover effect on neighbours, particularly

Burgeoning trade So far as the bilateral trade is concerned, China-Myanmar trade links are centuries old, dating back to the 11 th century during the Pagan dynasty. In the recent past, the trade relations started officially in November 1989 after decades of mutual avoidance. In November 1989, SLORC signed a multiple trade and economic agreement with the Yunnan province authorities. A month later, in December 1989, the two countries signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement in which China agreed to offer an interest-free loan of US$ 15 million for the Yangon-Thanlyin rail and road bridge construction project.

There has also been a sharp jump in the trade volume of the two countries. In 1988, for example, the total trade between China and Myanmar reached US$ 9.51 million. In the year 2000, the total trade increased to US$ 621.26 million.

China gradually replaced Myanmar’s neighbours like Thailand and other southeast Asian nations and became Myanmar’s biggest trade partner. However, there are several issues of concern raised by the international community; one of the most significant of them being the fact that China is not a member country of DAC (Development Assistance Committee) of the OECD and it does not disclose its economic cooperation programmes. The Myanmar government does not disclose their receipt of economic cooperation from abroad, either.

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the elections. A successful conduct of elections in Myanmar would not only help China project itself as a responsible power, but also claim its status as an ‘International Stakeholder’. This is crucial for China as it is increasingly cornered by countries, particularly the US and EU member countries on the issue of human rights and restoration of democracy in Myanmar.

China would like to see that the status quo is maintained in Myanmar as a regime change might not only lead to reversion of policies of the new government, but also massive losses for Chinese companies and migration of Chinese workers back home. Additionally, if one hypothetically assumes that the military junta will be thrown away in the elections; chances of which are extremely weak, there would

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

in China. Therefore, it is in China’s best interest that junta prevails in whatever form. However, the flip side is that if elections in Myanmar are rigged and happen to be grossly unfair, United Nations, EU member countries and the US will leave no stone unturned to put pressure on China; something which China would not like to face.

One doesn’t know what future holds for Myanmar and what exactly will be the outcome of the elections. One thing, however, is certain; and that is, both China and Myanmar are having sleepless nights and are strung-up about the future of Myanmar; which will be crucial in determining the future of a new phase of China-Myanmar relations.

The writer is a researcher at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, India.

Chinese guise

EXPOSED

Nobel

! e s e n i h C

Pawan Agrawal

The Great Wall of China stands because of the marvel of engineering and architecture, not the cement of humanism. Deng Xiaoping tried to give a new meaning to Mao’s crafty “let a hundred flowers bloom and let a hundred schools of thought contend” by setting up a “Democracy Wall”. Both wilted soon because of the inherent intolerance of its leadership.

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

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Chinese guise

EXPOSED

S

ometime back I asked a student of class V what Kind of world she wanted to live in when she grew up? I was surprised, rather shocked, to hear her reply. She gave an unexpected answer to my question that she wanted to live in the world with no borders! It was really shocking and astonishing to have such a thought at this small age. We do not expect such profound thoughts at this age. But of course as we grow, we mature and we develop our thought process which crosses from self to family to neighbour to society to nation to world affairs.

Nation and individual To develop a feeling of pride in every citizen is the responsibility of all the policy makers and decision makers in nation-States. No matter what is the environment of an individual State but it is the birthright of every citizen to have a life of dignity and honour.

The Norwegian Nobel Committee has awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 2010 to Liu Xiaobo for his long and nonviolent struggle for fundamental human rights in China. The Norwegian Nobel Committee has long believed that there is a close connection between human rights and peace. Such rights are a prerequisite for the “fraternity between nations” of which Alfred Nobel wrote in his will.

Responsible nation-State Over the past few decades, China has managed to achieve economic development the kind of which the world has never seen. China now has the world’s second largest economy and millions of people have been lifted out of poverty.

The new status of China brings with it many responsibilities in world affairs. China has been breaching many international conventions and not honouring promises made to its citizens. Article 35 of China’s constitution lays down that “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration”. But in practice, these freedoms have hardly been allowed.

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Nation’s conscience?

Liu Xiaobo has been a strong advocate for the human rights in China for more than twenty years. He was quite active in the Tiananmen protests in 1989 and was the main propounder of Charter 08, the manifesto of human rights in China which was published on the 60th anniversary of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights. After this Liu was sentenced to eleven years in prison and two years’ deprivation of political rights for “inciting subversion of State power”. Liu has always maintained that the sentence violates both China’s own constitution and fundamental human rights.

A relentless campaign to establish universal human rights in China is being espoused by many Chinese, both in China itself and around the world. In spite of severe and rigorous punishment Liu has become the icon and face of human rights struggle in China.

Liu was in the jail for twenty months for his role in the hunger strike during student protests on Tiananmen Square in 1989. His involvement and his outspoken views got him a 20 month jail term. He was later sentenced to three years in a “labour re-education” camp for his continuing opposition to the regime and has spent various periods over the last few years under house arrest.

To solicit support of international community, Liu’s wife has called upon world leaders to use their good offices to build a pressure on the Chinese government for his early release. “As the committee recognised, China’s new status in the world comes with increased responsibility,” Liu Xia said in a written statement released by the Freedom Now human rights group. “China should embrace this responsibility, have pride in his selection and release him from prison,” she said.

China’s protest The Norwegian Nobel Committee had not expected such strong opposition and protest from the Chinese government.

This is probably the first time in the history of the Nobel Prize that any State has opposed and ridiculed their decision. China reacted with anger to the news. “Liu Xiaobo is a criminal sentenced by Chinese judicial organs due to his violation of Chinese law,” the Foreign Ministry said in a statement.

“His actions are against the purpose of the Nobel Peace Prize. The Peace Prize to such a person is totally contrary to the aim of this prize and also seriously disrespects the peace prize,” the statement said.

The peace prize was also criticised by Wei Jingsheng, a senior figure in China’s democracy movement, who said that many other dissidents were more deserving than Liu whom he accused of being a moderate and light weight willing to work with Chinese authorities.

Illustrious support The nomination of Liu was backed by several Chinese intellectuals and activists which demanded political reform, free speech and multi-party elections.

November 2010 Defence AND security alert

Absence of humanism This event has completely exposed the policies of China as how serious the Chinese State is about human rights and humanity. Chinese government is becoming a major threat to human rights movement in China. China has grown to become the second largest economy in the world, but it is standing at the end of the queue as far as human rights are concerned. The Great Wall of China was built for but one reason - as a monument to Han exclusivism. A nation is inspired by history and China is inspired by the Great Wall but this does not mean that China will ever be in a position to build a red wall across the globe or paint the globe a monochrome red, uniform and stifling.

The writer is publisher and CEO of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine and has long and varied experience in publishing and media.

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