DSA November 2011 by Defence and Security Alert

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he Indo-Afghan Strategic Agreement is one of the most significant national security developments in the last decade. In its scope it is on par with the Indo-US Nuclear Agreement, but in its impact it is more immediate as far as national security is concerned. The potential of the agreement is such that it could directly influence developments across three regions of Asia - West, Central and South. For it is in Afghanistan that these three regions meet, making the country unique in its history, as well as its future role. The significance of the Indo-Afghan Strategic Agreement is well understood in Tehran, Tashkent, as well as in Dushanbe. For the moment though it is misunderstood in Islamabad and Rawalpindi. And that is where the rub lies.

It was only after 1947 that Afghanistan and India ceased to be immediate neighbours, although they remained in terms of bonding. It is not surprising that Indian interests in Afghanistan have remained consistent with those prevailing before 1947, despite dramatic changes in the nature of governance in both countries. An India under the rule of Imperial Britain and now a democratic one, has virtually similar interests in and with, Afghanistan. And it doesn’t take rocket science to realise that it is simply a question of geography and history that determines the formulation of these interests. So the signing of the agreement is only a culmination of a logical process taken to its rational end.

The signing of this agreement follows upon those signed with Mongolia and South Korea in the recent past. And coupled with the historically close relationship with Vietnam, there is a pattern developing in terms of India’s footprint across the Asian landmass. Lest anyone take it amiss, this is not a heavy boot print, stamping on sovereignty or on other valid interests any country may have. This is a lesson for India as much as it is for the naysayers. For if India was to become overbearing, that would nullify all the positives that the country has to offer to its immediate and continental neighbours. And overbearing is certainly not an Indian national trait, or an ambition. Which is also why the race to be a super power of the future is a non-starter for that is not where India is headed. India is happy being itselfand doesn’t want interference in its internal matters, just as it doesn’t want others do that, to neighbours or otherwise.

The Indo-Afghan Strategic Agreement took its time coming owing to the misgivings that Pakistan has about intentions, of New Delhi and some other countries. It was only after a series of tragic assassination incidents that President Karzai’s hand was forced. He may have wanted to pen this agreement all along, but hedged because of explicit Pakistan’s misgivings. But the intrusive nature of Pakistani intelligence activities spilled a lot of Afghan blood and convinced him that the future lies with the neighbour of the past. The ball is now in India’s court and there is no reason for it to underplay its strokes. The Afghan people deserve a better future and India must be a partner in that process.

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

publisher’s view

executive editor

Securit y education and standardisation An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Magazine

Volume 3 Issue 2 November 2011 chairman shyam sunder publisher & ceo pawan agrawal editor-in-chief manvendra singh executive editor maj gen (dr) g d bakshi SM, VSM (retd) director shishir bhushan corporate consultant k j singh art consultant divya gupta central saint martins college of art & design, university of arts, london corporate communications tejinder singh business development wg cdr sangeeta malla (retd) ad-sales anamika singh anupama singh creative vivek anand pant administration shveta gupta representative (Jammu and Kashmir) salil sharma correspondent (Europe) dominika cosic production dilshad & dabeer webmaster sundar rawat photographer subhash circulation & distribution mithlesh tiwari ranjeet dinesh e-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscription: subscription@dsalert.org online edition: online@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org editorial & business office 4/19 asaf ali road new delhi-110002 (India) t: +91-011-23243999, 23287999,9958382999 f: +91-11-23259666 e: info@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org

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here is no reason for any Indian to be deprived of education on the security aspects of everyday life. Its absence is the sole reason why we are always considered a soft state amenable to terrorist attacks at any time and any place. Any Kasab dares to attack us at will after hoodwinking our external defences. If we are educated on security aspects I am sure that these anti-national elements cannot dare to touch us; rather they will be scared of creating any problems for us. It is the responsibility of the state to disseminate widely tips and methodologies of detecting, suppressing and containing threats posed by terrorist activities as well as natural disasters like earthquakes and tsunamis. Another very important aspect to be considerd is about the standardisation of all the security products, technologies and services being offered in the Indian market. Particularly because we now know that the market in India has emerged as one of the biggest in the world in the past few years and it is going to be some US$ 16 to 18 billion in the next few years. Today the Indian market is flooded with substandard products being manufactured in China and Taiwan which are good for nothing. There is no government policy to check the quality and performance of these products. The closed circuit television (CCTV) cameras and many other products that are being offered by the many mushrooming companies in India have no standards of quality by which to be judged like the National Institute of Justice benchmarks in the US that lay down norms for such vital equipment as bulletproof jackets and bodywear for security forces and civilians alike. On the contrary, evidence is growing that having acquired foreign technology, Indian companies are manipulating production techniques to reduce the weave and texture of bulletproof / shrapnelresistant material to show qualities of lightness preferred by users to the detriment of anti-penetration qualities. Of course the prices are a big consideration at the time of procurement of quality security products, but at the same time I believe that there should not be any compromise on quality. The tendency to cut corners and make false savings in prices by procuring substandard security products must be stamped out. After all a life is more important than a few dollars. It is a matter of great concern to see that after so many attacks on our establishments and people our government has never thought of laying any security standards for any product and technology and that is the reason that most of the time the substandard goods are being offered with no check on them at all. We have a complete department of Police Modernisation but unfortunately this department does not even have any such policy or guidelines for the procurement of security products. Now that we are facing many more threats both within the country and on our periphery it is very essential to make a standards policy for the procurement of security products, technologies and services for security forces, our citizens as well as for the government establishments. I am sure our policy makers will pay heed to the requirement of such policy so that we can effectively secure our people and this nation. Much time and money has been spent but we are still not secure in the true sense of the word. Our resources are just being wasted because of a lack of standards policy. Why not have a separate department to lay guidelines and policy as we have for the defence procurements? Let all players offer their best products and technologies with strong after sales services and then the companies can be shortlisted on the performance and quality of their products where price will not be the guiding factor. Also, it is imperative that there should be enough space for the Indian companies to enter this growing market and some preference must be provided to the Indian companies to encourage them to undertake research and development in security-related equipment, the intention being to promote research-based growth of quality products. Education and training should be made mandatory for the end users as well at the time of procurement. JAI HIND!

“The country comes first - always and every time”. Retreat of the state: A dangerous erosion of will

he Indian armed forces have extensive experience in both the High Intensity and Low Intensity genres of conflict. While combating the multifarious tribal insurgencies in the north-east, the Indian Army evolved its own model of LIC that was manpower intensive as opposed to being equipment intensive (a la the American model in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq). It totally eschewed the use of offensive airpower, tanks, artillery and all heavy calibre weapons. It relied instead on the straight legged infantry and small arms alone to ensure its operations were discriminate and people friendly. By and large this model worked very well. Its notable successes were Mizoram, Tripura, Assam and Punjab. Even Jammu and Kashmir is inching close to a military resolution and the back of the terrorist Tanzeems has been broken.

Hence it is baffling that despite these successes, in the last decade the Indian state has exhibited an increasingly dangerous erosion of political will to conflict. It has progressively retreated from even its minimalist military model of force usage in LIC. This is in sharp contrast to the rest of the world which has graduated to the War on Terror model of the use of ruthless and unrestrained force while dealing with such violent extremist organisations. The Indian state is almost alone in its dogged insistence on the Criminal Justice Model of combating terrorism with kid gloves, using archaic laws enacted in the 18th and 19th centuries to deal with ordinary criminals and crooks. The result is that while there has not been a second attack on the continental US after 9/11, the Indian state has been hit repeatedly and has been annually losing some 2,000 or more citizens each year to terrorist / insurgent depredations in the last two decades. The state’s response has been increasingly more defensive and diffident. Because of political interference and pressures, the last six incidents of terrorist attacks are yet to be solved. When Delhi was struck recently some senior political functionaries pleaded helplessness and even blamed the citizenery for not defending itself!

Why has the Indian state turned so soft and supine in the last decade? The reasons seem to lie in the new political developments in India which have created a new differentiation between the Government and the Party. The Party now seems to wield considerable power behind the stage without the concomitant responsibility. The worrying development is the rising influence of a series of Western backed and funded NGOs on the Party and by extension the Government. These NGOs have striven hard to fashion a Liberal discourse in India which seems overwhelmingly focused on protecting the human rights of the terrorists and insurgents. Concurrently, they have sought to demonise the Army and Police forces and striven hard to hamper and impede their legitimate operations . They have been eminently successful in eroding the political resolve of the government to act decisively against violent extremist groups. Strident campaigns have been launched to remove the Armed Forces Special Powers Act and thereby erode the effectiveness of this option of last resort with the government. The clear intent is to delegitimise such operations and leave the state totally helpless in the face of determined assaults by violent armed groups. The actual intent is made transparent by the fact that these NGOs support all separatist and secessionist movements and advise the state to simply capitulate. They have so fashioned the discourse in this country that it is intellectually fashionable to support all separatist and subversive movements aimed at dismembering the Indian state. Old fashioned patriotism is despised and ridiculed as a lumpen trait, even as these bleeding heart liberals look to the West for Magsaysay awards, Pulitzer prizes and the most coveted Nobel peace prize which they seek by advocating the dismemberment of their own country.

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

executive editor

announcement

The most cogent example of the impact of this subversive process is seen in our Anti-Maoist operations. For the past so many years our Prime Minister himself has been highlighting the serious threat posed to our national security by Left Wing Extremism. Despite these pro forma assertions, his energetic and hands on Home Minister has not been allowed to act decisively by the party. The Home Minister lamented openly that he had been given a limited mandate and the experience of Operation Green Hunt that was launched with much fanfare, has clearly indicated that it is beyond the capacity of the Police and CAPFs to conduct offensive CI operations against the Maoists in dense jungle terrain. At the very outset of this campaign the CRPF took a tragically high level of casualties. Thereafter the Police and CAPFs have largely suspended all offensive operations and are merely lying low, trying to save face and conserve casualties. This is a tragic denouement and simply underlines the need to call in the Army not just to carry out training in the area but carry out meaningful operations to arrest and break the Maoist momentum.

We cannot view external and internal threats in isolated and watertight compartments. There is a dire need for a Whole of the Government Approach. The Chinese threat in Tibet has gone up from 22 divisions in two seasons to 34 divisions in just one season. This implies an increase in the threat level of 12 divisions. What use will additional CRPF force levels be against such threats from China or Pakistan? Would it not be far better and much more cost-effective to raise six Infantry / Mountain divisions of the Army instead? These could be initially blooded against the Maoists and later be available as Strike Corps for the mountains. The Maoists are very apprehensive that the Army may be called out against them. Hence they have slowed down their attacks on the CAPFs. We are not obliged to conform to their plans and strategic designs. Today they are linking up with the Insurgents in the north-east and the Jammu and Kashmir Terrorist Tanzeems and seeking ISI and Chinese support. Instead of unifying the national response, a section of the party has been advocating that the centre should leave it to the states to manage as best as they can and avoid all blame for the failure against the Maoists. Law and order they aver is a state subject. The Maoist threat has graduated far beyond normal law and order concerns. The writ of the Indian state now does not run in almost one third of its territory. Mining corporations and metallurgical firms have to pay huge sums as extortion money to the Maoists. The Maoists are now encouraging the cultivation of poppy and trying to take over the drug trade. There is little time to lose. The state must act and act decisively. That is where the NGOs come in with their covert agendas to impede and hamper the state response, to delegitimise the Army and demoralise the Police forces. Having neutered the Security apparatus, they advise the country to hold a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir and cede the “Afro-Dalit “segements of Central India and “free” the tribes of the north-east. The assault of the NGOs has left the Indian state incoherent and unable to defend itself or its citizens. Frankly, the time has come to question the motivations of some of our NGOs and examine the sources of their funding.

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A N N O U N C E S December 2011 Issue on

Sea Power in India: Towards Blue Water

In this issue devoted to Homeland Security, we look at the whole gamut of issues bedevilling our Internal Security. A galaxy of former Police Chiefs and serving and retired IPS and Army officers examine the multiple threats we face and how these are coalescing even as our national response is increasingly becoming fragmented and splintered between the centre and the states.The Maoist problem is acquiring a serious dimension and we cannot go into a denial mode once again just because the next round of elections is coming near. There is a very useful article that warns of the rise of dangerous communal /radical forces in Kerala. The Indian state cannot afford to lose the will to act and use force to defend its citizenry. In India the state is growing soft beyond a point of prudence. The assault of the NGOs has seriously eroded its will and reduced it to a soft and supine state that seems helpless in the face of a determined assault by terrorists and other violent extremist groups. This has to change.

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

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November 2011 Defence AND security alert

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contents Homeland Security Special ISSUE November 2011

An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Magazine

Volume 3 Issue 2 November 2011

A R T I C L E S

red terror

are we a soft state?

internal security and police reforms

Features

Pakistan's role in Afghanistan: geo-political perceptions

internal security doctrine: urgent need for review

India's internal security paradigm: a dangerous erosion of will

airport security in India

hospital CBRN defence

safety & security Asia 2011

security products: need for high standards

fight against Maoists: flip-flop vs resolute action

crime-fighting in urban battlescapes

internal security: need for a holistic vision

Islamic radicalisation: the rising threat

convergence of terror

Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s internal security challenges

terrorist threat: challenges and responses

Mumbai 26/11: have the hotels learnt a lesson?

dogs as sentinels

Prakash Singh, IPS (retd)

Joginder Singh, IPS (retd)

V Balachandran, IPS (retd)

Lt Gen R K Sawhney PVSM, AVSM (retd)

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) Brig Gen Ioannis Galatas, MD, PhD, MA, MC, (retd) Pawan Agrawal Nitin Gokhle

Dr Prem Mahadevan

Amitabh Thakur, IPS V K Shashikumar

Col R S N Singh (retd) Dr Pranav Kumar

Dr Rajendra Prasad

Kalakad V Ganapathy Cecil Victor

for online edition log on to: www.dsalert.org

Nepalâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s India-China equation

police reforms: long overdue

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

Shreejana Shrestha Anoop A J

DSA Research Team

Team DSA

October 12-14, Suntec City, Singapore

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DSALERT November 2011 Defence AND security alert

homeland security

Prakash Singh, IPS (retd) The writer is a distinguished police officer of India. He has served as Police Chief of Uttar Pradesh and Assam, commanded BSF and has an excellent track record for combating terrorism in the most turbulent parts of India. He was awarded the Padma Shri in 1991. An expert on internal security, he has given lectures in premier institutions and seminars across the world and has also written several articles and books on ‘Nagaland’ and ‘The Naxalite Movement’.

The United Nations has prescribed an average of 222 policemen per lac of population. As against this, we have only 128 policemen per lac of population in the country. The Home Minister, while addressing the Conference of Directors General of Police in New Delhi on Sep 15, 2011, stated that there are over 5,00,000 vacancies in the state police forces. The authorised strength of the IPS is 4,720; on January 1, 2011 however there were only 3,393 officers in position

IMPERATIVE

A highly respected Police Chief and former DG BSF, highlights his serious concern about the state of our Police forces. The state and central police forces are bearing the brunt of insurgents’ and terrorist onslaught. It is essential therefore that the police have the resources, the capability and the motivation to deal with these challenges. Unfortunately, however, the state police are in shambles. They are saddled with a colonial structure and are completely under the thumb of the executive. The stakes are very high. The challenges on the law and order front are becoming grim with every passing day. The terrorist threat is extremely serious and has the potential to destabilise the country. Separatist movements in the north-east are a huge drain on national resources. Maoists have spread their influence over vast swathes of territory. Organised crime is spreading its tentacles. We cannot face formidable challenges of the present times with a police force which was raised to deal with the problems of a medieval past. A must read for all concerned with our national security.

he internal security of the country is under severe threat from several quarters. The terrorists, who have spread their tentacles across the sub-continent, want to destroy India politically, economically and culturally. Jammu and Kashmir continues to be on the boil with Pakistan refusing to dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism and pushing in batches of infiltrators periodically to spread mayhem in the Valley. In the north-east, violence has been contained but permanent peace continues to elude with the Naga rebels insisting on recognition of their sovereignty and Paresh Baruah of ULFA refusing to come to the negotiating table. The Maoist influence continues to spread to different parts of the country in ever-widening circles.

State of police All these problems have no doubt political, social or economic dimensions. However, the law and order dimension is common to all the problems - be it terrorism, insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir, separatist movements in the north-east or the Maoist insurrection. The state and central police forces are bearing the brunt of insurgents’ onslaught. It is essential therefore that the police have the resources, the capability and the motivation to deal with these challenges. Unfortunately, however, the state police are in shambles. They are saddled with a colonial structure and are completely under the thumb of the executive. The political directions have to be carried out, right or wrong, lawful or unlawful. Transfers have become an industry. Discipline has taken a nose-dive. Morale has touched the nadir. The institution has degenerated into an instrument at the disposal of the political masters to further their agenda. As David Bayley said, “The rule

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

Police Reforms: Long Overdue

of law in modern India, the frame upon which justice hangs, has been undermined by the rule of politics”. The police urgently needs to be reformed, reorganised and rejuvenated so that it functions as an instrument of service to the people and is able to deal with the various threats to internal security.

National police commission The National Police Commission appointed by the government in 1977 felt that “far reaching changes have taken place in the country” since independence but “there has been no comprehensive review of the police system after independence despite radical changes in the political, social and economic situation in the country”. The NPC submitted eight detailed reports between 1979 and 1981 containing comprehensive recommendations covering the entire gamut of police working. The government’s response to the core recommendations of the National Police Commission was unfortunately negative. In 1983, when the reports were forwarded to the state governments, they were asked merely to take appropriate follow up action. The hint was more than obvious and it was not surprising therefore that the state governments conveniently put the major recommendations of the National Police Commission in cold storage.

Judicial intervention The core recommendations of the National Police Commission were resurrected in a PIL before the Supreme Court in 1996. At the time the petition was filed, the Supreme Court’s attention was drawn, among other things, to two major tragedies which had overtaken the Republic due to the failure of the police to uphold the Rule of Law: the Delhi Riots

of 1984 and the demolition of the disputed shrine at Ayodhya in 1992. During the pendency of the petition, another tragedy befell the country - the Gujarat Riots in 2002 when the police acted in a partisan manner. The National Human Rights Commission, which inquired into the incidents, commented as follows: “The Commission is of the view that recent events in Gujarat and, indeed, in other states of the country underline the need to proceed without delay to implement the reforms that have already been recommended in

order to preserve the integrity of the investigating process and to insulate it from extraneous influences …

‘extraneous’ consideration. The rot that has set in must be cured if the rule of law is to prevail.”

... there is, inter alia, urgent need for radical police reform ... ‘if the situation is to be cured, if the rule of law is to prevail’. The Commission therefore urges that the matter of Police Reform receives attention at the highest political level, at the Centre and in the States and that this issue be pursued in good faith and on a sustained basis with the greater interest of the country alone in mind, an interest that must overrule every

Recent events in Gujarat and, indeed, in other states of the country underline the need to proceed without delay to implement the reforms that have already been recommended in order to preserve the integrity of the investigating process and to insulate it from extraneous influences It

significant

that

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

while

homeland security

IMPERATIVE

the PIL was progressing in the Supreme Court, three Committees were appointed by the government at different periods of time to deliberate over the question of police reforms: the Ribeiro Committee in 1998, the Padmanabhaiah Committee in 2000 and the Malimath Committee on Criminal Justice System in 2002. All the aforesaid Committees broadly came to the same conclusions and emphasised the urgent need for police reforms in the context of newly emerging challenges. However, the much needed reforms could not be carried out because of opposition from the political parties.

and the stage has come for issue of appropriate directions for immediate compliance so as to be operative till such time a new model Police Act is prepared by the Central Government and / or the State Governments pass the requisite legislations.”

The state and central police forces are bearing the brunt of insurgents’ onslaught. It is essential therefore that the police have the resources, the capability and the motivation to deal with these challenges. Unfortunately, however, the state police are in shambles. They are saddled with a colonial structure and are completely under the thumb of the executive. The political directions have to be carried out, right or wrong, lawful or unlawful. Transfers have become an industry. Discipline has taken a nose-dive. Morale has touched the nadir. The institution has degenerated into an instrument at the disposal of the political masters to further their agenda. As David Bayley said, “The rule of law in modern India, the frame upon which justice hangs, has been undermined by the rule of politics”

●● State Security Commission which would lay down the broad policies and give directions for the performance of the preventive tasks and service oriented functions of the police;

The dilemma before the Supreme Court was whether it should wait further for the governments to take suitable steps for police reforms. However, as recorded in the judgment, “having regard to (i) the gravity of the problem; (ii) the urgent need for preservation and strengthening of Rule of Law; (iii) pendency of even this petition for last over ten years; (iv) the fact that various Commissions and Committees have made recommendations on similar lines for introducing reforms in the police set up in the country; and (v) total uncertainty as to when police reforms would be introduced, we think that there cannot be any further wait

In a landmark judgement on September 22, 2006, the Supreme Court ordered the setting up of three institutions at the state level with a view to insulating the police from extraneous influences, giving it functional autonomy and ensuring its accountability. These institutions are:

●● Police Establishment Board comprising the Director General of Police and four other senior officers of the Department to decide all transfers, postings, promotions and other service related matters of officers of and below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police and make appropriate recommendations regarding the postings and transfers of officers of the rank of Superintendent of Police and above to the state government; and ●● Police Complaints Authority at the district and state levels with a view to inquiring into allegations of misconduct by the police personnel. Besides, the Apex Court ordered that the Director General of Police shall be selected by the state government from amongst the three senior-most officers of the Department who have been empanelled for promotion to that rank by the UPSC and that he shall have a prescribed minimum tenure of two years. Police officers on operational duties in the field like the IG i/c Zone, DIG i/c Range, SP i/c District and SHO i/c Police Station would also have a minimum tenure of two years. The Court also ordered the separation of investigating police from the law and order police to ensure speedier investigation, better expertise and improved rapport with the people.

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

The Union Government was asked to set up a National Security Commission for the selection and placement of heads of Central Police Organisations, upgrading the effectiveness of these forces and improving the service conditions of its personnel.

Resistance to reforms The aforesaid orders were to be implemented by the end of 2006. The time limit was subsequently extended till March 31, 2007. Ten states gave affidavits that they would comply with the directions of the Supreme Court, though compliance at the ground level even in these states has yet to take place. The other states have been dragging their feet in the matter. Some states have passed Bills / Acts with a view to circumventing the implementation of Supreme Court’s directions.

Three Committees were appointed by the government at different periods of time to deliberate over the question of police reforms: the Ribeiro Committee in 1998, the Padmanabhaiah Committee in 2000 and the Malimath Committee on Criminal Justice System in 2002. All the aforesaid Committees broadly came to the same conclusions and emphasised the urgent need for police reforms The Thomas Committee which was appointed by the Supreme Court to monitor the implementation of its directions in the various states, in its report dated August 23, 2010, expressed “dismay over the total indifference to the issue of reforms in the functioning of Police being exhibited by the States.” The judicial directions, it needs to be highlighted, are not for the glory of the police - they are to give better security and protection to the people of the country, uphold their human rights and generally improve governance. If sincerely implemented, they would have far reaching implications and change the working philosophy of the police. The Ruler’s Police would be transformed into People’s Police. It appears that unless the judiciary cracks the whip and makes an example of one or two

non-compliant states, things would not move and the much needed reforms would remain an aspiration only. Public opinion also needs to be mobilised in the matter. Media should also chip in.

The Supreme Court ordered the setting up of three institutions at the state level with a view to insulating the police from extraneous influences, giving it functional autonomy and ensuring its accountability

Grey areas Apart from the core areas identified by the Supreme Court, reforms are urgently required in some other fields also: a. Manpower shortage: The United Nations has prescribed an average of 222 policemen per lac of population. As against this, we have only 128 policemen per lac of population in the country. The Home Minister, while addressing the Conference of Directors General of Police in New Delhi on September 15, 2011, stated that there are over 5,00,000 vacancies in the state police forces. The authorised strength of the IPS is 4,720; on January 1, 2011 however there were only 3,393 officers in position. b. Housing facilities for policemen: These are woefully inadequate. According to the National Crime Record Bureau Report for the year

2009, only 32.8 per cent of the police force has been provided housing facilities by the government. c. Training facilities: These should be upgraded and improved with emphasis on ●● Polite and courteous behaviour towards the citizens ●● Observance of human rights ●● Training in anti-terrorism and counter-insurgency

The Ruler’s Police would be transformed into People’s Police. It appears that unless the judiciary cracks the whip and makes an example of one or two non-compliant states, things would not move and the much needed reforms would remain an aspiration only d. Registration of crime: This is a very sore point with the people. There is concealment and minimisation of crime on a big scale. To a large extent, politicians are responsible for it. In the state of UP, for example, directions were given by the state government that crime figures should be brought down by 70 per cent and quite a few senior officers who could not execute this firman were placed under suspension. Opposition parties also make hue and cry to tarnish the image of the government if crime figures show an increase. The society as a whole should accept the inevitability of increase in crime

every successive year. e. Police stations: The police stations across the country must improve their building, furniture, weapons, transport, communications and forensic support. The educational qualification of constables at the entry level and their salary structure also needs to be revised upwards and he should not be treated as an "unskilled worker".

Conclusion The stakes are very high. The challenges on the law and order front are becoming grim with every passing day. The terrorist threat is extremely serious and has the potential to destabilise the country. Separatist movements in the north-east are a huge drain on national resources. Maoists have spread their influence over vast swathes of territory. Organised crime is spreading its tentacles. We cannot face formidable challenges of the present times with a police force which was raised to deal with the problems of a medieval past. Our first line of defence has to be strengthened. Its capabilities have to be substantially augmented. There is no room for delay or complacency. A professional police accountable to the people of the country and placing the highest importance to upholding the Rule of Law will provide the essential foundation for a progressive, modern India taking its rightful place in the comity of nations.

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

homeland security

Joginder Singh, IPS (retd) The writer is former Director of Central Bureau of Investigation and is best known for bringing the Bofors papers from the Swiss Courts to New Delhi. As a student he was selected for the Indian Police Service at the age of 20. He is both a regular columnist of leading dailies in India and an author of repute, with 50 books (including versions in Indian and foreign languages) to his credit.

This bomb attack is 20th strike in the capital since 1996, apart from numerous others all over the country, in places like Mumbai, Pune, Ahmedabad, Surat, Bengaluru, Assam, Coimbatore, Lucknow, Varanasi, Ayodhya and many others. We have become a soft state as the politics and especially vote bank politics has got mixed up with the fight against terrorism and other crimes

One of the purposes of the law is to provide equitable retaliation for an offended party. Infact so slow is the process of imposing the death penalty in india that it is almost as good as absent

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

A hard hitting article by a highly respected former Director of the CBI that laments how the Indian nation state is going soft beyond a point of prudence. He highlights how we are failing to carry out the death penalty in respect of convicted terrorists, murderers and rapists. At least 100 people in 2007, 40 in 2006, 77 in 2005, 23 in 2002and 33 in 2001 were sentenced to death (but not executed), according to Amnesty International figures. More than 105 people in India were sentenced to death in 2010, but no one was executed during the year. Can a nation state afford to grow so soft in the face of rising and lethal threats of terrorism? Should the state lay such inordinate emphasis on the rights of the terrorists, killers and rapists and callously ignore the rights of their victims?

leven people were killed and at least 82 others injured in a powerful bomb blast, on 7th September, 2011, outside Delhi High Court. This bomb attack is 20th strike in the capital since 1996, apart from numerous others all over the country, in places like Mumbai, Pune, Ahmedabad, Surat, Bengaluru Coimbatore, Lucknow, Varanasi, Ayodhya, Assam and many others. We have become a soft state as the politics and especially vote bank politics has got mixed up with the fight against terrorism and other crimes. The following facts speak for themselves.

Death penalty Madras High Court has stayed the execution of three killers involved in Rajiv Gandhi assassination case. Earlier their appeal against the sentence had been rejected by the Supreme Court and the mercy petition was also turned down, by the President. Tamil Nadu assembly has passed a resolution recommending that the death penalty be waived. Following the resolution of the Tamil Nadu Assembly, there have been similar demands for the waiving of the death penalty imposed on a Muslim terrorist involved in the attack on Parliament, by Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister and also similar concession has been asked for the Sikh terrorist who killed the former Chief Minister of Punjab, Beant Singh, himself a Sikh. Death penalty has been almost non-existent in India, since 1995, when Dhanjoy was executed. Indeed, death penalty has become fictional, after the Apex Court Judgement, (which remains unchallenged), that death sentence should be awarded in the rarest of the rare cases. As a layman, in my perception, a killing is a killing, whether it is done brutally or ghastly or in a plain, premeditated way. Indeed the Right of Private Defence under the law, confers power on every citizen to

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

Are We A Soft State?

defend himself and others and the power to kill in a certain set of circumstances. Indeed certain types of killings, by whatever names you call them whether killings under sudden or grave provocation of killing by rash and negligent driving already entail much lesser punishments. A murder is a murder, whether you do it by overrunning sleeping innocent people by drunken driving or shoot anybody down. While living in any civilised society, one is expected to abide by the laws and keeping our temper under check. Talking about any harm caused to others, Bible in Exodus 21:23-25 says “But if there is harm, then you shall pay life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound, stripe for stripe.” At the root of this principle is that one of the purposes of the law is to provide equitable retaliation for an offended party. Infact so slow is the process of imposing the death penalty in india that it is almost as good as absent. At least 100 people in 2007, 40 in 2006, 77 in 2005, 23 in 2002and 33 in 2001 were sentenced to death (but not executed), according to Amnesty International figures. More than 105 people in India were sentenced to death in 2010, but no one was executed during the year. The kind of crimes which are committed in India, like the rape of the kids from 3 to 10 years, child abuse leading to death, killing of girls in the name of the honour of the family, resisting rape, contract killings, terrorism are some of the ghastliest crimes, deserve the dealth penalty more than once, if it were possible to do so. Child abuse, assuming that a child survives it, casts a shadow for a lifetime. But since the powers that be are living with security and all amenities, they are least bothered about the rights of the victim. For the bleeding heart, the victim is the last priority. For them the victimisers matter.

Technically, the state is the victim, but actually the victim is a victim and not the state. We all pay lip service to the Criminal Justice System, but the reality of the crime is that there are more rights for the criminals and more injustice for the victims.

Rights of victims? The truth is that if a criminal, whether a murderer or rapist, or a terrorist, if he is traced, gets all free legal aid. But, if you are a victim, or a parent or a relation of the victim you literally have no rights. Otherwise, why the states should go all out to demand clemency for the killers of Rajiv Gandhi and 11 others as well as the attacker on the National Parliament. We as a Nation seem to have skewed priorities or at least our rulers have. Life is not like a flim movie or a television serial, where in a case of heinous crime, the offender is arraigned and brought to trial within 15 minutes. Within an hour, the killer has been tried, convicted and sent to prison for the rest of his life or ordered to be hanged. The victim’s articles and possessions are taken as evidence, which may not be returned to him for years, apart from the emotional and financial ruin. The victim of violent crime thinks and

believes that the attack was a crime against his or her person. But, our system says that a crime against the individual is a crime against the state, which is a totally impersonal entity.

The result of all this is that the criminals have a whole prop of constitutional rights, victims are left out in the cold and forgotten by the system of criminal justice. The then Chief Justice of Delhi High Court Mr A P Shah said while releasing the High Court report for 2008, that it would take the court (Delhi High Court) approximately 466 years to clear the pending 2,300 criminal appeals cases alone The result of all this is that the criminals have a whole prop of constitutional rights, victims are left out in the cold and forgotten by the system of criminal justice. The then Chief Justice of Delhi High Court Mr A P Shah said while releasing the High Court report for 2008, that it would take the court (Delhi High Court) approximately 466 years to clear the pending 2,300 criminal appeals cases alone. Over four million cases are pending in India in 21 high courts. 26.3 million cases are pending in subordinate

courts across the country. Taking Uttar Pradesh as a test case, for delay in criminal justice system, according to solicitor general of India, in August, 2011, 10,541 criminal trials were stayed by Allahabad HC. Of these, 9 per cent were pending for more than 20 years and 21 per cent for over a decade. This means, stay of trial in 30 per cent of heinous offences continued for more than 10 years. The Supreme Court observed that “It’s sad that administration of justice has come to such a pass. The HCs stay the trial and forget all about it. This means, we are choking the administration of justice. No one should be denied a fair and speedy trial. But what about the victims? What about society which feels that a wrongdoer should be punished at the earliest. Through these stays, that is being denied.” Whether it is terrorism or ordinary crime, unless the criminals or terrorists get the message that retribution will be severe and quick, he or she will continue in the same way. Government should remember, what Sophocles once said; “I have nothing but contempt for the kind of governor who is afraid, for whatever reason, to follow the course that he knows is best for the state.”

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V Balachandran, IPS (retd) The writer is former Special Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat and member two-man “High Level Committee” appointed by the Government of Maharashtra to enquire into Police response on 26/11 terror attacks.

Policing in UK and USA was always rooted on the local community’s requirements. In 1839 the UK County Police Act was passed and the first county police was set up. The present Conservative government introduced sweeping police reforms by reinforcing public scrutiny through elected “Police & Crime Commissioners” (PCC) with 4 year term as they felt that the present watchdogs (“Police Authorities”) were “too invisible or unapproachable”

In most other states too this trend of concentrating power on politicians assisted by pliant bureaucrats is seen. The local public has no say in policing. Everything is decided by politicians or faceless and unapproachable bureaucrats in far away state capitals. Public relations only became a slogan

DEVOIR

An incisive analysis of police functioning and reforms needed in our country. The writer surveys the police organisations and structures in the US and UK to draw lessons relevant to our context. He traces the historical evolution of our police organisation and highlights how the British deliberately made law and order a state subject. Professor David Steinberg analysed the real British motive in his essay “The government of India Act 1935”: “That by giving Indian politicians a great deal of power at the provincial level, while denying them, responsibility at the centre, it was hoped that Congress, the only national party, would disintegrate into a series of provincial fiefdoms”. The British colonists imposed several other responsibilities on police since they wanted it only as a coercive civil force. Our 1861 Police Act listed 22 responsibilities including cattle impounding and detection of street dirtying. In the beginning the IGP was the head of the State police department but gradually the state bureaucracy under politicians usurped this power. In 1987 Maharashtra Home Department amended S.4 of the Bombay Police Act to confer police “control, direction and supervision” functions on the Home Secretary. The DGP was made a figure head.

ome Minister Shri P Chidambaram and his predecessors have been saying that state police has to manage policing, internal security, cross border terrorism and Maoist violence. This is not so in other countries. Internal security is jointly managed by the centre and states. State police has the primary role in controlling crime and local disorder. In India this aspect is neglected since the police structure and functions are inherited from colonial days. We copied the ingredients of the Government of India Act 1935 while formulating constitutional provisions on distribution of subjects between central government and states. The 1935 Act had divided subjects into “Federal”, “Provincial” and “Concurrent”. Thus in our Constitution “Public order” and “Police” came under “List II—State List” in Seventh Schedule. Our Constitution makers ignored that the 1935 Act was passed under different circumstances. The late V P Menon says in “Transfer of Power” that the colonial administration wanted to appease minorities who did not want a strong centre after the failed 1931 Second Round Table Conference. Retired Canadian civil servant and Oxford Professor David Steinberg was more forthright on the real British motive in his essay “The government of India Act 1935”: “That by giving Indian politicians a great deal of power at the provincial level, while denying them, responsibility at the centre, it was hoped that Congress, the only national party, would disintegrate into a series of provincial fiefdoms”. That this did not happen was our luck. Yet it was puzzling why our Constitution makers copied this colonial

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

INTERNAL SECURITY AND POLICE REFORMS

provision on internal security management, which is the cause of all our problems. Sir Robert Peel, father of modern policing gave top priority to the public approval of police actions through his 9 principles while establishing London Metropolitan Police in 1829. He said that the basic mission of the police was preventing crime and disorder. However the British colonists and princely states in India did not think so and imposed several other responsibilities on police since they wanted it only as a coercive civil force. Our 1861 Police Act listed 22 responsibilities including cattle impounding and detection of street dirtying. Even after Independence this colonial practice was continued instead of re-orienting their philosophy towards obtaining public approval. Police burden was further increased by several State Police Acts and hundreds of “Minor Acts”. 14 additional responsibilities were imposed by the Bombay Police Act 1951, including tackling infectious diseases and offensive odours.

Local requirement After independence the princely state police forces were merged with big states and each state was put under the superintendence of a Police Chief, earlier designated as IGP, now DGP. In the beginning the IGP was the head of the state police department but gradually the state bureaucracy under politicians usurped this power. In 1987 Maharashtra Home Department amended S.4 of the Bombay Police Act to confer police

“control, direction and supervision” functions on the Home Secretary. The DGP was made a figure head. But the Home Department mandarins were conspicuously absent in discharging any of these functions during serious crises like Mumbai 26/11 terror attacks. It was power without accountability. The Maharashtra Home Department circular dated April 23, 2010 on police transfer policy insisted on prior consultation with Additional Chief Secretary (Home) before transferring of hundreds of Police Inspectors, usually incharge of Police Stations. In most other states too this trend of concentrating power on politicians assisted by pliant bureaucrats is seen. The local public has no say in policing. Everything is decided by politicians or faceless and unapproachable bureaucrats in far away state capitals. Public relations only became a slogan.

As against this, policing in UK and USA was always rooted on the local community’s requirements. In 1839 the UK County Police Act was passed and the first county police was set up. The present Conservative government introduced sweeping police reforms by reinforcing public scrutiny through elected “Police & Crime Commissioners” (PCC) with 4 year term as they felt that the present watchdogs (“Police Authorities”) were “too invisible or unapproachable”. PCCs under the watchful eyes of “Police and Crime Panels” drawn from local councils and independent members will supervise the Chief Constables who will be appointed or dismissed by PCCs. Policing in USA also developed from 1838 tailored to the needs of the local communities. A large number of state agencies like universities, municipalities, state hospitals, waterways, forests, parks and correction departments

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DEVOIR

were conferred with police powers in discharging their responsibilities in addition to the Sheriffs and County Police. There are over 40,000 different police units in USA. Only 43 of the 50 states have what is called “State Police” numbering only 1,500 to 4,600 with statewide jurisdiction. They are usually only for highway safety and do not interfere with local police’s activities unless the Governor directs them. Presently New York Police Department (NYPD), the biggest police unit in USA, has only a strength of 34,500 for a population of 8,175,133 (Mumbai: 21 million-45,000 policemen). Unlike the Mumbai city police, NYPD shares the crime and policing responsibilities with several other state policing systems like transport police, state court officers, correctional services, environmental correction police, forest rangers, park police and university police.

There are over 40,000 different police units in USA. Only 43 of the 50 states have what is called “State Police” numbering only 1,500 to 4,600 with statewide jurisdiction. They are usually only for highway safety and do not interfere with local police’s activities unless the Governor directs them. Presently New York Police Department (NYPD), the biggest police unit in USA, has only a strength of 34,500 for a population of 8,175,133 (Mumbai: 21 million-45,000 policemen) In addition, UK and USA have also federal police to share the internal security responsibility with state police. UK has 3 separate police systems: England-Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. They have 43 territorial police like our state police, 6 “National Police” like SOCA, SCDA etc. to fight nationwide organised crime, “transport police” under central transportation department for the railways, 7 “Miscellaneous forces like “parks & open space police” and 4 non-police forces having police powers like “serious fraud office”, “gambling commission” and “UK border agency”. In USA there are hundreds of federal law enforcement agencies with varying police type powers. Their postal inspection service with investigating powers dates back to 1772. They don’t have to depend on state police as in India to investigate

frauds, counterfeit postage stamps or even terror attacks through anthrax. Their park police was established in 1791. Thus the burden of policing and security is evenly spread out and not confined only on one type of police like in India. However part of the blame for this overload on our state police should be laid on our police leadership too as they are fond of expanding their empires. The induction of CISF for airport security was resisted by all state police chiefs from 1972, until the centre forced it on them after the 1999 IAC-814 hijack. The creation of National Investigating Agency (NIA) after the 26/11 terror attack was also resented by state politicians and state police although the proposal was languishing with MHA since 2001. Similarly the proposal to confer investigating powers on the railway protection force is also being opposed by the states despite the extremely inconvenient arrangement of our 64,000 km railways being divided into 28 state police responsibility, which makes the poor passengers running from pillar to post to register their losses or assaults.

Police reforms It is true that the Supreme Court’s directives on police reforms as a result of untiring efforts by former DGP BSF Shri Prakash Singh since 1996 have set in motion a process of police reforms in the country. However the question is: Will the professional autonomy that the Supreme Court envisages for the Police usher in an era of greater police sensitivity to the public demands? This may not be so if we study the report (2003-05) of the government

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appointed “Kerala Police Performance and Accountability Commission” led by Hon Justice (retired) K T Thomas who had made a case study of the police performance during the “autonomy” conferred on the police in 2002 and 2003 when Shri A K Antony was the Chief Minister. I shall quote excerpts: “The evaluation made by the Commission leads to the conclusion that while some improvement in the overall police performance during 2002 and 2003 was noticed, there was a disturbing tendency towards deterioration subsequently. The autonomy had rendered most of the police officers at the high echelons with a spirit of greater responsibility of commitment while it gave a feeling to a good number of policemen at the lower echelons a relief from discharging their duties including shirking of their responsibilities. … According to the Commission autonomy to the police is the ideal, but it should be tempered with measures to prevent its misuse. … Although autonomy was granted it did not make any discernible impact on the functioning of police force at the lower level … The police is not in fact an ‘autonomous’ body nor are they so under any law.” My conclusion is that genuine police reforms will never be achieved until we set up effective controls at the local level empowering the local community in deciding and supervising the policing of their area. On the other hand burdening the state police with the basic responsibility of counter-terroris and anti-Maoist operations in addition to normal policing has only made their performance dismal as revealed by several press reports recently.

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homeland security

Lt Gen R K Sawhney PVSM, AVSM (retd) The writer retired as the Deputy Chief of the Army Staff. He is a post graduate in Defence and Security Planning from the Royal College of Defence Studies, London. He has commanded an Infantry Battalion, Division and Corps during his military career and subsequently served as the Director General of Military Intelligence. He is presently a Distinguished Fellow of Vivekananda International Foundation, a ‘think tank’ in New Delhi, comprising retired senior officers of Armed Forces, diplomats, intelligence officers and civil servants.

Pakistan has been advocating the necessity of strategic depth in Afghanistan to mask its territorial ambitions and its aim of expanding its strategic frontiers towards West and Central Asian regions. Secure western borders and a subservient Afghanistan will enable Pakistan to deploy most of its armed forces against India. Pakistan's policy of gaining strategic space in Afghanistan is not new but probably is directly related to their ambition for carving out a larger Islamic entity in the South Asian region jointly with the global Islamic jihad movement, to emerge as a dominant power in South Asia

pak overreach Events in Afghanistan have a critical impact on India’s Internal Security because as Robert Gates, former Director CIA and then US Defense Secretary, said some years ago, “22 per cent of all terrorists operating in Jammu and Kashmir were either from Afghanistan or had been trained there”. The writer, one of India’s foremost experts on Afghanistan and a former DGMI, carries out an incisive analysis of Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan especially the spoiler dimension that provides sanctuary support to the Haqqani, Quetta and Hekmatyar Shooras and has recently torpedoed the peace talks between the Karzai government and the Taliban. In getting Rabbani killed and targeting the US embassy in Kabul has Pakistan overreached itself?

he geo-political perceptions of Pakistan in Afghanistan should be examined in the light of Pakistan’s persistent efforts for establishing a pliable and subservient regime in Afghanistan. Pakistan has been advocating the necessity of strategic depth in Afghanistan to mask its territorial ambitions and its aim of expanding its strategic frontiers towards West and Central Asian regions. Secure western borders and a subservient Afghanistan will enable Pakistan to deploy most of its armed forces against India. Pakistan’s policy of gaining strategic space in Afghanistan is not new but probably is directly related to their ambition for carving out a larger Islamic entity in the South Asian region jointly with the global Islamic jihad movement, to emerge as a dominant power in South Asia. Pakistan military’s unwarranted concerns about the Afghan army developing a potential to take on Pakistan comes in the context of India’s increasing influence in Afghanistan. To counter this Pakistan obviously wants Afghanistan ruled by a radical Islamic group over which it has significant influence and that would give no quarter to India.

Pakistani interest Pakistani military presents India as the prime adversary and a persistent long-term enemy and it has been constantly making efforts to convince Washington that Pakistan’s strategic needs must be met in Afghanistan. This means keeping Afghanistan firmly in Pak grip by exploiting religious affiliations. Their interests in Afghanistan are primarily linked to the Indo-Pakistani conflict. Accordingly, it has managed to turn almost every other dimension of its regional policy - such as its dispute with Afghanistan regarding the border issue and Pashtunistan and its dealing with Central Asia and the United States - into a zero-sum game with India. Preventing a dominant Indian influence

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

Pakistan's role in Afghanistan:

Geo-political Perceptions

in Afghanistan, which could evolve into an alliance between the two countries and trap Pakistan in a two-front situation, is Islamabad’s first objective. Paranoia feeds its strategic outlook, hence the floating accusations of terrorism and sabotage, conspiracy theories regarding Indian consulates in Afghanistan and allegation of Indian support for the Baloch and Wazir insurgencies. A stable, friendly and cooperative Afghanistan, in the eyes of Pakistan, is necessarily an Afghanistan under close Pakistani control, denied all possibilities of direct trade with India.

Pashtun question The Pashtun question is an issue in its own right and reflects to a large extent Pakistan’s identity related insecurities. It concerns both Afghanistan’s irredentist claim on the territories located between the former Durand Line and the Indus River as well as to the deep-rooted suspicion of extra-territorial affiliations of the Pakistani Pashtuns. It is also an economic problem for Pakistan, as smuggling across an unrecognised border deprives the Pakistani state of billions of rupees every year. Islamabad fears Pashtun irredentism and Afghan claims over the territories between the Pak-Afghan border and the Indus River. This explains the constant fight between the two countries over the demarcation of the border.

Securing international support In addition to preventing Indian influence in Afghanistan, securing US and international support against India, even if indirectly, is also one of Pakistan’s key interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan has never been able to secure the long-term alliance against India it desires. In recent history, it has only garnered US commitments to its security on an ad hoc basis. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was one such occasion. The “war on terror” against the Taliban in Afghanistan and against

Al Qaeda in Pakistan presented a similar opportunity. The US presence in Afghanistan and its military support to Pakistan are seen as parts of the same equation. The former is seen as a guarantee against dominant Indian influence in Afghanistan, the latter as a way of strengthening the Pakistani forces against India. Hence the US$ 8 billion Pakistan spent on conventional equipment for its army and air force, taken from the US$ 15 billion the country received from the United States ostensibly as

a reimbursement of its expenses in the war on terror. Post Abbottabad, US attitude towards such grants has however drastically changed.

Pakistan obviously wants Afghanistan ruled by a radical Islamic group over which it has significant influence and that would give no quarter to India Central Asia is viewed through the same prism of Indo-Pakistani

relations, albeit to a lesser degree. As a potential alternative supply route to Pakistan, the Central Asian Republics, in particular Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are seen as a threat - not to Pakistan but to Pakistan’s centrality in the Afghan conflict. An alternative supply route would likely diminish US and international dependency on Islamabad and, indirectly, on Islamabad’s overall Afghan policy, making the United States less likely to accept Pakistan’s demands and therefore benefiting India.

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pak overreach

Refugee question The refugee issue is only of secondary importance to Pakistan. As of March 2009, 1.7 million registered Afghan refugees were still living in Pakistan, where they are also allowed to work and attend school. These refugees are a drain on the country’s scarce financial resources. Only a peaceful and relatively stable Afghanistan would allow their return to their homeland. These interests are sometimes contradictory but do constitute the background against which Pakistan’s Afghan’s policy is formulated.

Ambivalent and complex Pakistan has positioned itself in support of US and international objectives and on September 12, 2001, it officially announced the end of its traditional support for the Taliban. Since then the country has provided some logistical facilities to the United States in the form of bases and later to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the form of transit routes. In practice, however, Pakistan policy is more ambivalent and complex. On the one hand, it truly supports the fight against Al Qaeda and more generally all groups it considers a threat to its own interests. But this list of antagonistic groups periodically changes. For example, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which Pakistan is currently fighting, was previously one of its proteges until the TTP turned against the Pakistani army following the cycle of attacks and reprisals generated by the Red Mosque incident. This policy is not without costs for Pakistan, both human and financial. The battles in the Bajaur district and the Swat Valley have generated a flow of internally-displaced persons that Pakistan has to manage, placing an additional burden on an already weak economy increasing social tensions. However, these costs are sometimes seen in some quarters as the price to pay for the realisation of Pakistan’s larger objectives and are therefore acceptable (even more so if they are paid for by the international community). Pakistan keeps supporting, training and funding a number of terrorist groups in the pursuit of its foreign policy

objectives. Despite tremendous foreign pressure, Pakistan has done virtually nothing against the Afghan Taliban movement present on its territory; the Quetta and Peshawar shooras still operate from Pakistani soil.

Pakistan keeps supporting, training and funding a number of terrorist groups in the pursuit of its foreign policy objectives. Despite tremendous foreign pressure, Pakistan has done virtually nothing against the Afghan Taliban movement present on its territory; the Quetta and Peshawar shooras still operate from Pakistani soil A relatively new phenomenon has also emerged in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, traditionally a launching pad for jihadi operations in Afghanistan: the replacement of local jihadist organisations by more extensive Punjabi ones, Lashkar-e-Toiba being the most prominent. Because of the post 9/11 effect of the fluidity of jihadist affiliations, it may not be fair to see the process as an operation entirely staged by the Pakistani army. The similarity with the Pakistani army’s strategy in Kashmir, however, is too striking to be coincidental. The Pakistani strategy in the area is highly selective. Pakistani officials clearly indicate that they want to hit one specific tribe, the Mehsuds, from which the TTP originates, in order to teach other groups a lesson and keep them quiet, on the basis of which they will conclude peace agreements. They have also stated that they will not touch any organisation that does not target the Pakistani state. As a result, this policy protects, for example, Lashkar-e-Toiba a group with an international agenda, as demonstrated by the Headley affair, but always presented by the Pakistani army and intelligence agencies as a local organisation. Insofar as reconciliation process is concerned Pakistan wants a stranglehold on this issue. It has done its best to sabotage any direct talks between Afghanistan government and the Taliban. The most glaring has been the assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani, former President of Afghanistan is perhaps

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

the last straw that broke the camel’s back as far as the peace talks are concerned.

Current situation Current problem post Osama and attack on their naval base is three fold. First, its relations with Afghanistan continue to deteriorate. This is complicated by a second problem, its worsening relations with the US. Then there is the third worry of being outpaced and outwitted by India in the days to come. Afghanistan accuses Pakistan of being behind cross border attacks which have killed many in the border regions. It also suspects the supportive hand of the ISI in Taliban led attacks in Afghan cities. All this, even as Islamabad woos Karzai and urges him to work closely with Pakistan. This is typical of how Pakistan operates, says one observer. “The left hand does not know what the right hand is doing.” There is little that can be done to produce a more coordinated policy because of the dominant role ISI plays in relations with Afghanistan.

A relatively new phenomenon has also emerged in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, traditionally a launching pad for jihadi operations in Afghanistan: the replacement of local jihadist organisations by more extensive Punjabi ones, Lashkar-e-Toiba being the most prominent The military’s Afghan goals are clear but with at least one part of the Taliban now attacking Pakistan, questions are being raised as to whether the military’s goals are good for the country. This is coming increasingly to the fore as the stage is set for the long awaited Afghan peace talks. The Afghan policy has become all the more entangled as Pakistan’s relations with the US deteriorate sharply. Again, so many of the contentious elements to the Pakistan-US relationship eventually go back to the priorities of the generals. US drone attacks, which have angered the Pakistani public deeply, were tolerated as a quid pro quo for “large amounts of

US military assistance. Now that the US relationship has soured, post Abbottabad, the drone attacks are a virtual fait accompli. The open battling between the ISI and the Central Intelligence Agency is an intra-agency squabble that is having repercussions against the national interest. Poor relations with Washington, some fear, could cost Pakistan in the all important Afghan talks.

Insofar as reconciliation process is concerned Pakistan wants a stranglehold on this issue. It has done its best to sabotage any direct talks between Afghanistan government and the Taliban In Pakistan itself, there is a growing debate on not just its proposed role in Afghanistan but the obsession with issues abroad. “This excessive focus outside is becoming a fatal distraction for the urgency of addressing pressing internal problems,” says Maleeha Lodhi, a former Pakistan ambassador to the US. Lodhi makes the point that Pakistan’s foreign policy needs to be turned on its head. “The fixation with overseas engagements is of course not new. It reflects legacy, historical factors, the country’s geostrategic location, intrusion of big power politics in the region and Islamabad’s proclivity to leverage geography to enhance its strategic relevance.” Ultimately all these foreign policy strands come together over the question of what role Pakistan will play in the region in the coming years. There is confusion here, again because of the military versus civilian divide. All are in agreement over better relations with India; any effort on the part of the political leadership to move ahead is thwarted by the military high command. As things stand, expecting the political leadership to stop military interference in civilian matters would be expecting too much.

Taliban campaign Violence against civilians has reached a record high in Afghanistan this year, with more than 1,400 civilians killed in the conflict till June 2011, according to a recently released UN report. The Taliban insurgency is responsible for 80 per cent of civilian casualties, with 14 per

cent caused by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) and Afghan forces. On 29 July 2011, a roadside bomb killed 18 civilians in southern Helmand province. The minivan carrying the civilians hit an explosive device in Nahri Saraji district. In the month of July 2011, insurgents managed to carry out three major assassinations, employing suicide attackers to eliminate Ahmed Wali Karzai, half brother of President Hamid Karzai and Presidential aide Jan Mohammad Khan. Both Ahmed Wali and Jan Mohammad were influential power brokers in southern Afghanistan. The third person killed was Ghulam Haider Hamidi, mayor of the restive Kandahar province. While the killing of Ahmed Wali and Hamidi took place in the restive Kandahar city, Jan Mohammad’s killing occurred in the outskirts of the national capital Kabul. On 28 July, 2011, the Taliban added another successful attack to their list of achievements. A daredevil and well-coordinated bomb and suicide attack involving multiple attackers in Uruzgan province killed 21 people. Some of the areas like Lashkar Gah in the southern Helmand province have witnessed a series of violent incidents. The three major assassinations in less than a month have created a power vacuum in southern Afghanistan and have consequently eroded President Karzai’s support base among the Pashtuns, particularly among the Popalzai tribe he belongs to. Another important potential implication for the south would be

the intra-ethno-tribal rivalry and power struggle that is likely to ensue. The Afghans are quick to point out the role of former warlord Gul Agha Sherzai in these killings. If Sherzai, belonging to the Barakzai tribe, gets appointed as governor of Kandahar, it would be an indication of dwindling support and influence of the Karzai clan. Seen in the context of the ongoing reconciliation process with the Taliban, these targeted killings both in the south and north also represent marginalisation of those who have either opposed the reconciliation process or have gained significant clout of their own. Following the killing of police commander Gen Mohammed Daud Daud in northern Takhar province in May 2011, there have been apprehensions that those opposed to the reconciliation process or have been effective in neutralising the Taliban are being targeted and eliminated. The community elders and officials in Mazar-e-Sharif, the capital of the northern province of Balkh, indicate that the targeted killings have been intended to marginalise them in the future power-sharing agreement with the Taliban. As a result, revival plans for the now defunct Northern Alliance as a hedge against such marginalisation is gaining ground. Is Pakistan playing an overambitious zero-sum game. The recent assassination of Rabbani and the Haqqani group’s attacks on the US Embassy in Kabul almost point to a game plan where Pakistan will go to the extent of trying to turn the US retreat in Afghanistan into a rout. That certainly is overreach.

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homeland security

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Poonch districts. He has served two tenures at the highly prestigious Directorate General of Military Operations. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 24 books and over 100 papers in many prestigious research journals. He is also Executive Editor of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine.

India is possibly the only country touting the Criminal Justice Model of countering terrorism. The state has turned soft beyond a point of prudence in dealing with such violent terrorist movements. It has started playing politics that has severely hampered the freedom of action of the secuirty agencies. There is a strange absence of political will to initiate firm and proactive action against terrorist organisations and their state sponsors in Pakistan

retreat of the state

The Indian nation state displayed tremendous political will and steely resolve in ensuring its internal security in the immediate wake of independence. It did not hesitate to use military force to compel the princely states to merge with the union or pacify tribal rebellions in the north-east. In the last decade however, there has been a significant erosion of the political will to use force in any form. This erosion of political will is most dangerous and worrying. There is a dire need for a Whole of the Government Approach and an overarching vision that anticipates events and looks well ahead into the future. The time for critical decisions is now at hand. We cannot afford to dither or dismantle our nation state to please some NGOs in Europe. Their motivated liberalism is misplaced and highly suspect. There is a need to look critically at the motivations and funding of some of our NGOs who have taken upon themselves to unite the entire gamut of terrorists and insurgents fighting in the remote corners of our country.

INDIA'S INTERNAL SECURITY PARADIGM:

A DANGEROUS EROSION OF WILL

rom its very inception the Indian nation state has been beset with serious internal security challenges. With the lapse of paramountcy, the colonial masters had tried consciously to set the stage for a meltdown of the nascent state by ensuring it remained a patchwork mosaic interspersed with princely states of all sizes. It was the iron willed Sardar who compelled all the princely states to accede to the Union under the threat of marching in the Indian Army. Thus, at its very inception, the Indian nation state was saved by a firm display of political will. Sadly this has been in retreat in recent years. Today the liberal lobby forgets that the Instruments of Accession signed by the princes of the various states were similar to what Maharaja Hari Singh of Jammu and Kashmir signed when the raiders were all set to rape the capital city of Srinagar. Today this very same instrument of accession is being used to harp on a separate status for Jammu and Kashmir. Would our liberal NGOs next want to apply the same yardstick to the plethora of other princely states that had also acceded to the Union? Most of the early military actions of the Republic had resulted from this process of consolidation of national territory. The recalcitrant states of Jammu and Kashmir and Hyderabad invited significant military actions from the Union. Op Polo in Hyderabad was independent India’s first decisive and successful operation. The Nizam’s forces were routed and Hyderabad liberated in just five days. What is lesser known is that the Indian Army had to be deployed immediately thereafter to crush the first Communist insurrection in Telangana in the immediate wake of Op Polo (September 1948). In Jammu and Kashmir, the Hindu ruler vaccilitated and invited a tribal invasion orchestrated by Pakistan. The Maharaja acceded to India at the eleventh hour and the Indian Army flew in to save the state from marauding tribal lashkars bent on loot and rape. Even the avowedly pacific administration of Pandit Nehru (mostly under prodding from Sardar Patel) did not hesitate to use military force to secure our national security interests.

The Indian state now began to display a bizarre dichotomy between the Government and the Party. The Party was greatly influenced by this array of NGOs and pseudo-intellectuals sporting an extreme new form of liberalism The first serious insurgency erupted in Nagaland in 1956 and the Indian state responded with military force. There was no hesitation or squeamishness in employing the Army to put down the rebellion by tribes who had been instigated on issues of identity. Western missionary organisations had played a dubious role in instigating this tribal revolt. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) was enacted to provide the legal cover to the army operations. Rebellions followed in quick succession in Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura and Assam. It was a classical illustration of the Skocpol Theory of the origin of insurgencies. Due to the difficult jungle terrain and a very low resource base, the colonial administration had not found it worthwhile to carry out administrative and infrastructural penetration of these tribal areas. This historical neglect and failure of state penetration by itself spurred the rebellions. Pakistan and later China did their best to support these tribal insurgencies. The primary bridgehead for this destabilisation effort by the ISI was the former province of East Pakistan.

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The Indian approach to LIC The Indian Army had closely studied Templar’s Counter Insurgency Model in Malaya. It adopted this model to combat its tribal insurgencies. Basically this involved a manpower intensive approach as opposed to the Technology and Equipment intensive approach of the Americans in Vietnam and later in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Indian doctrinal model eschewed the use of offensive airpower, tanks, artillery and all heavy calibre weapons to reduce collateral damage. The Indian Army relied upon straight legged Infantry and small arms alone to defeat the tribal insurgencies. The primary basis was the establishment of a CI Grid to secure the lines of communication and key population centres. This grid was then used as a base to launch offensive CI operations to cause attrition on the tribal guerilla bands. The large size of the Indian Army permitted it to rotate its battalions and keep up the pressure for decades. In fact, a tenure in CI operations in north-east was considered good professional learning for any Infantry battalion and toned up its basic fieldcraft and battle drills. In the 1971 Indo-Pak War the ISI support bases of the north-east insurgents in Bangladesh were destroyed and this proved to be a major setback to the insurgent organisations. In the wake of 1971 Gen Krishna Rao greatly increased troop density in the north-east and mounted significant military pressure on the

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retreat of the state

insurgents. The Shillong accord followed in 1976 as also the Aizwal accord in 1986 which largely broke the back of the tribal insurgencies in Nagaland and Mizoram.

The Indian Army had closely studied Templar’s Counter Insurgency Model in Malaya. It adopted this model to combat its tribal insurgencies. Basically this involved a manpower intensive approach as opposed to the Technology and Equipment intensive approach of the Americans in Vietnam and later in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Indian doctrinal model eschewed the use of offensive airpower, tanks, artillery and all heavy calibre weapons to reduce collateral damage. The Indian Army relied upon straight legged Infantry and small arms alone to defeat the tribal insurgencies. The primary basis was the establishment of a CI Grid to secure the lines of communication and key population centres. This grid was then used as a base to launch offensive CI operations to cause attrition on the tribal guerilla bands Having lost its support bases in Bangladesh the ISI now focused on Punjab and helped to arm and fund a vicious terrorist movement. Almost the entire strategic reserves of the Indian Army were employed to contain this revolt. However, once again, there was no hesitation or dithering in the use of force. In fact Op Blue Star was possibly overkill that proved to be counter-productive. Concerted Army and Police operations however broke the back of this vicious terrorist movement within a decade. The border fencing proved highly effective in curtailing the infiltration of men and material. India’s threats to escalate to conventional conflict in Brass Tacks forced Pakistan to scale back its support and the CT operations in Punjab were an unqualified success. By now Pakistan was freed of its Afghan commitment and its XI and XII Corps were now available for deployment against India. In the 1989 Ex Zorbe Momein it signalled that it believed it now had conventional military parity with India in deployable force levels. In 1990 Pakistan tested its first nuclear weapon on Chinese soil at Lop Nor in Xinjiang. It then launched its Proxy War in Jammu and Kashmir. Throughout the Eighties Gen Zia-ul Haq had been working to recruit the Jamat-e-Islami cadres in Jammu and Kashmir to start a guerilla movement in Kashmir. This was launched in 1989-1990 in the form of the JKLF. The Indian economy was close to collapse in 1990 and hence the capacity for a conventional military response was badly curtailed. However, India had a tried and tested LIC model. It inducted three additional divisions into Jammu and Kashmir from the Eastern Sector. Subsequently it raised three additional RR divisions and then three more such divisions were raised post the Kargil Conflict. This high level of military manpower served to wear down the terrorist organisations and in two decades of intensive operations the Indian Army decimated the JKLF and then the Jihadi Tanzeems in Jammu and Kashmir. The strength of Terrorists was brought down from a peak of 3-4,000 to just 300. At the time of Op Blue Star in Punjab, a clear need had been felt for a six division sized Internal Security Force of the Army. This was raised during the Proxy War in Jammu and Kashmir in terms of six RR divisions. Along with some four and half divisions worth of Assam Rifles for the north-east, this Internal Security Force levels of the Army sufficed to manage the internal security threats in Jammu and Kashmir and the north-east. In both these regions, the security situation has improved very considerably. However, despite the local successes, it is still too premature to withdraw or dilute troop levels from this region.

The rise of left wing extremism and the decline of political will to use force in India Despite the considerable success achieved in the CI / CT operations in the first five decades of our existence, today we are facing a strangely paradoxical situation. In the last decade (and very specifically since the UPA came to power), there has been a dangerous and inexplicable erosion of the political will to use force against terrorist and insurgent organisations. The great pity is that the Indian nation state constructed a very contrived narrative that its nationhood had been achieved by peaceful means and hence it abhorred the use of violence in any form. Historically this was a highly flawed narrative. The modern nation state that emerged with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 is premised upon the state’s sole monopoly of violence and coercion. The state has to completely disarm its population and retain the sole and legitimate right to use force / violence through its armed and police forces. A state cannot abjure the use of force for the sake of Gandhian rhetoric - especially if the threats to its security are becoming increasingly lethal and violent. The state is then duty bound to protect its citizens.

CRPF as the lead CI force of the country Perhaps one of the most disastrous decisions of the GoM (Group of Ministers) formed in the wake of Kargil War was the decision to designate the CRPF as the lead CI Force of the Country. The CRPF operates on a Company basis as an add on law and order force. It is simply not structured or organised to conduct offensive CI / CT operations. It has rendered yeoman service for law and order, elections, communal riots and defensive / protective tasks. However a mere bureaucratic fiat declaring it the main CI Force of the country was a disastrous decision. The CRPF relieved the relatively more militarised BSF in Srinagar - the key centre of gravity in Jammu and Kashmir. Soon this vital region began to slip out of control. The ISI exploited the opportunity to the hilt by trying to stoke an Intifada type agitation in 2008 and again in 2010 over contrived emotional issues aggravated by virulent propaganda. This almost resulted in an IS disaster where we seemed to be frittering away the gains of two decades of successful CT operations. The

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entire problem stemmed from a radical transformation in the government outlook to a very soft approach. A plethora of NGOs funded by the West now began a strident human rights campaign designed specifically to demonise the Army and remove the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. The Army was seen as the primary obstacle to the success of insurgent and terrorist organisations in India. The NGOs now made a concerted effort to tarnish the image of the Indian Army and hobble its operations and effectiveness. The clear cut aim was to delegitimise the use of the Army the most effective component for internal security tasks.

The CRPF operates on a Company basis as an add on law and order force. It is simply not structured or organised to conduct offensive CI / CT operations. It has rendered yeoman service for law and order, elections, communal riots and defensive / protective tasks. However a mere bureaucratic fiat declaring it the main CI Force of the country was a disastrous decision. The CRPF relieved the relatively more militarised BSF in Srinagar – the key centre of gravity in Jammu and Kashmir. Soon this vital region began to slip out of control. The ISI exploited the opportunity to the hilt by trying to stoke an Intifada type agitation in 2008 and again in 2010 over contrived emotional issues aggravated by virulent propaganda. This almost resulted in an IS disaster The Indian state now began to display a bizarre dichotomy between the Government and the Party. The Party was greatly influenced by this array of NGOs and pseudo-intellectuals sporting an extreme new form of liberalism. The West has used unrestrained levels of violence in Iraq and Afghanistan to include B-52 bombers, F-16 fighters, Abram Tanks and Artillery. These liberal NGOs had not a word of condemnation for them. Their entire ire is focused on the Indian Army that has exercised the utmost restraint. There has been a howl of protests about the human rights of the terrorists and insurgents but not one word about the human rights of their victims. There have been orchestrated attempts to demonise the Indian Army, strip away its legal cover for such operations and in fact seriously impede and hobble its ongoing operations in Jammu and Kashmir and the north-east.

The new threat There is a rising order of subversive threat from this new wave of Western inspired liberal organisations who are trying to create a climate where the state cannot exercise its legitimate right to use force to control violent, extremist groups. It is forcing the government to fight well armed and lethal 21st century terrorists with laws enacted in the 18th century to deal with common crooks and criminals. It has generated a discourse on human rights that focuses exclusively on protecting the terrorists and insurgents from the security forces. These NGOs exhibit scant concern for the 2-3,000 innocent Indian citizens who are killed by the terrorists / insurgents every year as a routine. The political leadership has become callous and the people apathetic and resigned to this annual level of casualties. There are two major approaches to counter terrorist operations: ●● The Criminal Justice (or Jurisprudence) model which insists on dealing with the terrorists under the normal laws of the land and lays inordinate emphasis on preserving the individual rights and liberties at the expense of effectiveness in CT operations. ●● The War Against Terror model where democratic countries like the USA have enacted stringent laws (like the

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retreat of the state

Patriot Act), set up military courts and used unrestrained force to destroy the terrorist organisations at home and abroad. India is possibly the only country touting the Criminal Justice model of countering terrorism. The state has turned soft beyond a point of prudence in dealing with such violent terrorist movements. It has started playing politics that has severely hampered the freedom of action of the secuirty agencies. There is a strange absence of political will to initiate firm and proactive action against terrorist organisations and their state sponsors in Pakistan. The result is that even as our bleeding heart liberals tout our lopsided emphasis on the civil liberties and rights of the terrorists, the slaughter of innocent Indian citizens proceeds unchecked. Appeasement of the Military-ISI complex in Pakistan has become our latest obsession. The lives of ordinary Indian citizens seem to count for very little in the matrix of our decision making. This strange lassitude and unwillingness to use force to defend the citizens against terrorist and Maoists depredations is becoming a serious cause for concern. Can the state abdicate its duty to protect its citizens? UN Resolutions mandate that Terrorism is a crime against humanity and countries must enact stringent laws to deal with them. Why then is the Indian state insisting on fighting 21st century lethal terrorism with laws enacted in the 18th/19th century? Why are our NGOs agitating to dilute even these laws further by doing away with the Armed Forces Special powers Act? Why are the NGOs now trying to unite the disparate terrorist groups in Jammu and Kashmir with the insurgents and Maoists operating in the north-east and central india? What explains the state’s increasing and inexplicable unwillingness to use force to protect its citizens? Mrs Indira Gandhi had no hesitation in employing the Army against the Naxals in West Bengal in 1970-71. Left Wing Extremism is emerging as the most significant Internal Security Threat in India. The same has been reiterated time and again by no less an authority than the Indian Prime Minister. Yet what has been the Indian response? So far it has been effete and ineffectual. The present Home Minister showed exemplary courage and launched Operation Green Hunt. However he has been hobbled and hamstrung by his own Party. The CRPF suffered such tragic disasters that it became a national embarrassment. It is not the fault of the force which is neither structured nor trained for such operations. Combatising the Police and Paramilitary force for such tasks will need well over a decade. Can the nation afford this luxury? The Maoists today have over 15,000 armed cadres. The bulk of their foot soldiers are tribals who make ideal guerillas. The Maoists are now networking with the north-east insurgents and ISI backed Tanzeems to secure weapons and training. There are reports of contacts with the Chinese. Yet all this while the liberal NGOs have ensured that the operations are hampered and impeded. They have induced the Supreme Court to ban use of Special Police Officers (SPOs) in Chhattisgarh and stop actions against OGWs. This is a disastrous decision. No insurgency can be fought without the use of local levies. The SPOs provide local knowledge of the human and physical terrain. They provide language and translation skills and actionable Intelligence without which no insurgency can be fought. This Western inspired, bleeding hearts lobby is now showing its true colours. Behind a façade of concern for human rights (of the terrorists primarily) its real intention seems to be to help dismember the Indian state by seriously hampering and impeding its security forces and eroding whatever is left of the government's political will to fight such violent and extremist organisation. The primary duty of the state is to protect its citizenry and today the Indian state seems to be abdicating this primary duty in its concern to win brownie points from these dubious NGOs who have begun to influence policy via the Party Channels in a very irresponsible manner.

Need for a whole of the government approach The Maoists tribal insurgency is highly lethal due to its expertise at fabricating powerful IEDs. It has used 70-100 kgs of explosives to blow up armoured Mine Protected Vehicles. The writ of the state does not run in one third of its territory. Corporate houses have to pay huge sums of protection money to the Maoists. The Maoists are now engaged in cultivation of poppy and control of the drug trade. Yet instead of taking action to destroy / disarm such violent elements - the whole shrill discourse is focused on treating this not as a law and order issue but a purely socio-economic and developemental problem. This begs the question. Unfortunately developemental activities can only be carried out once the area has been pacified and rampaging Maoist companies and platoons brought under control. Which Tehsildar or BDO, which PWD contractor will dare to venture into a lawless area where entire companies of armed CAPFs are being wiped out? Today, there is a patent need to enforce the Clear, Hold, Build Model. That will need some 6 to 8 divisions of the Army. The CAPFs and Police organisations are clearly not designed for such offensive CI operations in dense jungle terrain.

China’s military capability in Tibet has gone up from 22 divisions that were earlier built up in two seasons, to 34 divisions which can now be inducted in a month’s time. This is an accretion of over 12 divisions and we can ignore this capacity enhancement only at our national peril. The Maoists threat provides us the perfect excuse to rapidly raise these formations. Their initial use will enable our Police and CPOs to get the time to train properly and upgrade their combat skills by concerted training and mentoring by Army units. It is criminal to commit untrained police forces to this battle. Not only will that lead to needless casualties but also gift weapons to the Maoists Given their indifferent combat performance, there is hardly any point raising more CRPF battalions that will not be in a position to deliver. We cannot view External and Internal security threats in isolated compartments. The urgent

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need is to raise 6 more divisions of the Army. These could initially be used on the Assam model to carry out concerted operations in badly effected districts of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa for the next two to three years at least to break the Maoists momentum and destroy the PGLA. Special Forces must be used to carry out command and control attrition on the very narrow leadership base of the Maoists which is urban and non-tribal. Once these troops are bloodied against the Naxals they should be available to form badly needed Strike Corps for our Himalayan borders against China and Pakistan. We must remember that China’s military capability in Tibet has gone up from 22 divisions that were earlier built-up in two seasons, to 34 divisions which can now be inducted in a month’s time. This is an accretion of over 12 divisions and we can ignore this capacity enhancement only at our national peril. The Maoists threat provides us the perfect excuse to rapidly raise these formations. Their initial use will enable our police and CPOs to get the time to train properly and upgrade their combat skills by concerted training and mentoring by Army units. It is criminal to commit untrained police forces to this battle. Not only will that lead to needless casualties but also gift weapons to the Maoists. There is a need to view our External and Internal threats in a holistic fashion. Raising additional CRPF battalions will be of absolutely no use against the Chinese or Pakistanis. Additional Army divisions raised however could be useful for both the Internal and External Security Tasks. During the Second World War the Chhattisgarh forests were the British Indian Army’s Training Ground for the battle against the Japanese in Burma. CI operations in such terrain would be ideal to blood the new formations for any contingencies against China or Pakistan.

This erosion of political will in the state is most dangerous and worrying. There is a dire need for a Whole of the Government Approach and an overarching vision that anticipates events and looks well ahead into the future. The time for critical decisions is now at hand. We cannot afford to dither or dismantle our nation state to please some NGOs in Europe. This motivated liberalism is misplaced and highly suspect. There is a need to look critically at the motivations and funding of some of our NGOs who have taken upon themselves to unite the entire gamut of terrorists and insurgent organisations fighting in the remote corners of our country The Army was employed episodically in Assam, in Op Bajrang and Op Rhino. The Army may have to be employed initially to break the momentum of the Maoists insurgents and give the police and CPOs adequate time to train and re-orient their CI components. The Maoists have slowed down their operations against the CPOs not because they have improved in the interim but because they do not want to succeed to a point where the Army has to step in. We are not obliged to conform to their strategy. The pity is, to save face and conserve casualties, our CAPFs have virtually suspended offensive operations and are barely trying to survive in their jungle camps. We must not underestimate the Maoists threat. The Anti-LWE Campaign has been underestimated and underresourced for too long. The time has come for clear cut decisions in the national interest. We cannot play politics with such a serious threat. It is beyond the law and order pail and the states cannot be expected to deal with it on their own. The Maoists are trying to forge a united front with Jammu and Kashmir terrorists, north-east insurgents and Jihadi Tanzeems. We cannot afford to fragment our response and dilute it beyond a point of prudence. We should not be misled by bleeding heart NGOs who seem to have a clear agenda of hampering legitimate state operations. This erosion of political will in the state is most dangerous and worrying. There is a dire need for a Whole of the Government Approach and an overarching vision that anticipates events and looks well ahead into the future. The time for critical decisions is now at hand. We cannot afford to dither or dismantle our nation state to please some NGOs in Europe. This motivated liberalism is misplaced and highly suspect. There is a need to look critically at the motivations and funding of some of our NGOs who have taken upon themselves to unite the entire gamut of terrorists and insurgent organisations fighting in the remote corners of our country.

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homeland security

Brig Gen Ioannis Galatas, MD, PhD, MA, MC (retd) The writer holds a PhD degree in Medicine and a Master’s Degree in “International Terrorism, Organised Crime and Global Security” from Coventry University, UK. He is the Editor of the on-line “CBRNE-Terrorism Newsletter”. Since August 2010 he is the CBRN Scientific Coordinator at Research Institute of EuropeanAmerican Studies, holds the position of Vice Chairman of Greek Intelligence Studies Association and CEO of CBRN Hydra Consulting while being a CBRN consultant for Cristanini S.p.A (leading Italian decontamination company). His last military appointment before his voluntary retirement in August 2010, was as Head of the Department of Asymmetric Threats at the Intelligence Analysis Branch, of Joint Military Intelligence Division of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff in Athens, Greece.

Acclimatisation on personal protective equipment is of even bigger importance. Spending 30 minutes with a gas mask on is not enough if you do not do it again and again, day after day. Donning twice a year for a few hours means nothing

PREPAREDNESS One of the greatest disaster scenarios is the use of WMDs by non-state actors. India is enhancing its commitment to nuclear energy. These reactors are also potential targets for mass casualty terror strikes. The recent Tsunami in Japan led to a nuclear meltdown on an unprecedented scale. CBRN terrorism or catastrophes with a radiological dimension triggered by natural or man-made disasters are an eventuality that we must be well prepared for in this country. The recent Delhi High Court blast also highlighted the need for casualty management in such scenarios. A very timely and well written article by a Greek Brigadier General on CBRN response by hospitals in the event of WMD based terror strike or natural disaster.

his article focuses on hospital CBRN preparedness in megapolis environment and comments on the attitude of state high officials involved in CBRN planning.

Megapolis

A megapolis (combined Greek word: mega [or megalo] = huge and polis = city), also known as megalopolis or megaregion, is a clustered network of cities with a population of about 10 million or more and at least 2,000 persons / km2 (i.e. Delhi has a land of 1,483 km2 and a population density of 9,296 people / km2). Modern interlinked ground transportation corridors, such as rail and highway, often aid in the development of megalopolises. In the top-20 of most populated cities worldwide (Table 1), there are three Indian megalopolises Mumbai, Delhi and Kolkata.

Table 1 - Megapolises of the World 1

Tokyo, Japan - 32,450,000

Manila, Philippines - 16,300,000

Seóul, South Korea - 20,550,000

Los Angeles, USA - 15,250,000

Mexico City, Mexico - 20,450,000

Kolkata, India - 15,100,000

New York City, USA - 19,750,000

Moscow, Russian Fed. - 15,000,000

Mumbai, India - 19,200,000

Cairo, Egypt - 14,450,000

Jakarta, Indonesia - 18,900,000

Lagos, Nigeria - 13,488,000

Sáo Paulo, Brazil - 18,850,000

Buenos Aires, Argentina - 13,170,000

Delhi, India - 18,680,000

London, United Kingdom - 12,875,000

Osaka/Kobe, Japan - 17,350,000

Beijing, China - 12,500,000

Shanghai, China - 16,650,000

Karachi, Pakistan - 11,800,000

Source: http://www.worldatlas.com/citypops.htm

Hospitals as targets Since the beginning of the 21st century, hospitals both in peace and war were considered as sacred areas respected by adversaries either in urban environment or in the operational field. Starting with Cama Hospital in the Mumbai 2008 multiple terrorist attacks many instances of hospitals’ attacks have been recorded in various countries around the globe (i.e. Military Hospital in Kabul, Afghanistan [2011], Misrata Hospital in Libya [2011], etc.). Therefore it is obvious that hospitals represent an attractive soft target for modern terrorists. If by attacking hospitals you kill the hope for the people involved in a terrorist incident then it is like killing them twice.

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HOSPITAL CBRN DEFENCE CBRNE incident site In case of a real CBRN terrorist incident in a megapolis environment there are two things that you must have always in mind. The first one is that planning should follow major anthropocentric patterns. This means that every plan should always answer the following question: “What would be my personal reaction if involved in such an incident?” The second one refers to certain statistics that are crucial to

remember and have to do with the crowd behaviour. In that respect it is estimated that after the CBRN incident approximately 20 per cent of those involved will remain in place (dead, severely wounded and / or contaminated). The remaining 80 per cent will flee to all possible directions seeking medical assistance or if not wounded or contaminated will go home. The third important statistic is that the ratio of truly contaminated vs “worried well” is 1:5. This will soon overwhelm hospitals and collapse even the most

organised and advanced medical systems worldwide. The experience from Tokyo sarin release shows that 84.5 per cent of those involved went to 169 hospitals and clinics all over the capital by their own means. The above numbers stress the need to invest on hospitals’ CBRN defence instead of classic “golden hour” first responders. The latter will certainly go there but they will arrive late (due to very heavy traffic and big dimensions of decontamination vehicles) and most probably those who are severely contaminated / wounded would be

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PREPAREDNESS in hospital defence is to keep contamination away from the hospital, working medical personnel and existing patients. In that respect the CBRN Response Unit of the hospital should be deployed outside the hospital; preferably at the parking lot of the hospital. The response unit is composed by several stations that facilitate the arriving casualties.

The experience from Tokyo sarin release shows that 84.5 per cent of those involved went to 169 hospitals and clinics all over the capital by their own means. The above numbers stress the need to invest on hospitals’ CBRN defence instead of classic “golden hour” first responders. The latter will certainly go there but they will arrive late (due to very heavy traffic and big dimensions of decontamination vehicles) and most probably those who are severely contaminated / wounded would be dead dead. So why invest all that money on first responders that will go there late instead of investing on health infrastructure that will surely accept those escaped and have a good chance to survive? No need to say that medical consequences of CBRN agents’ release might last for decades - as is the case with Iran-Iraq chemical war casualties.

Hospital CBRN defence A hospital might be very close or adjacent to the incident site or far to very far away. If very close then reaction time is minimal if none. This means that the EMS section of the hospital must be able to go to “red alert” within minutes. This

takes a lot of training, specialised equipment, modern planning and open minded individuals that understand the nature of the event. Hospitals that are in more distant areas might have enough time to prepare although in many instances nobody will go there no matter how prepared they are. It is obvious that all hospitals and clinics both public and private should be equally prepared to accept mass CBRN casualties in case of a terrorist event. One might say that casualties should be “guided” to certain specialised hospitals and close all those that do not have the facilities to deal with CBRN contaminated victims. Now ask yourself what would be your reaction if arriving in such a hospital with your contaminated / wounded child and someone was informing you that it is closed and you have to go to another far away hospital …

Hospital preparedness The good thing with hospital CBRN preparedness is that most of the equipment needed is already available within the hospital. Of course there is certain additional equipment that is specifically made for contaminated environments (i.e. field respirator with NBC filter) but apart from these the remaining are every day’s materials and resources. The

important

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parameter

To start with it is very important to have a fence around the hospital. If there is no fence then the control of the arriving citizens would be difficult if not impossible to control. But even with a fence someone might try to override it if not willing to stay in line. This means that security personnel should be deployed as well guarding the inner territory of the hospital. The usual security personnel of the hospital it is for sure will not be able to contribute since they do not possess the abilities, training and personal protective equipment to fulfill their mission in a contaminated environment. Police support is the only solution available. In case of a real event (Figure 1): 1) All casualties / victims presenting to the hospital will enter hospital from one and only gate. 2) All casualties / victims will go through “Detection Station” where if negative they will proceed and walk through a decontamination solution on their way to the EMS department of the hospital. If positive they will proceed to “Triage Station”. 3) Casualties will be either able to walk or on stretchers. In the first case they proceed to “Mass Decontamination Stations” for thorough decontamination. 4) If non-ambulatory they will be transported to the “Non-Ambulatory Victims Decontamination Station”. When decontamination is over they will be rolled to adjusting “First Aid Station” for provision of life saving first aids (antidotes, respiratory support, bleeding control). Antidotes can be given at the “Triage Station” as well depending on the situation. 5) When victims from both the “Mass Decontamination Station” and

“First Aid Station” are ready and “clean” they proceed through the “Verification Station” that confirms the success of decontamination. If negative they end up in the main triage area of the hospital at the “cold zone”. If positive they have to repeat decontamination process. 6) At the “Triage Station” hospital personnel will decide who needs immediate hospitalisation and who can go home with written instructions in case a relapse evolves within the next few hours. One of the main tasks of the triage personnel is to get rid of “worried well” that represent a functional threat to the continuity of the hospital work due to their vast numbers. 7) First responders either from the hospital or from other state departments and organisations need to have their own decontamination line. This is mandatory and this line should be deployed before starting to accept contaminated casualties. “Save the saver to operate” is the main reason but also the rule in all CBRN operations.

The human factor Physicians, nurses and paramedics are the main components of a hospital CBRN response unit. Who are these people and why are they doing this? In most cases worldwide they belong to the EMS department of the hospital and they know how to handle medical emergencies of any kind. The problem is if they all can be involved in CBRN operations where usage of personal protective equipment is mandatory. Are they all fit to operate under very stressful conditions - both physically and emotionally? What if those in charge but not fit happen to be on duty the day of the real event? A dedicated hospital CBRN response unit might be a good alternative. In that respect all personnel involved in this unit are fit to operate under extreme conditions in a contaminated environment. But they need shifts and special arrangements regarding their daily duties in peacetime. Sometimes this is the biggest problem creating lots of friction and discomfort in hospital’s administration. A best

Figure 2 – CBRN training (hydration)

solution that covers all aspects does not exist. Perhaps a fixed unit with various levels of mobilisation and deployment depending on the threats’ index could do the job.

I strongly support the idea of inclusion of “Medical CBRN Defence” or “Terror Medicine” into the curricula of universities’ medical and nursing schools. This will be an opportunity for future front-line health professionals to come into contact with medical CBRN operations and have a basic knowledge in the back of their heads. If something real happens then this basic knowledge might be proven beneficial for the overall management of the citizens involved Then it is training (Figure 2). Just a few theoretical seminars are not enough to prepare somebody to be involved in medical CBRN operations. Practical training is of huge importance. Acclimatisation on personal protective equipment is of even bigger importance. Spending 30 minutes with a gas mask on is not enough if you do not do it again and again, day after day. Donning twice a year for a few hours means nothing. It will always be like the first time! Then there are the procedures. It is a mistake to believe that there is nothing we can do while in personal protective equipment. We can do many things - all the way to intubation (Figure 3) - but we need to do them again and again

Figure 3 - Intubation while in PPE (personal protection equipment)

in order to attain proficiency and self-confidence. We can cut clothing, provide antidotes, suck secretions, support breathing, clean wounds, stop /control bleeding (i.e. by using Quiklot™) or control seizures. These are life saving interventions that along with thorough decontamination will save the lives of those that were

unfortunate enough to be both wounded and contaminated at the same time. Drills and exercises (Figure 4) is the next logical step. They will help personnel involved to understand plans and practice their procedures. Night drills are of particular importance because then you discover that there was no prediction for flood lights! But even in this scenario, a medical responder must be able to improvise and operate even in the dark. Intubate once in the dark and you will never forget it - for life! Exercise (Figure 4) with other first responders both national and international. Participate in international exercises and try to copy and paste things and procedures that will help you

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

homeland security

PREPAREDNESS

improve your own. Create a network of experts that will help you solve problems and exchange ideas relevant to the core CBRN medical operations. Decontamination is the most important task given to the hospital CBRN response unit. Should it be fixed or deployed if needed? If it is fixed preparedness time is kept to minimum but the overall cost is higher. If it is portable, the cost is lower but preparedness time might be a problem especially if the hospital is close or adjacent to the incident site. My personal opinion is that all hospitals should have fixed dedicated decontamination stations (Figure 5). The final question is “why should they do it?” A good answer could be “for their country, their families and their society”. Although logical, logic is something that is very rare especially in Western societies. There in order to do something extra from your given assignments you must have a very good motivation. And motivation is usually translated to money. To a certain point there is some right in this way of thinking. Why? Medical CBRN defence is practically a new medical specialty. With a lot of studying, a lot of

laborious training, a lot of responsibility and a very dangerous one since medical personnel will have to save lives in a potentially lethal environment. So why a surgeon who spent many years in the medical school, then some additional years in order to become a specialist / consultant and now is working in a hospital and has his own private practice to be involved in a second specialty with no extra benefits for his future progress, no regular patients, no extra salary and no recognition of his role in the overall defence of his country? I experienced all kind of attitudes from “what is in it for me” (Greece) all the way to “for the country and the Queen” (UK) or “because they are told to” (India). Truth is always somewhere in the middle. I strongly support the strategy of motivation but also the feeling of community and universal support. If there is no gain at all, then even the most passionate responders will retreat sooner or later. So why not keeping everybody happy by applying a carrot and stick policy?

Towards the future Ignorance is a bad advisor and lack of knowledge regarding new emerging threats and CBRNE in

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

particular is the main reason for this reluctant attitude of medical community observed almost universally. In that respect, I strongly support the idea of inclusion of “Medical CBRN Defence” or “Terror Medicine” into the curricula of universities’ medical and nursing schools. This will be an opportunity for future front-line health professionals to come into contact with medical CBRN operations and have a basic knowledge in the back of their heads. If something real happens then this basic knowledge might be proven beneficial for the overall management of the citizens involved. In other words, if you have many cases of flu-like illnesses in August and the only thing you know is flu then your differential diagnosis will balance between “flu” and “flu” and you will miss “respiratory anthrax” because you have never heard about it and how you can identify it and set an alarm. “They have to be lucky all the time. We have to be lucky only once!” Statement made by an IRA spokesperson following the unsuccessful attempt to murder former UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Many people in high places usually mumble why spend all that money for something that will not happen. Well, if in January 2011 someone presented a scenario involving a mega-earthquake, a mega-tsunami and a mega-nuke catastrophe, then the audience would surely laugh and comment on presenter’s sci-fi capabilities. And then it happened in Japan! So keep in mind that “the unexpected always happens!” and support the medical / hospital CBRN preparedness by all means. It is never too late to do the right thing and it has been proven that by doing the right things it costs less!

D R D O armoured combat vehicle for urban warfare Wars have always held unpleasant surprise for contending forces and India in particular needs to be able to handle a combined conventional war / low intensity conflict / urban warfare. From our vast experience in counter-insurgency and counter-terror operations in north-east, in Jammu and Kashmir, the Mumbai attack and now the devastating events in the Maoist heartland to set qualitative requirements for weapons and accessories that will turn a manpower-intensive paradigm into a more one-to-one confrontation. As a matter of course because India’s enemies are increasingly using unconventional warfare to undercut our known conventional strengths. The Primary casualty causing tactic of the insurgents / terrorists relies upon Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The Maoist insurgency is characterised by very extensive and lethal use of IEDs. They have used huge quantities of explosives to blow up heavily armoured Casper Class mine protected Vehicles (MPVs). Even in urban warfare scenario which is very different from combat in the open at both the operational and tactical level. Tactics are complicated by a three-dimensional environment, limited fields of view and fire because of buildings, enhanced concealment and cover for defenders, below ground infrastructure and the ease of placement of booby traps and snipers. Urban warfare is fought within the constraints of the urban terrain. Urban built-up areas have become a restricting factor and will be exploited by the enemy by basing his defences in and around built-up areas equipped with RPG’s. Thus the ICV’s with the present configuration of available armour protection, so employed become highly vulnerable to fight in an urban environment. A major technological effort therefore has to be made towards countering IEDs and reducing the casualty effects these impose on ICV’s. This additional armour for countering the IEDs has been developed by the prestigious Vehicle Research Development Establishment (VRDE) under Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). A BMP Urban Survival Kit (BUSK) which is a kind of Infantry Combat Vehicle with sophisticated protection armour has been launched to meet the tactical and military requirements of Army in any low intensity conflict or in an urban warfare scenario to provide them with the required technological prowess. BUSK has been developed and designed keeping all these factors in mind. It enhances the protection levels against unconventional enemy weapons like RPGs, IEDs, 7.62 mm and 14.5 mm AP Shots. BUSK is based on BMP (Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty)-II. The kit can be easily assembled / dissembled at any workstation. The salient features of BUSK are: RPG NET: A new concept of RPG net has been provided on the turret and the rear doors of the vehicle to tackle the threat of RPGs. CAGE ARMOUR: Light weight composite cage armour is provided on the vehicle front and sides to diffuse / pre-detonate the RPGs fired at the vehicle. TRANSPARENT ARMOUR: This has been provided on the driver’s cupola, which is bulletproof shield glass for open hatched driving. This assists the driver to manoeuvre in built-up areas. CERAMIC ARMOUR: The add-on ceramic armour plates are provided on the vehicle front lower half, sides and rear doors to upgrade the protection level for threat against 14.5 mm AP B32 ammunition and against the protection of 7.62 mm X 51 AP of BMPs. WIRE MESH GUARDS: These have been provided to protect optical instruments and vision devices against likely damage from splinters /shrapnels. EXTREMITY MARKING POLES: These provide assistance in manoeuvring the vehicle through the confines of the built-up areas. HAND HELD SEARCH LIGHT: A hand held search light with a range of 1,000 m is provided along with the kit. There is an urgent need for the Indian Army, Police and CPOs to focus on Low Intensity Conflicts, urban warfare and insurgency. We must draw upon our vast experience in these and tailor make our weapon designs and field new weapon systems that are custom designed for our requirements and VRDE (DRDO) has taken the lead.

homeland security

GADGETS AND GIZMOS

I Pawan Agrawal The writer is publisher and CEO of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine and has long and varied experience in publishing and media.

t is, to put it mildy, disgusting, to know that when the National Investigating Agency comes around looking for culprits responsible for bombings they discover that either the recommended closed circuit televisions (CCTVs) are non-existent as in the case of the Delhi High Court blast or that the images recorded are so grainy and indistinct that they do not help the police to create cogent identikits of suspects as in the Ambala car bomb case. Hence the rather zombie-like pictures of those believed to be responsible for the Delhi High Court blast supposed to have been provided by eyewitnesses. The Delhi Police soon realised that not even the culprit’s mother would have recognised him from the identikits issued by it.

Proper threat assessment

The growing threat of terrorist attacks has spawned a niche market for security apparatus and security manpower. More and more it is becoming apparent that substandard goods are being peddled off in large numbers to government departments, private companies and individuals who feel threatened by their ambient circumstances. Substandard CCTVs for example. In the absence of Indian Standards Institution norms these entities are being supplied equipment that do not serve the requirement of a user who does not even know what he should have on the premises to ensure clear identification in day and night situations, proper recording of the timing of intrusion, the angle that needs to be covered by the camera and after-sales service to ensure that it remains operative 24x7

It is from this very capsule that the National Investigating Agency should begin to unravel the whole case of why homeland security is such a lax affair and begin by pulling itself up by its own bootstraps by ensuring by some way or the other that places recommended for installation of CCTVs are, indeed, brought within the purview of watchful eyes. It is no use blaming the Public Works Department post ipso facto. Threat analysis growing out of the rising tide of demands for a review of the Supreme Court sentence of death for Afzal Guru for the attack on Parliament should have alerted the NIA and the Delhi Police that courts could become the obvious targets of those who would prefer to use terror tactics to make their point. This is not being said in hindsight but in foresight because ever since the Babri Masjid demolition things tend to happen in a certain predictable pattern. Neither the NIA, a Union Home Ministry department created after the Mumbai carnage of 2008, nor police forces in the states and Union Territories that come within the jurisdiction of their respective governments have shown evidence of forward planning for eventualities that could occur as a consequence of some earlier events and grouses created by them. The only way any Indian will be convinced of the efficacy of the setup brought into being after the Mumbai attack is when he / she sees proof of it in the manner in which an oversight is conducted on the technical means of surveillance that is mandatory under the very concept of “homeland security”. Finally, after several weeks of painstaking running down of clues and evidences a set of very cogent and remarkably clear pictures of men wanted in connection with the Delhi High Court blast have been published along with a Rs. 10 lakh award for information about their whereabouts. Time cools and obfuscates the trail, Sherlock Holmes would have told Dr Watson.

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

Case studies Hence the need to identify, survey and recommend specific requirements to ensure the safety of places where people have to congregate for various reasons or institutons that are of national significance and of high value for terrorist attacks and ensure that the recommendations are carried out. Some years ago a veteran War Correspondent decided to survey two specific areas where a sure kill could take place given that evidence had been growing that terrorists had reconnoitered the places preparatory to a strike in the capital of India. One was Vijay Chowk and Raisina Hill leading up to Rashtrapati Bhavan, a passageway used extensively by visiting foreign dignitaries and Indian VVIPs. He saw that the Delhi Police was allowing chauffeurs of VVIPs to park their cars on the Raisina Hill slope. He wrote an article that was published in a local daily explaining how a car bomb could be placed on the slope and the consequences of an explosion between the two high promontories that constitute North and South Block. The Delhi Police quickly shifted parking to the beginning of the south side of Rajpath. The other venue was located on the basis of reports that Pakistan trained terrorists have access to shoulder-fired missiles (later proved true in Kargil where one Indian Air Force aircraft and a helicopter were shot down). The defence analyst drew a mental picture based on the range of known shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles and the height and distance of the glide path of any airliner using the Indira Gandhi International airport landing strip that could be reached by a SAM during the most vulnerable moments of any aircraft operation. He pinpointed out how anyone either waiting in hiding in a particular house or driving by on a motorcycle could shoot at an aircraft while it was landing (or create enough of a scare for the pilot to take evasive measures and crash because of the low altitude) and thus achieve the kind of spectacular strike terrorists thrive on. The Home Ministry and Civil Aviation department took cognizance of the report and the Central Industrial Security Force was posted close to the spot.

Looming NBC threat These are examples of how the common citizen can be made aware of likely threats to their existence. In both cases the government with local jurisdiction should have known, given the intelligence already available with it, how to take necessary corrective steps and educate the people about what needs to be done to ensure realistic “homeland security” in its micro level. On the contrary we have a National Disaster Management Authority

security products: need for high standards A timely article on the need for quality control in our security equipment and responses. The writer highlights with the aid of incisive case studies the need to be proactive in issues of security. The growing threat of terrorist attacks has spawned a niche market for security apparatus and security manpower. More and more it is becoming apparent that substandard goods are being peddled off in large numbers to government departments, private companies and individuals who feel threatened by their ambient circumstances. Substandard CCTVs for example. The Union Home Ministry which is the apex body within the “homeland security” concept should take the lead in ensuring the creation of multi-media aids to educate the people at large about threats to themselves as well as national security. fully aware of the theory of security unable to see the danger posed to the one installation it has itself identified as the safest place during a nuclear, biological and chemical attack (NBC) - the Delhi Metro which lies just one kilometer from its headquarters - by Pakistan Army Chief of Staff General Kayani’s recent threat to the US that he will use the nuclear weapons at any moment! He definitely cannot hit anything American with them but he can reach New Delhi in minutes. Hence the jitters in New Delhi. The growing threat of terrorist attacks has spawned a niche market for security apparatus and security manpower. More and more it is becoming apparent that substandard goods are being peddled off in large numbers to government departments, private companies and individuals who feel threatened by their ambient circumstances. Substandard CCTVs for example. In the absence of Indian Standards Institution norms these entities are being supplied equipment that do not serve the requirement of a user who does not even know what he should have on the premises to ensure clear identification in day and night situations, proper recording of the timing of intrusion, the angle that needs to be covered by the camera and after-sales service to ensure that it remains operative 24x7. A recent case came to light where a family

threatened by local goons had advertised for a pinhole camera with wide-angle coverage of a minimum of 120 degrees. Several firms responded with offers of Chinese made cameras. Few had any brochures to illustrate their product and its capabilities and the one that did have a brochure did not have the product in stock and after two weeks of prevaricating and promises was forced to return the advance collected for the camera or face police action. Also in companies where employees are averse to being watched constantly sabotage occurs as in Delhi airport where someone pasted chewing gum on the lens.

Standards / quality control The mushroom growth of “security agencies” has given rise to an industry bereft of the norms of labour laws where salaries are inadequate and working hours hard on the human condition. There is, therefore, need for a standardisation of norms for both equipment for security purposes as well as aftersales services and manpower management in this burgeoning industry. Inadequate management of the systems could well lead to a break of security with horrendous results. The shooting not too long ago in the Jama Masjid area happened when the CCTV installed in the area had been dismantled for repairs.

Clearly the terrorists are looking for such opportunities and could well have accomplices within the security network to inform of malfunctioning equipment. The Union Home Ministry which is the apex body within the “homeland security” concept should take the lead in ensuring the creation of multi-media aids to educate the people at large about threats to themselves as well as national security. Many a time propaganda about what to do on seeing an unattended baggage or suspicious object is not backed up by properly trained personnel who are assigned to respond to such threats. More often than not security institutions end up performing post-mortem tasks in the absence of immediate, adequate responses as in the Delhi High Court case. A bomb blanket put over a suspected suitcase could have restricted casualties dramatically. There are many other fine points of security management that have either been ignored because of the ignorance of the security establishment itself or there is tardy implementation of even the known parameters of security management. Things must change. Things must change if we are not to remain a “soft state” amenable to periodic assaults by anti-national elements at their will and pleasure.

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

homeland security

Nitin Gokhle The writer, a journalist with 28 years of experience behind him in various conflict theatres, is currently NDTV's Security and Strategic Affairs Editor.

There was great initial optimism, but the bluster quickly faded into hysterical demands for Army deployment and the use of the Air Force for offensive operations, after a succession of bloody Naxal ambushes predictably left hundreds of Security Force personnel dead in the early days of the ill-planned and undermanned Union Home Ministry-backed misadventure

NIGHTMARE SCENARIO?

India’s indecisiveness in defining the nature and scope of the Maoist movement is symptomatic of its ambivalence towards its idea of itself and what shape it wants to take: Is India a Nehruvian welfare state or a free-market entity? Coalition politics is preventing the decision-makers from undertaking the second wave of reforms in India’s economy. More people died in an insurgency and endless war that is playing out in the heart of India, in the states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar and Orissa in the period when bomb attacks in urban areas were hogging all the limelight. This large swathe of land in the centre of India frequently showed up the ineffective and lumbering Indian state in poorer light. It is in the theatres of escalating Naxal violence that the most visible indices of state incoherence, indeed, incompetence, have been notable. In late 2009, the centre launched what were repeatedly described a "massive and coordinated operations" by Central Paramilitary Force in combination with State Police Forces, across the five worst affected states - Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, West Bengal and Orissa. There was great initial optimism, but the bluster quickly faded into hysterical demands for Army deployment and the use of the Air Force for offensive operations, after a succession of bloody Naxal ambushes predictably left hundreds of Security Force personnel dead in the early days of the ill-planned and undermanned Union Home Ministry-backed misadventure. Now, the great enthusiasm of early 2010 has quickly faded into a defensive sulk and, despite claims to the contrary, operations against the Naxals have been substantially scaled down in desperate measures to save face and minimise security forces’ casualties.

etween 2006 and 2011, a series of bomb attacks in major Indian urban centres - Delhi, Mumbai, Ahmedabad, Bangalore and Jaipur, to name some kept the Indian security agencies fully occupied. These bomb blasts, carried out by a home grown terrorist group calling itself Indian Mujahideen under the active guidance of Pakistan’s notorious Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) peaked in November 2008 when 10 LeT (Lashkar-e-Toiba) terrorists attacked five star hotels and a Jewish establishment in Mumbai, killing over 170 people and garnering worldwide attention for the LeT. These attacks showed up the Indian state to be weak, vulnerable and slow to respond. Yet, the maximum number of killings did not take place in these attacks. More people died in an insurgency and endless war that is playing out in the heart of India, in the states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar and Orissa in the period when bomb attacks in urban areas were hogging all the limelight. This large swathe of land in the centre of India frequently showed up the ineffective and lumbering Indian state in poorer light.

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

fiffiight against Maoists: ffllipflfl-ffllop vs resolute action

Along with neighbouring West Bengal to the east, Maharashtra to the west and Andhra Pradesh to the south, this mammoth geographical spread constitutes the area of influence of what is known in Indian security establishment as LWE or Left Wing Extremism.

Security nightmare Statistics do not always reflect the correct picture but consider this: Out of 1,902 deaths in extremist violence across India in 2010 alone, 1,180 people were killed in Maoist areas! This number easily outstripped the death toll in all other violent incidents across the country put together. Even other indices indicate that the Maoist problem is currently India’s greatest security nightmare. In 2010, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh described the Maoist problem as ‘India’s biggest internal security threat’ and not without reason. It is in the theatres of escalating Naxal violence that the most visible indices of state incoherence, indeed, incompetence, have been notable.

more than 67 of these are categorised as ‘highly affected’, with high levels of insurgent organisation and persistent violent activity. Over the years, divergent assessments of the intensity of Naxal activities have been provided by official sources from time to time.

For example, in 2011, the government admitted that 223 districts across 20 states register some Naxal activity, though not

Union Home Minister Chidambaram, on September 15, 2009, claimed that Naxal violence “has been consistently witnessed in about 400 police

station areas of around 90 districts in 13 states”. There are well over 14,000 police stations in India and this assessment suggests that the problem is, at worst, marginal. Six months later, on March 12, 2010, with, no evidence of any change in the situation on the ground, the Home Minister went on to state that 34 districts were “virtually controlled” by the Naxals.

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

homeland security

NIGHTMARE SCENARIO?

It is not known if Mr Chidambaram’s change in stand was because in late 2009, the centre launched what were repeatedly described a “massive and coordinated operations” by Central Paramilitary Force in combination with State Police Forces, across the five worst affected States - Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, West Bengal and Orissa.

More people died in an insurgency and endless war that is playing out in the heart of India, in the states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar and Orissa in the period when bomb attacks in urban areas were hogging all the limelight There was great initial optimism, but the bluster quickly faded into hysterical demands for Army deployment and the use of the Air Force for offensive operations, after a succession of bloody Naxal ambushes predictably left hundreds of Security Force personnel dead in the early days of the ill-planned and undermanned Union Home Ministry backed misadventure. Fortunately, the MHA’s calls for Army and Air Force deployment were quickly shot down. Now, the great enthusiasm of early 2010 has quickly faded into a defensive sulk and, despite claims to the contrary, operations against the Naxals have been substantially scaled down in desperate measures to save face and minimise security forces’ casualties. In the past two years, huge amounts have been earmarked for force and technology augmentation, to boost Internal Security and Intelligence apparatus, but there has been very limited impact on the ground since implementation remains a big problem. In fact, the problem first begins at the policy level as it did all through the 1990s and continued well into the first five-six years of the new millennium. In that period, central government’s approach to the growing Maoist movement was marked by indifference. In New Delhi, the overwhelming assessment was the Maoist problem was a local phenomenon, manifest only in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar.

The Ministry of Home affairs therefore largely let the states deal with it. But that attitude suddenly changed to active support from 2006 onwards as the Maoist violence spiralled and the states seemed helpless in dealing with the problem. So in a turnaround, the MHA set up a separate wing to look into Maoist violence in 2006.

decided to extend financial help to the states to modernise the police forces and deploy paramilitary forces like the Central Reserve Police Force, The Border Security Force wherever required. This was the first of the series of U-turns exhibited by the central government in dealing with the Maoists.

Even then, it was called the Naxal Management Wing, a small adjunct working under a director-level officer unlike today when a Naxal Management Division, headed by a senior Joint Secretary, is entrusted with looking after the Maoist issue.

Now five years after enunciating a security plan to deal with the Maoists, the MHA has an elaborate, multi-pronged strategy for Maoists-affected areas. The overall objective, the plan says is to deal with Naxalite activities in a holistic manner in the arenas of security, development, administration and public perception management.

Till 2006, policy-makers in New Delhi underestimated the problem and clearly did not see the difference between the Naxalbari Movement of the 1960s and the current Maoist movement in terms of its spread, scope or nature. In fact, it was for the first time in 2006-07 that the MHA first acknowledged, when outlining, a pan-India plan to deal with the Maoists: “Naxalites typically operate in a vacuum created by inadequacy of administrative and political institutions, espouse local demands and take advantage of the prevalent disaffection and perceived injustice among the underprivileged and remote segments of population.” At that point MHA enunciated a “multi-pronged strategy, essentially of sustained and effective police action coupled with accelerated socio-economic development and management of public perception.” One of the key elements in the policy was to bring 55 Maoist-affected districts under the Backward District Initiative (BDI) for carrying out immediate and focused developmental activity funded by New Delhi. Also, the Backward Regions Grant Fund (BRGF) for 250 partially Maoist-dominated and affected districts was launched. The idea behind both schemes, according to the Planning Commission, was to “remove barriers to growth, accelerate the development process and improve the quality of life of the people.” Simultaneously, the MHA also

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

The aim is to uphold the law of the land, provide security of life and property and provide a secure environment for development and economic growth. “Considering the inter-state ramifications of Naxalite activities, the central government seeks to emphasise on the need for inter-state coordination and cooperation, both in terms of uniformity in approach and in terms of ground-level joint police action,” the MHA says.

Out of 1,902 deaths in extremist violence across India in 2010 alone, 1,180 people were killed in Maoist areas! This number easily outstripped the death toll in all other violent incidents across the country put together The three broad contours of this strategy and the mechanisms to implement them are listed in the subsequent paragraphs.

Security measures The central government emphasises the role of police action and response at the state level to counter the Naxal problem. It encourages states to ●● Formulate and implement effective surrender and rehabilitation policies for Naxalites who shun crime, violence and arms. ●● Use the mass media extensively to highlight the futility of Naxal ideology and violence and loss of life and property caused by it in the

affected areas. ●● Strengthen the state intelligence set-up. ●● Optimise utilisation of existing training capacity and creation of additional training capacity. ●● Provide secure police station buildings, trained personnel, basic amenities for the personnel deployed and specialised equipment, weaponry and vehicles at the police station level. ●● Expedite filling up of the vacancies in the state police forces. ●● Improve the police-population ratio, in consonance with the law and order requirements. ●● Make adequate provisions for equipment, weaponry, mobility, communication, training, police buildings and housing and forensic science in the state police budget. ●● Expedite investigation and prosecution of Naxalite crimes. The MHA also helps the states in their anti-Naxalite plans by providing additional forces, funding training and establishing specialised counters-insurgency schools. In July 2011, over 70 battalions of CPMFs (Central Paramilitary Forces) are currently deployed on long term basis for assisting the state police in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.

In 2010, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh described the Maoist problem as ‘India’s biggest internal security threat’ and not without reason COBRA Battalions: Ten battalions of Specialised Force trained and equipped for counter-insurgency and jungle-warfare operations, named as Commando Battalions for Resolute Action (COBRA) are being raised as a part of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF). In the first phase, key location points of 2 battalions have been raised at Jagdalpur in Chhattisgarh and Koraput in Orissa and the remaining battalions will be established in other

Naxal affected states over the next two years.

One of the key elements in the policy was to bring 55 Maoist-affected districts under the Backward District Initiative (BDI) for carrying out immediate and focused developmental activity funded by New Delhi. Also, the Backward Regions Grant Fund (BRGF) for 250 partially Maoist-dominated and affected districts was launched CIAT Schools: 20 Counter Insurgency and Anti-Terrorist (CIAT) Schools, four per state, are being set up to impart specialised training to state police personnel in respect of counter insurgency, jungle warfare and terrorism in Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Orissa and Jharkhand. Of these, 7 CIAT schools in 4 Naxal affected states of Bihar 1, Chhattisgarh 2, Jharkhand 2 and Orissa 2, have been sanctioned and Rs. 10.50 crore have been released. MPF Scheme: Under the Scheme for Modernisation of State Police Forces (MPF scheme), assistance is being provided for equipment, weaponry, mobility, communication, training, police infrastructure and buildings, forensic science

facilities, etc. SRE Scheme: Under the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme, assistance is provided for recurring expenditure relating to insurance, training and operational needs of security forces, as also for Naxalite cadres who surrender in accordance with the surrender and rehabilitation policy of the concerned state government, community policing, security-related infrastructure by village defence committees and publicity material. During 2008-09, against budgetary estimates of Rs. 80 crore, the entire amount has been released to the states. Scheme for Special Infrastructure: Based on detailed study and analysis of the fundamental requirements in the field, a new scheme aimed at filling critical infrastructure gaps in left wing extremism affected states has been implemented. The scheme is aimed at filling critical infrastructure gaps not covered under existing schemes of the central government including MPF and SRE schemes.

Policy on dialogue The MHA has however clearly told the states that there should be no peace dialogue with Naxalite groups unless they give up crime, violence and arms.

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

homeland security Other measures

Maoist during an operation!

States are being assisted in all-round development of affected areas, with qualitative implementation of central and state development schemes and with fair deal to deprived segments. Various schemes such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, the Prime Minister’s Gram Sadak Yojna [Village Road Plan], the National Rural Health Mission Scheme and Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan [Educate All Campaign] are being implemented in the affected states. But the biggest scheme launched in March 2011 is the Integrated Area Development programme also called Focused Area Approach.

In 2010, the MHA asked states to set up Unified Command structures comprising all agencies involved in the anti-Maoist operations to ensure better cooperation but to no avail. Despite all these measures, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had to appeal to the states to “be and also appear to be united and one in our resolve to counter the growing Maoist problem.” Then there is another problem to contend with: divergent views at the highest levels in the government and the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA).

There is another problem to contend with: divergent views at the highest levels in the government and the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) This decision has come in the wake of a detailed analysis of the spread and trends in respect of Naxalite violence. Accordingly, 34 affected districts in 8 states have been taken up for special attention on planning, implementation and monitoring of development schemes. Within these 34 districts, 8 most affected districts in Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa, have been taken up for implementation of integrated security and development action plans, an approach that can be replicated in other affected districts too. As if the number of schemes were not enough focus to the Maoist-dominated areas, there is a plethora of committees - Standing Committee of Chief Ministers of Naxal Affected States, a Coordination Committee, a Task Force, an Inter-Ministerial Group and an Empowered Group of Ministers on Internal Security - were set up to resolve, coordinate and control various activities related to the government anti-Maoist schemes. Interestingly, despite over one hundred meetings none of these committees have been able to decide on even a basic principle of “hot chase” that is whether a police force from a particular state can cross over to another state in pursuit of a wanted

homeland security

NIGHTMARE SCENARIO?

While one section - subscribed to by a large section of the civil society, political leaders and some in the government as well - views the Maoist movement as a result of the state’s failure. Seen from this angle, the Maoist movement is nothing but a reaction to the lack of social and economic development arising from deprivation, loss of livelihood, lack of employment opportunities and abject poverty. The Maoist problem, according to this view, is a result of the state abdicating its role as a guarantor of welfare. The solution to this, therefore, must lie in addressing the socio-economic development deficit. The view from the right, however, looks at the Maoist movement as necessarily a challenge to the manner in which politics and governance is organised in India. This section advocates the need to tackle the Maoists as enemies of the state. Days after an entire company 76 men of the Central Reserve Police Force - were killed in a single ambush, general secretary of the ruling Congress party, Digvijay Singh, said: “In this case (regarding Maoists), I have differed with his (home minister P Chidambaram’s) strategy that does not take into consideration the people living in the affected area who ultimately matter. He is treating it purely as a law and order problem without taking into consideration the issues that affect the tribals.” This divide in placing the Maoist movement in proper perspective has reduced India’s ability to address the issue to a jumble of policies that

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POLICING CHALLENGE

contradict each other. What perhaps compounds the problem is that many of today’s senior policy planners, bureaucrats and political leaders were idealistic young men and women during the Maoist movement of the 1960s and ’70s. If the Maoist movement – and the issues it raises – isn’t addressed soon enough, it won’t be long before India will be fighting a war not just on the borders with its neighbours, but within its own heartland – against its own people Many, in fact, had either participated in the movement or were at least influenced by its ideology, howsoever briefly. Naturally, for many of them, the fact that Maoists could be merely exploiting the socio-economic and governance deficit to merely strengthen their own movement is perhaps difficult to accept. The key to handle the Maoist riddle perhaps lies in managing these contradictory viewpoints. India’s indecisiveness in defining the nature and scope of the Maoist movement is symptomatic of its ambivalence towards its idea of itself and what shape it wants to take: Is India a Nehruvian welfare state or a free-market entity? Coalition politics is preventing the decision-makers from undertaking the second wave of reforms in India’s economy. As a result, contradictions associated with a transition phase in the growth of a nation are threatening to get the better of the system as a whole. The Maoists are rapidly expanding their arc of influence by exploiting these very contradictions. Unlike the central government in New Delhi or the various state governments, the Maoist leadership is working with a single point agenda - that of overthrowing parliamentary democracy in India and replacing it with a people’s dictatorship. If the Maoist movement - and the issues it raises - isn’t addressed soon enough, it won’t be long before India will be fighting a war not just on the borders with its neighbours, but within its own heartland - against its own people.

Dr Prem Mahadevan

A timely warning forecast that analyses the social impact of increasing urbanisation and the massing of human populations in dense metropolitan slums. This is likely to compress social spaces and lead to an explosion in organised crime within the urban battlescape. The writer cites the chilling example of Brazil, South Africa and Mexico where crime syndicates and drug mafias fight regular battles with machine-guns and rockets and sometimes employ former Special Forces military personnel. Principles of employing "minimum force" will have to give way to the use of “proportional force” in such vicious urban battlescapes. This phenomenon is already manifesting in the Maoist insurgency. The writer highlights the alarming fact that India accounts for over 50 per cent of all illegal firearms in circulation worldwide – roughly 40 million out of an estimated total of 75 million. The bulk of these are thought to be not in the possession of terrorist or insurgent groups, but of rural bandits and urban mobsters. In the years to come our police may have to militarise itself to fight such vicious levels of urban violence.

The writer is Senior Researcher for Intelligence, Sub-state Conflict and Organised Crime at the Center for Security Studies in Zurich, Switzerland. Between 2002 and 2009, he completed an undergraduate degree in War Studies and postgraduate and doctoral degrees in Intelligence Studies from King's College, London. He has written extensively on Indian and Pakistani intelligence agencies and his articles on Indian counterterrorism have been made recommended reading for military officers in North America and Western Europe.

Any criminal group that took the lead in trafficking drugs made huge profits, purchasing sophisticated weapons and police protection. It would then use these assets to marginalise rivals, forcing them to engage in the trade themselves. Such was also the dynamic in Brazil during the 1990s: turf battles in the favelas (slums) of cities like Rio de Janeiro saw cocaine dealers using machine-guns and rocket launchers against each other as well as against policemen who tried to intervene. Eventually, the police had to raise commando squads trained in urban warfare tactics to fight the heavily-armed traffickers on their own terms

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homeland security

POLICING CHALLENGE

here is a tendency among Indian policy makers to believe that democracy and prosperity can, between them, create a stable society. Pursuit of high economic growth rates has therefore become a national obsession and the government routinely stigmatises rebellious movements as either foreign-sponsored (jihadi terrorism) or ideologically anachronistic (left extremism). By portraying rebellion as social deviance, whose adherents exist outside the national mainstream, contemporary security policy is ignoring the risk that ‘progressive’ changes could lead to the intensification of civil strife, rather than its reduction.

Mexico was even worse: here, drug traffickers were able to buy not just military hardware, but personnel as well. Offering salaries up to 12 times higher than what could be earned in government service, powerful cartels suborned security officials into working for them. Many soldiers and policemen deserted en masse with their weapons, putting their combat skills at the disposal of the cocaine mafia. Today, the deadliest drug cartel in Mexico is led by former army special forces soldiers This article argues that India needs to study the experience of other developing countries which have experienced political and economic transformations. Such changes have tended to be accompanied by violent crime epidemics that have quasi-political overtones. These epidemics cannot be contained by conventional methods of policing. Instead of a reactive, criminal justice approach to crime-fighting, what becomes necessary is a militarised, proactive approach that seeks to track and neutralise anti-social elements on a war footing. Law enforcement agencies thus need to become adept at operating in ‘battlescapes’ i.e., zones of persistent low intensity conflict and / or high-intensity crime.

countries whose experiences might be relevant to India. All had relatively stable military or civilian regimes through much of the cold war, only to experience power transfers and economic liberalisation in the 1980s and ‘90s. The weakening of state control over movement of goods and people, coupled with the confusion of transitional politics, created openings for ‘violent entrepreneurship’. Business disputes began to be settled with contract killings, gang wars escalated and officials lined their pockets with the proceeds of corruption. Indian readers would be most familiar with the case of Pakistan. The country liberalised its economy in 1988 and switched from military to democratic rule in the same year. The combined effect of these changes, plus a high rate of urbanisation (by South Asian standards), caused real estate prices to boom. In the port of Karachi, local mafias used military-grade weaponry to fight over shipping routes for Afghan heroin and manipulation of land deals. Eventually, the army had to intervene. What it found was an urban battlescape - a combination of battlefield and landscape. Violence had become so integral to the local political and commercial environment that it could not be fully eradicated.

A global phenomenon

South Africa was a slightly different case. The country became violence-prone during the 1990s owing to its inheritance of a fractured polity from the apartheid era. Many amongst the public viewed the state as a partisan actor unable to arbitrate societal disputes in an objective manner. For them, crime was a semi-political act of rebellion and the general anomie within society together with inequities in wealth distribution obviated the need for an ideological narrative to justify it. Escalating violence, both organised and opportunistic, forced middle class neighbourhoods to hire private security guards armed with automatic weapons. By 2009, the number of such guards was roughly twice the size of the national police force.

Brazil, Mexico, South Africa and Pakistan are just a few examples of

The international drug trade played an important role in accentuating

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the viciousness of gang warfare and street crime in both, South Africa and Pakistan. Any criminal group that took the lead in trafficking drugs made huge profits, purchasing sophisticated weapons and police protection. It would then use these assets to marginalise rivals, forcing them to engage in the trade themselves. Such was also the dynamic in Brazil during the 1990s: turf battles in the favelas (slums) of cities like Rio de Janeiro saw cocaine dealers using machine-guns and rocket launchers against each other as well as against policemen who tried to intervene. Eventually, the police had to raise commando squads trained in urban warfare tactics to fight the heavily-armed traffickers on their own terms. With some of the traffickers being street children, the squads were indoctrinated to use lethal force against them, according to an unofficial principle that ‘the only difference between a veteran policeman and a dead rookie is the split second it takes to think twice about killing a child’.

trans-shipment hub. Better connectivity with markets in Europe and North America, brought about by economic liberalisation and the modernisation of transportation infrastructure, has encouraged drug traffickers to expand operations in the country.

What happened in Mexico was even worse: here, drug traffickers were able to buy not just military hardware, but personnel as well. Offering salaries up to 12 times higher than what could be earned in government service, powerful cartels suborned security officials into working for them. Many soldiers and policemen deserted en masse with their weapons, putting their combat skills at the disposal of the cocaine mafia. Today, the deadliest drug cartel in Mexico is led by former army special forces soldiers. Over 30,000 people have been killed in five years of intensive fighting between traffickers and the government and the deployment of 50,000 troops in counter-narcotics operations has failed to stem the violence.

Meanwhile, demographic factors are ticking down towards an unpleasant scenario: that of urban crime epidemics. Over the next two decades, the number of Indians living in towns and cities will rise from 30 per cent to 40 per cent of the total population. Rural immigrants seeking work are projected to arrive in urban areas at the rate of one every two seconds. Many will lack the education levels needed to compete for jobs in growth industries such as high-tech manufacturing and the services sector. Accordingly, some are likely to end up in the slums of mega-cities like Delhi and Mumbai India’s own favelas. Since organised crime has strong control over these slums, it is virtually certain that enforcer gangs fighting future mafia wars shall have a large pool of recruits to draw upon.

Proliferation India has little reason to be sanguine about the risk of violent crime within its borders. Maoist insurgents already deal in cannabis and opium poppy, having encouraged remote agricultural communities to view these products as high value cash crops. A well-entrenched heroin mafia, backed by a hostile foreign intelligence service, operates in Mumbai. India is a leading source of precursor chemicals used for refining drugs, as well as an important

Indian police forces will have to develop urban combat skills analogous to their counterparts in countries such as Brazil. Police intelligence, currently perceived to be the Achilles’ Heel of the Indian counter-intelligence system, would have to be massively upgraded. Outreach efforts shall have to be made towards civil rights groups, in order to explain law enforcement imperatives to them. Not many human rights activists would normally comprehend the dangers faced by policemen confronting well-armed gangsters in slum alleyways

Besides drugs and unemployment, a third factor of concern is the growing ease with which firearms can be illegally purchased. Indian gun laws are strict in theory but easily subverted in practice. One study, published in 2006, asserted that India accounts for over 50 per cent of all illegal firearms in circulation worldwide - roughly 40 million out of an estimated total of 75 million.

The bulk of these are thought to be not in the possession of terrorist or insurgent groups, but of rural bandits and urban mobsters. This means that a strong incentive exists for emergent criminal organisations to weaponise, both as a defence against well-armed rivals as well as a tool for expansion. It is hardly surprising that 90 per cent of the 35,000 homicides that occur annually in India are apolitical. Indeed, the country has already experienced a violent crime epidemic, though few today remember it as such. Most of the operational core of Khalistani terrorist groups during the 1980s and ‘90s were not ideologues, but instead, gangsters and mercenaries. A survey carried out by the Punjab Police found that only 5 per cent of captured Khalistani terrorists had any interest in politics; the remainder being thrill-seekers out to make a quick buck through smuggling and extortion. Many would engage in heroin trafficking at the behest of criminal gangs based in Lahore, Pakistan. Others focused on local kidnappings-for-ransom. Eventually, the ideological hollowness of the Khalistani separatist movement allowed determined police action, backed by the army, to crush terrorist groups in Punjab.

Militarised policing With 50 per cent of its population aged under 25, India needs to be prepared for sporadic eruptions of violent acquisitive crime. Although

politically-motivated terrorism, both foreign-sponsored and domestic, remains a real threat, an exercise in horizon-scanning would throw up warning signs of new problems. Crime, like terrorism is basically a local phenomenon. Its appearance is intimately connected with the politics and business of an area. Since Indian politics and commerce is increasingly urban-focused, violent crime too is likely to be concentrated in population centres. Combating it will require specialised tactical skills, as well as excellent field intelligence in order to avoid disruption to the public. This means that Indian police forces will have to develop urban combat skills analogous to their counterparts in countries such as Brazil. Police intelligence, currently perceived to be the Achilles’ Heel of the Indian counter-intelligence system, would have to be massively upgraded. Outreach efforts shall have to be made towards civil rights groups, in order to explain law enforcement imperatives to them. Not many human rights activists would normally comprehend the dangers faced by policemen confronting well-armed gangsters in slum alleyways. Yet, without the support of politicians and the general public, these policemen will struggle to prevent Indian cities from becoming permanently weaponised crime zones. Preparing for conflict is therefore, essential to preserving peace.

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homeland security

Amitabh Thakur, IPS The writer is an IPS officer of UP cadre. He is presently working in Economic Offences Wing at Meerut, Uttar Pradesh. He is a B Tech in Mechanical Engineering from IIT Kanpur. He has been SP of nearly 10 districts in UP and has also served at other important places like Vigilance, Intelligence, Special Enquiry, CB-CID and Police Academy, Moradabad UP.

In all matters related with internal security, particularly at higher level policy measures, the core is the integration of issues and formulation of a holistic and assimilated view. This also means that while the various subunits of the concept of internal security are definitely very important, the overall impact can be actually felt when the integrated view can be formulated in a more efficient, effective and combined manner

EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT

The writer, an IPS officer, calls for a holistic or “whole of the govt.” approach to internal security. Looking at internal security as only a mathematical conglomerate of a large vista of various topics or segregated issues might not be the most appropriate perspective. At higher level policy measures, the core is the integration of issues and formulation of a holistic and assimilated view. Real acumen is needed in making an assimilated, integrated and agglomerated assessment of the various separate issues. While the days of specialisation are already there, today possibly the need for such inclusive vision is even more.

e are often talking of various focused aspects of internal security and we all accept that today there are too many factors that are contributing to make internal security an extremely sensitive topic. But having gone through a host of these articles, I somehow have always felt that very often we tend to ignore the bigger picture for the sake of becoming specific, specialised and microscopic. In my opinion, this is a trait that has its own dangers because looking at internal security as only a mathematical conglomerate of a large vista of various topics or segregated issues might not be the most appropriate perspective. In fact, it has its own negative aspects because each of these specialists dealing with the specific aspects of internal security start believing that it is their cause that holds the crux of the problem and all the resources, all the concentration and all the focus should be given to that particular aspect. If we limit ourselves to the Indian context, here we might have an expert on north-east to whom the real danger to India’s unity and integrity lies in the conundrum that is north-east. He / she would like us to believe that we must leave everything else and start concentrating all our efforts and resources in the north-east because the inner simmering and the geo-political tectonics of this region are such that it might prove fatal, if not immediately taken care of. On the other hand, we might have an expert on Kashmir, who has spent all his life on Kashmir and its interrelated problems and has a very firm belief that if anything matters for India, it is a successful solution to the Kashmir problem because things are slipping out of hand at a very alarming rate and need a very prompt and sincere reaction. The case would be no different for the man who studies and deals in Naxalism and Red extremism which seems to have paved a huge red corridor through the length and breadth of the Nation and for the theorist, analysts and operational authorities whose subject matter is religious extremism, sometimes talked alternatively as Muslim extremism.

Wide-eyed monitoring The only fact I want to present through

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this enunciation is that while all of the above experts and specialists are true in their own way, if we take things in their totality, we would find that none of them are absolutely correct. Thus, they are possibly akin to the seven wise men who are looking at the different parts of an elephant and are forming their own final opinion about what it was that they interacted with. Hence a need for a constant holistic and wide-eyed reviewing and monitoring of the concept of internal security. As Wikipedia defines it, internal security, or IS, is the act of keeping peace within the borders of a sovereign state or other self-governing territories, generally by upholding the national law and defending against internal security threats. Thus, IS includes everything that is of concern to peace and tranquillity in a given region. Of course, that region needs to have the legal authority to govern or regulate itself because the act of keeping peace and order naturally needs a host of activities including formulation of laws and rules / regulations, assigning of tasks and responsibilities of different agencies, taking a host of legal measures etc. In general, this responsibility for internal security may range from police to paramilitary forces and in exceptional circumstances, the military itself. This also means that in all matters related with internal security, particularly at higher level policy measures, the core is the integration of issues and formulation of a holistic and assimilated view. This also means that while the various sub-units of the concept of internal security are definitely very important, the overall impact can be actually felt when the integrated view can be formulated in a more efficient, effective and combined manner. It is something like proper distribution of a pie. We know that the national resources - men, material, money, intellectual capacity and other requirements, existing with any nation are limited. At the same time, every nation is always faced with a plethora of problems and issues that have a direct bearing on internal security. So, what to do in all such cases? This art and science of proper management of resources for the most effective impact on

internal security is what we need the most. While we do need experts on all specific topics, subjects, regions and issues, we need even more such experts and knowledgeable people who have the capacity and vision to integrate these various issues into one big mass of problem and then to deal with it in a manner that has the effect of optimising the entire effort. Thus, if we assume that at the national scale, we have Rs. 100 crore for internal security, 10,000 people whom we can spare for this cause, 10 research laboratories that are working in this field, 10 new laws that are on the anvil, 100 most wanted criminals and 1,000 most sensitive cases which need to be tackled, then the real expertise and the real acumen is needed in making an assimilated, integrated and agglomerated assessment of the various separate issues by clubbing them together, by making as true an assessment of their relative seriousness and gravity as possible and then making the best distribution of all these resources so that the utmost results are achieved.

internal security:

need for a holistic vision

Effective management I must say that this entire exercise is much more difficult than its being presented in a few sentences. It is not only a highly advanced and complicated science, with a lot of extremely modern technological and technical inputs, it is also a hugely sensitive and minute art. At the same time, it also comes in the vista of being a hugely complex and difficult managerial problem which only the finest of the managers with the best of capacities of a manager are able to grasp and understand. Thus, the man responsible for the affairs of internal security of any country is often supposed to be one of the coolest and the most solid administrators and managers among the rest of their colleagues, because unlike many other portfolios and many other responsibilities, where there is ample scope to think leisurely and then react at one’s own

sweet will, in the matters related with internal security, it is ‘then and there’ situation. A terrorist attack has taken place and the nation will not wait for the internal security minister or internal security secretary or any other responsible person to take his own time before appraising the nation of the current situation, along with the latest updates. It also needs nerves of steel, the capacities of a bull and the wisdom of a saint to react at the spur of a moment, so that the problems that have suddenly erupted out of blue are not only handled with the least associated damage, they are also subsequently pursued in the most vigorous and effective manner so as to bring things to their logical conclusion. Why I focus on this particular aspect of internal security is the fact that quite often I have found people having expertise in their particular areas emphasising their point of view so much that they tend to overlook and sweep aside the other problems of internal security that a nation might be facing at the same time. They want all the resources and all the focus to be thrust on the area or the problem they are more conversant with. Thus, if they find that at a national level, the same kind of focus is not being given to the problem they have so meticulously presented, they start feeling disheartened and also form an opinion that the persons responsible for internal security are possibly not as much serious about the problems as they ought to be. Once they convince themselves of this point of

view, they start radiating their view on public platforms and the result is that adverse and inappropriate messages start originating, sending all kinds of wrong signals. But, if the same person had with him the overall perspective, other than his own area of focus, he would certainly have appreciated the act of the national authorities in a much better manner. But it also means that other than the area-based experts, this responsibility of disseminating information about the final and holistic decisions taken at the central level must also lie on the central authorities whose duty should be to propagate these facts to all the concerned persons to whatever extent they might be. This will help each of the two groups understand the point of view of the others in a better fashion. But before that it also requires that the central agencies making such decisions in allocation of resources have the ability to make accurate and appropriate assessments of the priority and respective needs of the different problem areas. Today fast, swift, vast, holistic, encompassing and inclusive vision is required day in and day out, if the mandarins of internal security really want to give it the best go and to yield the most desired results. Thus, while the days of specialisation are already there, today possibly the need for such inclusive vision is even more.

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homeland security

CONFLICT TERMINATION

INTERNAL SECURITY DOCTRINE:

URGENT NEED FOR REVIEW

DSA Research Team

Backdrop: An Indian approach to LIC In the post war period, the Indian Armed Forces are amongst the most combat tested forces in the world. They have a rich fund of experience both in Conventional wars and Low Intensity Conflict Operations. The Indian Army, in fact, prides itself on evolving a manpower centric approach to Low Intensity conflict. This manpower intensive approach stands in direct contrast to the Technology or equipment intensive approach of the Americans, the Russians and other European countries. Being a large Army, the Indian military has been able to ensure troop rotation for sustained CI /CT campaigns lasting two decades or more. The essentials of this Indian approach are:

In view of the exponential rise in the levels of violence, India may be forced to reconsider the term “Minimal force” and replace it with what Lt Gen Rustom Nanavaty terms “Proportional force”. The force used will have to be proportional to what is employed against us. Our pessimist and defeatist approach of just managing the levels of violence – needs to be replaced by a more proactive approach that seeks the successful termination of the insurgency (characterised by serious attrition on the insurgent organisation leading to a surrender of arms by “the insurgents” and their re-merger in the democratic mainstream). Managing conflicts may not be enough. We need to bring them to closure by using proportional levels of force

●● Light Infantry predominant operations that are marked by significant restraint in terms of weapons usage. The Indian Army has consciously eschewed the use of offensive air support, tanks, artillery and other large calibre weapons. ●● Its operations have been prolonged and sustained and have usually served to tire out the insurgents and psychologically exhaust the population that may support them. ●● The operations have been discriminate, humane and people friendly. The people in fact have been the Centre of Gravity of our operations. ●● Its basic operational feature is the establishment of an area grid to dominate the geographical space and the human terrain. Sustained operations are used to exhaust and wear down the insurgents. However in recent years, the Indian state is showing distinct signs of retreating even from this minimalist model of force usage that relies primarily on straight legged Infantry and small arms alone. Civil society has been asserting itself in terms of a plethora of NGOs that draw inspiration from Europe and other Western countries. The irony is that the Europeans and Americans themselves have made uninhibited use of bombers, fighters, tanks, artillery and heavy calibre weapons in their Counter Insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet there has hardly been a whimper from human rights organisations in the West who are so strident in accusing the Indian Security Forces of human rights violations. There is a major element of hypocrisy and double standards in the Western discourse on Counter Terrorism and human rights issues. The hypocrisy is evident in the blind eye being turned to the very fire power intensive operations of the US / ISAF in Afghanistan and elsewhere and the rather strident and exclusive focus on the Indian Security Forces despite their very low level of weapons usage. In the last two years, this stridency has reached a level that is now hampering legitimate SF operations. If this trend continues, India will soon find itself to be incapable of responding coherently to armed violence by non-state actors. This phenomenon is most visible in the operations against Left Wing Extremism where the use of SPOs (Special Police Officers) recruited from the local ethnic groups is being vehemently opposed. Yet these were extensively and very successfully used in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. They are indispensable for navigating the local human terrain and help to provide actionable intelligence and intimate knowledge of local terrain and village politics. The celebrity status given to Dr Binayak Sen by the Indian media means no action can be taken against Over Ground Workers (OGWs) - a very critical component of the support structures of insurgent organisations. All this is seriously hobbling SF operations against the Naxals. In Jammu and Kashmir, the military operations have successfully broken the back of the terrorist movement. However, Pakistan’s ISI is trying desperately to revive infiltration and stoke rioting and arson in the communally sensitive districts of the Valley. This could lead to a sudden deterioration in the situation. There are strident calls for withdrawal of the Army from a highly sensitive border state that faces a combined threat from Chinese and Pakistani forces. There are demands for revocation of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act that provides the basic legal cover for military operations in that state. Overall, a climate is being created that will hobble the state’s response to armed

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

insurgencies and vicious foreign instigated terrorist movements. The primary focus is on delegitimising the use of the most potent and effective instrument - the Army. The Indian state is turning soft beyond a basic level of prudence. It has now started retreating even from its minimalist model of response.

There are demands for revocation of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act that provides the basic legal cover for military operations in that state. Overall, a climate is being created that will hobble the state’s response to armed insurgencies and vicious foreign instigated terrorist movements. The primary focus is on delegitimising the use of the most potent and effective instrument - the Army. The Indian state is turning soft beyond a basic level of prudence. It has now started retreating even from its minimalist model of response

Dealing with the fourth generation of war Terrorism today is the primary tool of asymmetric warfare designed to destabilise large multi-ethnic nation states. It primarily targets civilians and non-combatants and aims to inflict mass casualties. It has eroded a significant level of moral restraint traditionally observed in conflict by not targeting non-combatants. 9/11 and 26/11 have unveiled a new and dangerous level of mass casualty actions. These could easily graduate to catastrophic acts of terrorism if Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) or crude Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs) are used. The way the Pakistani state is sliding towards chaos, the chances of such catastrophic acts of terrorism are increasing exponentially. Jihadi terrorism has become a new form of warfare that has to defend nothing and is totally offensive in nature. It stymies the normal processes of justice by terrorising the common people and witnesses. It has become a new and dangerous form of warfare in the 21st century that calls for a new order of responses.

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CONFLICT TERMINATION

Counter terrorism approaches: GWOT vs the criminal justice model The rest of the world has enacted stringent new laws to deal with this form of war. The Americans have set up military courts to swiftly try and award stringent punishment to such terrorists. They have adopted a clear cut and ruthless “War against Terrorism approach” designed to protect their population. They relentlessly hunted down Osama bin Laden and meted justice to him in his ISI safe house in the Pakistani military cantonment of Abbottabad, after 10 years of painstaking pursuit. The simple fact is that this model has worked eminently so far. After 9/11 there has not been another successful strike on the soil of the continental United States.

Terrorism today is the primary tool of asymmetric warfare designed to destabilise large multi-ethnic nation states. It primarily targets civilian and non-combatants and aims to inflict mass casualties. It has eroded a significant level of moral restraint traditionally observed in conflict by not targeting non-combatants. 9/11 and 26/11 have unveiled a new and dangerous level of mass casualty actions. These could easily graduate to catastrophic acts of terrorism if Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) or crude Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDDs) are used. The way the Pakistani state is sliding towards chaos, the chances of such catastrophic acts of terrorism are increasing exponentially India, in sharp contrast, is possibly one of the rare countries in the world that has insisted upon following a “Criminal Justice” model in its approach to Counter-Terrorism. It insists that this 21st century phenomenon of highly lethal terrorism must be dealt with under the archaic 19th century British enactment of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) designed for common criminals. The levels of violence in colonial India were dramatically lower than they are today. Our non-violent freedom struggle was characterised by a complete absence of violence and at best implied crowd control. Such an archaic approach fails to account for the highly lethal form of this new wave of terrorism. Even more unfortunate is the attempt to play communal politics with our Counter-Terrorism operations. This approach is reprehensible because it equates Jihadi terrorism with Islam and the Muslim Community. Nothing could be further from the truth. Islam is a stately world religion that does not condone the murder of innocents. Yet some politicians, by equating the two, unconsciously ask for a soft approach to terrorism, in the mistaken belief that this will make them popular with the community. It actually does great disservice to the beleaguered community. Highly misplaced notions of liberalism have prevented the Indian state from executing convicted terrorists like Afzal Guru and Kasab. What kind of a signal does this send to the Jihadi Tanzeems? It sends a signal of pathetic weakness that invites more such attacks. The state seems more concerned about the human rights of the terrorists than their victims.

Conflict management vs conflict termination Keeping in view the aggravated nature of Global Terrorism in the 21st century, countries have responded proactively by legislating stringent new laws to deal specifically with the threat. The Indian state stands alone in its strange conviction that legal processes of an earlier century should not evolve to deal with aggravated levels of threat to civil society in the 21st century. The levels of force usage and the stringency of the laws are increasing exponentially in all other nation states. The levels of force usage by America in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Russians in Chechnya have been staggering and unrestrained. It was said that force usage norms in foreign countries cannot be applied to one’s own country. Sri Lanka, China and Pakistan have used staggering levels of force against insurgents in their own territories. The Sri Lankans waged a ruthless civil war employing offensive air and naval power, tanks and heavy artillery. The Sri Lankans have succeeded eminently in totally destroying the LTTE. It is one of the few examples of successful termination of a vicious insurgency that had reached the levels of a civil war. The scale and scope of the Sri Lankan military success raises some critical questions about our basic approach to this genre of conflict. Though the Indian manpower oriented approach is highly touted - in actual fact it has succeeded decisively only in two cases - Mizoram and Punjab. In all the other CI / CT campaigns the Indian Army has only achieved conflict management in Nagaland, Manipur, Assam and to an extent even in Jammu and Kashmir. Barring the two success stories of Mizoram and Punjab, we have failed singularly to bring the conflicts to closure. This is primarily due to a lack of synergy between the civil and military components of the state. Nagaland has dragged on for over five decades and the situation is still uncertain. Manipur is still a hotbed of violence. Assam may be heading for closure but only due to unstinted support from the new government of Bangladesh. China however is renewing its arms supply to the north-eastern insurgencies and we have singularly failed to deter Jihadi attacks against our citizens. In fact our willingness to compromise in this domain now borders on the shameful. The greatest threat is the rising menace of Left Wing Extremism in the dense forest tracts of Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Jharkhand and Gadchiroli. Some 85 per cent of India’s tribal population lives here in central and peninsular India. It is now in open revolt. The total number of terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir never crossed 4,500. The armed Maoist cadres now number over 15,000. Their expertise in IEDs is lethal and widespread. We are grossly underestimating this critical threat. Frankly it is slipping well beyond the capabilities of the Police and Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs). The threat from China is rising with every month. A Jihadi coup in Pakistan or its implosion could create an unprecedented level of external threat. With this backdrop we cannot afford a leisurely approach to LWE, hoping that our police forces will get combatised enough over the next decade to deal with this threat. Operation Green Hunt that was launched with such fanfare was tripped up by the severe casualties inflicted on the untrained CAPFs who are neither structured nor organised for such offensive CI operations in such dense jungle

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terrain. The CRPF in particular lacks the operational ethos, operates mostly on a company and not a battalion basis and relies on civilian contractors for its logistics. It has unfortunately taken the heaviest casualties. After this initial setback, most offensive operations have been frozen to save face and obviate further casualties. The Maoists in turn have realised that it would be highly counter-productive for them to inflict further casualties on the CAPFs because it would generate pressures to bring in the Army. This the Maoists want to avoid at all costs at this stage. The key question is do we have to oblige them or conform to their game plan?

Sri Lanka, China and Pakistan have used staggering levels of force against insurgents in their own territories. The Sri Lankans waged a ruthless civil war employing offensive air and naval power, tanks and heavy artillery. The Sri Lankans have succeeded eminently in totally destroying the LTTE. It is one of the few examples of successful termination of a vicious insurgency that had reached the levels of a civil war Today there is a clear need for a whole of the government approach. We cannot view the External and Internal Security threats in isolated compartments. The Chinese threat in Tibet has risen from 22 divisions in two seasons to over 34 divisions which can now be inducted in one season. The Indian Army will have to respond by raising at least 5 to 6 new divisions. We should raise them urgently. We could well blood them initially in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa before their committal to our Himalayan borders. There is a dire need to raise the right sort of Units that can deal both with the external and internal threat dimensions. Combatising the police is not a rational or cost-effective response. In such a combination threat scenario, raising more CRPF battalions will not really be a cost-effective option. These units are currently not in a shape to conduct offensive CI operations and will be absolutely of no use in any war with China or Pakistan. Raising infantry / mountain divisions for the Army is a far more rational and cost effective response in the current scenario.

Minimal vs proportional force India simply cannot afford to retreat from its model of minimal military force in response to sub-conventional conflicts. In fact, in view of the exponential rise in the levels of violence, India may be forced to reconsider the term “Minimal force” and replace it with what Lt Gen Rustom Nanavaty terms “Proportional force”. The force used will have to be proportional to what is employed against us. Our pessimist and defeatist approach of just managing the levels of violence - needs to be replaced by a more proactive approach that seeks the successful termination of the insurgency (characterised by serious attrition on the insurgent organisation leading to a surrender of arms by “the insurgents” and their re-merger in the democratic mainstream). Managing conflicts may not be enough. We need to bring them to closure by using proportional levels of force. Internal conflicts cannot be allowed to drag on for decades. Such destabilising levels of restraint in military force usage are not cost-effective in the long term and the nation cannot afford this luxury just so that some hare-brained NGOs can score brownie points in Europe and elsewhere. It is the state’s duty to protect its citizens from the escalating levels of violence by non-state actors. We need to get our act together by a “whole of the government” approach that generates synergy between the various organs of the state as also the centre and the states. The time is ripe for a doctrinal debate across organisation boundaries.

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homeland security

V K Shashikumar The writer has reported on conflicts, wars and terrorism for over 15 years. From 1998 to 2003 he travelled across Af-Pak region, West Asia, Central Asia and Sri Lanka as a war correspondent.

INTOL ERANCE

A disturbing article on the rise of the Popular Front of India in the southern state of Kerela. A proud multi-religious state, home to India’s first church (52 AD), first mosque (629 AD) is now at the throes of an insidious religious conflict. As per the writer, the Indian government believes that Kerala is turning into a cauldron of competing religious and communal interests. The Popular Front of India (PFI) headquartered in Calicut, Kerala has thrown up a curious test for India’s secularism. In classified central government reports PFI is accused of introducing an extremist Pan-Islamist movement to India. PFI is a four year old organisation, though its constituents haven’t been able to wash off the taint of terror and communal violence. In December 2006 the National Development Front (NDF) of Kerala, Manitha Neethi Pasarai (MNP) of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka Forum for Dignity (KFD) merged to form PFI. The police claim that within the PFI organisational structure there is an Ideology Wing, Intelligence Wing and an Action Group. “The PFI is one of the beneficiaries of World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) and Rabitha largesse,” says a Kerala police officer involved in investigating PFI’s alleged terror linkages. Internal security experts will have to watch this organisation and its activities with care.

Islamic radicalisation:

the rising threat

he National Investigation Agency (NIA) is discreetly gathering facts from Karnataka police on the murder of two Karnataka college students (Sudhindra, 21 and Vignesh, 20) in June 2011. According to Karnataka police the murder suspects are members of ‘Karnataka Forum for Dignity’, an associate organisation of the Popular Front of India (PFI). The PFI is already under NIA scanner for its alleged links with terrorists group operating from Pakistan.

PFI has garnered rapid solidarity and support within the Muslim community because it has been able to demonstrate its organisational capability. The ‘Freedom Parade’ is the shining showpiece of its cadre-strength. On August 15th in the last two years its cadres dressed in uniforms similar to paramilitary organisations staged a perfectly synchronised march in cities across Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka

The Popular Front of India (PFI) headquartered in Calicut, Kerala has thrown up a curious test for India’s secularism. In classified central government reports PFI is accused of introducing an extremist Pan-Islamist movement to India. In official submissions to the High Court, Kerala police claim that it is linked to Al Qaeda. Last year former Kerala Chief Minister, V S Achuthanandan, stuck his head out to suggest that PFI has a 20-year plan to Islamicise Kerala. In the last week of July 2010 the general secretary of Communist Party of India (Marxist), Prakash Karat, speaking in the context of PFI activities drew an “interconnection between communalism and the spawning of such terrorist activities.”

Political violence Keralites were jolted out of their secular somnambulism on July 4, 2010 when a bunch of PFI cadres chopped the right palm of a college teacher, Professor T J Joseph. He was punished for setting a question paper which allegedly insulted Prophet Mohammad. Prof Joseph is the Head of Malayalam Department, Newman College in Thodupuzha, Idukki district. Prof Joseph was attacked when he was returning home from a church. Twenty Seven PFI cadres have been arrested, but a year later the police is yet to charge the accused. Chopping of limbs to settle scores is a political old hat in Kerala. Three decades of bloody political violence between Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPM) and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangha (RSS)-Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) combine have left behind a trail of over 250 chopped bodies. PFI blames Joseph for what its activists did to him. The Church admits he was wronged, but says he was responsible by provoking a retaliatory attack. The action against the lecturer was taken as the question paper issue had hurt the sentiments of a major section in the society,” says Major Archbishop Mar Baseliose Cleemis, head of the Syro Malabar Church. Prof Joseph’s colleagues and students have rallied together in his support, raised funds for his medical treatment and legal defence. Several civil society and cultural organisations have offered their support as well. Several influential voices in Kerala including that of Justice V R Krishna Iyer have publicly criticised the college management for dismissing Prof Joseph from service. PFI leaders

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condemn the “barbaric” attack on Joseph. But, they are equally unwilling to apologise for the militancy of their cadres. The trajectory of the politics of religious extremism in Kerala began in the 1980s with Muslim arsonists setting several cinema halls ablaze in Malappuram district. It coincided with the extra-ordinary sprouting of “Petrodollar Mosques” and rise in political violence. Between 1975 and 1987, 1,100 Mosques were built in Kerala. Roughly during the same period 138 people were killed in over 1,000 violent clashes between party workers. North Kerala’s nouveau riche Muslims, migrant workers in West Asian countries flush with ‘Gulf Money’ began using their new-found wealth to build ostentatious Mosques and fund religious fundamentalism deeply influenced by the Wahabi culture of the Gulf countries.

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

homeland security

INTOL ERANCE

The Popular Front of India (PFI) headquartered in Calicut, Kerala has thrown up a curious test for India’s secularism. In classified central government reports PFI is accused of introducing an extremist Pan-Islamist movement to India From the 1980s to the 1990s Kerala witnessed more than a dozen small scale terror incidents. Muslim radicalisation in Kerala was boosted by the formation of A N Madani’s Islamic Sevak Sangh. The ISS morphed into People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in 1992 after the demolition of the Babri-Masjid with its stated objective of fusing a Muslim-Dalit-Backward alliance. Madani was arrested for his suspected involvement in the Coimbatore blasts in 1998 killing 60 people. Law enforcement authorities claimed these blasts were targeted at BJP leader, L K Advani. He spent nearly 10 years in jail and was released in August 2007 because police investigations could not conclusively establish his role as the key conspirator. But the fact is that Madani was a changed man when he came out of prison and he sprung a surprise by apologising for whatever he had done without ever clarifying what he was actually alluding to. Meanwhile, in Malabar’s extremist politics a new challenger to Madani’s brand of politics had already begun taking its first tentative steps. The National Democratic Front (NDF) established in November 1993 gradually began taking over the legacy of PDP. The Karnataka police arrested Madani again in August 2010 for his alleged involvement in the Bangalore stadium blasts during the third season of Indian Premier League and also for his suspected association with the July 25, 2008 serial blasts in Bangalore. Investigations carried out by Kerala police reveal that Madani allegedly mentored Thadiyantavide Naseer, chief of Lashkar-e-Toiba’s Southern India terror operations and the key accused in 2008 Bangalore serial blasts, 2006 Kozhikode twin blasts and other cases related to recruitment of Muslim youth as terrorists. Police investigators claim that Madani admitted to being in constant touch, both before and after the blasts,

with 12 of the 31 men named in the chargesheet. While he accepted, during the course of his interrogation, that he was in touch with them, he denied having any inkling of their involvement in the blasts. Madani had earlier denied knowing the men involved in the blasts, despite several of them, including prime-accused Naseer implicating him in the case. Investigators brought Madani face to face with the accused and electronic evidence (like mobile phone records).

spiralled into a communal conflict. Last year a special trial court sentenced 65 NDF cadres to life imprisonment. MNP is allegedly the new avatar of ‘Al Umma’ accused of attacking the RSS office in Chennai in November 1993, killing 11 RSS cadres. PFI considers the members of Hamas, Talibanand Al Qaeda as freedom fighters. In its publications it declares: “We declare solidarity to the freedom fighters in Palestine, Afghanistan and Iraq.”

According to police investigators Madani accepted that he knew all the men except Sarfaraz Nawaz, who was based in Dubai and Muscat and who liaisoned for the group with the Lashkar-e-Toiba. Naseer’s statement is as follows: “When we informed Madani about the blasts he said he would support us in any way we wanted.” The Karnataka High Court has denied bail to Madani twice and currently his bail application is pending in the Supreme Court.

Frankly, it is impossible to judge whether PFI has sown the seeds of Talibanisation in India as claimed by several police officers in Kerala in off the record conversations. Kerala’s Director General of Police, Jacob Punnose, while disagreeing with his colleagues adds a parenthesis; “I realise the danger, but don’t want to exaggerate it.” Unnikrishnan, a well known Malayalam film maker and culture critic says Muslim radicalisation in Kerala will certainly have a major impact. But, the state’s unique web of strong economic relationships between all the communities will control and moderate it.

The latest entrant in Kerala’s extremist Islamist movement, the PFI, has slowly grown in the consciousness of every Keralite over the last three years. But it appeared in the radar of security agencies three years ago when it organised an ‘Empower India Conference’ in 2007 to declare its objective —Naya Caravan, Naya Hindustan.

Religious extremism Hindus and Christians feel uncomfortable with this brand of assertive, militant, religion-centred politics. “They are the Indian Taliban, but they cannot overcome the syncretic culture of Kerala,” says Raveendran, a building contractor in Trichur. According to him PFI is just a temporary fad pushed by Saudi Arabian petrodollars. PFI is a four year old organisation, though its constituents haven’t been able to wash off the taint of terror and communal violence. In December 2006 the National Development Front (NDF) of Kerala, Manitha Neethi Pasarai (MNP) of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka Forum for Dignity (KFD) merged to form PFI. The NDF was involved in the Marad Beach carnage in May 2003. Its cadres killed eight Hindu fishermen after a scuffle over drinking water at a public tap

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PFI’s head of the Kerala state, Nasrudheen Elamaram, says his organisation is expanding its support base because there is a feeling amongst Muslims, Dalits and Adivasis that they have been taken for a ride. PFI sees the state as the archetypal enemy. That there are visible signs of Islamisation is accepted by all. Whether it’s good or bad depends upon an individual’s degree of proximity to the post-modernist discourse on resistance to the state. Unnikrishnan aptly describes this as “hybrid Islamisation”. Suddenly, over the last decade the visible presence of Kerala’s 26 per cent Muslims appears to be more than their numbers. That’s because of the Arabisation of the dress code of Kerala Muslims. When first generation educated Muslims went to work in the Gulf countries it was natural that they would return with a conservative ideology, which was subsequently imbibed by friends, relatives and neighbours. This negotiation with modernity isn’t over yet. While PFI’s Elamaram admits that the “Gulf influence” is a causative factor, he adds that

“Purdah is matter of faith, but there is no compulsion.” Though PFI publicly says there is no compulsion to wear Purdah, fact is that it does impose a dress code.

PFI is a four year old organisation, though its constituents haven’t been able to wash off the taint of terror and communal violence. In December 2006 the National Development Front (NDF) of Kerala, Manitha Neethi Pasarai (MNP) of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka Forum for Dignity (KFD) merged to form PFI. The NDF was involved in the Marad Beach carnage in May 2003. Its cadres killed eight Hindu fishermen after a scuffle over drinking water at a public tap spiralled into a communal conflict Confidential missives of the Union Ministry of Home Affairs and Kerala police accessed by DSA suggest that PFI is the fastest growing cadre-based Muslim organisation in India. “it is not Talibanisation or radicalisation in the sense of what is happening in Pakistan and Afghanistan,” says N P Chekkutty, executive editor, Thejas, PFI’s daily Malayalam newspaper. Thejas has employed more than 400 media professionals to produce a wide range of media products. The idea is to use media for political mobilisation to establish a large broad-based Pan-India Muslim political organisation. PFI’s media company, Inter Media Private Limited, held by the Thejas Publishing Charitable Trust started publishing in January 2006. Since then PFI has launched four news publications in Malayalam, Tamil and Kannada. It also has four book publishing ventures in the same language categories. It has its own website and a dedicated web team. It has set up ‘Empower India Press’ to publish titles in English, Hindi and Urdu. Another organisation, ‘Media Research and Development’ produces audio-visual products and documentaries. “We see media as a vehicle for political empowerment,” says Chekkutty. In March 2011, Gulf Thejas was launched in Saudi Arabia to cater to nearly two million non-resident Indian workers. Intermedia

Publishing Limited which publishes Thejas formed a joint venture with a Saudi company, Al-Ramez International Group to launch the 16-page broadsheet Gulf Thejas printed and published daily from Riyadh. It was launched by Abdul Rahman Al-Hazza, spokesman of the Ministry of Culture and Information and Supervisor General of Saudi TV. Within five years of its launch in Kerala Thejas Daily is being published from five cities in Kerala and has a readership of 1,00,000. This expansion of readership is worrying because a letter classified as ‘secret’ issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), GoI, on November 25, 2009 states: “Thejas is a part of Pan-Islamic publication network, catering to the communal agenda of certain organisations. The publication invariably takes anti-establishment views on issues like plight of Muslims, Kashmir and India’s relations with USA and Israel. Occasionally, it describes government’s counter-militancy effort as state sponsored terrorism, thereby endorsing the stance of militant elements. More importantly, the contemporary developments / issues are invariably projected with a communal slant.” The Kerala government implemented the directive issued by the central government and withdrew all advertisements from Thejas on May 14, 2010. “In the period after the

Babri Masjid verdict PFI is gearing up to play an active role in bringing all Muslim groups in India under its banner. At its first National Political Conference in February 2009 in Calicut where it has established its headquarters the convener of Babri Masjid Action Committee, Advocate Zafaryab Jilani articulated a long-cherished dream of the Indian Muslim intelligentsia: “The Front should make sure that under its banner all the suppressed sections closed ranks.” The Calicut Declaration issued at the end of this conference urged the unification and consolidation of Muslim-Dalit-Backwards as the genuine ‘Third Force’ in Indian politics.

Inducements PFI has garnered rapid solidarity and support within the Muslim community because it has been able to demonstrate its organisational capability. The ‘Freedom Parade’ is the shining showpiece of its cadre-strength. On August 15th in the last two years its cadres dressed in uniforms similar to paramilitary organisations staged a perfectly synchronised march in cities across Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. The Muslims in Calicut would throng the roads and pack into the city stadium to watch the March. In 2008 PFI chose to stage the Freedom March in Mangalore, a city well-known for the presence of

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homeland security

INTOL ERANCE

Hindutva extremist groups like Sri Ram Sene. PFI leaders are candid in explaining the rationale of Freedom Parade. The Muslim community needs to show its strength for political mobilisation. “A disciplined cadre based organisation is necessary for the progress of the community,” says Elamaram. This year the government banned the ‘Freedom Parade’. Kerala police officers point out some curious features of PFI’s show of strength. It was always held in the afternoon or evening after the official Independence Day functions were over. In fact, none of the PFI leaders have ever turned up for official August 15th functions. PFI has consistently refused to furnish the list of names and contact details of its marching cadres to the police. The cadre strength is currently a matter of speculation by the security and intelligence establishment. Kerala police officers claim that these cadres have been trained by former police or ex-Army personnel. The police claim that within the PFI organisational structure there is an Ideology Wing, Intelligence Wing and an Action Group.

Remittances to Kerala via proper channels show 135 per cent growth in the last five years! In 2003, remittance from the Gulf was US$ 38 billion; in 2008 the figure reached US$ 90 billion. It is well known that funds transferred through Hawala are 300 per cent of the officially documented and channelled remittance But the South Indian Muslim community distrusts the police version. They admire PFI for its educational, social and public health initiatives. It offers career counselling, distributes educational aids and study material, runs motivational programmes like the ‘School Chalo’ campaign held in May-June every year. Its medical camps are also popular within the community. But the biggest inducement for Muslim youth to join PFI is jobs. “We have been fairly successful in building an organisation. There was a change because employment was given to Muslim girls, boys and Dalits,” says Elamaram. The police claim PFI goes beyond providing jobs. “All

Muslim youths joining PFI are given mobile phones, bikes and money. The organisation also assists in job recruitments in the Gulf,” says Vinson M Paul, ADGP, Crime. PFI’s leadership admits that it tapped into the anger of the Indian Muslim community after the release of the Sachar Committee Report. The official admission by the government that the Muslim community is the most backward in India set the ground for PFI’s spectacular expansion. Its assertive, militant brand of politics aimed at acquiring decisive political power at the national level appealed to Muslims who felt powerless. PFI’s political rationale that the Indian Muslim community’s absence in corridors of political power is the root cause for genocidal attacks on Muslims has resonated deeply within the community. In the last two years the PFI and its political wing, Social Democratic Party of India, have set up State Committees in 15 states and already have a significant following in the states of Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. Yet, if one accepts the militant political posture of PFI it is reasonable to expect India’s resilient democracy to absorb such religion based identity politics. So what is it about PFI that is raising an alarm in New Delhi and Thiruvananthapuram? Former Kerala chief minister Achuthanandan accused PFI of trying to make Kerala a “Muslim country.” “A senior official of the Kerala police claims that conversion of scheduled castes, tribes and backwards is high on PFI’s agenda. “We don’t run a conversion campaign,” says Elamaram. The ‘Q’ (intelligence) Branch of the Tamil Nadu police has despatched several intelligence missives to the government alleging that the PFI is conducting a conversion campaign through its Arivagam centres. Several politicians and senior police officials in Kerala admit in off the record conversations that PFI is behind the ‘Love Jihad’ campaign. This essentially refers to the allegation of PFI cadres luring non-Muslim women into matrimonial conversions. Though the Kerala High Court restrained the police in

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

December 2009 from investigating alleged conversion project of ‘Love Jihad’, Justice K T Sankaran did make a scathing observation. In fact, PFI mobilised the Imams in Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka to form the Imams Council “for unity among the ulema”. The eventual aim is to string together a National Imams Council “to undertake (Muslim) social causes more effectively. But this is being viewed suspiciously by central intelligence agencies and the Kerala police. The President of the Imam Council, Abdul Rehman Bakhiq, was interrogated at length by the police on the grounds that the Council was promoting communal discord. ”What I am seeing is not radicalisation in the traditional sense. We understand what we are doing here is very effective. We are giving voice to a segment of people who have been ignored. We are becoming assertive through reasoned argument,” explains Chekkutty.

Terror financing? One such argument that PFI is persuasively making is the implementation of Sharia or Islamic Banking in India. In early September a team of Islamic scholars assembled by PFI met officials of the Reserve Bank of India to present their case on Islamic Banking. According to PFI banking in accordance with Sharia laws “is the answer to abolish economic inequality and discrimination”. But RBI officials have already informed the government that under the current banking laws and regulations, Islamic Banking cannot be legally implemented. The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) and the Muslim World League (MWL) or Rabitha, both funded by Saudi Arabia’s royal family are actively engaged in the propagation of Islam and Sharia Banking in India. Muslim politicians from Kerala, like E Ahmed (IUML) and P V Wahab, have been pushing the agenda of Islamic Banking. WAMY’s representative Abdul Rahman and the MWL or Rabitha’s advisor Dr Khalaf Bin Sulaiman Namary have also been in touch with Kerala government and Muslim politicians to push this agenda. “The PFI is one of the beneficiaries of WAMY and

Rabitha largesse,” says a Kerala police officer involved in investigating PFI’s alleged terror linkages. Though police investigators haven’t been able to trace PFI’s funding trail, it is evident that the organisation does have deep pockets. For the sake of contextual reference it is instructive to recall that American and European governments have severely curtailed the activities of WAMY and MWL on grounds of “terror financing”.

A proud multi-religious state, home to India’s first church (52 AD), first mosque (629 AD) is now at the throes of an insidious religious conflict. The Indian government believes that Kerala is turning into a cauldron of competing religious and communal interests. “Kerala should be concerned about religious fundamentalism,” warns India’s former Home Secretary, Gopal Krishna Pillai These Saudi Arabian charities are also supporting mosque building activities in Kerala and India. But how are WAMY and MWL funding endangering Kerala and India’s security? The case of Shibli-Shaduli brothers in Indore is a helpful illustration. Peedical Abdul Shibli and his brother, Peedical Abdul Shaduli were arrested in Indore in 2008 for organising terror training camps in Kerala. These engineering graduates allegedly recruited and trained 40 Keralites. In Erattupetta, Kottayam district, their father is quietly supportive of his sons. He just doesn’t want to talk about it. Shibli-Shaduli brothers were radicalised by the activities of the local Muslim organisations. WAMY and MWL have local representatives in Kerala as in other states. The funding requirements are channelled through these representatives, often through the Hawala route. Union Home Secretary during a recent visit to Kollam in Kerala told journalists that “the funding (for Muslim organisations) seems to be more from outside than from locals.” These funds are then apportioned by WAMY and MWL’s local representatives to Mosques and local Muslim community organisations for religious propagation, relief activities and education. More often than not these funds are used for religious

indoctrination and radicalisation. Remittances to Kerala via proper channels show 135 per cent growth in the last five years! In 2003, remittance from the Gulf was US$ 38 billion; in 2008 the figure reached US$ 90 billion. It is well known that funds transferred through Hawala are 300 per cent of the officially documented and channelled remittance. The state government has also come up with a curious nugget on land purchases. In several districts nearly 70 per cent of land ownership is held by Muslims, out of which a considerable chunk is held by Muslim religious institutions and organisations through proxies. “We do not have a mechanism to monitor these activities. India will be taken by surprise,” says Dr Siby Mathew, ADGP Intelligence, Kerala police. There are 2.5 million Malayalee expatriates in the Gulf. More than half of them are Muslims. A significant amount of funding to fundamentalist and religious organisations is accrued through their donations. A classified MHA report alleges that rich Muslim businessmen in India and abroad fund PFI activities. Kerala police’s Internal Security Investigation Team (ISIT) is probing activities of PFI. They claim to have seized Talibanic material, videos and “highly communal” and subversive literature, in raids conducted across Kerala. In an affidavit submitted to the Kerala High Court by R Rajashekharan Nair, deputy secretary (Home) the government claimed that the ISIT found CDs linked to Al Qaeda. The court was also informed of PFI’s alleged connections with

Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). The suspicion of PFI’s terror links was backed by revelations made to the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad when it arrested LeT operatives Mirza Himayat Baig and Shaikh Lal Baba Mohammad Hussain Farid alias Bilal, for carrying out the German Bakery blast in Pune. According to Maharashtra ATS Baig was an active PFI cadre and was involved in arranging recruits for LeT. PFI leaders rubbish the police investigations and claim they are facing the brunt because of India’s aligning with the US led international coalition to wage war against terror. They say India’s security forces have been irreparably influenced by Israeli security agencies. According to PFI the Muslim community in India is facing a severe existential threat because of a systematic denial of justice, fairness and constitutional rights. A proud multi-religious state, home to India’s first church (52 AD), first mosque (629 AD) is now at the throes of an insidious religious conflict. The Indian government believes that Kerala is turning into a cauldron of competing religious and communal interests. “Kerala should be concerned about religious fundamentalism,” warns India’s former Home Secretary, Gopal Krishna Pillai. The scorching rise of assertive Muslim identity politics in Kerala is spawning mainstream political discomfort. PFI’s aggressive campaign demanding a share of political power in proportion to the Muslim population in Kerala, other states and at the national level could sow the seeds of communal conflict which in turn could snowball into terrorism.

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

homeland security

Col RSN Singh (retd) The writer served in R&AW. He has authored four books: 'Asian Strategic and Military Perspective', 'The Military Factor in Pakistan', 'The Unmaking of Nepal' and 'The Making of an Officer'.

ARMY THE ANSWER?

The writer highlights the phenomenon of convergence that is taking place between various terrorist organisations in India. The Maoists, Pakistan based terrorist groups and terrorist groups in north-east, Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir are now in collaboration. They have forged a nexus for training, procurement of arms, establishing external linkages and providing safe-havens to each other. They are leveraging on one another’s strength and reach. Their common objective is to destroy the Indian state. The inimical elements within the country are debilitating both our military resolve and our conventional capability. The arrest of two Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) leaders of Manipur Arun Kumar Singh and Dalip Singh in October 2011 exposed the emerging links between the militant organisations in the NE, Kashmir, LeT and the Maoists. They revealed the ongoing effort on part of these groups to form a ‘Strategic United Front’. While there is convergence of various terrorist groups, the Indian authorities have a compartmentalised approach on the specious argument of federalism.

A Corporate houses are paying ransom to the Maoists because the state cannot enforce its writ in large chunks of the hinterland. The Maoists menace is making thermal power plants starve for coal. India is becoming a dangerous place on this earth. Investors are being deterred. The Indian state machinery has become inured to the insecurity of the people

motley of so-called activists have embarked on a 4,500 kilometre march from Srinagar to Manipur to demonstrate solidarity with Irom Sharmila who has been euphemistically ‘fasting’ for revocation of Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). It is imperative to discern the theme, the timing, the coordination, the objective and the characters involved. The desperation with regard to AFSPA on part of insurgents in Kashmir and north-east is evident. In terms of coordination the ideologues of Kashmiri separatists, north-east insurgents and Maoists have graduated from sharing dais to holding joint rallies and marches. It is inevitable that they have financial links and their respective patrons who are inimical to India are getting their act together. It is rather pernicious that the terror groups that they represent are now collaborating and coordinating to carry out terrorist attacks in India. It is also pertinent to note that amongst those who flagged off the march were Medha Patkar and one Sandeep Pandey, curiously another Magsaysay award winner. Probably what disconcerted them was the fact that Kashmir was quiet this summer. The insurgencies that impacted the Indian landscape till early this decade were generally in isolation. Though, they, like all insurgencies had external links, but the internal linkages between them were at best tenuous. The Khalistan insurgency could be extinguished because of its uni-dimensional nature. It was confined to a specific geographic area and was supported by a specific group of people, easy to identify. Their cadre base was low. The Kashmir militancy had not fully reared its head. The ISI patronage and support was well-known. The pioneering ideologues of the movement were based abroad and did

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

Convergence of Terror

not belong to the segment of the community, which provided the foot-soldiers. The objective of the insurgency was to carve out another theocratic state. The same can be said about insurgencies in the north-east (NE). They too were supported by China, but in a manner that the deniability factor could be maintained. A separate country was their objective and not the destruction of the Indian state. The acts of terrorism in these insurgencies were to intimidate the local populace and preempt any support to the security forces. Over the years, there is fusion of insurgency and terrorism. It first took the shape of proxy war with territorial objectives. Therefore, when the Indian Security establishment was faced with the Kargil misadventure, it initially appeared bewildered because it could not appreciate that a low intensity conflict could assume the shape of a conflict, which was constricted in limit and scope due to internal and external considerations and pressures. The overall military superiority that India enjoyed vis-à-vis Pakistan could not deter the latter. The proxy wars waged by Pakistan and China are now converging on Delhi. This proxy war has various terrorist groups as its main tool. The main instruments of this war are none other but some Indians who are allured by ideology or money or both. They have been convinced that India in its present form is a demonic state and needs to be destroyed. The Maoists, Pakistan based terrorist groups and terrorist groups in north-east, Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir are now in collaboration. They have forged a nexus for training, procurement of arms, establishing external linkages and providing safe-havens to each other. They are leveraging on one another’s

strength and reach. Their common objective is to destroy the Indian state. When the Army Chief talks about a two-front situation, he must realise that India is already facing a multi-front situation in terms of proxy war being waged by China, Pakistan and other inimical powers. This multi-front proxy war is rendering the country hollow from within. The inimical elements within the country are debilitating

both our military resolve and our conventional capability. The security of a country is the harmony between internal security and external security. Pakistan is collapsing because it always viewed internal security from the prism of external security. India on the other hand has been notorious in ignoring the external dimensions of internal security problems and treating them as that of law and order. If the Maoists, who are

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

homeland security

ARMY THE ANSWER?

trampling the heart of India and the Pak sponsored jihadis of Kashmir as well as terrorists groups in Punjab and the China backed insurgent groups of north-east, who have been trying to severe the head and limbs respectively, are now acting in concert, the internal security situation is grim. A super power like the Soviet Union with its massive military capability, collapsed because it could not harmonise internal security with external security. India must not repeat the mistake. The Indian Army must revisit its threat perception and the very definition of ‘enemy’.

The arrest of two Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) leaders of Manipur Arun Kumar Singh and Dalip Singh in October 2011 exposed the emerging links between the militant organisations in the NE, Kashmir, LeT and the Maoists. They revealed the ongoing effort on part of these groups to form a ‘Strategic United Front’

Convergence of terror The arrest of two Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) leaders of Manipur Arun Kumar Singh and Dalip Singh in October 2011 exposed the emerging links between the militant organisations in the NE, Kashmir, LeT and the Maoists. They revealed the ongoing effort on part of these groups to form a ‘Strategic United Front’ since they had the common objective to overthrow the Indian government. They reckon that it is only collectively that they would be able to take on the might of the Indian state. They also revealed the plans of setting up a ‘Joint Training Camp’ in Myanmar. The Times of India on 08 October 2011 quoted official sources “ISI and PLA are in-touch and supply Maoists with arms. They are supposedly using China as the alternative route.” The official sources also claim to have photographic evidence of Maoist cadres from six Indian states being trained by the PLA of Manipur, in Orissa and Jharkhand. This writer has learnt through top intelligence sources that the

Chinese have supplied a weapon manufacturing facility to the Kachin Insurgents in Myanmar. This facility is manufacturing replicas of AK-47, which is being supplied to all terrorist groups in India including the Maoists. The latest recovery of explosives from a car on 12 October 2011 has also exposed the links between ISI, Lashkar-e-Toiba and Babbar Khalsa. Their objective was to target Delhi. Taking into consideration, the seizures made by the security forces in the last few years, two important facts emerge - first, that Babbar Khalsa, the militant outfit, which carried out the killing of the Punjab Chief Minister Beant Singh has been under the revival mode, under the patronage of ISI and second, that the organisation has no dearth of sophisticated arms and explosives supplied by the ISI. The revival of Babbar Khalsa and Khalistan insurgency received impetus after the creation of the Pakistan Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee under the Chairmanship of Lt Gen Javed Nassir, former ISI chief. He is instrumental in forging the link between LeT and the Babbar Khalsa. In October 2010, the Indian government had alleged that the Maoists of Nepal (PLA) had been imparting training to Indian Maoists on Nepal’s soil. Further, the Maoists were receiving training from LeT instructors in these camps. There was information of 234 Maoists training in Nepal under the supervision of Naxalite leaders like Vinod Gurung, Prakash Mehto and LeT members like Razak Khan and Latif Khan, who hail from Karachi. In August 2010, Karnataka and Andhra police, following four arrests in Hyderabad and two in Bangalore that the ISI through the ‘D-company’ had managed to establish links with the Maoists terrorists in the country. There were plans to invite Maoist leaders to Dubai to coordinate terrorist activities in India.

The spearheads The spearheads of the modern terror network are people, who enjoy or have been conferred respectability by way of international awards or

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membership of NGOs ostensibly engaged in public cause. Some of these ideologues are active in forging links between various military groups. A noted human rights activist, based on telephonic intercepts, has come under the scanner of intelligence agencies for trying to bring together various terrorist groups at the behest of Pakistan.

The emerging strategic partnership between India and the US and India and Afghanistan has unnerved a tottering Pakistan. The only recourse available to Pakistan is to destabilise India by leveraging on all terrorist groups

one-third of India and the terrorist groups in Kashmir, Punjab, north-east and Pak based terrorist groups and crime syndicate of Dawood Ibrahim.

Even in the national capital the ideologues of the Maoists, Kashmiri and NE separatists have come together on a common platform on many occasions. Their agenda is common, i.e. to weaken the resolve of the Indian state to fight terrorism. It is in this backdrop that their diatribes against the state, the security forces and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act should be viewed. This Act, they feel is the most robust tool in preserving the unity of India.

The most formidable spearheads for convergence of terror in India are there in the media and amongst people who fancy to be called as intellectuals. The ‘terrorism economy’ is also formidable and has the ability to sustain some big media houses and other public platforms. They decry the Indian state, but ‘Misuse the Freedom of Speech’.

In this there is a congruency of interests between Pakistan and China. China too is not comfortable with the Indo-US strategic partnership and consequently the direction of the geopolitical discourse in the region. It has very high strategic stakes in Pakistan as well as in the Indian Ocean, particularly in the Bay of Bengal, where it is seeking presence by way of ports on Myanmar’s western coast for convenient supply of oil from Gulf for its energy needs. It is for this reason that China is engaged in thwarting India’s ‘Look East’ outreach by increasingly brazen support to north-east terrorist groups and the Maoists.

Why convergence?

Conclusion

It is pertinent to note that when Anna’s agitation was at its peak, the eternal fast of Sharmila Irom of Manipur, was consistently highlighted. The focus was not she, but the removal of Armed Forces Special Powers Act from Manipur. One of the active members during the agitation is known for his ULFA links. During the same period, the so-called lawyer civil activist and core member of the Team Anna, in one of the television channels, had categorically stated that the days of elected representatives are over, thereby implying that the India must jettison multiparty democracy. He was only articulating the Maoist agenda. He also had then spoken that it is the Kashmiris who should decide whether they want to be part of India or not. Such was the hysteria during that period that these statements were lost in the din and did not receive adequate attention. The same gentleman has now advocated plebiscite in Kashmir and repealing of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act.

The entire region in the surround of India is in unprecedented geopolitical flux. The US-Pakistan strategic partnership, which ensured the survivability of the latter since its inception is now under tremendous strain, arguably on the verge of collapse. The internal problems of Pakistan seem to be intractable. The spectre of the country’s split is haunting. Pakistan’s strategic manoeuvre space is getting increasingly constricted. The conventional tools available in the hands of Pakistan in leadership to alter the dangerous geopolitical discourse are in disarray or blunted. It is not India, but Pakistan’s machinations in Kashmir and Afghanistan, which has brought the country to this juncture. The emerging strategic partnership between India and the US and India and Afghanistan has unnerved a tottering Pakistan. The only recourse available to Pakistan is to destabilise India by leveraging on all terrorist groups, i.e. the Maoists, who are active in

The convergence of Pakistan and China backed terror and spearheaded by the ideologues has dangerous portends for India. While the aim of this terror is to paralyse India, its main focus is shifting to its heart, i.e. the National Capital. In all probability terrorist attacks in India are likely to become more vicious, more deadly, more widespread and more frequent.

The revival of Babbar Khalsa and Khalistan insurgency received impetus after the creation of the Pakistan Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee under the Chairmanship of Lt Gen Javed Nassir, former ISI chief. He is instrumental in forging the link between LeT and the Babbar Khalsa

One of the members of the Team of interlocutors on Kashmir has enjoyed the hospitality of Fai Foundation, headed by Syed Ghulam Nabi Fai the face of the Kashmir separatist cause in the United States. The Fai Foundation is funded by the ISI. It was a foregone conclusion that the team of interlocutors would recommend more autonomy for Kashmir. The timing of the submission of the report and utterances of the lawyer are not a mere coincidence.

This proxy war has disastrous economic consequences. There is a thriving parallel terrorist economy. The Maoists are disrupting train services at will. Bandhs orchestrated by Maoists are having crippling effect on the economy and the livelihood of the people. Corporate houses are paying ransom to the Maoists because the state cannot enforce its writ in large chunks of the hinterland. The Maoists menace is making thermal power plants starve for coal. India is becoming a dangerous place on this earth. Investors are being deterred. The Indian state machinery has become inured to the insecurity of

the people. It probably feels that time itself will resolve the problem. The internal war against terror is being fought in a disjointed and half-hearted manner. The resolve mechanism and instruments to fight this convergence of terror are in disarray.

The Maoists, Pakistan based terrorist groups and terrorist groups in north-east, Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir are now in collaboration. They have forged a nexus for training, procurement of arms, establishing external linkages and providing safe-havens to each other. They are leveraging on one another’s strength and reach. Their common objective is to destroy the Indian state If this war is not won, India despite its conventional war making capability, will collapse. We are fighting the war with wrong tools, wrong mindset and misplaced ideas of war, oscillating between law and order approach and internal security approach. While there is convergence of various terrorist groups, the Indian authorities have a compartmentalised approach on the specious argument of federalism. It’s a war and given its import and spread, the internal enemies can only be defeated, if the Indian Army is in the forefront.

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

homeland security

Dr Pranav Kumar The writer is currently Assistant Professor at Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal University, Manipal. Prior to his current assignment, he was working as a Research Associate at the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He had a stint as an Assistant Professor at Hawassa University, Ethiopia. His areas of teaching and research interests include Indian Foreign Policy, International Politics, International Security Issues, Energy and Technological Cooperation and Governance.

The evolution of Left Wing Extremist violence has again impacted negatively on India’s internal security. The evolution has posed serious challenges in the states like Bihar, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa and parts of Madhya Pradesh. The creation of organisations like the People’s War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) has become very active and poses severe challenges in terms of maintaining peace and stability domestically

MENACING THREAT

Highly dynamic changes around the world especially in the wake of the end of ideologically loaded cold war, the march of democracy and the dynamic phase of globalisation have ushered in an era where the Hobbesian theorisation of “peace as absence of war” has come under serious academic and intellectual scrutiny. During the last two decades or so, the state centric view of security and peace has been revisited and is increasingly being replaced by individual centric view of security and peace. Re-conceptualisation of the concepts like peace and security has not only widened the scope of these concepts but also understood as an important step forward towards sustained development.

he debates pertaining to security raise the concerns like economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, political security and so on. All are vital for sustained development. In the wake of the cold war, the conventional concept of security has also redrawn its traditional contours outwards by enlarging its range and accommodating broader concerns of human security. The conventional state centric explanations defined security as protection of state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and are mainly concerned with military dimensions. However, owing to emergence of new set of challenges that not only obstruct the progress of nation state but also looming large over livelihood and existence of each and every individual; academia, civil society and intellectuals started to talk about larger concerns of human security. These concerns began to shadow human safety and survival in form of poverty, disease, environmental degradation, food scarcity, energy insufficiency etc.

Owing to its diverse and complex socio-economic-political and demographic background, India has been in the phase of severe internal security crisis that not only challenge the nation building process but also pose gravest threat for survival and existence of humanity itself. The current discourse on peace and security reflects not only the challenges to attain it but it also impacts the overall efficiency and effectiveness in the governance. Even though, after being undermined for nearly half a century of under realised potentials, riding on the waves of economic growth, nuclear tests and soft power projections, India is being recognised as a great power in the making and the ‘swing state’ in the global balance of power, it faces a number of complex threats and challenges to its internal security, which has wider ramifications on overall national security scenario. The debate on national security issues cannot afford to de-link it

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

India’'s Internal Security Challenges

with the emerging precarious threats at the domestic front. It has also been recognised by the members of the strategic and academic community that a number of insurgencies confronted by India have been mostly either fuelled or drawn covert support from outside forces. The objective of outside forces has been to see India destabilising. Hence, it is very difficult to isolate internal security challenges with those of external security challenge. But there are some internal security challenges that need to be given special attention.

Naxalism and Maoism Naxalism has been one of the most central internal security challenges for India for more than four decades now but it has become more widespread and complex during recent past. The severity of problem can be understood form the recent statements of government executives. Union Minister Jairam Ramesh, recently in order to show the geographical extant of the Naxalism in India, said that spread of Naxalism is “from Tirupati to Pashupati”. The so called “Red corridor”, cutting across the heart of India - extending from Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, all the way to Nepal - is the most vivid representation of the threat that Maoists pose to our country. The Prime Minister describes the Maoists as India’s most serious internal security challenge and the Home Minister rates it as a “problem graver than terrorism.” Keeping in view its geographical spread, it is required to have proper horizontal and vertical integration among security agencics to tackle this problem in effective and efficient manner. Covertly the movement is directly linked with the same sort of movement in Nepal and indirectly with Pakistan and China. Link with Nepal has made the scourge more complicated. Delinking it with these external forces is very essential for the solution. More than its spatial expansion the magnitude, intensity and internal legitimacy are posing major challenge, as far as its solution is concerned. As Naxalism problem,

since its inception in Naxalbari in West Bengal in the year 1967, has changed drastically. Initially the movement was agrarian in nature and so was limited to only northern plains, but now influence has also covered tribal and poor people from relatively inaccessible central part of the region. As these parts of the country are also relatively under developed and are deprived of some of their basic necessities, so for the people living in these parts there is no difference between Naxals and the government. Hence a two-track approach is needed. On the one hand government should deal with the Naxal leadership, on the other hand focusing on the concerns of the people the Naxals claim to serve will help to solve the problem in the longer run.

It has also been recognised by the members of the strategic and academic community that a number of insurgencies confronted by India have been mostly either fuelled or drawn covert support from outside forces. The objective of outside forces has been to see India destabilising. Hence, it is very difficult to isolate internal security challenges from external security challenges The evolution of Left Wing Extremist violence has again impacted negatively on India’s internal security. The evolution has posed serious challenges in the states like Bihar, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa and parts of Madhya Pradesh.

The creation of organisations like the People’s War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) has become very active and poses severe challenges in terms of maintaining peace and stability domestically. The Left Wing Extremist Groups have virtually launched a war against the armed groups of higher castes in India. The problems become manifold because these groups have the potential to create a serious instability in the affected areas.

Insurgency In the north-east region of India, the evolution and growth of insurgency has been an area of major concern of India’s internal security. A number of insurgent groups in the region have been demanding independence. In

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a notification brought by Tripura government recently, it is said that the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and Meitei extremist outfits of Manipur have been maintaining a close association to undertake subversive and violent activities in north-east India. Apart from its domestic link it is also being fuelled by outside forces. There is certainly a high level of violence in some of the states in the region. The intelligence reports in India have linked the growing problems in the north-east region with Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) involvement in the region and with some of cross-border groups operating form Bangladesh. The law and order problems of the north-east have been aggravated by the rising migration to the region from Bangladesh. It has been estimated that roughly 15 million people of Bangladesh origin have migrated to the north-east since 1971. It has, to a greater extent posed a number of challenges to the internal security, which has in turn created destabilising political, social, economic, ethnic and communal tensions. It is true to say that at the political level, the migrants from Bangladesh have reached to a position now where they can influence the results of the elections in a large number of constituencies in the north-east. It has become a serious issue for India in handling the rising problems emanating from large scale migration. It must be stressed here that the illegal migrants are not only restricted to north-eastrn states but over the years have proliferated to a number of far-off states including Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Gujarat, Rajasthan and Delhi.

The so called “Red corridor”, cutting across the heart of India - extending from Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, all the way to Nepal - is the most vivid representation of the threat that Maoists pose to our country

Narco-terrorism Another major challenge being confronted by India as far as its

homeland security

MENACING THREAT internal security issues are concerned can be seen in the field of well established narcotics-arms nexus. The narcotics trade and the smuggling of arms and explosives are intertwined and it adversely impacts the security and the social fabric of the region. It is well known that the topography and the geopolitics of India have made the drug trafficking easier. India is located between two drug producing areas of the Golden Crescent in the west and the Golden Triangle in the east. The activities of the drug mafia have been escalating and that in turn has been posing severe challenges to India’s internal security. By and large, it is evident that the terrorists and the insurgents are receiving weapons mainly from across the borders with the cooperation and help from organised groups. Undoubtedly, most of the arms are coming to India from Pakistan through the ISI, fundamentalist groups, Afghan Mujahideen groups and the militants themselves. The arms and ammunitions are mostly smuggled through Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab borders, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra and the west coast of the country. The Indo-Nepal border also has been used for the smuggling of arms and ammunitions.

Islamic terrorism India’s national security is gravely threatened by the rise of Islamic terrorism. Recent media coverage of gradual spread of Islamic fundamentalism across the country is a major cause of concern for India’s internal security. Union Home Ministry has recently shown concern over an Intelligence Bureau report that revealed that Islamic fundamentalism is fast gaining ground in Kerala, one of the most educated and developed states of India, with its roots spreading right up to Pakistan. According to a confidential IB report covered by CNN-IBN, Jammat-e-Islami, People’s Democratic Front and now the infamous Popular Front of India are collaborating with banned organisation SIMI. The report also highlights that youths are being trained in manufacturing and handling of IEDs. This development also questions the common perception

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that emphasises direct relationship between underdevelopment and insecurity problems.

The Prime Minister describes the Maoists as India's most serious internal security challenge and the Home Minister rates it as a “problem graver than terrorism.” Keeping in view its geographical spread, it is required to have proper horizontal and vertical integration among security agencics to tackle this problem in effective and efficient manner Emergence of new sets of insecurity severely threatens long-standing fabric of peace. India’s internal security scenario could be viewed as outbursts of accumulated grievances and mismatches generated by scores of socio-economic and political factors that require reconciliation in a synchronous and constructive manner. Furthermore, these internal security concerns are manifestation of disquieting tensions brewing beneath the surface and may result into a major challenge to national security unless addressed properly and timely. The resultant conflict situation not only signifies ongoing process of socio-economic and political transformation, but also the decaying of cultural norms, traditional values, beliefs and attitudes that for so long have maintained the unity, concord and stability of India. Apart from revamping the administration and governance in the affected areas and empowering local people who are essentially victims, by giving them access to basics, by giving them what is theirs by right and by securing their livelihoods; modernisation and integration of security agencies and delinking them from external forces are also equally important. The prevailing situation might project a negative trend in India’s articulation of its internal security threat perception. It is most likely that India would search for a new paradigm to address these emerging challenges. The exploration of an alternate mechanism to handle the emerging issues domestically would be emphasised in due course of time. It is high time India rises to contain the growing problems emanating from socio-politico-economic conditions in the existing milieu.

RAMIFICATIONS

TERRORIST THREAT: =CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES Dr Rajendra Prasad The writer is Professor in the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies (DDSS) and Dean, Faculty of Science, DDU Gorakhpur University, UP, India.

An academic overview of the terror threat to india’s homeland security and its international and internal ramifications. The writer emphasises the aspect of managing perceptions in the fight against terror.

oday, India is faced with multiple terrorist threats to its homeland security. It faces twin challenges of two kinds of terrorism - the domestic structure and modules germinated by some sections of our own people, the foreign state-sponsored and externally aided terror acts. The domestic terrorism itself has different objectives - political and religious as in the case of the terrorist groups in Jammu and Kashmir, purely religious as in the case of the jihadi terrorist groups perpetrating terror outside Jammu and Kashmir, ethnic as in the case of Assam and ideological and economic as in the case of the Maoist or Naxalite elements operating in the tribal areas of India. Over the years, as claimed by India’s incumbent UPA government and intelligence agencies, we have also witnessed terror activities perpetrated in terms of right-wing extremist violence in some parts of India.

In legal terms, terrorism encompasses both the act and the perpetrator. While prevention and intelligence are aimed at curbing terrorist acts, prosecution and punishment are against the perpetrator (s) of terrorism. At the domestic level, India’s legal mechanism has been weak in dealing with terrorism and its perpetrators. Combating terrorism requires an International Law approach entirely different from what is needed for humanisation of armed conflicts at the international level

Foreign state-sponsored terrorism is mainly the terror act of the jihadi organisations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) operating from Pakistani territory and the HuJI perpetrating their activities from the bases in Bangladesh.

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homeland security

RAMIFICATIONS

Their members are Pakistani or Bangladeshi nationals or other foreign Muslims and their activities on the Indian soil are sponsored by the hostile intelligence agencies in order to serve their own goals, especially for purpose of creating a polarisation between the Muslim and Hindu forces in India. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has the additional motive of causing disruption and disorder in Jammu and kashmir through terrorism. Foreign state-aided terrorism gets space due to indigenous terrorist groups receiving assistance in the form of training, financial assistance and arms and ammunition from the terrorist organisations and the intelligence services of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Examples would be the Khalistani terrorists who used to be active in Punjab and Delhi till 1995, the Kashmiri terrorist groups, the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and the so-called Indian Mujahideen (IM) and the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA). Foreign-aided terrorist groups have been involved in creating instability in India and keeping the Indian security forces preoccupied with internal security problems. In conformity with Acharya Kautilya’s assertion, we must admit that “the (said) internal challenges are just like lurking hoods of snakes and they must be crippled or brought into full control”.

Goals of terrorism in a fragile scenario In the prevailing situations, terrorism has emerged as the most potent instrument of some governments, as well as tactics of revolutionary and other anti-government groups, aimed at attaining broader strategic and specific tactical goals and eventually inflicting tremendous losses to homeland security of inimical governments. India is no exception in this regard. Based on the historical evidences and the unending challenges of terrorist threat to India’s homeland security in a changing world scenario, some can be identified as follows: 1. Individual acts of terrorist scourge may be aimed at carving out definite concessions, such as the release of prisoners, the payment of ransom or the flash of a terrorist message under the fear of killing. Terrorists very often strive hard to create dramatic situation thereby intimidating a government or regime to fulfil their specific demands immediately. Going by past evidences, India has been one of the worst sufferers. 2. Terrorism as a menace to India’s homeland security may be aimed at inducing relatively wider publicity advantage in the age of Information Revolution and interconnectedness through world-wide web (www). By expanding the reign of terror, a terrorist organisation or its outfits can draw public attention towards its ultimate goal and glorify it as a group that must be recognised for the stated or projected ends. The propaganda attained by terrific acts of violence and fearful situation induce people and media to make a mountain out of a molehill for uplifting the stature of various terrorist groups and primacy of their cause. Dramatic and sometimes symbolic acts of violence may provide enough publicity to terrorist groups operating in a particular milieu. In a way, it

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

facilitates demonstrative leverage to the perpetrators of terror to use violence and unleash warning of further spate of violence. The phenomenal developments in the field of information and communication technologies, electronic media and international press are playing vital roles in the propagation of this kind of terror-induced publicity, intra- as well as inter-net facilities to instill the act of fear. The 9/11 terror events as well as other onslaughts in the recent years clearly taught the lesson that the strength of various terrorist organisations and their outfits for the use of these technologies had grown exponentially for the purposes of training, command and control, international money transactions and coordination of activities at various levels.

atrocious acts, the kidnapping of foreign diplomats or business executives, or sporadic violence against civilians can also be launched, aimed at blemishing government and frustrating it to react outrageously. The incumbent government in the centre or victimised state(s) may thus be compelled by the terrorists to self-collapse or ouster from power.

3. Terrorism may be resorted to by some groups to initiate collapse of the existing social, economic and political structure in India’s homeland and to attenuate demoralisation of the society, especially under the shadow of the current trends of globalisation. This may be a typical and attractive goal for the revolutionary, religious, separatist or anarchistic terrorists. Maoist revolutionary terrorist or Naxal groups initiate terroristic violence on the ground that it is a paramount process to mobilising the masses towards revolution. Indian society is more prone to such challenges due to the “rising but frustrated expectations of people”. Particularly in the age of globalisation, the paradigm shift from traditional to non-traditional approaches to security in general and protection and empowerment of the people in particular have made the homeland situation quite complex and uncertain. In such a situation, the traditional barriers of tradition, culture, economy, technology have been dismantled, causing more conflicting images of human well-being. Notably, starting from Pakistan-sponsored cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir to attack on Indian Parliament to more brutal acts of planting explosives in five separate trains and two stations in Mumbai - the economic capital of India, killing 181 and injuring over 700 innocent passengers on 11th July 2006 (popularly known as 7/11 in media circles) and the recent 2011 serial blasts in Mumbai and from many more acts of terrorism in other parts of India’s homeland to the growing voices of international cooperation and related developments, etc., the world has witnessed the gradual rise of disruptive graph of terrorism on the one hand and the dis-arrayed efforts of caging the genie of trans-national terror on the other hand, involving a lot of uncertainty, insecurity and trans-nationalisation of violence in the age of globalisation. Globalisation holds out great promise if it is managed properly, for both rich and the poor. But it will only work if the winners share with losers.

5. Terrorism can be a potent instrument to enforce cooperation and a gesture of admiration and reverence. These are the usual phenomena of domestic terrorism, but terrorists themselves may also use institutional violence against the individuals of their own group to ensure utter dedication to their goal. State-sponsored terrorism is directed against another state. In the international comity of nations, there are some nations which have set up specialised agencies to carry out terroristic acts against other states. States that sponsor terrorism are employing it as an instrument of conflict to attain specific strategic goals in the situations where they cannot use conventional means and methods. Another dangerous trend in state-sponsored terrorism has been found due to the coercive diplomacy of powerful industrial nations particularly when they get involved in such blatant coercive practices of diplomacy to intimidate less powerful developing nations. One of the resultant consequences has been the state-sponsored inter- or trans-national terrorism by relatively weaker nations against the powerful ones as a retaliatory action. But after 9/11 and especially with the initiation of global war against terror, this trend has assumed enormous reverberations in different regions. South Asia has experienced several dramatic situations, particularly due to the changing behaviour of Pakistan towards Taliban and its “unfaithful” and “wavering” cooperation with the Bush and Obama Administrations in its fight against terrorism, both regionally and globally. Historically, Pakistan was caught in the cross-fire due to her proxy war and supportive culture of terrorist violence against India. Above all, we should understand the critical position of Pakistan in supporting state-sponsored terrorism without any exaggeration or distortion: Pakistani leaders officially denounce the use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy, yet there is a wide-ranging gap between their utterances and practices. In the post 9/11 period, at least in principle, the long denial by Pakistan of not making India a victim of cross-border terror is a selfexplanatory case in tormenting the mutuality of their relationships in the South Asian region. In the prevailing scenario, the Pakistan-supported ideological campaign of “one man’s terrorist as another’s freedom fighter” cannot be given any acceptability in Jammu and Kashmir or elsewhere. One who does not hesitate in employing terrorist tactics is to be treated as terrorist. Hence, for operational criteria in the post 9/11 situations, “one man’s terrorist is every man’s terrorist” .This kind of perceptive approach might be more practicable in identifying the acts and perpetrators of terrorism against India.

4. Terrorism may be aimed at deliberately unleashing repression and revenge which may eventually lead to the bitter criticism. Such activities may be directed against the security personnel and law enforcement agencies of the government; at the same time, deliberately perpetrated

6. During September 11, 2001 and 2011, a period stretching for almost ten years, many events evidenced the growing strength of skilled terrorist individuals, their organisations and global networks to execute the acts of terror for causing death, destruction and despise.

Pakistani leaders officially denounce the use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy, yet there is a wide-ranging gap between their utterances and practices

Terrorists often seek to stress upon the point that the victimised persons or objects are somehow guilty or they are the despised symbols of economic, political or social system opposed by the terrorists and their supporters. In many of the terrorist campaigns, persons have been killed and buildings or objects have been severely damaged because they represented symbols of the opposed government or system. For instance, the terrorist attack on Indian Parliament in December 2001, the 26/11 terrorist violence in Mumbai in 2008, growing menace of terror after the killing of Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011 and other terror acts have all challenged the authority of governments in power. Thus in a compact ensemble, while the most menacing and hitting impact of terrorism on India’s homeland is fear, it may be used to achieve a variety of goals: specific concessions, dramatic publicity for terrorists and their cause, disruption of existing social order, provocation of repression, enforcement of compliance and cooperation or punishment of those despised by the terrorists. A single event may be aimed at obtaining several of these goals simultaneously.

Response to the new wave of terrorism As part of serious initiatives towards insuring India’s homeland security against the terrorist threat, the national, regional and international milieu should be made politically, socially, culturally and economically sound one with the intention to cut to the minimum breeding grounds of most forms of terrorism. In addition to international cooperation in technological, economic, cultural and social fields, including specific research and exchange of information and intelligence sharing, there may be numerous other important measures irrevocably required in dealing with the emerging challenges of terrorism. Fighting terrorism is not only a problem of the government, security forces and the law enforcement agencies, but also an uphill and consistent task of the target societies. In India’s case, a workable framework can be presented as follows: ●● Adequate and effective coordination of intelligence and contingency planning; ●● Strict security measures at embassies, airports and the venues of international gatherings and meetings; ●● Highly sensitive and improved devices to detect metals, explosives and other deadly means of terrorist attack against persons or objects; ●● Consistent screening of profiles to identify terrorists; ●● Implementing more stringent custom provisions; ●● Provisions for protective clothings, gas masks and specialised Civil Defence measures as part of the long-term planning against Chemical and Bio-terrorism; ●● Observance of stepped-up security arrangements at the nuclear power establishments, sites and other facilities to help prevent any event of nuclear terrorism

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in foreseeable future. Nuclearised India requires specific attention and specialised knowledge; ●● Improved avionics for the civilian planes along with sophisticated safety devices by using state-of-the-art technology to separate passengers from captain’s cabin and crew members in case of any emergency; ●● Clamping strict international pressure on the patron states and sympathisers of state-sponsored international terrorism; ●● Concluding bilateral and multilateral extradition agreements; ●● Development of counter-terrorist elite combat forces to fight terrorism; and ●● Denial of unrestricted access and use of press, electronic and communication media and proper media management in a terrorist environment.

Crisis management options In a protracted terrorist campaign like Jammu and Kashmir, India’s military contingency planning is to be chalked out in the primary stage of terrorism, well before taking the decision to use military force. Quick response with overwhelming momentum provides opportunities to launch hard actions against terrorists for the purposes of insuring India’s homeland security. Once the military or paramilitary forces are employed, the ultimate goal should be to destroy terrorists and their structure as speedily as possible. Intense responses have the benefit of restraining the media coverage for undue publicity to terrorism. But in certain situations of state-sponsored terror, the use of force can be the ultimate option, especially if it involves long-term implications. India, for instance, had mobilised its armed forces against Pakistan after the terrorist attack on Parliament on 13 December 2001, but had ultimately chosen to withdraw by applying serious unilateral restraints in a nuclearised South Asian scenario. The use of force in countering terrorism should be cautiously planned and executed to minimise collateral loss of persons and facilities, limiting resentment among the population and curbing the subsequent emergence of sympathisers or supportive subculture in the terrorist milieu. The situation in South Asia remains very volatile in this context, particularly due to deep-rooted inimical postures of India and Pakistan against each other. In fact, terrorism after 26/11 remains the single largest zig-saw puzzle to have been solved for any concrete and successful pace of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) and normalisation of India-Pakistan relations.

Need for international cooperation The feeling of international society of shared core values is a moral ingredient of the UN Charter and signifies the authority of International Law. In a poly-centric and globalised world of today, as a comprehensive drive against terror, India must seek

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RAMIFICATIONS

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long-term objective steps towards its homeland security, aimed at garnering effective international cooperation from both the developed and developing countries for curbing the plague of terrorism and eradicating its roots gradually. There are also problems of differing perceptions and legal ramifications both nationally and internationally. For example, in South Asia, Pakistan’s long-drawn perception of ‘terrorists’ operating on the soil of Jammu and Kashmir as ‘freedom fighters’ still looms large over the horizon due to the tinted views of its decision-making elite, clearly indicating that Pakistan is a part of the problem and in no way problem-solver. Such attitudes motivate Pak-sponsored terrorists to create more problems against India’s homeland security.

Legal ramifications of curbing terrorism Taken in legal terms, terrorism encompasses both the act and the perpetrator. While prevention and intelligence are aimed at curbing terrorist acts, prosecution and punishment are against the perpetrator(s) of terrorism. At the domestic level, India’s legal mechanism has been weak in dealing with terrorism and its perpetrators. Combating terrorism requires an International Law approach entirely different from what is needed for humanisation of armed conflicts at the international level. It encompasses international law treaties on inter-governmental cooperation for the prevention and punishment of acts of terrorism. But a global counter-terrorist convention is now the need of present situation. Concerted homeland security drive is irrevocably needed to combat the menacing monster of terrorism. The UN Resolution 1373 (28 September 2001) of the Security Council has been quite significant, on account of which a number of mandatory decisions were taken on terrorist financing and money laundering, obligating states to refrain from providing support to terrorists and to take necessary steps to prevent financing of terrorism and deny safe haven to terrorists. India has been a gainer in exposing the Pakistani terrorist network of financing and providing shelter during the post 9/11 situations through various channels. This has been quite important for India’s homeland security.

The future The futuristic threats to India’s homeland security mark the fact that the new trends of post 9/11 terrorism have germinated a variety of permutations and combinations with regard to its nature, ends, means and devastative impact on the hearts and minds of people living in India and elsewhere. In a fragile world of today, it is difficult to derive any final view of what will be the magnitude of India’s counter-terrorist campaign or homeland security drive, especially when the US troops are in a state of phased withdrawal from Afghanistan. So far as India’s comprehensive homeland security is concerned, it requires irrevocably new initiatives and paradigm shifts. Hopefully, the road to paradigm shift remains open in the fore-running circumstances.

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Mumbai 26/11 Have the hotels learnt a lesson?

166 people were killed in the twin attacks on the Taj Mahal Hotel and the Trident Oberoi Mumbai. There were twin bombings in Jakarta Hotels namely Ritz Carlton and Marriott. Suicide bombers killed 8 persons and maimed 50. The 26/11 terrorist attack on the two Mumbai Hotels - The Taj and The Oberoi Trident was majorly responsible for exposing the vulnerability of the hospitality industry to such malicious man-made attacks. But has the incident changed the perception of the hospitality sector regarding their vulnerability to such attacks and security incidents? The writer takes stock of security enhancement in the hospitality sector, which has in recent times become a prime target of terrorist attacks and laments the attitude of trying to do the bare minimum essential to meet regulatory requirements.

Kalakad V Ganapathy The writer is a freelancer based in Bangalore. He has worked on projects centred on Safety, Quality, 5S, Business Process Reengineering, Integrity Management, Technology Trends etc. and worked on “Rerefined oil technology strategy,” has delivered lectures in management colleges like S P Jain Global (Singapore), Somaiya Institute of Management Studies, ITM-Mumbai, Mumbai Institute of Management, Insurance Institute of India where he has taught subjects like Risk Management, Insurance, Project Management, Supply Chain Management and Technology Management.

Some of the hotels try to cut corners by installing lesser number of cameras than what is required. Much less attention is paid towards minor details like position of the cameras, the capturing and storage of images, training, retrieval of images, capturing moving objects with excellent precision and installing cameras in common areas like lobbies, reception etc

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otel security in India is definitely in a state of high alert. A visit to the Taj Mahal Hotel will make you aware of how the hotel has become a fortress. Oberoi Trident, which we happened to visit in January 2011, appeared to have taken steps to ameliorate upon the security surveillance systems. The 26/11 attack has changed the perception of security in the hospitality sector. 166 people were killed in the twin attacks on Taj Mahal Hotel and Trident Oberoi. There were twin bombings in Jakarta Hotels namely Ritz Carlton and Marriott. Suicide bombers killed 8 persons and maimed 50. The 26/11 terrorist attack on the two Mumbai Hotels – Hotel Taj and Hotel Oberoi Trident was majorly responsible for exposing the vulnerability of the hospitality industry to such malicious man-made attacks. The incident garnered global attention as countries across the globe condemned the incident. It took a while for the two hotels to refurbish their premises and resume their operations. But has the incident changed the perception of the hospitality sector regarding their vulnerability to such attacks and security incidents? I was recently staying at Hotel Keys in Thiruvananthapuram and was amazed at the security arrangements in the hotel. Instead of a key, the hotel gave me an access card. This card had to be inserted into a slot in the lift only when the green light blinked could one press the floor number on the lift. The access card had to be inserted into a slot inside the room to get the power connection into the room. An interesting aspect was that the instructions about fire safety were cogent - particularly the suggestion to crawl at the time of fire to avoid getting suffocated from smoke. This was a revelation. The hotel was built post 26/11. The guest manager admitted that the 26/11 incident did push them to look at the security aspects in the design more forcefully. Hotel La Marvella at Jayanagar, Bangalore has built a state-of-the-art facility where the customer is spoilt for choice by way

of state-of-the-art modern security surveillance systems. Not just that, the hotel seems to be a perfect blend of aesthetics and security.

Mumbai 26/11 Gadgets like CCTV Surveillance should serve as proactive tools to avoid a disaster but in reality, their usage is more reactive - to help the police nab the criminals. Modern day criminal elements do not seem to consider gadgets like CCTV as a deterrent. The person who warned people in VT station not to proceed in the direction where the terrorist Kasab was stationed did display tremendous presence of mind that helped save lives. Technology may have advanced a lot, but nobody can dismiss the importance of human element in averting such incidents. The 26/11 terrorist attack on the two Mumbai Hotels - Hotel Taj and Hotel Oberoi Trident was majorly responsible for exposing the vulnerability of the hospitality industry to such malicious man-made attacks. The incident garnered global attention as countries across the globe condemned the incident. It took a while for the two hotels to refurbish their premises and resume their operations. But has the incident changed the perception of the hospitality sector regarding their vulnerability to such attacks and security incidents? Percival Edward, a security expert based in Bangalore says that the actions taken by hospitality sector post 26/11 were more of knee-jerk reactions. Installing security surveillance systems is not enough. Installing effactive security surveillance systems coupled with creating awareness among the hotel staff by way of intensive training is what is needed. Design aspects deserve greater attention. Another security expert says that some of the hotels try to cut corners by installing lesser number of cameras than what is required. Much less attention is paid towards minor details like position of the cameras, the capturing and storage of images, training, retrieval of images, capturing moving objects with excellent precision and

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installing cameras in common areas like lobbies, reception etc. Though both Taj and Oberoi Trident have taken stringent measures to restore their premises and beef up the security, the same cannot be said about the other members in the hospitality sector in India. Fire safety and security surveillance must go beyond the need to “comply”. We are a very compliance oriented nation. We wear helmets while driving a two-wheeler because there is a penalty if we do not wear it. Very few wear helmets because they are safe. In a likewise manner, the hotels should build fire safety and security surveillance as hygiene factors in their operations. It is not enough to do something to meet codes and standards or to get a “No-objection” certificate from the fire department authorities or the municipal authorities. Worse is the fact that hospitality sector does not believe in regular annual maintenance contracts with the service providers. Says Chetan Nagappa who works for a security organisation, “At the end of the day everything boils down to cost. The hotel authorities will remember the service providers only when there is a problem; they are so intent on tightening their purse strings on matters related to safety and security that this attitude shocks us”. The hospitality sector should look at the consequences in the aftermath of an accident. How will it impact their brand? How long will it take to rebuild the hotel in case of property damage? Global insurance companies like FM Global do talk about resilience - the ability to bring back a damaged property back to shape, but in India, the insurance companies seem to be more concerned about losses and claims. Our question is - why not look at prevention through robust risk management and prudent underwriting norms? The situation in some of the lesser known second rung hotels is even more alarming. It doesn’t help that there is not a single designated authority to conduct periodic checks or audits. One is not sure if hotels have a disaster response plan in place.

Nagesh, a security expert based in Bangalore, feels that there are very few people who have realised the need to make their properties fail-safe or security safe. He agrees that there are limitations that the hospitality sector faces in terms of foolproof security measures. Security has always been on top of the agenda in the 5-star and highend hotels, but the 26/11 incident has made them realise the importance of maintenance.

The mid-range and lower end hotels install CCTVs only to comply with regulatory norms. He even adds that most of the 5-star hotels are not aware of what they exactly need. So, the thinking of the hospitality sector has to change Nagesh regrets that other than these top-end hotels, the efforts of the mid-range and lower range hotels in the hospitality sector to improve the security measures are only for namesake. Windsor Manor hotel in Bangalore refurbished their security surveillance post the 26/11 incident. He says that earlier hotels neglected maintenance but after 26/11 they have realised that maintenance is important too. According to Nagesh, the mid-range and lower-end hotels install CCTVs only to comply with regulatory norms. He even adds that most of the 5-star hotels are not aware of what they exactly need. So, the thinking of the hospitality sector has to change. The thinking should not be restricted to looking at the criteria required or meeting the norms. The need to install security systems under pressure from Fire Department or legal cell should be replaced with the need to enhance security surveillance to take care of their employees, guests, their properties and also the surrounding properties. The buildings adjacent to such hotels are also subject to collateral risks. This cannot be ignored.

Reinsurance and terrorism pool It is strange that the 26/11 incident has not made the Government or the Home Ministry announce broad guidelines about security to the hospitality sector. More so, when the Government knows that the terrorism

pool managed by GIC Re paid a loss of Rs. 400 crores to the affected parties after the 26/11 incident. It is strange that even insurance companies haven’t done much in this area to press for a mandatory guideline in all hotels. The insurance sector seems to have consoled themselves to the fact that - of the loss that was paid, Rs. 300 crores was recovered through reinsurance. I feel this sort of thinking needs to be eschewed. Imagine a large country like ours with so many mouths and hungry stomachs to feed spending crores of rupees on paying insurance claims for five star hotels. Just imagine, the cost of setting up an appropriate safety and security surveillance in a luxury 5-star hotel won’t even be 1 per cent of the claim amount paid by GIC Re from the terrorism pool. Yet, the reaction of the hospitality sector in the aftermath of the 26/11 incident continues to be lukewarm. While some hotels are using the tags of “Ecotel” hotel, “Green Hotel” as a means of enhancing their brand equity, it is inscrutable that they do not bandy about safety or security as a component of their brand. While no one expects them to divulge the internal details of what they have done in terms of upgrading their security surveillance, at the minimum, some statements from some of the big players in the hospitality sector would have triggered actions from the sleeping members of the hospitality sector. I am sure that this is not a tall order. What needs to be done ●● Conduct emergency briefings

●● Mock drills ●● Self-audits and self-assessment inspections ●● Updating of the disaster response plan ●● Creating greater awareness about emergency exits Won’t it be a better idea if a safety note is given to the guests at the time of check-in to ensure that guests appreciate the efforts taken by the hotel to promote the cause of safety? This safety note can be a simple note (in bullet points) that can briefly delineate the dos and don’ts and inform the guests about emergency exits, mock drills and assembly area where the guests can converge in case an incident occurs. Besides terrorist attacks, the hotels can be exposed to other risks like riots or fire too. Dharmarajan G a senior citizen based in Mumbai however begs to differ from Nagesh. As a freelance HR advisor and consultant, Mr Dharmarajan G attends meetings in hotels in Mumbai and he feels that hotels are taking actions post 26/11 by installing CCTVs and manual frisking. He says, “The hotels install CCTV devices as a deterrent to malicious attacks by anti-social elements. Unfortunately, the culprits seem to know that the hotels do not maintain the systems well.” He solely blames the 24x7 television channels for trivialising and sensationalising delicate intelligence issues during 26/11 when the terrorists were holed up in the Taj Mahal Hotel. Such minute by minute account only served to feed the terrorists and their associates with information about the actions taken by the police.”If

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the television channels had exercised some restraint then more lives could have been saved”, he says. Ramesh Ved, a chartered accountant in Mumbai says that since 2001 when the twin towers were attacked, there has been no such incident in US. But in India, such incidents have become regular affairs. Take for instance - in the 26/11 incident, the Taj Mahal Hotel was like a maze for the police force but for the terrorists? How did they get in? Is this possible without internal support? There is more to this than just a security lapse. The entry points and exit points in Taj are one too many. Stewards, cooks, drivers - who will check the integrity of these people? Terrorists involved in the Taj Mahal Hotel attack seemed to have done a thorough recce. They worked with such clockwork precision that they would have put the best project planners to shame. Is this possible without the involvement of insiders? Hotel’s ties with external security forces (outsourced) need to be checked. Thus, the hotels need to engage special staff for CCTV monitoring if they have not done so already. The hospitality industry also shies away from stringent measures as they feel that it can be a cause of discomfort to their guests. But is this fair?

Recommendations Terrorism risk has raced past traditional theft and fire risks in the hospitality sector. The Government of India needs to establish a think tank to come up with certain minimum standards that need to be fulfilled by the hospitality sector to upgrade their security systems. A strong regulation is a must to improve matters. The terrorism pool that GIC Re paid was Rs. 400 crores; the cost of security surveillance is not even a fraction of that. The Government needs to do a serious rethink. The hospitality sector should be given some sort of tax exemptions for using technology to improve security surveillance. This is very important to drive growth in the business.

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prime target Home Ministry needs to issue standards for commercial buildings including hotels. The Government needs to appoint a state level independent monitoring agency to check compliance. The hospitality sector needs to focus on integrated security systems. Technological solutions must be easy to implement - organisations in security space are well advised to remember this. On the flip side, system integrators provide solutions from different manufacturers - they find it difficult to integrate various systems. But this can be corrected.

●● Swift detection of any untoward or suspicious movement must be made easy

As of now, the balance between human intervention and electronic surveillance is more tilted towards the latter. This should change. A vigilant staff is a great source of strength for the hospitality sector. The hotels need to upgrade their systems and set aside a separate budget for safety and security measures.

●● Restricted access to pools and restaurants

The day is not far when luxury hotels or high-end hotels that do not value safety or security will lose their market share. Hospitality sector has to give higher precedence for safety and security than worrying about discomfort to guests. Some more urgent actions that are needed are

●● Finger print readers for high level guests

The good news is that innovative technologies are now available to strengthen security surveillance. These are: ●● Surveillance cameras

●● Inspect trucks, vans, parking lots

●● Full body scanners

●● Train all employees

●● Baggage scan

●● Relook at the outsourced model of physical security as this can present risk. An in-house security officer can also be employed

●● Metal detectors

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The writer has covered all wars with Pakistan as War Correspondent and reported from the conflict zones in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in South East Asia as well as from Afghanistan. He is author of “India: The Security Dilemma”.

Innovative technologies

●● Secure airlock

●● Video analytics to be used for common areas of hotels

Cecil Victor

The 3 elements of security namely - Detection, Deterrence and Delay deserve a heightened sense of importance. Absence of Safety and security vigilance can lead to loss of reputation for the hospitality sector.

●● Inspect vendors

●● Entry and exit points need to have electronic security surveillance

The writer makes a strong case for increasing the number of dogs deployed on the LC / IB as also for routine surveillance within the country to prevent incidents like the Delhi High Court blast. The Remount and Veterinary Corps itself has only a couple of years ago increased its output to about 250 dogs per training session of nine months. For an Army so extensively committed to counter-insurgency / counterterrorism / proxy war its employment of dogs as a force multiplier is grossly inadequate. The writer makes a strong case for an across the board increase in this canine capability for the Army / BSF as well as the Police.

●● Address proofs - passport, pan card, aadhar card and other forms of identification must.

●● Biometric systems

●● Manual frisking - bodyguards of VIPs also should be subject to this

DOGS AS SENTINELS

●● Corridors, floors, parking, lobby areas, multiple exits, stair cases, escalators, server rooms, food storage areas, kitchen, laundry - these areas too need CCTV surveillance

●● Depute high tech security personnel in every sensitive area of the hotel

●● Effective use of technology to minimise discomfort to guests

UNCONVENTIONAL SOLUTIONS

●● Hi-sec doors

●● Access control ●● Video surveillance ●● Intrusion detection ●● Xray machines It is high time hospitality industry in India starts making judicious use of these products and technologies.

ot long ago a military source told newsmen that Pakistani attempts at infiltration of terrorists are being stopped at the Line of Control “BUT SOME MAY HAVE GOT AWAY”. For those who wonder why India appears to be a “soft state” here is the reason why. For every infiltrator that gets in, it will take between 20 to 50 security personnel to chase and neutralise one terrorist depending on the lay of the land and sociopolitical conditions in the area of operations. It is not a luxury India can afford any longer given the very likely possibility of a two-front war with Pakistan and China together. It will be horrendous to have highly trained Fifth Columnists operating behind Indian lines in Jammu and Kashmir to harass our troops, hit our logistics and lines of communication and generally interfere with the Indian Army’s war effort.

Much of the travails of the Kashmiris could have been reduced if the Indian Army had paid heed to the recommendations of its own Remount and Veterinary Corps made as early as 1958 that dogs have superior sight and smell capabilities and can be employed in both the military role as well as in counter-terrorism. The Army has been singularly tardy in resorting to the use of dogs as facilitators for detection, neutralisation and tracing of terrorists in the several violence-ridden states on the periphery of India

The lay of the land in many sections of the Line of Control is very difficult terrain and it is not surprising that if a group of terrorists is able to subvert the barbed wire fence and gain entry into the area under Indian control and if it is not immediately accosted and neutralised could easily melt into the hinterland to pursue its mission of destruction. That is how terrorism has been sustained by Pakistan against India over the past three decades first in Punjab in the form of the Sikh Khalistan movement and, after that failed, in Kashmir since 1991. From the moment of gaining independence in 1947 Pakistan used tribesmen from the North West Frontier Province led by officers of the Pakistan Army to slice off a large chunk of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. In 1965 it used infiltrators to try and incite the local population to revolt against India but the people themselves handed over the infiltrators to Indian security forces and that attempt flopped. November 2011 Defence AND security alert

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UNCONVENTIONAL SOLUTIONS

Dogs as facilitators Having learned that for a Muslim Pakistan to support a Sikh revolt on the basis of religion could not have been sustained without a military victory Pakistan turned to Kashmir hoping that co-religionists on this side of the Line of Control would be more amenable to the idea of secession. For a time it did appear so because many Kashmir youth were lured across the LoC for training in weapons and terror tactics. Their families were paid a monthly income through agents in Jammu and Kashmir some of whom now own palatial houses indicating where most of the money went. But the Kashmir secessionism was always tainted by its association with the Pakistan Army Inter-Services Intelligence and could never secure the kind of mass uprising that could constitute a revolt. More recently Pakistan has tried to whitewash Kashmiri secessionism as being an “indigenous” movement but the large-scale peace in the Kashmir valley and the other districts over the last two years marked by the resurgence of tourism and concomitant improvement in the commercial sector has given the lie to Pakistani claims. In hindsight much of the travails of the Kashmiris could have been reduced if the Indian Army had paid heed to the recommendations of its own Remount and Veterinary Corps made as early as 1958 that dogs have superior sight and smell capabilities and can be employed in both the military role as well as in counter-terrorism. The Army has been singularly tardy in resorting to the use of dogs as facilitators for detection, neutralisation and tracing of terrorists in the several violence-ridden states on the periphery of India. Since 1970 I have been writing about the usefulness of dogs in reducing the drudgery of counter-terrorism / counter-insurgency imposed on the men in what is essentially a manpower-intensive operation. The Border Security Force which is also deeply involved in the protection of the international border from anti-national elements has had its own dog training facility at Tekanpur in Madhya Pradesh but in every department inclusive of police forces around the country where dogs could have been of great assistance in unconventional warfare waged against the state the progress has been patchy because not enough trained dogs are being produced. The Remount and Veterinary Corps itself has only a couple of years ago increased its output to about 250 dogs per training session of nine months. For an Army so extensively committed to counter-insurgency / counterterrorism / proxy war its employment of dogs as a force multiplier is grossly inadequate. How could anyone escape into India during an encounter if there is proper mix of man and dog in the first-response team that confronts an infiltration attempt?

Pak interventionism Knowing the problem caused either by large numbers involved in the infiltration attempt coupled with the Pakistan Army’s interventionism in support of the attempt – providing covering gunfire with small arms – or the nature of the terrain on both sides of the Line of Control there are ways of handling a situation whereby if some among the infiltrators manage to break through the barrier

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

and hide in the forest or in built-up areas they can be tracked by dogs and re-engaged in a running gunbattle. The whole operation would be localised to within a few kilometers of a breakthrough point instead of it festering into a terrorist module deep inside Kashmir.

It is amazing that no attempt has been made to raise dog squads in their thousands rather than in the hundreds as at present. I have suggested that retired Army dog handlers be given the facilities to breed dogs for military service even if pedigreed German Shepherds and Labradors are not available An illustration of this is in the many encounters between terrorists and Indian security forces beginning from the seige of the terrorists who burned the Charar-e-Sharif mosque and managed to escape from the cordon laid by the Indian Army and return to Pakistan to be hailed as heroes on television. If there had been enough dogs as part of the cordon their sight and smell capabilities would have helped the manpower deployed to at least know where the breakthrough is being attempted. Indians only came to know of the breakout several days after the actual shooting stopped and the terrorists were well on their way back to Pakistan! After that there have been many encounters where terrorists holed up in hideouts under seige have managed to escape. This should not have happened if the kind of ferocious German Shepherd shown holding a well-protected “infiltrator” on television to demonstrate the prowess of Army dogs were actually deployed in enough numbers on the border and the Line of Control itself. If nothing else at least one terrorist can be caught alive by one such dog and the whole operation would be localised. More recently when Bhutan decided to rid itself of the United Front for the Liberation of Asom (ULFA) and other north-eastern terrorist groups that had converted southern Bhutan into a safe haven it informed the Indian authorities about the impending operations but in spite of Indian security forces being deployed to prevent a breakthrough into India the ULFA cadres managed to travel several hundred kilometers across India into Bangladesh and Myanmar to link up with the Chinese in whose lap Paresh Barua, the military commander of ULFA, is still sitting. Something radically wrong happened at that point of time or we should have neutralised the ULFA when the Bhutanese Army went into the offensive named Operation All Clear in December 2003. We could have killed the movement eight years ago if enough dogs had been deployed to prevent the ULFA from re-entering India. So how do they fit into India’s modern-day military requirement? For those dogs deployed on the well-defined international borders as well as the Line of Control with Pakistan and the Line of Actual Control with the Chinese the training should be undiluted ferocity to maim and hold the intruder either on voice command or whistles. The ratio between man and dog can be 1:1 - one dog for every man per battalion. The result will be that one battalion can be strung over a larger area which, given the looming connectivity planned for the Futuristic-Infantry Soldier As System (F-INSAS) and network centric warfare, would be an improvement in border management. With man and dog

having a nudging relationship with each other the collateral consequences of the man-dog narrative would be less stress among the men deployed in difficult terrain, climate and terror-infested conditions. This relationship would be necessary to ensure that the dogs can differentiate between friend and foe in close combat situations (quite apart from the therapeutic effect it has on both man and dog).

What a dog can do As far as anyone escaping from the scene of an infiltration or encounter here are two examples of what a dog can do: As recounted by Colonel Anil Shorey in the Tribune in December, 1998 there is the case of Rock the Labrador deployed in the dangerous and rugged Doda district of Jammu and Kashmir who tracked terrorists over snow covered and rugged land for four kilometers. It helped the Army to catch four Pakistani terrorists and recover four AK-47 rifles, two radio sets, an improvised explosive device (IED) and 170 rounds of ammunition. And then there is Rocket, another Labrador, who tracked a group of terrorists over 12 kilometers after an encounter near the Banihal Pass after sniffing a bandana (headscarf) dropped by the fleeing terrorist. Rocket helped recover a cache of weapons left by the terrorists to save their lives - one universal machine gun (which is a heavy weapon), three AK-47s, two AK-56s, one sniper rifle, two 9 mm pistols, seven radio sets, 11 IEDs, 26 handgrenades, 37 detonators and 1,500 rounds of ammunition. If man and dog are positioned at the same place at the same time it will take just a few minutes after the shooting has ended for the dog handlers to let the dogs sniff the area and collect the enemy scent and rush off in the direction he has taken. Within an hour Indian security forces would be in contact with the fleeing terrorist who could be brought down by the dogs themselves. It is not that the Indian Army and the Border Security Force do not know this and that is why it is amazing that no attempt has been made to raise dog squads in their thousands rather than in the hundreds as at present. I have suggested that retired Army dog handlers be given the facilities to breed dogs for military service even if pedigreed German Shepherds and Labradors are not available. The important thing is any dog’s ability to do the job though it has to be acknowledged that the ferocity of a German Shepherd and the olfactory (sense of smell) of the Labrador are better than most other species. Pedigreed dogs are expensive but by spending cash for importing breed stock the Indian Army could well save the lives of young officers who are worth their weight in gold who lay down their lives leading their men from the front in counter-insurgency / counter-terror operations.

First response teams Much the same tardy progress is seen in the deployment of dogs by police organisations throughout the country even though it is noticeable that dogs are now being inducted in the first-response teams deployed in counter-terror operations. However, in the absence of a good police anticipation of likely targets of terrorist attacks the deployment of police dogs happens post ipso facto after

the terrorists have struck – as in the case of the bomb blast at the Delhi High Court recently. If sniffer dogs had been present in the area where litigants assemble to gain entry into the court nobody would have been able to place the explosives in their midst because the dogs would have got a whiff of it even through the container or from clothes of the terrorist who had planted the explosives and raised an alarm or attacked the man. Similar would be the case of the Pakistan-trained terrorists taking a bomb-laden car into the forecourt of Parliament House in 2001. Thank God it did not explode or the symbol of Indian nationhood would have been reduced to rubble. But if there had been sniffer dogs at the gate (they are still not there) security forces would have been warned and the attack could have been aborted at the gate itself. All this may appear to be hindsight but the Delhi Police knows that it is true more particularly because at least on one occasion it was able to discover explosives planted in Connaught Place by the early deployment of its dog squad. Delhi Police and almost all other state police organisations use a mirror to try and detect if explosives have been strapped under the car. It is a time wasting and illogical method of detection as the recent seizure of an explosives laden car in Ambala has shown the explosives were in special compartments inside the car in very natural-looking places and could only be detected by the sniffer dog. It needs to be reiterated that there is nothing in the world that is more capable of detecting explosives than a welltrained dog. Technical means of sniffing chemical explosives are expensive and bulky contraptions not amenable to be deployed in crowded localities where bombs are at their most destructive. The dog is mobile, agile and quick to respond to a hidden threat. The normal response to any red alert is the posting of policemen in large numbers. It should be the other way around. More dogs should be deployed at points of entry in the first instance and within threatened localities as a backup against a successful infiltration by a terrorist. Nowadays one sees the entry points of most market areas barricaded and entry regulated with a metal detector when the police knows full well that metal detectors are useless against explosives and even the regulation of traffic is haphazard given that members of the market association themselves take cars into crowded streets ignoring security considerations. Here again, the question of how many dogs need be deployed comes up. I would say one per policeman deployed for several reasons. For a dog to remain fully alert during patrol its effective deployment time should not be more than three hours either in walkabout mode or static sniffing. With more than one dog on the premises there can be a quick turnaround of fully alert dogs on duty. Also the handlers get a respite from looking for telltale signals from the dog and being ready to respond with their own small arms if a terrorist is seen. Otherwise most policemen (except those on spotter duty on the lookout for known terrorists whose photographs are available) just lounge about looking vulnerable as in Pakistan after the Lal Masjid episode where a suicide bomber just walked into a clump of policemen and killed most of them. Finally, the deployment of a dog squad itself is a deterrent to a terrorist attack.

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

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Nepal’s India-China equation Shreejana Shrestha The writer is Defence News Correspondent of Republica English daily, Nepal.

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A Nepalese perspective on the power-play between India and China for dominance in the landlocked state of Nepal. The writer highlights that neither India nor China cares much about the kind of government - whether it is democratic or leftist - that comes into power in Nepal as long as the Nepali soil is not used against them. Being a landlocked country, India’s importance to Nepal is great as the trade routes between the two countries are the Himalayan nation’s only access to the sea. King Birendra didn’t want to follow a policy of ‘equidistance’ in ties with India and China, but, at the same time, wanted to woo China to counter India's growing influence in the country. The decision of the former king Gyanendra to play ‘China card’ against India by proposing to include the northern neighbour in SAARC regional body invited a huge backlash from India. India’s influence in Nepal is prominent because Nepal’s political instability itself provided the arena for external inquiry as well as interference. The two Asian giants will continue to exploit opportunities in Nepal - both in positive and negative ways - as both have their pre-framed foreign policies vis-à-vis Nepal. Nepal, she concludes, should read the lurking mistrust between the two countries and learn how to complement both in mutually exclusive ways.

Being a landlocked country, India’s importance to Nepal is great as the trade routes between the two countries are the Himalayan nation’s only access to the sea. In another context, as China is emerging as the world’s leading economic power and is only second to America in terms of the size of the economy, Nepal should also give equal importance to its relationship with northern neighbour

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November 2011 Defence AND security alert

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SCEPTICAL?

ewly-elected Prime Minister Dr Baburam Bhattarai’s recent statement has raised hopes that the government may introduce some new foreign policies to deal effectively with the country’s immediate neighbours, India and China. The prime minister said he would maintain balanced relations with both the neighbours, although he didn’t elaborate on the matter. He was being very diplomatic while making the aforementioned remarks, as he knows well the important roles the giant neighbours are playing in Nepal, a country that has just emerged from a decade-long conflict and that is undergoing a difficult transition period to draft a new constitution and successfully conclude the peace process.

Nepal’s relations with its northern and southern neighbours very much define the foreign policy of the new republic. Nepal looks up to India and China to meet its development goals. The country seeks cooperation from both neighbours in various sectors including hydropower, agriculture, infrastructure development and manufacturing

Multi-layered relationship Maintaining a balanced relationship with its immediate neighbours can greatly benefit Nepal as far as its economy is concerned. Nepal is not only a landlocked country with a difficult geographical terrain, but a country that witnessed a bloody armed conflict in which more than 17,000 people lost their lives and countless others were either maimed and injured or went missing. Moreover, it is a country that is desperately trying to redefine its image in the world especially after the cessation of the conflict. But the task is easier said than done. The government must understand the dynamics of international politics (and its pressure) and the multi-layered relationship between its neighbours India and China, which is largely driven by the shared economic interests, before forging the new foreign policies. Nepal’s relations with its northern and southern neighbours very much

define the foreign policy of the new republic. Nepal looks up to India and China to meet its development goals. The country seeks cooperation from both neighbours in various sectors including hydropower, agriculture, infrastructure development and manufacturing, among other things. The foreign policies of India and China, on the other hand, are driven by their ambition to become super powers. The way India and China identify the concepts of national interests in their respective foreign policies is crucial for Nepal. But Nepal has not been able to promote its own national interests due to the ongoing political instability. The cultural, historical and religious affinity between Nepal and India has helped the two countries to maintain a close relationship. The common cultural and religious heritage shared by the two countries, however, doesn’t mean that both countries could be put into a single bowl. Meanwhile, the bilateral relationship between Nepal and China is not as old as that between Nepal and India because the former does not share much cultural, historical or religious affinity. Nepal’s relation with China underwent changes only after the Chinese communists invaded and occupied Tibet in 1950. Prior to that, Nepal had been enjoying religious, cultural as well as trade ties with Tibet. As against widespread presumptions, neither India nor China cares much about the kind of government - whether it is democratic or leftist - that comes into power in Nepal as long as the Nepali soil is not used against them. The economic assistance extended by India and China to Nepal has been very remarkable and helped improve the country’s development prospects. The economic assistance provided by India in sectors like education, health, infrastructure development is remarkable. The Himalayan republic has also benefited from China’s steadily increasing economic and technical assistance in industrial infrastructure and economic planning. However, lack of proper

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

interests, more than a neighbour. So, if Nepal is able to maintain cordial relationship with its giant neighbours, there are many advantages that Nepal can take.

government policies and deteriorating security situation in Nepal always gave our neighbours opportunity to wield undue political influence, flex their muscles and play their cards close to their chest. Recently, a report about a Chinese agency wanting to invest Rs. 8 billion to develop Lumbini, the birth place of Gautam Buddha, as an International Centre of Buddhism hogged media headlines. If the proposal of the Chinese agency is accepted and the International Centre of Buddhism is built in Nepal then it can indeed boost Nepal’s economy by promoting country’s tourism. The establishment of the Centre will help turn Lumbini into a ‘Mecca’ for the Buddhists and that will enhance Nepal’s popularity and prestige the world over. But experts say that since Lumbini is just a few kilometers away from the Indian border, the Chinese plan has become a matter of great concern for India. More importantly, India is also trying to build another “Lumbini” close to its border with Nepal. In this regard, India may view the Chinese assistance as a major hindrance to its plans. After India broke the 200 year-old shackles of British rule and gained independence in 1947, it has been very important neighbour for Nepal. Being a landlocked country, India’s importance to Nepal is great as the trade routes between the two countries are the Himalayan nation’s only access to the sea. In another context, as China is emerging as the world’s leading economic power and is only second to America in terms of the size of the economy, Nepal should also give equal importance to its relationship with the northern neighbour.

Historical scenario It is obvious that India became more conscious about the growing strength of China after 1949 (after founding of the People’s Republic of China). This made India and China to draft their respective foreign policies vis-à-vis Nepal. Many Nepali experts including international observers still perceive that the 1950 treaty between Independent India and Nepal was forcefully imposed upon the then Himalayan kingdom to serve India’s

security interests. Sanjay Upadhyaya, in his book Raj Lives, mentions that even after Indian freedom fighters broke the shackles of 200 years of colonialism and India became an independent nation, its leaders continued to follow the same British policy with regard to Nepal. Finally, in 1950, taking advantage of the chaos inside Nepal, India forced the dying Rana regime in the country to sign the controversial peace and friendship treaty. The official relation between Nepal and China dates back to 1960 when the two countries established formal diplomatic relation by putting their resident ambassadors in each other’s capitals. Similarly, Kathmandu agreed to construct an all-weather highway linking Kathmandu with the Tibetan border in 1961. However, this route didn’t give any trade benefits to both countries. It must also be recalled here that Nepal took a neutral stance during the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 and that it worked to thaw the strained relations between Kathmandu and New Delhi to a great extent. King Birendra didn’t want to follow a policy of ‘equidistance’ in ties with India and China, but, at the same time, wanted to woo China to counter India’s growing influence in the country as well as in the South Asian region. China had implicitly recognised India’s predominance in the region, however and was willing to oblige Nepal only to the extent of pledging support in safeguarding its national independence and preventing foreign interference. For India and China, Nepal has become a playground of their vested

But it doesn’t mean that our neighbours are reluctant to foster the economic sectors. Some people think that even six decades after India became Independent, India’s influence has been most noticeable as the relations between two countries rely upon the growing and competing interests and relationship of India and China and vice-versa in Nepal.

Socio-economic impact S D Muni in his book, India and Nepal: A Changing Relationship, says, “India had shown its insensitivity towards Nepal’s aspirations and susceptibilities, causing avoidable misunderstanding and tension in bilateral relations as well as broader regional and international perspective. Behaviours of many individual Indian policy makers, diplomats and casual visitors to the Kingdom may also be seen as improper and questionable in relation to their counterparts in Nepal or other neighbouring countries.” We have a clear example of how the withdrawal of the Indian military security check-post and military liaison, in 1970, from the northern border led to the issue of trade and transit to emerge at the forefront among other bilateral issues between Nepal and India. Nepal, as a landlocked country, demanded the transit route through Radhikapur to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) but India gave clear indication of its unwillingness to tolerate the kingdom’s trade with any other countries. India, then, turned down Nepal’s demand and even briefly blocked transportation of goods and materials to Nepal. Similarly, when Nepal inked an accord with Beijing to purchase weapons in 1988, India perceived it as a deliberate threat. It feared that the

ties between Nepal and China could jeopardise its security. Thus, India ended up by putting Nepal under the trade blockade. The blockade created havoc in Nepal which became a catalyst for the 1990 popular movement that reinstated multi-party democracy in the country. It is said the decision of the former king Gyanendra to play ‘China card’ against India by proposing to include the northern neighbour in SAARC regional body invited a huge backlash from India. The move by the then king forced India to rethink its policy towards Nepal. India started to actively support the agitating parties including the underground Maoists in their struggle to defeat the royal regime and establish a democratic rule. It is obvious that India’s influence in Nepal is prominent because Nepal’s political instability itself provided arena for external inquiry as well as interference. The water woes, security issues (including border encroachment, border investment, fake currency issues, border crime and Madrasa activities) between the two countries are like wide canvas to portray the challenges Nepal has faced since the beginning. And a country without access to the sea is totally dependent upon India for any international trade. Therefore, it seems very important for Nepal to maintain cordial relationship with both neighbours to maintain peace and stability in the region and especially in regard to security perspective when India often believes that Nepal is a hub for transaction of counterfeit Indian currency. For both India and China, Nepal is just a small country where they have little economic interest. But still, they will continue to maintain a certain level of interest in Nepal as their wish to bolster their standing in the world stage will only be possible through regional dominance. The two Asian giants will continue to exploit opportunities in Nepal both in positive and negative ways as both have their pre-framed foreign policies vis-à-vis Nepal. Nepal should read the lurking mistrust between the two countries and learn how to complement both in mutually exclusive ways.

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

homeland security

ENDEMIC SCOURGE

ddressing the top police officers of the country last month, the Home Minister of India made a very alarming statement. “I regret to point out that there is no significant decline in violence in Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra and Orissa. Even in West Bengal, there are reports that the state unit has been instructed by the CPI (Maoist) to develop guerrilla bases in Jangal Mahal and to intensify the conflict. The CPI (Maoist) has added at least four companies to the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army and its goal remains seizure of power through an armed liberation struggle.

Anoop A J The writer is an expert on Left Wing Extremism and is a researcher with Vivekananda International Foundation, New Delhi.

The increased militarisation of the extremist has become the major strength of the Left Extremist movement. The reports of the Ministry of Home Affairs in the past 10 years have repeatedly emphasised on the increasing militarisation of Left Wing Extremism and thereby increasing number of security forces and civilians being killed. MHA report 2004-05 observes that “Naxal violence is characterised by steadfast militarisation including upgradation in military capabilities and change in tactics”

He seemed more apprehensive saying that the number of incidents and casualties may have gone down and it may indicate a gradual decrease in violence, but this decrease is fully attributed to the situation that was prevalent in Bengal in 2011. The Home Minister’s point is that the nation is still a long way from containing the Maoist menace from any part of the country.

Unholy alliance?

red terror

The writer, a young researcher from the VIF points out that the state’s campaign against the Maoists has reached a stalemate. The reports of the Ministry of Home Affairs in the past 10 years have repeatedly emphasised on the increasing militarisation of Left Wing Extremism and thereby increasing number of security forces and civilians being killed. Increased usage of IEDs is another noteworthy reason for the sustained growth of Naxal fatalities. Reports say that IEDs account for about 40 per cent of the troop fatalities in Chhattisgarh since 2007 and nearly 70 per cent of all injuries sustained by security forces from January 2008 to March 2010. They have advanced their military strategy from guerrilla war using dalams or squads of 5-9 size to mobile war - employing platoons and companies. Overall a realistic appraisal of the LWE situation.

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

West Bengal was busy in the assembly elections during the past one year and hence the Maoists were quiescent. In her ‘no holds barred’ mission to capture power in West Bengal, Mamata Bannerjee had made a political arrangement with the Maoists and its front organisations. The Maoists who were on a killing spree in order to convert Jangal Mahal into a base area and oust its biggest natural enemy - the Left Front of West Bengal, temporarily decreased violence in the region. This not only caused the arrests of many Maoist leaders but also devolution of the prominent front organisation PCAPA. The whole situation brought down the amount of violence and the number of casualties. But the situation in Bengal ahead is bleak. Soon after getting into power, the Chief Minister stopped all security operations in the state to fulfil her promises given to Jangal Mahal ultras. She tried to forge a deal with them by which she could buy time for making any strategic move or initiate some serious developmental activities.

years. For example, Jharkhand and Maharashtra continue to witness a very large number of casualties of security forces as well as civilians; even more than the number in the previous years. This large number of casualties in 2011 indicates that the trend of increasing violence continues and as the Home Minister analysed, the security measures remain far from effective.

However the Maoists, by supporting Mamata, were just befriending a lesser enemy for a short period in order to pull down a bigger enemy from power. Once the agenda - of helping Trinamul Congress until the Left Front goes - was fulfilled, the Maoists made a reversal to their original agenda. The Maoists will not pay heed to Mamata’s call for a truce and will continue targeting civilians in big numbers and therefore the number of casualties may increase once again. Even Mamata Bannerjee has now belatedly recognised the futility of trying for peace with the Maoists who are not prepared to suspend the operations to let development activities take place.

I regret to point out that there is no significant decline in violence in Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra and Orissa. Even in West Bengal, there are reports that the state unit has been instructed by the CPI (Maoist) to develop guerrilla bases in Jangal Mahal and to intensify the conflict. The CPI (Maoist) has added at least four companies to the People's Liberation Guerrilla Army and its goal remains seizure of power through an armed liberation struggle

The more worrisome part of the Home Minister’s statement is the ‘still no better’ situation in other highly affected states, namely Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Bihar and Maharashtra. The table below shows that the number of casualties remains high despite of increased security measures and efforts. States

Andhra Pradesh Bihar Chhattisgarh Jharkhand Karnataka

The lethality of the ‘barrel of the gun’ has increased manifold in the past 15 years and hence the number of lives lost because of it. The number of violent incidents No. of No. of due to Left Wing Extremism casualties casualties (LWE) has almost doubled (2010) (2011 and the total death toll Till 16 increased three fold, during October) the past 10 years. There are various factors responsible 33 7 for this and most of them continue to facilitate the 98 51 increasing trend of violence. The principal two factors are 327 162 the increased militarisation of Maoist movement and 147 118 the ineffectiveness of the anti-Naxal security 1 1 mechanism.

Madhya Pradesh

Maharashtra

Militarisation

Among all reasons for such a rapid increase in violence, Odisha (Orissa) 108 70 the increased militarisation of the extremist has become Uttar Pradesh 0 0 the major strength of the Left Extremist movement. West Bengal 425 43 The reports of the Ministry of Home Affairs in Total* 1180 518 the past 10 years have repeatedly emphasised Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal on the increasing militarisation of The situation in some states is Left Wing Extremism and thereby worse than that of the previous increasing number of security forces

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

homeland security

ENDEMIC SCOURGE

and civilians being killed. MHA report 2004-05 observes that “Naxal violence is characterised by steadfast militarisation including upgradation in military capabilities and change in tactics.”

this context, one can estimate the level of militarisation from the incident of April 2010, in which Maoists killed 76 CRPF personnel, employing a mobile war operation coupled with a landmine ambush.

It is during this decade that Maoists successfully matured from simple rifles to AKs, rocket launchers and Claymore mines. MHA report 2004-05 points out, “Naxal outfits have laid special emphasis on militarisation of their fighting formations by acquiring new technology, particularly relating to fabrication and firing mechanism for improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and weapons”. Indigenously developed rocket launchers were recovered from the Maoists for the first time in 2005. In one of the largest-ever weapon haul in India, the police recovered 875 rockets and 27 rocket launchers belonging to the CPI (Maoist) from Mahabubnagar and Prakasam districts in Andhra Pradesh. Later, a CPI (Maoist) leader named Tech Madhu, who was the chief coordinator for the research and development of many of these weapons, including rocket launchers, surrendered before the police - revealing a larger picture of the rapid militarisation of the party. The home minister P Chidambaram has repeated that they purchase weapons from Bangladesh, Myanmar and Nepal. The amounts of weapons they are seizing from the security forces and purchasing are adding up to their arsenal.

It is obvious to relate the increase in violence to the augmentation of cadre strength. While in 2004, according to MHA, the total cadre strength of Left Wing Extremists was roughly around 9,300. The current cadre strength has augmented to approximately 16,000-18,000.

Mobile war Increased usage of IEDs is another noteworthy reason for the sustained growth of Naxal fatalities. Reports say that IEDs account for about 40 per cent of the troop fatalities in Chhattisgarh since 2007 and nearly 70 per cent of all injuries sustained by security forces from January 2008 to March 2010. They have advanced their military strategy from guerrilla war using dalams or squads of 5-9 size to mobile war employing platoons and companies. Resort to positional warfare is also suspected and there are clues that they have acquired weapons like UMGs and MMGs, generally used in positional war. They are now likely to defend their liberated areas. In

Increased usage of IEDs is another noteworthy reason for the sustained growth of Naxal fatalities. Reports say that IEDs account for about 40 per cent of the troop fatalities in Chhattisgarh since 2007 and nearly 70 per cent of all injuries sustained by security forces from January 2008 to March 2010 The thrust and extent of success of security operations is another factor which determines the death toll and level of violence. The very high death toll clearly indicates a deficiency in the security mechanism against Left Wing Extremism. The Indian security establishment has been putting its best efforts to contain the Naxal menace since its beginning. The principal groups responsible for most of the Naxal violence during the 1990s included CPI (ML) People’s war, Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), CPI (ML) Party Unity and CPI (ML) Janashakti. During this period, most of the violence existed in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh. The state governments and their security establishment in coordination with the Ministry of Home Affairs, through all these years, have been innovating and implementing various strategies to curb violence. They might, to an extent, have been able to create a roadblock to the Left Extremist movement, but have not been able to contain it effectively.

Special forces The initiatives of the Andhra Pradesh government bore fruits only after 2005, when the violence and death toll was successfully brought down - from more than 200

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

killings in 2005 to less than 20 in 2009. However, in hindsight it appears that the operations in Andhra merely drove out the Maoists into the neighbouring states. Meanwhile, the states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, West Bengal, Maharashtra, Bihar and Orissa witnessed a growth in violence through this decade owing to the shortcomings in the anti-Naxal strategic planning. It is interesting to note that in the MHA reports for successively 5 years since 1995, it is repeatedly stated that “Special Forces are being raised in the affected states and will be given training in jungle warfare, commando operations, handling of explosives, use of sniffer dogs etc.” Except for the Greyhounds of Andhra Pradesh, this did not happen effectively and it took many years to get these measures implemented, thereby keeping the violence on a high. With the success of Greyhounds in Andhra Pradesh in 2005-2006, the security experts realised the urgency of improving security measures and strategies in other states. The breeding of anti-guerrilla Special Forces like Special Action Groups, COBRA etc., setting up of Jungle warfare schools, increasing the number of forces etc. included the advancements in the operations planning. But still, the numbers of those battalions are very small and most of them have not finished training, to enable deployment. Lack of skills in jungle and guerrilla warfare is causing large casualties of security forces, especially the Central Paramilitary Forces. This is clearly evident from many incidents in the past including the killing of 76 CRPF men in Dantewada or ambush of 9 jawans in Gariabandh. More than 100 security personnel were killed till this month by Maoists. This trend has been continuing for the past 15 years and may continue until sufficient battalions of anti-Naxal forces are trained and deployed. The statement of the Union Home Minister should be considered as a timely reminder that Indian state is still lacking the strategy, will and preparedness for fighting the Red menace. The war between the state and the Maoists is almost near a stalemate.

homeland security

BELOW PAR

A timely article on airport security. India should not only learn from the mistakes of the past within our nation but also document the learnings from incidents across the world to avoid recurrence of such events in the future. Breaches in aviation security protocols and processes are not uncommon in various parts of the world, because of systemic or ‘human factor’ failures or absence of appropriate technology with required capabilities to interdict terrorists using innovative methods to evade existing security procedures and processes. Terrorist threats and narcotics are the main threats at Indian airports. Another problem that some airports face is the proliferation of slums around the airport boundaries in places like Mumbai. Considering the growing instances of terrorism across the world, such terrorist detection technologies and the market are expected to grow exponentially from US$ 540 million in 2010 to US$ 6.3 billion by 2014. India needs to embrace such technologies to ensure security of its airports.

D Delhi’s Indira Gandhi International airport is an example, the airport currently is built to accommodate 12.5 million passengers a year but must deal with 16.2 million (for comparison, Thailand’s Suvarnabhumi airport is built to handle 45 million)

All the technology solution providers must be encouraged to take part in strategic issues that deal with security in airports. The threat posed by suicide bombers like the Moscow airport attack is the key to the emergence of transformational counter terror technologies

espite the participation of the private sector in the modernisation of airports, the security aspects in the aviation sector leave a lot to be desired. The website of New Delhi Airport only mentions the routine things that are associated with airport security. The recordings of the CCTV cameras are kept only for three days and hence reports of loss shall be reported immediately to the concerned airport’s Airport Director this is another directive from the authorities. Even the other airport websites touch upon security only superficially. The Economic Times headline on 7th September 2011 screams that the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) has destroyed records relating to mishaps before 2010, raising fears that safety issues in the accident prone sector are being taken lightly. Shockingly, incidents like “recall of an aircraft in midflight” or “the sudden opening of the door in mid-air” are considered by the agency as minor incidents. It appears that even records of serious accidents are kept only for three to four years. Does this explain the alacrity with which instances of serious lapses are invading our skies? Safety records are excellent source of learning for improvements in the future - how can they be destroyed just like that? Charles Runckel is caustic when he talks about Indian airports. To take Delhi’s Indira Gandhi International airport as an example, the airport currently is built to accommodate 12.5 million passengers a year but must deal with 16.2 million (for comparison, Thailand’s Suvarnabhumi airport is built to handle 45 million). Besides poor aesthetics (low ceilings in some places), Charles says that leakages are found in some areas and most airports are in need of upgradation.

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

Airport Security

in India

Team DSA

India has come a long way in terms of airport security, but if one looks at the Asian economies and countries like Japan, Singapore, China, UAE etc., we realise that we are still a long way from where we really have to be. This is more so because in the last few decades, India has undergone tremendous transformation - politically, socially and economically. The gap between India’s rich and poor only seems to be widening. Population explosion is no longer bandied about. Corruption and terrorism have become such routine affairs in the media that they no longer hold the kind of shock value that they had. So, it seems security lapses in the skies are also being treated as routine affairs. Let us recap some of the headlines in the newspapers recently: ■■ Indian Airlines pilots go on strike causing major disruption in the traffic and causing great inconvenience to passengers. ■■ Instances of damages to cargo and theft of baggage and consignments have been reported. ■■ Logistics firms have complained about the enormous time taken for clearing cargo. ■■ A Turkish airplane was stuck in the Mumbai airport runway. ■■ Instances of bird hits, encroachments on airport territory and trespassers in the runways have been reported in Mumbai. ■■ Some airlines are reported to have hired pilots who do not have the desired licences. (Isn’t this scary?) All these instances have been reported despite the fact that the Mangalore air crash

happened only a year ago. Despite this, the apathy of the authorities is appalling and now we have the report of safety records being destroyed. Where is all this going to lead to? Let us look at the chronology of air crashes in India on page 84. A total of 329 people lost their lives when Air India flight ‘Kanishka’ from Montreal to Delhi was blown up by terrorists in mid-air on June 23, 1985, but that incident took place near the Irish coast.

Existing security structure In India, the airport security is the primary responsibility of AAI and airline security is the primary

responsibility of airline operator. Over the past 10 years, the Indian aviation has moved from a closed, poorly managed and over-regulated industry to a more open, liberalised and investor friendly sector. Growth in civil aviation is threatened by challenges such as declining volumes due to high fares, high operational costs, global economic slowdown, security and law and order issues. The Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation (CAPA) has estimated that by 2020, Indian airports will in all probability handle over 100 million passengers every year. Ministry of Civil Aviation stated that international passengers will touch 50 million by 2015. There is a greater need for integration of physical security

with the other security surveillance systems. Let us take the Bangalore International Airport Limited (BIAL). One is not sure if BIAL has a perimeter protection, but even if it has one, we are not sure how effective it might be. This is because the airport is surrounded by a hilly terrain; the surrounding areas are very poorly lit in the nights. The security surveillance paraphernalia are excellent tools for reactive investigations, but how effective are these for proactive actions - this is still a grey area. Let me pose a question. Let us again take the example of BIAL. After the security personnel see your E-ticket and identity proof, they let you inside. But what if someone carries a bomb in a suitcase and leaves it on one of

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

SAARC COUNTRIES : US$ 20 REST OF THE WORLD : US$ 25 NOVEMBER 2011

INDIA : ` 120 VOLUME 3

ISSN

ISSUE 2

0976-206X

9 770976 206003

> VOLUME 3 > ISSUE 2 > NOVEMBER 2011

homeland security

BELOW PAR

Year

Details

Remarks

Jul 7, 1962

Alitalia flight from Sydney crashes into a hill near Mumbai

94 killed

Jan 1, 1978

Air India flight crashes into Arabian Sea

213 killed

Jun 21, 1982

Air India flight crashes at Mumbai airport

17 of 111 passengers killed

Oct 19, 1988

Air India flight crashes at Ahmedabad

124 out of 129 passengers killed

Apr 26, 1993

Air India flight crashes at Aurangabad

55 of 118 passengers killed

Nov 12, 1996

Planes of Saudi Arabian Airlines and Kazakhstan Airlines collide in mid-air near Charkhi Dadri in Haryana

349 people killed

Jul 17, 2000

Alliance Air flight crashes at Patna

60 passengers killed

Sep 4, 2009

One of the engines of Air India flight catches fire at Mumbai

21 injured

May 22, 2010

Air India plane crashes in Mangalore

158 killed

May 26, 2011

9-seater plane crashes in Faridabad residential colony; the plane reportedly nosedived from a height of about 8,000 feet

10 killed

the benches (before the check-in)? We are again dependent on human intervention at the entry point. Despite having the best security solutions available, why are the airports still relying only on human intervention at the entries? One would think of a future technology where a camera at the entrance of the airport does some fingerprint scanning and only when it matches with what is stored in the server will the person be allowed entry.

India has come a long way in terms of airport security, but if one looks at the Asian economies and countries like Japan, Singapore, China, UAE etc., we realise that we are still a long way from where we really have to be Thus, security structure in our airports has improved considerably but the gaps such as the one described above need to be addressed. The most glaring fact is that not all airports have similar wherewithal or facility. Why? At present security officers are posted only at about a dozen airports in the country. Why do we need to have separate safety benchmarks for different airports within the same country? Please visit Ahmedabad and Goa airports and you will see how inadequate they are in terms of their security arrangements. Director General of Central Industrial Security Force (CISF)

Mr N R Das says that India needs a standardised and uniform system of security across all airports in the country. From 92 airports today, India will have 150 airports by 2030 with a total capacity of handling 500 million passengers per year as per Shri V P Agarwal, Chairman of AAI. So, this is all the more reason security in our airports needs to be given greater prominence.

Cargo handling As per a report in Cargo Talk, growing world trade, stringent inventory control standards, increasing demand for transport of perishable, time-sensitive commodities and the need to replace airplanes will create a requirement for 2,490 freighter deliveries over the next 20 years and the world air cargo traffic will be tripled. TNT says that the growth of express cargo logistics industry in India depends on the seriousness with which infrastructure, security and procedure related issues are addressed by the government. Mr R K Saboo, of First Flight Couriers says that load retrieval at various common user terminals is time consuming and affects the overall delivery of shipments. In Mumbai, the common user terminal is located 5 kms from the domestic airport. The government’s open sky policy and liberal air service agreements have led to the presence of a large

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

number of foreign players, which has resulted in traffic congestion and delays at a majority of the airports. Human resources - mostly contractual staff involved in cargo handling have let their greed overtake business interests. In February 2011, workers of Larsen & Toubro which was undertaking modernisation work at Mumbai International Airport Limited (MIAL) accidentally cut the cable which connects the customs Electronic Data Interchange system to the main server. Cargo movement came to a standstill. On an average, the air cargo complex clears around 600 tonnes of cargo for export and around 400 to 500 tonnes of import consignments. The trade was put to a great inconvenience and the exporters and importers suffered huge losses over the weekend. On 26th July 2011, the airport police in Chennai arrested an employee of a private cargo agency, for stealing cell phones from the conveyor belt inside the air cargo hub at Chennai airport. A senior official at the Chennai air cargo hub said it was not difficult for people with access to steal items from the air cargo hub as the station has a poor security mechanism. “Security has become poorer because of the ongoing construction of a new cargo complex,” he said. Many cargo consignments including imported boxes had been found damaged and sealed packets opened

India

Current capacity - no. of passengers per annum at all airports

Prevailing demand no. of passengers per annum at all airports

162 million

95 million

Cargo handling capacity in 2006

Cargo handling capacity in 2010

0.5 million tonnes

3.3 million tonnes

No. of commercial aircraft in India in 2011

No. of commercial aircraft in India in 2030

700

2000

No. of airports in which CISF has a presence

No. of airports in which CISF will have a presence in the future

at airports. AAI has been getting several complaints from importers regarding theft. Most of the culprits are contract labourers of private cargo handling agencies who pilfer these goods. Customs officials said that there was a staff shortage and it was not possible to check all the consignments and verify the documents to see if all the items are there. Typically, theft is discovered after the goods are delivered.

Other security issues The discovery of a ‘crude, bomb-like device’ in the cargo-hold of an ATR aircraft (IT 4731) of the Kingfisher airlines on March 21, 2010 at Thiruvananthapuram airport revived chilling memories of that horrific incident pertaining to the Kanishka tragedy. In India, as elsewhere in the world, civil aviation security is a shared responsibility between government agencies (CISF in our case) and airline and airport operators, each being assigned specific security functions. This model was adopted after the hijacking of IC-814 to Kandahar in1999, where after security at airports was augmented and the CISF replaced state police forces at over 50 airports to professionalise aviation security functions. The Homeland Security Research says that the terrorist detection market in India will reach US$ 6.3 billion by 2014. The January 2011 suicide bomber attack at Moscow’s

airport killed 12 people; airport security authorities had not installed standoff suicide terrorist detection technologies equipment in front of the airport entrance. These systems detect the terrorist explosives at a safe distance and automatically close the airport terminal gates, preventing the terrorist entrance until the cause of the alarm is cleared. The Civil Aviation Authority of Dubai manages the overall safety and security of the airport. In 2005, an upgrade in screening technology and rising security concerns led to luggage-screening processes being conducted behind closed doors, as opposed to them being done just before check-in previously within public view. Dubai Airport Police plans to introduce a biometric identification system for access into restricted areas. In early 2007, Dubai airport introduced a new type of airport screening device which not only detected weapons, but also could screen the passengers for drugs in the blood. Airport food outlets have started using plastic glasses and utensils as opposed to glasses made

out of glass and utensils made out of metal to reduce the usefulness of such items as weapons. In the United States non-passengers were once allowed on the concourses to meet arriving friends or relatives at their gates, but this is greatly restricted now. Australia does not yet restrict nontravellers from accessing the airside area, however non-travellers are typically subject to the same security scans as travellers. Another critical security measure utilised by several regional and international airports is the use of fibre-optic perimeter intrusion detection systems. These security systems allow airport security to locate and detect any intrusion on the airport perimeter, ensuring real-time, immediate intrusion notification that allows security personnel to assess the threat and track movement and engage necessary security procedures. In Singapore, security for the country’s two international passenger airports comes under the purview of the Airport Police

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

homeland security

BELOW PAR

Division of the Singapore Police Force, although resources are concentrated at Singapore Changi Airport where scheduled passenger traffic dominates. Roving patrol teams of two soldiers and a police officer armed with machine-guns patrol the terminals at random. Departing passengers are checked at the entrance of the gate rather than after immigration clearance.

India should not only learn from the mistakes of the past within our nation but also document the learnings from incidents across the world to avoid recurrence of such events in the future While the CISF plays the most visible and nodal role, airline and airport operators also undertake critical security functions in India. The Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS) in the Ministry of Civil Aviation (MCA) serves as the coordinating authority between different agencies as well as the regulatory and auditing ‘watchdog’ for civil aviation security in India. All these entities must view the incident as a challenge and review the security architecture and its weaknesses in light of emerging terrorist methodologies. In view of the increasing security threats, the newly formed Global Air Cargo Advisory Group (GACAG) has decided to adopt a worldwide comprehensive programme to ensure safe and fast cargo traffic. The GACAG emphasises on security and risk based approach - however it stresses that this should lead to minimum disruption in the services. Breaches in aviation security protocols and processes are not uncommon in various parts of the world, because of systemic or ‘human factor’ failures or absence of appropriate technology with required capabilities to interdict terrorists using innovative methods to evade existing security procedures and processes. Instances of passengers, without malafide intention, getting through security undetected with banned items like pistols, ammunition and sharp edged objects are known to happen at various airports around the globe. There have also been

instances of seriously disgruntled airport, airline security and other staff, resorting to threatening activity endangering civil aviation operations or being involved with crime and drug syndicates operating at airports. An ‘insider job’ is now one of the primary threats, in view of the massive and diverse employment profiles at international airports. The possibility of ‘dry runs’ by terrorist organisations, particularly the Al Qaeda and its affiliates, like the LeT, who have an abiding attraction for iconic targets particularly aircraft and airports, must also be factored.

CONCLUSION India’s security market is still in the nascent stage; most of the technologies and product information tend to be fragmented and unorganised. In future, one can expect a demand for full dimension solutions. India should not only learn from the mistakes of the past within our nation but also document the learnings from incidents across the world to avoid recurrence of such events in the future. Airports, we reiterate, are vulnerable spots and so no effort should be spared in strengthening the security within the airports as well as outside it. Identifying weaknesses in the system and taking remedial measures is an urgent imperative. Terrorist attacks and narcotics are the main threats in Indian airports. Another problem that some airports face is the proliferation of slums around the airport boundaries in places like Mumbai. Private institutions should be set up for training airport managers, air traffic controllers, navigation and communication engineers, airport security and fire fighting personnel. The government should insist on a robust emergency response plan and also ensure that airport staff are adequately trained to cope with situations of exigency. The authorities should leave no stone unturned in their efforts to influence people to be vigilant. The National Institute of Aviation Management and Research should be strengthened so as to act as the lead institution for human resource

November 2011 Defence AND security alert

development. Legal hurdles to engagement of contract labour or contractual agencies will have to be dismantled through legislative intervention. Going forward, it will be a good idea to have a single nodal authority comprising of security advisors who can exercise overall control over AAI / CISF as well as the airlines. Considering the ambitious growth plans of our government, this is a necessity. All the technology solution providers must be encouraged to take part in strategic issues that deal with security in airports. The threat posed by suicide bombers like the Moscow airport attack is the key to the emergence of transformational counter terror technologies. Certifying agencies like Underwriters Laboratories (UL) and Conformité Européene (CE) must be encouraged to play a greater role in validating the technology solutions. The maturity and deployment of several standoff technologies capable of detecting suicide and other terrorist attacks at a safe distance will change the landscape of homeland security and the war against terror. Considering the growing instances of terrorism across the world, such terrorist detection technologies are expected to grow exponentially from US$ 540 million in 2010 to US$ 6.3 billion by 2014. India needs to embrace such technologies. Often, people tend to get irritated with the security checks at the airport. The authorities need to use the visual media to drive home the point that those who are involved in the security check are doing their job. The government should give liberal tax incentives on such technologies like terrorist detection equipment, surveillance etc. that are deployed at airports. Needless to add, physical security and technology solutions must work as an integrated unit. Only when steps are taken in this direction, can we consider India to be on a growth path. Model airports like Dubai and Singapore are worth emulating. China is already a step ahead of us in these matters. It is time we smelt the coffee.

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November 2011 Defence AND security alert