DSA October 2010 by Defence and Security Alert

1st A N N I V E R S A R Y S P E C I A L

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OCTOBER 2010

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security from the mother to the motherland... the world of

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FABULOUS PRIZES

mission The power of a King lies in his mighty arms… Security of the citizens at peace time is very important because State is the only saviour of the men and women who get affected only because of the negligence of the State.

— Chanakya

DSA is as much yours, as it is ours! I

t is now a year since we launched your magazine and we wouldn’t be here without you and your tremendous support and encouragement. Here’s wishing you all a very happy first anniversary and with all our thanks. So much has happened in the last one year that the headlines don’t seem the same at all. And most of all, there is something deeply disturbing in the manner the governments of India and of Jammu and Kashmir have responded to the stone throwing mobs. They are, after all, only stone throwing mobs, nothing more, nothing less. And for that rallying crowd to have the two governments in apoplectic fits is a poor testimony to both governance and national priorities. It is one thing to be sensitive to public opinion, but another to buckle and betray a complete absence of balance. The state government can be accused of the former, while the government of India is guilty of the latter. When the first stone came to be pelted sometime in June they were assumed to be part of the Kashmir Valley’s political routine, a public reacting to an innocent’s violent death, or a particularly heavy security clampdown. When the death toll grew, there was a sense of something new at play, a different group of players, a new set of agendas. But as the stones multiplied and the venues changed, it became obvious that this was nothing more than another enactment of the Valley routine, fiery public demonstrations, stone pelting, police jeeps on fire, independence slogans et al. The players are the same, so are the venues and the slogans. Nothing has changed, so why should the governments respond in such a seething manner! What has indeed changed is the reversal of years of gains imposed by the Army and the security forces led by a rejuvenated Jammu and Kashmir Police. In every insurgency the local police has to play the pivotal role and once J&K Police began to, the contours of insurgency changed. No longer could the militants, the few local or the largely Pakistani ones, run through the state as they once did. This was because the local police had got its network up and running and was beginning to deliver results. While the Army had pretty much cleared up the countryside, it was the J&K Police that delivered the urban centres. What was left should have been cleared up by political initiatives. It is difficult to imagine this is the same state that just recently had its first municipal and panchayat elections in decades. The same state that had provided remarkably peaceful polling for the parliament and assembly elections. Which only suggests that obviously the will of the people to participate politically is there, all it needed was a government to play politics to end. Unfortunately for the valley, for India, we did not have that. Instead there was a political drift when it came to Jammu and Kashmir. What with the government of India declaring in January that the Naxals would be finished in three months. Governance is not being unifocal, especially not when it comes to matter of security, terror and insurgency. All these are ingredients of the J&K pot and must be tackled in a systematic manner. Knee jerk reactions are just what the insurgents want and which they have gotten with both governments in a bind over the Armed Forces Special Powers Act. That is a fig leaf, for the people are not going to be taken by such tokenism. And the Army is not going to gain in confidence of the government. Insurgencies are, after all, political problems and can only be solved through governmental initiatives. The Army can deliver the table, served, but it is for the political authority to eat it hot. Cold food in the valley is past its time.

manvendra singh

October 2010 DEFEncE AnD SEcURIty ALERt

publisher’s view

Karmanyevadhikaraste Ma Faleshu Kadachanan Your right is to work only and never to the fruit thereof

- The Bhagwad Gita Volume 2 Issue 1 October 2010

chairman shyam sunder publisher & ceo pawan agrawal editor-in-chief manvendra singh director shishir bhushan corporate consultant k j singh art consultant divya gupta central saint martins college of art & design, university of arts, london corporate communications monika kanchan ad-sales manish upadhyay vivek ojha representative J&K salil sharma creative vivek anand pant correspondent (europe) dominika cosic production dilshad & dabeer webmaster sundar rawat photographers subhash circulation & distribution prem gupta ranjeet, sandeep, virender system administrator vikas e-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscri ption: subscription@dsalert.org online edition: online@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org editorial & business office 4/19 asaf ali road new delhi-110002(India) t: +91-011-23243999,23287999,9958382999 f: +91-11-23259666 e: info@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org

disclaimer all rights reserved. reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part by any means without permission from Defence And Security Alert is prohibited. opinions expressed are those of the individual writers and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher and / or editors. all disputes are subject to jurisdiction of delhi courts. defence and security alert is printed, published and owned by pawan agrawal and printed at graphic world, 1686, kucha dakhini rai, darya ganj, new delhi-110002 and published at 4/19 asaf ali road, new delhi (india). editor: manvendra singh

Our heartiest greetings and best wishes to Indian Air Force on the occasion of IAF day! Dear readers, DSA was conceived and visualised very spontaneously. The journey started with a thought. And the trigger was 26/11 and its aftermath. It took just a couple of weeks to fine-tune the idea and publish the inaugural issue of the magazine with a very small team and today it’s a matter of great pleasure to share with you that DSA has completed one year since its inception and this is the 13th issue in your hands. It was possible only because of guidance and complete support of renowned experts of defence and security who have served their motherland – our Bharat for a long time and it will be eminently correct if I say that they have devoted and sacrificed their whole life for the cause of defence and security of our country. For DSA they are the real Heroes. I salute each one of them and I wish I could mention all their names in this article but their list is so long that it does not seem possible for me and I am afraid that I may miss some names. It was well-nigh impossible to bring out DSA without their support and guidance as I remember how all of them have supported this mission. Many a times, these Heroes have given their articles at the shortest notice from me. We all at DSA really feel indebted to them. We are giving a brief profile of all our contributors and names of their articles recognising their great support to the 12 issues of DSA published so far. It was not an easy task to shift from Hindi literature which has been my forte to English journalism and that too in a completely new niche area. Many doubted if we would get the relevant and worthy articles for the magazine and we will be able to sustain the quality and standards. But we resolutely started the journey which is now gaining momentum and touching new horizons with every issue. Our readers are appreciating the efforts we are making and a collection of the treasured testimonials is included in this edition for your information. I feel it imperative to express my thanks to my entire team without whose hard work, dedication and commitment DSA would not have become a successful magazine in the defence and security genre in so short a time. To begin with I am thankful to our Editor-in-Chief Mr. Manvendra Singh who has been taking all pains from day one in framing the DSA policies, selection of themes of every issue, selection of senior experts and inviting them to write for us and then zealously keeping an eye on every development and guiding the team in all possible manner in spite of his other commitments. I am sure DSA will become one of the best magazines in its genre under his guidance. I am thankful to Mr. K J Singh, our Corporate Consultant who has been advising us every moment as to how the magazine can be improved and established. DSA could not have been published in its present form without his advice. Our Art Consultant Ms. Divya Gupta has been a great source of encouragement, new ideas and creative inputs in shaping the contours of the magazine in spite of her other commitments. It was her vision which brought this revolutionary dimension in defence and security journalism. I also express my thanks to Ms. Monika Kanchan, our Manager, Corporate Communications who has been supporting me in all ways possible to establish DSA as a unique brand in the defence and security journalism genre to make it a successful

October 2010 DEFEncE AnD SEcURIty ALERt

venture. I am also thankful to our circulation team which is headed by Mr. Prem Gupta who has been contributing his best efforts for the visibility and availability of DSA across the country. Our creative head Mr. Vivek Pant is playing a wonderful innings with DSA to improve its overall presentation and I am thankful to him for making it more impressive in every issue. Our production team also deserves a bunch of thanks especially Mr. Dabeer and Mr. Dilshad. My close associates Ranjeet Singh and Vikas have been great support since day one. They have also been a big support to DSA in maintaining and managing all day to day affairs. I welcome new DSA team members Mr. Manish Upadhyay as our Senior Manager, Sales and Mr. Vivek Ojha as Deputy Manager, Sales. I am sure with their long and varied experience DSA will scale new heights in the coming months and years. I am also thankful to all my previous associates who gave their best to shape the magazine in the initial stages from Ms. Sanghamitra Mondal, Ms. Puja Raina, Ms. Sweta, Ms. Shilpi, Mr. Rohit Srivastava, Mr. Vipin to Mr. Garvit who extended their best support during their association with DSA. I owe my thanks to each one of them as well at the completion of one year of DSA. I cannot, in this anniversary issue, forget their respective contributions in its evolution. Jammu and Kashmir has always been a part of India and will always be. No matter whatever these so called leaders like Geelani, Mirwaiz, Yaseen Malik etc. - who are creating hatred in the region and are responsible for the bloodshed - say or do. These people are trying to create another Afghanistan in the region for their existence only as they believe that if such bandhs and agitations continue then only they can survive in Kashmir. Have they ever organised any agitation for the cause of better life for the people of Kashmir for education, health and other important amenities? No, never. The central government has to be tough with these people immediately otherwise things will go out of hand. The only way out is to arrest these so called leaders, put them in separate dark jails in different parts of the country and keep them there for years. The government should conduct a surgery for this ailment at the earliest and should not be scared of bleeding as in every surgery there is likely to be some bleeding. Its better to go for a surgery rather than keep on giving sweet pills of packages which are no more effective in curing the disease. These people are enjoying these pills instead of getting cured for years. I am confident that nothing untoward will happen because of this surgery. Kashmir is the crown of our country and we have to save it whatever the cost and we must conduct this surgery to save it. Why are we scared of any mass agitation or any interference by any country? This is our internal matter and we have to solve it without any further delay and loss of innocent lives. India is strong enough to face such challenges but I am sure if we don’t do this immediately, the situation may deteriorate beyond redemption as we all see happening next door in Afghanistan. DSA released various special issues in the first year. Our readers who could not come across all the issues will get a glimpse of the first 12 issues in this edition. I am happy to share that almost all the issues have been sold out and we have very few copies left with us as our office copies. But you may procure the online editions of these issues for your reading pleasure and reference purposes. This also shows that our initial efforts in this direction were taken seriously by discerning readers which proves that people are interested in this niche subject too. This support also gives us confidence to make DSA a more meaningful and worthy magazine in all forthcoming editions. In the end on behalf of Team DSA, I assure you dear readers that DSA is not just a business venture; it’s a mission to make India safe and secure and its people more alert towards their security. And I seek your support in this mission. I look forward to more guidance and more support from all corners of India and Indians everywhere as I believe that if we start thinking on this we will start acting too. I have complete confidence in the youth of our country that they are now enlightened with the fact that only India can lead this world in the future but the only thing missing in our society is alertness towards security whether it be personal, social, educational, health, financial, food or above all the security of our sacred nation. So if we all are alert to all aspects of security in our lives we can surely lead this troubled world to an era of peace and prosperity for all. And the world is looking towards us in anticipation. As the issue is going to press, we see another attempt to tarnish the image of India by targeting the international tourists at the famous holy mosque, the Jama Masjid on Sunday, 19.09.2010. As we all know that India is hosting Commonwealth Games in the next two weeks, this is to create apprehension and doubt among the international players. Also the verdict by the Allahabad High Court is awaited on Babri Masjid dispute on 24.09.2010. This attempt seems to be part of a larger conspiracy to vitiate the atmosphere of communal harmony at this sensitive juncture. But India is not a soft State and our security forces are competent to defeat the nefarious designs of anti-national elements. JAI HIND!

pawan agrawal

October 2010 DEFEncE AnD SEcURIty ALERt

contents

FIRST ANNIVERSARY SPECIAL

ISSUE OctOBER 2010

Volume 2 Issue 1 October 2010

A R T I C L E S cyber warfare: offensive defence

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Aditya Singh

naxalism: the malady and the remedy E. n. Ram Mohan IPS

security alert system: a national priority Hormis tharkaran IPS

Vietnam and south china sea: intractable wrangle 127 8 16 24

the chinese hauteur

strategic weapons: new military power

Afghan imbroglio: Indian options

Kashmir: a healing touch

monitoring offset obligations

human trafficking: sexploitation

congratulations Sachin!

a letter to the Indian Air Force

cruise missiles: evolution and current status

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) G. D. Bakshi

Dr. Rajiv nayan

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Shantonu choudhry

Brig. (Retd.) Gurmeet Kanwal

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Mrinal Suman

Dr. Mondira Dutta

Air chief Marshal (Retd.) S. P. tyagi Air Marshal (Retd.) t. M. Asthana

aerospace protection: AWAcS

101

women officers: epoch-making journey!

104

disaster management: role of Indian Air Force

109

belligerent neighbours

115

opium economy: destabilising Afghanistan

118

peaceful Europe: an illusion?

124

Dr. Arvind Kumar

Air Marshal (Retd.) P. Bandhopadhyaya

Prof. Rajendra Prasad

Brigadier chitranjan Sawant

Saurabh Sharma Dominika cosic

for online edition of Defence And Security Alert (DSA) log on to: www.dsalert.org

October 2010 DEFEncE AnD SEcURIty ALERt

contents Dr. Pankaj Jha

maritime defences: flying boat option

130

maritime muscle: Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s new thrust

134

national security challenges

139

cecil Victor

Rear Adm. (Retd.) Raja Menon

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) V. G. Patankar

F E A T U R E S DSA the journey so far... DSA treasured testimonials DSA contest-3 winners DSA subscription DSA outlets pan India

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It is an esoteric world designed for war without bloodshed. There are no prisoners-of-war, just dead nations that, most likely, will know what hit them a few moments before collapsing. The only realisation of an attack is when the symptoms occur like the explosion in an oil pipeline caused by a “sleeper cell” implanted in the software.

ith the recent flurry of attacks on government websites, Cyber Warfare has been much discussed and is a live issue. It is a concern at the highest levels and in April this year, Defence Minister A. K. Antony requested Chiefs of all the three services to accord the highest priority to this. The thrust so far has been on defensive aspects of cyber security and how to protect networks (NWs). There is equal concern in the public and private sector not only with respect to security but also crime and sabotage as also increasing number of attacks.

Ambience Organisations do not publicise such break-ins for fear of loss of faith amongst customers and shareholders, however these in a large number of cases emerge to haunt them. An example is the Criminal breach of TJX computer systems announced in January 2007 wherein information of 45.7 million credit and debit cards was exposed to possible fraud in a breach of its computer systems. Court filings by banks that sued TJX estimated the number of cards affected at more than 100 million. Criminals hacked into retailer’s data systems by driving around the stores with a laptop. These hackers sold the stolen credit card information to people in US and Europe via the Internet and also used the stolen cards to illegally withdraw tens of thousands of dollars at a time from ATMs.

The concern is thus for every organ of the State. Richard Clarke, a former White House staffer in charge of counter-terrorism and cyber-security, in his new book on Cyber Warfare envisages a catastrophic breakdown within 15 minutes. Computer bugs bring down military e-mail systems; oil refineries and pipelines explode; airtraffic-control systems collapse; freight and metro trains derail; financial data is scrambled; the electrical grid goes down in the eastern United States; orbiting satellites spin out of control. Society soon breaks down as food becomes scarce and money runs out. Worst of all, the identity of the attacker remains a mystery. Others, specially skeptics like Bruce Schneier disagree. They opine the threat is exaggerated. The truth lies somewhere in between.

Killer friendly Cyber Warfare has remained in the grey realm and yet is referred to as the most serious threat of the 21st century. It is a shadowy domain which has no boundaries or for that matter, respect for state of nations or individuals. It is conducted silently in peace and can be used to devastating effect whenever desired, more so in a conflict situation. Its practitioners can be States, non-State actors or individuals. It transcends both the civil and military domains. It is inexpensive for the attacker and effort and money intensive for the defender. It emerged with onset of the Internet, however, its potential is

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cyber warfare: Offensive defence

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Aditya Singh

now being increasingly exploited with exponential growth in the past three years. The first recorded incident was in 1982, when a computer control system stolen from a Canadian company by Soviet spies caused a Soviet gas pipeline to explode. The code had been modified by the CIA to include a logic bomb which changed the pump speeds to initiate the explosion. Thereafter, in 1998, in order for US and NATO to bomb Serbian targets successfully in Kosovo, the USA hacked into the Serbian air defence system and tricked the Serbian Air Traffic Controllers. The US accomplished its goal so well that there was concern about continuing or escalating the attacks. The perception being that any further hacking of Serbian targets would damage civilian targets. In the 2006 war against Hezbollah, Israel alleged that cyber-warfare was part of the conflict. In 2007 when Israel struck the Deir-Az-Zur nuclear reactor it penetrated the Syrian Air Defence NWs and rendered them ineffective.

Increasing trend Examples in the past three years highlight how such attacks have increased in scope and intensity: ■ In 2007, McAfee, Inc. alleged that China was actively very involved in “cyberwar.” China was accused of

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cyber-attacks on India, Germany and the United States, although they denied knowledge of these attacks. ■ In April 2007, Estonia came under cyber attack in the wake of relocation of the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn. Estonian authorities, including Estonian Foreign Minister Urmas Paet accused the Kremlin of direct involvement in the cyber attacks. Estonia’s defence minister later admitted he had no evidence linking cyber attacks to Russian authorities. In the attack, ministries, banks and media were targeted. ■ In 2007, the United States government suffered "an espionage Pearl Harbour” in which an “unknown foreign power broke into all of the high tech and military agencies and downloaded terabytes of information.” ■ In 2007 the website of the Kyrgyz Central Election Commission was defaced during its election. The message left on the website read “This site has been hacked by Dream of Estonian Organisation”. During the election campaigns and riots preceding the election, there were cases of Denialof-service attacks against the Kyrgyz Internet Service Providers (ISPs). ■ Russian, South Ossetian, Georgian and Azerbaijani sites were attacked by hackers during the 2008 South Ossetia War. ■ In 2008, a hacking incident occurred on a US Military facility in the Middle East. United States Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III had the Pentagon release a document, which reflected a “malicious code” on a flash drive spread undetected on both classified and unclassified Pentagon systems, establishing a digital beachhead, from which data could be transferred to servers under foreign control. “It was a network administrator’s worst fear: a rogue programme operating silently, poised to deliver operational plans into the hands of an unknown adversary. This was the most significant breach of US military computers ever and it served as an important wake-up call,“ Lynn wrote in an article for Foreign Affairs. ■ On 28 March 2009, a cyber spy network (NW), dubbed GhostNet, using servers mainly based in China tapped into classified documents from

government and private organisations in 103 countries, including the computers of Tibetan exiles. China denied the claim. ■ In July 2009, there were a series of coordinated cyber attacks against major government, news media and financial websites in South Korea and the United States. While many thought the attack was directed by North Korea, one researcher traced the attacks to a server in United Kingdom. ■ In December 2009 through January 2010, a cyber attack dubbed Operation Aurora, was launched from China against Google and over 20 other companies. Google said the attacks originated from China and that it would “review the feasibility” of its business operations in China following the incident. According to Google, at least 20 other companies in various sectors had been targeted by the attacks. McAfee spokespersons claim that “this is the highest profile attack of its kind that we have seen in recent memory.”

garner information, study patterns, use the machine as a ‘Bot’ with devastating effect in a crisis or war-like situation.

Definition There is still no formal definition of Cyber war. Some doing the rounds are: ■ Richard A. Clarke, Cyber War (May 2010), as “actions by a nation-State to penetrate another nation’s computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption.” ■ ·The Economist describes cyber warfare as “the fifth domain of warfare, after land, sea, air and space”.

Offensive cyber warfare It has wide connotation and can be defined as any action in which another computer or NW is penetrated is an offensive action. When conducted in an organised manner it constitutes offensive cyber war. In brief it will aim at:

■ Figures in respect of India replicate this disturbing trend. From an estimated 25,600 ‘Bots’ or computers controlled by external agencies in 2007, the number has now gone to over 2 million. Similarly, attacks on government NWs have doubled every year. There has recently been the much publicised case of the officer posted in Andaman and Nicobar Islands where a large number of files and presentations were stolen and found their way to an inimical power.

■ Information gathering. Recent examples are Titan Rain and Moonlight Maze.

Low profile penetration

– Military activities that use computers and satellites for coordination are at risk of equipment disruption. Orders and communications can be intercepted or replaced.

Big Brother is not only ‘watching you’, he is probing into your computer, stealing information and manipulating it to varying degrees – all without your knowledge! A major reason why this remains concealed is also that a potential adversary while intruding would by design always keep it to a level that the user does not come to know and continues to have a false sense of security. In fact the more a computer or NW is used, the greater is the information that the adversary obtains. It is only when stolen data is misused such as in the case of the credit cards that cases come to light. What is of import is that no enemy will ever reveal the secrets or vulnerabilities he has garnered. He will keep them to

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■ Vandalism. Defacing web pages, or use denial-of-service attacks to take them down. In the recent past a number of Indian public websites were defaced. ■ Sabotage. Including destruction of data. This is of major concern with respect to national security and encompasses:

– Power, water, fuel, communications and transportation infrastructure. All may be vulnerable to disruption. Some are concerned that computer hardware may have malicious software hidden inside or inserted during maintenance which can be activated when required.

Current realities After land, sea, air and space, warfare has entered the fifth domain of ‘cyberspace’. According to Spy Ops by the end of 2008 nearly 140 countries possessed at least basic cyber

attack capabilities and an unknown number of extremist groups had also developed or acquired cyber weapons. Some commercially available products are flexible enough to be classified as dual purpose – security testing tools as also weapons of attack. In addition, some organisations have and / or are developing cyber weapons and cloaking them under the heading of security testing tool. Naturally it is all classified and each nation must work on its own. After updating the cyber warfare threat matrix that assessed the cyber capabilities of over 175 countries and organisations, the following watch list of the top ten was compiled by the USA: 1. China. 2. Russian Business NW. 3. Iran.

7. North Korea.

thus no option but to ensure a degree of security measures and ‘offensive defence’. After all one can only defend when one knows the manner in which an attack will come. Methods of potential adversaries must therefore be under constant study.

8. Japan.

US assigns “Strategic Asset”

9. Turkey.

President Barack Obama has declared America’s digital infrastructure to be a “strategic national asset” and appointed Howard Schmidt, the former head of security at Microsoft, as his cybersecurity tsar. In May 2009 the Pentagon set up its new Cyber Command (Cybercom) headed by General Keith Alexander, Director of the National Security Agency (NSA). His mandate is to conduct “full-spectrum” operations - to defend American military NWs and attack other countries’ systems. Precisely how and by what rules, is

4. Russia tied with France. 5. Extremist / Terrorist Groups. 6. Israel.

10. Pakistan. “Craig Mundie, chief research and strategy officer for Microsoft, said “there are at least 10 countries in the world whose Internet capability is sophisticated enough to carry out cyber attacks … and they can make it appear to come from anywhere.” What is of disquiet for India is that two of our neighbours as also terrorist groups figure in this list. There is

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For military aspects there is a need to create a Cyber Command. This should comprise not only the three services but personnel from the DRDO, scientific and technological community. To start with this could be combined with the Space Command which is being talked of. The US Cyber Command created under Gen. Alexander at Fort Meade last year could be studied to arrive at an organisation for India secret. In the US National Security Strategy issued on 26 May 2010 the President has stated: “Use of Force: Military force, at times, may be necessary to defend our country and allies or to preserve broader peace and security, including by protecting civilians facing a grave humanitarian crisis. We will draw on diplomacy, development and international norms and institutions to help resolve disagreements, prevent conflict and maintain peace, mitigating where possible the need for the use of force. This means credibly underwriting US defense commitments with tailored approaches to deterrence and ensuring the US military continues to have the necessary capabilities across all domains - land, air, sea, space and cyber. It also includes helping our allies and partners build capacity to fulfill their responsibilities to contribute to regional and global security”. Studies and Papers: There is a plethora of literature and discussion on this aspect in USA. Given that it controls the Internet, it must ensure its use by whatever means necessary. Among the advocates for offensive ‘Cywar’ are Gen. Eugene E Habiger, USAF (Retd.), Daniel Ventre, Richard Clarke, Col. Charles W. Williamson III, Eric Oliver et al. The main thrust is an offensive capability for deterrence.

However, what constitutes deterrence, who is supposed to be deterred and how it is to be undertaken is all a matter of discussion. Amongst others, 24 AF under the US Cyber Command has been created for offensive operations. Britain and NATO. Cyber-security policy outfit and an “operations centre” based in GCHQ, the British equivalent of the NSA has been set up in the UK. A Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) has recently been set up by NATO. Others. Many other countries are organising for cywar, among them are Russia, Israel and North Korea. Iran boasts of having the world’s secondlargest cyber-army. Several countries in the Middle East use Russian hackers and scientists to operate on their behalf. As a result, Israel has attached growing importance to cyber-tactics and has become, along with the US, France and some other nations, involved in cyberwar planning. Many international high-tech companies are now locating research and development operations in Israel, where local hires are often veterans of the IDF’s elite computer units. Aman (Israel’s Military Intelligence) has the 8,200 Signals Intelligence for cyber operations.

China’s headstart China talks of “winning informationised wars by the mid-21st century”. China has demonstrated its intention to become an internationally leading player in the fields of Information Warfare (IW) and Cyber Warfare more than 20 years ago. It began to publish its theories, doctrines, policies or strategies concerning both defensive and aggressive use of cyberspace. The main characteristics of this Chinese approach to IW and Cyber Warfare, has two main dimensions, military and civilian, both developed through theoretical and practical considerations. ■ Military dimension. The dazzling success of the USA in the first Gulf War was interpreted by several armies in the world as the victory of new technologies. Information was central to RMA. From the mid 1990’s, the PLA had implemented its modernisation, guided by the concept of “informationisation” (that means the acquisition of dominance over information

October 2010 DEFEncE AnD SEcURIty ALERt

technologies and cyberspace). A great number of publications have defined the concept and strategies of IW in China. The joint action of Computer NW Attacks (CNA) and EW against C4ISR and logistic systems NWs of the adversary constitutes the basis of offensive Chinese IW. Several military training centres (in Zhengzhou, Wuhan and Changsha) have delivered training programmes to military staff since the mid 1990s. Starting 1997 international media has reported a number of IW exercises conducted by military forces. The exercises are evidence of the transition from theory into practice. The actual IW and Cyber Warfare capabilities of China remain unknown. Whatever these capabilities are, gaining power and superiority of cyber dimension has become a major thrust area for China. Thus the global level of military development is measured through the level of IW capabilities. The objective is to be able to win wars conditioned by information before 2050. Without any ambiguity, China is deeply committed: “Cyber war is no longer a matter of science fiction”, declared Colonel Dai Qingmin in 2009, adding that “the Internet will become the place of an inevitable arms race“. ■ Civilian dimension. The involvement of the civil sector is reflected in many ways: China develops its military capabilities in close relationship with private industry and academia, putting into practice the policies promoting the connection between private and public sectors, civilian and military sectors. This phenomenon can be observed in a great number of industrialised nations. At the frontier of civil and military dimensions, militia units established by the Army in various military provinces, involve citizens from the industry or academia. Units have been set up that have expertise in IW, Electronic Warfare, Psychological Warfare, Information Operations, NW Warfare, etc. Some sources suggest the existence of links between some suppliers of the PLA and the hacker community, one might question whether the PLA has any power over this community. Chinese IW is mainly devoted to managing power relations with the outside (to ensure the position of China on the world stage), but this may also be applied within the framework of its

borders: information and cyberspace superiority are thus a matter of power in China. In recent years, technological progress has played the spoilsport. Social NWs (Twitter and Facebook) have become new actors and tools on the national and international political scenes. In August 2009 an article published on CENEWS Site (Central European News in Chinese) described Twitter and the social networks as a new weapon, a tool of subversion, of cultural and political infiltration of a country, a tool for spreading rumours, a powerful political and destabilisation tool. Cyberspace is a vulnerable weaponised system. China knows how to play with it. But it is the victim of this vulnerability too.

democracy what example will India set? et al. The primary argument must be that it is to garner knowledge to find how systems are breached and thus provide the ability for defensive measures to be developed for public, commercial and private NWs. There is a further contention that it must be done to have the ability to deter an attack. There is the issue that this capability cannot be demonstrated hence credibility will be suspect. However, ambiguity in this regard needs to be created. Moral arguments will stand thin in face of realities and cogent examples of other nations. Given the structure of Indian polity and planning, any strong step may not get the supportive directions.

inexpensive for the attacker. Decision makers have few choices after an impact and all of them are costly to implement. Proactive defence however, is key to mitigating Operational risk. A Proactive Pre-emptive Operations Group (P2OG) was created in 2002 in US.

There is therefore a need to clearly define the objectives and ensure these are in keeping with international norms.

Infrastructure’. What this implies is unclear and may be defined in the rules which are yet to be issued. There is no provision for any ‘offensive action’, thus these must fall within this Act and its rules. ‘Immunity’ as mentioned in the Business Standard report of 4 August 2010 may not legally be tenable. An analogy could be that there is no international understanding to protect an agent on a covert mission outside a country’s borders. Therefore legal provisions cover criminal activity in the cyber domain and law enforcement or investigation measures, form part of this Act.

■ Legal provisions. Legal provisions for any such activity need to be structured under clauses of defensive measures. The IT Act as amended in 2008 covers all actions in this domain. Section 69, which has been objected to by some, has provisions for monitoring traffic in certain conditions. Section 66 covers cyber terrorism. Section 70A mentions ‘protection of Critical

Indian scenario What should India do? It cannot be a silent observer and for proper defence, the old adage of offense must apply. A lot that can be done and the Business Line of 4 August 2010 in an article by Thomas K. Thomas, mentioned that the National Security Council (NSC) has proposed setting up of laboratories in research institutions with the help of ethical hackers. These would train intelligence agencies for carrying out such activities. It was reported that these agencies would be given legal immunity. The lead agencies for this mentioned are the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). While the veracity of this report is questionable, there can be no argument with the need for this approach. Any such ‘offensive’ action will always be in the grey realm and can never be public whether it is by a government agency or a private institution. Commercial concerns too have to protect their interests and it would be naïve to expect there is no industrial or financial ‘snooping’ going on at present. There are a host of moral, ethical and legal arguments as also international understandings. Thus issues which must be considered to take the argument further are: ■ The Objective. Given current realities, any such step will invite a host of objections. The Internet being a facility for the universal good, how can India misuse it? India must observe international norms and protocols. As a

■ Proactive cyber defence. One way to do this is to act in anticipation to oppose an attack against computers and NWs. It represents the dynamic between purely offensive and defensive action; interdicting and disrupting an attack or a threat’s preparation to attack, either pre-emptively or in self-defence. Proactive cyber defence will most often require operationalising upstream security (security from the ‘Cloud’) mechanisms of the telecommunications / Internet providers. Some of the compelling reasons for a proactive defence strategy are about cost and choice. As mentioned earlier, it is often

■ Developing capabilities for a war scenario. Other countries have accepted cyber war as a threat and are developing capacities for offensives for

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a warlike scenario. It must also be so for India and falls within its legitimate rights. India is taking measures for conventional and nuclear threats. It must be so for the cyber domain. As acknowledged, it will take time but needs to be pursued with firm resolve. It must however remain covert and ambiguous and could also form part of the strategic deterrent. ■ Grey realm and doctrine. Thus whatever India does, has to be in the grey realm. By implication any formal offensive ‘cywar’ measures would remain within the government domain and restricted. They cannot be public. What needs to be done is for the government to clearly enunciate it as a public doctrine or policy that it will take every measure to protect NWs, systems and users and build capacities. This would be applicable to all organisations and draw on capacities outside the public domain as tools for implementation in a large number of cases, would be similar. ■ The structure. Cyber security transcends government, public and private domains. It thus has to be coordinated at the highest level, in India’s case NSC may be best positioned to do so. An example is that of the USA where this is directly under the White House wherein Harold Schmidt is the ‘cyber tsar’. There may be need to create such an office which could oversee and coordinate both defensive and offensive cyber operations. There is a need to also have close coordination with the private sector as they in a growing India, are equal if not larger stakeholders. Regular meetings must be held and if needed a forum created. Current organisations which could be tasked to take on this role include the NTRO, the Defence HQ. Others could be intelligence agencies such as RAW and IB. Reps of DRDO, CERT, NASSCOM etc. will invariably be involved. Each would have to function under guidelines. This apex coordinating structure merits considerable thought and a proper system of operation. ■ ·Cyber command. For military capability there is a need to create a Cyber Command. This should comprise not only the three services but personnel from the DRDO, scientific and technological community. To start with this could be combined with the Space Command which is being talked

of. Many aspects overlap and it would economise on resources. The structure must be flexible and need based. The US Cyber Command created under Gen. Alexander at Fort Meade last year could be studied to arrive at an organisation for India. ■ ·Capacity building. Capacity building is vital. It must also be sustainable and of larger benefit. There is thus a need to create an R&D base and support institutions. The questions that arise are Why? For what? How will it help? Who will invest? How will it be sustained? With current levels of Internet penetration and usage, the requirement has not hit home. However, as its use grows at an increasing pace, the requirement of ‘Cyber Doctors’ and sleuths is going to grow in day-to-day life. Given realities, this has immense employment potential. Just as 26/11 created a whole new dimension of requirement of physical security services, Internet usage and transactions will create millions of jobs in the cywar domain in the future. It will be a seller’s market and India must provide the human resource. The government and private enterprises must accelerate this process. Some thoughts in this regard are: ■ Partnerships. India cannot go it alone. Attempts only by public agencies will not be the solution. This has to be seen as a global issue and capacities developed across the board to meet international norms. Data protection is a global concern and if India has to increase its share of the BPO industry it must develop internationally accepted norms of protection of NWs and data bases. ■ HR and R&D. The Dept. of IT has set up a programme called Information Security Education and Awareness (ISEA) with funding. Other options which need to be considered are government, public and private institutions. China is a guide in this regard. They set up four Universities in the 1990s. As mentioned earlier, measures to ensure security of data is unquestionable. Private industry and government agencies could combine for talent spotting and training. Competitions such as CyberPatriot in the USA are an example. This is an ethical hacking competition involving over 300 schools set up by private companies and ISPs along with government agencies. Students compete to hack into

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programmes. It is jointly funded and provides a large talent base for all, thus a win-win situation. It would not be too dissimilar to the quiz competitions on TV NWs where schools from all over India compete to disply their prowess. ■ Testing and certification. As a large protion of hardware in the IT and telecom industry is imported, testing and certification capacity has to be Indian. Eventually, hardware for critical infrastructure must be Indian. Till that is so, this capacity can ensure security and can also be adapted for proactive defence. ■ Innovation. The key in the Internet is innovation. Funding in this regard should not be an issue. Here too the PPP model needs to be exploited. ■ Language training. HR trained in language of our potential adversaries is a must. Only then can one garner full information. This must be provided suitable incentives and permanence of employment. ■ Understanding vulnerabilities. It is not as if others do not have vulnerabilities. These exsist specially in respect of potential adversaries and must be exploited as it is in the conventional domain. It is not that India does not have this capability or capacity. It would be realistic to assume that work on this is ongoing. What needs to be stressed is not the change but the increasing pace of change and volume that we have to contend with in this realm. It is a new field and India has to adapt and adopt new methods and systems. Given realities it will be no easy feat, but the perils of not changing or not adopting an offensive approach could be catastrophic.

The writer retired on 30 September 2007 as GOC-in-C, Southern Command,vv the largest and senior-most Command of the Indian Army. Prior to this he had been C-in-C, Andaman & Nicobar Command from Jan 2005 in the aftermath of the Earthquake and Tsunami of 26 December 2004. In this capacity he was also the Vice Chairman and Operational Head of the Integrated Relief Command responsible for the emergency relief and rehabilitation of the ravaged Islands. He now devotes time to strategic and national security issues, looking after educational establishments and building institutions.

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would like to state at the outset that I hold the firm belief that in any insurgency, the first step that the government should take is to study the economic background to the insurgency, assess the causes and then dovetail the security strategy with the plan of setting right the economic, social and development failures by the government so that economic and social injustices are set right as the security operations progress.

the malady and the remedy E. N. Ram Mohan

The root cause I believe that handling an insurgency is best left to the professionals. It is absolutely necessary to leave politics out of it. I am basing my article on two factors only - security and delivering economic and social justice. I feel that when this is done the insurgency will wither away because there will be no cause for any of the people of the affected areas to fight with the government. I have always held that the best model of a counter-insurgency that succeeded was the campaign conducted by President Magsaysay of the Philippines against the Huk guerillas. In fact the leftwing extremism or Naxalite insurgency that we are facing in this country strongly resembles the situation in the Philippines when the Huk insurgency erupted before the Second World War and continued after the country was given freedom by the United States.

If the country does it will belong to no one.

not

belong

everyone

- Tupamaro Manifesto. Nothing illustrates the abysmal immorality of the state of things than to have a few families mine the land of its minerals and amass huge wealth and political clout even as the miners are paid bare subsistence wages. Worse, the tiller of the land is dying in droves. If Naxalism is a threat to national security, remove the threat which, ironically, is not Naxalism or Maoism but the poverty, which every anecdote shows, spawns Naxalism. 16

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In India the obstacles hindering the counter-insurgency effort are easily identified. They are bad politics and not just bad politics but rotten politics. One of the major obstacles is something that the Philippines did not have. This is caste and this is at the root of the Naxalite problem. The third problem is a peculiar concept that was introduced into the body politic and administration of India during the emergency and perpetuated thereafter by all political parties without exception. This is the concept of committed bureaucracy to not just the party in power but to the family heading the party in power. When you have a situation of the caste factor being conjoined with the political factor, then you have a stranglehold where on the basis of caste the oppression of the poorer economic communities continue and economic and social justice is continually denied and the concept of committed

bureaucracy protects the perpetrators who are oppressing the lower castes. Denied economic and social justice, the oppressed classes are motivated by the left-wing extremist parties and you have an insurgency on your hands. Let us now examine the incidents of left-wing extremism in India briefly, assessing the cause of resorting to violence in each case.

1946: Tebhaga movement The demand was for the share of the landlords to be reduced from one half to one third. The movement spread from Rangpur and Dinajpur in the north to 24 Parganas in the south. When their demands were not heard the Kisan Sabhas, dominated by the Communist Party, encouraged the peasants to forcibly take two thirds of the harvested crop from the granaries. As a result there were bloody clashes between the peasants and the landlords. The movement petered out when the landlords with the help of the local administration let loose a wave of repression.

1946-51: Telangana The movement was directed by the Communists from the very beginning. The peasants launched their struggle on economic issues against forced labour, illegal exactions and unauthorised evictions. It soon developed into an uprising against the feudal rule of the Nizam. More than 4,000 lives were lost before the Communist Party withdrew the struggle. The Telangana insurrection (1946-51) was broad-based and had no parallel in Indian history since the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny.

1967: Naxalbari The revolt was in the area of three police stations - Naxalbari, Kharibari and Phansidewa. About 65 per cent of the populations of these three police stations were scheduled castes and tribals. They worked as agricultural labour or in mines, forests and plantations. A small percentage owned small holdings. The majority cultivated on agency basis (baghchash). The baghchashis were exploited by the jotedars. When the land reforms act was passed in 1955, the jotedars started malafide transfers of land. Santhals armed with bows and arrows forcibly

occupied the lands of the kulaks, lifted stocks of hoarded rice and killed an Inspector of police. Thereafter there were a number of such incidents. After this there was a major deployment of police forces by the CPI (M) government and after several operations the movement was squashed. The leadership of the movement was by communist cadres who were following the path set by Mao Zedong after the Cultural Revolution. This culminated in the formation of the Communist Party of India Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML) on 22 April 1969. Not more than a score of people were killed in this uprising, but it left a far reaching impact on the entire agrarian scene throughout India. It was like the throw of a pebble bringing forth a series of ripples in the water.

1968: Srikakulam Girijans or tribals comprised about 70 per cent of the population of Srikakulam district living in the agency area of the Eastern Ghats. They were mainly involved in agriculture, while some collected minor forest produce. The British, conscious that they may be harassed by the plainsmen decreed that no land could be transferred from a girijan to a plainsman without the permission of the District Collector. The Act was unfortunately observed more in the breach. The traders and money lenders took full advantage of the poverty of the girijans. They gave them daily requirements like tobacco, kerosene, salt and cloth on credit and also lent money for purchase of seeds. Those unable to clear their debts were made to part with their land. Thus most of the fertile land was alienated from the girijans and passed into the hands of the plainsmen. The landlords squeezed them to the utmost and paid subsistence wages. Lease holders had to give two-thirds of their produce to the landlord. It was in 1967 that one Vempatapu Satyanarayana started work among the girijans. The movement he led was able to make substantial gains for the poor girijans. Wages of farm servants rose, the landlordâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s share of harvest was reduced from 2/3 to 1/3, 2,000 acres of land was wrested from the landlords and more than 5,000 acres of wasteland came under the possession of girijans.

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1967-71: Midnapur, Birbhum The Midnapur district of West Bengal bordering Bihar and Orissa witnessed a well planned and well organised Naxalite movement in the Debra and Gopibhallavpur police stations. The district has a sizeable tribal population of Santhals, Oraons and Lodhas. The majority of them were landless labourers. A small proportion owned small plots of land or cultivated the jotedar’s land under the barga system.

Gopibhallavpur has a long forested border with Orissa and Bihar. After the Naxalbari uprising in 1967, a section of CPI (M) workers in Midnapur started propagating the extremist line. They supported the kisans and bargadars and worked for a movement against the jotedars.

1968-70: Bihar, Uttar Pradesh The Mushahari block of Muzaffarpur district of Bihar covered 12 villages with a population of about 10,000 people. There were various forms of oppression by the upper classes on the peasantry. In April 1968, the peasants of Gangapur harvested the arahar crop of the landlord in broad daylight. Retaliation was quick. Bijli Singh the zamindar of Narsingpur organised an attack on

the peasants with 300 men armed with lathis, swords and firearms with the landlord leading on an elephant. In the fight that ensued, the landlord and his hoodlums were routed. The humbling of this powerful landlord by the harijan peasants had a magical effect on the surrounding villages. Kisan Sangram Samitis were formed and there were incidents of seizing of land by the peasants. The Mushahari struggle caused ripples to spread into

Darbhanga, Champaran and Chota Nagpur. Here in May 1970, 54 adivasis were arrested in the Jaduguda forest during police operations. A British girl Mary Tyler was found among them. Later she wrote poignantly about the movement - “The Naxalites crime was the crime of all those who cannot remain unmoved and inactive in an India where a child crawls in the dust with a begging bowl, where a poor girl can be sold as a rich man’s plaything, where an old woman must half starve herself in order to buy social acceptance from the powers that be in her village; where countless people die of sheer neglect, where many are hungry while food is hoarded for profit, where usurers and tricksters extort the fruits of labour from those who do the work, where the honest suffer, while

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the villainous prosper, where justice is the exception and injustice the rule and where the total physical and mental energy of millions of people is spent on the struggle for mere survival.” The Naxalite violence that erupted in Singhbum and Ranchi had more serious dimensions. Jamshedpur became a mini Calcutta, with instances of attacks on schools and government offices and police pickets. Schools were also attacked in Jamshedpur. There

were also large scale attacks in Ranchi. In Uttar Pradesh, the Palia area is part of the Lakhimpur district in the Terai region. It was inhabited by Tharu tribals. The state government encouraged poor peasants to go to the Palia area, allotting 10-12 acres of land to each family. In actual fact landlords forcibly occupied big chunks of land, ejecting the poor peasants. This provided the Naxalites with fertile grounds for agitation.

Fatal flaws In all these states the Naxalite movements were organised and coordinated by various CPI (ML) groups. Unfortunately the top MarxistLeninist leaders like Charu Mazumdar in West Bengal, Satyanarain Singh of Bihar, were not tactically sound

In the forest tracts, laws should be legislated that only forest dwelling tribes and scheduled castes should have access to forest lands. Very strictly, upper castes should be prevented from entering the forests. Cooperatives should be organised of tribals who can be trained and only these tribal cooperatives should be allowed to trade in forest produce. Branches of banks with micro credit loans as operated by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh should be set up with forest cooperatives to sanction loans to the forest tribes. The Paramilitary forces that were used to hunt the Naxalites should now be used to enforce the new laws for the forests in their approach. They thought that there would be mass uprisings and they could build up a Peoples Liberation Army from the rag-tag band of peasants who had revolted against the atrocities of landlords and money lenders. Charu Mazumdar succeeded in arousing the students of Calcutta who left their studies and went and lived in the forest villages and shared the tribulations of the tribals. The vital element of building up a guerilla force training and equipping them to take on the might of the State was lacking. One by one the movements fizzled out. Meanwhile internal dissensions between the factions of the CPI (ML) also disrupted the movement. A number of top leaders were arrested,

including Charu Mazumdar. When he died shortly after, it marked the end of a phase of the Naxalite movement in India.

The resurgence However, it was only a lull. The movement was to surface again, for the Indian government had not removed the causes of the insurgency. This movement was not going to be finished with cosmetic remedies. The causes were deep rooted in caste, the crucial factor behind the exploitation of the poor and the downtrodden.

1980: Peoples War Group Andhra Pradesh has a radical tradition going back to the Telangana struggle of 1946-51. The Girijan awakening in Srikakulam had preceded the Naxalite movement. The forces of the state squelched the uprising by 1970. The movement however continued to simmer. After Charu Mazumdar’s death, his associates Kondapalli Seetharamiah, K. G. Satyamurthy and Suniti Kumar Ghosh formed a Central Organising Committee in December 1972, concentrating in organising and mobilising the masses. They decided to eschew militancy until such time as the party was strong enough to embark on a course of violence. Kondapalli Seetharamiah encouraged the party workers to commit money actions an euphemism for dacoity or robbery. He was arrested on 26 April 1977, but jumped bail and thereafter organised underground activities on a large scale. He broke away from the COC CPI (ML) on 20 April 1980 and formed the CPI (ML) Peoples War Group (PWG). For the next ten years he moved from strength to strength and the Peoples War Group emerged as the most formidable Naxalite formation in the country. What led to the resurgence of Naxalism in the Telangana area? The basic reason was the continued economic exploitation of the tribals by the landlords, traders and government officials especially those of the Forest Department. As P. S. Sundaram wrote “The tribals owning small pieces of land are expropriated and sharecroppers impoverished. They are all kept under perpetual bondage towards repayment of a small debt supposedly taken generations ago. The forest wealth is

freely smuggled out by contractors in connivance with the forest staff. The tribals get neither a remunerative price for their produce nor a fair wage for their labour.” The social dimensions of exploitation were far more revolting. The landlords of the region were commonly known as dora (lord). C. Lokeswara Rao has described the high-handedness of the doras - “The tyranny of Doras in Telangana is unmatched. Tribal girls working on the Dora’s land are forcibly taken in his household and are at the disposal of the master and his guests.” On 20 May 1981, the Naxalites had called for a meeting of tribals at Indraveli in Adilabad district. More than 30,000 tribals had turned up. The administration refused permission for the meeting, apprehending a clash between landlords and tribals. The tribals were determined to have the meeting. There was a lathi charge and firing and 13 Gond tribals were killed. The PWG exploited the anger of the tribals and consolidated their hold on the area. Kondapalli Seetharamiah was arrested for the second time on 2 January 1982. He escaped from hospital on 4 January 1984. He now concentrated on organisation of the PWG cadres. He constituted Forest Committees for the forest areas and Regional Committees for the plains areas. Armed squads or dalams comprising 6 to 10 members were formed. About 50 dalams were soon active in Telangana. The PWG is believed to have redistributed nearly half a million acres across Andhra Pradesh. The modus operandi was to forcibly occupy excess land of big landowners and give it away to the landless or to the labourers working for the landlord. As per the state government’s own admission, counter affidavit 68/82 filed by the state against the Naxalites, the radicals had forcibly redistributed 80,000 acres of agricultural land and 20,000 acres of forest land. I wonder that the court did not react to this. What was the government doing all this time since the land ceiling act came into being? This is the crux of the matter in Andhra Pradesh and in many states of India. The land ceiling act is not enforced. The party activists insisted on a hike in the daily minimum wages from ` 15 to ` 25 and the annual fee for jeetagadu (year

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long labour) from ` 2,000 to ` 4,000. The poorer sections were particularly happy at these two measures. They found that what the politicians had been talking about and the government promising year after year could be translated into a reality only with the intervention of the Naxalites. Gorakala Doras (Lord of the Bushes) is how the Naxalites came to be known in the interior forest areas.

Revolutionary bards Revolutionary writers helped in furthering the Naxalite ideology. The moving spirit of the Jana Natya Mandali, the cultural front of the PWG was Gummadi Vittal Rao, better known as Gaddar. This wandering ministrel’s ballads inspired the simple tribal. He became a legend in Andhra Pradesh. The PWG fought a running battle with the Telugu Desam government. When the Congress came to power in 1989 they took a soft line with the Naxalites, freeing a number of Naxalites who were under detention and in prison. They however did nothing to control the exploitation of the tribals like enforcing the land ceiling or controlling the moneylenders. The Naxalites began organising, extorting money and running peoples courts,

giving the general impression of a parallel government. The Congress resumed the hard line.

Counter-operations Soon the PWG had spread to the adjoining areas of Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa and into some areas of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. They also acquired 50-60 AK 47 rifles probably from the LTTE. Naxalite violence was gradually stepped up peaking in 1991 with several attacks on railway and electrical installations and police stations and patrols. On 8 May 1992, the PWG was banned and coordinated operations commenced against them by the Central Paramilitary forces and the state police. The results were good with 3,500 cadres being arrested and 8,500 surrendering. By 1993, the Naxalites surged back with violence again rising. They now spread to the Bastar district of Madhya Pradesh, which till then was a sleepy forest outpost. The tribals of Bastar were used to a life of deprivation. They made the truant teacher to take classes regularly and the absentee doctor to attend to his patients. The tribals began to look at the Naxalite cadres with awe and respect.

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The Peoples Union of Civil Liberties wrote about Bastar - “A lopsided socio-economic development of the district caused by exploitation through cheating and duping was an ideal setting for the Naxalites to take root in the area. With their idealism, free of corruption or other vested interests, they could win the confidence of the tribals. They punished corrupt officials and made the tendu leaf contractors to increase the wages. The movement spread to Balaghat and Rajnandgaon districts. Gadchiroli district of Maharashtra is largely inhabited by tribals. The jungle is spread through 10,495 square kilometers out of the district area of 15,434 square kilometres. The entire life of the tribals revolves around the forests, yet the tribals were denied access to the forests due to a stupid interpretation of the Forest Act and rules. With the coming of the Naxalites, the forest officials abdicated their jurisdiction. The best testimonial of the presence of the Naxalites was given by an innocent tribal who got a lift from the Commissioner of Scheduled Castes and Tribes during his visit in Gadchiroli district. The Naxalites are called Dadas in Gadchiroli. When asked about the Dadas, the tribal replied - “There is at

least one change since the Dadas have come. The government atrocities are over and the police cannot harass us.”

New left The best description of the dismal state of affairs in Bihar is summed up by Arvind N. Das - “Bihar’s economy has been at a standstill for decades. The discriminatory nature of public and private investments, the green revolution bypassing the state, principally on account of nonimplementation of land reforms, the wilful subversion of whatever social security system existed, all these have pushed the people into poverty, the economy into backwardness, the society into violence.” The resentment of the oppressed sections in this environment found an outlet in the emergence of a ‘New Left’ manifested in the form of three Naxalite groups in the beginning of 1980 - The Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), CPI (ML) (Anti Lin Piao Group) and the CPI (ML) Party Unity. In May 1982, the Bihar government reported that 47 out of the 857 blocks were affected by the Naxalite movement. Subsequently the movement has grown enormously in the face of a corrupt, casteist and incompetent administration. When the CPI (ML) was formed, one Naxalite group Dakshin Desh had remained aloof. Amulya Sen and Kanai Chatterjee were its leaders. They considered mass mobilisation as a precursor to armed action. The group chose Jangal Mahal area of Burdwan, with a sizeable population of scheduled castes and tribals, for its operations. Agricultural land was inadequate, irrigation virtually non-existent, and the wage rates dismally low, all conditions suitable for a Naxalite uprising. The landlords generally belonged to the upper castes, while the sharecroppers and landless labour were scheduled castes or tribals, the ideal cocktail for the Naxalites to enter. By 1973, the party had 37 militias who organised actions like looting of foodgrains, killing of class enemies and snatching of arms. In 1975, the group was renamed as the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC). The MCC gradually spread over central Bihar. Its membership exceeded 10,000 and they had stockpiled about 700 weapons including some AK rifles. Vinod Misra formed the CPI (ML) Anti Lin Piao faction in December 1973. It struck roots in

Bhojpur district and spread to Rohtas, Jehanabad, Patna and Nalanda districts. They had 50 underground armed squads and some weapons, mostly country made guns, a few rifles and sten guns. The Indian Peoples Front was the political front of the Anti Lin Piao faction. The CPI (ML) Party Unity was formed in 1982 by the merger of the COC CPI (ML) of Andhra and the Unity Organisation of CPI ML of West Bengal. The Party Unity has about 30,000 members. It has 25 armed squads holding about 150 weapons, including a few sten guns.

Third phase – rearmament The third phase of Naxalite violence commenced with the holding of the 9th Congress of the Peoples War Group in 2001 in which it was decided to give more sophisticated arms to the Peoples Guerilla Army. This phase has extended the Naxalite war to nine states.

Salwa judum The case of the exploitation of the adivasis of Bastar is a little different from the similar cases in Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, Bihar and even Maharashtra. The area affected in Madhya Pradesh borders Telangana and Srikakulam and also Koraput in Orissa. The adivasis are much simpler than their counterparts in the states mentioned. When Andhra Pradesh organised the Greyhounds - a counter insurgency force with the help of a retired Security Service Bureau officer in 1989, the quality of the counterinsurgency operations improved and the leftist guerillas found themselves at the receiving end. Encounters forced them to retreat into Bastar and Koraput, where they found their brother adivasis much more meek and tolerant of the oppression by the caste Hindu landlords and the banias. The problem here was less with exploitation on land and much more with sale of forest produce. The hardened guerillas of Andhra found their brother adivasis too timid to arouse and join forces with them against the oppressors. At this point they made a mistake and tried to intimidate the adivasis of Madhya Pradesh and coerce them to join their groups. This press ganging alienated many of the local adivasis. And they began to look for help to the district authorities. It was at

this point that some local adivasi leaders who were in politics and the local civil bureaucrats and police officers got the idea of resettling the forest dwelling adivasis in areas where some control could be exercised over them. This has gravitated into forcing many forest dwellers to leave their huts and come and live in settlements nearer the towns. Sudeep Chakaravarthi travelling in the area was aghast to see the miserable conditions of these forest dwellers living in dirt and squalor in miserable shanties. In many cases the police and civil bureaucracy has forced the forest dwelling families to burn their huts in forest glades and come and live in the settlements.

Resettlement Madhya Pradesh has meanwhile been divided and Bastar and Dandakarnya forests are now in Chattisgarh. This concept of resettling forest dwelling adivasis is the worst step that a professional fighting an insurgency would take. It is worse than the regrouping of villages done in the Naga Hills and Mizo Hills districts. The Nagas and Mizos have not forgotten the scars of that terrible period. There was one saving grace in that resettlement. Politicians were not involved in it. In the salwa judum the lead role is of the politician. Nothing much is left to the imagination as to how much of the funds for the resettlement are reaching the hapless people. The politician and the bureaucrat must be getting at least 70 to 80 per cent and a miserable 20 per cent must be trickling down.

West Bengal example It will be seen that in all the theatres of Naxalite violence, there has been a diagnostic response only in one state - West Bengal. Here the CPM government carried out operation barga under which sharecroppers were registered and given permanent and inheritable rights on cultivation of their plots covering a total area of 11 lakh acres. Besides 1.37 lakh acres of ceiling surplus and benami lands were acquired by the state government and distributed among 25 lakh landless and marginal cultivators. The land reforms have seen the emergence of a new class loosely termed rural rich weakened the social and political power enjoyed by the landlords in the countryside.

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Land ceiling This has not even been thought of by Andhra Pradesh or Bihar where the Land Ceiling Act has not been enforced after more than 50 years of its legislation. And sadly this is not the end of the picture in these two states. The law enforcing officers say openly that the Naxalites are a band of thugs and criminals and must be wiped out. There is no question of the land ceiling being enforced. What they have left unsaid is that it is the right of the upper classes to have hundreds of acres of land and it is the duty of the scheduled classes and tribes to slave on these lands for the benefit of the upper classes.

Tenancy rights In this regard, the case of land tenancy in Kerala is of interest. The upper classes in Kerala were generally landlords but with medium holdings. The majority of the landlords had tenant farmers on their lands who deposited half of the crop to their landlords. The landlords themselves and their progeny were educated and took up white collar jobs in the metropolises of the country. When the CPI (M) was elected in the late fifties, they legislated land tenancy laws that transferred ownership of tenant holdings to the tenants who were having tenancy for 12 years. At one stroke hundreds of upper caste landlords lost their holdings and tenant farmers got ownership rights of the lands that they had tilled for long years. This is one reason why the Naxalite movement did not grow roots in Kerala. They had no cause. The issue in the forest lands of Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh and Jharkhand is different. Traditionally the forests here have been the home of the tribals for centuries. Here again the root cause is the caste factor. It is the vaisya who trades. It is he who is the moneylender. In thousands of years of Hinduism the roles of the castes have been honed well. You will find that in the forests of all the Naxalite affected states, the bania has had a vice like grip on the tribals. He lends money to them and collects minor forest produce against the loans, taking care to keep the tribal perpetually indebted. Here then is the crux of the problem. The same situation exists in Bihar, where the brahmin, bhumihar and rajput

will have his land holdings in the names of his pet dogs and cats rather than allow the land ceiling to be enforced. In the landed areas, the upper castes are the main political factor and they will not allow the lower castes to get their share of land. In the forested lands, it is the bania, the vaisya, who is in league with the political class and who bribes the bureaucrat and keeps the poor low castes and the tribals in perpetual subservience. There can be no solution to the problem of the CPI (ML) leading a proletariat rebellion without solving the basic problem of giving rights to the lower castes and the tribals and putting an end to the exploitation by the upper castes. Measures like the salwa judum are clever ploys by the same upper caste politician and bureaucrat nexus operating. Above all there can be no military solution to this problem.

The way forward In the landed areas, the first step is to enforce the land ceiling. This has to be done forgetting the political factor of particular political parties wanting to retain power in states like Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. The Central Paramilitary forces and the state Police which are used in operations against the Naxalites should now be used to enforce the land ceiling, evict the landlords from their excessive holdings and ensure that the surplus lands are cultivated by the lowest classes and tribals. They should ensure that the crops grown by the new landholders are secure and they harvest the crop keeping the landlords away. Once this is done the Naxalite cadres will not use landmines on the police forces. In the forest tracts, laws should be legislated that only forest dwelling tribes and scheduled castes should have access to forest lands. Very strictly, upper castes should be prevented from entering the forests. Cooperatives should be organised of tribals who can be trained and only these tribal cooperatives should be allowed to trade in forest produce. Branches of banks with micro credit loans as operated by the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh should be set up with forest cooperatives to sanction loans to the forest tribes. The Paramilitary forces that were used to hunt the Naxalites should now be used to enforce the new laws for the forests. They should

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see that the bania does not enter within 100 kilometers of a forest. They should ensure that all trade is carried out only by the Forest Cooperatives. They should guard the branches of the micro credit Grameen Banks. When this is done the tribals will know that the government is now with them at last and they will befriend the police force and stop putting land mines for them. The Naxalite problem will then wither away. Today there is a very serious issue hanging fire, concerning the forest dwelling adivasis. This is the issue of minerals discovered in the forests where the adivasis are living. The simple issue is - who owns these minerals? The government, both state and central and all the political parties, save the CPI (Maoist) say that the minerals belong to the government and they have the right to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with any Company, Indian or Foreign to mine the minerals. The CPI (Maoist) and the adivasis whom they are organising say that the minerals in a forest in which they have been living for centuries belong to them and only they can decide to mine the minerals through a mining company. Going by the history of exploitation of the scheduled castes and tribes by the upper castes for thousands of years it is clear that minerals in a forest belong to the adivasis who were dwelling in that forest for thousands of years. In the United States the Red Indians were pushed into reservations by the White man. Today when oil or minerals are discovered in the Reservation where a particular Red Indian tribe has been confined, the owners are all the Red Indians living in that Reservation. Similarly in Australia, oil and minerals discovered in the Reservations of the Aborigines belong to those Aborigines. Is it not imperative that we do as the Americans and Australians did in their respective countries?

Mr. E. N. Ram Mohan, IPS was DG, BSF, Advisor to Governor of Manipur and Member National Security Council Advisory Board.

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few days back, on the anniversary of 9/11, the newspapers in India carried a front page story with the headline “Police Sound Alert in Mumbai”. The alert was based on intelligence inputs received from the Union Home Ministry which said that two foreign nationals had entered Mumbai in the recent past to cause disruption in crowded places. The Police circulated the names, description, age and photographs of the foreign nationals and requested citizens to be alert, look out for the suspects and pass on any relevant information to the nearest police stations and to two dedicated numbers. The Police, on their part, had formed a number of teams to nab the two suspects and activated CCTV’s to monitor “religious and other crowded places in the city”.

No “red alert” Himanshu Roy, the Joint Commissioner (Crime), Mumbai Police did not use the term ‘Red Alert’ while briefing the Press in this regard. However, most people believe that we have in our country a system of colour-coded security alerts with the colour red indicating the highest level of threat. The reason is that for years, the term ‘Red Alert’ has been used loosely in the media and the movies giving rise to such an impression. The fact, however, is that we have no such system in place.

We need one

inputs which had become available the previous Friday, regarding the possibility of a terrorist action in Hyderabad. However, the Police was unable to take any effective preventive action since the specifics of the place and time where the attack was to take place were not available. In the domain of national security, there are two distinct wings which must work in perfect co-ordination if optimum results are to be achieved and citizens are to feel secure. On the one hand, there are the Intelligence Agencies which generate intelligence about the activities of criminals, anti-nationals, terrorists etc. and on the other, there are Security Forces, including the Police (which is our first line of defence as far as internal security is concerned), the Central Paramilitary Forces and the three Defence Services who are expected to initiate action on the basis of the intelligence received.

National security grid Within the Intelligence Agencies, there are the intelligence operatives in the field who produce intelligence and there are those who analyse these intelligence inputs, trying to make sense out of disparate inputs and who are responsible for passing on the ‘final product’ to the ‘consumers’, or the ‘security practitioners’ in the Police, the Paramilitary Forces and the Defence Services.

Recent events impacting on our security, especially the attacks in Mumbai on November 26, 2008 have brought out as never before the need for a security alert system. As per information available in the open domain, there were certain intelligence inputs regarding the attack that materialised on 26/11. All of us are aware that despite these inputs, the most stunning terrorist attack in India’s history did take place.

There are many areas where discord can arise amongst these various components of this National Security Grid. There could be differences of perception between the operative and the analyst within the Intelligence Agencies or between one Intelligence Agency and another. There could be differences of perception between the analyst in the Intelligence Agency and the final consumer, i.e. the officer in the Security Forces who has to act on the basis of the inputs provided by the former.

There have been similar other instances in the past when despite availability of intelligence inputs admittedly wanting in details, terrorist attacks could not be prevented. In August 2007, there were two blasts in Hyderabad on a Sunday, which killed a number of people. According to media reports, there were intelligence

The intelligence operative in the field very often feels that a piece of information which he collected and which he believes to be very important, generated through hard work, taking considerable risks, is trashed by the intelligence analyst to whom he sends it. The analyst’s expectations are high and he is rarely satisfied with the bits

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and pieces that trickle in from the field. It is his responsibility to keep his consumers happy with ‘actionable’ intelligence. He burns the midnight oil to put the bits and pieces together, connect the dots etc. and produce an intelligence report, which to his mind is the best that he can produce while being true to facts. However, almost invariably the feedback he gets from the consumer who has to act on his report is that it is not actionable.

Hormis Tharkaran

Holistic inputs This does not mean that the consumer is putting up an excuse to shirk his responsibility. For the consumer, i.e. the Police or Paramilitary or Defence Service Officer, it is important to know where exactly the enemy is at a given moment - or, in the context of 26/11, to have a holistic idea about the nature of attack to be anticipated with specific information as to when and where the attack is to take place. The ultimate dream of the intelligence operative is to get hold of a document which contains the enemy’s plan of action in its entirety. There have been historic occasions where such documents have been procured through intelligence operations. But realistically speaking, such occasions have been extremely rare. Thus the intelligence operative, the intelligence analyst and the security practitioner, whether he be a military officer or a police officer has to do most of the time with imperfect intelligence inputs. The real challenge is how to make the best use of such imperfect inputs.

Deterrent effect The general conviction of security practitioners is that it is difficult to take any effective steps against a terrorist attack without knowing the exact nature of the threat. However, the fact is that heightened activity on the part of the Security Forces, by itself, is bound to have a deterrent effect, even in the absence of specific information about the nature of the threat. This is clear from the fact (as per media reports) that the terrorists panicked when a boat which they mistakenly suspected to be an Indian Navy vessel approached the hijacked Indian vessel in which they were sailing. Consequently, they

security alert system:

a national priority

It makes eminent sense to codify and disseminate to every corner of the country what drill each member of society must take on being informed of a specific level of threat garnered from intelligence inputs. It is in keeping with an age-old dictum that an alert raised in a particular time and place will tend to induce hesitation or deflect conspirators against the king or nation-State for fear of exposing themselves before they can act. They have to begin anew which gives the monarch or the targeted nation-State a breather or clues. During the Mumbai attack the terrorists had to change ships suddenly and they made the gravest of mistakes.

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transferred themselves hurriedly into a dinghy, leaving behind in M.V.Kuber, two invaluable pieces of evidence, a GPS instrument giving details of their route and a satellite phone they used for communicating with their handlers in Pakistan.

In the United States of America, the Homeland Security Advisory System was introduced in pursuance of a Presidential Directive a few months after the Al Qaeda attacks on September 11, 2001, to provide “a comprehensive and effective means to disseminate information regarding risk of terrorist acts to Federal, State and local authorities and to the American people". It has five levels of threat - Severe (Red), High (Orange), Elevated (Yellow), Guarded (Blue) and Low (Green).

Possibilities Based on this principle, it is possible to devise a Security Alert system taking into account intelligence inputs which may not be specific in details, but do point towards the likelihood of a terrorist attack. This is where the skills of the Intelligence analyst as distinct from the Intelligence operative come into play. He has to link the inputs with bits and pieces received earlier and grade the level of threat. This, then has to be discussed amongst the members of the now reinvigorated Multi-Agency Centre before an appropriate Security Alert level is agreed upon and given due publicity. The alert could be for the whole country or limited to that city or state which is likely to be targeted.

The latest initiative by the United Kingdom in this regard is Her Majesty’s Government’s Security Policy Framework issued in May 2010. This framework

Operating procedures However, before the system is introduced, it is necessary to familiarise the Security Forces at all levels about the Standard Operating Procedures which need to be adopted in response to each level of alert. The general public has to be educated as to what security precautions they would be expected to take at each level of threat. This has to be an elaborate exercise. Those who manage schools, hotels, malls, markets etc. will have to be told what action is expected of them at each level of threat.

Timebound It is also necessary to devise ways and means to ensure that the alert, once sounded, does not stay in place forever. It will have to be laid down very clearly that unless renewed, the alert will expire after a prescribed period, perhaps a week. Otherwise, there is a danger that people would gain the impression that the alert is a routine affair and hence tend to ignore it. It is also imperative to ensure that intelligence agencies do not develop a propensity to grade threats at a higher level than the inputs would warrant and keep the alert in place for long spells. It

must be laid down that the frequency of feedback in the form of Situation Reports from the agencies goes up progressively at each higher level of threat, so that the officials have to put in greater effort and longer hours of work if they are inclined to keep the threat level artificially high in order to protect themselves against any unforeseen contingency. However, most of our intelligence officials are responsible people and such safeguards are called for merely in order to keep the odd recalcitrant official under check.

Grading The security alert system that we introduce in our country need not

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necessarily be a colour-coded alert mechanism. Alerts could be graded in their degree of gravity even by means of alphabets (A,B,C etc.) or numerals (1,2,3 etc. or I, II, III etc.). There are several models available in other countries which could be followed by us while introducing a security alert system. The VIGIPIRATE Plan introduced in France nearly three decades back to counter the GIA threat has received favourable reviews from security experts. The jurisdictional parameters and procedures of the various agencies and departments responsible for responding to terrorist threats have been spelt out in this Plan. The scope of the programme was enhanced after 9/11.

(The Mumbai) terrorists panicked when a boat which they mistakenly suspected to be an Indian Navy vessel approached the hijacked Indian vessel in which they were sailing. Consequently, they transferred themselves hurriedly into a dinghy, leaving behind in M.V.Kuber, two invaluable pieces of evidence, a GPS instrument giving details of their route and a satellite phone they used for communicating with their handlers in Pakistan speaks of ‘threat levels’ and ‘response levels’. Threat levels are based on the

analysis and assessments of inputs of various kinds regarding anticipated terrorist attacks. However, response levels are mostly related to sites and their vulnerability.

Advantages What are the advantages of having a Security Alert system in place? For the intelligence operative and the intelligence analyst, the very fact that their inputs play an important part in determining the level of threat is itself a matter of satisfaction. There cannot be scope for criticism that they did not act on the inputs available to them. The very act of defining the level of threat would be an activity based on the available intelligence inputs. The consumer would not say that the input is not actionable, because at every level of threat, there is a set of actions to be initiated. The consumers, i.e. the Police, the Paramilitary and the Defence Services, on the other hand, would know what exactly they are supposed to do at any given level of threat. There cannot be room for criticism that they did not act on the information provided to them.

Citizen’s role For the common man, he would

get a clear idea of the government’s assessment of the level of threat. He would also have a clear idea of what he is expected to do and what precautions he has to take given the level of threat. To that extent, there is less scope for panic. Finally, the Security Alert system would provide the government with a well-defined set of parameters to judge whether the intelligence personnel and the security personnel did their job in anticipating and responding to a crisis situation or emergency. In the ultimate analysis, the State has the responsibility to alert its citizens when there is credible information of a terrorist threat, or for that matter any other threat including natural disasters. It is time that we in India put a well-crafted Security Alert system in place.

The writer was Secretary (R) in the Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India and Director-General of Police, Kerala. Currently, he is a Member of the National Security Advisory Board and is also a Visiting Professor at the Department of Geopolitics, Manipal University. He writes on strategic issues and police reforms.

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The Chinese hauteur

Maj. Gen. (Retd.) G. D. Bakshi

China is now taking concrete steps to project its power through Jammu and Kashmir into the North Arabian Sea. India will have to do something about it or forever remain a power of â&#x20AC;&#x153;low-level equilibriumâ&#x20AC;? as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh put it. For one thing it should reiterate that the whole of the former princely state is an integral part of India and, at the same time revise its stance on Tibet. Merely stamping stapled visa sheets may send a signal but China must be turned inwards if it is to be stopped. 28

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he phase of the peaceful rise of China now seems to be over. The Dengist advise of “Hide your capabilities and bide your time” era seems to have come to a premature end in 2009. The global financial crisis seems to have hastened the onset of this new Chinese phase of surprising assertiveness. The Chinese possibly see the US as bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq and the initial awe of the Chinese military with the US initiated RMA seems to have worn off.

Gloves off Possibly the development of the Chinese Dong Feng 21D missile is behind the new-found Chinese confidence in challenging the US Navy. This antiship ballistic missile was specifically developed by China in the wake of the 1995 Taiwan crisis as an answer to US aircraft carrier battle groups. The Dong Feng 21D is an aircraft carrier killer missile that could sink or put at serious risk any US carrier battle groups that might sail to the defence of Taiwan or South Korea in any future crisis. Armed with this new wonder weapon, the Chinese have exhibited a surprising degree of virulence. They stridently opposed US-South Korea exercises in the Yellow Sea and actually forced the US to back down and hold them well away in the Sea of Japan. Future US exercises in the Yellow Sea will still have to be without the aircraft carrier George Washington.

Larger picture Closer home, the Indian media’s strident hype on Chinese tactical intrusions on the LAC last year had sidetracked attention and concern from the far more serious aspect of China’s “strategic intrusions” into India’s backyard in South Asia. Overtime these strategic intrusions will prove to be far more dangerous than the tactical intrusions of a few meters or more on the LAC. It is imperative that the issue is seen in the larger perspective instead of being smothered in the details of tactical trivia. China started its economic modernisation in 1978. It thus has a headstart of almost 12-13 years over India (whose economic liberalisation commenced only in 1991). China consciously sought a peaceful periphery to pursue its economic modernisation

unhindered. Hence China deliberately tried to create a peaceful periphery to focus unhindered on its economic modernisation. What is now apparent in hindsight however is China’s conscious Grand Strategy to deny India this very same peaceful periphery via its “string of pearls” stratagem. The prime component of this strategy was to build up Pakistan’s nuclear and conventional military capabilities to a level which would enable it to destabilise and permanently keep India off-balance. Pakistan thus became China’s primary catspaw and principal surrogate in South Asia.

Strategic use of nukes Unfortunately for the last three decades India has been in a state of denial regarding the unprecedented levels of nuclear proliferation and conventional military support that China has provided to Pakistan. Given the stark security consequences of this Chinese support and the levels of nuclear and military parity engendered between India and Pakistan, such denial is dangerous. The harsh reality is that the degree of proliferation support provided by China to Pakistan is simply unprecedented in the history of international relations. Consider the following cold facts: ■ China provided the blueprints of a Nuclear device to Pakistan and also HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) for two bombs. ■ China tested Pakistan’s first nuclear device at Lop Nor in 1990. ■ China gave the M-9 and M-11 missiles to Pakistan. ■ When the US imposed sanctions on the Chinese firms supplying these missiles, China put A. Q. Khan in touch with the North Koreans. ■ China paid for the Nodong and Taepodong missiles purchased by Pakistan from North Korea. ■ China is now assisting Pakistan in converting its nuclear arsenal from HEU to lighter Plutonium weapons. For this it is helping Pakistan build a Plutonium Reactor and will supply two more in the years ahead.

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Pak proxy All this support was given precisely in the period that India was making major peace overtures to Beijing. It is noteworthy that in December 1988 Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had visited China in a pathbreaking visit to restore ties. This was the period in which the Chinese had given Pakistan blueprints for the bomb. In fact in 1990 China had permitted Pakistan to test its first nuclear device at Lop Nor. No other country in the world has gone to such lengths to provide this degree of proliferation support to another. This action had disastrous consequences for India’s national security, but we seemed to be blissfully unaware and fully engaged in thawing our relations with China. This level of nuclear proliferation support therefore is unprecedented and in itself poses the greatest danger to Indian security. Thereafter China stepped up delivery of M-9 and M-11 missiles to Pakistan even as it talked peace and tranquility with India. This must also be seen in relation to the fact that almost 70-80 per cent of Pakistan’s main battle tanks, combat aircraft and artillery pieces are of Chinese origin. China’s massive support has given Pakistan notions of nuclear and military parity with India. It is precisely this parity that has emboldened Pakistan to wage a relentless proxy war in J&K and now a jihad in Indian cities. It is the Pakistani dimension of the Chinese threat that needs to be clearly understood for it is the core of the Chinese containment strategy against India. Viewed in the light of the determined Chinese inroads into Nepal, Myanmar and now Sri Lanka and Gilgit, the encirclement strategy becomes apparent.

Asymmetries The second aspect of the Chinese threat comes from the steadily aggravating military power differential that is emerging between the two States. China’s defence budget has been rising annually by double digit percentages for over one decade. India’s Defence Budget in 2009 was US$ 39.8 billion. In sharp contrast, Chinese sources estimated China’s Defence Budget at over US$ 75 billion. The Pentagon points out that this does not include China’s massive outlays on defence

research and development and other heads. If these are factored in, China’s Defence Budget stands at a whopping US$ 150 billion a year. This amounts to almost a 250 per cent differential annually and should be a cause for serious disquiet.

Maintain deterrence India cannot engage in a ruinous arms race with an economically stronger China. However the capability differentials and asymmetries have to be kept at reasonable levels so that these do not present windows of opportunity to a rising China. Indian capabilities must be sufficient not just to dissuade but to deter. Creating huge capacity differentials could simply invite attack / aggression. We simply cannot permit major asymmetries in Comprehensive National Power (CNP) to emerge to a level which opens serious windows of vulnerability. Doctrinal aspects China’s primary military threat had emanated from the former Soviet Union. With the sudden collapse of the USSR, China felt that its threat perception had undergone a dramatic paradigm shift. The Chinese doctrine of Local Wars now stemmed from paramount leader Deng Xiaoping judgment that small and medium local conflicts and not general total wars were the most likely threats. China’s military doctrine therefore changed from the defence in depth of the Peoples War era, to active defence and then to Local Wars under high tech conditions. Gulf War I shocked the Chinese into starting their own military modernisation and switch to “Local wars under conditions of Informatisation”. However the Chinese doctrine for limited war envisages very high levels of the use of military force and lays heavy stress on pre-emption and seizing the initiative. Nuclear differential China currently has some 250 warheads in its inventory. By 2020 these could rise to 500 bombs (ranging from 10 kt, 90 kt, 250 kt to 2.50 mgt). It has hardened its nuclear silos, converted from liquid to solid fuelled missiles that are far more manoeuvrable and MIRVed. It has 60 ICBMs (DF-31 of 8,000 km and DF-31 A of 13,000 km range).

By 2020 it will have 100 ICBMs and 6 Jin class (Type 094) nuclear submarines each armed with 12 JL-2 SLBMs (MIRVed with 3-4 warheads each). Besides DF-25 class IRBMs, China’s 2nd Artillery Corps has over 1,000 SRBMs with conventional warheads that will be fired in salvos to precede major ground attacks or prevent US carrier battle groups from intervening in any conflict over Taiwan. Overall China has 15 Missile Brigades grouped into four Bases. Air Force: The most disquieting development that has not attracted its due share of media attention is the rapid qualitative upgrade of the Chinese PLAAF. This had a vintage fleet of the 1950s and 60s era F-6 (Mig-19) and F-7 (Mig-21) class of fighters. This fleet is rapidly being replaced by third and fourth generation fighters like the Russian SU-27 and SU-30 and their Chinese copies the J-11. The mainstay of the Chinese Air Force will be the J-10 (Chinese F-16 equivalent fighter based on the Israeli Kfir design). China already has 150 J-10s, 97 SU-30s, 48 SU-27s and over a 100 J-11s. By 2020 China will have a formidable fleet of 1,200 J-10s, 200 J-11s, 200 SU-27 and some 100 SU-30. It is jointly developing the JF-17 with Pakistan and will have some 250 of these aircraft. It is now developing a fifth generation J-X Stealth Fighter. It already has AWACS and air-to-air refuelling capability. Thus by 2020, the Chinese Air Force could field 2,300 combat

aircraft of the third / fourth generation to India’s just 750 combat aircraft. So far the Indian Air Force had the qualitative edge. This will now stand largely eroded. China will soon have a significant quantitative edge as well as qualitative parity (if not a clear advantage). This tilt in the air power balance is the most ominous development in security terms. This will not go away simply by admonishments to the Air Force brass not to demoralise the nation by highlighting this asymmetry. The nation should be acutely conscious of this differential and do its utmost to create the requisite degree of balance in an acceptable timeframe. Army: At 1.6 million men, the PLA is the world’s largest Army. As per the Military Balance 2009 it has 40 divisions to India’s 28, some 7,660 Main Battle Tanks (MBTs) to India’s 3,978 and 17,700 artillery pieces to India’s 10,360. Besides there are some 60 Divisions worth of the People’s Armed Police (the Internal Security Force) the bulk of which are demobilised PLA Divisions. Navy: Due to the Taiwan-centric focus of Chinese operational thinking, the PLAN received heavy funding and priority in modernisation. By 2020-2030 it could have three carrier battle groups and 60 submarines (10 nuclear) and 78 surface combatants to India’s two / three carriers and 17 submarines (1/2 nuclear) and 58 surface combatants.

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Denying a visa to Lt. Gen. Jaswal is a major and deliberate provocation. China is now defining an ever increasing list of core areas / red lines. Taiwan, Tibet and now South China Sea, East China Sea and Yellow Sea are all core interests where it will brook no interference. Do we have any core interests left any more? Should we not define our red lines in J&K? China has a well articulated strategy of “Access Denial” to stop intervention by US Carrier Battle Groups by firing salvos of medium / short range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and sending in its submarines in packs. The DF-21D missile could become a significant game changer in naval warfare. Could it end the era of the dominance of the aircraft carrier? Space China tested its first anti-Satellite Missile in January 2007. This year it has carried out an Anti-Ballistic Missile test. By 2020 it hopes to have 200 remote sensing satellites and a military Space Station (It has already launched three manned missions and a lunar orbiter). It is planning for nano satellites that will serve as space mines and has invested heavily in cyber warfare capabilities. (There are reportedly 30,000 computer professionals in its military and two hacker brigades). Infrastructure The most pertinent is the major infrastructure differential between the Chinese logistic capacities in Tibet and Xinjiang versus ours in the Himalayan region. China now has a standard gauge railway line up to Lhasa with a capacity of up to eight trains per day.

This is being extended up to Nepal and the Chumbi Valley. By 2030-2050 two more rail links will connect Tibet with mainland China and Xinjiang. Tibet will have over 60 airfields. The existing road network has been upgraded and this has created a paradigm shift in the Chinese logistical capabilities in Tibet. The scale and velocity of any Chinese build-up has now already gone up by a factor of over 120 per cent. Training The Chinese Defence White Paper of 2006 had identified the three phases of a Chinese Perspective Plan that forms a blueprint for a super power status: ■ First Stage (to be completed by 2010) aims to lay a solid foundation for the country’s military posture and produce a modern force capable of defeating a moderate sized adversary (India, Vietnam, Taiwan). This phase has been completed a year ahead of schedule. ■ Second Stage (to be completed by 2020) aims to catch up with second tier world powers like Russia, Japan and EU and embrace information based operations and technologies as the principal focus of its modernisation. ■ Third Stage (to be completed by 2050) aims at being an advanced military information power by the middle of this century. This is a euphemism for catching up with the USA and achieving full fledged super power status with global power projection capabilities and a Blue Water Navy. Watershed year The year 2009 will probably go down as a significant year in Asia’s recent history. China, which had studiously been maintaining a low profile to focus on its economic development shed its inhibitions and began to flaunt its military muscle. The era of “hide your capabilities, bide your time” was over. The Global Financial Crisis has debilitated the US power and encouraged China to strike a far more assertive profile in Asia. This was also the 60th Anniversary of the PRC and it showcased its military might at the Anniversary Parade. Its PLA Navy and PLA Air Force held major expositions in 2009 to showcase their strength.

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Threatening exercises What was most significant however was a series of some 23 major military exercises culminating in the large scale Military exercise called Kuayue (or Stride). Four Divisions from four different Military Regions of China (Lanzhou, Jinan, Guangzhou and Shenyang) took part in this exercise. What was most significant was that all previous Chinese military exercises have focused on Taiwan and rehearsed for an amphibious assault. This was the first major exercise not focused on the renegade province but on overland military operations against possible adversaries like India and Vietnam. The Chinese papers termed it “Trans Military Area Command Exercise”. These exercises entailed high speed mobilisation and long range manoeuvre (to actualise the transregional War Zone Concept in which the resources of many Military Regions are focused on to a single conflict zone for a Local War under conditions of Informatisation). In the Kuayue Exercise however, these four divisions were not focused on one single combat zone. Rather a division each from these four Military Regions mobilised rapidly – moved almost 2,000 kms each to the other military region to carry out two sided exercises in unfamiliar terrain that entailed assault river crossings of major rivers and culminated in joint live fire exercise at the field firing ranges. These four exercise sets were: ■ Shenyang-Lanzhou. Some 10,000 troops and 1,000 vehicles of Shenyang MR were deployed at the foot of the Helan mountains in the north west of China (to the Lanzhou MR). ■ Lanzhou-Shenyang. Mechanised Infantry Division from the Lanzhou MR mobilised and moved to the Taonan tactical training area in the Jelin Province of the Shenyang MR. This force practiced a major assault river crossing of the Yellow River. A 250 meter pontoon bridge was launched to enable the divisional crossing. ■ Jinan-Guangzhou. Troops of the Jinan MR mobilised to the Guangzhou MR. Main Battle Tanks were moved by rail and lightly armed troops moved by the new high speed bullet trains and civilian aircraft. ■ Guangzhou-Jinan. A Motor Rifle Division of the Guangzhou MR

■ All these exercises culminated in joint live fire drills in the tactical training bases of the four military Commands. These used Laser Combat Simulation systems and tested encrypted satellite communications. The long range mobilisation used civilian airlines, rail networks and high speed bullet trains.

It is noteworthy that there have been a large number of unreported clashes between Vietnamese Navy patrol vessels and the Chinese Navy in the disputed Spratley and Paracel Island group last year. In fact the Chinese had warned the ONGC not to carry out drilling in the block allocated by Vietnam. Alternatively these river crossings were possibly designed to ensure continued movement in scenarios in which enemy air attacks were to destroy existing bridges on the Chinese induction routes.

■ The Shenyang to Lanzhou series of exercises were definitely rehearsing a scenario with India as the likely target. The reverse direction enabled a rehearsal of North Korea centric contingencies. The Jinan to Guangzhou component of the Kuayue Exercise was clearly targeted against Vietnam. Ominously, these exercises practiced assault river crossings. These put out the sinister message that in any future conflict between China and Vietnam, the Chinese intend to drive deep beyond the border hill belt and perhaps attempt assault crossings of the Red River or the Mekong River in Vietnam.

Taiwan has already been coerced into submission by a series of high profile Chinese military exercises and missile firings designed to highlight China’s will and resolve to use military force. This could render surplus a huge Chinese expeditionary capability. The Kuayue Exercise seems primarily focused on Vietnam, to coerce that small but brave nation into a meek surrender of its claims in the disputed South China Sea. It is also a warning to the other South East Asian countries with claims in this oil rich area. India is another intended target of such “Trans Military Area Manoeuvres”.

mobilised and moved to Jinan MR in Central China. It covered a distance of 2,000 kms over four provinces. It carried out a major assault crossing of the Xianjang River.

Airborne exercise The 15 Airborne Corps is the prime Strategic Reserve (Rapid Reaction Force) of the PLA that functions directly under the Central Military Commission. It comprises the 43rd, 44th and 45th Para Divisions. This Corps held a 20 day Airborne Manoeuvre Exercise in 2009 called Kongjiang Jidong (Airborne Movement 2009). This is the largest single exercise executed by this strategic formation so far. It was termed a trans-theatre comprehensive campaign manoeuvre exercise involving 13,000 officers and men, some 1,500 vehicles and 700 pieces of equipment. These troops manoeuvred over 2,000 kms between Hubei, Henan, Annui and Jiangsi provinces by multiple means and routes. These carried out vertical landings or “Descent Operations” in Central Henan by a crack Demonstration Brigade deemed one of the best in the PLA.

Tibet choke force It is noteworthy that some 10,000 AB Troops of this Corps had been mobilised in less than 48 hours to quell the Tibetan riots in 1988. Similarly in Sichuan earthquake of 08 May 2009, some 4,000 AB troops arrived in less than 36 hours for disaster relief operations. This AB Corps is likely to spearhead operations whether in Taiwan, Tibet or Vietnam. Given the South China Sea territorial disputes and the recent rise in incursions on the Indian border, Kuayue Exericse was an ominous warning signal both to India and Vietnam (as well as Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand) that the Expeditionary Capability now rendered surplus from Taiwan could be easily employed against these two primary “combat target nations” of the PLA. In addition to the large scale Kuayue Exercise, China held another series of exercises called the “Vanguard” and “Victory” to test tactical concepts and air support procedures. The threat profile from China is rising primarily because of the steady expansion of the capability differential between the two Asian giants. The only way to ensure that peace endures is to prevent the opening up of such large windows of vulnerability that could, in themselves, invite attack.

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first anniversary Threat to J&K

Selig Harrison’s report on the deployment of 7,000-11,000 Chinese troops in the Gilgit Region of PoK has sent ripples in South Asia. By way of denial the Pakistanis and Chinese have not refuted the presence of the troops but their purpose. The Pakistanis claimed they were there to assist in “flood control”. Zhao Gang Cheng of the Shanghai based Institute of International Studies stated that the purpose was “for considerations of economy and energy and not to pose a threat to anyone”. The Gwadar-Karakoram triple rail, road and pipeline link is a key component of the Chinese “Malacca by-pass strategy”. It must be noted that 80 per cent of China’s energy imports are transported via the sea route through the critical choke point formed by the Malacca, Sunda and Lombok Straits near Malaysia and Indonesia. The Chinese are acutely conscious of the extreme vulnerability of this critical SLOC (Sea Line of Communications) to disruption by any hostile Navy in the event of a conflict. China’s dependence on imported oil is now to the tune of 56 per cent. By 2015 this will go up to 66 per cent of China’s energy needs and by 2030 this would touch 80 per cent of China’s needs. The Persian Gulf, Central Asia, Africa and North America meet the bulk of China’s oil needs. Hence the Chinese paranoia about the extreme vulnerability of its energy imports as they are funnelled through the critical choke points of Malacca. China has consciously been trying to reduce this major strategic vulnerability. To achieve a supply chain that is less vulnerable to disruption from outside factors, China has consciously devised a “Malacca by-pass strategy” that seeks to re-route as much of its oil inflows via overland routes and pipelines. A key component of this Chinese strategy hinges upon its investment in the Gwadar Port of Pakistan and the frenzied construction / upgradation of a triple tier rail and road highway along with an oil / gas pipeline which will carry Iranian gas to China’s Western Provinces. Thus a bulk of the Persian Gulf oil would be diverted from the week long voyage via Malacca and would flow overland in just 48 hours via this GwadarKarakoram highway. This Chinese oil and gas artery via Pakistan and the Shia rebellious province of Gilgit in PoK has

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SEcURIty FIRSt now become a core Chinese interest and a vital strategic artery. That still confines it to a matter of economy and energy and does not make it a military threat.

Chinese expansionism Unfortunately, the Chinese have an ingrained habit of defining core interests and vital communications arteries. Overtime they become prepared to launch “self defence counter attacks” to safeguard these arteries. Take our minds back to the India-China border War of 1962. One of the key Chinese concerns was their perceived threat to the vital Aksai-Chin highway that connects Tibet with Xinjiang. They perceived India’s “Forward Policy” (of establishing its claims by token posts in disputed areas) as a threat to this vital artery. Within a little over three years of a perceived threat to this road, the Chinese had attacked India. If Pakistan persists with its terrorist provocations, a limited war between the two countries could well erupt. The Chinese could then view it as a threat to their Gwadar–Karakoram energy life line and intervene militarily. This is not mere conjecture. There has been an alarming shift in the Chinese stance over J&K. From complete neutrality in the Kargil War of 1999, China now assertively claims J&K as disputed territory. That however does nor prevent it from executing major infrastructure, energy and possibly military projects in PoK. However it does induce it to staple visas on the passports of Indian citizens from the state of J&K. It has now deliberately escalated the level of provocation by denying a visa to Lt. Gen. Jaswal (Army Commander, Northern Command) on the plea that he commands troops in J&K. The same logic did not apply to the Eastern Army Commander who commands our forces in Arunachal Pradesh! This is not a minor shift of stance or nuance. It is a major and deliberate provocation and upping of the ante. China is now defining an ever increasing list of core areas / red lines. Taiwan, Tibet and now South China Sea, East China Sea and Yellow Sea are all core interests where it will brook no interference. Do we have any core interests left any more? Should we not define our red lines in J&K now that both Pakistan and China appear to see our political will as crumbling?

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Extensive tunnelling The Chinese troops in Gilgit are reportedly involved in the upgradation of the existing Karakoram Highway to double lane status and the addition of a new railroad and oil / gas pipeline. The most baffling part is the construction of 22 tunnels to which even the Pakistani troops are not allowed. There is intense speculation on what these tunnels are meant for. One speculation is that these are designed to store the new aircraft carrier killer Dong Feng 21D anti-ship missiles. These as stated earlier are roadmobile missiles (with a range of over 3,000 kms) which could move down the Karakoram highway to attack US or Indian aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf / Arabian Sea and thereby form a key component of the Chinese AntiAccess Strategy. If that is so it would be a very strange way for Pakistan to repay its American patrons for their most generous aid! It would also have serious implications for Indian Naval operations in the Arabian Sea. Seen as part of a developing pattern, the Chinese moves have serious and long term implications which we cannot afford to brush under the carpet. There is an urgent need to speed up our arms acquisition process. Given the recent developments there could be sudden and non-linear changes on our periphery and we can ill afford to be caught flat footed a la 1962. India’s position in Arunachal Pradesh has been strengthened considerably by sensible precautions. Was the Chinese hype about Arunachal Pradesh and Tawang just strategic deception while its main new focus seems to be J&K which it can threaten in concert with Pakistan? If that be the case it could have very serious repercussions that we must factor in our operational planning, force re-structuring and weapons acquisition exercises.

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strategic weapons:

Dr. Rajiv Nayan

new military power With new nuclear powers and new technology for modernisation of existing nuclear stockpiles the world will only tend to see refinement, not any real move towards the stated goals of nuclear disarmament. This factor will goad other nations like Iran, already a target of sanctions, to go the whole hog thereby forcing a redesign of the whole global strategic architecture. India has, willy-nilly, joined the nuclear arms race but it has to extend the range of its missiles to be a truly global player.

The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in J&K and Punjab. He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Punch districts. He has served two tenures at the highly prestigious Directorate General of Military Operations. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 17 books and over 70 papers in many prestigious research journals.

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he Cold War ended but its military machine did not disappear. In some sectors, we did witness mass obsolescence. The former Soviet Union and its successor - Russia were forced to retire some weapons. The United States, too, entered into a few arms control agreements with Russia to reduce their nuclear arsenals. The United Kingdom (UK), of late, witnessed some debate about nuclear disarmament or eliminating its strategic forces. France conducted a number of nuclear tests in the 1990s. The French action was ably matched by the Chinese. China conducted a series of nuclear tests before the conclusion of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In the summer of 1998, India and Pakistan also conducted nuclear tests and declared themselves nuclear weapon countries. So far, both the countries have not declared the size and the number of their nuclear stockpiles. India conducted its nuclear explosions in three categories - fission, thermonuclear and sub-kiloton. In 2009, the project leader of the 1998 series of Indian tests raised a question mark on the achievement of the desired yield of the thermonuclear device. When the expansion of strategic weapons is talked about, we may have to talk about not only nuclear warheads but also their delivery vehicles. In some countries, it is dyad - only two types of delivery vehicles such as aircraft or bomber and ballistic missiles - at the same time, in some countries, it is triad meaning bomber, ballistic missiles and submarine launched ballistic missiles. A country may also possess only one type of delivery vehicle in its strategic forces. It could be either ballistic missiles or bomber or submarine launched ballistic missiles. The Chinese Second Artillery is the strategic force of China. The 2009 Chinese White Paper notes: “The Second Artillery Force is mainly composed of the nuclear missile force, the conventional missile force, the support force, educational institutions, research institutes and the headquarter organisations. The missile force is organised into missile bases, missile brigades and launch battalions.” China is the only NPT-defined nuclear weapon country that is still expanding its nuclear arsenals. The other four countries have declared a moratorium

on their fissile material production. Russia and the US also have plans to cut their nuclear arsenals drastically. There is general global consideration that China does not have a modernisation programme for its warheads or if it at all has a modernisation programme, it is rather slow. However, this line of argument is contested by others. It is argued that China may not be going for the actual nuclear testing, but like the US it also has a very advanced scientific programme for nuclear warhead modernisation without explosive testing. One of the studies notes that China is carrying out stockpile stewardship activities. Hydrodynamic testing is an integral part of the stockpile stewardship programme. Media reports suggest that China is probing safety enhancements like integration of insensitive high explosives.

Solid fuel China is also developing a new generation of missiles. China does not provide the true figure of its ballistic missile production. The Chinese media reports also indicate that China is proceeding with its missile development programme at a high speed, not at the ‘glacial speed’. The number is increasing in almost all the categories of ballistic missiles. The Western sources believe that each category has hundreds of missiles and some even in thousands. It is replacing many of its liquid-fuelled missiles with the solid-fuel missiles. Solid-fuel missiles are considered compact, easy to handle and modern.

Long-range missiles China is also shifting from the silobased ballistic missile systems to the mobile systems. The idea behind the conversion to the mobile system is to make its nuclear assets survivable after an attack on it either through conventional means or by nuclear weapons and thus, increase its striking power. Of the ballistic missiles, it was generally believed that China is concentrating on short and medium range of ballistic missiles. For a long period, China did not seem interested in modernising its long-range missiles. However, the recent writings and reports are accepting that China is modernising its long-range ballistic missiles as well.

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Dual track

opposing development of new nuclear weapons, the security establishment is actively resisting the idea of the nonproliferation community.

Another nuclear neighbour of India, Pakistan, is also expanding its nuclear arsenals. Like China, Pakistan has also not officially declared the size and number of its nuclear weapons. However, the international community is guessing its number ranging from 50 to 200. The common knowledge is that Pakistan has enriched uranium based nuclear weapons. However, later intelligence reports suggest that one of the tested weapons of Pakistan was of plutonium. There is all possibility that the Pakistan-led proliferation network included nuclear testing as one of the items for business. Now, there are several published and unpublished reports which highlight plutonium production facilities in Pakistan; thus, the adoption of dual-track nuclear weapons development threatening to take a shape.

A Pentagon report complained that the average age of the stockpile had tripled since the US had stopped testing in 1991. The US Department of Defense wants to resume warhead production, which had also been stopped since the early 1990s. A report of the US ministry of Defense noted, “The weapons systems that compose the nuclear triad

As for delivery vehicles, Pakistan has already pursued two-track development. Earlier, the Chinese system and technology helped it in acquiring solid-fuel ballistic missiles with the range suitable to target India.

Black market Later, it swapped liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles for centrifuges and other nuclear items. As it is well known, the country is North Korea. Pakistan is announcing acquisition of ballistic missiles quite frequently. Currently, it has 300 km-range M-11 ballistic missiles, the 750 km-range, solid-fuelled Shaheen-1 ballistic missile, 1,500 kmrange Nodong (Ghauri) ballistic missiles, the 400 km-range Ghaznavi (Hatf-3), 450 km-range Shaheen-1 (Hatf-4), and the 1,200 km-range Ghauri (Hatf-5), the 2,000-2,500 km range Shaheen-2 missiles and so on. It is also developing Babur cruise missiles. Pakistan is supposed to use F-16 to mount nuclear warheads, but because of the problem in supply, it is relying more on militarily and strategically better option - ballistic missiles.

Super powers Russia and the US together constitute 95 per cent of nuclear arsenals of the world. The 2010 follow-on Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between Russia and the US has prescribed substantial reduction in the size of the strategic

forces of the two countries. Both the countries are not supposed to deploy more than 700 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles and heavy bombers. On all the deployed strategic delivery vehicles, there could not be more than 1,550 nuclear warheads. The treaty has put a ceiling (800) on the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile launchers, Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile launchers and bombers whether these delivery vehicles are deployed or not.

and in Russia, the number is 5,100. The US has Minuteman-II, Minuteman-III and Peacekeeper Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles; the Trident-II Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles, and B-52G, B-52H, B-IB and B-2A bombers. Russia has RS-12M, RS-12M2, RS-18, RS-20 and RS-24 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, the RSM-50, RSM-52, RSM-54 and RSM-56 Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles and the Tu-95MS and Tu-160 heavy bombers.

Current arsenals

However, the treaty left it to the discretion of the two countries to determine the composition and structure of their strategic offensive arms. At present, in the US, there is tremendous internal pressure on the Administration to develop a lean and more efficient size of its nuclear stockpile. Though the non-proliferation / arms control community is

Currently, the US has 4,700 operational strategic weapons and Russia has 4,100 such weapons. The US also has more than 500 non-strategic operational weapons and Russia has 3,800 weapons. Moreover, there are 4,200 nuclear weapons in the US in reserve and awaiting dismantlement

No one knows whether China would modernise its own strategic forces citing the Americans, but internally in China it may have an impact. China which is quite ambitious to take the leadership role in the global affairs would match the American arsenals. The concerned countries would argue for modernisation to establish ‘escalation dominance’. So, the salience of nuclear weapons would not decrease, but would remain constant were built and designed decades ago. If the United States is to maintain a strong nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future, a strategic roadmap for nuclear weapons systems and delivery platforms should be developed.”

Future plans The US apparently is undertaking the life-extension process that involves immensely superior capabilities for next system arming, fuzing and firing and / or radar component. It also has a plan to develop modern capabilities to replace outdated test-readiness capabilities to resume explosive testing. Russia also wants to replace its old discarded nuclear warheads and delivery capabilities with the modern ones. In fact, various arms control

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treaties may help Russia diverting its resources for the task. It was spending a vast sum on the maintenance, security and safety of these weapons, though through the Global Threat Reduction Initiative the US also helped security of the Russian arsenals and helped it convert some of the redundant stockpile for peaceful purposes. The new Russia would like to revive and modernise its defence industry if it has to run its writ in its sphere of influence.

French arsenal Although in March 2009, the US President announced the French decision to rejoin the NATO after a gap of 43 years, it made it clear that it will continue to have its independent nuclear deterrence. Currently, it has about 300 nuclear warheads. France is also redesigning its nuclear force structure. It is replacing the 48 M-45 missiles mounted on its four SSBNs with the new three-stage M-51 missile with the range of 6,000 kilometers. It is also discarding the old Mirage aircraft and refurbishing its fighter planes. It has also increased the range of its cruise missiles ASMP Ameliore. It may have cut down the number of its arsenal and stopped production of its fissile materials, but it has not stopped the qualitative development of its strategic forces.

UK review The UK, another nuclear weapon country, has about 200 nuclear warheads. In the post-Cold War period, it has at least twice reviewed the status and the future of its strategic forces. In 2010, it may announce another

strategic forces review. It is still relying on nuclear deterrence. It stopped using Tornado aircraft for nuclear use in 1998 and is now only using Vanguard Class submarines. The UK is entitled to have 58 submarine launched ballistic missiles. Actually, it shares a collection of missiles with the US.

New players North Korea is the new nuclear actor which is continuously testing its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Sometimes, ballistic missiles are tested in the name of satellite launchers. Similarly, Iran is also testing its ballistic missiles and is suspected to enrich weapon grade uranium soon. Israel is an old and acknowledged nuclear weapon country. It too is quietly modernising its nuclear warheads and delivery capabilities.

Impact Strategic forces are generally designed for counter value purposes i.e. for targeting population and commercial centers. However, their counter-force use value means targeting armed forces and military installations or centers is not ruled out. The countries which do not have ‘no first use policy’ may opt for counter-force strategy and would develop force structure for that purpose. However, the reliance on counter-force strategy may start coming in the way of nuclear reduction and may force the countries to go for modernisation and even increase of strategic forces. We are witnessing this problem vis-à-vis the US. The earlier Strategic Arms Reduction

Treaty could not be implemented because of the American wavering. Now, the follow-up treaty has been signed. There is resistance in the Congress and outside. Neoconservatives have already campaigned enough. The security establishment does not seem to be happy either. No one knows whether China would modernise its own strategic forces citing the Americans, but internally in China it may have an impact. China which is quite ambitious to take the leadership role in the global affairs would match the American arsenals. The concerned countries would argue for modernisation to establish ‘escalation dominance’. So, the salience of nuclear weapons would not decrease, but would remain constant. The country which has no first use policy or other countries as well would like to maintain an assured retaliatory capability to react after absorbing nuclear strike. Some may argue that the task may be accomplished through smaller forces, but public opinion would be for matching the size of the adversary or adversaries, if not larger forces. Nuclear crisis management and dealerting may be institutionalised, though the Cold War experience suggests it to be a ‘fragile’ enterprise.

Indian position The most important point is the response of India. India has plutoniumbased nuclear weapons with the policy of credible minimum deterrence and no first use. It is also developing solid-fuel ballistic missiles, though it possesses liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles. It has also developed its indigenous Arihant submarine capable of launching submarine-launched ballistic missiles. However, it needs to increase the range of its solid-fuel ballistic missiles and further refine its submarines. It will have to undertake this task indigenously.

The writer is a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi since 1993, where he specialises in export control, non-proliferation and arms control. He was a Visiting Research Fellow at Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, where he published his monograph Non-Proliferation Issues in South Asia.

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DSA makes a mark at The Indian homeland security industry converged on INDESEC Expo - the leading exhibition that focuses on homeland security held in New Delhi from 6-8 September, 2010. Officially supported by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India and ASSOCHAM with over 2,000 attendees over 3 days, INDESEC further cemented its position as the market leading event for the homeland security industry. With exhibitors from 11 countries, INDESEC showcased latest technologies for homeland and border security, network centric operations and maritime security. Defence And Security Alert (DSA) was the leading journal in defence and security genre and was the centre of attraction during the event which was well attended by all sectors of the homeland security industry and showed an extremely high level of satisfaction from all visitors and participants. Visitors from across India especially from the armed forces - Army, Navy, Air Force, Paramilitary Forces and representatives from the State Police Forces visited DSA stall. Almost all the visitors complimented the quality of high value content and the presentation of the magazine. And our September 2010 issue which was Nuclear Special was the most in demand defence and security publication during this event. The national and international participating organisations and delegates took note of the presence of DSA in the defence and security journalism arena and highly appreciated the efforts being made by the magazine to disseminate the message of defence and security to every citizen of the world guiding them to become Aware and Alert. We all at Team DSA congratulate Team INDESEC for organising a meaningful event.

A Passage to India India is becoming increasingly important for UK manufacturers of Homeland Security & Defence products looking to enter a key growth market, offering opportunities for technology transfer, joint ventures and partnerships. India’s security industry has expanded hugely in recent years – the continuous threat of terrorism, the development of India’s infrastructure and the eventual development of the nation’s civil aviation capacity promise to expand overall security spending to over US$ 9 billion by 2016. The Indian security sector has been growing at an annual rate of 35 per cent. Last year alone saw 200 new companies formed and the sector added one million new jobs in 2009, making it India’s largest employer. Never has there been such an opportunity for sales, technology transfer and building partnerships in this high profile sector. UK companies obviously wish to participate and be at the forefront in helping to develop this market. The UK security industries is in itself a major security market, validated by historical experience and know how. An extensive knowledge base through interaction between government, universities and industry drives innovative, R&D based products and systems, providing world class capability with a strong history in international collaboration. A major consideration and key to our strategy is the partnership with Indian companies. We need to work collaboratively in providing our Indian partners with technology specifically matched to Indian requirements. In a broader sense, this means listening to our partners, adapting technology to suit Indian doctrine and forming long lasting joint ventures and enabling the transfer of technology. UK Trade & Investment (UKTI) provides expert trade advice and practical support to UK-based companies wishing to grow their business overseas. With a presence in 96 countries, UKTI provides support on every step of the exporting journey. Whatever stage of development businesses are at, we can provide the support that is needed to expand and prosper. Through a range of unique services, including participation at selected trade fairs, outward missions and providing bespoke market intelligence, we can help companies enter foreign markets and get to grips quickly with overseas regulations and business practices. Specifically, we are currently engaged on a long term project of facilitating and encouraging business relationships in the HLS sector, providing a platform of support to UK technology carriers, by means of targeted Meet the Buyer events and leading trade missions to the INDESEC exhibition in New Delhi. Over 19 UK delegates exhibited forming the largest foreign exhibition contingent on the UKTI pavilion.

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Afghan imbroglio: Indian options P

resident Obama, while agreeing to the â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;surgeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; as suggested by General Stanley A. McCrystal announced in 2009 that US Army will start pulling out of Afghanistan after July 2011. This has resulted in a suspected loss of morale of the US Army and other NATO allies as also the Afghan Government and National Army. Given the home situation in USA, politically it will be very difficult for the President to reverse the order. Other members of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) would, if anything, be too happy to even precede the US Forces.

The re-Talibanisation of Afghanistan will lead to a huge arc of instability from the Russian border in the northern hemisphere to South-east Asia. American, western and Indian interests cannot but be adversely affected. There is a school of thought that suggests that India must revisit the concept of a stable Pakistan being a polestar for stability in the region as a whole. It is an anachronism. 42

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being toppled by an Islamic surge, which is a strong possibility, if one looks at the history of the region. History has a habit of revisiting her old playgrounds. Uzbekistan has been affected by a fairly strong movement of Islamic extremism in the shape of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the origin being the fertile valley of Ferghana in the South Eastern part of Uzbekistan. Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic, both politically fragile, are equally susceptible to an Islamic extremist movement to destabilise them.

In such a scenario the country coming again under control of Taliban, though not a certainty, is very likely. It gets reinforced further with Pakistan siding with the Afghan Taliban and virtually abdicating the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, inter alia adjoining areas of North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan to Taliban and their mentor Al Qaeda by a series of agreements. The concerns of the surrounding nations would be well worth pondering.

Any Islamic movement presently does not affect Kazakhstan, the richest of them all, floating on oil and gas and enjoying a growth rate of 10 per cent plus of GDP, but the Government is concerned of the domino effect of such a movement in the southern neighbours. The unproven but educated estimate of hydrocarbon reserves in the whole region of CAR is supposedly next to Saudi Arabia. Hence the concern of Russia, China and no less, India and the West.

CAR concerns

Iran factor

The five countries comprising the CARs are Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Turkmenistan during the short regime of Taliban in Afghanistan had accepted the situation and was happy to do business with Taliban. So, I presume they would not be unduly concerned unless the present ruling regime fears

Iran has a deep sense of contempt for Taliban, indeed the Pashtuns are generally looked down upon in Iran, whereas Tajiks and Uzbeks are acceptable. Dari which is a derivative of Farsi is spoken and understood by many Afghans particularly the Tajiks and even a large segment of Uzbeks. The only pure Shia tribe in Afghanistan,

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Shantonu Choudhry

The Hazaras are close to Shia Iran at least emotionally and spiritually. An unstable and extremist Sunni regime like that of Taliban can be a constant source of concern for Iran. One would recall that Iran almost went to war with the Taliban, when in Mazar-e-Sharif in 1999 it butchered a number of Iranian diplomats.

Global ataxia? Russia has been bleeding in Chechnya for a long time with Dagestan likely to follow suit. A Taliban rule in Afghanistan will give a boost to the insurgency in Chechnya. Besides, Russia has a strong influence in all the countries of CAR whose destabilisation will directly affect Russian strategic interests. Turkey too which lately is seeing a revival of hardline Muslims will be concerned at the outcome. Let us now look at China. North Western China is the province of Sinkiang, also referred to as Eastern Turkman region, whose ethnic population is known as the Uighur Muslims. Due to continuous exploitation of the area by Beijing and intensive efforts to settle large Han (mainland Chinese) population in and around the capital city of Urumchi, there is unrest and violence amongst the Uighur Muslims. In fact a number of members of Al Qaeda are from Uighur stock. If Afghanistan was to go the Taliban way, it is only a matter of time before the incipient Uighur movement gains strength.

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Finally, the Western countries led by the USA are likely to feel the heat of Islamic terror most if Taliban and Al Qaeda were to return to Afghanistan. Tony Blair was right when he had said that the history of the world is being played out in the rocky wastes of Afghanistan. Indian concerns stem from the Chanakya thesis that an adversary’s neighbour must be a friend of yours. A friendly Afghanistan is an imperative for us. India has to have access to the energy sources as well as the growing market of Central Asia. A Taliban Afghanistan and an extremist bunch of CAR nations are likely to be inimical to Indian strategic interests. So what are the options for India? First and foremost is to have strong ties with the present democratic regime of Afghanistan and make all efforts to strengthen it along with other countries who seek stability in the region. In this effort we must be seen clearly to have an even handed approach to Pashtuns and other groups to dispel any suspicion of a tilt towards the erstwhile Northern Alliance. It may be recalled that during the civil war in Afghanistan, Taliban backed by Pakistan was fighting aginst a loose alliance of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras referred to often as The Northern Alliance, which incidentally had the support of Russia, Iran and India.

The demography However, before discussing the other options let us have a quick look at the political and ethnic geography of Afghanistan. The estimated population of Afghanistan is about 25 million. The Pashtun is the largest ethnic group of 42 per cent of the population. Next are the Tajiks comprising 24 per cent, followed by Uzbeks and related Turkmen people at 18 per cent and Hazaras at about 6 to 8 per cent. Remainder are smaller groups of Baluchis, Kirgiz, Almak, Nooristanis etc. Pashtuns (Taliban are from Pashtun tribes) are chiefly based in south and east of the country with an isolated but significant pocket in the province of Kunduz in the north, where the founder of the first political entity of Afghanistan Emir Dost Mohammed settled them in mid 19th century. Pashtuns are also scattered all over the

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SEcURIty FIRSt country but in small numbers. Tajiks generally are in and around Kabul and the north-eastern parts. Uzbeks reside in the north and northwest while the Hazaras are mainly concentrated in the central province of Bamyan. During the Taliban rule all the non-Pashtun groups were persecuted in some form or other, the worst sufferers being the Hazaras who besides having distinctly mongoloid features are Shia Muslims who the Talibans consider as bad as Kafirs (non-believers). The mountain range of the Hindukush geographically divides the country in north-south axis. A civil war had ensued in early 90’s between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban which was very openly supported by Pakistan. The Taliban routed the Northern Alliance from most of the areas and ruled Afghanistan from 1997 till 2001. Then happened 9/11 and US Forces attacked Afghanistan in November 2001. The ground offensive towards Kabul was spearheaded by the Northern Alliance. All this and for other historical reasons there is a strong antipathy between Taliban and the other minority groups who put together are a larger entity than the Pashtuns.

Frangible regime Thus there is the need to plan for contingencies for the possibilities of the present regime being toppled after the pullout of bulk of US Forces. In this scenario we can have an option of making friendly overtures to Taliban but it is unlikely to succeed for many reasons, chief of which is the strong alliance of Pakistan with the former and the extreme religious and social views of Taliban. Next is to have a plan for reviving the Northern Alliance comprising the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras and some other disgruntled groups who have suffered at the hands of Taliban and there are many. This can only succeed if Iran and Russia join hands together with India and the CAR countries. The last Alliance suffered from many drawbacks, mainly lack of mutual trust and working in tight compartments. It also worked to a great extent because it was led by the legendary guerrilla general Ahmed Shah Masood, a Tajik, who was assassinated two days prior to 9/11 by the Al Qaeda / Taliban. The differences need to be understood and accepted and will need to be ironed out in the contingencies.

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This would lead inevitably to another civil war in Afghanistan, which would be the price to pay if total Talibanisation of Afghanistan is to be prevented. Of course USA will have to be on board for the contingency to succeed because even after the withdrawal of most of US Forces a sizeable number would still be in Afghanistan. China while making appropriate noises may not be too averse to the idea..

Af-Pak vivisection Mr. Robert Blackwill, who was the US Ambassador to India some years back and later Deputy National Security Advisor to government of USA, has been quite vocal in suggesting division of Afghanistan in a northsouth axis. A civil war leading to a division of Afghanistan can have many possibilities, all of which need to be greatly discussed and analysed. One strong fallout will be the demand by Taliban to merge the Pashtun areas of Pakistan viz The Federally Administered Tribal Areas and parts of Northwest Frontier Province recently named Pakhtunkhwa Khyber, a presient name perhaps! The Durand Line dividing Pakistan and Afghanistan has never been accepted formally by any Afghan government including the Taliban. This may eventually lead to fragmentation of Pakistan with all its follow up consequences. The threat which may loom large for Pakistan could perhaps act as leverage for India! In any case the author is of the firm view that a stable Pakistan in short and mid term is not in India’s strategic interest. The idea is not new but not often articulated. It is time South Block, with both its military wing and the Ministry of External Affairs with the National Security Adviser in the lead put their heads together unless it has been done already. THE GREAT GAME MUST GO ON. The writer retired as Vice Chief of Army Staff in January 2005. He has served in Military Operations and Military Intelligence Directorates and has been an instructor in Defence Services Staff College. He is a widely read officer who writes regularly on national security.

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Kashmir: a healing touch

Brig.(Retd.) Gurmeet Kanwal

The all-party approach to the current crisis in Jammu and Kashmir will succeed only if the futility of the Pakistani intervention is brought home to those who are trying to elevate a blatant foreign invasion to the same sublime heights of the Palestinian intefada. The farce is obvious and that is what the government of India and Omar Abdullah should concentrate on.

lmost 100 stone-pelting youth have died in the Kashmir Valley since June 2010 and many more have been injured in police firing. The ongoing agitation is slowly spilling over to some of the areas south of the Pir Panjal Range in the Jammu Division. While the army has not so far been deployed to quell the violence, the separatist leadership of the Hurriyat Conference has planned to confront army bases.

Expert group Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has realised that it is time to deliver in Kashmir and has come out strongly in favour of a healing touch. He has spoken of feeling the people’s ‘dard aur mayusi’ and has expressed his anguish over the recent killings in the Kashmir Valley. Though it came a bit late in the day, the PM has held an all-party meeting to discuss the emerging situation and to send an all-

party delegation to Kashmir. He has appointed an Expert Group headed by Dr. C. Rangarajan, with N. R. Narayana Murthy, Tarun Das, P. Nanda Kumar, Shaqueel Qalander and an official representative of the J&K government as members, to formulate a plan for creating new jobs in the state. However, the PM has stopped short of also appointing a political interlocutor to unconditionally resume the stalled dialogue with Kashmiri

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political parties representing all shades of opinion.

socio-economic challenges facing the state.

Revolution or instigation?

The successful resolution of insurgencies requires a three-pronged approach: governance, development and security, along with perception management. While the security situation has improved considerably over the last few years — exemplified by the demands for the repeal of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) and even for the withdrawal of the army from counter-insurgency operations — poor governance and the lack of adequate socio-economic development continue to hamper efforts to put an end to the insurgency being sponsored by the Pakistan Army and its Inter-Services Intelligence. No insurgency anywhere in the world has ever been solved by the security forces alone.

While the Prime Minister’s initiatives are a welcome development, the situation in the Kashmir Valley continues to be grim and is reminiscent of other revolutions in recent memory. In February 1986, the Filipino people restored democracy through the People Power Revolution. In 1989-90, Lech Walesa’s Solidarity movement in Poland beat back the mighty Soviet Union’s tanks. The citizens of Czechoslovakia shook off totalitarian communist rule in the Velvet Revolution. The victory of the Ukrainian peoples Orange Revolution represented a new landmark in the history of peoples movements for democracy. The Cedar Revolution in April 2005 ended the Syrian military occupation of Lebanon after 30 years. The Nepalese revolution next door is the latest manifestation of the power of the people.

Critical situation Clearly, there is a lesson in this for India. If the Kashmiri people come out on the streets of Srinagar, Baramulla, Sopore, Kupwara, Anantnag and half a dozen other towns like they did in 1988-89, in today’s mega-media age, it will be well nigh impossible to keep Kashmir by force. The situation in the Kashmir Valley is far more critical than ministers of the central government are ready to admit at least in public. A new generation of students born in the early 1990s has taken to the streets and they are not going to go back home emptyhanded. An overwhelming majority among the youth in the Valley is in favour of azadi. Of course, the consensus in the Jammu and Ladakh divisions of J&K is for the state remaining within the Indian Union. Brought up during two decades of violence under the shadow of the guns of the security forces as well as the terrorists, the hopes of these students remain unfulfilled. They are educated and they are jobless. And, they are angry. While some of these protesters are no doubt being paid to shout slogans demanding azadi and hurl stones at the security forces, most of them appear to be genuinely concerned about the lack of resolution of the core issues and the government’s inability to resolve the

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Alienation Another major cause for concern is the palpable sense of alienation of the Kashmiri people from the national mainstream. While successive Prime Ministers have taken several laudable initiatives in the past, including the appointment of five-task forces and holding of talks in February 2006 with the political leaders of Jammu and Kashmir other than the Hurriyat leaders who refused to participate, there has been marked slackness in follow-through and most of the promises made to the people of J&K have not been kept.

Linkages with India Meanwhile, loose talk of abrogating Article 370 of the Indian Constitution the glue that binds the Constitutions of J&K and India - continues unfettered. Except for a very small minority that has been deeply influenced by radical extremism, the Kashmiri people do not wish to either join Pakistan or opt for independence from India, despite the slogans being shouted in recent months. Creeping Talibanisation in Pakistan goes against the grain of Kashmiriyat and Sufi culture and it has not gone unnoticed.

autonomy, which will allow them the right to rule themselves, within the Indian Union. They will accept that the central government continues to deal with defence, foreign affairs, currency and communications while the J&K Assembly is left free to legislate on everything else. This should not be viewed as an out of the way concession as federalism forms the basis of the Indian Constitution. If some sections of the Indian polity think that is too much to concede, they need to consider the alternatives – each of which is too horrible to contemplate.

Accommodation possible The late Prime Minister Narsimha Rao had said the “sky is the limit” for autonomy. When asked whether he was proposing to hold talks within the framework of the Constitution, former Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee had said he was willing to host talks within a “humanitarian framework”. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had made a pitch for “mutual tolerance, understanding and accommodation” in his first term. All-party talks must be held to evolve a national consensus on resolving the problem in J&K. As soon as the Composite Dialogue with Pakistan is resumed, discussions on J&K must be taken up in all earnestness. Meanwhile, Chief Minister Omar Abdullah and political leaders belonging to all other political parties at the centre and in the state must rise to the occasion and provide the leadership that the situation requires.

monitoring offset obligations Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Mrinal Suman

Offsets were touted as manna from heaven when first introduced and subsequently reformatted in the Defence Acquisition Policy. It was left to the vendor to decide what was offered as offset. At the very beginning India abdicated its right and responsibility to choose what essentially should be the building blocks for future growth of the military-industrial complex. The Ministry of Defence is using the Official Secrets Act to dampen curiosity over what exactly is coming into the country; whether it will fulfil the purpose of improving the technological base for spare parts and component / systems production for the lifecycle of the main weapons platform.

Unfettered but restrained

Political settlement

As for the security forces, they must be allowed to conduct their counter-insurgency operations against Pakistan-sponsored terrorists in accordance with the well established rules of engagement, but must do so with a sense of utmost restraint. It is time to stop inflaming passions on vote-bank based party lines of the past and to act in a statesman-like manner in the national interest. The integrity of India as a nation-State must remain inviolable.

After very hard and acrimonious bargaining, the Kashmiri people will ultimately settle for unadulterated

The writer is the director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi.

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Photo courtesy: Lockheed Martin

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he World Trade Organisation considers offsets to be detrimental to free trade practices and prohibits its signatories from imposing, seeking or considering offsets for government procurement transactions. Yet, the world is witnessing an exponential increase in the quantum and scope of offset obligations in world commerce, especially defence deals. Whatever be the positives and negatives of offsets, they have become an integral part of the international arms trade and are accepted as a corollary to natural interplay of the market forces. Earlier, arms exporters dictated terms by inflating prices and imposing stringent usage conditions. With shrinking defence budgets after the end of the Cold War, it is a buyers’ market at the present. Now all importing nations impose offset obligations on the sellers, with the objective of redirecting part of outflow of resources back into their own economies for national industrial growth. India is no exception.

Dynamics of offsets To derive full benefit, it is absolutely necessary to understand the dynamics of offsets. It is universally accepted that real value of an offset depends primarily on its appropriate selection, meticulous planning and diligent monitoring. Ill-conceived, poorly planned and indifferently monitored offset programmes invariably prove to be highly wasteful and uneconomical for their value. It is also a well established fact that most offset programmes rarely achieve their objectives, the primary reason for this failing being indifferent monitoring. For example, offsets received against South Africa’s US$ 4.8 billion Strategic Arms Procurement Package of 1999 were designed to generate 65,000 jobs. Subsequent studies showed that just a fraction of the above number was achieved. Thus, the said offset programme was unsuccessful in achieving the designated objective. Lack of close oversight is considered to be the main cause for the failure.

Indians remiss Despite the fact that offsets carry enormous financial ramifications and are susceptible to dishonest manipulations in execution, Indian policy makers have failed to grasp

the criticality of keeping a close eye on their implementation. Monitoring of offsets has been treated in a highly cavalier and slapdash manner. As will be seen shortly, the Indian offset policy contains no guidelines and measuring norms to ascertain diligent compliance by foreign vendors. Acquisition Managers in the Acquisition Wing are the nodal authority to monitor implementation of offsets pertaining to their respective Services. As per Defence Procurement Procedure–2006, one of the functions assigned to the Defence Offset Facilitation Agency (DOFA) is to assist the Acquisition Manager concerned in monitoring tasks. Subsequently, Defence Procurement Procedure–2008 set up an Offset Monitoring Cell (OMC), headed by a Director in the Department of Defence Production, for the same purpose. In other words, Acquisition Manager is to be assisted both by DOFA and OMC in monitoring functions, without spelling out division of their respective responsibilities. The whole policy is obscure, imprecise and muddled. Worse, both DOFA and OMC are devoid of necessary competence and wherewithal. Both are typical bureaucratic offices with two or three officials manning tables.

Cockeyed A foreign vendor can, giving reasons, request re-phasing of his offset schedule within the period of the main contract. Director General Acquisition may allow the request if the reasons are considered justified. Any request on exceptional grounds for extension of the period of the offset contract beyond the period of the main contract has to be examined by the Acquisition Wing and placed before the Defence Procurement Board for decision. Requests for any further extensions are required to be decided by the Defence Acquisition Council. Interestingly, DOFA has been tasked to assist the Acquisition Wing in examining all such requests while OMC has been assigned no role in the above deliberations. As regards the monitoring procedure, foreign vendors are required to submit quarterly progress reports on the implementation of their offset programmes to the Acquisition Manager concerned in the specified format. In case considered necessary, an

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audit by a nominated official / agency may be conducted to confirm the actual status of implementation. If a vendor fails to fulfill the offset obligation in a particular year, a penalty of 5 per cent of the value of the unperformed offset obligation is levied. The said penalty is either paid by the defaulting vendor or recovered from his bank guarantee of the main contract, subject to replenishment, or deducted from the amount payable under the main contract. Further, the unfulfilled offset value is carried forward to the subsequent year.

Disqualification In case a vendor fails to fulfill his full offset obligations during the period of the main contract, or during the period duly extended, he becomes liable to be disqualified for participation in future defence contracts. Disqualification is decided by the Acquisition Wing after giving a fair opportunity to the vendor to explain the reasons for his failure. Any differences or disputes are to be settled through discussions. The decision of the Acquisition Wing is to be considered final. As regards arbitration, provisions of the main contract apply to the offset contract as well. As seen above, the Indian approach to offset monitoring is limited to asking vendors to submit periodic progress reports. Due to sheer ignorance, India has trivialised a matter of enormous economic significance to routine ‘inspector raj’ practice – ask for periodic reports, verify on ground when in doubt, compile them to attest compliance and consign them to files. Since the Acquisition Wing possesses no resources for physical verification on ground, it accepts whatever the vendors claim. Worse, vendors’ reports are limited in scope and indicate percentage of ground progress alone. It is a highly unreliable, simplistic and shallow way of handling a crucial issue.

Twin facets Monitoring of offsets has principal aspects, as follows:

two

a) Oversight and corrective functions It must be remembered that offsets are not sought just because others are demanding them – they do not operate in a purposeless vacuum.

Every offset programme should have a predetermined objective assigned to it. The objective could be to boost exports, create local jobs, find new markets or upgrade indigenous technology. Success or failure of any offset programme is solely decided on the basis of extent to which it realises its designated objective. Therefore, ensuring achievement of the assigned objectives has to be the primary purpose of monitoring. Everything else is of causative essence and value.

Recommended dispensation It is apparent that the current offset monitoring regime is grossly inadequate and languid. While addressing a seminar in New Delhi in February 2010, Secretary (Defence Production) Raj Kumar Singh admitted that monitoring of the implementation of defence offsets deals was fuzzy. Stressing the need for close oversight, he promised setting up of a monitoring mechanism on implementation of the

It will not be out of place to mention here that India has abrogated the right to choose offset programmes to vendors, rendering its own needs inconsequential. Therefore, little attention is paid to the drafting of offset contracts. The MoD is also aware that the public interest remains focused on the main contract under which military equipment is being procured. As long as the main contract runs smoothly, it expects no uproar. Since cost of offsets

As all offset contracts run in tandem and co-terminus with the corresponding main contracts, slippages in offset implementation schedule can jeopardise progress of the main contract as well. It has to be guarded against at all costs. Thus, it is imperative that progress of offset programmes is kept under close and regular oversight. It is only then that timely corrective measures to remove impediments can be initiated. This implies that the monitoring agency should have adequate authority to take required decisions. Since no two offset programmes can be similar, detailed evaluation criteria and appraisal mechanism have to be evolved for each programme. In case the offset contract includes provisions for incentives and penalties, methodology of their determination has also to be worked out well in advance. b)

Feedback and review functions

India is new to the world of offsets and its policy is still evolving. Experience gained from each programme should be made use of to streamline the policy further with regular feedback providing vital inputs. Further, detailed appraisal must be carried out after the completion of every offset programme to ascertain the degree of achievement of the stated objectives. Review must help identify weaknesses and infirmities both in the policy and the execution. Thereafter, necessary lessons should be drawn for initiating curative changes for future programmes. An effective and constructive system of feedback and review helps in formulating a policy with focus on targeted areas for realising full potential of offsets.

offsets obligation by vendors. Over six months have passed but nothing has been promulgated so far. MoD needs to pay urgent attention to the following three critical aspects of the Indian offset system: a)

Drafting of offset contract

Poorly drafted offset contracts lend themselves to multiple interpretations, resulting in rancorous squabbles and resultant delays. Despite the fact that offsets carry enormous financial encumbrance, inadequate attention is paid to finalising their contracts. Most MoD functionaries have little understanding of the dynamics of offsets and the cost penalties involved. They consider offsets to be free add-ons and equate them with free Christmas gifts that are offered by householdappliance sellers. Therefore, MoD is satisfied with whatever vendors offer.

remains hidden, offset programmes are never subjected to public scrutiny, MoD functionaries remain secure in their belief that non-fulfilment of offset obligations would never be held against them. Therefore, they find no reason to ‘waste’ time in scripting offset contracts. Additionally, in the absence of required expertise, MoD displays a distinct penchant for treating offset contracts in a lackadaisical and dismissive manner. Foreign vendors are quick to spot this weakness and exploit small print to their advantage. It is time that this deficiency is made up and offset contracts are drafted with due diligence with monitoring mechanism unambiguously spelt out. b) Performance audit by independent agency Monitoring of offsets is a multidimensional and long-duration task. It requires special skills and capabilities.

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Every offset programme needs a unique matrix, assigning values to different criteria for collation. Complexities get compounded when dealing with programmes that relate to the export of services as their fair quantification and evaluation tends to become subjective. Similarly, programmes that have wider economic and social ramifications are difficult to compute. Performance audit should be done by an independent expert agency, preferably under the Ministry of Commerce. There are two reasons for this. One, as MoD negotiates and signs offset deals, it becomes a contracting party. It is always better that discharge of contractual obligations is overseen by an independent entity. It enhances probity and increases credibility of the mechanism. Two, MoD possesses none of the skills required for effective monitoring. DOFA and OMC are ad-hoc cells that are totally bereft of any competence to perform complex monitoring functions. On the other hand, considerable expertise exists with many agencies under the Commerce Ministry that are performing analogous functions at present. Furthermore, their professional and knowledgeable feedback would prove invaluable in streamlining the policy further. c)

Transparency

Transparency is the key to effective monitoring. Although a certain degree of secrecy is essential for all defence contracts, the same cannot be said of offset contracts. Offset contracts are akin to normal commercial deals. They warrant no secrecy at all and must be fully in public domain. Keeping offset contracts under wraps is the surest way of perpetuating a regime of corruption and wrong-doings.

No secrets It needs to be reiterated here that India does not seek technology against offsets. It wants to export defence goods / services or invite FDI in defence sector and defence R&D. None of these fields have any security implications. Further, as there are no licencing stipulations in place, over 2,000 companies of all sizes have become eligible to be Indian offset partners. Most undesirably, MoD continues to be highly secretive and releases negligible information

about the offset programmes and their progress, raising doubts about the system’s uprightness. In view of the above, India must make all offset contracts public along with their respective monitoring criteria. Thereafter, periodic progress reports showing actual ground position should be posted on its website. Delays, if any, should be unambiguously spelt out. Deficiencies and corrective measures taken should also be made known to all. Public declaration of imposition of penalties and award of incentives would make all companies vigilant and conscious of their commitments. At the end of every offset programme, fully collated data should be published indicating the degree of achievement of the laid-down objectives.

Way forward According to Transparency International, offsets are most susceptible to corruption and sleaze. It exhorts all governments to increase transparency of the whole process and institute effective mechanisms for their greater monitoring. It recommends inclusion of specifics of monitoring in all contracts upfront. In India’s case, monitoring acquires added importance due to the fact that India has abrogated the right to select offset programmes to the vendors. India is thus totally dependent on the diligence, sincerity and truthfulness of the foreign vendors. Further, India has allowed offset banking, i.e. foreign vendors can amass offset credits through approved programmes in anticipation of winning contracts at a later date. Such banked credits can be discharged against future offset obligations. As offset programmes for banking purposes are unrelated to any main contract, they function in a vacuity and remain totally unmonitored. Such programmes can be exceedingly deceptive and are highly vulnerable to manipulation. Therefore, close oversight, both for quality and quantity, is essential. It has been seen that major defence vendors are highly conscious of their reputation. Any default in offset implementation schedule, if made public, would dent their standing the world over. Resultant loss of credibility is the biggest deterrent that forces them to deliver. Transparency is thus

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a leverage that every buying nation must exploit to ensure compliance of offset commitments. Regrettably, India has failed to appreciate the power of transparency. Not a single offset contract has been made public to date. MoD continues to resort to its old subterfuge of citing security concerns to hide its own deficiencies and infirmities of the system, harming India’s interests in the process. It needs to be recalled here that offsets do not come for free. Buyer has to suffer a cost penalty that varies between 10 to 20 per cent of the contract value. Regular monitoring not only helps mid-course corrections, it also facilitates value-for-money audits. Such audits serve two purposes. First, they reveal degree of achievement of the designated objectives. Secondly and more importantly, they apprise whether the accruing benefits justify the cost penalty suffered. India’s lax monitoring regime extends an open invitation to a wily foreign vendor and his unscrupulous Indian partner to connive to shortchange the country. They can easily enter into an unholy nexus to submit inflated progress reports and claim offset credits. In the absence of a credible verification mechanism, MoD has to accept their reports at their face value. Resultantly, instead of benefitting from offsets, India would end up suffering additional outflow of resources. Unless corrective steps are taken immediately and a suitable monitoring mechanism is put in place, India is bound to rue its apathy and indifference. Worse, unmonitored offset programmes will inevitably degenerate into cesspools of inefficiency and corruption.

The writer heads Defence Technical Assessment and Advisory Service (DTAAS) of Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). He did MSc in Defence Studies and Doctorate in Public Administration. He commanded an Engineer Regiment in the most hostile battlefield in the world i.e. the Siachen Glacier. He was awarded a gold medal for being ‘the most outstanding engineer of the year’. He was the first Technical Manager [Land Systems] when the newly created Acquisition Wing was established in the Ministry of Defence in 2001. He has been closely associated with the evolution and promulgation of the new defence procurement mechanism.

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human trafficking: sexploitation

Dr. Mondira Dutta

Rampant poverty and a mindset conditioned to treat women as lesser beings contribute to sexploitation of women and girls. It is a crime, but invariably the police are part of the problem when they turn a blind eye to the flesh trade in their localities. Non-government organisations are fighting against the tide of newcomers to rescue and rehabilitate those within their reach. Not every sex-worker is â&#x20AC;&#x153;reachableâ&#x20AC;?.

he persistent attitude, behaviour and practices projecting unequal gender status in the society continue to haunt, subordinate and oppress women and children resulting in violence against women. Such grave abuse of human rights gives rise to the monstrous act of trafficking of women and young girls from rural areas into metropolitan cities for commercial sexual exploitation. The phenomenon of trafficking of women and girls in South Asia is also widespread due to exploitative structure, lopsided development, iniquitous resource ownership, large-scale unemployment, extreme poverty, increasing disparities in wealth and cutbacks in spending

for social sector. Though there is no authentic magnitude for the total number of trafficked victims available, it is estimated that a total of 700,000 to two million women and children are trafficked globally each year(1).

Modern slavery The poverty and the relative powerlessness of women in many countries create an endless supply of victims for this modern-day form of slavery. Trafficking also is exacerbating the spread of HIV/AIDS, hepatitis and other infectious diseases, making it a significant public health hazard as well.

Trafficking of young women, underage girls and children for commercial sexual exploitation has emerged as one of the most formidable challenges of the new millennium. It threatens the basic dignity of women besides exploiting them in the most despicable manner destroying them physically and psychologically.

Rescue programmes This article is based on a study on the rehabilitation of the rescued victims in the metropolitan cities of Kolkata, Mumbai and Delhi(2). It highlights the plight of the trafficked victims on the basis of case studies. A total of

(1) UNICEF 2001: Commercial Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse of Children in South Asia: 2nd World Congress against commercial sexual exploitation of children , Yokohama, Japan 17-20 December 2001. (2) Dutta Mondira & Bupinder Zutshi (2003): Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Women and Children- Situational Analysis: Rescue, Rehabilitation and Reintegration, ( A Case Study of Delhi, Mumbai and Kolkata cities in India) supported by United Nations Human Rights, Geneva, 2003

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45 rescued victims were interviewed revealing that they are often stigmatised for life and are unable to lead a normal healthy life. An attempt is being made to throw light on the existing situation of life in the brothels and their post rescue scenario.

Indian situation India unfortunately is an origin, destination as well as a transit for trafficking of women and children for sexual exploitation. Trafficking mostly takes place under the garb of fraudulent marriages, false job promises and deceit. The world today is a witness to mass exodus of people migrating from one place to another due to conflict, war, natural calamities, ethnic cleansing, terrorism and insurgency or in search of livelihood options.

Regions that are in the grip of extreme poverty, human rights violation, conflict ridden and war torn have enhanced the risk and vulnerability of women and children to trafficking. Unfortunately girls are often supplied by middle women in addition to men and pimps to the brothels, through coercion, deceit and compulsion inflicted by trafficking mafia on both the parents and victims. A large section of these victims happen to be minors and many are below the age of 20 years. Most of these women were found to belong to the states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh(3).

exploitation of children has on many occasions found its roots in traditional practices, beliefs and gender discrimination. In fact research shows commercial sexual exploitation of children is a socially acceptable norm in certain sections of the Indian society. Several forms of Devadasi / Jogin system in the South and East India and the Bedia and Rajnat community in Rajasthan and UP send their women for prostitution knowingly. Case studies revealed that victims after being rescued have had to return back to the illegal trade due to the pressures from her own family.

In addition culture and religious beliefs contribute significantly in playing havoc with the lives of women belonging to these communities. Sexual

An understanding of the suffering about their life in brothels came out sharp after interviewing the rescued child victims. Several victims provided

Brothels

(3) Ibid

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The analysis of victims’ life at brothels depicts their extreme and invisible exploitation in the brothels by the pimps, brothel owners (aunty / madam) as well as customers. It is one of the most brutal forms of violence that can be inflicted on the life of a woman and that too a minor girl. The victims suffer extreme physical, psychosocial and emotional abuse irrefutable evidence that prostitution is not voluntary. They narrated several incidences of physical abuse and confinement of the newly procured girls who were not willing to enter into the flesh trade. Initially the younger victims are pushed into domestic work, begging, drug trafficking and even pick-pocketing activities. Subsequently they are taught the tricks of dressing up, face makeup and ways of attracting the attention of the customer. Then they are prepared for the “breaking in” ceremony in the brothels, for eager customers, seeking virgins and willing to pay a high rate to the brothel ‘Madams’. Their training basically entails learning to submit to the demands of the brothel owner, which sometimes may even result in rape.

Coersion In the case of a girl being a virgin, potentially high earnings from her first customer limit her training to beatings and psychological intimidation. As narrated by a 15 year old rescued victim, “When the psychological approach does not work, the brothel staff resorts to physical abuse, or allows customers to do so. It includes beating, gang rapes and torture with burning cigarettes”. Girls who attempt to escape or try to refuse to comply with the customers are subjected to severe violence. The more the number of customers the victim is able satisfy in a night, the more is the love and care showered on them by

the brothel ‘Aunty’, who is usually a former sex worker.

Brutalisation The girls at times have been given shots of heroin to enable them to handle five or six men in a single night. They are subjected to physical assault, starvation, forced use of drugs and drinks, burning with cigarette ends, rape and sexual abuse, parading them naked and locked up in isolation in a dark room in case they dare to disobey the instructions of the brothel owner. During peak hours sometimes the victims have to satisfy customers even if they are sick or sleepy. The brothel owners would be pleased only if they would satisfy more and more customers. The lot who worked under a brothel owner seemed to be the ones most exploited. They are overworked with no rest and no money.

No hygiene Living and hygienic conditions in the brothels are pitiable. They have to satisfy customers in small cramped up pigeonhole like rooms without any ventilation. Although some of them were aware about HIV/AIDS but they could hardly dare to ask customers to use condoms. However a few customers did use condoms themselves out of fear for AIDS as revealed by some of the children. According to some who were childmothers, the brothel owners got them pregnant on purpose so that the latter could disguise their age before the police in case she was caught. The children of victims remained bereft of mothers’ love and affection. During the time when the victim is busy with a customer, her infant / child is usually given sleeping pills / drugs, so that customers are not disturbed. In one case when a child was weeping, a burning cigarette butt was presented to keep the child silent. The maintenance of the children of the victims comes out of the earnings of their mothers. The victims also reported some cases of abortion in the brothels.

Brothel economy In the brothels, the brothel owner generally collects the fees from the customers. Sometimes when a customer

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tips the girl, these are promptly taken away by the brothel owner or are used to buy make up and cosmetics. Sixty-eight per cent of the victims had no access to the money, which was received by the brothel owner. It was observed that the monthly earning varied from Rs. 1,500 to Rs. 2,000 regardless of whether they had access to it or not. In the case of those girls who did not work under any specific brothel owner, the money they had collected over a two / three year period after deducting their expenses amounted to sums such as Rs. 20,000. These were partly recovered and the same is kept away safely with the superintendent of the various homes in which they are being rehabilitated. However most of the rescued girls working under a brothel owner had not received any money after the raid and rescue.

Accommodation Living conditions in the brothels were appalling with hardly any room space. About 6-8 inmates shared a small sized room. Standard of sanitation and hygiene is very poor. Toilets were filthy and highly unhygienic. Water is a scarce commodity. There is lack of cleanliness all around and in the common bathrooms as well. Toilets are used by too many people and as a result are always overflowing. Supply for water in the toilets and bathrooms were only for a few hours with the result that there was a heavy rush for their use during that time. Victims remained without baths for days together. The food supplied is normally vegetarian like pulses, chapatis or rice. Quality of the food is generally poor with very little nutrition value. They had no privacy or control over their life and bodies. They were not allowed to move out without an escort. Majority of the victims had no contacts whatsoever with their families. The brothel owner kept a tight rein on them to avoid trouble or lose them. Illness was reported frequently mainly due to unhygienic conditions and due to sexually transmitted diseases. When ill or pregnant, most of the victims have to take care of themselves with their inmates help. The bill spent on their healthcare is usually considered as a debt on them, which they have to repay. It was revealed by some of the rescued victims about instances where the girl was authenticated as HIV/AIDS patient.

Raids

AIDS

The victims feel extremely traumatised of raid and rescue operations. They have been told all kinds of stories by the brothel owners and have been instructed not to reveal their real age and other details as otherwise they would have to face dire consequences and beatings from the police. Victims were of the opinion that authorities and police are not sincere to rescue all the victims. Several instances were stated when police raided their brothel much after they were taken away to safe hiding places, as information had been passed on to the brothel owners about the planned raid well in time.

Although it is mandatory to have a thorough medical examination of the rescued victim from the brothel to identify whether the victim has been infected with HIV/AIDS, but on scrutiny in the government run rescue centres, hardly any information was

and HIV/AIDS. Sexual exploitation of children has significant emotional ramifications as the victims are unable to return to a normal way of life and are psychologically scarred by the experience. In Mumbai, many young prostitutes were found to have sexually transmitted diseases with significant proportions of cases having AIDS(4).

Some victims even reported that police had asked them not to speak against ‘Aunty’ in front of the Magistrate or Child Welfare Board members after rescue. They narrated horrible experiences just before a raid is conducted. They are asked to remain inside the water tanks; hidden pigeonholes or cabins for days together like a pack of sardines.

Utter helplessness Questions related to their views and perceptions on being commercially sexually exploited (CSE) indicated their helplessness and destiny to be in this activity. They felt cheated by the society and do not think or hope that anything better may be in store for them. Majority of them wanted to leave the activity, but are hesitant as they believe their parents and society will never accept them and hence it is rather better to stay on and belong to the brothels. Some of them had tried to leave the brothel but failed. Even if some succeeded they were not happy with the state of affairs back home. Some of the reintegrated victims were happy to be back in the society. Their fear and apprehensions also seemed much less but they are constantly on the lookout for other sources of income. If not quickly absorbed there is always the threat that they may relapse into prostitution. Many of them still do not disclose their eventful past before their parents, community members, friends, society or relatives.

available. Several victims were ignorant about this test. However tremendous awareness was available in the NGO run homes especially in SANLAAP at Kolkata and Rescue Foundation in Mumbai. Systematic data is being recorded by SANLAAP on this vital issue. Data indicates that a significant number of victims tested HIV/ AIDS positive.

Illness The analysis of victims’ life at brothels depicts their extreme and invisible exploitation in the brothels by the pimps, brothel owners (aunty / madam) as well as customers. It is one of the most brutal forms of violence that can be inflicted on the life of a woman and that too a minor girl. The victims suffer extreme physical, psychosocial and emotional abuse, which have a threatening consequence on the entire life. They risk early pregnancy, maternal mortality, sexually transmitted diseases

The girls are often victims of beatings, verbal abuse and sexual molestation and rape in the brothels(5). Medical tests conducted on released children from brothels revealed that 60 per cent to 70 per cent of the girls were HIV positive(6). After being HIV positive the victims are not even accepted back by parents or the society. There are lack of rehabilitation camps / hospices for such cases in India, with the result these children are forced to live on streets with no support either from family, society, government and the employers for whom they had worked. The writer is an Associate Professor in the Centre for South, Central, Southeast Asian and Southwest Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Her fields of specialisation include Gender Studies, Human Security & Development with particular reference to India, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Currently she is actively engaged in an evaluation study for the Ministry of External Affairs, Govt. of India on ‘The Indian Initiatives for the Afghan Women’.

(4) Gilada, I.S (1997) “Child Prostitution: a Blot on Humanity”, Indian Health Organization. (5) Blanc, C.S. and others (1994), Urban Child in distress: Global Predicaments and Innovative Strategies, Florence, Italy, UNICEF International Child Development Centre, London. (6) Tim McGirk “Nepal’s Lost Daughters, India’s soiled goods,” Nepal/India News, 27 January 1997.

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A LETTER TO THE INDIAN AIR FORCE Dear Indian Air Force, You were born in 1932. I in 1945. You are 78 years old - I am 65. With each passing day we both get older. I joined you as a teenager in 1963 and we have shared much together. In many ways we continue to grow our beautiful relationship - an affair that will never end. Now I truly understand the meaning of "Till Death Do Us Part". While we grow old together - there is a difference. I am slowing down with age; while you get faster and faster from sub-sonic to transonic to supersonic to hypersonic. Climbing heights is getting difficult for me while you climb higher and higher; indeed to stratospheric heights and outer space. Age has affected my vision both in terms of the distance that I can see and the clarity of vision; while you have become far sighted (in many senses) with clearer vision - with assets in space, AWACS, Aero-Stats etc. You can see far and wide and with amazing clarity. My sense of co-ordination is slowing down; while with great communications equipment, skills and integration, you are getting better every day. My hearing is not what it used to be (did the jet noise contribute to this?); yours is getting clearer. And do I confess that your ability to eavesdrop is getting better. Age has brought loss of memory for me while yours on the other hand has improved by zillions of gigabytes. My ability to multi-task is slowing, while you are getting stronger by co-ordinating multiple aircraft strike packages with data transfer from one to the other along with AWACS, Tankers and Ground Based Systems. I don't see too well in the dark anymore, while you can strike terror at any time of the day or night at an adversary. I canâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t shoot as straight as I did before, while your shooting accuracy is now legendary (remember Pokhran!). My dreams of running a marathon are now just dreams; while you can ly ever longer distances to places across the oceans - somewhat like our mythological characters. As I grow physically weak, I avoid the tough guys of Gurgaon. You, the peace enforcer get stronger and put the fear of The Lord in the neighbourhood toughs. Long term schemes now do not interest me as I seek short term results; you are the opposite, thinking long term and strategically. Yes, we have shared so much together and I do watch with both fascination and admiration as you get stronger and better each passing day. As the number of my admirers reduce, yours increase. You are the pride of the Nation - loved by many and feared by our adversaries. Like vintage wine, you get better with age. More power to you my Air Force. Happy Birthday! Air Chief Marshal (Retd.) S. P. Tyagi

IAF anniversary

AEROSPAcE SEcURIty

Cruise missiles:

evolution and current status

Air Marshal (Retd.) T. M. Asthana

Having learnt how to make the supersonic speed BrahMos missile there is nothing to prevent India extending its range by using indigenous missile technologies without coming within the purview of the Missile Technology Control Regime (which, like the infamous Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) has done nothing to prevent the spread of cruise missiles. That it does so urgently is dictated by the fact that the Chinese have developed an aircraft carrier killer that is seen as a â&#x20AC;&#x153;game changerâ&#x20AC;? of geopolitics in the Pacific Ocean by restricting the employability of the vaunted super-carriers against the Chinese mainland.

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n this article I intend to cover some aspects of cruise missiles and the ‘limits and effects’ will be embedded in the recountal. Instead of a quote let me start by the definition of a cruise missile as I see it. “Cruise missile is an unmanned self-propelled guided vehicle that sustains flight through aerodynamic lift for most of its flight path and whose primary mission is to place an ordnance or special payload on a target.” This definition can include unmanned air vehicles and unmanned control guided helicopters or aircraft.

Evolution The evolution and history of cruise missiles makes interesting reading and provides an understanding of how the limitations have been overcome over the years. Most people would think that cruise missiles are a modern technology. However, the concept of an “aerial torpedo”, a pilot less aircraft with a warhead that flies to a distant target and dives into it, has been around since the First World War. In 1916, Lawrence Sperry filed a patent for an aerial torpedo, featuring the following elements: ■ A gyrostabilizer to keep the aircraft level. ■ An automatic steering gyro to keep the aircraft on a preset heading. ■ A barometer to indicate cruise altitude, causing the aircraft to level off. ■ An engine revolution counter to determine when the aircraft should cut power and dive into its target. ■ A wind-driven electrical generator to provide power for the gyro motors and the servomotors that moved the aerial torpedo’s flight control surfaces. Orville Wright contributed his expertise to the development of the airframe for the “Kettering aerial torpedo”. Another engineering team designed a motor, a 40 HP air cooled V4, which cost only US$ 40. A third team designed a cheap, portable launch system. Kettering was unable to build a workable autopilot and had to call on Elmer Sperry for help. Sperry graciously

lent his assistance. The resulting Kettering weapon actually looked like a torpedo, fitted with dihedral wings. Tests began in September 1918, with the first full scale flight on 02 October, when it was given the nickname “BUG”. RCA’s Dr. Vladimir Zworykin, one of the prime movers behind the invention of television, had been promoting the idea of a television-guided assault drone for some time, but nobody in the military was listening until Farnhey got in touch with him. The first televisionguided drone was demonstrated in 1940, using a RCA-developed television system.

Pearl Harbour The Japanese threw the US military into the war more abruptly than planned due to the Pearl Harbour attack on 07 December 1941. One of the results was consideration of a wide range of weapons that might help win the war. A secret programme to build an assault drone, codenamed Project Option, was formally begun in February 1942. Smith and Farnhey were moving ahead on a production assault drone, the TDR-1. Beginning 27 September 1944, a series of attacks were conducted on Japanese installations on the island of Bougainville. When the attacks ended on 26 October 1944, 46 TDR-1s were expended in combat, with 37 performing attacks and at least 21 hitting their targets. The Japanese were convinced that the Americans had resorted to suicide attacks. The Boeing B-17 (Fortress) were converted and christened ‘BQ-7”. These were filled with 9 tonnes of Torpex explosive. The BQ-7 was to take off normally with two pilots, who would bail out as per plan, and the weapon would now be on remote control armed to explode on the target. Incidentally, the roof of the cockpit was cut off to allow the crew to escape easily.

Kennedy connection The first Anvil mission of a converted B-24 on 12 August 1944, ended in disaster, exploding in mid-air. The two crewmen, Navy Lieutenants Wilford J. Willy and Joseph Kennedy Jr. were obliterated. Joseph Kennedy Jr. was the eldest son of the prominent Joseph Kennedy family and was being groomed to contest the Presidential

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election. Flight tests of other prototypes began in 1953 leading to pre-production prototypes in 1957. Development of the Northrop SM-62 ‘Snark’ was unusually troublesome. In 1956 one Snark decided to head south on its own and vanished from sight, only to be re-discovered in the Brazilian jungle by a farmer in 1982.

70s success While the attempts to build cruise missiles during WW II and in the immediate postwar period were not generally successful, by the 1970s the technology was available to do the right job. The results were first really practical cruise missiles, the “Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM)” and the “Sea Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM)” or “Tomahawk”.

Soviet programme It is generally believed that the German V-1 is the true forerunner of cruise missiles. The V-1 was an odd and ingenious weapon, designed to be cheaply built in large numbers. The V-1 was directed to its target by a simple guidance system, which incorporated a set of gyroscopes driven by compressed air to keep the missile stable; a magnetic compass to control bearings and a barometer to control altitude. The Soviets apparently did consider using piston-powered cruise missiles in WW-II, but details are vague and in any case nothing came of these efforts. More significantly, in October 1944, the British sent the remains of a V-1 that had been shot down over England to the USSR. The Soviets found it very interesting and promptly set up an experimental design bureau, designated “OKB-51” to reverse-engineer it. The team was lead by Vladimir Chelomei, who later became famous for directing development of the big Soviet Proton space launch booster. The V-1 provided by the British was lacking a few significant parts, but special Red Army detachments assigned to collect “the loot” were able to provide more gear. The Mittelwerk facility at Nordhausen fell into the Soviet zone of control of occupied Germany. Although the Americans had hastily cleaned a great deal of gear out of the mine before the Red Army arrived; there was still material left over.

Soviet engineering design doctrine and military requirements differed from those of the West and if it is difficult to categorise Western missiles, it is exasperating to try to categorise Soviet missiles. For example, while the Americans developed long-range cruise missiles and air-launched stand off missiles for strategic attack, the Soviet emphasis in development of such weapons was for strategic and anti-ship attack as ‘equalizers’ against Western naval dominance. Such long-range anti-ship weapons had no equivalents in the West. The difference in military philosophies and the choppy data available for Soviet missiles at present make a detailed description of the topic difficult.

General characteristics The term cruise missile covers several vehicles and their capabilities, from the Chinese Silkworm (HY-2), which has a range of less than 105 km, to the US Advanced Cruise Missile (ACM), which can fly to ranges of up to 3,000 km. These vehicles vary greatly in their speed and ability to penetrate defenses. They are inexpensive to build and can, therefore, overwhelm current defenses by sheer numbers. They can be designed to be small with low-thrust engines which can penetrate radar and infrared detection networks. The technology to build them is simple and available to any country that builds even rudimentary aircraft. Finally since cruise missiles are unmanned, they require no flight crew training, expensive upkeep programmes, special hangars for housing, or large bases for basing.

Navigation The US introduced cruise missiles into its inventory when a combination of technologies reached a critical point in their development. Except for Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM), the 1990s have seen these technologies, or the knowledge of how to reproduce them, become wide-spread among industrialised and newly industrialising nations. The introduction of GPS and GLONASS eliminates the need for a country to rely on TERCOM navigation. A proliferator is not forced to seek out any other technologies to build a cruise missile, though many, such as rocketassisted take-off units, may give a combatant more flexibility in using a

cruise missile for a variety of combat operations. Of the five major subsystems that compose a cruise missile - airframe, propulsion, guidance, control and navigation and weapons integration none is expensive. In the late 1960s, the US first introduced turbine propulsion systems that weighed less than 100 lbs and produced many hundreds of pounds of thrust. These turbine engines, or their lineal descendants, powered most of the early US cruise missile designs and were one of the least costly items. The power plant may even be as

prosaic as a reciprocating engine with a propeller. The latter, of course, has little hope of disguising its signature from defenses, but the mission profile may allow it to disguise itself as another platform.

Accuracy Currently, GPS receivers provide more capability and accuracy than any targeting strategy requirements of the guidance, control and navigation systems. Cruise missiles, being aerodynamic vehicles, do not need the rapid response cycle time that ballistic

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AEROSPAcE SEcURIty

missiles must have to keep the vehicle under control and on an appropriate track. Avionics systems available for first generation commercial aircraft are both light enough and accurate enough to keep a cruise missile under control for long periods of time. For navigation, civilian code GPS is priced for the civilian hobbyist market, so purchasing an off-the-shelf navigation unit capable of obtaining 20 m Circular Error Probable (CEP) is within the range of the common pocketbook. This level of accuracy is better than that of early TERCOM systems installed on US cruise missiles, which made them practical for the first time in the late 1970s. For long cruise missile flight paths, a country without access to GPS systems must develop mapping guidance logic for its cruise missile or accept highly degraded performance from an inertial measurement unit (IMU). Long flight paths allow errors in the IMU to become so great that the missile may stray far from its target. Also, without an updated mapping system, the cruise

missile must fly at an altitude high enough to avoid all manmade obstacles, thereby exposing itself to detection. Even with GPS the autonomous cruise missile carrying an on-board map must be supplied with the latest terrain and physical feature changes that have occurred along its course if it flies near the ground.

Stealth technology If a country wants to increase the penetrability of its cruise missiles, it must identify technologies that aid in signature reduction, signature masking, or other means to confuse detection systems. Some of these technologies include radar jamming and spoofing technologies; infrared suppression of engine exhaust; paints and coatings that disguise the thermal signature of leading edges; computer routines that predict the flow field around aerodynamic surfaces and the methods to change those surfaces to reduce heat transfer and turbulent flow fields; wind tunnel technology that supports the computer prediction

and computer routines that predict redesign methods to achieve certain design specifications. The cruise missile is suited for the delivery of chemical or biological agents if it does not fly at supersonic or transonic speeds. Supersonic missiles cannot dispense chemical and biological agents from sprayers since the air stream itself will destroy the agent by heating or shock, but they do deliver nuclear weapons with great efficiency.

Anti-ship missiles Even the German WW-II era V-1 “buzz bomb” meets the definition of a cruise missile, but today, cruise missiles can be as sophisticated as the American AGM-129 Advanced Cruise Missile with its W80 nuclear warhead which can strike targets 3,000 kms away using guidance systems that hug satellite mapped terrain, or they could be as simple as small unmanned air vehicles built from commercially available kits. Antiship cruise missiles only need a relatively simple inertial navigation system and a radar return from their

The cruise missile is suited for the delivery of chemical or biological agents if it does not fly at supersonic or transonic speeds. Supersonic missiles cannot dispense chemical and biological agents from sprayers since the air stream itself will destroy the agent by heating or shock, but they do deliver nuclear weapons with great efficiency. target, which is within the area the missile is launched at. Consequently, antiship cruise missiles, being simpler and often shorter range, are generally the first kind of cruise missile acquired by states or organisations, such as the Hezbollah.

Plethora of types Reliable accounts reckon that as many as 130 types of cruise missiles exist today, with 77 countries possessing them. A brief summary of the cruise missiles available to countries may be of interest. Harpoons have been exported to 19 countries, including Egypt, Iran, Pakistan, South Korea and Saudi Arabia. India has received Sea Eagles, while Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea have Silkworms and Seersuckers, a version of which North Korea now manufactures. Italy has Komorans and Taiwan, South Africa, Chile, Ecuador, Kenya, Singapore and Thailand have Gabriel Mark-II. Italy has exported turbojet powered Otomats to Egypt, Iraq, Kenya, Libya, Nigeria, Peru, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, while the Swedes exported the RBS-15 to Yugoslavia and Finland. The Soviets sold the long-range (500 kms, 850 kg) turbojet powered “Shaddock” to Syria and Yugoslavia. At the next notch down in technological capability, the Soviets have flooded the world market with 1960s generation liquid fuelled “Styx” (SS-N-2C) missiles. Algeria, Angola, Cuba, Egypt,

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Ethiopia, Finland, India, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Vietnam, Yemen and the former Yugoslavia have the Styx missile in their inventories.

Cruise missiles I intend covering the Tomahawk in some detail with references nearer home later. The Tomahawk is a long-range cruise missile for both surface and submarine launch against both surface-ship and land targets. It was subsequently adapted for land launch as the Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) as part of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces that were deployed in Western Europe. Initially known as the Sea Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM), the Tomahawk’s principal roles are antiship (TASM), land attack with a conventional warhead TLAM-C) and land attack with a nuclear warhead (TLAM-N). All versions operate at very low altitudes and have a radar cross section of approximately 10.76 ft square (1 m square). The missile is sealed in its launch canister at the factory and can be treated as a “wooden round”. The missile achieved initial operational capability in 1982 and modified in 1987 as TLAM-N. On September 27, 1991 President Bush announced that all tactical nuclear weapons would be removed from US Navy surface ships and submarines. These are now placed in storage.

Tomahawk The Tomahawk cruise missile (BGM109) is a 20 feet long weapon costing US$ 1.3 million. A booster rocket shoots the missile off a ship / submarine. Then a small turbofan engine takes over and the missile jets towards land, directed by its ‘inertial guidance system’, which uses sensors and gyroscopes to measure acceleration and changes in direction. Once the missile crosses the shoreline, a more precise guidance method, TERCOM takes over. TERCOM (Terrain Contour Mapping) scans the set checkpoints, taking altitude readings and comparing them to map data in its computer memory. The missile moves at about 550 miles per hour and can twist and turn like a radar-evading fighter plane all the while skimming over land at 100 feet to 300 feet. After covering 1,500 miles the Tomahawk closes in on its target and a third guidance system takes over: Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator (DSMAC). DSMAC snaps a picture of the target area and compares that data to a digitised target map in its memory. The computer then gives the wings and tail fins a final adjustment and takes the warhead to its target. For night missions the DSMAC can flash a strobe light when needed. The antiship Tomahawk is fitted with a modified Harpoon active radar seeker. The missile flies a preprogrammed profile at sea skimming height for most of its flight. When the missile nears the

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IAF anniversary

AEROSPAcE SEcURIty Other salvos followed for a total of 291 Tomahawks launched in the campaign. Of the first 106 Tomahawks fired at least 100 hit their targets. American and British reporters in Baghdad watched as a Tomahawk zoomed above the street before making a right angle turn down the next street on the way to its target. British TV camera crews filmed five Tomahawks entering the Baghdad city limits, one after another. It has been suggested that strike mission planners deliberately plotted the flight path to pass by the hotel where the reporters were staying. Among the targets hit in Baghdad were the Presidential palace, the Ministry of Defence and a central communications centre. Elsewhere in Iraq, targets included chemical, biological and nuclear warfare research facilities. The US Air Force also launched 35 conventional ALCMs at targets in northern Iraq, for a total expenditure of 326 cruise missiles in the conflict.

target’s estimated position, the active radar seeker takes over. The latest antiship variant is reported to have a reattack mode.

Babur The propulsion system of the Babur missile that Pakistan tested in 2005 definitely resembles that of the BG-109 Tomahawk. After an initial launch by a solid fuel booster, a cruise turbofan engine cuts in, giving the Babur a speed of 880 kmph and a range of 500 km. That Chinese assistance was a factor in developing the Babur’s GPS and INS based guidance system is supported by its resemblance to the Chinese YJ-62 antiship cruise missile and the family resemblance of both missiles to the Tomahawk.

BrahMos The Babur was, in a sense, Pakistan’s predictable response to the test firing in 2001 of the PJ-10 BrahMos cruise missile by India. Jointly developed by Russia’s Mashinostreyenia and India’s BrahMos Corporation, the BrahMos ramjet cruise engine is based on the Russian supersonic antiship Yakhont missile and capable of speeds of 2.5 to 2.8 Mach. India and Russia have

ensured that BrahMos did not violate the Missile Technology Control Regime by keeping its range within the 300 km limit specified for antiship cruise missiles by the MTCR. To comprehend the “effects” of the cruise missiles one would need to analyse their uses in recent wars. I don’t intend to cover case by case in detail. Hence, I shall cover just a few instances. In Lebanon the Hezbollah’s recent use of an Iranian variant of the Chinese “Silkworm” C-802 radar guided antiship missile against an Israeli warship illustrates the larger trend. In the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, the first Gulf war demonstrated America’s unparalleled global power, which flowed, in part, from possession of a new class of weapons with near surgical accuracy at great distances. Fifteen years later, another shift in the balance of global military power is occurring as missile technology - particularly, the cruise missile technology that was once a hallmark feature of the US military. Beware! cruise missiles are now being democratised. In Afghanistan every strategist remembers 20 August 1998. This was the

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day when the almighty USS Abraham Lincoln Battle Group, stationed in the Arabian Sea, launched Tomahawk cruise missiles at an Al Qaeda training camp in eastern Afghanistan, hoping to take out Osama bin Laden. With a top speed of 550 mph the Tomahawk made the 1100 miles in 2 hours. By then, Bin Laden was gone - missed by less than an hour. Cruise missiles cannot deliver on targets that are not stationary.

At least one TLAM-D was specially modified to provide a “soft kill” on Iraqi power stations, using an improvised warhead designated “KIT-2”. Its

submunitions were filled with spools of conductive fibers instead of bomblets and dumped the spools over the power stations, temporarily shorting them out.

space-launch vehicles and land-attack cruise missile systems.

MTCR monopoly

The member countries agree to control the export of technology covered by the guidelines. The guidelines initially provided for a strong presumption of denial of export licensing for ballistic and cruise missile systems capable of delivering a less than 500 kg payload to a range of 300 kms. Subsystems and technology, which could be used in such systems was also described and controlled although dual use items could be exported if there was reasonable evidence that the end use was not weapon oriented.

No session discussing cruise missiles can be complete without reference to the MTCR. Seven countries with significant manufacturing and technological capabilities in missile technology originally established the MTCR in 1987. The aim of the MTCR is to limit capabilities of less technologically advanced countries in using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by restricting the availability of missiles and missile technology, which might be used to deliver such weapons. The original intention was aimed at systems with nuclear warheads, but more recently the scope has been extended to include both chemical and biological systems. A cruise missile is a Category II item – meaning, essentially, that any company that manufactures it may export it. Incidentally, Category I severely limits exports of ballistic missile systems,

Dual-use technology

The writer, a fighter pilot, was appointed first Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Forces Command in January 2003 with responsibility for India's nuclear weapons and held this post till retirement in June 2004. He was Assistant Chief of Operations, ACAS (Ops) at Air Headquarters in January 1999 during the Kargil Operations.

During Operation Desert Storm at the cost of repetition I must mention this conflict since this was the first occasion when cruise missiles and fighters were used in conjunction. During Desert Storm, 264 BGM-109Cs (unitary warhead) and 27 BGM-109Ds (cluster bombs) were launched from the battle ships, several cruisers and destroyers and at least two submarines, mostly in the early days of the war. An analysis of Tomahawk results suggested that 85 per cent of the 242 target aim points were hit. The US accepted that two missiles might have been shot down. On 17 January 1991, the Tomahawk became the first American long-range cruise missile to be used in combat, when 52 were fired in a salvo at targets on the first day in Iraq from US warships in the Persian Gulf.

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Global Security Asia 2011, the fourth in the Series, returns bigger and stronger than ever with over 190 exhibitors expected to showcase their state-of-the-art products and services. This dedicated international exhibition & conference is the most influential homeland security event in the Asia Pacific and will be held at Singapore’s latest exhibition venue, the Marina Bay Sands Expo & Convention Centre from the 15th to 17th of March 2011. Since its launch in 2005, the GSA Series enjoys an enviable reputation as being the most important Homeland Security Event in the Asia Pacific region and in its short history GSA is now regarded as a ‘must attend’ Event. The Event attracts a highly focussed audience including security academics, engineers and personnel from the Armed Forces, Civil Defence groups and Specialist Agencies. The Exhibition provides an unique forum for members of the VIP Delegations to evaluate the latest equipment and systems that are currently available and to exchange ideas and establish new networks. GSA 2011 is officially endorsed by the UK’s ADS Group and the UKTI Defence & Security Organisation plus the Australian Trade Commission, the Singapore Exhibition & Convention Bureau as well as the United States Department of Commerce. The continued support of these organisations further underscores the credibility and importance of the GSA Series as the premier Counter-Terrorism event in the Asia Pacific region. This year’s event will also feature eight International Pavilions from Australia, China, France, Israel, Korea, Singapore, United Kingdom and United States of America. The Singapore Pavilion is developing into the largest national pavilion to date in the GSA Series. The growth and expansion of the Pavilion is a reflection of the Homeland Security market potential in the Asia Pacific region which is forecast to grow by 20% annually for the foreseeable future and is expected to reach US$25.8 billion annually by 2015.

AEROSPAcE SEcURIty

The AWACS will form the backbone of the “aero” component of “aerospace” defences. In conjunction with AFNET (Air Force Net) telecommunications system which has just been inaugurated along with several other data links and connectivity a complete air defence ground environment system (ADGES) will soon be in place with at least two of the three AWACS airborne and active covering the main sources of threat to the Indian mainland. The “gaps” that hitherto existed in the ground based radar network will thus be eliminated.

Dr. Arvind Kumar

Located at the heart of Asia, Singapore is one of the leading countries in the South-East Asian Region to continually embrace the latest technology in counter-terrorism. With the Asia Pacific region set to experience strong sustainable growth in the coming decades many countries will have to grapple with a variety of internal and external threats to their stability. In Singapore many Government Ministries and Agencies such as the Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Trade & Industry, the Maritime Port Authority, Civil Aviation Authority, the Armed Forces and Land Transport Authority have adopted state-of-the art technologies to control access, improve and enhance perimeter security, as well as for use in civil defence and emergency planning. Many Multi-National Companies, building owners, shopping and retail outlets, banking, and financial services have now followed this trend. Furthermore, the strategic location of Singapore in the Asia Pacific region together with its solid economic infrastructure naturally makes it a premier homeland security hub for the global Industry to serve countries in South East Asia and beyond. The GSA 2011 Conference, running concurrently with the Exhibition is also a major feature of the GSA Series and will cover all aspects of

• Aviation security • Border security • CBRN security • Counter-terror intelligence • Emergency response

• Intfrastructure security • Maritime security • Mass transit security • Telecommunications, data and cyber security

Meet and network with the International Experts and Speakers in this highly regarded and

aerospace protection: awacs - the force multiplier

influential Event.

Exhibits / Exhibitor Profile Manufacturers, distributors, R&D Agencies and organizations involved in, but not limited to the following list of products, services and technologies, will be participating in GSA 2011:  Special Forces Equipment & Vehicles

 Border Security Land, Air and Seaport Security

 UAVs, USVs & UUVs

 Maritime and Coastal Security

 Sensors – IR and EOD

 Mass Transit Security

 Surveillance & Counter-Intelligence

 Chemical, Biological, Radiation and Nuclear (CBRN) Security

 Simulation & Training

 CBRN Detection and Protection Equipment

 Small Calibre / Non Lethal Weapons

 System Integrators

 Area Protection via Dedicated Sensors

 Biometrics

 Telecommunications, Data, Cyber & IT Security

 Infrastructure Security

 Law Enforcement Equipment

 Civil Defence

 Crisis Response

 Fire Service

 Communications Monitoring Systems

 Emergency Response

Bellwether Exhibitors including Thales, EADS, CERTIS CISCO, Motorola, NEC, Sheares, Glock, Swiss Securitas and Raytheon are regular participants of the GSA Series. The prestigious US Homeland Security Department is again planning to participate in 2011. For further information, please visit www.globalsecasia.com

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he articulation of India’s threat perceptions in the current regional security environment suggests that most of the threats emanate from the Indian borders with Pakistan and China. India’s overall position in South Asian region is remarkable. It has a long land frontier of around 14,880 km and a coastline of 5,422 km. India also has a total of 1,197 islands accounting for 2,094 km of additional coastline. In fact, barring Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh, Delhi and Haryana, all other states in India have one or more international borders or a coastline and can be regarded as frontline states from the point of view of border management and surveillance. It must be emphasised here that many of the national security related problems emanate in India from the bordering states. It would be relevant and worthwhile exercise to examine various issues relating to the maintenance of India’s national security and what role Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) can play in terms of enhancing India’s airborne effectiveness and capabilities.

Pak-China centric It is a well established fact that India’s major adversary Pakistan would keep involving itself with the cross-border terrorism and proxy war more particularly in Jammu and Kashmir with the single minded aim of destabilising India. The intensification of cross-border terrorism in the recent years has certainly thrown up new challenges for India to re-look and devise mechanism by which India would be able to either contain such nefarious designs or deal with in any case of eventuality. In the current scenario, it is evident that the offensive agenda of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to promote terrorist activities in Kashmir valley and elsewhere in India is expected to intensify. Pakistan will continue to pose a threat to India’s security. India under this probable and futuristic scenario certainly would require strengthening its overall preparedness and readiness to cope up with the emerging situations. It must be pointed out here that India’s relationship with other bordering countries including China is certainly not on a high pitch. India has a long

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standing border dispute with China. China-Pakistan nexus also creates problems for India.

Indigenous AWACS Hence, India’s threat perceptions have driven it to acquire all the relevant and modern defence technologies, which would be required both during peace and crisis time. India way back in the year 1992 established Centre for Airborne Systems (CABS) at Bangalore as a national laboratory of Defence Research and Development Organisation and launched indigenous AWACS project. The initiation of this project was very much in line and consonance with India’s needs and requirements based on its threat perceptions. The larger objective was to strengthen the base and capabilities of Indian Air Force. The world in general and India in particular had also seen the capabilities of AWACS during the first Gulf War during the Operation Desert Storm of 1991 and later on the potential of AWACS were absolutely utilised and exploited during the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Project setback India’s keenness to acquire AWACS grew because of its growing concerns with adversaries in its neighbourhood. Unfortunately, India’s indigenous effort got derailed after the crash of one of its prototype meant for technology demonstration in 1999. The indigenous project was shelved by the government of India after the crash. After a lull and downslide, the AWACS project at CABS again resumed in 2004. By then, India had already delayed the process. Meanwhile, India faced several crises with Pakistan. Kargil in 1999 and Op. Parakram deployment in 2002 crisis which lasted for more than ten months after the attack on Indian Parliament.

US embargo There was always a pressure from the Indian Air Force to acquire AWACS from abroad if India was not able to build indigenously. India had initiated track one dialogues with Israelis in this regard for the acquisition of AWACS. The existence of ‘No-Supervision Agreement’ between the United States and Israel prohibited India to get

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AWACS from Israel for some time. According to the ‘No-Supervision Agreement”, Israel was not allowed to conduct trade and commerce with 27 countries listed by the United States unless it has been approved as a special case. India figured in the United States’ list of 27 countries. Obviously, the United States blocked Israel to supply AWACS to India.

Indo-US thaw The change in the atmospherics of the Indo-US relations in recent years provided impetus to Israel for the supply of AWACS to India. The Indian Air Force finally inducted its first “eyein-the-sky” AWACS during May 2009. The AWACS had flown from Israel to the Jamnagar airbase in Gujarat in fruition of a US$ 1.1 billion deal for the three AWACS.

to be quickly disseminated and shared with other AWACS in the vicinity. The AWACS has a number of other capabilities including Electronic and Signal Intelligence gathering (ELINT & SIGINT). India would reap the benefit after it is operationalised along with the Operational Data Link (ODL), Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) and the Air Force Net (AFNET) and then it would be very useful for making network-centric operations more robust.

the AWACS would add great value to its overall military and strategic capabilities and will look deeper into its major adversaries and also help in detecting incoming missiles and aircrafts from hundreds of kilometers away in all weather conditions. India can now detect troops build-up in its neighbourhood.

India-Russia-Israel link

acquiring few more AWACS in the next couple of years. The remaining two ‘Phalcon’ fitted aircraft are expected by the end of 2010. India has a wide area to cover and hence the requirements would be more in the context of its overall air power status. India has been able to convince Brazil about its requirements and it has been agreed that India will be receiving three AWACS from Brazil in next three years. Brazil’s Embraer’s ERJ-145 when fully equipped will act as the overall system integrator. Brazil’s Embraer has signed a contract to deliver 3 ERJ-145 jets, which would be modified into AWACS aircraft by adding radar systems created in India’s various defence research and development labs.

Indo-Brazil project It is most likely that India will be

with regard to the overall integration of the electronic systems, mission computer, display and data handling exist. It would obviously require more time and effort for India’s scientific community to develop AWACS indigenously. However, the consistent effort put forth in the last two decades especially by the scientific community with a brief lull in between has proved to be of great help in making India’s research and development in defence sector more robust.

Quantum jump The capabilities of Indian Air Force got boosted because of the induction of AWACS. The AWACS has the ability to detect aircraft, cruise missiles and other flying objects at ranges far greater than is possible through existing systems. The best part of AWACS has been that it can collate surface information about troop movements and missile launches much in advance and hence a nation like India which has been surrounded by unfriendly neighbours can take effective steps in the readiness and defence preparedness. The AWACS can also provide with all very relevant confidential communications between the enemy’s frontline units. The AWACS can also track several hundred friendly and enemy aircraft at once. It acts as an airborne command centre for aircraft. It has the potential to detect both friend and foe aircraft. The friendly planes are always kept out of each others’ way and hence, there was not a single friendly air-to-air collision during the 1991 Gulf War, or in the 2001 Afghanistan air campaign.

AWACS-AFNET synergy During hostilities enemy aircraft are spotted, identified and friendly interceptors play an important role in taking care of the hostile planes. The communications and navigation systems on board an AWACS allow information gathered by one AWACS

The AWACS, which India has inducted, is a tripartite venture amongst India, Russia and Israel. The specifications and operational requirements were laid down in detail by the Indian Air Force. The Israeli ‘Phalcon’ radar was mounted on the Russian IL-76 aircraft, which has been equipped with the more powerful PS-90A engines. It has become a very advanced system also because it is fitted with phased array radars. India is one of the few countries to have inducted the AWACS in their Air Force. Undoubtedly, the AWACS aircraft has proved itself to be a vital component in modern air warfare and command, control, communications, intelligence and integration systems. In India’s case,

The indigenous AWACS programme has been evolving and the expertise

India’s emphasis on acquiring AWACS either by adopting indigenous route or by importing has been mainly because of the relevance and requirements. AWACS is certainly a force multiplier because it enhances the capabilities effectively in both offensive and defensive modes. The AWACS will certainly help and provide with an aerial protection during any incoming threat or eventuality.

The author teaches Geopolitics and International Relations at Manipal University. He also heads the Department of Geopolitics. His areas of research interest are in the field of nuclear weapons, ballistic missile defence, strategic capabilities of China and Pakistan and matters relating to international security.

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Indian women have finally won the right to Permanent Commission in the Armed Forces. Going by electronic media visuals the debate is still quite heated on the issue of participating in warfare in the combat zone as fighter pilots and, er, “infantry women”.

Air Marshal (Retd.) P. Bandhopadhyaya

women officers:

epoch-making journey!

ndian Air Force took off as a tiny fleet with four Wapiti bi-planes, six RAF trained officers and 19 hawai sepoys. Today, it is the world’s fourth largest Air Force with a highly technical and specialised fighting force. Indian Air Force celebrates it’s 78th anniversary on 8 October. The IAF has been successfully led by very capable and dedicated Chiefs of Air Staff. It has scaled many new peaks in this journey true to its motto, “Touch the Sky With Glory” i.e. Nabha Sparasham Deeptam. I am very proud and feel honoured to have been a part of this elite Service for nearly four decades.

Landmark judgement In the present scenario, there has been a lot of talk, discussions in print media, audio visual media and the judiciary regarding grant of Permanent Commission (PC) to Short Service Commissioned (SSC) women officers. On March 12, 2010, the Honourable Delhi High Court gave the verdict to grant Permanent Commission in the Indian Army and Indian Air Force to Short Service Commissioned Women Officers. A landmark decision indeed! Let us briefly look at the pages of history and ‘what they say’ about women all over the world. Myths focus

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on the active male and the supporting female roles. It is said that there is a woman behind every successful man. Plato defined women as “lesser men,” Aristotle described women as “a deformity, a misbegotten male,”. St. Thomas Aquinas argued that God should not have created women. Craniologists of the nineteenth century argued that women’s smaller heads justified their subordinate position in society (thus initiating all the “pretty little head” rhetoric about women). Freud believed women had “little sense of justice,” and so on. One finds words like “Yatra nariyastu Pujyante, ramante tatra Devata” in the scriptures. However, Saint Tulsidas had written about women, “Dhol ganwar shudra pashu nari, ye sab tadana ke adhikari”.

Male attitude Women perform bulk of domestic work and many a times they work outside homes as well. We have traversed a long journey to attain gender equity in urban areas. However in villages it would take very long to balance the gender inequity. What is galling is the male attitude that women continue to encounter, overtly and covertly. Women have a long way to go.

Neither men are women’s enemies, nor their competitors. Many women achieve success with the help and understanding of their husbands, brothers and fathers. Life would be ideal when men and women are equal partners. Women’s image and roles are changing in society dramatically. Today, the young girls have clear views regarding their future and perform exceedingly well. To be successful, they may have to work harder and more sincerely in their selected direction than their male counterparts without wallowing in self-pity

First Air Marshal I am very thankful and grateful to IAF and Army Medical Corps for promoting me to be the First Air Marshal. The higher ranks of Lieutenant General, Vice Admiral and Air Marshal are granted to the Permanent Commissioned Officers only. As different from Short Service Commission (SSC) and Emergency Commission (EC), Permanent Commission (PC) officers are assigned certain responsibilities and enjoy privileges like eligibility to attain the top ranks and grant of study leave in India or abroad. They are also entitled

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Is our society ready to accept the possibility of their daughters, wives, mothers becoming POWs? There will be so much of hue and cry from the family, society and the mass media. This will definitely hamper the working of Armed Forces specially during war scenario for grant of pension and gratuity on completing the term as required. Thus, they improve themselves professionally and also have a possibility of attaining position and status attached to the higher ranks. During the twilight years of their life, pension and gratuity and ECHS bestows financial security and freedom and caters for their health needs. Great advantages indeed.

20-year tenure The other side of the coin: They also have a responsibility to serve for a minimum period of 20 years in any part of India or abroad and perform duties as required. PC officers are trained at various academies like National Defence Academy, Officers Training School, Air Force Academy, Naval Academy and Armed Forces Medical College etc. It is a well known fact that young girls often excel at school and college. However, the family circumstances and societal pressures may make them lag behind their male counterparts. Thus, men may earn more and are more likely to hold positions of power in political and economic spheres. Hitherto, the Armed Forces were known as “Male Bastion” and they did not have women officers in PC till nearly five decades ago. There were very few Nursing Officers in higher ranks.

Batch of ’67 Let us wind the clock backwards. The

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first batch of women medical cadets passed out of the prestigious Armed Forces Medical College, commissioned in Army Medical Corps and seconded to Navy and Air Force in January 1967. They were the first Women Army Officers to have been granted Permanent Commission directly. Surprising but true, before this there were few Women Medical Officers but they were all commissioned as SSC officers and very few amongst them were granted PC. They were commissioned for an initial term of five years extendable to another five years if willing and found suitable. They completed their term and had no pension or other benefits Earlier, only Nursing Officers could attain higher ranks. However, they were denied their fundamental rights and were not allowed to marry. In case they did get married they were required to quit. They were allowed to join local Military Nursing Service (MNS) in the last rank held, in which they retired. The women Medical Officers (Doctors), were allowed to marry but maternity benefits were normally not being granted to them at par with their civilian counterpart, due to Service exigencies. In due course of time, Nursing Officers were also granted this privilege and presently we have many senior officers in AMC including Army Dental Corps and MNS.

Non-combat roles After nearly three decades, in 1995, women officers were commissioned in all the three Services in non-combat role as Short Service Commissioned Officers. In the Army, they were commissioned in Corps of Signals, Army Ordnance Corps, Corps of Electrical and Mechanical Engineers and Army Service Corps. In the Indian Air force, they were commissioned in all branches including transport and helicopter streams but excluding fighter stream. In the Indian Navy, the SSC officers were not posted to ship and submarine duties. It was a red letter day for women SSC officers to be eligible for PC. Initially, the number of women officers were few. As years rolled by, their number increased. Presently, their total number is 5,137; Indian Army has 4,101, Indian Air Force has 784 and Indian Navy 252 Women SSC officers respectively.

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Initially, the term of engagement was for 10 years which was extended to 14 years. Earlier, these women officers had performed well and some had excelled also. Yet they had no choice except to hang their uniforms after 14 years.

No pension During this long term of 14 years which are the most productive years in anyone’s life they served the Armed Forces. Many of them got married to Service officers and got settled in their professional and family lives, till they found the sword of Democles was hanging. Initial batch of officers did not raise their voice and left service without any pension benefits. On the other hand, SSC men officers had a choice to apply for PC and if they qualified, they could get their PC. Here I would like to define Gender Equity as ‘the condition of fairness and equality of opportunity whereby gender is no longer a basis for discrimination and inequality between people’. As our Constitution grants gender equity, both women and men enjoy equal status, rights, levels of responsibility and access to power and resources. This enables them to make their own life choices.

Adverse anomaly So, this was an anomaly affecting the women officers adversely. Around this time, the Army Medical Corps promoted two women officers to the highest rank of Lt. General viz one in the Navy and another in the Air Force. They were posted as the Director General Medical Services Navy and Director General Medical Services Indian Air Force, heading the Medical services of Navy and Air Force respectively. Their examples motivated women SSC officers to seek help from all channels including judiciary for getting PC. It is now history that the judiciary has accepted their claim after a long protracted struggle. SSC women officers won their cases for grant of PC from SSC. Recently a panel discussion was held on the Lok Sabha TV on this issue as well.

Strict norms We all know very well that not all

women SSC officers want to be PC officers. Those who opt for PC will have to go through a fine comb of selection procedures and medical examination before they are selected for PC. Some will definitely make it and will volunteer for being bound by rules and regulations required of a PC officer. Same rule applies to male SSC officers also. The day is not far off when women cadets will find their way into institutions like NDA. Please remember every rose has its thorns. PC is a not a panacea for all the issues. You do not have choice in your postings. This affects specially the young officers both men and women who may have to spend quite some time in field / forward areas / or its equivalent in Navy and Air Force where life is rosy if you make it or thorny if you choose it. Do not crib and criticise the great institution of Armed Forces if you are posted to the thick jungles, dreary deserts, lofty heights or massive seas. That is the challenge, which has to be accepted and enjoyed. Perform your duty to your best capability and earn laurels for your unit, service and country.

Marriage Then there is the social institution of marriage. For a few women officers marriage and children may take precedence over their careers. This is more so because of Indian traditions, social and psychological pressures involved. Lot of research work is being carried out the world over on this issue. For a successful marriage a lot of understanding and adjustments are required, which may result in ego clash between equally placed PC officers. Maturity has to be developed to deal with various issues. It may not be possible to post all couples together due to Service exigencies. Accept this with grace and perform your duties with dedication, instead of applying pulls and pushes. You do get lot of leave compared to our civilian counterparts. Try to adjust your needs and project requirement in advance.

Combat ready? The clamour for allowing women to join the Army in Infantry, Artillery, Armoured Corps, for being Fighter

Pilots in IAF and Executive branch in the Navy, besides other branches is increasing day by day. This single question is being regularly asked to me in all TV interviews as to when will an SSC Officer be allowed to be a Fighter Pilot? Why can’t they take up this role when they can take all other roles. The reply may lie in some unspoken assumptions i.e. that women are different, they do not have executive ability, orderly minds, stability, leadership skills and they are too emotional. In this country with so many positive factors, we are still struggling to get 33 per cent reservation for women in Parliament. It is therefore likely that it would take some time for their dreams to come true. There are women in combat roles in a few foreign countries like Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Norway and Switzerland. Even in USAF there are trained fighter pilots but mostly they are employed in training duties. Britain and Israel have women in combat role like in Artillery but not in Infantry. Culturally and socially they are very different from our Indian society. As a Doctor and also as the first woman Aerospace Medicine specialist, I can vouch for the fact that there are no physical disqualifications specially in women to become a fighter pilot. It is a fact that out of total applications many will be disqualified medically (both among men and women) for not having the required leg length. True, but it is also a fact that many girls are taller and they will definitely make it. This will no more be the exclusive ergonomic factor. Psychologically speaking, in cognition, verbal skills, emotional skills and perception, they are as good as their male counterparts if not better. So, what prevents them from combat roles?

Impediments The young brave ladies are raring to go but NOT ALLOWED. Indian history is replete with the courageous acts of Jhansi ki Rani, Queen of Kittur Rani Chennamma, Ahilyabai Holkar, Razia Sultana to name a few. Some likely hurdles: a) Are the young ladies ready both physically to undergo the torture and

psychologically not to lose the mental balance. This is a real possibility in an operations scenario. b) Is our society ready to accept this possibility of their daughters, wives, mothers becoming POWs? There will be so much of hue and cry from the family, society and the mass media. This will definitely hamper the working of Armed Forces specially during war scenario. c) Last but the most important is Political WILL. I sincerely hope that all these hurdles will be successfully tackled by our spirited young women and one day they will be in the combat roles. The times are changing for women, they have scaled many new peaks and they will conquer this last hitch also and do exceedingly well. But, the time may not be just ripe now. Recollect, it took almost a century for women officers in the AMC to get Permanent Commission; another three decades for women officers to join other noncombatant branches (as SSC officers); fifteen years to get into Permanent Commission and in the near future they may be flying the fighter planes as well. To conclude, the humble beginning of few women officers as PC officers in 1967 to many women officers in the forces have borne fruitful results. Today, the maximum percentage of women officers are in the Indian Air Force. IAF is the first Service to have a woman officer as Director General Medical Services as Air Marshal. IAF is the first Service to implement the Court order to grant PC to SSC women officers. I salute IAF, the youngest of all the three Services, on this great day and wish and pray that IAF scales higher peaks than ever and touches the sky with glory.

Jai Hind!

The writer is a key player in revolutionising the position and prominence of women in the Indian ared forces. She was a first woman Air Marshal of India and the first fellow of the Aerospace Medical Society of India. She is also the first Indian woman to have conducted scientific research at the North Pole.

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Prof. Rajendra Prasad

disaster management:

role of indian air force The civil authority along with the National Disaster Management Authority need to improve and pre-position specific types of equipment and relief materials for every known type of disaster. These range from the known dangers of earthquakes, floods, drought and famine to nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) events as at Mayapuri in Delhi recently. The Armed Forces with their superior logistics capabilities can then be expected to provide almost realtime relief to the victims.

DRDO

Securing the Future

Defence Research & Development Organisation Ministry of Defence, Govt of India

www.drdo.org

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he word ‘disaster’ means the occurrence of unprecedented disruption in the functioning of a community or a society involving colossal human, material, economic or environmental losses which outpaces the capability and resources of the affected community or society to withstand the immediate and longterm devastative ramifications. Thus, disasters - natural or man-made - are a serious challenge to any society or nation-State. It must be envisioned that India needs ‘freedom from fear and trauma’ and ‘freedom from want’ on account of both kinds of disasters, whether they are nature’s wrath or man-made. Disasters have proved to be the major sources of fear, shock and scarcity of resources in the region or areas of their occurrence and hamper the normal functioning and developmental activities. Hence, in a country like India, disaster management, disaster risk reduction (DRR) and their overall importance for human well-being constitute the basic tenets of safety, security and development.

Shadow over India Human history bears testimony that nearly 60 per cent of the world’s natural disasters have occurred in the Asia-Pacific region. Among these, South Asia is the worst hit. Evidently India, on account of its geographical setting, extent of territory, climatic and geological setting and especially its peninsular position, is the worst affected theatre of disasters in the South Asian region. Of all its states and union territories, 22 are disaster-prone. Drought and floods, earthquakes and cyclones devastate the country with grim regularity year after year. They are spiralling out of control, increasing in frequency, causing more and more injury, disability, disease and death, adding to the health, economic and social burden of an already impoverished nation. India’s 5,700 km Indian Ocean coastline is cyclone prone; 40 mha flood prone; 68 per cent net cultivated area in 116 districts is drought prone; 55 per cent of total area is located in seismic zone III

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& IV; and Sub-Himalayan and Western Ghats are landslide prone. ■

Damage to life and livelihood

■

Economic loss

■

Environmental damage

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Sociological and psychological trauma

The country’s mangroves that are rich in biodiversity would be disappearing because of rising sea levels. Causing enormous health hazards, dengue fever would spread rapidly across India. Diarrhoea and malnutrition would cause havoc even as climate change sets in. Vector borne diseases, like dengue and malaria, could increase exponentially across India as abrupt changes in temperature make it conducive for mosquitoes to multiply and thrive.

Human mistakes

Warming-disasters connect Due to global warming, as some studies forecast, sea levels will likely rise to 40 cm higher by 2100 and 50 million people in coastal India would be displaced by flooding. In the plains, winter precipitation would decline, causing water shortages, shrinking grasslands and triggering a fodder crisis. Foodgrain production in India is likely to decrease by as much as 30 per cent. Wheat crop in northern India would in particular bear the diminishing return. If current warming rates continue, glaciers on the Tibetan plateau will shrink alarmingly from 5 lakh sq km to 1 lakh sq km by 2030. The glacial meltdown will first result in rivers being flooded and then drying up. The Ganga delta would become infertile. Up to 50 per cent of the total biodiversity in India is very likely at serious risks on account of climate change. The country’s grasslands are expected to decline precipitously. India’s 25 per cent flora and fauna would become extinct by 2030. Warmer ocean temperatures would cause bleaching and destroy large tracts of India’s coral reefs. Ocean acidification would culminate in shell dissolution, dangerously impacting marine life and fisheries. With erratic rainfall and decrease in precipitation levels, India’s forests would decrease unexpectedly.

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Several studies bear the evidences that, in the long journey of India as an independent nation-State, faulty development planning can be seen as one of the root causes of so many natural disaters. For instance, constructed dams pose a serious threat to the fragile ecosystem of the Himalayas. Recurring floods and droughts are precipitated by the unrestricted felling of forests, serious damage to mountain ecology, overuse of groundwater and changing patterns of cultivation. When forests are destroyed, rainwater runs off, causing floods and diminishing the recharging of groundwater. The spate of landslides in the Himalayas in recent years can be directly traced to the rampant deforestation and network of roads that have been indiscriminately laid in the name of development. It is by now a well-established fact that human-made structures, including canals, dams and embankments, have worsened the flood situation in the country as the repeated flooding of the Kosi river in Bihar shows. Big dams also pose a seismic threat. Despite this, numerous dams, vulnerable to seismic activity, are being built in the Himalayan foothills. The Tehri dam, a major hydroelectric project faced stiff opposition from environmental organisations and local people because it is located in the Central Himalayan Seismic Gap, a geologic fault zone. A major earthquake in the region could cause severe havoc in Haridwar, Rishikesh and other mountain towns. The deep-rooted seeds of separatism and cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, the nexus between organised crime and trans-national terrorism in India’s north-east and expanding tentacles of naxalism in

its different parts have shown their potency to cause death, destruction and despise. There can be other manmade disasters being germinated in the Indian soil indigenously. According to the report of Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, 21 states are under the threat of naxalism, causing one of the most serious man-made challenges of disastrous nature.

D i s a s t e r management In India, the Disaster Management Act, 2005 was enacted on December 26, 2005 to develop plans for prevention and mitigation and procedures to strengthen capacity building and awareness among people. The Act also allows states to have their own legislation on disaster management. Under the Act, a ten member National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) was set up with the Prime Minister as its chairperson. The Authority, with the assistance of the National Executive Committee (NEC) of Secretaries is responsible for: Preparing national policies, plans and guidelines for disaster management; Approving disaster management plans developed by the states; Coordinating enforcement and implementation of the policy and plan; Arranging for funds and take effective measures for disaster prevention; mitigation, preparedness and capacity management; and Providing assistance to countries affected by disasters. To carry out these functions, India has constituted a broad-based Disaster Management structure, ranging from national to state, district to local levels.

Role of armed forces In addition to their primary duties to protect India’s land, sea and aero-space frontiers against any outside invasion and intrusions, the disciplined ‘menin-uniform’ of the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force inevitably offer their services in securing the country from diverse onslaughts of non-traditional vulnerabilities, germinating from natural and man-made disasters. They are always in the state of functional readiness to reach any kind of disaster-hit areas and have the strong sense of duty and courage to act in inaccessible and adverse terrain, weather and climatic situations, which is of immense assistance in facilitating the civil authority during disasters like floods, cloud-bursts, avalanches, landslides, earthquakes and cyclones, along with their ‘selective’ role in man-made disasters like 26/11 terrorist situation in Mumbai and marine disasters. On so many occasions, their response action for rescue and relief during the disaster situations and postdisaster phase has been exemplary and with the ever increasing frequency of disasters in different parts of the country, they are dutifully committed to play a vital role in the unforeseen contingencies.

Civil-military synergy Furthermore, despite their readiness

for the disaster rescue and relief responses, there is always an urgent necessity for proper functional coordination between the civil administration and the armed forces, as and when they are asked to provide assistance. Since their effective response depends on immediate information readily made available by the civil authorities, delay in informationreceiving has often caused loss of precious time, along with concern for loss of lives and salvage of valuable items. In this regard, the national, state and local institutions must appreciate the operational mode of action in which the Indian armed forces function or inter-operate. Their professional ethics are autonomous in character and do not offer any spaces for political and bureaucratic interventions. At the same time, there is need to recognise that the source of primary information for disaster response lies with the civil authorities. Disaster management plan should incorporate the expected role of the ‘men-in-uniform’ so that the process for deploying them is well-organised and well-coordinated. It would require an interface correlation between the civil and the military authorities for immediate and effective availability of rescue and relief to the victims hit by natural / man-made disasters.

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Despite the integration of disaster mitigation planning with mainstream development in principle, Indian civil administration is ill-equipped for conducting disaster response activities in the event of major disasters. They largely depend on the help of the Indian Armed Forces. The latter with the state of the art technology support and adequately ready core competence, manpower and material resources carry out rescue and relief operations in any disasters As observed, despite the integration of disaster mitigation planning with mainstream development in principle, Indian civil administration is ill-equipped for conducting disaster response activities in the event of major disasters. They largely depend on the help of the Indian armed forces. At the same time, the Indian armed forces being one of the most dedicated, professional, modernised defence services in the world with the state of the art technology support and adequately readied with the core competence, manpower and material resources carry out rescue and relief operations in any disasters. For example, when Asian tsunami hit peninsular India in December 2004, the Indian army, navy and the air force coordinated by the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) effectively performed the relief, rescue and evacuation activities under Operation Sea Wave and also extended assistance to Sri Lanka and Maldives under Operation Rainbow and Operation Castor at the request of their respective governments. Whether the Kashmir earthquake of 2005, the cyclone in Bangladesh on 15 November 2007, the fire breakout at Burrabazar in Kolkata on January 12, 2008, the serial blasts at Bangalore and Ahmedabad in July 2008, or the recent landslide

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disaster in Leh in 2010, the role played by the ‘men-in-uniform’ of the Indian armed forces is highly creditable.

Role of IAF The Indian Air Force, because of its operational ability and command and control over the aero-space, ranging from the vast tracts of high Himalayas in Jammu and Kashmir to the far-flung frontiers in the north-east region to the peninsular parts, and Andaman & Nicobar Islands and vigil over the waters of the Indian Ocean, enjoys a unique position in offering assistance to civil power in cases of major disasters. As a disaster prone country, every year, India is faced with disasters like floods, landslides, cloud-bursts and cyclones of different magnitudes and frequencies, in which the Indian Air Force lends its support to civil administration. Some of them are worth-mentioning to signify its role in any futuristic disaster management policy, planning, programming and coordinated implementation, along with main-stream development of the country. Leh (August 2010): On 6th August 2010, Leh town in Jammu and Kashmir’s Ladakh region got badly hit by the flash floods triggered by a massive cloudburst, causing mudslide, debris, death of 120 people and devastation on a large scale. Leh airport, which got affected in the mudslide, was opened and six planes of the IAF carrying disaster response teams, doctors, communications equipment and material took off from Delhi and Chandigarh. The rescue and relief operations received a major boost with the arrival of six planeloads of men and material. Two Ilyushin-76 and four Antonov-32 aircraft of the IAF carried 30 tonnes of load, which included 125 rescue and

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relief personnel, medicines, generators, tents, portable X-ray machines and emergency rescue kits. Two teams from the central ministry of health and family welfare, including specialist doctors and surgeons from Delhi, also reached Leh. They activated disaster management for rescue operations on a war footing since the tragedy hit the cold desert mountainous region located at an altitude of 3,505 metres. Heavy rainfall disrupted the operations for a few hours. From Western Command Headquarters in Chandigarh, 4,000 ready-to-eat food packets were sent to Leh. An MI-17 helicopter had been pressed into service to carry out relief operations in Nubra Valley ever since the flash flood disaster after the cloudburst on 6th August 2010 hit, while two more Chetak helicopters have been provided to the civil administration for aerial recce of affected areas. More than 500 injured civilians and tourists have been treated at the military hospital at Leh and about 100 discharged after treatment. As a special gesture, the IAF also agreed to carry bodies of foreign tourists and non-locals to Delhi if no civilian flights are available from Leh. Gujarat Cyclone (1998): Cyclonic storms in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal during the premonsoon and post-monsoon months are formidable challenges to India’s

disaster management machinery. Originating from a low pressure area, they gain momentum. During cyclone which struck Gujarat in June 1998, all IAF Meteorological Sections were kept on high alert from 06 June 1998 and constant interaction with India Meteorological Department (IMD) at Mumbai and the IMD Centre at Ahmedabad resulted in 24 hour tracking and plotting of the cyclone, which was passed down as forecasts to Service and civil administration in the Saurashtra and Kutch region. A Disaster Management Cell (DMC) under the direct command of the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, South Western Air Command was established at the Command Operations Room to communicate with the state government and start necessary actions. All aircrafts were evacuated from IAF bases at Jamnagar, Bhuj and Naliya and flown to predetermined air stations. In this carefully planned and well-executed exercise, more than 60 aircraft (including helicopters) were flown out on 08 June 98 alone. The 20 odd aircraft that were under repairs were lashed to the ground. In addition to transmitting regular forecasts to civil agencies, all airbases undertook safety measures to minimise storm damage. As a consequence, even though the storm passed right over Jamnagar airbase (with a measured wind speed of over 200 kmph, at which stage the measuring instrument broke) inflicting serious damage to buildings and establishments, not a single serious injury was reported. A high degree of co-ordination between the IAF and the Gujarat government resulted in the successful fulfilment of all tasks assigned to the IAF. Not a single mission was turned down, ranging from supplying food to carrying troops, Navy divers and relief equipment, search and rescue missions etc. The close coordination between the IAF and the state government lasted well after the crisis was actually over. Operation Blue Angels (1998): On 18 August 1998, just after midnight, all the people at Malpa, a small village along Mahakali river in Pithoragarh district of Uttar Pradesh, now Uttarakhand, mountains, woke up to a thundering sound. Before they could appreciate the situation themselves, a huge portion of the mountain towering above the gorge broke off and came rolling down, on

the tiny settlement, near the river bed which was accommodating over 200 people that night including 60 pilgrims. The Indian Air Force initiated Operation Blue Angles. Air Force helicopters flew 277 sorties in 135 hours. For all the tasks at Malpa, which is absolutely narrow gorge, at least four Chetak and Cheetah helicopters were necessarily required. For airlifting passengers and dead bodies, six MI-17 helicopters were requisitioned from HQ Western Air Command, ex Hindon and Sarsawa airbases. Two AN-32 aircraft were kept at short notice standby to airlift any casualties and dead bodies to the pre-determined destinations. They carried 15 injured and 566 passengers to safe places; brought out 37 dead bodies and carried approximately 17,110 kg of foodstuffs and medicines. The total amounted to 43,510 kg. Asian tsunami: On December 26, 2004, an undersea earthquake erupted in the Indian Ocean just north of Simeulue Island, off the western coast of northern Sumatra, Indonesia. The epicentre of the main earthquake was some 160 km (100 miles) west of Sumatra, at a depth of 30 km (18.6 miles) below mean sea level (initially reported as 10 km).The earthquake produced a tsunami that was recorded as one of the deadliest disasters of the 21st century, which destroyed the shores of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, South India and up to Tanzania, with waves as high as 18 m (55.8 feet). The majority of deaths recorded were in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, India and Maldives. The tsunamis affected 2,260 km of the Indian coastline besides the entire Nicobar Islands. The tidal waves on the mainland were between 3 to 10 meters high and penetrated between 300 m to 3 kilometers. The Armed Forces launched Operation Sea Wave for relief, rescue and evacuation. This was co-ordinated by the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS). Two AN-32 aircraft were immediately put on alert in HQ Southern Air Command. Other Commands Headquarters were also instructed to keep their aircrafts in readiness for the expected Rescue Relief and Casualty Evacuation Operations. The first AN-32 aircraft was flown at 1000 hr and the second at 1036 hr for Carnic with refuelling halts at Tambaram and Port

Blair. Both aircrafts landed in Carnic by 1636 hr. As the magnitude of the disaster became clear, resources in addition to the already tasked AN 32, the AVRO and Do 228 fleets had to be operationalised. Four Do 228, Four AVROs, Seven IL-76s, 15 AN 32s and 16 Helicopters were pressed into action for this Operation. A massive airlift operation was launched from the mainland. An Air Bridge was soon established for the A&N islands, Sri Lanka and The Maldives; the main hub-centres were Delhi, Chennai, Tambaram and Car Nicobar / Port Blair. While airlift operations were undertaken from all over the country. Bulk / major supplies were lifted from Delhi / Bombay / Calcutta/ Bhubneshwar / Ahmedabad and flown directly to Car Nicobar by the IL-76/78 aircraft. Operation Rainbow: At the request of Sri Lankan government, six medium lift IAF helicopters were sent to Sri Lanka to launch relief operations. The helicopters undertook casualty evacuation, distribution of relief supplies, deployment of medical teams and air dropping of food while operating from Katunayke and Minneriya bases. Total air effort involved including ferry of aircraft, was 445 missions, 316:10 hours and tonnage and pax lifted were 328.845 tonnes and 882 respectively. Operation Castor: After the onslaught of the 2004 Asian tsunami, two Para-drop modified, long range AVROs of the Indian Air Force were tasked to move to Maldives on 28 December 2004 at the request of Maldives government. Their task was to undertake casualty evacuation, air landing of food, water and other supplies and deployment of medical teams. Total air effort involved was 155 sorties 198.00 hours and tonnage and passengers lifted were 169.425 tons and 885 respectively. Dr. Rajendra Prasad is Professor in the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies (DDSS) and Dean, Faculty of Science, DDU Gorakhpur University, UP, India.

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belligerent neighbours

Brig. (Retd.) Chitranjan Sawant

The X series family has just grown in size. Now offering a complete range of 6 models, the newly added 3 models are 720p HD network cameras – SNC-CH110, SNC-DH110, and SNC-DH110T. The 720p high definition (HD) surveillance cameras offer one of the world’s smallest HD cameras that can fit into the tiniest of spaces for discreet use.

Just as it is said that there are no permanent friends nor permanent enemies it is also an immutable fact that the price of liberty is eternal vigilance. When the Prime Minister says that China wants India to be in a state of “low level equilibrium” in bald terms it means that India is being made victim of coercive diplomacy. We need to improve our strengths and repair our weaknesses. Fast.

In the world of security where every pixel counts, the 720p X series delivers exceptional quality HD video footage using CMOS sensor technology. Its ultra compact size and the compelling price factor do not compromise on power or performance. It is energy-friendly, consuming an estimated 75% less energy than a conventional 11.2w FHD fix box camera. The innovative Stream Squared function allows simultaneous streaming of two 4:3 aspect ratio videos in userselectable SD resolutions. An entire image or a part of an image can be selected from the original view and resized to SD resolution. This means it can stream a wide-angle view and a close-up shot at the same time. It is perfect for keeping a close eye on high-risk spots while keeping the wider picture in sight simultaneously. With this feature, the 720p X series cameras can replace two SD cameras installed in the same line of view – saving on costs. “The new 720p X series HD Network Cameras offer high definition clarity without the frills of a high-end system. The friendly price point combined with its innovative features is set to be a catalyst in speeding up adoption of high definition surveillance,” said Yoshikazu Hirano, General Manager, for Security Solutions, Business & Professional Products Asia Pacific (BPPA), Sony Electronics Asia-Pacific. Merging design with performance, the 720p X series comes in mini-dome or fixed camera styles. Both are sleek form factors dressed in black or silver/white matte finishing to easily blend in with different settings and deco. Some models are made with vandal-resistant materials, protecting the cameras from vandalism. The full range of X series is ideal for commercial spaces, offices, retail shops and outdoor areas. The full range of products from the X series is now available in Asia Pacific. The official global launch of the 720p X series was in Secutech Vietnam 2010 on the 25 – 27 of August 2010. For more information, please contact: Manish Bhalotia Marcom Manager Sony India Pvt. Ltd. E-mail: manish.bhalotia@ap.sony.com www.sony.co.in +91-9711201101 October 2010 DEFEncE AnD SEcURIty ALERt

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ndia is a great country. India has a history of many millennia and has seen many ups and downs. In its chequered history, it is seen that after the epic war of Mahabharat, the kings and commoners lost the power of perception of threat to the security of the country. The country did produce great warriors and strategists like Chandragupt Maurya who defeated the Greek general and viceroy of Alexander the great, Seleucus Nikator but his own empire crumbled within 58 years of the demise of his grandson, Emperor Ashok the great. The later Maurya kings lost the capability of threat perception and ability to mobilise military power to counter the threat.

Modernisation ignored Samudragupt of the Gupt dynasty was a great statesman and general who excelled the capabilities of Napoleon Bonaparte of the 18th-19th century Europe. Nevertheless, they did not have the vision to develop sea power that could be a deterrent to Arab invaders later. The India rulers of the dark period did not pay adequate attention to modernisation of their armed forces and paid for the lapse dearly. Let us take the example of gun powder that the Chinese people had invented in the 9th century and made use of in warfare extensively but the Indian rulers did not know about it until the first battle of Panipat in 1526 AD. Over a period of time India failed to remain in touch with the latest developments in the art of war, notwithstanding the Philosophy of Statecraft preached and practised by the Machiavelli of the east, Acharya Chanakya who lived from 350 BC to 275 BC. It was he who had groomed Emperor Chandragupt Maurya and had put the fear of God in the Greek army of Alexander causing their retreat to Alexandria. What was it that weakened India and attracted many marauders to invade, loot and plunder the country that was known as a golden bird? Are the same situations prevailing now? Is history likely to repeat itself?

What ails India? Absence of a strong central government in New Delhi today has led to the perception of neighbouring hostile countries that India can be toyed with, India can be tinkered with, India can be challenged with impunity

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because there will be no retaliation. A lot of time and energy of the present central government is spent on machinations to hold on to power and, therefore, little attention is paid to proper governance of the country. India is facing serious internal and external threats but ministers spend their energy in castigating each other, sometimes even on foreign soil. The words “Modernisation of the Armed Forces” do not find a place in the lexicon of the Ministry of Defence. In the hierarchy of the decision making body of the government of India, the three Service Chiefs do not find a place. Bureaucrats who rule the roost know little about war, strategy and defence weapon systems. With the result no new gun has been bought for the Indian artillery in the last 25 years or so. Bofors, the much maligned but very effective gun was the last that India bought for its army in the 1980s. Corruption in purchase of armaments has put paid to acquisition of the most modern weapon system for the Indian Armed Forces.

Half strength Believe it or not but it is a fact that the three Service Chiefs have gone on record to say that the capability of the Indian Army, the Navy and the Air Force is bordering fifty per cent of what they are expected to perform. In other words, if a hostile country attacks India today, our armed forces will be unable to mobilise and use one hundred per cent of their manpower because they lack the wherewithal of a combat force. The defence preparedness of India is worse than what it was when the Mughal empire was crumbling and the British power was making heavy inroads to gobble the whole country.

Firebreathing dragon China and India have never been friends like China and Pakistan are today. China never wanted India to come up and become a power to reckon with in Asia. The friendship between Jawaharlal Nehru and Chou En-Lai was a myth nourished by Nehru to project his larger than life image on the international stage. Records reveal that the then government of India knew all along how the Chinese troops were nibbling the Indian territory in Aksai Chin in Ladakh but misled own

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people and parliament to believe that all was well on the northern and northwestern front. Imagine the Nehru-led government, specially the communist card holder defence minister, Krishna Menon, goofed at every step in dealing with the Chinese as a friend or as a foe. The 1962 debacle of the Indian army was a result of the Himalayan blunder of Nehru. Are his successors falling in the same trap laid by the fire-breathing dragon and letting India down by not preparing the Indian Armed Forces to face the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. A look at the comparative strength will make the picture crystal clear that even the myopic defence policy makers in New Delhi can see and repent their inaction.

Statecraft “Constant surveillance of the enemies is essential for the security of the State” wrote Chanakya in his book on statecraft. Unfortunately the defence mandarins do not read Indian saints and sages as they are constantly westbound planners with closed minds. Although the Chinese are not transparent in policy matters, least of all in defence preparedness, some statistics are quoted in the succeeding lines that have been taken from the Military Balance 2010 and are presumed to be fairly authentic. Let us recall the 60th anniversary parade of China held on 1st October 2009 and how the international military observers were impressed with the display of latest armaments, technology and above all the man behind the gun. The parade was a mirror of military prowess of China. What India put on parade on the 60th Republic Day Parade on 26 January 2010 pales into insignificance. We Indians have to be pragmatic about the assessment lest we face the prospect of another debacle.

INDIA

CHINA

13.25 lakh active military.

22.55 lakh active military.

BrahMos missiles are capable of Carrier–killer missiles, range 2,000 carrying nuclear warheads. km ready. Dong Feng missiles or CSS 5 missiles deployed. IAF has 3,000 aircraft including PLA Air Force has 9,000 aircraft 790 fighter jets like SU 30 and including 2,000 fighter jets. J-10 is Mirage. the latest fighter jet designed and made in China. Indian Navy has an Aircraft PLA-Navy has 284 modern vessels Carrier but only 145 Naval but no aircraft carrier. Hope to have vessels. a Carrier Group by 2012 Let us remember that now a war is Total War where the economy of a country matters a lot. The Chinese economy is booming. India is also doing well. The Chinese leadership is decisive. The Indian leadership has a Hamlet in it; to be or not to be. It may prove fatal in war.

Instigator

Total war

A State much smaller than India is trying to compete with its big neighbour, with China at its back in support. A recent report from Washington DC claimed that the nuclear capability of Pakistan is now more than that of India. How did it happen? The nuclear technology acquired by Pakistan was a gift from China and North Korea. What China and Pakistan have in common is: hatred for India. The Hate Hindu Hate India policy of Pakistan has blinded it to its own needs. The flood-ravaged Pakistan did not wish to receive the Indian aid and India routed it through the United Nations. Disgraceful show.

Yogeshwar Shri Krishna said “Yudhai krit nishchayah”. Wage war with Determination.

The present Indian leadership is unnecessarily placating Pakistan. China is encouraging Pakistan to be

The nuclear capability of China far exceeds that of India. India has not been making any progress in new acquisitions. Moreover, the unwarranted NO FIRST USE policy is likely to hamstring India.

belligerent towards India so that India remains entangled with a smaller neighbour and lets China walk away with the cake. The Indian leadership gave a large amount of money to Pakistan as flood relief. However, there is no guarantee that Pakistan would not misuse the Indian money to arm terrorists to kill Indians. What a policy the Indian government has! Financing own death and destruction is no statecraft. It goes without saying that the Pakistani terrorists are nurtured by the ISI, a wing of their army. Pakistan is sympathetic to terrorists who struck in Mumbai and other parts of India. One wonders who is angling for Nobel Peace Prize by financing anti-India forces.

Internal threat The Prime Minister has said that Naxalites are the biggest threats to the security of India. And yet he took no concrete steps to eliminate the MaoistNaxal menace. One of his cabinet colleagues, Sushri Mamta Banerjee shared a public platform with the killers of innocent passengers of the Indian Railways. When the Home Minister makes a plan to defeat the red terror,

the general secretary of the ruling party criticises his plans publicly. How can India meet internal threats to its security when the government of India and the ruling party are baying for each other’s blood? No one is there to discipline the errant ministers lest the government loses majority in the Lok Sabha and loses the perks of office. Who cares for security of the country? Not the government of India and not the ruling party. Everyone is for himself or herself. Let India that is Bharat be damned, so say actions of the corrupt ministers of the government who hobnob with the anti-national elements for their votes.

Problems galore Is the common man, the backbone of a country’s security healthy and happy? How can he or she be? With adulteration of food rampant, with the influx of fake Indian currency pushed into India by the agents of Pakistan, with prices spiralling up and up, it is the common man who is sick, sad and stands bewildered. The ministers and their mentors shout from house tops that they are doing everything for the welfare of the common man and it is the common man who goes to bed hungry. Grains rot in government godowns but the common man below poverty line remains in a semi-starving state. Indeed it is the abject poverty of the common man that is a serious threat to the security of the Indian State. Acharya Chanakya had envisaged that citizens of a well administered country will be healthy and happy. They will form the backbone of defence of the State for which they must have SUKH. Chanakya further said: “The basis of sukh is Dharma; the basis of Dharma is Artha and the basis of Artha is Rajya.” Thus it is the Rajya or the State that must have strength to meet all challenges of Security and defeat all enemies internal and external. The writer is a well-known commentator on television and radio and has been giving running commentaries on Akashvani, Doordarshan and other channels on the Republic Day Parade and other national events for 38 years in Hindi. He has travelled widely and written on events in the conflict zones around the world.

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opium

destabilising

economy: Afghanistan

India’s attempt to retain a sphere of influence in Afghanistan must confront the drug economy that currently sustains all contenders - the Taliban, the ethnic warlords as well as the central government. Its commitment to revival and reconstruction of that war-torn nation will eventually also have to deal with a sustainable alternative livelihood for the people that will pay more than what drugs do.

Saurabh Sharma

oppy cultivation continues to be a major threat to the ongoing rebuilding process in Afghanistan. It is the core issue of the Afghan security problem. The security environment in Afghanistan has gradually deteriorated since the overthrow of the Taliban regime in 2001. The impact of drug industry is intertwined with issues of governance, corruption, warlordism and the Taliban-led insurgency. Billions of dollars have been spent on counternarcotics operations – encompassing interdiction, eradication, public information and alternative-livelihood programmes – and the mainstreaming of counter-narcotics in the Afghan reconstruction project has meant that a large percentage of donor-funded projects have a counter-narcotics element.

Dynamics So, drug economy poses a major challenge in the rebuilding of Afghanistan, hence responding to it is essential. Although poppy production has declined marginally in the last two years, but it is less to do with the counter-narcotics policies or the actions of the power-holders and more to do with economics and the priority farmers place on food security. The dramatic rise in the price of wheat – which began in the last quarter of 2007, has been integral to the fall in opium poppy cultivation. Afghanistan has become a major source of cannabis resin for illegal markets in West Asia and beyond and a destination for smuggled psychotropic substances and precursors. Although with the fall of Taliban, the Afghan civil war came to an abrupt end but it did not eliminate the four major factors contributing to the operation of the illegal drug “industry” which are rampant poverty, lack of a viable economy, ethnic rivalries and the

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absence of a strong central government. The first two factors have induced many Afghan peasants to substitute non-profitable traditional farming with financially rewarding opium production, while creating a large army of recruits for drug trafficking. Apart from foreign influences, the other two factors have given birth to warlords who have ruled over distinct territories as independent rulers for over two decades. The bloody rivalries

The Afghan drug “industry” will continue to pose a major threat to security and stability of Afghanistan as long as it suffers from two major deficiencies, first the absence of a strong central government and secondly the lack of a viable economy capable of generating enough revenue for the government and adequate numbers of well-paid jobs for the people among warlords have deepened ethnic conflicts while preventing the formation of a fully functional central government and Afghanistan’s reconstruction. Over the last two decades druggenerated income has been the main source of revenue for almost all the major Afghan political actors. The Taliban turned Afghanistan into the largest global producer of opium, but under severe international pressure, imposed a ban on poppy cultivation. In July 2000, Mullah Omar issued an edict

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declaring opium haram – un-Islamic – by far the most effective measure against poppy cultivation ever taken in Afghanistan. Following the ban, the total opium production in Afghanistan drastically declined to 185 tonnes and production was mainly confined to the northern province of Badakhshan, which was controlled by the Northern Alliance. Following this brief interlude, however, opium production has resumed the upward trend that began in the 1980s (Figure 1).

‘shelf life’ opium can be easily traded throughout the year; in this regard it is an ideal investment for farmers.

High employability In the poverty stricken Afghanistan with widespread unemployment and underemployment - the impact of poppy cultivation on the labour market is straightforward. Poppy cultivation and harvesting are labour intensive activities that provide sharecroppers

Pakistan

Over 60 per cent of Afghan opiates transit Iran, mainly across Khorasan or

personnel, equipped with elaborate counter trafficking infrastructures such as patrol roads, concrete dam constructions, ditches, sentry points, observation towers, barbed wire, electrified fences and even electronic surveillance devices. Tehran has placed great emphasis on interdiction and has lost more than 3,000 border guards in counter-narcotics operations over the past 20 years. Despite the billions of dollars Iran has invested in interdiction efforts, coupled with the stringent penalties meted out to traffickers, with an estimated 10,000 executed over the past decade, these have not curtailed the flow of drugs. A high-ranging counter-narcotics official based in Kabul suspected the complicity of elements of the Iranian security forces; mainly the Sepah-e-Pasdaran (Army of Guardians) also called Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), in securing the transit of large quantities of drugs through Iranian territory.

Baluchistan via Sistan province. Iran shares borders with both Afghanistan and Pakistan and is a strategic outlet for Afghan opiates on their way to main consumer market of Europe (Figure 3). A 2,440 km-long coastline also makes Iran a natural springboard for maritime drug trafficking, towards the United Arab Emirates and East Africa. The Iranian border with Afghanistan and Pakistan is manned by law enforcement

Despite its efforts, Iranian authorities claim that 65 per cent of the trafficking in Afghan opiates goes through its territory. As opium production is concentrated in southern Afghanistan, the Iranian route remains the major route to Turkey and Eastern Europe, where heroin laboratories are known to operate and thence to the European Union.

In the south, Sangin in Helmand province was the biggest opium market in 2002 followed by Musa Qala, north of Sangin. Northern Afghanistan’s regional market is dominated by the heroin trade, mainly because of the leading role taken by both the Shinwari and the Afridi in heroin conversion. In the south of the country, the principal trade is in the opium and morphine base which is converted into heroin

who benefit from the production and trafficking is also a major factor for producing opium particularly in southern Afghanistan. Peasants are left with no choice but to grow opium, as there is direct intimidation in the form of threats of retaliation if cultivation is discontinued.

Trafficking routes The main transit routes for the export of Afghan opiates remains via Iran and Central Asia (Figure 2). Iran has the highest per-capita number of heroin addicts in the world, with two million officially recognised by the Iranian government, To the east, Pakistan, home to almost a million heroin addicts, is also an important transit route for traffickers. The main transit cities being Quetta, Karachi and Peshawar.

Iran

Source: UNODC and UNODC/MCN opium surveys 1994-2009.

Opium economy Under the conditions of political and economic instability, poppy cultivation has become Afghanistan’s leading economic activity, constituting the most significant source of cash income for the civilian population. Overall production may involve over 2 million people, earning higher incomes than in other activities. “There is a large interpenetration of the opium economy with local and central political interests and many millions of people participate in the profits, in a broad network of protection and pay-offs. Drug profits are clearly financing local warlords and the political elite; they also sustain the livelihoods of many quite poor people”. Opium has a number of advantages over other crops: the relatively short time of six months between seeding and harvesting, its resistance to major natural diseases and the high cash value of its harvest. With a longer

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Even after many checks being imposed on Pak-Afghan border supply of opium has continuously been coming from Afghanistan into Pakistan through North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan province. One of the main opium markets in northern Afghanistan was in the village Ghani-khel, south east of Jalalabad, but it was closed down in April 2002. Two other such regional markets were Achin and Kahi, located further away from the Kabul-Jalalabad-Peshawar road and thus less convenient, until the closure of Ghani-khel. United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) reported, in southern Afghanistan, where most of the opium production is concentrated in Kandhar and Helmand provinces, the opium market was less centralised than in the northern Nangrahar province where the Pashtun - the Shinwari tribe in Afghanistan and the Afridi in NWFP tend to monopolise the trade.

and migrant labourers with additional income. Itinerant harvesters come from all over Afghanistan, even from as far as refugee camps in Pakistan. They often start in the lowlands in May and move to fields in the mountains where the higher altitude can postpone the harvest until as late as August. The itinerant workers are typically paid a share of the final yield. They also represent the most likely reason for the wide diffusion of poppy cultivation know-how throughout the country. The major reason for planting opium has been survival, debt and quick profits. The common practice of money-lending in the agricultural sector is the salaam, a form of micro-credit with high interest rates, involving a monetary advance on expected future crop production, usually contracted at the beginning of the season and paid at the harvest. According to Jonathan Goodhand, this system places the debt-laden farmer in a patron-client relationship with the lender, who is usually a local trader. The night letters issued either by the Taliban or by the local commanders

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using acetic acid anhydride, mostly conducted by Balochi and Pashtun merchants who are not members of the Afridi and Shinwari tribes. The result is that NWFP and central Asia are experiencing heroin trafficking on a larger scale than south Pakistan (Baluchistan) and Iran, where seizures tend to relate to opium and morphine base. Heroin is easily trafficked in NWFP from Afghanistan across Afridi territory and the Khyber Pass, through what has been termed as a ‘drug pipeline’.

Camel express Southern Pakistan’s Baluchistan province shares a 1,200 km border with Afghanistan and touches two of its biggest opium producing provinces, Helmand and Kandhar. Sizeable amount of opiates go through Baluchistan to be smuggled from the Makran coast and then transported by thousands of fishing boats and cargo

and passenger vessels. Baluchistan is at the cross-roads of Afghan opiates trafficking and is plied by countless caravan of camels, crossing the deserts of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran by night. Groups of drug traffickers relay one another, for example, from Afghanistan to Panjgur in Pakistan then to Turbat and eventually to Mand, Pasni or Gwadar. Dalbandin is a major centre of regional drug trafficking from Afghanistan to the Makran coast or to Iran. Thus opium, morphine base and heroin, which is not able to pass directly from Afghanistan to Iran crosses into Iran through Baluchistan.

Central Asia Central Asian route has grown in importance for narco-trafficking in the last decade. With the demise of Soviet Union in 1991, the northern border of Afghanistan touched three new nations - Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The old silk routes

were revived and Afghan opiates were quickly taken through this outlet (Figure 4). The increasing amount of illicit drugs seized since 1998 depicts that these routes are being increasingly used for illegal drug trafficking. Tajikistan, which faced civil war between 1992 and 1997, became the main corridor for Afghan opiates smuggled to the emerging Russian market and traditional European market. From Ishkoshim to Nijni Pandj, drug trafficking was fast developing across the Amu Darya (formerly Oxus) river, turning Khorog into the main transit town from where the only major road from Badakhshoni Kuhi province in Tajikistan led, via Dushanbe, to Osh in Kyrgyzstan and the Ferghana valley. Afghan opiates could then go west, to the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan and Georgia, or north, through Kazakhstan to Russia. Turkmenistan has also become a major route for Afghan opiates, which can very well be deduced from the major

opium seizures in Kushka, the main border post between Afghanistan and Turkmenistan. The reopening of the QuettaKandhar-Herat-Ashgabat road by the Taliban, partially financed by the Pakistani (Pashtun) mafia, considerably helped the development of drug trafficking in Turkmenistan. However it is through Tajikistan that drug trafficking has most increased in the recent past. Increased drug trafficking through Central Asia and opium production in Afghanistan has encouraged heroin consumption along drug trafficking routes. Intravenous heroin consumption has surged both in Central Asia and Russia, as far as Novosibirsk and Irkutsk, in Siberia, where heroin first appeared in 1999. According to Russian interior ministry, half the heroin penetrating Russia came through Kazakhstan shipments via Troitsk (in Chelyabinskaya oblast) to go to Yekaterinburg, or via Orenburg and Oral to Samara. Further east, Barnaul is a trafficking relay before Novosibirsk and eventually, Irkutsk.

Strategy Afghanistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. Afghanistan has also signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. The Government of Afghanistan is now trying to abide by international legal obligations to which it is a party and is working with the international community to bring Afghanistan into compliance with its international obligations. Within the Interior Ministry, the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) is the leading Afghan agency for law enforcement and interdiction of drugs. The CNPA is trained and mentored by American, British, German and Norwegian police officers and customs officials. A Counter-Narcotics Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) has been established in May 2005, comprising judges, prosecutors,

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investigators and lawyers specialising in narcotics cases. The CJTF cases are forwarded for prosecution to the Central Narcotics Tribunal (CNT) - a dedicated court of 14 judges located in Kabul, with exclusive jurisdiction over major drug cases. The CJTF and CNT relocated in 2007 to a Counter-Narcotics Justice Centre, a secure facility equipped with courtrooms and a pre-trial detention centre.

Policy framework On the aspect of policy making, the Counter-Narcotics Directorate, formed in October 2002, was upgraded in 2004, to become the Ministry of Counter Narcotics. Its role is to coordinate and oversee Afghanistan’s counter-narcotics policies and to monitor and evaluate their implementation. To look after the proper implementation of counter narcotics programmes, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) established a Counter Narcotics Trust Fund in October 2005 to improve the coordination of donor resources and expenditures. The United Kingdom took responsibility as lead nation for counter-narcotics in 2002 under the Security Sector Reform (SSR) process and has experimented with several counter-narcotics approaches. Due to its initial failure a more hands-on approach has been promoted, targeting laboratories and focusing on lawenforcement training and interdiction efforts on the one hand and promoting comprehensive rural development and alternative-livelihood programmes on the other. In 2002, the UK launched Operation Headstrong, an attempt to bolster anti-narcotics efforts by creating and training a 200-strong paramilitary Afghan Special Narcotics Force.

US involvement Due to the initial failure of UK, the role of US in counter-narcotics has dramatically increased since 2004. The US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Department of Defense announced their involvement in the ‘Kabul Counter-Narcotics Implementation Plan’. Since then the DEA has deployed Foreign Advisory and Support Teams (FAST) to Afghanistan and has permanently stationed Special Agents

and Intelligence Analysts to assist Afghan counter-narcotics officers in their interdiction efforts. There are five important pillars of US counternarcotics strategy: public information, alternative livelihoods, eradication, interdiction and law enforcement / justice reform. These five elements are a part of Afghan government’s eight-pillar approach, under the Afghan National Drugs Control Strategy launched during the 2006 London donor conference. The other three pillars – public awareness, demand reduction and institution building – are being looked after by the British and other donors involved in counter-narcotics programme. The Afghan drug “industry” will continue to pose a major threat to security and stability of Afghanistan as long as it suffers from two major deficiencies, first the absence of a strong central government and secondly the lack of a viable economy capable of generating enough revenue for the government and adequate numbers of well-paid jobs for the people. Given the strength of the warlords, the half-hearted commitment of the international community to Afghanistan’s economic development and that country’s impoverishment, there is no real ground for the success of the government in addressing those deficiencies in the foreseeable future. Afghanistan will therefore remain the largest global producer of opium and heroin and a centre for the international drug trafficking in near future. Afghanistan-based drug trafficking will be a major contributing factor to the warlords’ strength and to their inter-and-intra-ethnic turf wars with a negative effect on the consolidation of the Afghan central government and on the Afghan economy’s revitalisation.

The writer is a PhD scholar in the Centre for South, Central, Southeast Asian and Southwest Pacific Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. His academic interests include post conflict reconstruction and management with particular reference to Afghanistan.

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peaceful Europe:

an illusion?

Dominika Cosic

It just needed a little foresight and if the powers-that-be had not tinkered with Tito’s carefully crafted balance of ethnic communities in Yugoslavia - top positions were shared by rotation - the Balkanisation of the Balkans that saw bloodletting on the scale of a world war would not threaten to engulf the whole of Europe as it is doing today. The only sensible lot were the Czechoslovakians who said ‘we’re different, lets part’. They did. Peacefully. They are two of the most beautiful nations in the world in more ways than one. has opened a road to independence of Kosovo. And it created another problem, ethnic cleansing. Now it was the Albanian people who discriminated against and killed Serbs and Gypsies.

Pandora’s box

urope is considered, very often from distance, as an island of peace, prosperity and security. But this idealistic image is not exactly coherent with reality. There is one, potential dangerous point in Europe which still can destabilise the situation not only in its own region but also in the rest of Europe. It is Kosovo. And political impact of independence of Kosovo is comparable with opening of Pandora’s box, it can revitalise spirit of independence in many other regions.

European dream European Union was the first completely peaceful European project. However even in the beginning of twentieth century some of the politicians had started to talk about European integration, this idea was really born after horrible experience of Second World War. Europe understood

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that only way to prosperity is consolation and peace. Conciliation of eternal enemies: France and Germany and close co-operation between these two countries was significant and symbolical. Creation of NATO and thanks to this “protective umbrella” of the United States it gave European citizens a sense of security. Even the Iron Curtain has not destroyed this impression. During almost 45 years there was only one serious military incident – Turkish invasion of Cyprus, but it was on the periphery of Europe. These 45 years were the longest period without war in history in Europe. Europeans believed that they live in a stable, peaceful world.

End of illusion Europe was brutally woken up from this wonderful dream in 1991 when, after the collapse of Yugoslavia, wars

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started in Slovenia, Croatia and finally in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Almost nobody from Western Europe expected that after the experience of the World Wars and the Holocaust Europe will experience again the horrors of war and terror. Yugoslavia was considered as an excellent example of multicultural society and great player in dealing with capitalistic and communistic part of Europe. Peaceful agreement in Dayton in 1995 has stopped the most cruel war in former Yugoslavia, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has claimed more that 2,00,000 victims. But situation did not come back to normalcy. Four years later, in 1998 another conflict started, this time between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. The next year - for the first time in its own history - NATO decided to attack an independent, integral country which was not attacking any of its member country. NATO intervention in Yugoslavia

In February 2008 Parliament in Pristina, Kosovo’s capital, proclaimed declaration of independence. Most of European countries almost immediately recognised Kosovo. Only Spain, Greece, Slovakia, Cyprus and Romania have not recognised this republic. European support for independent Kosovo was and still is a huge political mistake, it could open a Pandora’s box. First, Kosovo was not mature enough to be an independent republic. This country does not have efficient administration and what is even more important tradition of democratic government. There is still a clan structure of society and powerful influence of mafia which control all parts of life. But there is more dangerous external problem – independence of Kosovo can destabilise situation in the whole region. The South part of Serbia (valley

of Presevo and Bujanovac), western part of FYROM Macedonia, and part of Montenegro have problems with strong Albanian minority (in Macedonia it is over 30 per cent of population), which wants for itself bigger autonomy and is giving Kosovo as an example of future solution. In 2001 in Macedonia it was even an Albanian rebellion. In southern Serbia almost every week there are new incidents of violence and confrontation. In December 2010 it will be only 15 years after horrible war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Blood is still fresh and divisions between Serbs, Croats and Muslims are still existing. Political situation is still not fully stable. And there is one potential hotspot Republika Srpska (with a significant Serbian population). Leader of Serbian population just after independence of Kosovo has told that because of the same legal and political reasons Republika Srpska should be totally independent (from the rest of Bosnia) or should be a part of Serbia. But Pandora’s box is not only a problem of western Balkan region. It creates potential problems for whole of Europe. Clear example was visible just one year after this decision - it was war in Georgia

and proclamation of independence by two separatist parts of Georgia: Abhkasia and Ossetia. Russia which is political protector of these two provinces openly declared that Kosovo was “causus” which can and should be emulated by other countries. Even Western Europe has potential hotspots: Spain (with Catalonia and the Basques), part of Romania with Hungarian minority, Slovakia, Belgium (which is close to separation), even United Kingdom. Activists from Catalonia would like to organise referendum next year in which they will decide about independence. Separatist tendencies are growing and can destroy European mosaic. What is conclusion? We should never forget about experience of World War II and still remember that peace is not for eternity. First step should be to rebuild a sense of stability and the stabilisation of the situation in Western Balkans.

The writer is European correspondent of Polish weekly magazine Wprost. She specialises in NATO and European Union affairs and also the Balkans issues. She is correspondent (Europe) of Defence And Security Alert (DSA) magazine from India.

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vietnam and south china sea:

Dr. Pankaj Jha

intractable wrangle No matter which part of the Chinese periphery one looks at, one sees signs of a new assertiveness that is both disturbing and destabilising. The manner in which Beijing dealt with the US-South Korea naval exercises in the Yellow Sea at the beginning of the year by forcing a change of venue and removal of the aircraft carrier George Washington shows the confidence with which China is handling geopolitics in its socalled â&#x20AC;&#x153;core areasâ&#x20AC;?.

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he diplomatic spat over the arrest of the captain of the Chinese fishing boat by Japan near Kuba islands off the north-western coast of Japan in the first week of September has created another dimension of Chinese assertiveness in the disputed territorial waters. It has given rise to a feeling that China is ready to militarily resolve the disputed territorial waters.

Chinese intentions The question that arises at this juncture is whether China is trying to fathom its naval might or is trying to test the resilience of the countries which are parties to the territorial water disputes with China. The turn of events be it in the Kuba Islands or in South China Sea has vitiated the strategic atmosphere in the region and it would be interesting to see whether the major powers would be able to coax China to make firm commitments to maintain peace in the region or would lead to a highly aggressive posture leading to the resurgence of arms race and naval skirmishes in the region. The protracted strategic rivalry and assertiveness would surely make the region vulnerable to major power interference and it might be possible that countries like US and Japan would create anti-China rhetoric in the region. This would not only make things worse but also would put to rest the liberalist notion of China’s peaceful rise. While the unexpected development in September has created concerns the South China Sea issue is one area where there has been an undeclared agreement with regard to maintaining the status quo in the contested waters. South China Sea dispute is a long maritime territorial claims dispute with six main contesting parties including China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Brunei, Philippines and Vietnam claiming their sovereign rights over either all or few of the islands in the Spratley island group. Earlier in 1974 China annexed the Paracels Island group which was close to Vietnamese eastern coast. At that time Southern Vietnam was administered by US forces. The lack of protests from the US side and also subdued response from the South Vietnamese government created doubts and suspicions of a USChina agreement on the matter.

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China-Vietnam contest Thereafter, there have been a number of skirmishes between China and Vietnam on this issue and the major incident happened in 1988 when more than 50 sailors of Vietnam were killed by Chinese attack in the contested waters. Thereafter, the two nations have been raising their voices about the jurisdiction. The dispute between Vietnam and China over waters and features in the South China Sea has proved intractable. Despite progress over issues relating to the Gulf of Tonkin, overlapping claims to the South China Sea remain a constant irritant. In October 2004, after Premier Wen Jiabao’s successful visit to Hanoi, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs voiced ‘serious concern’ about Vietnam’s release of bids to explore for oil and gas in waters over its continental shelf. China claimed that Vietnamese actions went against earlier commitments. Vietnam nonetheless proceeded with the bidding process.

Oil in sea Minor incidents continued to crop up. In March 2005, China claimed that its fishermen in the South China Sea had been attacked by Vietnamese ‘sea robbers’. China called on Vietnam to join with it to suppress maritime crimes. Two months later a Vietnamese cargo ship sank off the coast of Shanghai fuelling speculation that it had been fired upon by Chinese naval forces which conducted naval manoeuvres at that time. On May 12th, the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement declaring that China was not responsible for the ship’s loss. In April 2006, the 10th National VCP Congress adopted a resolution decreeing that Vietnam’s maritime areas should be developed with a focus on sectors that have comparative advantages ‘in order to develop a strong maritime economy, maintain national defence and security in a spirit of international cooperation’.

Demarcation The bitterness between the two restarted in January 2007 when China created Sansa Special Administrative Region under which it proclaimed that the whole of South China Sea falls under

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its jurisdiction. This proclamation saw two rounds of protests within the Vietnamese capital Hanoi. This was rather surprising because Vietnamese government is known to have avoided protest against China on its soil. In April 2007, during the exchange of claims and counter-claims, Chinese naval vessels detained four Vietnamese fishing boats near Spratley islands and fined their crews. Following this, Vietnamese President Nguyen Minh Triet made a visit to Beijing in May 2007. Triet and Hu Jintao reviewed bilateral economic and political relations. They reached agreement on the value of continued high-level visits after relations were normalised in 1991 and the efficacy of the Joint Steering Committee on Cooperation. A joint statement issued after their discussions affirmed the leaders’ commitment to complete the demarcation of the land border by 2008 and to step up joint oil and gas exploration in the Gulf of Tonkin. Both sides agreed to refrain from taking unilateral actions that would upset the status quo or exacerbate conflict in the South China Sea.

paralleled by China’s construction of an airfield at Woody Island in the Paracel islands and consolidation of facilities at Fiery Cross Reef and the maintenance of a continuing naval presence at Mischief Reef both in the Spratley archipelago. In sum, China is rapidly acquiring an enhanced capability to exercise its sovereignty claims over the South China Sea and protect its vital Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) through the Malacca and Singapore Straits through which much of its energy resources flow.

UNCLOS implementation

New complications

suddenly with little apparent warning. Now is the time for diplomacy and confidence building measures to reduce strategic uncertainty. Even earlier, Vietnam and Malaysia submitted the list of islands under their jurisdiction which included the islands of South China Sea. China also submitted its claims to UN and was really annoyed with the similar claims by Vietnam and Malaysia.

In the second case the Philippines has arbitrarily redrawn its baselines to extend its territorial waters and thus also its EEZ. This brings the Philippines into conflict with Vietnam whose claimed EEZ overlaps and China which claims the entire South China Sea on historic grounds. The Philippines has not yet tried to enforce its claims to a new maritime zone. Both incidents should sound an alert to regional States that a serious security issue could blow up

Provocation At the end of the year, PLAN exercises in the Paracel Islands from November 16-23, 2007 provoked Vietnamese protests. A Foreign Ministry spokesperson declared that the Chinese naval exercises violated Vietnamese sovereignty and ‘was not in line with the common perception’ and spirit reached by leaders at recent high-level discussions in Singapore. Vietnam’s adoption of a new maritime strategy coincided with increased Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. China claims the waters and features that Vietnam seeks to develop. China has reportedly applied pressure on foreign firms that were likely to be involved in developing Vietnam’s maritime sector, warning them that their commercial operations in China might suffer if they became involved in developing areas claimed by China. In July 2008, for example, an Exxon Mobile executive revealed that his company had come under Chinese pressure to scrap a preliminary exploration agreement with PetroVietnam. The development of Sanya Naval Base, (satellite images of which were released in 2008 by Janes)

In 2009, there have been two separate and distinct incidents but are linked with the larger issue of the applicability of the UN Convention on Law of the Sea. In the China-US case both sides disagree over whether military vessels can conduct intelligence in China’s 200 nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone. The US has not signed UNCLOS. China has a right to claim an EEZ and to restrict certain types of activities, including military activities that constitute a threat. It is arguable that intelligence gathering by a ship like the USNA Impeccable, manned by a civilian crew and without armaments, constitutes a military threat. The US claims it was in international waters. The right of China to claim an EEZ is not an issue. But China has forced the issue by sending naval vessels to interdict and harass a US ship.

Options open China though has voluntarily accepted the Declaration of Code of Conduct of the contesting parties in South China Sea but has been violating the norms of the declaration and so Vietnam is planning to force a Code of Conduct which would be a binding agreement while China is not very keen on the issue. Vietnam being the chair of ASEAN is trying to gain international attention on the issue. In fact the

developments in South China Sea in the recent past and also the increasing Chinese influence in southeast Asia had forced US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton to assert in ARF Summit in July 2009 that ‘US has returned to southeast Asia’ and subsequently in the 2010 it has urged China to resolve the South China Sea dispute with its contesting partners and clearly stating that it was a global common. In response China had stated that South China Sea is ‘its core interest’. In fact the improving strategic ties between Vietnam and US have also imposed a complex configuration for China and the docking of US ships in Danang port of Vietnam showcases that Vietnam might choose US over China for securing its national interests. Also, the argument with regard to the line covering the whole of South China Sea as its jurisdiction germinates from the ambiguous drawing in 1947 where it claimed the region under its sovereignty which is hotly debated in the region. The forthcoming ASEAN Defence Ministers plus (ADMM+) Meeting in October 2010 is going to make things difficult not only for China but also for many southeast Asian countries because it is likely that the Code of Conduct issue might be raised and frayed tempers might mar the first such initiative in the defence domain. This might lead to naval skirmishes and also a whole range of claims and counter claims. This would put liberalist thinkers on the back foot for espousing greater economic integration and resolving of issue through dialogue and the strengthening of neo-realist argument that China’s rise is threatening. It is seen in realist thinking that wherever it takes grounding in southeast Asian context there is arms race and the basing opportunities for major powers. This would create tensions and undo the economic and trade cooperation which has been able to create cooperative frameworks of confidence building and dialogue in the region. The writer is Associate Fellow at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). He has done his PhD from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. His areas of interest include Southeast Asia, terrorism, defence industry and related economic issues. He has written extensively on the issue of terrorism in Southeast Asia, including issues pertaining to radical islam and counter terrorrism policies.

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maritime defences: flying boat option

Cecil Victor

Area denial weapons are on the horizon and India will have to plan for the possibility that its amphibious strike capability is not rendered hors de combat. A threat from the seawards side kept in readiness along with other landbased weapons systems will keep the enemy guessing from where the attack will come. INS Delhi posted in the Gulf of Aden swatting pirates helps the process but flying boats could make a bigger difference.

ot long ago Somalian pirates captured some Indian dhows (seafaring wooden boats of Arabian origin). The Government of India, on the advice of the Indian Navy which has been put in command of all maritime matters be it inshore security or bluewater sea denial and sea control after the terrorist attack on Mumbai 26/11, ordered a ban on the movement of dhows in waters infested by pirates. The rationale obviously was that it did not want to expend the energy or the effort to either rescue or pay ransom for the captured boat and crew.

Amazing abdication This is an amazing attitude for a

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nation that claims regional Super Power status but behaves like Robinson Crusoe. It is because of just this attitude that we are left wringing our hands in despair while Pakistan and China are building roads, pipelines and railways across territory captured by devious means in Jammu and Kashmir to forge links with oil-rich Iran and open overland routes to Europe avoiding the maritime chokepoints in the Malacca Strait in the east and the Gulf of Aden in the west.

the peninsula and Persians, Arabs and Africans down to the Cape of Good Hope. It is because of this bedrock of traditional and historical linkages that India enjoys so much affinity with peoples of the Indian Ocean littoral.

It is an abdication of the legacy of our forefathers who, travelling in just these kinds of dhows, conducted trade and forged cultural interlinkages between Indians on the western seaboard of

Safer sealanes butâ&#x20AC;Ś

Similarly, on the eastern seaboard the Chola kings extended their influence into Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam as is evident from the Angkor Wat temples and historical linkages strewn across the whole of South East Asia.

At both chokepoints in the Gulf of Aden in the west and Malacca Straits in the east the Indian Navy has contributed

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The Indian Navy has already laid a good foundation of cooperation with smaller nations in the Indian Ocean littoral. It will instill a larger measure of assurance if it has a demonstrable quick reaction capability as well. The “string of pearls” that China is trying to sling around India’s neck can still be rendered purely decorative greatly in curbing piracy and criminal activity on the high seas through participation in multilateral naval operations. But pirates have shifted operations and posed dangers where multilateral naval forces are unable to patrol because of the limitations of the naval assets in the area, logistics and a policy of saving the most saveable which is where convoys converge. It is because of this experience that it is becoming increasingly obvious that India will have to evolve new tools and techniques to handle the lowintensity conflicts, piracy, smuggling and poaching of fish stocks on the one hand and the maritime threat posed by China’s “string of pearls” policy of creating military bases all along the Indian periphery.

Sphere of Indian influence In many ways the region from ancient Mesopotamia, now Iraq, to the Pacific Ocean seaboard of South East Asia is a traditional and time-honoured sphere of Indian influence. India will have to find ways and means to protect, nurture and expand these influences instead of cutting them off suo moto because of a lack of national will that prefers absence instead of active synergy. India has already seen how this part of the world is being sought to be carved up into new spheres of influence and domination practically pandering to the very Islamic fundamentalist terrorism that was supposed to be the target for eradication. Pakistan’s “strategic depth” in Afghanistan is

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being sought to be reinforced at the cost of India’s traditional relations with the “Kabuliwalas” of folklore. Worse, US President Barack Obama sought to bestow the mantle of “arbitrator” in Kashmir on China in a gesture that reeked of the division of Europe at Yalta after World War II. In this context India will have to defend its national interests very much on its own.

More proactive Given that malcontents, Islamic fundamentalists and fringe elements are increasingly being used as proxies by nations bent on spreading instability in the region, India cannot afford the increasing numbers of dhow-borne trade, commerce and traditional contacts with the Indian Ocean rim countries being targetted. The ability to intervene decisively against groups inimical to traditional Indian contacts depends, as recent events have shown, on the ability of the Indian Navy to arrive on the scene as soon as a detection takes place. It is not an easy task given the kind of weapons platforms it has in its arsenal (which are orientated to conventional warfare instead of lowintensity conflict) and in the imperative of emerging circumstances it must redress. Long range maritime patrol, in essence, means to be able to monitor and control shipping activity at the chokepoints at the Gulf of Aden to the west of Mumbai and the Cape of Good Hope to the south west. On the east is the Malacca Straits and the approaches south of Indonesia.

Extend reach Distances range from 3,000 km (Aden) to 4,000 km from points on mainland peninsular India. On the east the landing strips in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands can be used to extend the range of fixed-wing and patrol and strike aircraft. Something similar needs to be done on the western seaboard. Airstrips on the Lakshadweep Islands, suitably raised so as not to be submerged if a tsunami occurs as was the air and naval base at Port Blair in 2004. India has done well to forge strategic ties with the island group of Seychelles

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which lies off the coast of Malagassy in east Africa. India has been helping the island-nation in maintaining the security of its island territories as well as preventing pirates from extending their operations southwards from the Gulf of Aden where things are difficult for them at the moment. Defence Minister A. K. Antony has promised to expedite the delivery of Dornier fixed-wing patrol aircraft and Chetak helicopters to maintain surveillance on Seychellois Exclusive Economic Zone. India has helped out Maldives as well with frequent visits by the Indian Navy.

Quick reaction Given the nature of the current threats and the looming changes on the horizon, the ability to intervene in an ongoing crisis or launch operations to interdict troublemakers on the high seas only after a time-lapse of several days with no assurance of success will no longer be acceptable. Failure to detect the boat bringing the terrorists to Mumbai is a case in point. Much of the success of current patrols in preventing pirate attacks is because of presence in the vicinity of large convoys of naval vessels of several nations for whom keeping the sea lanes of communications safe is a matter of vital importance. Interdiction can be executed long before pirates can approach the convoy as happened recently when the INS Delhi captured a speedboat full of pirates.

Game changers Proximity is the essence. But at what cost? The INS Delhi is, after the aircraft carrier Viraat, the largest warship in the Indian Navy. Using it to chase pirates is like using a sledgehammer to swat flies. Having said this, one does concede that other purposes can be served by positioning a ship like the INS Delhi along with replenishment vessel close to the Gulf of Aden. But it is also stressed that the “looming dangers” mentioned above will render such a deployment suicidal within a decade. Even aircraft carriers (or more especially aircraft carriers) will no longer be able to approach an enemy seacoast and launch waves upon waves of airstrikes from such mobile airfields. China has developed a missile that will hit an aircraft carrier long before it can come close enough to launch

its aircraft. It has already used this weapon to employ coercive diplomacy to stop the US and South Korea from conducting naval exercises in the Yellow Sea or allow the Super carrier USS George Washington to participate.

Redesign fleet Amphibious operations for which India bought the Trenton from the US will also not be able to be deployed without courting danger from the missile which China will gift to Pakistan if the logic of its westwards expansion through the Karakoram Highway is to be achieved. The Indian Navy will have to redesign itself. It can begin by inducting flying boats. These are very flexible platforms and can be used for everything from chasing pirates between islands miles away from the mainland to search and rescue; rapid deployment for disaster relief as in the case of a tsunami where shore facilities have been decimated; anti-submarine warfare; and firefighting to quench forest fires.

Rapid action force Given India’s huge coastline, the peninsular nature of its landmass and its position in the middle of three oceans it needs assets that will enable rapid action after danger is identified by the several layers of surveillance equipment already in place. This includes satellites in space (a dedicated maritime satellite will be in place before the end of the year), fixed-wing long-range maritime

reconnaissance aircraft which can find and destroy from a distance ships and submarines but can do nothing against speedboats full of terrorists / pirates. Only flying boats and helicopters can but the latter is hobbled by the limited range it can operate in. A flying boat will take only a few hours to cross the Arabian Sea or the Bay of Bengal to get at a target which a surface vessel even of the size of INS Delhi and an intrinsic speed of 30-35 miles per hour will take the better part of three days to get to the Gulf of Aden from Mumbai. So it has to be posted there for weeks on end sanitising large chunks of sea with its onboard helicopters.

Flying boats All colonial nations used flying boats to govern their far-flung overseas dominions. Many have lost their colonies but still use flying boats. China uses them to patrol the huge South China Sea where it has laid claim to both the Spratley and Paracel group of islands. Its Harbin Sh5 has a range of 4,000 km and can loiter on station for as long as 12 hours. The Russians have resurrected their Soviet era A-40 Albatross and have a smaller version in the Bariev Be-200. In the US the Dornier has built a flying boat with a plush interior for island-hopping millionaires. India uses the Dornier fixed-wing aircraft for maritime patrol. Given its commitments and keeping future area denial missiles in mind India will have to redesign its defences

so that it can protect its traditional seafraring / trading communities and demonstrate an ability to intervene forcefully anywhere in the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. The first requirement would be to install transponders on every seagoing vessel be it dhow or commercial freighter (and insist all nations using the Indian Ocean sealanes to do likewise). When an SOS is received either by other surface ships or airborne patrol craft the information would be transmitted to landbased stations already set up after the Mumbai attack. The shorebased flying boat can take off and arrive in the general area from where the SOS is being transmitted within a few hours. With commandos in speedboats it can envelop the target ship with shortduration gases to disable the pirates / hijackers and bring crew / passengers to shore.

Tailormade India can tailormake its requirements. One, a smaller variety for pirates and criminals and a larger one for both amphibious assault given that ships would be easy targerts in the future. A seaskimming flying boat with a hundred commandos on board can create a beachhead by destroying the missile sites (they are road mobile) so that the follow-on force of surface ships or submarines can effect a landing. The larger flying boats with the peculiar anti-submarine (particularly nuclear ballistic missile submarines) warfare capabilities would be required to sit in wait for Chinese nuclear submarines that must use the southern approaches from Indonesia to enter the Indian Ocean. The Indian Navy has already laid a good foundation of cooperation with smaller nations in the Indian Ocean littoral. It will instill a larger measure of assurance if it has a demonstrable quick reaction capability as well. The “string of pearls” that China is trying to sling around India’s neck can still be rendered purely decorative.

Cecil Victor has covered all wars with Pakistan as War Correspondent and reported from the conflict zones in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in South East Asia as well as from Afghanistan. He is author of “India: The Security Dilemma”.

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Maritime muscle: SEcURIty FIRSt

India’s new thrust

Rear Adm. (Retd.) Raja Menon

There are furious mindgames underway about what can happen and what needs to be done about the Indian Ocean. China saw a window of vulnerability in the narrow Malacca Straits and has therefore decided to take the land route for Iranian oil through J&K. For India, bluewater capacity to dominate the chokepoints in Aden, the Cape of Good Hope (South Africa) and the sea south of Indonesia could counter-balance the inequities north of the Himalayas.

hina, India and Japan have had maritime pasts. Their decision to turn inwards was taken, in all cases, for reasons of regime survival – as it would be called in today’s strategic jargon. China’s great voyages under Zheng He (he was actually a cavalry General promoted to Admiral) opened worlds so frightening to the Ming dynasty, that the emperors ordered all relics, memories and imports of the Zheng He voyages destroyed – to avoid contaminating the docility of the Chinese people. Today all that remains of the great voyages is a rudder and rudder stock so gigantic that one can wonder at the size of the ship steered by that rudder.(i)

India’s maritime past Indian

mariners

dominated

the

Indian Ocean trade, both in the west and east, with Hindu temples established on the Pacific coast of Vietnam and Tamil inscriptions being found in New Zealand. But in a remarkable turnaround, between the fifth or sixth century and the tenth, Indian mariners were first made into outcastes and denied all access to education, astronomy, science and the rudimentary science of hydrography. So the lucrative Indian trade financed by the merchants of Venice, was taken over by European seamen willing to round the Cape of Good Hope on the southern tip of Africa, to make vast fortunes. By the early nineteenth century, European ship building and navigation was supported by steam machines, astronomical tables, navigation instruments, hydrographic surveys, medical science and

what we would today call systems management .(ii)

Maritime empires The rise of the East can take place only if China and India reverse their cultural prejudices against seagoing and embrace the idea that since the days of Genghis Khan, all great empires have been maritime ones. In the depths of India’s naval headquarters there are people tasked to create a maritime strategy that will match the great churning going on in the rest of the country. Uniformed people are beginning to wonder what the strategic equivalents would be of Tata’s acquisition of Jaguar and Land Rover, or the Indian acquisition of global raw material and telecom companies. Armed Forces thinkers are already

[i] Unfortunately there is no analytical study available of the implications of the size of the ship, by looking at the rudder. The most accurate non-Chinese record is of Ibn-Batuta who travelled from Calicut to China by ship and records Chinese ships with four decks, double bulls and transverse bulkheads. [ii] Rear Admiral Raja Menon, speech at Vasant Sheth Memorial talk, 10 December 2004, published by Vasant Sheth Memorial Foundation.

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dazzled by the innovation, science and project management that have gone into the Reliance Command Centre, more gadget oriented than the US’ Strategic Command headquarters in Omaha.

Modern navies operate no conventional submarines. But it is a difficult question to answer as to why the Indian Navy has only recently gone in for the Scorpene and followed it with an RFI for another batch of conventional submarines. An internal debate is clearly going on in the Navy, but the outcome is clear - the nuclear submarine is unbeatable in every way They have begun to be aware that the era of when the armed forces worked at the cutting edge of technology is not just past – but long past. So much so that, in the field of command and control, their own level of expertise may have also been bypassed by that of the major corporate offices.

Strategic mentality The macro-economic indices of India are changing, as they will have to. Among them is the foreign trade to GDP ratio, currently at around 25 per cent. This figure will move up in term of percentage, but more importantly in quantity, as the GDP itself grows at 9 per cent (hopefully).(iii) What all this indicates is that a great deal of India’s

wealth will be at sea, at any one time. Perhaps not as much as China’s whose trade to GDP ratio is already close to the seventies in percentage. Somewhere in the trade statistics will be mixed up the quantum of hydrocarbons, that we will be importing and hence, what the CIA calls ‘single commodity vulnerability’. Most people will not disagree with most of what is written here, but there is a catch. The catch is that accepting all that has been stated so far requires a mental shift in strategic thought. To shift one’s strategic thought we must first be clear, what the ‘old’ thought in Delhi was. The first attempt to define a strategic thought for modern India probably occurred during the time of the viceroy, Lord George Nathaniel Curzon – that most extraordinary man. Based upon the unprecedented superiority of the world-girdling Royal Navy, Curzon felt that continental threats could only emanate from Russia (to Afghanistan) and from China, in the North East. A Chinese foray did occur down the Walong valley in the early 20th century. The response of Whitehall was to enact a giant intercontinental pincer move and occupy the Chinese island of WeiHai-Wei, in the Yellow Sea which from then on became a British submarine base, until overrun by the Japanese in World War II. (iv) This strategy essentially took as granted, that British maritime supremacy would never be questioned in the 20th century. As a result, we have the odd case of New Delhi ordering the C-in-C India to dig trenches at the Khyber Pass, on the outbreak of World War II, to prevent a Russian invasion. If Whitehall knew how the Second World War would develop, New Delhi certainly didn’t. During that war India was again most threatened from the Sea, by the Japanese navy. The furthest advance of the Japanese was the capture of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Ozawa’s Carrier Air Group could probably have had a shot at Sri Lanka, before the Japanese carriers were withdrawn for the Battle of Midway in 1942.

Coercive events Subsequent grand strategic thought

didn’t emanate or originate in Delhi. It was forced upon Delhi by the tribal invasion of Jammu and Kashmir in 1948; by the Sino-Indian war of 1962; and by Ayub Khan’s failed Operation Topac in 1965, which led to the subsequent war. These operations forced upon a newly independent, fragile multi-ethnic, multi-religious polity, the panic of centrifugal separation, aided by China and Pakistan. The threats would, in New Delhi’s inarticulate Ministry of Defence, manifest itself as pieces of India being detached, to reduce it to the same moth-eaten state as Pakistan. Minister after Minister spouted patriotic rhetoric of defending ‘every inch of sacred soil’ as the keystone of Indian strategic thought in the old mindset. In the 21st century world, the idea of someone detaching a piece of India away is ridiculous and bizarre. We need a new foundation of strategic thought and that is what this article attempts to put across. To justify a defence budget of US$ 22 billion, ostensibly to prevent China and Pakistan from detaching Indian territory is quite absurd.

Emerging dimensions Hence, the ‘new’ thought. The New thinking on Indian maritime strategy is evolved through a definite process, in which the first step is to define the emerging world around India, both from the viewpoint of geo-political changes, as well as the way in which issues such as energy, arms control, climate change, and nuclear weapons will be seen by the major players. Geopolitically there is little doubt that the most influential game changer in Asia and the world will be China, which between 2010 and 2020 could see a rise in GDP from about five trillion dollars to fourteen trillion. The effect of Chinese money, goods and influence will be felt strongly by its continental neighbours, but more significantly by SE Asia, the African littoral countries and some countries of South America. (v) The other critical States that could change security perception are Pakistan, Iran, Myanmar and the Horn of Africa. The first has not even evolved a stable political system to deal with one of the fastest growing populations (and hence unemployment) in the world. Pakistan’s future could be grim.

www.siliconindia.com Wei Hai Wei 1898 and 1930. For the Khyber Pass episode, see Bishweshar Prasad, official inter-services Historical section History of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War (1939-45) India & Pakistan, Introductory volume. [v] Rajiv Bhatia, China-Africa: Evaluating a growing partnership, in the Hindu, Op-ED, 17 September 2010. [iii] [iv]

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Shia-Sunni contratemps

with those of China.

Iran’s nuclear ambitions could release a Shia-Sunni conflagration in the Middle East, and a military response from Israel. The effect of a weaponised Iran will not be to lead to any Islamic leadership, as envisaged by Iranian hawks, but to split the Islamic world along sectarian lines. The Palestinian problem will look minor compared to the consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran. Myanmar will definitely see turbulence when the junta begins to voluntarily or forcibly change the administrative process. Dictatorships and Autocracies have limited lives. Chinese involvement in Myanmar’s economy makes the post Junta scenario dangerous. The Horn of Africa is slowly but surely collapsing demographically with a fertility rate of about 5.5.(vi) This area, without any governance, investment or adequate water will spin off large number of refugees and terrorists into the neighbouring countries of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Oman and the Gulf States. The piracy problem and a collapsing Somalia are symptoms of the same disease.

■ The pursuit of a mercantilist approach to commodities and resources by Beijing will make it vulnerable to extortion and violence in many parts of the globe, which will eventually see the Chinese flag follow Chinese trade. This movement will be the game that

Challenge to US hegemony The effect of climate change has still not been fully understood , but if there is going to be global warming, food production will decline in the tropical zones and food insecurity will arise in Africa and the poorer lands of Asia. With North Korea and Pakistan as nuclear weapon failing States, the danger of more nuclear leaks are almost certain. Looking at all these factors, it is still possible to glean some incontrovertible changes that will occur: ■ The rise of China, with a contrary world view from that of the US will allow many more rogue States, genocidal leaders and autocrats to thumb their noses at the International World Order, currently run by western civilisation. ■ The influence of Chinese investments and money power will slowly enable Beijing to exert more control of world institutions like the UN, Security council , UNCLOS, World Bank, IMF, ADB, IMCO, ICAO and others, so as to vote against US interests when and if they clash [vi]

changes geo-politics and provide the challenge to US hegemony. ■ Between the developments mentioned above, India will be squeezed as China surges past, both financially and geographically. Indian interests will require that some Indian asymmetric capability exists, to conventionally deter China, so as to create our own space for economic development, in peace.

Tibetan succession The contours of a geopolitical competition are difficult to specify, but the most immediate crisis that could overtake Sino-Indian relations is the question of the Dalai Lama’s succession. In approaching the problems that could arise from a contest over the ‘True’ Lama it would be a fatal mistake for India to imagine that the consequences would be faced on the Tibetan border. To think that would be to relapse into ‘old’ thinking. The communications and infrastructure networks that China has built in Tibet have immensely strengthened its position. With links to Lhasa from the North, East and West, as well as a logistics highway running parallel to the Indo-Tibetan

Gerrie Swart, Somalia, A Failed State governed by a Failing Government, www.hollerafrica.com

border, the Indian choice of a theater for ratcheting up compensating tension is clearly the Indian Ocean and not the northern border. That border must obviously be defended, but the place to be adventurous is the Indian Ocean and the strategy – a maritime one.

Foundations of new thinking

So the background to India’s new maritime strategy has as its background, the following constituent parts: ■ India’s wealth, travelling on its sea lines of communication will be protected, as will international shipping on the commons of the Indian Ocean. ■ The country’s sea based deterrent will operate from the Indian Ocean to ensure that deterrence is always credible, but minimum. ■ The Ocean’s littoral navies will be co-opted to act cooperatively in the pursuit of common interests such as trade protection constabulary duties and humanitarian tasks. Mutual facility exchange will be encouraged. ■ Trade will depend primarily on the international system to ensure equity in price and distribution. Mercantilism is a 19th century practice. ■ An ocean wide surveillance and reconnaissance capability will be built to prevent incidents, rather than chasing after the consequences. ■ A force level adequate to operate in the long distances of the ocean and exert enough tactical superiority in

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three dimensions will be built. ■ Sea power will be used to compensate for continental weaknesses emphasised by geography and to deal with the external environment before it affects the homeland.

Force structures A naval force structure that India can afford, even upto 2020, when Indian GDP could be as large as US$ 6 trillion, will never support an indigenous defence industry that can supply all the weapons, equipment, aircraft, sensors and submarines that the Indian navy will need. The numbers will be too small to support the indigenous effort. But under the circumstances the level of indigenous content is the highest in the Navy, of all the three Services. The platforms that depend hugely on numbers, to reduce costs are specialised naval aircraft. In the naval aviation scenario, there will be few countries with the interest to maintain a capability in platforms like ASW helicopters, jet fighters operating off catapults and specialised carrier aircraft in the next two decades. The scene in warship building is generally happier for medium navies like India’s. Even so, it will again be difficult to strive for impossible indigenisation in weapons and equipment - like torpedoes (with a virtually limitless life) and marinised automatic gun turrets. Seagoing version of radars, missiles and other sensors are a possibility. With these limitations in mind, the present system of RFIs is probably the best route to follow, provided private sector bidding is permitted freely along with PSU yards. This is a contentious issue, as some PSU yards have spent capital in setting up capabilities which cannot be amortised, unless they are given further contracts(vii), possibly in an uneven playing field. An example is the OPV contract, where only limited private participation has been permitted, while none has been allowed for the Scorpene project.

Carrier aviation Particularly in the distant reaches of the Indian ocean, carrier aviation will be indispensable to master the tactical environment, against platforms [vii]

firing anti-shipping missiles. Once a navy decides to opt for a carrier based solution, a major part of the navy will have to get used to operating in CVBGs. So far naval planners have never been given the luxury of planning for a carrier that can truly do everything. But the day for looking in that direction has probably come, considering the 12 years from planning to delivery for a large vessel of this kind. Carriers are the most versatile platforms in peace, but it will be some time before the foreign service begins to understand the nuances of exerting foreign policy through a combination of statements at sea and in diplomatic debriefings. Without thinking of the ultimate use of carriers - as weapons of war, the carrier will change the perceptions of India of many leaders in the troubled regions, like the Gulf, where many nations constantly jockey for power and influence.

Submarines Modern navies operate no conventional submarines. But it is a difficult question to answer as to why the Indian Navy has only recently gone in for the Scorpene and followed it with an RFI for another batch of conventional submarines. An internal debate is clearly going on in the Navy, but the outcome is clear – the nuclear submarine is unbeatable in every way. As quieting techniques improve, the few remaining handicaps of the nuclear submarine will disappear. The problem with the nuclear submarine, is that it has never had a chance to show its true potential, except in the brief encounter in the Falklands war. Most practitioners in high positions of government whose choices would be most expanded by nuclear submarines, comprehend very little of what these boats can do, other than from hearsay. The same is true in Delhi with most government officials unclear about whether the word nuclear in nuclear submarines refers to propulsion or warheads. It is simply not apparent to people that a nuclear submarine can sink an entire medium sized navy in a week or less, or that it can happily transit across the Arabian sea three times within a week. It is true that everyone’s energy SLOCs transit the Indian Ocean, which is why, a flotilla of nuclear submarines

India Defence Online, http://indiandefenceonline.com Indian Maritime Doctrine 2009, INBR 8, Naval Headquarters, New Delhi. Freedom to use the Seas, India’s Maritime Military Strategy, NHQ, 2009.

[viii] [ix]

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in the Indian Ocean will ensure that all trading nations will live according to the international rules, no matter how powerful they may feel continentally.

Doctrine and strategy During the last six years, the Navy has seen a dynamic process in the production of Doctrine and Strategy. In 2004, the Navy published its first doctrine, which was accepted in the strategic community as a bold and innovative departure from the hithertofore bland and boring non-statements. This first doctrine was an ambitious and expansive document that was not inhibited by the vague political statements that had preceded the issue of similar doctrines in the past. Not resting on its laurels, the Navy produced another newer doctrine in 2009 that was even more ambitious than the 2004 version.(viii) This document, spoke of an Indian interest in the entire Indian Ocean up to the Cape and as far as the deep water straits of South East Asia. It gave some idea of the kind of operations that the navy is interested in and the deep emphasis that the Navy intended to place on the collection of data, to compile the maritime domain awareness picture. It also spoke unabashedly about the Navy’s responsibility in maintaining strategic deterrence and the faith the Navy placed on aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines. At about the same time the Navy published a Maritime Strategy(ix) an unclassified version of which appeared on the naval website. The strategy went farther than the doctrine in writing about the areas where the Navy thought it might have to operate and doing the tasks that would arise. In the classified realm are clearly other doctrines and strategies which generally bespeaks of a certain amount of intellectual dynamism that bodes well for spending the bigger budgets that are coming the Navy’s way.

Rear Admiral Raja Menon retired in 1994 as the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Operations). He has also served as Chairman of the Task Force on Net Assessment and Simulation in the National Security Council and is a distinguished fellow in the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies and the National Maritime Foundation.

Lt. Gen. (Retd.) V. G. Patankar

National Security Challenges

Nations have a vision of themselves for the future. They strive to realise it constantly; the endeavours and concepts being reflected in their grand strategies. From that seminal notion flow other strategies - geo-political, economic and military. The spheres covered by the three strategies tend to overlap in some aspects and, therefore, it is desirable that they in fact remain correlated. It is axiomatic that military strategies tend to encompass all things that have bearing on national security; be it internal or external security or human security - the basic needs of all citizens - food, water, shelter and energy. All of them tend to influence and define security objectives. Security strategy in turn is thus the method to achieve them.

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he primary role of the armed forces is to deal with all threats to national security. Some threats to security like those of external aggression are so well known and long-established, that they are taken as ‘traditional’. Other threats emerge from the prevailing security environment and are, therefore, dynamic in nature. They have come to be known as nontraditional threats to security and could be military or non-military in nature. To deal with threats and to realise security objectives, armed forces develop doctrines and concepts of operations. They, in turn determine what capabilities are required to implement them. Force structure of each component of the armed forces is either based on perceived threats or on desired capabilities. Where traditional threats predominate and when resources are limited, force capabilities are structured mainly to deal with existential threats. Where threats are both traditional and non-traditional, it is not sufficient to have a force structure that essentially responds only to traditional threats. In the context of myriad threats to the nation’s security and with a view to achieving comprehensive national security objectives, a versatile and adaptable force structure is essential.

Security environment India’s security environment is complex. It comprises not only traditional threats but increasingly, nontraditional challenges as well. South Asia is a region of paradoxes. It has the world’s largest democracy in India but in its neighbourhood there are States which were, till recently, ruled by the military or continue to be so ruled (as in Myanmar). In some States democratic institutions have not yet taken root and civilian governments tend to be fragile. There are many issues like unsettled land and sea boundaries that frequently cause friction and souring of relations between nations. There are other issues like water treaties, illegal migration and ethnic questions that add to the volatile mix. In such an environment, it is little wonder that, for India’s armed forces, security challenges have increased. While conventional threats have remained, additional threats have been looming. Threats like those from

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terrorists and left wing extremists (Naxals) have added a new dimension, not only to internal security but also to the overall security environment. There are other features of the security environment which arise out of non-traditional threats. They cover a vast field from advanced technologies to other aspects like India’s burgeoning requirement of energy for its rapidly developing economy. Revolutionary progress has been made in information technology and in navigation, precision guidance and surveillance systems. Accuracy, speed of response and increased lethality of weapons have introduced effects not confronted hitherto fore. Thanks to information easily accessible on the Internet, ordinary citizens now have access to knowledge that was once considered restricted and part of highly specialised domain. Transformation and change in the nature of warfare is a continuous process. It is both evolutionary and revolutionary. As adversaries develop different and newer methods, better tactics and techniques are evolved to overcome them. Revolutionary changes brought about by new inventions and technological advances necessitate equally remarkable transformation in the art of warfare. Some changes are specifically instituted as answers to introduction of new weapon systems. This has been particularly noticeable in counter-insurgency and counterterrorist operations; nearly interceptionproof communication technology and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are two well known examples.

Insurgency and terrorism Insurgency is an insurrection that arises out of a popular cause or sentiment. Terrorism, on the other hand, is a tactic – a method. Insurgents too have been employing such tactics. Thus there is often very little difference between attacks by insurgents and those by terrorists. Though terrorism is not a new phenomenon, the terrorism that we face today is driven and supported by extremist ideology. The perpetrators recognise no boundaries or law, respect no norms of civilised behaviour and are ruthless and brutal in their methods. They are rightly termed non-State actors.

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The spectrum of conflict extends from relatively simple situations arising out of breakdown of law and order at its low end to all out war employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is at the highest point. In general the security apparatus of most States is so structured that responses to conflict situations are proportionate and graded. While beat constables deal with routine situations, any major breakdown of law and order is dealt with by special police and paramilitary forces. Armed forces are summoned only in exceptional cases in aid to civil authority. They are otherwise called out only in the event of grave emergencies like disasters or war. In other words the armed forces represent the ultimate instrument in a graded response to crises by the State.

there is a huge concern for avoiding collateral damage and inconvenience to population. To that end the principle of graded response is sine qua non in CI and CT operations. The other important aspect is that CI and CT operations are often conducted in areas with large concentration of civilian population, where the police is far better experienced and has adequate legal and organisational provisions to facilitate their operations. Thus it is logical that while the police, aided by central police organisations (CPOs), should take on CI / CT operations in urban and semi-

it is important to create adequate know-how within that force. Starting with inducting the right quality of manpower, the force should be trained and equipped appropriately to deal with the challenges of CI and CT missions. For this layered expertise should be created within police forces. The beat constable should be reintroduced where he has been done away with. He is not only the prime source of information but also the first respondent in a potential crisis situation. Next up the chain should be lightly armed reinforcement from the

called upon to execute special missions in CI and CT operations.

urban areas, the armed forces should deal with trans-border terrorism and conduct CI / CT operations in remote and difficult areas.

‘thana’ (police station) that could be deployed without delay. Specialists like building intervention experts, sharp shooters, bomb disposal teams, hostage negotiators, para-medics and so on should be available for deployment at short notice. It would, therefore, be seen that the police force will be required to reorganise itself and build specific capabilities in the right numbers, with the right skills and equipment.

challenges to police forces. Meeting the challenge of terrorism is indeed the need of the hour.

Conclusion India’s security environment has always thrown up new and varied challenges since our independence. Our armed forces have fought major wars, limited wars and even proxy wars. They have dealt with insurgencies and terrorist attacks. The menace of urban terrorism has brought grave security threats to our towns, cities and metropolises; which has brought new

Terrorist attacks have become more potent; given the propensity of the terrorist to use violent methods ranging from detonating IEDs to launching vicious attacks, even employing suicide bombers. It is obvious that terrorist attacks are a new, low-cost form of warfare. In the spectrum of conflict they occupy a position somewhere in between incidents of serious breakdown of law and order and situations just short of war. Some terrorist strikes in recent past have precipitated exactly such situations. The near war-like state after the attack on our Parliament on 13 December 2001 and the situation in the aftermath of the infamous terrorist attack at Mumbai in November 2008 are still vivid in our collective conscience.

Paradigm shift Since insurgency and terrorist strikes are virtually a form of warfare and could lead to war-like situations, it is important to determine who should deal with them. There are clearly two choices. One is to upgrade the capability of the police forces to conduct counterinsurgency (CI) and counter-terrorist (CT) operations. The other is to assign the role to the armed forces. The armed forces are equipped and armed to destroy enemy forces. Their training and techniques are geared to the maximum exploitation of their fire power; minimum collateral damage is seldom a term of reference. CI and CT operations are conducted on the principle of ‘minimum adequate force’. As most of such operations are carried out in urban or semi-urban areas,

The key to success in CI and CT missions is prevention. To be a step ahead of the insurgents or terrorists, sound and timely intelligence is needed. While HUMINT is probably the most important element in early detection of a possible attack, TECHINT through effective, multi-layered and gap-free surveillance and monitoring of communications can provide early indications which could be decisive. There is need to invest heavily in the right quality of human and technical resources. Since police should be the choice for conducting CI and CT operations,

The armed forces should be ready to come to the assistance of civilian authority and, therefore, be equipped for secondary tasks such as difficult CI and CT operations. Their special forces already have the basic skills but it is equally important for all combat units of the Army should maintain a minimum level of the special skills and equipment that will be needed when

New challenges call for new paradigms. Inflexible mind set and setpiece solution will not be adequate to meet and defeat new threats. Terrorism, in particular, is a global phenomenon. We could benefit from the experience of other countries but develop indigenous solutions. In the war against terror, every citizen has to play soldier even if in the smallest of way. Eternal vigilance is the price we will have to pay to keep our freedom and our values secure. Lt. Gen. V. G. Patankar (Retd.) was the Quartermaster General of the Indian Army before he retired. He is Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

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SAARC COUNTRIES : US$ 20 REST OF THE WORLD : US$ 25

INDIA : ` 120

OCTOBER 2010

VOLUME 2 ISSN

ISSUE 1

0976-206X

9 770976 206003

1st Anniversary Special

> VOLUME 2 > ISSUE 1 > OCTOBER 2010

security from the mother to the motherland... the world of