DSA October 2011 by Defence and Security Alert

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here is a game of serious brinkmanship underway between Pakistan and the United States of America. Actually the game has been started by Pakistan and the US willy-nilly has to partake in it. Because that is the peculiar nature of the game and since it involves countless lives and at least three countries. All of it revolves around the shape and structure of a post troop withdrawal Afghanistan. The US is determined that the hapless country not fall into extremist hands all over again and allow another Al Qaeda type base to appear in its ungoverned lands. Pakistan is determined that it be part of the final settlement and those it considers its proxies feature in the governing set-up. And Afghanistan is determined to do things its own way, as it suits the country and its people. Thatâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s a fair call, but the problems begin when there are those who remain determined to impose their own idiosyncratic worldview, by the barrel of the gun.

Such forces are being supported by the Inter Services Intelligence says the outgoing US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee Adm Mike Mullen. A number of senior Cabinet and official members of the US government have supported him in this allegation. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has reportedly told her Pakistani counterpart that the country is fast losing friends in Washington. The implication being that no longer are US officials willing to turn the eye when the ISI continues to remain in mischief making mode. All of this is the outcome of the 13 September attack on the US Embassy and surrounding offices in Kabul. The attack lasted 22 hours before it was finally over. Audacious by any stretch of imagination. But this has been the pattern over the last few years in Kabul, where the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s focus remains wedded. Beginning with the ghastly attack on the Indian Embassy in 2008, there has been a spate of such incidents in Kabul, the deadliest ones of course restricted to Indian establishments. Even after the first embassy attack there were murmurs in the US that the ISI was in the know of things. But now the cat is out of the bag, so to say, since the target was explicitly American.

The Haqqani network has been accused for the attack, just as it had been for the Indian Embassy one. This is one amongst many groups that can quite easily be called the Taliban, for they all appeal to similarly nihilistic ideologies and seek a seat on the Afghan high table through similar violent means. There is little to differentiate between the groups other than the names, or possibly tribal or clan subscriptions. And all of them are firmly based in territory that flies the Pakistani flag and under the influence of the ISI. Now as the end game nears Pakistan is becoming more defiant in its actions and even daring the US to take further steps. All of it driven by a belief that the US needs Pakistan as much as Pakistan needs the US. Forgetting for a moment that needs are never permanent, but friends and interests are. And in Afghanistanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s case it is clear where the friends are and what their interests. Pakistan seems to have lost its way looking for Kabul. It needs to find itself first before it can find its way out of the mess. None of it portends well for the near future.

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

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Volume 3 Issue 1 October 2011 chairman shyam sunder publisher & ceo pawan agrawal editor-in-chief manvendra singh executive editor maj gen (dr) g d bakshi SM, VSM (retd) director shishir bhushan corporate consultant k j singh art consultant divya gupta central saint martins college of art & design, university of arts, london corporate communications tejinder singh business development wg cdr sangeeta malla (retd) ad-sales anamika singh creative vivek anand pant administration shveta gupta representative (Jammu and Kashmir) salil sharma correspondent (Europe) dominika cosic production dilshad & dabeer webmaster sundar rawat photographer subhash circulation & distribution mithlesh tiwari ranjeet dinesh e-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscription: subscription@dsalert.org online edition: online@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org editorial & business office 4/19 asaf ali road new delhi-110002 (India) t: +91-011-23243999, 23287999,9958382999 f: +91-11-23259666 e: info@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org

disclaimer all rights reserved. reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part by any means without permission from Defence and Security Alert is prohibited. opinions expressed are those of the individual writers and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher and / or editors. all disputes are subject to jurisdiction of delhi courts. defence and security alert is printed, published and owned by pawan agrawal and printed at graphic world, 1686, kucha dakhini rai, darya ganj, new delhi-110002 and published at 4/19 asaf ali road, new delhi (india). editor: manvendra singh.

o here we are on the second anniversary of the publication of Defence and Security Alert and another very important day for team DSA to remember each and every moment of how this platform was visualised, crafted and brought to a successful fruition. The support from every corner, the contribution of each one, the achievements, the mistakes, the learning curve over the past two years which have really made DSA one of the most read and respected magazines in the defence and security genre in India and abroad need to be recalled and treasured. It was not that easy to enter and sustain ourselves in this niche field with no background of defence or security but each team member was always imbued with one common vision that we have to bring forth a world class magazine. And that we did together.

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Protecting Indian values,

enhancing national security interests! I believe that each team member at DSA whether present or past had a personal attachment with it and for them it was not just a product but a mission and that is why I always have a great concern for all the team members at DSA. It is through the best efforts of the entire team that this 25th edition is in your hands dear reader.

Anniversaries are always intended to be celebrated with great pomp and show but I deeply believe that more than celebration one should introspect how DSA has managed itself in the past year and seek new ways of further innovating and improving a product that has the potential and promise of becoming the best in genre magazine in the world. What needs to be done in the coming years is what is propelling us all into a future which is very clear in our minds. When DSA was soft launched in October 2009 I believed that for any serious and sincere effort silence is very important especially when it applies to issues of national importance and that was the reason we decided not to hold any official function to launch DSA. Now, after two years, I realise that it was the right decision at that time and I have no regrets for not organising a function much against the wishes of many of my dear friends at that time.

The efforts of our Editor-in-Chief Mr. Manvendra Singh are great that in spite of his busy schedules he is able to guide the team to attain its goal. Very recently DSA was honoured by the association of renowned defence expert Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi with our mission as the Executive Editor of DSA. I am sure that under his guidance DSA content will be more strong and effective and will for sure bring more awareness and alertness among the policy and decision makers and those concerned with national security and defence. His long experience in the Indian Army will enable team DSA to understand these subjects better. I am thankful to him for all his best efforts, support and guidance to the entire team, which he has extended from day one of his association with us.

Before starting DSA I knew little about the defence and security domain, but in the last two years while shaping DSA I have come to a shocking realisation of the casual attitude of the government at the centre as well as in the various states in the country where terrorism and Naxalism are major threats to the common man. I don't understand the reason for such negligence by the government at this stage when we are seeing strong interference by Pakistan almost on a daily basis. Why is the government taking it so casually and continuing the talks with a neighbour who is actually at war with us?

I am thankful to Mr Vivek Anand Pant, our creative head, who is giving his best to make DSA one of the best magazines in this genre in India and is committed to make it one of the best in the world. I am sure his abilities will take DSA to that level when you, our readers, will readily acknowledge.

In the past two years many significant developments have transformed the secnario of the defence and security in India and globally and DSA tried to bring attention on most of them through the experts' opinion in all the past twelve issues. India is continuously facing threats from our neighbours namely China and Pakistan so DSA took a note of it and published a special edition on China focusing on the threat perception and challenges foreseen by Indian defence experts immediately after its first anniversary in November 2010. US is playing a vital role today in the defence and security of all States and more particularly now in South Asia. A wide coverage was given to this in a US special edition. Our readers will find details of all these issues especially published in this anniversary compendium to encapsulate how DSA has been aware and concerned about these developments in the last one year. DSA has been honoured by its esteemed contributors, the renowned defence and security experts of our nation and the main force for the success of DSA in just two years. Team DSA is thankful to each one of them. The list is expanding every month and I am also thankful to contributors from abroad who liked to associate themselves with DSA only for one good reason - that they found it to be a strong platform to disseminate their thoughts to the Indian as well as the global audience. I assure all DSA contributors that they will find excellent editing and presentation of their thoughts always. DSA has maintained a very high quality from the very first edition because it has a clear view that nothing sustains itself without quality. Let me assure you that we are committed to excellence in everything we do and that is the reason DSA was awarded the ISO 9001:2008 certification for maintaining the most stringent international standards and we became the first and the only ISO 9001:2008 certified magazine in the defence and security journalism in India. Kudos to the entire DSA team.

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

I must extend my most sincere thanks to Mr K J Singh, our corporate consultant, who is involved in every aspect of production of every DSA issue and I acknowledge with admiration his many contributions. He has been a truly committed mentor to DSA and without his guidance and support we would not have reached this level of excellence. I am indeed very grateful to him for all that he has done for us at DSA.

I am also thankful to Mr Tejinder Singh, our head of corporate communications, who has made value additions to DSA through his excellent communication skills in just few months of his association and I am sure he will take the DSA communications and mesage to greater heights. Lastly, but not the least, I must express my thanks to Ms Shveta Gupta my EA who is always there to support me in all that goes into the making of a magazine with great patience and professionalism. She has been handling all activities smartly to give support to the system. I am also thankful to Mr Ranjeet without whom it is difficult to find any document at short notice. He is always ready to support the entire system. I should not forget extending my thanks to Mr Anup who is handling all finances and accounts with great finesse. I on behalf of team DSA welcome Ms Anamika Singh as our Deputy Manager Ad-Sales. I am sure with her long experience in the media she will add value to ad-sales department. I gratefully acknowledge the overwhelming response that DSA has been getting issue after issue from discerning readers, defence and security professionals and think tanks from India and around the world and the wholehearted acceptance by the defence and security industry. This global interest and recognition has helped in our ever rising circulation. DSA now plans to regularly cover latest developments in the industry impacting defence and security environment. I am thankful to everyone in DSA who is extending his or her best expertise, support and efforts to maintain its standards and quality, make it most readable and available to the people concerned with defence and security of India and the world. At the same time I believe that for any mission it is more important to introspect our process, procedures and systems to improve upon them and attain higher standards and I assure, on this happy occasion, all our readers that the entire DSA team is committed to excellence and maintaining and improving the highest standards in quality and content in the coming months and years. And in the end, I would like to update you, dear reader, that DSA is now taking a new step by organising its first seminar next month on Limited Wars in South Asia on the occasion of its 2nd anniversary and I assure you that we will organise many more such seminars and conferences on important topics to initiate debates and discussions in the concerned quarters of policy and decision makers and to help make India more safe and secure. We all at DSA seek your blessings and support to attain this goal. JAI HIND!

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

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HOMELAND SECURITY : DAUNTING CHALLENGES

“The country comes first - always and every time”.

he current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is premised upon the Paradigm Shift in the lethality and precision of Aerospace Power. The CEP of dumb gravity bombs in World War II was 3,300 ft, today PGMs have a CEP of less than 10 ft. Air Power has emerged as the clear war winning factor in Gulf War I and II, in Kosovo and Afghanistan as also in Georgia and now in Libya. It is incumbent on India as a rising power to catch up with this RMA. After the 1962 War a study had identified the need for a 64 Squadron Air Force to deal with a two front war situation. Due to economic constraints we could never cross the 45 squadron mark that was achieved in the 1980s courtesy subsidised Soviet equipment. Today our sanctioned strength is 39 Squadrons but as per media reports we are down to 32. Media reports that factor in the aging Mig-21 Fleet, put it as low as 28 Squadrons. Is this the Indian response to the latest RMA - a scaling down of Air Power instead of scaling it up dramatically? The sole saving grace are the lethal Su-30s we have inducted along with force multipliers like the AWACS and Aerostats as also the air to air refuelling capabilities and BVR capabilities. However, today we urgently need to expedite the induction of the MMRCA and the LCA fighters. The nation needs to invest in Air Power in a massive and urgent manner to field dominant war fighting capabilities. Air Power will play a lead and decisive part in Limited Wars against a nuclear backdrop. It can ensure deterrence by punishment instead of deterrence by denial. It is flexible, precise and focused and is the ideal instrument to initiate response to asymmetric provocations as also set the stage for a Limited War designed to severely “Raise Costs” for the aggressor in an Air-Land Battle format. Army Aviation constitutes the integral Air Power element of the Army and is increasingly playing a lethal and responsive role in the Land battle.

This Issue is dedicated to Aerospace Power in India: Challenges and Response. There is an exclusive interview with the Air Chief as also insightful articles by scholar warriors like Air Marshals B D Panday, Inamdar and Air Cmde Jasjit Singh. Scholars from the CAPS have provided incisive inputs on the threats posed by the PLAAF and the PAF. China is rapidly becoming an Aerospace Power of consequence and will field almost 2,300 fourth / fifth generation fighters by 2020 alongwith AWACS, Air to Air refuellers , BVRs and PGMs as also over a hundred military satellites. The IAF is celebrating its 79th anniversary on 08th October and the Army Aviation in November this year. We are also carrying an interview with Lt Gen V K Ahluwalia, Army Commander Central Command and Colonel Commandant of the Army Aviation Corps in this issue. This is also the Second Anniversary of the DSA and hence some seminal issues like our Strategic Culture have been included. The criticality of developing our Aerospace Power to match the rising envelope of threats from the Chinese PLAAF and its surrogate PAF, hardly needs emphasis. We urgently need to speed up the acquisition process of the MMRCA and the LCA as also hasten the advent of the Fifth Generation fighter. We need a 60 Squadron Air Force and an 80 per cent inventory of PGMs. We need this capability in an operationally viable time frame and for that the glacial pace of our arms acquisition process will have to be speeded up drastically.

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Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

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2nd Anniversary Issue

AEROSPACE POWER IN INDIA ISSUE October 2011

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Volume 3 Issue 1 October 2011

A R T I C L E S

F E A T U R E S

challenges and responses in national security: the vital need for synergy

exclusive interview

Indian air force in transition

Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne PVSM, AVSM, VM, ADC

PLA air force (PLAAF): doctrine and strategy

exclusive interview

uav operations: some thoughts

modernisation of the PAF

Air Cmde Jasjit Singh AVSM, VrC, VM (retd)

Air Marshal B K Pandey PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd) Gp Capt J V Singh (retd)

Air Vice Marshal A K Tiwary VSM (retd) Shalini Chawla

PLAAF: coercive air force of the 21st century

critical role of air power in limited wars

Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s standing as an aerospace power

Wg Cdr Vishal Nigam

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) Shiv Ram Krishna Pande

Colonel Commandant, army aviation corps Lt Gen V K Ahluwalia AVSM**, YSM, VSM

DSA seminar

book review book: ...so that others may live author: AVM M Matheswaran AVSM, VM, PhD

DSA: the journey so far ...

Srinagar sightings

Manvendra Singh

Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s air power capabilities

regional policy challenges for India

India in transition: strategic challenges and opportunities

CCTV: security solutions

damming and diverting the Brahmaputra

Indo-US relations: the next big idea?

India and NATO coming closer

Dr Arvind Kumar

Brig Rahul Bhonsle (retd)

Arundhati Ghose Claude Arpi

India-China: emerging fault lines

Lt Gen Sudhir Sharma PVSM, AVSM, YSM, VSM (retd)

international political economy: emerging trends Dr (Ms) Navniit Gandhi

east asian waters: China vs India Dr Harsh V Pant

technology policy and national security in India Dr Sanjeev Bhadauria

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

an indian strategic culture: the Kautilyan inheritance

108

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

114

Team DSA

Dr Venkat Loknathan

Dominika Cosic

ebb and flow in US-Pak alliance

101

looming danger along Indo-Pak border

104

Prof Chintamani Mahapatra

Cecil Victor

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DSALERT October 2011 Defence AND security alert

aerospace power

CAS INTERVIEW

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Interview

Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne PVSM, AVSM, VM, ADC in conversation with Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd), Executive Editor, Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine DSA: The Indian Air Force took off as a tiny fleet with four Westland Wapti bi-planes in October 1932. Today, it is the fourth largest Air Force in the world with a highly technical and specialised fighting force that safeguards our skies against enemy threats. How do you see this transformation since then? What is your vision for this Force? Air Chief: Terms like ‘fourth largest’ etc. are totally misplaced. Size is not relevant; it is the total capabilities that we bring to the table for meeting the security challenges and the nation’s aspirations, which are more relevant. IAF has embarked on a modernisation programme aimed at transforming itself into a potent strategic force. IAF envisions itself to be a modern force capable of taking on multi-front and multi-dimensional threats in the future. With the ever changing geo-political alignments, especially in our neighbourhood, IAF will need to continue to evolve in order to keep pace with the perceived challenges to our national security. Rapid technological advances will continue to change the concept of employment of aerospace power in the future. Hence, IAF doctrine will also continue to evolve so as to leverage the capabilities offered by new technologies. DSA: As an emerging strategic aerospace force, how well is the IAF prepared to face future challenges especially of a two and half front war? Air Chief: Our perceived security challenges of the future are a vital part of our decision matrix guiding our ongoing modernisation programme. As per our Long Term Perspective Plan (LTPP), by the end of 14th Plan period we would have gradually built-up our capability to face future challenges of a two and half front war. The IAF aims to equip itself with a good airlift capability, extended reach and special operations capability by induction of Very Heavy Transport Aircraft, Flight Refuelling Aircraft and Special Ops Aircraft respectively. These capability enhancements in terms of inductions / upgradations, force enhancers, modern aircraft, Surface to Air Guided Weapons, Radars and Networking will provide us an ideal force structure, which would enable to effectively tackle the entire spectrum of expected contingencies.

Indian Air Force has come a long way from its humble beginning as a tactical

DSA: Media reports indicate that the IAF’s strength is today down from 39 Squadrons to just 28 Squadrons. Does that worry you? What steps are being taken to fill these gaps?

but protection of our core values and enhanced national interests based on

Air Chief: These figures are incorrect. IAF presently has 35 combat squadrons consisting of a mixed fleet of modern and older generation fighter aircraft. IAF continues to maintain the requisite combat capability to face any challenge to our national interests. Additional fighter aircraft like Su-30MKI, Light Combat Aircraft, Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft and Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft are in the pipeline to enhance our combat potential. In addition, IAF is in the process of carrying out mid-life upgrade of MiG-29, Jaguar and Mirage-2000. All these combat aircraft after the upgrade will have improved capabilities and operational effectiveness. The modernisation programme of IAF is progressing well and we are moving steadily towards full spectrum capability. DSA: IAF claims to have transformed itself from a tactical force to one with strategic capabilities. Should these not include strategic Bombers like the TU-160 / Blackjack? How relevant will these strategic capabilities be in the context of a Limited War in South Asia that will be fought against the constraints of a nuclear backdrop? Air Chief: The Long Term Perspective Plan (LTPP) of IAF caters to our need for strategic capabilities in our area of influence. These will be extremely relevant in our environment, notwithstanding the inevitable constraints of the nuclear backdrop. The induction of MMRCA, FGFA, Su-30MKI, C-17 along with Flight Refuellers, AWACS and network centricity would provide IAF with the necessary strategic depth in all future operations. Strategic bombers like the TU-160 / Blackjack etc. do not figure in our list of priorities nor are they relevant in our context. DSA: Upgradation of Jaguars, Mirages, An-32s and other ageing IAF assets has been in the news for a long time. What measures are being taken for the upgradation of existing aircraft, equipment and infrastructure?

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

force. We are transforming into a potent strategic force in keeping with national aspirations. IAF vision addresses not only physical security of India country’s growth profile and aspirations Air Chief: The modernisation programme of IAF includes mid-life upgrades of all the fleet, which is a continuous process and includes equipping our fleet with modern weapon systems and avionics that would enhance their combat potential. A robust air defence system is being put in place by induction of new air defence radars like the MPR, LLTR, LLLWR, Rohini and Aerostats to replace the legacy systems. The induction of Surface to Air Guided weapons like MR SAM, Spyder and VShorads will enhance protection to our VA / VPs. The Integrated Air Defence Command and Control System will enable seamless integration of all the combat and support elements to provide complete net centricity of operations. The operating environment is also being upgraded by modernising all airfields with state-of-the-art Navigation and Avionics equipment under the Modernisation of Air Field Infrastructure (MAFI) programme. At the same time, we are also modernising our maintenance support services at the operating bases, Base Repair Depots (BRDs) and Equipment Depots (EDs). DSA: The IAF has been engaged with other leading Air Forces of the world in exercises, what are the latest exercises IAF is going to participate in? And what operational advantages has the IAF derived in specific terms from these exercises? Air Chief: We have been regularly conducting international exercises with major Air Forces in the world like US, UK and France to name a few over the last decade. Two major international exercises are planned in 2011, one with Oman in October 2011 and other is the annual Joint Military Training Exercise (JMT) with the Republic

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

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CAS INTERVIEW

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of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) from October-December 2011. The significance and advantages of conducting joint, bilateral / multinational air exercises with friendly foreign Air Forces are immense. Firstly, it enhances defence co-operation and strengthens mutual defence relationship with friendly foreign countries. Secondly, it enhances mutual understanding of employment philosophies and tactics, in realistic and real time threat scenarios. Thirdly, it enhances operational potential by conducting joint operations with Air Force of allied nations. Other advantages that accrue are that we imbibe best practices to improve overall operational efficiency, stay abreast of the latest technological developments, provide exposure to own personnel and systems and last but not the least display IAF’s capabilities and professionalism. DSA: In the present scenario, national and International, the need for highly effective transport aircraft and helicopters comes into focus. Apart from steps to acquire the C130J and C-17 heavy lift transport aircraft what is the IAF’s long-term plan to enhance tactical air transportation in conjunction with the Army? Air Chief: As you are aware, aerospace power is most effective when controlled and employed centrally. We have dovetailed the requirements of other Services in the capability building plan of IAF especially for our Transport and Helicopter assets. We have already procured the C-130J aircraft and are in the process of inducting the C-17 heavy lift aircraft. Similarly, the heli-lift capability is being enhanced with the induction of more Attack, Medium and Heavy Lift

The nation has reposed a great degree of trust and faith in our capabilities and it becomes the sacred duty of all air warriors to strive relentlessly to live up to this onerous responsibility. I can assure our countrymen that Indian Air Force is fully prepared to deliver with speed, precision and pride in our mission Helicopters of various categories in near future. DSA: We aspire to a super power status, yet import upto 70 per cent of our advanced weapon systems. How can we attain autonomy and reduce drastically this import dependence. What steps are needed to create a Defence Industrial Base in India?

During current plan period, we have increased our procurements from

Air Chief: IAF has always made efforts to support the indigenous industry in all our procurements. Government has initiated many steps to energise the Indian defence industry to provide the requisite impetus to our defence industrial growth. It would be encouraging to note that during current plan period, we have increased our procurements from domestic market from 58 per cent in 2007-08 to over 80 per cent in 2010-11. Our defence industry, however, is still dependent on transferred technology. Our defence industry needs to expand its technology base to absorb the modern technology available in order to develop core technologies. The MMRCA induction will inject approx. Rs. 20,000 Crore over the next 13 years into the indigenous defence industries as part of the 'Offset' obligation for this project. This will be a golden opportunity for our local industries to expand their industrial base. With a synergistic approach by all stakeholders and supported by government, I am sure we would be able to achieve self-reliance in defence production in the near future.

defence industry, however, is still dependent on transferred technology. Our

DSA: What are your views on the CDS? Would a Chairman Joint Chief of Staff be a better option? In what time frame should this be introduced?

Fast Track Selection akin to campus placement, participation in career fairs and exhibitions, motivational lectures in various schools and colleges etc. have also yielded very positive results. In a nutshell, IAF is presently attracting the right kind of talent from amongst the youth. Our courses are fully subscribed and we are on the path to progressively and rapidly make good the shortages in the officer cadre.

Air Chief: Contrary to the perception of print and electronic media, IAF is not against creation of CDS. A restructuring of HQ Integrated Defence Services (IDS) and MoD is required to be undertaken before progressing towards CDS. This will enable proper integration of all three Services with MoD and fulfill the spirit of joint functioning under the CDS. Only when the integration of MoD with Service HQs is complete, we can absorb the concept of CDS in totality. DSA: The armed forces are today short of some 14,000 officers at the cutting edge. We are also not getting our due share of the higher ability level segment. What steps have you envisaged to attract the best talent to the IAF? Air Chief: The situation in the IAF is well within our control. Currently, we have a shortage of only 584 officers which will be made good by 2014-15. IAF has instituted multi-pronged measures with an objective of attracting the best talent as well as to make up the shortfall in numbers. Our proactive publicity campaigns in print and electronic media have yielded positive results, which are substantiated by the higher number of candidates who have applied and been recommended by Air Force Selection Boards (AFSBs). The quality of human resources has in fact enhanced with even Engineering Graduates being inducted into the Flying Branch which augurs well for a technologically intensive organisation like ours. Induction of more NCC cadets as officers in all the branches of IAF,

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

domestic market from 58 per cent in 2007-08 to over 80 per cent in 2010-11. Our defence industry needs to expand its technology base to absorb the modern technology available in order to develop core technologies. The MMRCA induction will inject approx. Rs. 20,000 Crore over the next 13 years into the indigenous defence industries as part of the’ Offset’ obligation for this project

DSA: What is your message to the Air Force and the Nation? Air Chief: Indian Air Force has come a long way from its humble beginning as a tactical force. We are transforming into a potent strategic force in keeping with national aspirations. IAF vision addresses not only physical security of India but protection of our core values and enhanced national interests based on country’s growth profile and aspirations. In the coming decade IAF envisions itself to be a modern force with cutting edge technologies; a force which is flexible, adaptable and has the reach to provide strategic options to India in our area of interest. I believe that raison d’être of the IAF is to safeguard the sovereignty of Indian skies with honour and pride. The nation has reposed a great degree of trust and faith in our capabilities and it becomes the sacred duty of all air warriors to strive relentlessly to live up to this onerous responsibility. I can assure our countrymen that Indian Air Force is fully prepared to deliver with speed, precision and pride in our mission.

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

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ESPRIT DE CORPS

Challenges and Responses in National Security: Air Cmde Jasjit Singh AVSM, VrC, VM (retd) The writer is Director of Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi. He is Fellow of World Academy of Science and Art and has been awarded the Padma Bhushan for a life-time’s contribution to national security and defence.

The Armed Forces which can identify, understand and find ways and means to build the highest degree of mutually strengthening the strengths and rely on the component(s) that can step in to fill the deficit of other’s limitations would achieve the highest level of professional competence jointly. We need to introspect and understand these limits, strengths and weaknesses accurately and not get carried away by narrowly based vision and loyalties. What makes the problem more complex is that loyalty to the unit, squadron, regiment, etc. is crucial and makes our Armed Forces so very special and highly combat capable. But this is bound to come in the way of a common / joint approach at another level

The Vital need for Synergy The doyen of India’s strategic thinkers in uniform reflects upon the paramount need for synergy between air and surface forces to further the needs of national security. All professional militaries work on the principle of collegiate decision making as the individuals move up the command and responsibility chain. Historically the offensive capability largely rested with the land forces in the continental context and the naval forces in the maritime scenarios allowing the maritime nations to dominate and rule the world. A century of air power has progressively shifted the equation where the air forces have provided the central capability in the use of force for political purpose. Advances in technology have made it capable of air dominance both in air-to-air as well as air-to-surface operations at even beyond visual ranges. Air forces are the most effective means available to the country to apply punitive force calibrated in time, space and effect especially in the context of Limited wars we may see against a nuclear backdrop. Differences among different components can arise due to even non-parochial professional reasons; and they need patient friendly discussions and exchange of views and mutual accommodation.

ndia is unquestionably one of the foremost major powers of the world. One of the most important lessons one learns from human history is that rising to greater power and capabilities brings its own challenges. And more often than not, the assumption of being a great power can lead to the biggest mistake the powerful make: that their power would deter challenges and hence mere power is enough as the core of response. The reality is that like building a high reputation is much easier than sustaining it, the same principle applies to national power and security. And

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

we are not anywhere near the peak to assume that high economic growth will naturally provide the means to great power status. To begin with, such a rise in economic growth also triggers the revolution of rising expectations; and the first thing that one must expect is the desire of ever increasing numbers of people wanting to get rich and richer by fair means and foul on one side and the reality of debilitating poverty, disease, hunger, homelessness, illiteracy and deep despondency watching on television screens

a quality of life that most middle class are still aspiring to and the rich working hard to increase their income that they don’t have time to enjoy. In all this a single but the most important issue: that of national security which even those who preached and / or practiced and were directly responsible for it no longer reflect on the central elements in it. Hence to me the greatest challenge to India’s security and the dream of a billion people is that of inadequate

understanding of national security. And if we don’t understand the meaning of national security, how can we respond successfully to the challenges it faces?

Core values It may surprise most that the subject of national security is not taught as a discipline in any of hundreds of universities that churn out experts in political science and

other disciplines. On the other hand there is hardly any university in the United States, the sole super power, that does not have a full course or a major curriculum backed up by think tanks on national security. The internationally well recognised concept and definition of national security rests on two pillars: that of protection and sustenance of the core values of the nation and secondly, the protection and promotion of the country’s vital national interests.

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

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But where do we find Indian core values? Can we judge and define them individually like some of the scam-masters no doubt do? Or is it laid down anywhere for our guidance? In the Armed Forces we take our oath to uphold the Constitution, but few if any look at even the first page in the Preamble that tells everything. And rules require that this should be displayed prominently in every government office in India. But this has lost its significance because this is not related to anything learnt even in formal education. The essence of this page implies that the idea that forms the ideology of India is based on the principle of equality of the human beings. And not surprisingly that forms the basis of democracy, secularism, social and economic justice and so on. If we deviate from these values and norms, we endanger national security. Thus the challenge and required response are fairly simple to understand but people don’t know the connection nor does this form part of our Macaulayian education system. And if the Armed Forces do not pay attention to it, their ability and legitimacy receives a setback weakening national security. The other pillar of national security concerns the Armed Forces equally directly (and vital for the nation to understand the issues since they constitute the most important public good so as to ensure its survival and security) since the most vital interest of a State is its sovereignty and territorial integrity without which the nation State does not remain one as such. There are many other vital interests that would and should take priority in our thinking and actions. Time and space do not allow me to dwell on them here. But applying the concept of national security along the above lines we can identify the principles vital for success of the Armed Forces. The obvious first is that each component of the Armed Forces and their sub-sets must work toward a common goal and objective. In other words a common approach to national security and hence a common understanding of what can be done individually as well as collectively is critical. The ideal would be a national consensus on our national interests. But the minimum is the common understanding and sharing of that understanding among all segments of the society and the

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ESPRIT DE CORPS nation. Achieving that common understanding about critical military issues is a military task and responsibility.

All professional militaries work on the principle of collegiate decision making as the individuals move up the command and responsibility (both representing accountability) chain. The good ones are conscious of the limits and strengths of each other and that provides the space and the concept of jointness so that each Service or component of military power compensates for the limits of the others to create a more powerful response than would be possible otherwise To begin with, each component of the Armed Forces operates in a different medium (air power in the vertical dimension above the surface of the earth, land power on the surface of land, naval power at and under the sea) and hence each has its own strengths, capabilities and limitations. And the Armed Forces which can identify, understand and find ways and means to build the highest degree of mutually strengthening the strengths and rely on the component(s) that can step in to fill the deficit of other’s limitations would achieve the highest level of professional competence jointly. We need to introspect and understand these limits, strength and weaknesses accurately and not get carried away by narrowly based vision and loyalties. What makes the problem more complex is that loyalty to the unit, squadron, regiment, etc. is crucial and makes our Armed Forces so very special and highly combat capable. But this is bound to come in the way of a common / joint approach at another level. While at a certain level up the hierarchical ladder, this is supposed to transform into an expanded envelope of common loyalty and at the apex level this turns into loyalty to the concerned Service. Thus there is an in-built risk of natural jointness at lower levels of command and operations than at higher levels where each person has to assess the value of cooperation versus a loyalty-based single-service approach.

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

Jointness All professional militaries work on the principle of collegiate decision making as the individuals move up the command and responsibility (both representing accountability) chain. The good ones are conscious of the limits and strengths of each other and that provides the space and the concept of jointness so that each Service or component of military power compensates for the limits of the others to create a more powerful response than would be possible otherwise. Thus jointness becomes a farce by simply using the same or similar uniform one day in a weak without understanding one’s own and the partners’ strengths and weaknesses. Incidentally, this loyalty factor also needs to undergo significant changes in its span all the way to loyalty to the Armed Forces in general and the country in particular as the individual moves up the vector from small unit command leadership and loyalty to their own Service to higher positions of responsibility to the nation. These capabilities of each component need to be clearly taught and understood at each level. For example, simply because of the intrinsic quality that air power acquires since it operates in the vertical medium above the earth, makes it possible for it to influence and even control the movement and freedom of actions of the surface forces on the earth and oceans below it. But the latter can only marginally impose a similar effect on air power limited to the envelope of terminal defences. This provides air power (regardless of who it belongs to or who owns it and / or operates it) with a strategic capability each and every time. Consider the oft ignored first sorties of the old warhorse, the Dakota DC-3 that flew the infantry troops from Delhi to Srinagar in a couple of hours on early morning of 27th October, 1947. If they had not landed when they did we could not have been able to put “boots on the ground” with the IAF consistently providing critical airlift and combat strength where required even in uncharted areas that finally rolled back the Pakistani invasion. The situation was so critical that the pilots were instructed to fly over the

airfield (mostly a rudimentary strip then) and assess if the airfield had not been captured by the enemy and only then land. Both the Air Force and the Army, operating in their own environment to achieve a common aim, compensated each other’s limits and maximised their total capability. Otherwise the map of the sub-continent might have been quite different though not necessarily at peace. In doing so both components of military power upheld both pillars of national security.

Over 1,20,000 innocents have been killed in this “Fourth Generation War” during the past quarter century. While no civilised nation would like to respond in kind, India has opted to fight this with a defensive strategy by capturing / killing terrorists within our own frontiers with no threat to the sanctuary from where thousands of misguided youth come up as replacements and reinforcements for those killed by our security forces Take another example. An IAF SIGINT unit picked up information about the East Pakistan Cabinet meeting the next morning in the Government House in Dhaka to consider their desperate situation in the face of Indian Army’s inexorable advance. The Chief of Air Staff consulted with his colleagues and ordered a four MiG-21 air strike. The four aircraft hit the building while the meeting was going on inside which quickly dispersed and as the aircraft left they knelt down to pray since there were no casualties and decided to surrender. Or take the case of the gallant infantry company of 23rd Punjab in 1971 war that withstood the threats of attack from two Pakistani tank regiments the whole night at the isolated post of Longewala till the Hunter aircraft came in the morning and started decimating the tanks most strikes ably guided by (then) Major Atma Singh, an Air OP pilot who was shot down in the battle zone but continued to guide Hunters strikes. Just think over it; if the post had shown any weakness, the Pakistani armour would have rolled over it and the Hunters might have been

preparing to evacuate Jaisalmer by the sunrise. These and hundreds of thousands more instances and events tell us of our own history of instinctive jointness in the Indian Armed Forces which the nation can be rightly proud of instead of bickering about it. In fact air power is the lynchpin of jointness and joint operations. There is also another critical difference between air forces and the other components of military: that of the nature of discipline. The air forces require self-discipline at much higher levels than the other services since a single man in the cockpit in a combat aircraft is alone in the vast sky to fight another of his breed. The technicians work on different systems according to their trade and skills and are expected to perform correctly all the time every time to ensure that no mistake is made which would place the pilot who accepts the aircraft as fit for flying in all respects virtually in trust rather than any supervised actions. Hence trust and mutual confidence in the flying community, whether in the Air Force, Army or the Navy, is a dominant institutional culture which has to be respected while working for the same cause, though among the air warriors it may be more critical because of the nature of the profession even in peacetime. But this becomes a problem where successes and failures are perceived through an ACR (Annual Confidential Report) system in a highly competitive environment

creating a tension-filled institutional culture.

Professional military education We also need to understand that differences among different components can arise due to even non-parochial professional reasons; and they need patient friendly discussions and exchange of views and mutual accommodation rather than getting clouded by loyalty factors limited to one’s own Service which the top leaders may believe is one of their primary duties. The problems or tension in jointness arises much more from the budget battles (again for mostly professional reasons) and the factor of accountability of command which does not become any less since the title of the commander-in-chief was discarded in 1955 on questionable grounds since the title continues to exist at the Army and Corps levels. Multiple agency approvals and re-justification because of the disjunction in our higher defence organisation only add to misunderstandings. This can be better attended to through emphasis on what the Americans term as Professional Military Education (PME) of military and civilian officers dealing with military matters as distinct from training and skills so important at lower levels. Such education needs to produce a historical mind in higher leadership. But the difficulty is that Indian culture has relied more on oral history rather

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

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than the written. The record of official histories of employment of the Armed Forces in Wars the nation had to fight itself stands as a testimony to the lack of the historical mind which then tends to form judgements on opinions rather than facts. These are some of the factors why our Armed Forces have not been able to formulate credible and effective military strategy. Even Pakistan has done better. For example, it acquired nuclear weapons clandestinely mostly with help from China with the US facilitating the process in their own national interests; and then began the past twenty years of terrorism in the name of religion to implement a strategy that they openly claim is to, at its minimum, “bleed India through a thousand cuts” while hoping to take Kashmir at its best. At its median is the aim to create a massive divide between the Muslims and non-Muslims in India by promoting locally based terrorism to undercut the foundations of India’s ideology discussed above. Over 1,20,000 innocents have been killed in this “Fourth Generation War” during the past quarter century. While no civilised nation would like to respond in kind, India has opted to fight this with a defensive strategy by capturing / killing terrorists within our own frontiers with no threat to the sanctuary from where thousands of misguided youth come up as replacements and reinforcements for those killed by our security forces. And since even our Central Police Organisations have continued with questionable capabilities and poor discipline not to talk of weak dedication to the task of ensuring national security even in local terrorist groups, the Armed Forces have been called out, with the Army leading, to handle the internal security threats weakening their capacity for dealing with external ones. Yet the only difference between the Army and Police is the basic recruitment and initial training.

Coercive force This brings me back to the question of joint warfighting by the Armed Forces of the Union of India. Air power had been an indisputable instrument of victory in wars since the Second World War. Its proper

organisation and employment has led to dramatic effects and in many cases leading to victory in direct air to naval warships (as in the key battles of the war in the Pacific Ocean and in the Battle of the Atlantic Ocean) and armoured forces on land like in Longewala in 1971 war. It has shaped the battlefields for a victory on land and sea. During the last three decades of wars in Asia, especially in our extended neighbourhood, the employment of air power has been witnessed again as the most potent instrument of coercive force. The reason, as noted earlier, has been the intrinsic quality of operations in and from the vertical medium and hence the capability of air power to transcend natural boundaries and even the battle on land and sea to strike at strategic targets at long ranges to create strategic effect. Thus the air forces are best employed in deep battles since they are most suited for this role. But even more important is the fact that while air power intrinsically produces strategic effect with its strategic reach, advances in technology have made it capable of air dominance both in air-to-air as well as air-to-surface operations at even beyond visual ranges. In a nuclearised environment its role becomes even more crucial providing conventional and nuclear deterrence. If deterrence fails then the strategic effect of air forces becomes the most important component of military power since credible punitive force can be employed for military as well as political-economic effects by targeting them deep inside the aggressor country. Air forces are the most effective means available to the country to apply punitive force calibrated in time, space and effect. Military history’s lessons inform us that victory is won by defeating the enemy’s strategy where imposing our will on the hostile military becomes critical adjunct. In a nuclearised environment success in a clash of arms would be best fought in a Limited War (or local-border war as the 25-year old Chinese doctrine calls it). The land forces, once engaged, can disengage either through destroying the enemy’s land forces, or by losing one’s own or through a mutually accepted cease-fire. Hence the use

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

of land forces has become far more escalatory in the nuclear threshold ladder. However air forces can engage and disengage in a far more controlled and calibrated manner since these do not have to hold ground. Compare our own examples. One year after the overt nuclearisation of both countries Pakistan launched an unprovoked aggression in Kargil sector while achieving strategic surprise. The employment of IAF’s combat power altered the equation rapidly and the Indian troops began to roll back the aggression particularly when the Pakistan Army’s supply dumps were destroyed by air strikes in the narrow valleys at very high altitudes. There were no concerns, in India or in the international community, about any escalation across the nuclear threshold because constraints of space were clearly articulated and conveyed to all concerned. On the other hand, the moment Indian Army started to action the plan of punitive strikes by armour across the Rajasthan border, international pressure concerned about the risk of escalation to nuclear exchange forced New Delhi to hold back any offensive action. It was Pakistan that claimed that its nuclear weapons had deterred India! Global and regional developments of technology, conflict environment, political and economic dimensions of conflict and the risk of nuclear exchange have consequently started to alter the role of the different components of Armed Forces in war. Historically the offensive capability largely rested with the land forces in the continental context and the naval forces in the maritime scenarios allowing the maritime nations to dominate and rule the world. A century of air power has progressively shifted the equation where the air forces have provided the central capability in the use of force for political purpose. If in a nuclear environment the land forces are forced to a local border war, the option for deep strikes rests with the calibrated employment of offensive combat power of the air forces since they can provide the policy makers the choice of punitive and coercive effects not only in military terms but also in terms of political and economic effects at points of greatest vulnerability of the hostile nation.

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Air Marshal B K Pandey PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd) The writer is former AOC-in-C HQ Training Command, IAF, Bengaluru and served for three years in a Diplomatic Assignment at the Indian Embassy during the years of turmoil (1989-1992) in war-torn Afghanistan. He was responsible for setting up the only English Medium School in Kabul at that point in time. He has also been Operations Manager at ARC, an intelligence organisation.

HAL has entered into a joint venture with United Aircraft Corporation of Russia to produce a customised twin-seat version of the Russian T-50 PAK FA. Referred to as the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), the IAF is expected to get around 250 (14 squadrons) with induction beginning in 2017. This fleet will in due course replace the 17.5 squadrons of third generation aircraft that have been in service with the IAF for over 25 years. These include the MiG-27, MiG-29, Jaguar and the Mirage 2000

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MODERNISATION An excellent overview of the evolution of aerospace power in India and the way ahead. The writer highlights the fact that the combat potential of the combat fleet of the IAF has been declining over the last decade is not a closely guarded secret. With the MiG-23 fleet and several squadrons of MiG-21 procured in the sixties / seventies phased out and the LCA Tejas not yet operational, there has been considerable erosion of combat potential. Even with the induction of seven squadrons of the Su-30MKI so far, the strength of fighter squadrons in the IAF stands at 33.5 against the authorised 39.5. As per the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the remaining nine squadrons of the accident-prone MiG-21 fleet would be phased out by 2017. By then, the IAF hopes to receive another eight squadrons of the Su-30MKI. If no other combat aircraft is inducted, by the end of 2017, the IAF will have a fleet of only 32.5 combat squadrons. He concludes grimly that the effort at the contemplated transformation of the IAF into a modern aerospace power in a practical time frame, will face challenges from the controlling politico-bureaucratic systems that are perhaps as daunting as those from the enemy.

stablished on October 8, 1932, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has now entered its eightieth year of existence. During its glorious history, the combat elements of the IAF underwent baptism by fire in the 1930s operating against rebel forces on the North West Frontier and later in Burma during World War II. Their mettle was again tested against fierce opposition by Pakistan Air Force in the wars in the sub-continent in 1965 and 1971. The combat fleet went into action once again in Kargil in 1999 albeit without aerial opposition. Each time the spearhead of the nation’s air power exerted a decisive influence on the outcome of the conflict. Since independence, the transport and helicopter fleets of the IAF have been rendering yeomen service supporting the forward deployment of the ground forces along the inhospitable northern and north-eastern frontiers. However, on four occasions, the transport fleet of the IAF has been employed aggressively, each time playing a crucial role in furthering national security interests. The first was the daring mission on October 27, 1947 to land three Dakota aircraft at Srinagar airfield with troops to prevent it from falling into the hands of the Pakistan-sponsored invaders. With Srinagar airfield secured, reinforcements were inducted speedily by air and the Valley was thus saved. On December 11, 1971, 36 transport aircraft of the IAF carried out an airborne assault operation behind enemy lines in the then East Pakistan. The 700 paratroopers dropped behind enemy lines at Tangail, cut off retreat of the Pakistani forces hastening collapse of Dacca, bringing to an end the war in the east.

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

Indian Air Force in Transition

In the last week of July 1987 the IAF airlifted a 10,000-strong military contingent from Hyderabad to Jaffna as the lead element of the 80,000-strong Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in accordance with the historic Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. The IAF transport fleet remained the lifeline for the IPKF throughout their deployment in Sri Lanka. IAF helicopters were used extensively for logistic support, reconnaissance, communication duties and offensive missions. But the most dramatic military intervention at long range by the IAF was in the Maldives on the night of November 3, 1988. The operation was undertaken in response to a request from the government of the Maldives for urgent military assistance to counter externally sponsored invasion. Two IL-76 aircraft with 400 Para Commandos flew directly from their base in Agra to Hulule airport in the Maldives 2,000 km from the Indian peninsula. The swift military intervention in a distant land was possible only through long range strategic airlift aircraft.

Challenges ahead The nation can derive satisfaction from the fact that the IAF lived up to expectations each time it was called into action. However, the IAF must now prepare for the challenges looming over the horizon. Speaking on the occasion of the IAF anniversary in October 2010, Air Chief Marshal P V Naik, the then Chief of the Air Staff described the prevailing security scenario in India’s neighbourhood as “a volcano that may erupt anytime”. He went on to say that “operational preparedness was the key to meet the complex threat with swift response, flexibility and precision”. As per the Air Chief, the IAF was

in the process of transformation into a potent aerospace power by 2017. The statement of the CAS succinctly drew attention to the challenges that lay ahead for the IAF. The traditional foe Pakistan although on the verge of being a “failed State”, ought not to be underestimated as it continues to receive potent combat aircraft from the US and in larger numbers from China. The Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) on the other hand is rapidly evolving from

an antiquated force to a modern aerospace power. Its combat fleet has the cloned versions of the latest Russian fighters and has even test flown its indigenous fifth generation fighter. In terms of numbers, the PLAAF is three times the size of the IAF. India cannot afford to ignore China’s rise as a military and economic giant on the global arena. India is also emerging as a regional economic and military power and

its security interests now transcend its borders extending from the Middle East to South East Asia. As a regional power, India will be expected to play a critical role towards regional security and stability. Such a responsibility will require the nation to possess the capability of power projection. India therefore needs not only a potent combat force but also the means to transport swiftly and deploy combat power over long distances within and beyond national

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boundaries. India’s capability to play a meaningful role as a regional power, will therefore hinge to a large extent on a powerful and balanced Air Force.

The traditional foe Pakistan although on the verge of being a “failed State”, ought not to be underestimated as it continues to receive potent combat aircraft from the US and in larger numbers from China. The Peoples Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) on the other hand is rapidly evolving from an antiquated force to a modern aerospace power. Its combat fleet has the cloned versions of the latest Russian fighters and has even test flown its indigenous fifth generation fighter. In terms of numbers, the PLAAF is three times the size of the IAF However, what needs to be evaluated is the state of operational preparedness of the IAF today and as to whether the “process of transformation into a potent aerospace power” as purported by the CAS, is actually on schedule.

Combat potential The fact that combat potential of the combat fleet of the IAF has been declining over the last decade is not a closely guarded secret. With the MiG-23 fleet and several squadrons of MiG-21 procured in the sixties / seventies phased out and the LCA Tejas not yet operational, there has been considerable erosion of combat potential. Even with the induction of seven squadrons of the Su-30MKI so far, the strength of fighter squadrons in the IAF stands at 33.5 against the authorised 39.5. As per the Ministry of Defence (MoD), the remaining nine squadrons of the accident-prone MiG-21 fleet would be phased out by 2017. By then, the IAF hopes to receive another eight squadrons of the Su-30MKI. If no other combat aircraft is inducted, by the end of 2017, the IAF will have a fleet of only 32.5 combat squadrons. The IAF is banking on the induction of six squadrons of the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft with which the tally will go up to 38.5 squadrons, still short of the

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MODERNISATION currently authorised level. Besides, the MoD intends to enhance the number of combat squadrons to 42 by the end of the decade, a figure close to an earlier assessment of 45 squadrons to fight a full-scale war on one front and holding action on the other. However, in case the nation is embroiled in a full-scale two-front war against China and Pakistan simultaneously, it will need a 60-squadron Air Force. However, the immediate shortfall of 3.5 squadrons can be made up with the LCA Tejas provided it receives Final Operational Clearance and the IAF doubles the order for 40 aircraft already placed. Alternatively, there is talk of enhancing the order for MMRCA by 63 aircraft (three squadrons). Besides, HAL has entered into a joint venture with United Aircraft Corporation of Russia to produce a customised twin-seat version of the Russian T-50 PAK FA. Referred to as the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), the IAF is expected to get around 250 (14 squadrons) with induction beginning in 2017. This fleet will in due course replace the 17.5 squadrons of third generation aircraft that have been in service with the IAF for over 25 years. These include the MiG-27, MiG-29, Jaguar and the Mirage 2000. With midlife upgrade at phenomenal cost underway, these aircraft may continue in service up to 2025. Beyond this date, the combat fleet of the IAF will comprise the upgraded Su-30MKI, the MMRCA, the FGFA and the Tejas MkII.

Induction HAL Nasik is expected to complete delivery of the 272 Su-30MKI on order by 2014. Meanwhile, test flights on the T-50 are progressing satisfactorily in Russia. However, the twin-seat FGFA on which Indian and Russian designers are working jointly, will practically be a new aircraft. The stipulated time frame of 2017 for the commencement of its induction may only be tentative as there may be impediments not uncommon in the development programmes for new aircraft. There is also talk of the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) developing a fifth generation twin-engine Medium Combat

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

Aircraft (MCA). But given the track record of the Indian aerospace industry, development of the MCA in a respectable time frame may well be outside the realm of possibility. The IAF may do well to factor this into their future plans. Apart from the uncertainties of the indigenous aerospace industry that could adversely affect plans for transformation of the combat fleet, a nagging problem that continues to linger is the inordinate delay in the selection of the vendor for the MMRCA. Initiated by Air Headquarters over a decade ago, the process continues at an excruciatingly tardy pace. Although Dassault Rafael and the Eurofighter Typhoon were shortlisted in June this year after completion of technical evaluation, commercial bids are yet to be opened. There is also the complex problem of “benchmarking of price” yet to be tackled. The Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) was formulated to be impartial, fair, totally transparent and ensure the best value for money. However, these attributes have not been balanced against the imperatives of national security. There is growing concern in the IAF at the slumberous pace at which the case is being processed by the MoD while its combat potential continues to erode. If at all the MMRCA is finally a reality, on account of the interminable delay in procurement, the aircraft might well be due for midlife upgrade or overtaken by obsolescence before induction. Besides, the possibility of the tender being cancelled cannot be ruled out at this stage, given the dilemma of decision making by the controlling bureaucracy in the uncertain political climate prevailing in the country.

Airlift capability The scenario in respect of the strategic and tactical airlift capability is somewhat reassuring. A US$ 4.1 billion deal has been concluded with Boeing through the US Government’s Foreign Military Sales route for ten C17 Globemaster III, the most capable strategic military transport aircraft in the world to replace the ageing IL-76 fleet inducted in the mid eighties. Another seven are likely to follow in

due course. HAL has also entered into a joint venture with United Aircraft Corporation of Russia to co-develop a Multi-role Transport Aircraft of 20-tonne payload capacity as replacement for the 100 AN-32 aircraft inducted in the mid eighties. Being a completely new platform, the stated time frame of 2019 for induction may be over optimistic. In the meantime, the IAF will have to manage with the AN-32 fleet currently undergoing midlife upgrade.

Rotary wing On the rotary wing front, proposal from the IAF for over 200 helicopters to replace the ageing fleet of Cheetah and Chetak through imports and production by HAL of a three-ton class machine, is progressing at a snail’s pace. Action is also in hand to procure 15 heavy-lift helicopters to replace the defunct MI-26. Tenders have also been floated for the second time for the replacement of the obsolete MI-35 Attack Helicopters. In the meantime, induction of the 80 MI17 V5 helicopters ordered earlier, has begun in March 2011. These will augment / replace the ageing fleet of 150 MI8 / MI17 helicopters on the inventory. HAL has been successful with the five-tonne medium capacity Advanced Light Helicopter programme, the Dhruv, which are being inducted in large numbers. HAL is also working on the Light Combat Helicopter that resembles the Italian Mangusta.

Force multipliers While the IAF is set on enhancing

combat force levels, it has simultaneously focused on Force Multipliers which include an order for three IL-76 based Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) with the Phalcon Radar with options for two more. Also on order are three Embraer 145 jets mounted with indigenously developed Airborne Early Warning & Control (AEW&C) systems. The IAF needs a total of nine such aircraft. These should plug most of the gaps in low level radar cover and strengthen Air Defence considerably. Air Defence cover will also be strengthened through the deployment of Aerostats. The IAF is seeking to double its fleet of six Flight Refuelling Aircraft for which a tender has been floated for the second time. As in the case of all big ticket purchases, this case too is moving at an imperceptible pace.

A nagging problem that continues to linger is the inordinate delay in the selection of the vendor for the MMRCA. Initiated by Air Headquarters over a decade ago, the process continues at an excruciatingly tardy pace. Although Dassault Rafael and the Eurofighter Typhoon were shortlisted in June this year after completion of technical evaluation, commercial bids are yet to be opened The IAF began its foray in the regime of Unmanned Aerial Systems over a decade ago to boost reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities. Following an agreement with Israel

in 1996, the IAF received the medium altitude Searcher II and subsequently the high altitude Heron. In 2009, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) unveiled to the world for the first time the Harop Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle in the run-up to Aero India 2009 international air show at Bengaluru. Ten of these are to be inducted into the IAF. Meanwhile the Aeronautical Development Establishment has produced the Nishant (equivalent of the Searcher I) and is currently developing the Medium Altitude Long Endurance UAV (equivalent to Searcher II). The IAF is scheduled to get its first dedicated communications satellite by the end of 2012. This will substantially augment ground-based Integrated Command and Control Systems and enhance its war-fighting capability through better net-centricity.

The problem within Echoing the sentiments of his predecessor, Air Chief Marshal N A K Browne who assumed charge as the Chief of the Air Staff recently stated “The IAF is well poised on the path of transforming itself into a potent strategic force.” The statements emanating from the top echelons of the leadership in the IAF undoubtedly reflect confidence and optimism about the future of the IAF. However, the effort at the contemplated transformation of the IAF into a modern aerospace power in a practical time frame, will face challenges from the controlling politico-bureaucratic systems that are perhaps as daunting as those from the enemy.

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

aerospace power

Gp Capt J V Singh (retd) The writer was commissioned as an Officer in Indian Air Force in 1978. He is a graduate of Defence Services Staff College and in addition has undergone a diploma course at National Institute of Industrial Engineering (NITIE) during his service tenure. He has also worked as a Senior Fellow with Centre for Air Power Studies while he was in active service for a period of two years. He has recently retired from Indian Air Force and he has rejoined as a senior fellow at the Centre once again. His current research project relates to the understanding of China’s Aerospace Strategy and its present status and future implications for the Asia Pacific Region as well as its larger role as a global player.

The PLA Air Force is now able to fight both defensive and offensive battles under high-tech conditions. The Air Force is now capable of waging high level long distance combat, rapid manoeuvrability and air defence and is able to provide assistance to Navy and ground forces. Over the next few years, the Chinese Air Force will enhance its deterrent force in the air, its ability to impose air blockades and its ability to launch air strikes, as well as its ability to conduct joint operations with the ground forces and Navy

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THE CHINESE SURGE Changing PLA, Changing PLA Air Force -“We should keep deepening and broadening preparations for military struggle, quicken the pace of the modernisation work of the troops and keep enhancing the capability of accomplishing diversified military tasks with winning localised wars under informatised conditions as the core”. - Hu Jintao to PLA Air Force Officers Attending 11th PLA Air Force Party Congress on 22 May 2009. An analytical overview of the Doctrine and Strategy of the Chinese PLAAF. The writer highlights that change in the PLAAF is happening across a wide front and in myriad endeavours, in operational matters, in institutional affairs and in the acquisition of new capabilities. Today, the PLAAF is more operationally capable than at any time in its past. The years 1993, 2002 and 2004 represent important benchmarks for Chinese military modernisation. In 1993, the Chinese leadership and the PLA issued the equivalent of a new national military strategy. In 2002, the entire PLA was told to rethink how it would incorporate 21st century information technologies and operations in outer space, cyber space and in the electromagnetic spectrum to conduct information intensive operations. In 2004, the PLA Air Force, promulgated a service specific Space Operations concept, being Prepared for Simultaneous Offensive and Defensive Operations, yielding a significant PLAAF role in strategic deterrence and a desire for the capability to win high-tech local wars with airpower. The PLA Air Force, PLA Navy and the Second Artillery are now being described as “strategic” services with strategic level missions in their own right.

he People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is an organisation undergoing a series of major transitions and significant changes. Like the rest of the Chinese armed forces, change in the PLAAF is happening across a wide front and in myriad endeavours, in operational matters, in institutional affairs and in the acquisition of new capabilities. Today, the PLAAF is more operationally capable than at any time in its past and it is enjoying the fruits of years of focused and sustained reform and modernisation.1 Operation Desert Storm (1991) shocked the PLA into the realisation that, if it did not begin to focus on being able to engage in high-tech, information age warfare, then it would fall even further behind the world’s modern militaries than it already had. Hence, the CMC promulgated a new national military strategy. The years 1993, 2002 and 2004 represent important benchmarks for Chinese military modernisation as well as for the PLAAF. In 1993, the Chinese leadership and the PLA issued the equivalent of a new national military strategy. The objective in promulgating “The Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period” was to

refocus China’s military modernisation objectives across and well into, the new century to enable the PLA to fight and win wars based on high-tech weapons and joint operational concepts. In 2002, the entire PLA was told to rethink how it would incorporate 21st century information technologies and operations in outer space, cyber space and in the electromagnetic spectrum to conduct information intensive operations “Local Wars Under Informatised Conditions,” in the parlance of the PLA. In 2004, the PLA Air Force, for the first time in its history, promulgated a service specific "Space Operations, Being Prepared for Simultaneous Offensive and Defensive Operations." The exposure to these ideas has driven recognition of the air force as a major national capability to contain and win wars, yielding a significant PLAAF role in strategic deterrence and a desire for the capability to win high-tech local wars with airpower. Also in 2004, the CMC directed the PLA to develop high-tech conventional war fighting capabilities as well as preparing for non-traditional security operations. “The Historic Missions of Our Military in the New Period of the New Century,” articulated by PRC President and CCP leader Hu Jintao in 2004, provided the PLA with a mandate to

DOD, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), VII. P 206.

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PLA Air Force (PLAAF): Doctrine and Strategy

think beyond conventional war fighting scenarios. The PLA, literally borrowing a term previously used by the US armed forces, now speaks of engaging in “Military Operations Other Than War” (MOOTW).2

Aircraft acquisition The PLAAF divides its aircraft acquisition into five periods. The first period revolved around the relationship with the Soviet Union (1949-1960), which had a lasting impact on the development of China’s aviation industry and PLAAF force composition. During that period, China acquired about 3,000 Soviet aircraft and received production rights to various models. The second period began in July 1960, when the Soviet Union notified China that it was withdrawing all of its specialists and cancelling all of its contracts. China then spent several years attempting to either modify or reverse engineer some of the aircraft and missiles furnished by the Soviet Union. After 1965, the Cultural Revolution severely disrupted PLAAF efforts. Between 1969 and 1971, continued disruptions led to profound quality control problems. The third period began following the 1979 border conflict with Vietnam, when the PLAAF realised that the F-6 2 China’s National Defence in 2010. Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. Downloaded from URL:http:// www. china.org.cn/ government/ whitepaper/ node. 7114675. htm on 31 March 2011.

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could no longer meet its long-term requirements. As a result, the PLAAF terminated the F-6 programme and money was infused into the F-7 and F-8 programmes, which were faltering at the time. This led China and the PLAAF to begin negotiations with the United States, resulting in a foreign military sales contract (known as the Peace Pearl Programme) in the late 1980s to upgrade the fire control system on the F-8II with F-16 class avionics. The fourth period occurred during the 1990s, when China turned back to Russia for weapon systems and technology. During this period, the PLAAF purchased Su-27s, Su-30s, and Il-76s from Moscow. The Shenyang Aircraft Corporation also began assembling and producing the Chinese-licensed copy of the Su-27, known as the F-11. The PLAAF deployed its first F-11s to an operational unit in 2000.3 The fifth period covers the 2000s. During this period, the PLAAF has deployed Chinese produced FB-7s, F-10s, and K-8s, as well as modified B-6 bombers capable of carrying air launched cruise missiles. Although China produces all of these aircraft, most of them either are based on foreign aircraft and technology or include key foreign components, such as the engines.

The current operational component of the “Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period” is known as the “Active Defence” strategy as adjusted for the conduct of “Local Wars under Informatised Conditions.” The “Active Defence” or “Active Defence Military Strategy” establishes set of broad strategic concepts and principles and a set of very general operational concepts, for prosecuting war at the strategic level of conflict. It applies to all PLA services and branches. “Active Defence” strategy has remained relatively constant

The picture today is quite different. The PLAAF is replacing older fighters with third and fourth generation aircraft fitted with long range, precision strike weapons for land attack and anti-ship missions and, in some of these aircraft, in-flight refuelling capabilities, which when fully operational, will extend operating limits. These include Russian designed Su-27s and Su-30s but also China’s own domestically developed J-10, which is assessed to be comparable in capability to the US F-16. Many PLAAF fighters now carry beyond visual range air-to-air missiles and PGMs and the PLAAF possess a first generation air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), carried on the H-6 medium bomber. China is experimenting with domestically produced airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft and PLAAF aircraft now routinely operate at low level, over water, in bad weather and at night (sometimes all at once). Based on recent trends, these changes are likely to accelerate in the future, so that, within another decade, the capabilities of China’s air force would have strategic reach.4 The defence White Paper of 2004, in unambiguous terms, states that China intends to eventually achieve “command of the air and sea” and the ability to “conduct strategic counter-strikes.” The PLA Air Force (Aerospace Power), PLA Navy and the Second Artillery are now being described as “strategic” services with strategic level missions in their own right.

Military doctrine and strategy China does not publish equivalents to the US National Security Strategy, National Defence Strategy, or National Military Strategy. Rather, China uses “white papers,” speeches and articles as the principal mechanisms to communicate policy and strategy publicly. The transparency of China’s military and security affairs has improved in recent years, including its biennial publication of Defence White Papers. The Defence White Papers 2008 and 2010 summarise China’s defence policy as upholding national security

and unity and ensuring the interests of national development. Operational Theory (zuozhan lilun, i.e., doctrine): There is no single Chinese word for “doctrine,” and the PLA does not use a word substitute for “doctrine” in referring to its own operational theory or operational concepts. However, recognising that the Americans do use that word, PLA operations professionals translate “US doctrine” as “American Military Operational Theory.” Understanding the linkage between operational theory and operational practice in the PLA is an important tool for identifying operational concepts. Active Defence (jiji fangyu): The current operational component of the “Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period” is known as the “Active Defence” strategy as adjusted for the conduct of “Local Wars under Informatised Conditions.” The “Active Defence” or “Active Defence Military Strategy” establishes set of broad strategic concepts and principles and a set of very general operational concepts, for prosecuting war at the strategic level of conflict. It applies to all PLA services and branches. “Active Defence” strategy has remained relatively constant.

Offensive-defensive doctrine Since the 1990s, China has paid close attention to developments in airpower thought in other countries. In formulating its own offensive-defensive doctrine, the PLAAF has synthesised US assessments of the Gulf War, Kosovo campaign and US operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, building on the doctrine that it has practiced since the days of Russian assistance and influence. There is recognition of the air force as a major national capability to contain and win wars, yielding a significant PLAAF role in strategic deterrence and a desire for the capability to win high-tech local wars with airpower. Former President Jiang Zemin asserted that "we must construct a powerful people's air force ‘with Chinese characteristics,' that is both offensive and defensive."5

Tong Hui, Chinese Military Aviation, 1995–2009, Section 1: Fighters, 1–2, available at <http://cnair.top81.cn/>.

IHS (Global) Limited, "World Air Forces, China," Jane's World Air Forces, (Singapore: IHS, July 2009), P, 3–5. Guo Jinxiao, "The Science of Air Force Strategy," Chinese Military Encyclopedia (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2002), 311–312.

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Operationally, the PLAAF is going to aim to extend its reach and its lethality in order to enable the joint operational concepts --- the --- greater PLA is adopting as it thinks through how to fight and win high tech 21st century wars As part of this drive China plans to accelerate PLAAF modernisation, transform it from a homeland air defence type of air force to a type that combines both offense and defence and develop modernised capabilities to defend China's security and interests. In 2004, in accord with the Central Military Commission's new military strategy programme, the PLAAF formalised this approach in a new air force strategy (actually more operational doctrine than strategy), which integrated air and space, with both attack and defence. The PLAAF is a multifaceted service with many missions; therefore, it already has a strategy. As we saw beginning in 1992 the PLA established a committee of NDU and PLAAF officers to initiate research on Air Force strategy, culminating in the publication of Science of Air Force Strategy in 1995.

This book laid out an argument, based on international air power doctrine, for the PLAAF to be an “independent” service and to be assigned its own operational component in the PLA’s National Military Strategic Guidelines.

PLAAF strategy The Gulf War and the 199596 Taiwan Strait crisis provided additional ammunition for the PLAAF to seek its own strategic doctrine. For example, statements by Former Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Jiang Zemin and recently installed PLAAF commander Liu Shunyao emphasised the PLAAF’s requirement to fight offensive battles. In 1997, General Liu stressed this new strategic direction in the following words: “The Chinese Air Force plans to build-up state-of-the-art weapon systems by early next century, including early warning aircraft, electronic warfare warplanes and surface-to-air missiles. The PLA Air Force is now able to fight both defensive and offensive battles under high-tech conditions. The Air Force is now capable of waging high level long distance combat, rapid

manoeuvrability and air defence and is able to provide assistance to Navy and ground forces. Over the next few years, the Chinese Air Force will enhance its deterrent force in the air, its ability to impose air blockades and its ability to launch air strikes, as well as its ability to conduct joint operations with the ground forces and Navy”.

The CMC approval In 2004, the CMC approved the PLAAF’s “Active Defence” strategy as a component of the National Military Strategic Guidelines for air operations. The PLAAF’s strategic component was designated as “Integrated Air and Space, Simultaneous Offensive and Defensive Operations.” The approval also signalled a fundamental shift in how the PLAAF was to be viewed. The article states that this change is encapsulated in three bold new assertions on the strategic positioning of the PLAAF: ●● First, the PLAAF is a national Air Force led by the CCP. ●● Second, a modern Air Force must be built to unify aviation and spaceflight, combine defence and offense and unify information and firepower.

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●● Third, the PLAAF should be a strategic Air Force standing side by side with the Army and Navy to achieve command of the air, ground and sea.

New warfare concepts At the strategic level of discourse, the PLAAF today is beginning to rethink the roles and missions it must assume and the capabilities it must have, to conduct aerospace operations that will achieve Beijing’s larger national objectives. Exactly what is meant when the PLAAF is exhorted to become a “strategic air force” is still unfolding. What is clear at this point is that the PLAAF is no longer viewed as being solely a tactical adjunct to ground force operations or a service mainly concerned with territorial air defence. It is evident that the leadership of the PLA is looking to the PLAAF to be capable in the future of offensive operations in larger joint campaigns and even to “execute long range precision strikes and strategic projection operations” although at the moment, these latter two missions are challenging. In 2004, in recognition of the new emphasis the PLA leadership places on the aerospace dimensions of warfare, the PLAAF was finally given its own service-level strategy, known as “Integrated Air and Space, Being Prepared for Simultaneous Offensive and Defensive Operations.”

Joint experience Another noteworthy trend in the past few years is the assignment of PLA Air Force general officers to important national level military assignments. The PLA has traditionally been dominated by “army green” and, to a certain extent, it still is. However, more blue uniforms (PLAAF) are showing up in venues that matter reflecting more jointness in the make-up of its national level leadership relative to the past.6 For example: ●● Since 2004, the commander of the PLAAF (along with the commander of the PLA Navy and Second Artillery) has been a member of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese 6

aerospace power

THE CHINESE SURGE Communist Party (CMC), the national command authority for the PRC. ●● In 2003, PLAAF Lieutenant General Zheng Shenxia became the first air force officer appointed as head of the prestigious PLA Academy of Military Science (AMS). The AMS serves as a think tank directly subordinate to the CMC and both drives and executes major initiatives of PLA-wide reform and modernisation in the realms of military strategy, the operational art and tactics. ●● In 2006, PLAAF Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotian became the first air force officer appointed as Commandant of the PLA National Defence University (NDU). In 2007, Ma became one of the four Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff with the important portfolio of intelligence and foreign affairs for the entire PLA. ●● In the last few years, PLAAF general officers have also been appointed to various Deputy Director positions in the General Political Department (GPD) and General Logistics Department (GLD). ●● Moreover, since the early 1990s, the practice of concurrently dual hatting each Military Region Air Force commander as a Military Region deputy commander has been institutionalised.

Conclusion It is clear that the PLAAF is going to become more operationally capable over time. That said, its transition from a primarily tactical asset to a “strategic air force” will not happen overnight or without problems along the way; there are weighty systemic and technological challenges that will guarantee a certain amount of friction. What one can state with some certainty is the following: ●● The fundamental decisions the CMC makes for the entire PLA will continue to shape the major contours of future PLAAF reform and modernisation programmes administratively and operationally. Therefore, any understanding of

where the PLAAF will be in 5 to 10 years must factor in the bigger picture of where the PLA will be and why. ●● Bureaucratically, because of historical precedents and how the Chinese defence establishment continues to be organised and managed, the PLAAF is unlikely to develop the very unique service persona or accrue the same degree of independence that characterise the services in other major powers. That said, if the PLAAF links its institutional stature in the PLA system to where its general officers are placed at the national level, then the PLAAF is going to continue to accrue bureaucratic gravitas over time.

Air Vice Marshal A K Tiwary VSM (retd) The writer commanded a MiG-29 Squadron in late 80s. His various command and staff appointments like Chief Operations Officer at a major Wing, operational planning at Command level, Director Concept Studies at Air HQ, Command of a major flying base, Head of the Training Team (Air) at Defence Service Staff College and Senior Directing Staff (Air) at National Defence College have conferred a rich practical experience. The air staff course at DSSC Wellington (TN), Command and Air War Course at the Air University, Maxwell Airbase, Montgomery (USA), all inducted and accelerated his interest in air war studies. After premature retirement he now flies as Commander on Boeing 737-800 NG.

●● Operationally, the PLAAF is going to aim to extend its reach and its lethality. PLA is adopting as it thinks through how to fight and win high-tech 21st century wars. Regardless of the shortcomings it may exhibit today, the vector clearly points towards enhanced range and capabilities. ●● The PLAAF has the potential to be an air force, among other regional air forces, that will shape the future operational environment in the Asia-Pacific region and, perhaps one day, even beyond. Finally, although the PLAAF has traditionally emphasised defensive operations, that is no longer the case and the PLAAF will be an aggressive opponent in the event of a conflict. The PLA clearly prefers to achieve air superiority by attacking its enemy on the ground or water. Especially at the beginning of a war, the PLA will endeavour to attack enemy air bases, ballistic missile bases, aircraft carriers and warships equipped with land-attack cruise missiles before enemy aircraft can take off or enemy missiles can be launched. These attacks, moreover, will be carried out not by China’s air force operating in isolation but in coordination with the Second Artillery’s conventional ballistic and cruise missiles.

Yang Xiaobo et al., Science of Joint Campaign Command (Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, December 2005), 282.

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NEW WEAPON SYSTEMS

UAV OPERATIONS: SOME THOUGHTS A very useful article on the employment of UAVs in our services. The writer points out that the IAF started the UAV path fairly early in comparison to other important elements necessary for a modern Air Force. For example nearly 15 air forces had been operating AWACS / AEW&C for decades before IAF contemplated its procurement. Same was the case with air refuellers. He asserts that it is necessary to develop a separate operational career field for the UAV operators. There is need to select UAV pilots based on what is needed for UAV operations. It is also time that the three Services jointly decide on UAVs operations demarcating area of UAV operations integral to each service.

It is also time that the three Services jointly decide on UAVs operations demarcating area of UAV operations integral to each service. For example US Army has over 4,034 tactical UAVs compared to 42 plus UAVs with US Navy. The USMC has 32 tactical UAVs compared to 158 large UAVs of USAF. The operation of these UAVs over a live battlespace would need coordination which can be facilitated by proper demarcation of area of operations, mainly by altitude segregation and possibly distance from the frontline along with targets differentiation

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

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AF started the UAV path fairly early in comparison to other important elements necessary for a modern Air Force. For example nearly 15 air forces had been operating AWACS / AEW&C for decades before IAF contemplated its procurement. Same was the case with air refuellers. In fact Jaguars inducted in 1979 as deep penetration strike aircraft had their air to air refuelling capability removed to fulfill Indian requirement! In the case of UAVs, fortunately this undue delay did not occur. So now the IAF has nearly 14 years of experience in UAV operations. Even Army and Navy have been operating UAVs for some time. It is reported that even NTRO has procured UAVs, but in the absence of other infra-structure NTRO UAVs are lying in some warehouse. Home Ministry, police have also evinced their interest for UAVs.

It is necessary to develop a separate operational career field for the UAV operators. There is need to select UAV pilots based on what is needed for UAV operations. While this will be similar to requirements as for pilot selection, there will be additional criteria for UAV pilots. The RAF and the USAF, since 2009 are experimenting with a new pattern for UAV pilot selection. It is based on 32 hours of flying training on light aircraft â&#x20AC;&#x201C; single engine land aircraft. This is followed by UAV instruments qualification programme lasting two months and 35 hours of simulator training. The complete training for Predator UAV is 22 weeks A study of UAV operations in other air forces reveals following points which could merit attention in our review of UAV operations and its integration in overall operations - singly, jointly and within civil airspace for air space management.

Pilot selection The first major point is selection and training of UAV operators. Basically medium and large endurance UAVs have an External Pilot (EP) who launches / conducts the take off

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NEW WEAPON SYSTEMS and does the recovery and landing of UAV. An Internal Pilot (IP), thereafter flies / operates the UAV itself. It could be local operations or operations half way around the world; example being USAF UAVs in Afghanistan and Iraq being operated from mainland US. Then there are payload operators who operate the various payloads dealing with imagery, signals, EW etc. Nearly all air forces started using aircraft and helicopter pilots as EP and IP. IP also often acted as the overall Mission Commander. As numbers of UAVs increased, the air forces faced the problem of shortage of pilots. USAF experienced similar problem as they developed space operations. Initially only engineering qualified officers operated satellites. Later they were successfully able to induct non-science background officers for space operations as well as enlisted personnel for routine space functions. Thus moving away from the misconception that only space qualified engineers could undertake satellite operations. Now a similar model is being looked into for UAV operations. Today the USAF is training more number of UAV pilots than normal pilots. Soon this would be a reality in India. Who will train them? Can it be planned centrally? There is no doubt that UAVs will continue to form an increasingly larger proportion of air forces and other users in future. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a separate operational career field for the UAV operators. There is need to select UAV pilots based on what is needed for UAV operations. While this will be similar to requirements as for pilot selection, there will be additional criteria for UAV pilots. The RAF and the USAF, since 2009 are experimenting with a new pattern for UAV pilot selection. It is based on 32 hours of flying training on light aircraft - single engine land aircraft. This is followed by UAV instruments qualification programme lasting two months and 35 hours of simulator training. The complete training for Predator UAV is 22 weeks. In case of US Navy, for Pioneer UAV, a 16 feet wing-span UAV,

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

launched from a launcher, only the Mission Commander is a former aviator. Rest of the UAV operators are enlisted with aviation background of air mechanic etc. It is felt that not only UAV selection and training be separate, but UAVs must have separate qualifying weapon school. The precision weapons likely to be used on-board a UAV would require specialised training. The normal fliers and UAV fliers could have cross-flow into each stream. There are enough similarities apart from pure flying like payload operator, weapon system operator etc. These similarities will only increase in future as UAVs assume larger functions and are crafted and equipped for live combat operations in air to air role. The air to air combat could be to save itself from enemy interceptors or to shoot hostile UAVs / aircraft.

UAVs of medium and high endurance travel over vast distances cutting across civil air corridors. As the persistence of UAVs increases, an inevitable trend - this crisscross across civil air space would become more frequent. So it would not be too late to arrive at an understanding with DGCA / Civil Aviation Authorities on devising procedures for UAVs operation in and through civil air space.

followed a long cycle of demand, execute, develop, print, analyse, process and supply the information to planner, the new proliferating sensors give you instant information. The sensors and their capabilities will continue to grow following Mooreâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Law. So in future the multitude of sensors will continue to give vast amount of information direct to the user. How then one should plan to take out actionable intelligence from this vast information, in real time if possible, is the big question? Where will the intelligence officer be located? Should operations and intelligence merge into one for best result? Only proper analysis and thereafter trials in operational conditions alone can provide correct answers. Because often the sensor itself is a shooter or the shooter has good sensors in its pods. There is no more time for cross-checks, extensive fusion with other sources, confirmation from experts and time for decision makers as to what is to be done with real time detected intelligence. As and when we use UAVs on a vast scale for internal security this requirement would become critical. So this increasing capability in ISR is making battlefields transparent and poses a very serious question to exploit it optimally.

The multiple sensors on-board aircraft and UAVs have thrown up a big dilemma needing urgent attention. Unlike the past where imagery information either from space or photo reconnaissance aircraft

IAF has never had dedicated intelligence branch for air operations. In the past photo-interpretation was a secondary duty performed by offices trained in this secondary role. This arrangement barely met the needs of

Multiple sensors

peacetime intelligence processing. But how can this time consuming model serve the needs of sensor-shooter cycle of minutes and seconds? How does the decision maker fit in this sensor-shooter cycle? At what level will the decisions be made? How can we decentralise the decision making? Does the operator also become an intelligence provider? If so then how should we train for operational and actionable intelligence? UAVs are being produced in many sizes from huge UAVs on one side to micro UAVs at another extreme. The above discussion applies mainly to medium and large UAVs, sophistication and design of which mandate flying by proper trained pilots. But this is not true for small UAVs. Small UAVs are individually carried, weigh little and are hand launched. An example is the RQ-II B Raven, made by AeroVironment in USA. US Army has around 3,500 of these. It looks like a model aircraft and can be carried backpack style. It weighs two kgs. These are being used extensively in Afghanistan to detect targets for artillery; to escort conveys and also to laser mark the targets. The controlling hardware is like a tablet computer, rather like a portable games console. A person can get the hang of flying it in a couple of days. Raven costs US$ 56,000 as compared to US$ 5 million for a Predator. In addition a Predator costs US$ 5,000 an hour to fly. Also small UAVs confer ownership at field operating level, immediate availability and

ability of ordinary soldiers to fly it with little training. Such UAVs would become the natural observer posts for the artillery units. This raises the question about tasking for different type of UAVs. The nature of battlefield, the type of targets and the requirement of soldiers at the front can decide this. Put simplistically, static and semi-mobile targets and semi-permanent targets can be tasked to conventional UAVs. Such targets include fixed storage sites, dumps, POL depots, bridges, A and B Vehicles parks, artillery gun locations and other supply stores. Whereas highly mobile targets like troops, vehicles, tanks and even earmarked individuals could be assigned to UAVs with soldiers in the field. Targets could also be separated by their distance from the frontline. To add to the complexity of modern war, the sensor-shooter cycle has to be integrated with cyber operations, information operations, electronic warfare etc. and the decision to use lethal weapons or non-lethal weapons. If not done properly, then mere possession of modern technology will not suffice to fulfill associated expectations. While some answers will suggest themselves in cerebral inquiry, the real answer will only accrue from operational trials in operational conditions, over and over again. This is inescapable. In India the need to adopt pro-active measures in optimisation of UAVs by all agencies is highly critical.

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PAK HEADWAY “It is my strong conviction that offensive application of airpower is what can yield positive results in a war.” - Air Chief Marshal Mushaf Ali Mir, CAS, Pakistan Air Force, 2002.

Shalini Chawla The writer is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS), New Delhi. She joined CAPS in 2006 and specialises in Pakistan studies. She is a frequent contributor to various journals and magazines on defence and security issues.

General Zia-ul Haq managed to negotiate an elaborate military and security related aid package of US$ 3.2 billion. The US military assistance programme included the sale of 40 F-16 Falcon multi-role combat aircraft, one of the most advanced military aircraft in the world at that time. Pakistan also received attack helicopters and second-hand destroyers.

A perceptive article on the modernisation and expansion of the Pakistan Air Force. The writer asserts that Pakistan Air Force is engaged in a massive modernisation since 1990. The current and future acquisitions of the PAF would enhance both the quality and quantity of equipment. Consistent demands for high technology weapons clearly indicate the modernisation of the Pakistan Air Force and Naval Air, has been given even higher priority over the Army and Navy which implies that they expect the Air Force to play a major role in any future conflict. Out of the total combat aircraft in 1990 just around 10 per cent were fourth generation. But by 2020 more than 90 per cent would be fourth generation aircraft in the PAF inventory. Besides the Pak Air Force has added the AWAC, BVR and Air to air refuelling capabilities to emerge as a truly modern air force.

akistan has been on an arms acquisition spree to rapidly modernise its Air Force since Kargil war, accelerating the process during the last nine years. Significantly, Pakistan’s arms acquisitions since the Kargil War have been exclusively centered on modernisation and build-up of the Pakistan Air Force and aerial maritime strike capabilities of the Navy. This has to be viewed in the context of the reality that the Army in Pakistan, which has ruled the country for most of its existence and has been in direct control since 1999, calls the shots in military priorities and modernisation. As part of the Armed Forces Development Programme AFFDP-2019 Pakistan has invested in the build-up of the Army, managed to expand the land equipment and has also initiated an infantry modernisation programme for it’s special, regular and paramilitary forces. But, the focus of Pakistan’s major defence procurements has been the build-up of the PAF and maritime strike capabilities of the Navy. While China has been an all weather friend and Chinese imports have taken precedence in Pakistan’s import list in the last two decades, the United States became Pakistan’s major arms supplier since 9/11. Pakistan did manage to get more than US$ 20 billion of the US aid between 2002-2010. Future of the US aid and equipment, obviously remains uncertain due to the increasing mistrust between the two nations. The Obama administration has already declined the forthcoming aid of US$ 800 million this year. On the other hand, anti-American sentiments in Pakistan have risen and surprisingly, for the first time have surpassed anti-India sentiments. Pakistan’s military capability and the

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

Modernisation of the

military build-up have been primarily shaped by its relationship with the US and unstinted support from China. The last 60 years have seen fluctuations in Pakistan’s military capability development owing to Pakistan’s relationship with the United States. While the main suppliers to Pakistan have been the US and China, France and Turkey have been important partners in supporting PAF’s existing fleet of Mirages. To get an understanding of Pakistan’s military capability, it’s essential to look into the objectives behind the military build-up.

Basic objectives Pakistan has looked at arms procurement to satisfy its security concerns. The perceived threat perception from India, strategic developments on the border with Afghanistan and the emerging technologies, have been the dominant factors contributing to the sources and kind of arms procurement by the military. The basic objectives shaping arms acquisitions of Pakistan have been as follows: Firstly, Pakistan’s adversarial relationship with India has played a major role in formation of its threat perception. The dominant military lobby in Pakistan has aggressively propagated the Indian threat within Pakistan to legitimise Pakistan’s high defence spending and on the international front to support the acquisition of high technology weaponry. This also interacts with and promotes the military’s special and dominant role in the country’s power structure. Secondly, Pakistan’s urge to match India’s conventional military superiority. This has perpetually driven Pakistan into

ways and means to acquire superior technology. In 2006, the then Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Kaleem Saadat stated in an interview to Jane’s Defence Weekly, “When US sanctions were imposed in 1990, both the PAF and the Indian Air Force

were second-generation air forces. No real-time surveillance capability, no air-to-air refuelling capability, no airborne early warning capability, no beyond-visual-range-capability, no stand-off weapon capability. However, after 13 years of

sanctions, India had all the above and Pakistan had none until about three or four years ago. This is the gap … We have to bridge this gap in the manner that we can deny the advantage that our neighbour has …”

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

aerospace power

The strategic aims, as outlined by Ross Masood Husain are: “to strengthen national power; to prevent open aggression by India; to induce India to modify its goals, strategies, tactics and operations; to attain a position of security or, if possible, dominance, which would enhance the role of other (non-military) means of conflict; to promote and capitalise on advances in technology in order to reach parity or superiority in military power.” Thirdly, Pakistan’s reliance on high technology weapons to seek competitive military advantage. The desire to acquire high technology weapons has been very strong in the Pakistan military and its alliance with the US has assisted Pakistan to procure high technology equipment.

The strategic aims, as outlined by R M Husain are: “to strengthen national power; to prevent open aggression by India; to induce India to modify its goals, strategies, tactics and operations; to attain a position of security or, if possible, dominance, which would enhance the role of other (non-military) means of conflict Fourthly, Pakistan’s belief in offensive aggressive strategies and its deep rooted belief that by going on the offensive, smaller size forces in history have won wars against bigger enemies. All the four wars which Pakistan has fought with India (in 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999), have been initiated by Pakistan. The war in 1971 was caused by Pakistan’s internal instability. But the actual war was initiated by Pakistan with a pre-emptive air strike against Indian Air Force bases on 3rd December. In addition it adopted the offensive route for its covert war through terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir since 1988 (besides that in Punjab in 1983-93). Pakistan has relied heavily on the strategy of offensive action and thus the acquisitions of high technology weapons are sought to support this strategy.

Modernisation of the PAF During the early decades, Pakistan acquired arms mainly from the USA

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PAK HEADWAY (for high-technology systems) and China (for low cost but efficient systems) and a small proportion contributed by France. In fact, the massive US arms aid to Pakistan in the late 1950s provided it with both the incentive to initiate the 1965 war as well as demonstrated the philosophy of high technology weapons providing a competitive advantage against India. Pakistan entered into the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1955 and the Baghdad Pact, renamed the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), after Iraq left the pact in 1956. This resulted in a robust inflow of military and economic aid for Pakistan. Being a member of these two security alliances provided Pakistan a stronger claim on US resources and, as Dennis Kux rightly states, the US also benefited with the regular interaction between the Pakistani civilian and military officials and their counterparts from the other member countries. In this process the US acquired a larger stake in its Pakistan relationship. By the year 1957, Pakistan was receiving a massive amount of sophisticated military equipment, training and economic aid. The inflow from Washington included sophisticated Patton main battle tanks, modern artillery, howitzers, F-86 jet fighter squadrons, F-104 Starfighter supersonic interceptors, air-to-air missiles, submarines (the first submarine to be introduced into the Indian Ocean by a developing country, as indeed was the F-104 supersonic interceptor) and state-of-the-art radar, communications and transportation equipment. Further, qualitative boost came from the military training by the US military teams and also in the US military schools for the Pakistani army.

Affiliation with China Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto’s diplomatic policy brought Pakistan closer to Beijing and Pakistan entered into several economic and military cooperation agreements with China. After the 1965 Indo-Pak war, Pakistan received interest free economic aid and also a significant amount of free weapons from China. Pakistan, in fact

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

became the only non-communist third world country to receive generous assistance from China. The Chinese F-6 entered the PAF inventory in 1966 followed by other systems. Chinese military assistance came in not only in the form of arms but also development of the indigenous facilities for defence production in Pakistan. The F-6 Rebuild Factory (F-6RF) at Kamra was set up with Chinese assistance. The United States arms embargo followed by the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war led to withdrawal of US military assistance and also the suspension of US equipment to Pakistan. Pakistan was compelled to look into alternate options and thus it turned to China, North Korea, Germany, Italy and France for military aid. In the late 1960s, Pakistan received Mig-19 Fighters from China, apart from the substantive infantry equipment. France supplied a few Mirage aircraft and even Soviet Union provided Pakistan Mi-8 helicopters. In the 1970s, although US equipment was not available for Pakistan, modernisation of the PAF was kept up with the help of Chinese equipment on one side and the French equipment on the other. China supplied 115 F-6 Fighters between 1971 and 1981. France supplied 72 Mirages between 1971-83. Some air defence equipment like F-104A Fighters and Helicopters were bought from Jordan and UK. Indigenous defence production was focused to progress towards self-reliance and more importantly to revitalise the PAF in the 1970s. Rebuilding factories for Mirages and F-6 planes and the production facility for MIF-17 trainers was set up.

The arms pipeline The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 led to the American review of their South Asian policy and consequently Pakistan entered into a new engagement with the US. Pakistan was declared a “frontline State” and in return received massive military aid. General Zia-ul Haq managed to negotiate an elaborate military and security-related aid package of US$ 3.2 billion. The US military

assistance programme included the sale of 40 F-16 Falcon multi-role combat aircraft, one of the most advanced military aircraft in the world at that time. Pakistan also received attack helicopters and second-hand destroyers. The second US package worth US$ 4.02 billon commenced in 1987 but was suspended due to the US arms embargo in 1990 due to Pakistan crossing the “red line” to acquire nuclear weapons capability. Chinese weapons, being cheaper, continued to hold a significant share in the Pakistani inventory. Although arms from China were technologically not as superior as from the West, however they were capable systems, were affordable and provided quantity to boost Pakistan’s military powers. In fact, by the early 1980s, China had provided Pakistan with roughly about 65 per cent of its aircraft.

Pakistan’s Non-NATO Ally status allows the sale of used US weapons well below their depreciated value. For example the F-16s supplied to Pakistan in 2005 with the original unit acquisition value of US$ 16.2 million have been transferred at a current unit value of US$ 6.48 million. The eight P-3 aircraft were delivered free of cost to Pakistan in 2006. Deal for 100 Harpoon anti-ship missiles for the P-3Cs was also finalised During the 1980s, the focus of arms procurement was on strengthening the PAF. Pakistan had lost the last two wars and believed that effective air defence would give them leverage in future offensive operations against India. The Pakistan military leadership, in their second deal with Washington, sought 70 F-16s aiming to raise the inventory to 110 high performance multi-role combat aircraft. During the 1980s, Pakistan also made an unsuccessful attempt to acquire the Airborne Early Warning (AEW) from the US which, if successful, would have dramatically increased the Air Force combat capability. China (besides France) continued to be a major source of PAF weapons and this increased after the US arms

embargo in 1990. About 90 A-5s were obtained in 1983-84 for the price of US$ 1 million per aircraft. Procurement of around 95 F-7 series aircraft was done adding to the quantitative element in the PAF. American military and economic aid came to a halt following the sanctions in 1990. The sanctions were highly damaging in nature as they not only suspended the US military aid and assistance but the procurement of essential spares was also blocked. The Brown amendment in 1995 permitted taking possession of the military equipment frozen in the United States, with the exception of nuclear capable F-16 combat aircraft. The decade of 1990s was a setback for PAF modernisation due to the American sanctions and also Pakistan’s crippling economy. Economic growth recorded a steep decline and Pakistan was under severe pressure from the international financial institutions to cut down the spending on defence. Despite the US sanctions, low GDP and a collapsed democratic structure, Pakistan tried hard to acquire the air force equipment. Ayesha Siddiqua Agha states that in 1990, 50 Mirage-3 were acquired from Australia for a paltry sum of US$ 28 million along with engines and spares. These Mirages were apparently retired from the RAAF and most of them had about a hundred flying hours remaining on their airframes.

Pakistan’s nuclear test in 1998 followed by General Musharraf’s military coup a year later led to further US sanctions laying further restrictions on acquiring high technology weapons from the West. The result was China’s pre-eminence in Pakistan’s arms imports. Sino-Pakistan defence collaboration flourished under the umbrella of the US sanctions. While the K-8 jet trainer has been under production at the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, China and Pakistan entered into deal for the co-development of a fourth generation fighter aircraft, the JF-17 (earlier called the FC-1). The JF-17 is designated to be a low cost combat aircraft to meet the tactical and strategic requirements of the Pakistan Air force with the reduced reliance of Pakistan on imports. The JF-17 is co-developed by Pakistan and China and is being built by China’s Chengdu Aircraft Industry Corporation (CAC) and Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC). Pakistan has increased its initial target of buying 150 JF-17s to acquiring up to 250 aircraft. The PAF inventory currently possesses 16 JF-17s. Interestingly, beginning of May this year, immediately after Osama bin Laden’s killing in Pakistan’s high security military compound of Abbottabad, China announced the decision to deliver 50 JF-17s free of cost to Pakistan, by the end of 2011. This represents a quantum jump in Pakistan aircraft

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industry. Deal for two squadrons of Chinese J-10 has been finalised and the deliveries are scheduled in 2014-2015. China has also confirmed the sale of six ship-based medium sized Z 9C helicopters to the Pakistan Navy.

Consistent demands for high technology weapons clearly indicate the modernisation of the Pakistan Air Force and Naval air, even more than the Army and Navy which implies that they expect the Air Force to play a major role in any future conflict. Inflow from the US has been at a rapid pace post 9/11. Although the initial US supplies to Pakistan consisted of items like UH-II utility helicopters, VHF/UHF aircraft radios, air traffic control radars, night vision equipment and other equipment and support systems including intelligence gathering devices, Pakistan did receive major US equipment boasting the capabilities of the PAF. Pakistan did receive the F-16s including the 12 F-16 C/D Block 52 (6 more on order). The other important PAF acquisitions include C-130E Hercules Transport aircraft and air surveillance radars AN/TPS-77 and L-88 LASS. On the Naval Aviation front Pakistan received 8 P-3C Orion Maritime patrol aircraft. Out of which 2 were destroyed in the terrorist attack carried on at Mehran Naval Airbase, on May 22, 2011. It is important to note that Pakistan’s Non-NATO Ally status allows the sale of used US weapons well below their depreciated value. For example the F-16s supplied to Pakistan in 2005 with the original unit acquisition value of US$ 16.2 million have been transferred at a current unit value of US$ 6.48 million. The eight P-3 aircraft were delivered free of cost to Pakistan in 2006. Deal for 100 Harpoon anti-ship missiles for the P-3Cs was also finalised. With the uncertainty related to the inflow of the US equipment owing to the experience in the past and increasingly strained relationship between the two countries, Pakistan has been aggressive in diversifying its sources of weapons supply. A

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PAK HEADWAY deal for the purchase of 40 Mirage interceptor / ground attack aircraft from Turkey was finalised in 2004. The aircraft will be used as spares for the PAF’s existing fleet of Mirages. The Grifo-7 radar from Italy, designed to improve air to air and air to ground performances is produced with the objective of equipping 46 F-7 PG aircraft with the radar, together with approximately 45 Mirage IIIOs Pakistan has focused on building force multipliers in the last decade. Pakistan entered into the procurement of airborne early warning systems from Sweden and China. In 2005, Pakistan entered into a deal with Sweden for the purchase of 4 SAAB-2000 turboprop aircraft equipped with Erieye Airborne Early Warning and Control systems (AEW&C). The negotiations for purchase of Chinese built airborne early warning aircraft – ZDK-03 have been finalised. Pakistan is the first country to buy the Chinese airborne early warning aircraft. 2 SAAB turboprop Erieye and 1 ZDK-03 have been delivered to the PAF. Airborne Early Warning would certainly be an additional asset for offensive air strikes at sea. Deal for 4 aerial refuellers from Ukraine has been finalised. The Il-78 will give the PAF its first airborne refuelling capability. Once operational these will be used to refuel Mirage III, F-16s and eventually JF-17s. Acquisition of the aerial refuelling would provide extended range and deployment radius. The PAF capability would increase significantly by 2020 as seen in the table below: Modernisation Effect: PAF 2020 1990 Combat*

380

420

AEW&C

Nil

Air

Nil

Maritime Patrol and Air Strike AC

Air to Refuelling

*It is interesting to note that the combat number in the table does not give the true picture. Out of the total combat aircraft in 1990 just around

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

10 per cent were fourth generation. But by 2020 more than 90 per cent would be fourth generation aircraft in the PAF inventory. Pakistan’s growing defence cooperation with China and support from the United States has been a major factor contributing in the modernisation of the PAF in the last nine years. The US sanctions in the 1960s and then in the 1990s not only gave space for Chinese and French defence equipment in the Pakistani market but also, Pakistan made concerted efforts towards defence production which has provided an exposure to Pakistan defence industry in the international market. The defence exports are estimated to increase to US$ 1 billion in the next 10 years.

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COERCIVE AIR FORCE OF THE 21st CENTURY Wg Cdr Vishal Nigam The writer graduated in Economics (Hons) from Delhi University and was commissioned in the Indian Air Force in 1991. He holds a postgraduate diploma in Business Management and a diploma from National Defence University in Taipei, Taiwan. He is presently working as a research fellow at Centre for Air Power Studies focusing on PLAAF and the rapid growth in China’s Aviation Industry.

Conclusions To sum up following conclusions can be drawn based on the publicly known information and analysis of trends in the current phase of modernisation of the Pakistan Air Force: 1. Pakistan Air Force is engaged in a massive modernisation since 1990 (boosted after 9/11) both qualitatively and quantitatively. The thinking, writing and arms procurement in Pakistan indicates the historical consistency of approach to military capability - the desire and efforts to acquire high technology arms to take the initiative to compensate for asymmetry in numbers and increase options for offensive strategy. 2. The current and future acquisitions of the PAF would enhance both the quality and quantity of equipment. 3. Pakistan is making significant efforts to add force multipliers in the PAF inventory. 4. Consistent demands for high technology weapons clearly indicate the modernisation of the Pakistan Air Force and Naval Air, even more than the Army and Navy which implies that they expect the Air Force to play a major role in any future conflict.

A perceptive article on the growth and evolution of the PLAAF. In the early years, PLAAF was conceptualised as ancillary and long range artillery of the army; PLAAF was quick to embrace RMA after the Gulf war and by the turn of the century started consolidating on various aspects like informatised and asymmetric warfare techniques and enhance its strategic power projection capability in an effort to build itself into a strategic air force by 2020. China’s use of airpower in the 21st century is also guided by the philosophy of coercion aimed at compelling to change the behaviour of the target State. The total number of fighter and bomber aircraft with PLAAF in 2000 consisted of 1900 J-6; 720 J-7; 222 J-8; 55 Su 27/J-11; 440 Q-5 (modified MiG 19); 305 H-5/IL-28; 142 H-6/Tu-16 and just about a dozen JH-7 1 . Its front line bomber fleet consists of no more than a hundred H-6 aircraft with a weapon carrying payload capacity limited to 20,000 pounds; the period did see a change in PLAAF’s profile from an earlier force which consisted of basic fighters with limited radius of action, low end avionics and limited fire power capabilities to a force equipped with AWACS, air to air refuelling and multi-role tactical aircraft with high end avionics, firepower and extended radius of action to reach at least the first island chain, Spratly and Paracel.

PLAAF was quick to embrace RMA after the Gulf war and by the turn of the century started consolidating on various aspects like the informatised and asymmetric warfare techniques. It augmented its earlier capacity to carry out air strikes,reconnaissance and early warning, air and missile defence and enhance its strategic power projection capability in an effort to build itself into a strategic air force by 2020

1 Frank W Moore, “China’s Military Capabilities”, Published for Institute for Defence and Disarmament Studies, Cambridge MA, June 2000.

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t’s been a haughty journey for the Chinese air force since its creation from a small army unit based in Wuhan in the middle of the twentieth century. In the early years, PLAAF was conceptualised as ancillary and long range artillery of the army; which continued to be the guiding philosophy for more than three decades until the command was handed over to a hard-core air force professional Wang Hai. China during the course of PLAAF's evolution has had a number of visionaries who believed that air power should be central to the military strategy and therefore underlined the importance of it being effectively employed in the calculus of war-fighting doctrine. In fact Mao as early as in 1949 had mentioned that other than having a powerful army; it was also imperative for China to build a powerful air force and a navy. Hence it was not only the military but also the political leadership which had a vision for the air force, though, in its periphery, but at the same time acknowledging the importance of employability and the efficacy of air power in future battle space.

Ideation However, China’s security dilemma and PLAAF’s evolution basically stems from its political leadership guided by Mao, Zhou, Deng and Jiang. Mao’s military philosophy was deep-rooted in ‘People’s War’; and also reflected in the large numbers of antiquated and laggard aircraft in the air force during that period. Both Mao and Zhou were offensive realists; though Zhou much lesser of the two; and China’s security strategy largely expounded an intolerant approach; observed the world as a hostile place and considered that its entire security dilemma was a result of the other countries imperialistic policies. However Deng and Jiang more sober; integrationist and believed in the principle of engagement and cooperation; which was also the hallmark of defensive realism and a pillar of China’s security stratagem in the Deng-era. Hence, post-Mao, there was an apparent transformation of the State’s policy from ‘offensive to defensive realism’ and China as a result was pushing hard to pursue a strategy of maintaining amicable relationship with its

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CHINESE HAUTEUR neighbours. The transmutation of the evolutionary shift in the post-Mao era was followed by propagation of Four Modernisations; favouring modernisation of all sectors in the economy. The concept had been propagated by Zhou in January of 1975 while speaking before the fourth National People’s Congress and Deng carried it forward by laying emphasis on modernisation of agriculture followed by industry, science and technology and then national defence. The Four Modernisations did not however catalogue military or national defence as its last pillar; but only stated an idea that national defence must be built on a country’s economic strength and therefore, it was first essential to strengthen the fundamentals before initiating the process of its military modernisation.

A change in PLAAF’s profile from an earlier force which consisted of basic fighters with limited radius of action, low end avionics and limited fire power capabilities to a force equipped with AWACS, air to air refuelling and multi-role tactical aircraft with high end avionics, firepower and extended radius of action to reach at least the first island chain Spratly and Paracel PLAAF during the Deng era was also looking to improve its deterrent capability by strengthening airborne forces, enhancing quick mobility and increasing the strategic reach, which until now had been its innate weakness. It also started to perceive itself as a unique service capable of engaging in local border wars because of its intrinsic quality of reach and speed; and further strengthened by its rapid reaction force capable of attaining the laid down political objectives and end the war as quickly as possible; an earlier domain of the PLA, which ceased as a result of soul-searching by the ground forces. PLAAF during this period also started to understand the concepts of air superiority, firepower, manoeuvrability, control of electronic means and technology; all critical and without which the strategic objectives could not have been achieved. It therefore initiated significant reforms in the force structure, training and

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

weapon systems and redefined its role with greater clarity by listing out areas of responsibility in terms of its offensive capabilities to carry out air strikes and attain air supremacy. It was almost a foregone conclusion that any future war would have to be multi-dimensional involving land, sea, air and space; therefore no single service could afford the luxury of being overbearing. Hence, it took more than three decades for the establishment to convince PLA that; ‘the largest obstacle for any ground force or a united campaign came from the air’, and the onus for this ideational shift will necessarily have to be attributed to Deng’s willingness to accept the transcendent nature of air power and Wang Hai’s surpassing influence on Deng during the Sino-Vietnam conflict. Also, soon after the Gulf war; PLA was left with no other option than to accept the gospel truth that the biggest challenge for the ground forces actually came from the air and for the first time also acknowledging the inherent limitation in the concept of PLA being the sole underwriter to guarantee security; a prime concern for all Chinese citizens and its policy formulators. PLA as a result was left with no other choice than to coerce PLAAF to modernise and prepare itself to fight major air battles away from home. The major take-away from the period of transition was that it accentuated the role of information, high-end technology, weaponry and air power. Also the acceptance of air power being pivotal and an important element of the decision making apparatus and an independent instrument in the context of a joint campaign was a result of Deng’s broad-minded approach; which helped PLAAF transcend into becoming an offensive air force and preparing to take on the centre-stage to challenge the best in the world.

PLAAF’s aspirations PLAAF was quick to embrace RMA after the Gulf war and by the turn of the century started consolidating on various aspects like informatised and asymmetric warfare techniques. It augmented its earlier capacity to carry out air strikes, reconnaissance and early warning, air and missile defence and enhance its strategic

power projection capability in an effort to build itself into a strategic air force by 2020. The 2010 white paper further states that there has been a concerted effort on part of PLAAF to accelerate the transition from being a tactical air force looking at territorial air defence to now being able to participate in both offensive and defensive operations2. Hu Jintao had also said that “we will ensure that our armed forces are capable of winning a war in the information age, modernisation of weapons and equipment should be accelerated and personnel training enhanced. We will gradually increase spending on national defence as the economy grows and continue to modernise national defence and the armed forces.”

Resource constraints and the rapid rise of second artillery may have initially contributed to the slow pace of PLAAF’s modernisation in the early 1990s; however the pace of China’s economic development and the surge in the arms trade with countries in South America, Africa, Iran and Pakistan could have offset PLAAF’s early setback China’s use of airpower in the 21st century is also guided by the philosophy of coercion aimed at compelling to change the behaviour of the target State and then become a midwife to the continuation of the State’s policy by other means. It also acknowledged the huge potential of airpower being an efficacious tool to influence international disputes both through active and passive means, which could further also be employed for decapitation of leadership and ‘denial’ without the deployment of any credible ground threat. At the same time they were cautious against bequeathing overarching responsibility in one single ‘power’; mainly because of the limited capability of its armed forces and more so of its ‘airpower’ assets. They believed that with limited capability, changing regional architecture and under the weight of geopolitics, no single ‘power’ could

win for them future wars against a strong and a robust adversary like America. Hence to bridge the gap between aspirations and capabilities; the Chinese resorted to the concept of ‘jointness’ which in their design included ground forces, air force, navy, second artillery and also the space based assets. Although PLAAF in the past has had issues over control of space-based assets, but has never laid too much importance other than to state the obvious that aerospace power has a broader scope as compared to airpower and both have an inherent capacity to guarantee ‘air superiority’. They also believed that building a credible air force with enhanced fire-power capability, will largely help them to offset their major shortcomings in the face of a powerful adversary and therefore airpower in their calculus was turning out to be an extremely powerful tool of PRC’s coercion strategy3. Attainment of ‘air superiority’ continues to be the soul for all future wars whether fought in an environment of a joint campaign or an independent air campaign; probably inspired by Colonel John Warden III, when he stated that “no country has won a war in the face of enemy air superiority, no major offensive has ever succeeded against an opponent who controlled the air and no defence has sustained against an enemy who had air

superiority”4. PLAAF’s larger aim is to evolve a seamless aerospace strategy with a potential to be spread out over a battle space area envisaged larger than ever in the past. It initiated this process by inducting multiple platforms, developing potent EW capabilities, integrating combat and control system in a modern air combat environment with enhanced capabilities and lethal strike option. PLAAF was in a state of transition, redefining its earlier mission exclusively responsible for providing support to its ground forces to now graduating and becoming an independent service capable of providing deterrence and conducting strategic attack. Over the years PLAAF has made significant inroads in developing concepts related to aerospace power in a joint environment involving PLAN, second artillery and space based assets.

Force structure The future battlefield areas are getting corporatised; forces becoming lean and mean and munitions more lethal with unimaginable accuracy. The efficiency of the battlefield area is increasing at a rapid pace and therefore PLAAF too had to quickly adapt to the changes and prepare itself to fight the next generation war.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-03/31/c_13806851.htm,White paper on China’s National Defence 2010, accessed on July14, 2011. According to Mark Stokes, coercive power is different from brute force and attempts to dissuade the adversary from taking an action and therefore can consist of diplomatic coercion and military coercion. As per Daniel L Byman’s definition both military and diplomatic coercion can force another government to choose between making concessions or suffering the consequences. 4 Colonel John A Warden III, The Air Campaign, Planning for Combat, (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989), pp.10.

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It restructured its force, exuviated ‘Corp level’ and associated cadre from its organisation structure; sliced almost a 1,00,000 personnel and pruned its fighter fleet to half of its earlier strength. It phased out majority of its obsolete J-6, J-7 and older variants of J-8 and reduced the number of such aircraft by two thirds whilst increasing the number of multi-role platforms by four times5. It proposed that the number of J-6 would be halved before the turn of the last century and by the first decade of this millennium the entire fleet would be phased out, reaching an end of their service life and not surprisingly, PLAAF has been able to achieve all the set targets. They also stopped production of J-7 and converted a large number of the phased out J-6 and J-7 into unmanned aerial platforms. As a result PLAAF reduced the number of fighter aircraft from 4,400 to roughly 2,300 by 20056 and from a 32 fighter division air force in 1997 to 20 divisions by 20057.

To bridge the gap between aspirations and capabilities; the Chinese resorted to the concept of ‘jointness’ which in their design included ground forces, air force, navy, second artillery and also the space based assets Frank W Moore estimated that the total number of fighter and bomber aircraft with PLAAF in 2000 consisted of 1900 J-6; 720 J-7; 222 J-8; 55 Su 27/J-11; 440 Q-5 (modified MiG-19); 305 H-5/IL-28; 142 H-6/Tu-16 and just about a dozen JH-78. PLAAF vigorously started inducting large number of Russian and indigenous air superiority fighters and tactical bombers and by the end of the first decade of this millennium had a far wackier force consisting of 120 J-10; 150 JF-17; 200 upgraded Su-30MKK, 200 upgraded J-11 and 120 JH-7. 800 different variants of J-7s and upgraded J-8s continue to be in service and employed in different roles; a few out of them are

also utilised as conversion trainers at flight training base and flight colleges9. Though the period did see a change in PLAAF’s profile from an earlier force which consisted of basic fighters with limited radius of action, low end avionics and limited fire power capabilities to a force equipped with AWACS, air to air refuelling and multi-role tactical aircraft with high end avionics, firepower and extended radius of action to reach at least the first island chain, Spratly and Paracel. Although PLAAF’s decision to acquire large number of tactical multirole fighters instead of strategic bombers not only intrigues a number of China gazers but also exposes the limitation of its inventory which does not match-up with its larger vision to evolve as a strategic air force; considering that its front line bomber fleet consists of no more than a hundred H-6 aircraft with a weapon carrying payload capacity limited to 20,000 pounds; one third of B-52s total capacity! Hence from that perspective, China requires to urgently augment its fleet with long range heavy bombers and strategic airlift aircraft. Its current bomber fleet of a few hundred Q-5, JH-7 and H-6, which at most could carry a land attack cruise missile (LACM), appears to be grossly insufficient for China to be able to tango deep into the Pacific. PLAAF approximately has thirty IL-76 strategic airlift aircraft; eight to ten IL-78 aerial refuellers which they acquired from Russia in 2005 and a few H-6 bombers converted to refuellers. Though it appears that the air-to air refuelling capability of PLAAF has substantially improved since 2000 but its efficacy in an operational environment remains questionable due to limited training. China’s AWACS programme has also been through a rollercoaster ride. It suffered its first setback when US threatened Israel with US$ 2.8 billion military aid; to cancel the sale of Phalcon radar to the Chinese and the second setback was the crash of KJ-200 in June 2006 during the development stage

which killed forty operators. But China’s resolve to indigenously develop an airborne early warning aircraft has yielded good dividends. It has developed KJ-200 on a Y-8 platform and four to five KJ-200 on IL-76 platform inspired by Russian Beriev A-50.

Potent stratagem It has been a journey of another kind, from an obsolete force consisting of volunteers formed by adopting a system in the narrow celestial realm of territorial air defence in 1950s to striving to become an air force capable of both offensive and defensive operations in a battlespace arena conceptualised in an infinite ethereal expanse with a strike capability extending beyond its borders with range in excess of 3,000 km. The expansion of PLAAF’s long range strike capability augmented by an increasingly sophisticated collection of ballistic and cruise missiles is becoming a key instrument in China’s evolving coercive statecraft and gradually altering the regional strategic landscape. PLAAF’s rise, though surreal has been a combination of planned and destined occurrences adequately capitalised by the leadership and cleverly incorporated in its stratagem. Resource constraints and the rapid rise of second artillery may have initially contributed to the slow pace of PLAAF’s modernisation in the early 1990s; however the pace of China’s economic development and the surge in the arms trade with countries in South America, Africa Iran and Pakistan could have offset PLAAF’s early setback. China’s new and evolving stratagem has conceptualised PLAAF as an emerging player in the joint theatre campaign which envisions synergy between information warfare, long range firepower, space, maritime and air defence assets; all ‘game changers’ in future military campaigns.

http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2010hearings/transcripts/10_05_20_trans/cliff_testimony.pdf , Roger Cliff, The Development of China’s Air Force Capabilities , Paper presented before US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 2010, (RAND), accessed on July14, 2011. You Ji, The Armed Forces of China,(IB TaurusPublishers,1999), Ch. 5, pp.134. 7 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/plaaf-intro.htm accessed on June 20, 2011. 8 Frank W Moore, “China’s Military Capabilities”, Published for Institute for Defence and Disarmament Studies, Cambridge MA, June 2000. 9 These figures may not be absolute; however they have been corroborated from various websites, news reports as well as The Military Balance 2010, which mentions that the fighter fleet consists of 800 J-7 and J-8; 120 J-10; 134 J-11; 73 Su-30MKK and 72 JH-7/JH-7A. There isn’t any mention of JF-17 and other variants of Su-30 in its list of fighter aircraft. Military Balance also alludes that PLAAF has 1,100 or more fighters; 8 AEW aircraft; 18 tankers and 120 reconnaissance aircraft consisting of JZ-6, JZ-8 and JZ-8F. 5

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aerospace power

DSA: Army Aviation has completed 25 years since bifurcating from IAF. How successful has been the journey so far? Lt Gen V K Ahluwalia: At the time of independence, there was only one Air OP Squadron of RAF in India whose assets were divided between India and Pakistan. Thus, on 15 August 1947, No 1 Independent Air OP Flight, IAF, became the first Army Aviation Unit. Many Air OP Flights and Squadrons were raised thereafter and on 01 November 1986, Army Aviation Corps was raised with these Air OP units. Army aviators with their professionalism, courage and dedication have served the country with distinction. Army Aviation has served with professional elan in all types of operations, such as Indo-Pak wars of 1965 and 1971, OP PAWAN, OP VIJAY, OP RAKSHAK, OP MEGHDOOT, OP HIFAZAT, OP RHINO and many others. During OP VIJAY in Kargil in 1999, the Army aviators flew 2,500 missions, 2,700 hours and evacuated more than 900 casualties, in a short, intense operational environment. Apart from playing a pivotal role in these operations, Army Aviation has contributed immensely in aid to civil authorities, be it in the Jammu and Kashmir earthquake of 2005, cloudburst at Leh, Tsunami relief operations, more recently during Sikkim earthquake etc. and earned for itself a reputation of a motivated, efficient and professional Corps. I had the opportunity to undertake active flying in the intense operational environment of Jammu and Kashmir for about two and a half years from 1976. Throughout my command and staff appointments, I have closely monitored the operations and growth of Army Aviation Corps and I take great pride in the achievements of the Corps. Army aviators have won innumerable gallantry awards and unit citations, thus living upto the motto of “Soldiers in the Sky”. Army Aviation Corp’s short journey of 25 years has really been commendable with limited resources, but the Corps is poised to grow substantially in times to come. DSA: How do you visualise the relevance of Army Aviation in conventional and unconventional conflict situations? Lt Gen Ahluwalia: The contours of future conflict in our context are likely to involve all dimensions to include land, air, sea, space and cyberspace. The conventional wars are likely to be at short notice, swift, fluid, non-linear, of short durations and fought against nuclear backdrop, followed by long periods of stabilisation operations. Our aim of application of combat power in such situation will be to bring about a strategic dislocation of the adversary by causing psychological paralysis amongst its decision makers. It will involve focused and coordinated application of combat power to degrade enemy’s combat potential. Army Aviation with its capability to contribute towards surprise, manoeuvre, speed, firepower and mobility enables a commander to apply combat power at decisive points in the battlefield. Army Aviation increases the area of influence of a commander and gives him additional flexibility in all kinds of terrain. In unconventional operations too, Army Aviation plays a vital role by providing support in form of recce, surveillance, transportation and casualty evacuation missions. With induction of armed helicopters, Army Aviation will soon have the capability to be employed offensively in LICO and asymmetric warfare, if required. DSA: What measures has the Army taken to ensure that Army Aviation achieves the desired shape, size and capability? Lt Gen Ahluwalia: With the passage of time and expansion of the Indian Armed Forces, a number of Army Aviation units have been raised. Next two decades will witness substantial growth in capability of this Corps. Road map for the desired profile for the Corps as per envisaged role has been finalised. It not only envisages induction of new platforms like ALH Dhruv, ALH WSI Rudra, LCH, attack helicopters and medium lift helicopters, but also involves changes in doctrinal concepts and organisational structures. Raising of Aviation Brigades will bring about synergy in application of aviation assets in Tactical Battle Area. Army Aviation will thus become a true force multiplier available to a commander to execute combat, combat support and combat service support tasks. DSA: What has been the contribution of Army Aviation in projecting India’s image as a force to reckon with? Lt Gen Ahluwalia: Army Aviation Corps has been at the forefront of Indian Army’s operations in Sri Lanka during OP PAWAN and also in the UN Missions in Somalia (1993-94) and Democratic Republic of Congo (since 2005). Performance of the Army Aviation units as part of multinational task forces has been stellar and well appreciated. Army Aviation units have also participated in exercises and training with a number of foreign armies and have contributed immensely towards projecting the professional image of Indian Army. DSA: How do you visualise Army Aviation integrating with land forces in tactical battlefield? Lt Gen Ahluwalia: Integrated employment of all arms in the battlespace is the need of the hour. Army Aviation units are an integral resource available to the field force. These units with enhanced capability will be able to undertake multifarious operations either independently or as part of the combined arms team. Aviation Brigades once raised will provide command, control and synergy in application of the Aviation units and ensure seamless integration of these units in Tactical Battle Area. I wish to state that Army Aviation units are integral to field formations, therefore to achieve optimum results in battle, these units need to be fully involved in operational discussions and planning. DSA: How is training being imparted in Army Aviation and what steps are being taken to use modern technologies like simulators for training of aviators? Lt Gen Ahluwalia: Combat Army Aviation Training School is the premier training institute imparting basic and

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Interview

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

Soldiers in the sky

Interview with Lt Gen V K Ahluwalia AVSM**, YSM, VSM GOC-IN-C CENTRAL COMMAND AND COLONEL COMMANDANT, ARMY AVIATION CORPS advanced training to aviators. Training of an aviator is a phased and continuous process and is ensured in operational units also. Foreign Armies and Civil Aviation lay a lot of emphasis on use of simulators for training. Simulators help building flying skills of pilots by way of simulations of emergencies and handling critical situations. These can also be used for providing tactical picture painting, thus enhancing training value. Army Aviation has a basic flying simulator located at Nasik and plans to induct full motion simulators for all types of helicopters on the inventory in future. We are far short of state-of-the-art simulators to train our pilots which requires urgent attention. DSA: Are you satisfied with the pace with which modernisation of Army Aviation is being undertaken? Lt Gen Ahluwalia: Army Aviation Corps like in most of the foreign countries came into being to fulfill the requirement of land forces to have their own integral air arm. Ever since 1986 and even in the time preceding that, Army Aviation has been on a growth path. Over a period of last one decade, a number of squadrons with ALH have been raised and operationalised. Weaponised version of ALH, i.e. ALH WSI Rudra is likely to be inducted into the Army in the current financial year. Decision to induct replacement helicopter for Chetak and Cheetah helicopters is in advanced stages of finalisation. Army Aviation is also looking at inducting Light Combat Helicopters (LCH), developed by HAL. The issue of induction of assault and attack helicopters is under active consideration at the appropriate levels, so as to further improve our effectiveness in the TBA. Being a technology driven arm, Army Aviation, in order to stay contemporary, will always remain on the path of modernisation by way of inductions and design improvements. DSA: What is your vision for Army Aviation Corps over the next two decades? Lt Gen Ahluwalia: I envisage Army Aviation Corps to emerge as a true force multiplier. Army Aviation Corps needs to develop night flying and night fighting capabilities. I am also certain that organisational changes under consideration regarding manpower management will fructify thereby making the Corps self-sufficient and acquire the desired shape and size to assert itself. DSA: Would you like to convey a message to Army Aviation Corps on its silver jubilee? Lt Gen Ahluwalia: We have a complex security environment with a large number of external and internal challenges. With the changes in the security environment, changes in the technology and resultant changes in the nature of warfare, we have to be fully prepared to fight a full spectrum war against nuclear backdrop in the future. Army Aviation would need to relook at employment philosophy, doctrines, structures and its cadre. Considering the envisaged future battlefield environment, we must jettison our old mindset and change to meet the future challenges. A greater integration of Army Aviation in operational discussions and planning would yield better results. Army Aviators have served the nation with success and glory for the past 25 years. However, we must remember that the bulk of aviation fleet is nearing the end of its operational utilisation. Emphasis on flight safety by aviators and aviation technical staff in order to prolong the life of the fleet and maintain safe flying environment has become more essential. Army Aviation Corps is poised for exponential growth that will place bigger responsibilities and greater challenges upon it. I wish the Corps the very best, safe flying and Happy Landings!

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

SEMINAR Limited Wars in South Asia - Against a Nuclear Backdrop

On the Occasion Of 2nd Anniversary of

ith the nuclearisation of South Asia in 1998, India's political class seems to have convinced itself that conventional war in response to Pakistan's asymmetric provocations is no longer a viable option. Accordingly our political elite have been self-deterred into complete impotence. During Op Parakram, India mobilised its entire armed forces in response to the attack on its parliament. However the 'all or nothing' nature of this massive military deployment caused the political class to blink and no combat action was initiated across the LC / IB. This has greatly emboldened Pakistan and dented India's stance of conventional deterrence. Post Mumbai 26/11, India failed to take, or even threaten any military action whatsoever. The result has been a series of low level terrorist attacks in various cities of India. India's tolerance thresholds are being stretched beyond limits. Post Kargil, there was considerable discussion on the concept of limited wars in South Asia. Unfortunately, this petered out and by the time of Op Parakram, we were back to the concept of initiating hostilities with our ponderous strike corps. These took inordinately long to mobilise and the fleeting window of opportunity was closed. Post Parakram, there was much talk of a Cold Start doctrine of attack by combat groups from the line of March. The use of land forces to initiate hostilities however, can generate considerable fog of war and confusion. Land forces once committed cannot be easily disengaged / recalled. This would lead to an erosion of escalation and dominance. The cold start doctrine has therefore been widely criticised. Is there a space for waging conventional war in South Asia between the spectral ends of all-out nuclear war and sub-conventional conflict? If so should such a conflict be initiated by land forces or by air and naval forces? Air power can inflict precise and controlled punishment to raise costs for the aggressor. Air power is flexible, precise, focused and could be the ideal instrument to retain Escalation and Dominance at the outset of a limited war. The use of air power and / or naval power to initiate the response to asymmetric provocations can methodically set the stage for a limited / punitive war. What should be the aims and desired end states in such a war? Should it be simply to raise costs for asymmetric adventurism? Should this simply aim at acquiring territory for post war bargaining or aim to bring to battle and severely degrade the adversary's operational and strategic reserves? There is an urgent and pressing need to devise a limited war doctrine in the Indian context.

4th November 2011

Constitution Club of India, Rafi Marg, New Delhi Objectives of the Seminar

On the occasion of its second Anniversary, the Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine is organising a Seminar on the theme Limited Wars in South Asia - Against a Nuclear Backdrop. The Seminar will be held on the 4th of November 2011 at the Constitution Club, New Delhi. Former chiefs of Services, senior defence and civilian officials will participate in these exciting deliberations to chart out response options and viable escalation ladders in response to mass casualty asymmetric provocations by our adversaries. There is an urgent need for wide-ranging debate and discussion on this vital subject, which this timely seminar seeks to fulfill.

Post nuclearisation - what Chris Gagne calls the Stability-Instability Paradox - has enabled Pakistan to

launch repeated asymmetric attacks against India with impunity.

KEY SPEAKERS

Aim of this Seminar is to determine whether space exists for a conventional war in South Asia between the spectral ends of all-out nuclear war and sub-conventional conflict.

Gen V P Malik PVSM, AVSM (retd) Former Chief of Army Staff

Mr Kanwal Sibal (IFS) Former Foreign Secretary

If so, do we need to articulate a declaratory doctrine for Limited War against a nuclear backdrop. What should be the aims or desired end states of such a conflict? How should these be prosecuted? What measures need to be put in place to ensure Escalation Control / Dominance?

Air Chief Marshal Fali Homi Major PVSM, AVSM, SC, VM (retd) Former Chief of Air Staff

Mr Manvendra Singh Editor-in-Chief DSA Magazine

How can small and medium enterprises (SME's) contribute to the indigenisation of defence industry in India?

Air Cmde Jasjit Singh AVSM, VrC, VM (retd) Director, Centre for Air Power Studies

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) Executive Editor DSA Magazine

Commodore C Uday Bhaskar (retd) Director, National Maritime Foundation

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aerospace power

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Poonch districts. He has served two tenures at the highly prestigious Directorate General of Military Operations. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 24 books and over 100 papers in many prestigious research journals. He is also Executive Editor of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine.

It was with the 1971 war for the liberation of Bangladesh that the Indian Armed Forces graduated to the level of conducting a quasi total war. The Indian air force gained air supremacy over Bangladesh. It massed effects and induced shock and awe. It paved the way for a decisive war with spectacular results. A decisive war in the post World War II context is characterised by the ability to march on the adversary national capital and enforce regime change

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PARADIGM SHIFT A comprehensive analysis of the crucial role Air power will play in a Limited War against a nuclear backdrop in South Asia. There is a need to switch from deterrence by denial to deterrence by Punishment in the Indian Context. Deterrence by Punishment can be done much better by Air Power and even by Sea Power. Air power is precise, focused and flexible. It is most conducive to retaining escalation dominance and can set the stage for a Limited War designed to steeply raise costs for the Aggressor and bring to battle and seriously degrade his operational and Strategic reserves preferably in his own territory. India will therefore have to evolve and enunciate a Limited War Doctrine that exploits the current RMA by giving primacy to Air Power to be the first responders and if needed, set the stage for a wider Air-Land Battle designed to sharply escalate costs for the Enemy.

ost nuclearisation the South Asian geo-strategic scenario has been shaped by what Chris Gagne calls the “Stability-Instability Paradox”. Stability at the Nuclear level has been offset by increasing instability at the sub-conventional level of conflict. There has been a concomitant sharp downturn in the use of Conventional Military Force as is evident from the force usage profile of India given below. This histogram indicates the number of Divisions employed by India in each conflict after Independence. Thus from 1947 to 1962 the Indian Military usage was confined to the tactical level of 2-3 Divisions alone. However Air power played a significant role in Jammu and Kashmir, Hyderabad and Goa operations. Tragically offensive Air support was eschewed in the 1962 War against China though extensive air transport and logistics support was provided.

With the 1965 War the Indian Armed Forces graduated to the level of operational Art via use of 12 Divisions in combat and virtually the entire Western Command of the Air Force with reinforcement from other theatres also employed. Though this war was a stalemate it was a highly useful learning experience. It was with the 1971 War for the Liberation of Bangladesh that the Indian Armed Forces graduated to the level of conducting a Quasi total war. The Indian Air force gained Air Supremacy over Bangladesh. It massed effects and induced shock and awe. It paved the way for a decisive war with spectacular results. A decisive war in the Post World War II context is characterised by the ability to march on the adversary national capital and enforce regime change. This is precisely what was done. A new country was created with the force of arms and over 93,000 prisoners of war were taken. This spectacular victory marks the apogee of Indian Military Power in the post-Independence era.

CRITICAL ROLE OF AIR POWER IN LIMITED WARS

1987 saw the onset of recessed deterrence and a sharp curtailment in the use of conventional military force. The economic setback of 1990 thereafter severely constrained response options and from the decade of the 1980s till today India completely surrendered the strategic and tactical initiative to Pakistan. Pakistan’s ISI waged an asymmetric war first in Punjab and then in Jammu and Kashmir. India’s response was reactive and purely defensive in nature and strictly confined to its own territory. 1998 saw overt nuclearisation and that marked a paradigm shift in South Asia. It generated hubris in Pakistan and led to the Kargil

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

Intrusion - a hybrid war response that clearly marked a new threshold in Pakistan’s asymmetric war against India. Indian response was innovative but confined to the tactical level of two Divisions supported by Air Power but confined to our side of the LC. This was a Limited War highly localised in space but extended in time to almost three months of attrition and direct frontal assaults in the mountains. This was followed by the Terrorist attack on India’s Parliament and our mobilisation for War in terms of Op Parakram. The flaw was the 'all or nothing' nature of this deployment. No combat took place and the coercive effect of this

mobilisation wore off over time. This generated considerable angst and the Indian Army came up with the Cold Start Doctrine of attack from the Line of March to make shallow penetrations all along the Western Front. Cold Start suffered from serious conceptual flaws. The Political Masters and other two Services were not taken on board. The use of land forces to initiate conflict would generate tremendous fog of war and could breakdown escalation control. Land forces once launched cannot be easily disengaged / called back. Shallow penetrations are half-baked conventional response options. What if the enemy reacts with full fledged

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

aerospace power

Strike Corps offensives in response to divisional sized thrusts? There is a need to switch from deterrence by denial to deterrence by Punishment in the Indian Context. Deterrence by Punishment can be done much better by Air Power and even by Sea Power. Air power is precise, focused and flexible. It is most conducive to retaining escalation dominance and can set the stage for a Limited War designed to steeply raise costs for the Aggressor and bring to battle and seriously degrade his operational and Strategic reserves preferably in his own territory. This would actualise deterrence by punishment. The response to asymmetric terrorist strikes is far better initiated by Air Power which target in a precise and proportionate manner those terrorist facilities, camps and infrastructure used to initiate the attack. This would make our response just and proportionate. Any enemy retaliation / response would then justify our graduation upwards on the escalation ladder. A good model for such a campaign is the Israeli Air Forces decimation of the Syrian Air Force in the invasion of Lebanon in 1982. This would set the stage for a Limited War in the Air-Land Battle format - to steeply raise costs for Pakistan for its asymmetric adventurism.

Limited war doctrine India will therefore have to evolve and enunciate a Limited War Doctrine that exploits the current RMA by giving primacy to Air Power to be the first responders and if needed, set the stage for a wider Air-Land Battle designed to sharply escalate costs for the Enemy. There was considerable discussion on the concept of Limited War in the wake of the Kargil operations. This debate was initiated by Air Cmde Jasjit Singh (then the Director IDSA). Significant contributions were made by the then Army Chief Gen Ved Malik and the then Raksha Mantri Mr George Fernandez. Surprisingly within three years - this debate had died out altogether and this very welcome initiative was not taken forward.

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PARADIGM SHIFT

1998 saw overt nuclearisation and that marked a paradigm shift in South Asia. It generated hubris in Pakistan and led to the Kargil intrusion - a hybrid war response that clearly marked a new threshold in Pakistan’s asymmetric war against India. Indian response was innovative but confined to the tactical level of two Divisions supported by air power but confined to our side of the LC. This was a Limited War highly localised in space but extended in time to almost three months of attrition and direct frontal assaults in the mountains There is a considerable body of literature available in the West on Limited Wars against a Nuclear Backdrop. Korea was the First such Limited War and lasted some three years. The Chinese threw in almost a million troops and fought the US to a standstill. The US suffered over 1,37,000 soldiers killed in this Limited War where the Chinese completely ignored the nuclear threshold. Gen Mac Arthur was sacked when he asked for the use of atomic weapons against the Chinese. Bernard Brodie and William Kaufman were the chief theorists of limited war. Kaufman used the experience of the Korean war to theorise about nuclear thresholds and redlines. He identified the primary Limitation as the non-use of nuclear weapons. The Cuban Conflict validated his theories and helped America transition from massive response to flexible response. The Vietnam war was the second form of conflict to breakout in a backdrop of nuclear symmetry. Though classed as Low intensity Conflict it saw the US deploy 5,49,000 troops and launch a massive air campaign (Op Rolling Thunder) against North Vietnam. Henery Kissinger tried to popularise the concept of a Limited Nuclear War but this hardly carried conviction and was never put to the test.

Limitations in war Limitations in such conflicts can be in terms of: ●● Limitations in Space (localisation of conflict).

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

●● Limitations in Time (these are very much likely in our context). ●● Limitations in terms of Weapon Usage. The first of these is non-use of nuclear weapons. In many conflicts (e.g. Vietnam 1979) the Chinese made a virtue of necessity by not using their Air Force. ●● Limitations in War Aims. By 1978 the Chinese paramount leader Deng Xiaoping had come to the clear cut conclusion that General Wars (like World War I and II) were a thing of the past. The future decades would witness only Local or Limited Wars and accordingly the Chinese armed forces would prepare to fight them. This contrasts sharply with our treatment of Limited War as a lesser contingency rather than the norm in a nuclear setting. The Indian MoD continues to insist that our armed forces must prepare to fight a full fledged war and such preparation can take care of any lesser contingency.

especially in terms of air power.

India will have to evolve and enunciate a Limited War Doctrine that exploits the current RMA by giving primacy to Air Power to be the first responders and if needed, set the stage for a wider Air-Land Battle designed to sharply escalate costs for the enemy. There was considerable discussion on the concept of Limited War in the wake of the Kargil operations. This debate was initiated by Air Cmde Jasjit Singh (then the Director IDSA). Significant contributions were made by the then Army Chief Gen Ved Malik and the then Raksha Mantri Mr George Fernandez. Surprisingly within three years this debate had died out altogether and this very welcome initiative was not taken forward

The revival

Air power in India

The Soviet Union suffered an economic collapse in 1990. Thereafter the Americans exploited the Aerospace generated RMA to resume decisive Conventional Conflicts. These were Limited but Intense Conflicts localised in space. They used air power to virtually destroy the enemy and all the ground forces had to do was to mop up in the wake of the air offensive. In Yugoslavia and recently in Libya, air power by itself proved adequate to cause a country to capitulate. Swift and decisive campaigns that led to a march on the enemy capital and regime change were made possible by generating a complete asymmetry in Aerospace power. The Libyan model has emulated the earlier Afghan model of 2001 wherein Special Forces embedded with local militias, vectored accurate Air Strikes. However the tragic lesson from Afghanistan has been the need for boots on the ground to control and retain the areas won by the application of air power. The primary requisite for victory in surface operations is Air superiority bordering on air supremacy. To generate this we have to field overmatching forces -

Post the 1962 war with China a need was felt for a 64 Squadron Air Force to deal with a two front threat. This was never actualised. We reached at best a 45 squadron level. With the introduction of PGMs and Third and Fourth Generation fighters it was felt that a lesser number of aircraft would now be needed to carry out tasks formerly executed by much larger number of aircraft. A single Su-30 today can carry almost as much ordnance as a Mig-21 squadron. It does not work out that way in practice however. Given the vast size of our country - theatre specific forces have to be deployed to deal with a two-front threat. We now need a combination of quality with quantity to achieve overmatching capabilities and generate a marked asymmetry of air power. Today the IAF has graduated from a Secord Generation Air Force to one which has a rising component of Third and Fourth Generation fighters. It has AWACS and Aerostats for over the horizon surveillance and target acquisition. It has Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missiles and has perfected their employment tactics in numerous exercises with Front

Line Western Air Forces. It has force multipliers like AWACS and midair refuelling to enhance range and reach and PGMs to enhance lethality manifold. We need to switch now entirely to a combat fleet of 4th and 5th Generation Aircraft. These must be inducted rapidly to balance the rise of Chinese and Pakistani Aerospace capabilities and strive for a visible edge in deployable forces even over such a combination. We must retain our qualitative advantage over the PLAAF even as we are not able to match it quantitatively. High Altitude Airfields in Tibet impose a takeoff load penalty on the Chinese Air Force. We can generate viable options for Limited War only if we can assure air superiority over the Theatre of operations (and not just a favourable air situation). To do this we must speed up induction of MMRCA and LCA as also our Fifth Generation fighter. It is now a race against time (because China has a head start of almost two decades in economic and military modernisation).

Air power in limited war ●● Air power is far more responsive and flexible than land power. Hence any response to asymmetric provocation - especially in terms of mass casualty terrorist strikes must be initiated by air power. ●● We must carefully ascertain the groups which have initiated the strike and target them in a precise and focused manner. ●● Partial mobilisation would be essential prior to such a response to cater for enemy reactions. ●● Should the enemy choose to escalate we must seek to destroy his air power and thereby set the stage for the employment of surface forces. ●● Surface action could go up the escalation ladder in terms of graduated attacks possibly in the mountains - extending to the plains and semi-deserts depending upon how the adversary responds. ●● Air power must set the stage for a punitive air-land battle to raise the

costs for the aggressor and seriously degrade his operational and strategic reserve. ●● The terror infrastructure of the ISI and training camps must be specifically targeted in such a campaign for imposing salutary attrition. ●● Precise escalation ladders must be drawn up and war gamed. We must cater for a series of escalation plateaus to retain escalation dominance and provide scope to the political authority to escalate vertically or horizontally or even de-escalate depending upon the situation. ●● Limited wars need not mean just tactical level engagement. The Chinese concept of Local Wars, as seen in Korea and Vietnam, encompasses the level of operational area and may well envisage the employment of 20-30 divisions or more. ●● To inflict meaningful punishment air-land battles will have to be orchestrated to this level. ●● Air Power will have to lead the way, initiate our response and set the stage, if needed, for a Limited War designed to significantly raise the costs for the aggressor.

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

aerospace power

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Shiv Ram Krishna Pande The writer is Research Associate at Centre for Air Power Studies. He is BE Electronics and Communication Engineering from Manipal Insitute of Technology, Manipal University, Karnataka and is currently purusing MA International Relations from South Asian University, New Delhi.

The ongoing MMRCA competition is to be concluded by the year end and one can be assured that whichever aircraft is selected at the end (The Eurofighter Typhoon or the Dassault Rafael), the Indian Air Force shall have a fourth generation fighter with BVR capability and a state-of-the-art radar system among many other features in ample numbers. The MMRCA acquires special importance on the fact it will help the Indian Air Force regain its 3:1 superiority in numbers against the PAF (Pakistani Air Force) that it enjoyed for decades

A survey of India’s plans to be an Aerospace Power. Aerospace power depends upon a strong and vigorous aviation industry. This should ideally be a mix of State and private owned enterprises where Joint Ventures (JVs) are encouraged. The LCA Tejas has recently been granted the IOC (Initial Operational Clearance). MMRCA competition is to be concluded by the year end and one can be assured that whichever aircraft is selected at the end (The Eurofighter Typhoon or the Dassault Rafale), the Indian Air Force shall have a fourth generation fighter with BVR capability and a state-of-the-art radar system. The acquisition of AWACS from Israel will redefine our military strategy. The AWACS along with the recently set up AFNET (Air Force Net) sets the stage for space net working through the operational data link and shall give it NCW (Network Centric Warfare) capability. The CARTOSAT and RISAT-2 Satellites enhance our situational awareness. With the proposed induction of the fifth generation fighters, the writer paints a very optimistic picture of our status as an aerospace power.

Aerospace Power

hike in the same. The Indian Air Force (IAF) has been allocated US$ 3.16 billion, which is US$ 105.8 million higher than the revised allocation of US$ 3.04 billion for the previous fiscal, US$ 178.4 million higher than the US$ 3.2 million hike from the revised figure of US$ 1.88 billion for the previous fiscal and US$ 202.2 million more than its original allocation of US$ 1.68 billion.

This phase is now thankfully over and has been reversed. 2010-11 was the first time that the Ministry of Defence consumed its entire Defence Budget even after there was an 8.3 per cent

One must however pay close attention to the fact that the terms “Air Power” and "Aerospace Power" are not interchangeable. They are two highly distinct terms with separate meanings altogether. All Aerospace Powers are Air Powers but not vice-versa.

he Indian Air Force is one of the largest and among the most technologically competent air forces in the World. This tag however seemed to be taking a beating with the constant delays in acquisitions, massive red tape problems and aircraft crashes. The situation was so dire that the number of squadrons plummeted to an all-time low of 29.5 as against a sanctioned 39.5 in the late eighties.

India’s standing as an

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

aerospace power Late starter

The line between Air and Space in context has been blurring very rapidly in the last 20 years, ever since the USAF displayed the advantages of using Space (the highest point of observation) in the battlefield during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. The world suddenly stood and took notice and again in 1999 when Kosovo became a war fought only by the forces 24,000 feet above the ground. Technological prowess along with the “Shock and Awe” treatment was dished out by the Allied Forces wherever they went (barring Afghanistan). Aerospace Powers can also be extended to the civilian domain but this article shall deal only with the military aspect of it. The Indian Ministry of Defence has been a late starter on this chessboard but now is rapidly catching up. A tremendous modernisation of the Indian Air Force is underway and the signs are very clear - The Indian Republic wants to be an Aerospace Power in every dimension. But, statements aren’t going to get us anywhere. Statements are only the first of many steps. One has to convert statements to policy, strategies, doctrines in order to prove its mettle when the need arises. One has to first make an assessment of what constitutes an Aerospace Power. Essentially, if the Armed Forces of a nation can make use of their air and space based assets as one single unit for operational needs, it is termed as an Aerospace Power. The importance of such integration is far too obvious. Unlike the land or the sea, space covers 100 per cent of the Earth’s surface and offers no protection to the assets if well placed but also mobility, responsiveness, flexibility and versatility. These advantages are a direct product of the perspective, speed, range and manoeuvrability of the platforms one decides to use. The biggest asset of using space is its ability to gather intelligence. Accurate gathering and transmission of intelligence is possibly the most important part of any military operation in the 21st century. It’s of paramount importance that the intelligence gathered as a precursor

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KEY PARTNERSHIP to any military operation is accurate, reliable and quick (in case the status of the subject under observation changes). Space being the highest point of observation can gather and transmit this data. One could argue about the use of air based assets to gather intelligence but then, detection of intelligence gathering by an adversary is far easier if one uses air based assets and not space based.

The LCA Tejas has recently been granted the IOC (Initial Operational Clearance) as it looks to replace the ageing and crashing fleet of the MIG-21s. It is also being fitted with advance armaments like LASER guided bombs and BVR (Beyond Visual Range) missiles Once this is achieved, the use of air based assets decreases the number of land forces to be deployed to achieve the strategic objectives. Thereby, saving a large number of lives that would have otherwise been lost in combat. This message seems to have reached the right ears in the Government of the Indian Republic. The vision of India as an Aerospace Power is now gaining a strong foothold and plans have set rolling. Let’s be very clear about the fact that a very few select group of countries can even pursue a field as challenging (both financially and technologically) as air and space. The Indian Air Force, among the finest in the world can very much do so.

in real time situations. This task can be a technological nightmare as assets don’t run on the same bandwidth or spectrum. Most of the times, the electro-magnetic spectrum required to run such platform isn’t even readily available.

many other features in ample numbers. The MMRCA acquires special importance on the fact it will help the Indian Air Force regain its 3:1 superiority in numbers against the PAF (Pakistani Air Force) that it enjoyed for decades.

Second, is the need for an integrated command headquarters. Technology is just a bunch of fancy silicon chips and wires without the right manpower operating it. Even more important than that is the need for the right set of people to keep aside their differences and work as one cohesive unit since this requires the constant interaction of a number of departments.

Ground networking through the IACCS (Integrated Air Command And Control System) later this year and the AWACS along with the recently set up AFNET (Air Force Net) makes the stage set for space networking through the operational data link, to be ready by middle of this decade

Thirdly, future of aerospace power depends upon a strong and vigorous aviation industry. This should ideally be a mix of State and private owned enterprises where Joint Ventures (JVs) are encouraged. Conferences and seminars with adequate representation both from the government and the private industry are a good way to get things rolling in the right direction.

The induction of the Lockheed Martin Super Hercules C-130J and The Boeing C-17 Globemaster is a major game changer. Operation Parakram in 2001 took about 3 weeks to deploy our forces on the border. This not only negated our advantage of surprise but also cost the exchequer US$ 2 billion. The induction of the C-130J and the C-17 will change that completely with massive troop deployment at very short notices of time. More importantly, these two heavy lift aircraft are the very best in their category in the world.

Since the basic requirements are laid out pretty clear, the next obvious question is - where does India stand in terms of being an aerospace power? If recent developments are the measure of the yardstick one is convinced that all the right news did reach the right people in the Government of India albeit, a bit late.

Game changers

It was the acquisition of AWACS from Israel that will redefine our military strategy. The AWACS fitted on top of the Il-76 aircraft shall redefine the way Indian forces gather and assimilate intelligence data and shall be very vital air based asset

The requirements to be an Aerospace Power may look easy but are extremely difficult to achieve, operate and maintain. The possessing of air and space based assets is probably the easiest step in the process. The real trouble comes in the integration of all these on one or many platforms to achieve inter-operability

The ongoing MMRCA competition is to be concluded by the year end and one can be assured that whichever aircraft is selected at the end (The Eurofighter Typhoon or the Dassault Rafale), the Indian Air Force shall have a fourth generation fighter with BVR capability and a state-of-the-art radar system among

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

However, it was the acquisition of AWACS from Israel that will redefine our military strategy. The AWACS fitted on top of the Il-76 aircraft shall redefine the way Indian forces gather and assimilate intelligence data and shall be very vital air based asset. All said and done, it shall form the first line of our action and defence. Ground networking through the IACCS (Integrated Air Command And Control System) later this year and the AWACS along with the recently set up AFNET (Air Force Net) makes the stage set for space networking through the operational data link, to be ready by middle of this decade. This is what is meant by integration of assets. The Land, Air and Space assets might be on various platforms but are executing a common purpose with perfect harmony. More importantly, it shall plug a major operational gap within the Indian Air Force and shall give it NCW (Network Centric Warfare) capability.

In the area of space India has been equally successful as well. Indian space based assets are handled by ISRO. ISRO is primarily a civilian body and comes directly under the ambit of the PMO. Recent launches by India’s space agency clearly show that it has a military dimension to it but ISRO categorically denies these claims. It was the launch of the CARTOSAT series of satellites that led the Indian media announcing to the world that India now possesses military satellite. The ISRO again denied these claims. However, the launch of the RISAT-2 is what made the denials of ISRO pretty much irrelevant. The RISAT-2’s primary sensor comes from the Israeli Aerospace Industries and was launched just months after the 26/11 attacks (RISAT-1 still being in the integration phase). These satellites have such powerful panchromatic cameras that they can read the number plate of your car. It’s about time that the PMO accepts the facts that are for all to see and starts framing a national space policy with a military dimension heavily included.

Further developments like the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft, a joint venture between The Republic of India and The Russian Federation will ensure India joins an extremely elite class of nations and is able to project itself as an Aerospace Power to reckon with Further developments like the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft, a joint venture between The Republic of India and The Russian Federation will ensure India joins an extremely elite class of nations and is able to project itself as an Aerospace Power to reckon with. Based on these modernisation plans, the Indian Air Force will have a stipulated 45 combat ready squadrons, a wide range of helicopters

and transport aircraft, AWACS, AEW systems and a well packaged fleet of UAV’s. The only major stumbling block that it currently faces is the problem of spectrum allocation. No matter how advanced a weapons / communication system maybe, if it’s not operated on the right bandwidth it is a colossal waste of the taxpayer’s hard earned money. It’s like having the best cell phone in the market with the best call plans without any network coverage! India still doesn’t have UHF capability rendering some of the systems aboard the C-17 as mere showpieces. The Antrix Devas scam showed how precious and rare spectrum is in the world today. In today’s scenario of warfare, it’s not the cities which are targeted first; it’s the communication systems and the command and control bases. The need of the hour is quick and efficient allocation of the necessary spectrum at concessional rates to the Indian military. That also boosts our signals division manifold instantaneously. India needs to get its basics clear quickly if it wants to be an Aerospace Power that will be taken seriously by the rest of the world.

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

aerospace power

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PERILOUS SCENARIO?

An overview of the needs of aerospace power in the Indian context. The writer emphasises the need for air superiority to pursue successful operations on the earth’s surface and talks of what needs to be done to develop such capabilities.

Dr Arvind Kumar The writer is Professor and Head of Department of Geopolitics and International Relations at Manipal University, Manipal, India.

It is anticipated that India will spend roughly US$ 100 billion on defence acquisitions by 2020. It is also generally believed among the members of academic and strategic community in India that aerospace sector will be given top priority in both research and acquisitions. The emphasis on space assets will be given to complement India’s land, air and sea based assets

ndoubtedly, air power is an essential component of modern warfare. The evolution of air power capabilities in India has been directly linked with its threat perceptions and the articulation of its requirements. It is, therefore, important to note that in the existing scenario, India needs to be better equipped with the defensive systems which would be required in any eventuality. These defensive systems could also help in building a deterrent capability, which ultimately would help in containing the crisis. It is generally believed among the members of strategic community that without having air superiority, it would be a difficult proposition for any nation-State to sustain itself during the crisis time. Undoubtedly, Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) is an important ingredient of air power. At the same time, AWACS will have no great role to play if there is no air superiority. The goal of the warning mission has always been to alert national forces of any air vehicle attack, which ultimately helps in preserving strategic bomber forces. The adequate warning can only escape strategic bomber forces from the probable attack during the crisis time.

The possession of airborne surveillance radar enhances air power capabilities. The possession of AWACS in particular has been viewed as a vital force multiplier. Despite the fact that, India so far has not been able to achieve AWACS indigenously, the Phalcon based radars of Israeli origin have been mounted and perform operations as and when it is required.

Dual challenge

Perilous scenario

Under this scenario, a very legitimate question could be, “why India should worry about warning of attack by slow air vehicles when a strategic attack on India would clearly first be manifested by the obvious arrival of ballistic missile nuclear warheads”?. First, India should not leave an “open door” for Chinese cruise missiles or aircraft to fly completely undetected to strategic bomber bases and other important targets. If India leaves the door open, it would be naïve to anticipate that it would never be exploited in a strategic attack. Secondly, the massive strategic attack from China has not been the only concern for India’s national security. One needs to be concerned about possible future air vehicle attacks from lesser powers like Pakistan, which is also a nuclear weapon State and is very much hostile towards India and also constantly creating problems across Indian borders.

An elaborate ground infrastructure to facilitate rapid transfer / re-deployment of the air force between the west and east against Pakistan and China needs to be put in place at the earliest possible time period. The perilous scenario which India has been undergoing with regard to air power is not very satisfactory. The report about the existing fleets of the aircraft which keeps appearing in the world media presents a very precarious picture about the Indian Air Force. For the last five decades, MiG 21s have been the backbone of the Indian Air Force. It is a well known fact that most of the MiG-21s in possession with Indian Air Force are basically the Russian aircraft of the earlier era. The prevailing and dominant view in India has been that India became so dependent on Soviet military technology that it could not enhance its own indigenous production on the one hand and it could not even show willingness to cooperate with other countries.

Airborne surveillance radars are being viewed increasingly as a fundamental asset for use during missions ranging from all-out war to peacekeeping operation.

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

India’s Air Power Capabilities

Bearing in mind that any future conflict with India’s adversaries would require the level of India’s defence preparedness at a very higher degree, the military planners and strategists in India would require to put a greater emphasis on self-reliance. India in this case would certainly need to acquire force multipliers like night-fighting sensors, better air-defence equipment, real-time command, control, communications and intelligence systems in addition to a modern electronic warfare capability. There seem to be glaring operational gaps in India’s overall defence capabilities as far as air defence and air capabilities are concerned. The need of the hour is to upgrade the air-defence system in the eastern part of the country in view of China’s expanding air power projection.

The recent short-listing of Eurofighter Typhoon and French Rafael aircraft done by

India in terms of buying 127 medium multi role combat aircraft (MMRCA) has been a byproduct of long endeavours of the modernisation of India’s air power capabilities. Such short-listing after careful scrutiny done by India on the other contenders like Swedish Gripen, F-16s, F-18s reflects India’s growing concerns for enhancing its air power capabilities. The short-listing must have factored the technical specifications and a number of other parameters including manoeuvrability, acceleration and flight envelopes. The primary sensor system and high-tech electronic devices in the combat aircraft become very important in terms of understanding the endurance and survivability. India certainly would be able to achieve primacy if it receives 127 MMRCA. There is also a growing pressure from the Indian Air Force for India to buy a number of additional MMRCA.

Gnawing obsolescence It would be a worthwhile exercise to understand the composition and functioning of the Indian Air Force. The Indian Air Force has been split into seven commands, which work under the stewardship of the Headquarters located in New Delhi. There are five commands, which are geographical out of seven and two are mainly training and maintenance commands. Western Air Command is also based in New Delhi and controls the northwestern states including the disputed Kashmir. It has around nine permanent airbases and four forward airfields. Its air defence squadrons operate Mig-21s, MiG-23s and MiG-29s while ground attack forces use the MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-27 and Jaguar.

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

aerospace power

PERILOUS SCENARIO?

Historically, air power has been used by nation-States to accomplish very complex tasks of projection, denial and oversight. The major part of modern air power theory and doctrine has been mostly directed toward the capability of projection. India has been in the search of robust air power capabilities where it can have the ability to place its military force at a given location at a certain and definite time South Western Air Command has been based at Jodhpur and it covers western states such as Rajasthan and Maharashtra. Its air defence units operate the Su-30s, as well as MiG-21s, MiG-23s and maritime strike Jaguars. Central Air Command located at Allahabad controls the area between Delhi and Bengal. It has MiG-21 and Mirage 2000 in its air defence units and it also controls the majority of the Indian air force’s transports, both fixed and rotary wing. The Eastern Air Command based at Shillong covers the border with Bangladesh and Myanmar and its air defence squadrons operate MiG-21s while the strike units use MiG-27s. Southern Air Command is based at Thiruvananthapuram and it covers the south and is responsible for operations in the Bay of Bengal and around the Andaman and Nicobar islands. It controls no squadrons. The current situation of all the air-defence squadrons clearly reflects that despite the fast changing international security environment and various advances made in the technological sector, India seems to be mostly banking on its existing fleets of obsolete MiGs. The urgent necessity for India in the existing milieu would be to prevent airborne reconnaissance and then provide enough active defence to deter or interdict aircraft attacks by terrorists or other hostile adversaries. A demonstrated ability to place a manned interceptor in a position to engage an unidentified aircraft before it reaches the Indian coastline or border should be the general goal and in the process India would be able to enhance its air power capabilities.

These tasks would be accomplished by the network of radars and manned interceptors described for the warning mission.

Revamping The technical challenges before India are very substantial and require to be addressed by the key policy makers and the scientific community. Efficient coverage of India’s earth surface requires radar operation keeping in mind the border related problems at ranges of 200 to 300 km and these long ranges might be a challenge for detecting low-observable vehicles. With air superiority, aircraft can drop their smart bombs with less fear of coming under attack while guiding them to their target, thereby offering a greater probability of a successful strike. There has always been a quest to find out the enemy’s plans and moves well in advance in order to develop one’s own operations effectively since the early days of warfare. In other words, domination of the high ground was sought which gave a commander knowledge of the enemy’s strength and disposition. This has become very complex in the existing environment where sophisticated technologies have been invented. These complexities by and large have been addressed by radar, which has the effect of forcing air operations down to lower levels to stay below the radar horizon and ultimately helps in evading detection. Over the years, it seems that India’s offensive operations priority is being upgraded along with the air defence. The concept of air defence in India has been gaining momentum. There seems to be a consensus in India among the key planners that India would require to maintain point air defence in addition to the ability to build a strategic or deterrent air defence. India would certainly require a number of long range aircraft in addition to having a capability of air-to-air refuelling. India has also been working towards

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

having overall improvements in the command, control, communications and intelligence structure in addition to a revamped modernised air defence and communications network. The technological edge in air warfare would become an essential component of India’s air power capabilities. India’s defence purchases and acquisitions over the years have reflected the major concerns shown by the Indian Air force. It is anticipated that India will spend roughly US$ 100 billion on defence acquisitions by 2020. It is also generally believed among the members of academic and strategic community in India that aerospace sector will be given top priority in both research and acquisitions. The emphasis on space assets will be given to complement India’s land, air and sea based assets The other two areas would be in the field of aerial refuelling and air lift capabilities, which might get attention in future. Air power is nothing but a military employment of aerospace resources to defend the nation and support national foreign policy. Historically, air power has been used by nation-States to accomplish very complex tasks of projection, denial and oversight. The major part of modern air power theory and doctrine has been mostly directed toward the capability of projection. India has been in the search of robust air power capabilities where it can have the ability to place its military force at a given location at a certain and definite time.

Book Review Title: ...So That Others May Live Author: AVM M Matheswaran AVSM, VM, PhD Publisher: Indian Air Force Air Headquarters (Vayu Bhawan) Rafi Marg, New Delhi-110011 Year Of Publication: June 2011 Reviewed by Wg Cdr Sangeeta Malla (retd)

n exquisite coffee-table book that recounts the eventful journey of the Indian Air Force through the decades. The cover photograph shows a helicopter engaged in a rescue mission over the sea and that explains the haunting and lyrical title. This book literally gives a “hovering account” of IAF’s flight to touch the sky with glory through years from Saturday 8th October 1932 till 2011 through the medium of rare photographs which take us down memory lane.

Baptism by Fire, the first chapter takes us back to the early years of formation. There is a rare photograph of the Crown Gazette Notification which established the Indian Air Force. There is the tumultuous period when IAF was called upon to respond to the most tragic humanitarian crisis caused by the Partition which saw one of the largest migrations of human history. The IAF really touched the sky with glory during the First Indo-Pak war over Jammu and Kashmir when it formed an air bridge to Srinagar and flew in the Indian Army even as the Raiders were knocking on the gates of that terrified city. Mounted with ancient Dakotas it was one of the biggest air lifts of recent history to provide succor to the men, women and children during tribal raids that ravaged Jammu and Kashmir. Fresh out of the Admin Box experience of fighting the Japanese in the Burma theatre, the IAF mounted operations to support the besieged garrisons at Leh, Poonch and Skardu. “Air bridge links” had to be provided and maintained for extended periods of time at a stretch for almost two years, all along in tough mountainous and extreme weather conditions. It was truly a magnificent response. Apart from that it gives a detailed account of the helping hand IAF lends to the civil administration to provide relief to the flood hit areas, tsunami struck regions, casualty evacuations from disaster struck areas. Thus IAF provides a vital link to the disaster management agency as it has the ability to overcome obstructions and span across over land or sea. By virtue of its sheer reach and speed, the IAF can arrive on the spot, literally pluck victims out of the difficult situation and fly them off to safety. In the period of rehabilitation too, the service is one of the means of providing sustenance, thus helping the civil administration to extend their administrative control which would not have been possible otherwise. It also gives a detailed account of various operations IAF has undertaken like Operation Black Tornado to counter the Mumbai terror attack wherein the synergy between various units of civil and armed forces got the job well done.

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

Similarly it also highlights the role of women officers - whether its expeditions to Mount Everest or flying across swathes of earth to accomplish the task at hand. The famous words of First IAF man in space Sqn Ldr Rakesh Sharma “saare jahan se achchha Hundustan hamara” in response to then Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi’s query, have been portrayed at a time when a changeover was taking place in IAF as well. From being defensive it was being transformed into a strategically offensive Air Force. An era which heralded the aggressive use of technology, advances in hardware and training to leverage and also unleash the potent force of Aerospace power by induction of various supersonic fighters, heavy lift fixed wing and rotor crafts, AWACS, UAV’s and heavy lift transport aircraft like IL-76, IL-78 used for mid–air refuellers; also Tejas, Dhruv and finally the masterpiece like C-17 Globemaster. This changeover has been beautifully depicted through the medium of high resolution photographs. Finally it also highlights the gratitude the countrymen have for their men and women in blue. As has been best summed up in the book that “most villagers may have never seen a motor car in their lives, but they are familiar with the names and types of aircraft that the Air Force flies”. And true to their word, these silent blue soldiers have kept their countrymen engaged with their tryst with destiny which started at midnight while the whole world was asleep. For their bravery, courage and steadfastness we salute them. The nation must be made aware of the humanitarian face of IAF and the selfless dedication of the men and women in blue who have surmounted stiff odds so that others may live … The accounts contained in this book are historical in significance because they contain a key narrative of efforts that have built this nation and the same have been presented in an anecdotal style rather than as prosaic and dry narratives. A must for all squadrons as also for all the votaries of Aerospace power and military history buffs.

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

October 2010

DSA 1st Anniversary Issue was a mega 148 page special collector's edition covering the exciting journey of DSA from October 2009 to September 2010. It had an interesting bouquet of 22 articles and 5 features. Incisive articles on Cyber warfare: offensive defence, Naxalisim: The malady and the remedy, The Chinese hauteur, Afghan imbroglio: Indian options and Maritime muscle: India's new thrust etc. were highly acclaimed by the readers and experts alike. Imaginative features like the journey so far and treasured testimonials also received kudos and appreciation. A great beginning of the second year of DSA! The distinguished writers who contributed to the 1st Anniversary Issue: Lt Gen Aditya Singh PVSM AVSM (retd), Mr E N Rammohan IPS (retd), Mr Hormis Tharakan IPS (retd), Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd), Dr Rajiv Nayan, Lt Gen Shantonu Choudhry (retd), Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd), Maj Gen (Dr) Mrinal Suman AVSM, VSM (retd), Dr Mondira Dutta, Air Chief Marshal S P Tyagi PVSM, AVSM, VM, CAS (retd), Air Marshal T M Asthana (retd), Dr Arvind Kumar, Air Marshal P Bandhopadhyaya (retd), Prof Rajendra Prasad, Brig Chitranjan Sawant VSM (retd), Mr Saurabh Sharma, Ms Dominika Cosic, Dr Pankaj Jha, Mr Cecil Victor, Rear Adm Raja Menon (retd), Lt Gen V G Patankar PVSM, UYSM, VSM (retd) For details of this issue kindly visit the following link of our portal: http://www.dsalert.org/images/web/intro/DSA-Oct-MagazineIntro.pdf

December 2010

DSA December 2010 issue was USA special. Thought-provoking articles on strategic US thinking and operations like US in Afghanistan: Quo vadis?, Indo-US partnership, United States and global disarmament, Non-proliferation: US impetus, US-Pak umbilical cord!, Global war on terror: Af-Pak strategy, US and the challenge from China etc. This issue also covered President Obama's India visit and interesting fact sheets on the US-India partnership. The highly regarded writers who contributed to this issue: Air Marshal B K Pandey PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd), Mr K Subrahmanyam (Late), Prof P M Kamath, Cmde Ranjit B Rai (retd), Dr Harsh V Pant, Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd), Dr K S Sidhu, Dr (Ms) Manpreet Sethi, Dr Rajiv Nayan and Mr Sanjeev Kr Shrivastav, Mr Cecil Victor, Maj Gen (Dr) Sheru Thapliyal SM (retd), Dr (Ms) Arpita Basu Roy, Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee AVSM (retd), Dr Tej Pratap Singh, Ms Dominika Cosic, Dr Rajiv Nayan, Vice Adm Venkat Bharathan PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd), Vice Adm Arun Kumar Singh (retd) For details of this issue kindly visit the following link of our portal: http://www.dsalert.org/images/web/intro/DSA-Dec-MagazineIntro.pdf

November 2010

January 2011

Our November 2010 issue was CHINA special. In-depth articles like Bloody nose to China! Twice!!, China's global clout, Sino-US equations: Implications and consequences, Aggressive China: India over-cautious?, Sino-Indian relations: Trust deficit? etc.

Our January 2011 issue was Indian Army special covering an interesting mix of articles on Operational doctrines, Military leadership: Morale and motivation, Military diplomacy, Kargil conflict: Resounding victory, Defence and security: Chanakya's vision, India: Security in doldrums etc.

Other articles covered NATO's global role?, China-Japan-India axis: Challenges and opportunities, China-Myanmar: Burgeoning kinship etc.

The well known professional experts who contributed to this issue: Air Marshal Satish Inamdar PVSM, VSM (retd), Lt Gen O P Kaushik PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd), Lt Gen Sudhir Sharma PVSM, AVSM, YSM, VSM (retd), Lt Gen Aditya Singh PVSM, AVSM (retd), Maj Gen V K Singh (retd), Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd), Dr Sanjeev Bhadauria, Brig Rahul K Bhonsle (retd), Lt Gen V R Raghavan PVSM, UYSM, AVSM (retd), Dr Bidanda Chengappa, Maj Gen (Dr) Mrinal Suman AVSM, VSM (retd), Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd), Mr Praful Shankar Adagale, Maj Gen (Dr) Sheru Thapliyal SM (retd), Brig (Dr) Anil Sharma (retd), Prof R N Swarup, Brig Chitranjan Sawant VSM (retd), Ms Dominika Cosic

The renowned writers who contributed to this issue: Maj Gen V K Singh (retd), Prof Srikanth Kondapalli, Prof Chintamani Mahapatra, Dr Ravni Thakur, Dr Sanjeev Bhadauria, Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd), Dr Tej Pratap Singh, Dr B R Deepak, Ms Dominika Cosic, Mr Manvendra Singh, Dr Sudhir Kumar Singh, Brig Rahul K Bhonsle (retd), Mr Cecil Victor, Prof Rajendra Prasad, Mr Rahul Mishra, Mr Pawan Agrawal For details of this issue kindly visit the following link of our portal: http://www.dsalert.org/images/web/intro/DSA-Nov-MagazineIntro.pdf

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February 2011

DSA February 2011 issue was our Russia Special highlighting Russia: Global aspirations, The Russian renascence!, Medvedev doctrine, India-Russia strategic relationship, Russia: The energy tsar?, Russia-US: Reset relationship, Russia China accord: New vision. Another topical article was on The IED menace. Renowned subject experts who contributed to this issue:

Prof P L Dash, Maj Gen Dhruv Katoch SM, VSM (retd), Dr Arvind Gupta, Dr Rajiv Nayan, Prof Nalini Kant Jha, Dr Sanjeev Bhadauria, Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd), Dr Arun Mohanty, Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd), Dr Sharad K Soni, Ms Shebonti Ray Dadwal, Mr Kapil Dhanraj Patil, Mr Cecil Victor, Mr Rahul Mishra, Dr Jagmohan Meher, Mr Rajorshi Roy, Mr Rai Mahimapat Ray and Mr Rajeev Lala, Dr Nivedita Das Kundu, Prof Anuradha M Chenoy, Mr Rohit K Mishra, Ms Aditi Malhotra For details of this issue kindly visit the following link of our portal: http://www.dsalert.org/images/web/intro/DSA-FEB-2011-ISSUE.pdf

April 2011

DSA April 2011 issue was our very well received Pakistan special. Insightful articles on topics of regional and global importance included Islamic nukes: Global implications, Pak-US relations, Pakistan 2020: Possible scenarios, Radicalisation: Global threat, Pakistan's undoing: Media the monster or ill-advised conceit?, Pak-China-N. Korea nexus, Global war on terror: Role reversal etc. The following well known writers contributed to this issue: Mr G Parthasarathy IFS (retd), Prof P M Kamath, Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd), Prof Kalim Bahadur, Brig Rahul K Bhonsle (retd), Dr Prem Shankar Jha, Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd), Dr Harsh V Pant, Maj Gen Afsir Karim AVSM (retd), Dr Arvind Kumar, Cmde Ranjit B Rai (retd), Dr Jagmohan Meher, Brig Chitranjan Sawant VSM (retd), Dr Rajiv Nayan, Vice Admiral Venkat Bharathan PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd), Dr Tej Pratap Singh, Lt Gen O P Kaushik PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd), Dr Rajendra Prasad, Mr Rohit K Mishra For details of this issue kindly visit the following link of our portal: http://www.dsalert.co.in/web/DSA-April-2011.pdf

March 2011

May 2011

Our March 2011 issue was Europe Special. This issue began with a tribute to K Subrahmanyam, the national security specialist par excellence. Other well researched articles were on European Union: A role model for Asia, EU and Latin America, Europe and South-East Asia, India and Europe: Dynamics of a multi-polar world, EU-US relations, EU and Russia: Gateway to WTO, Balkan conundrum.

Our May 2011 issue was dedicated to Internal Security: Vital role of Science and Technology featuring high value articles on hologrammatic terror, FMS route: How vulnerable?, Harnessing technologies, Countering low intensity conflicts, Information dominance: Power of the future?, Techno-savvy cop!, Nuclear power: How safe?, Remote sensing and national security, Maritime Governance Authority, Cyber crimes, Innovative policing, Information secrecy: New challenges?, Managing multiple threats etc.

This issue also carried a very interesting article on federalism and security challenges. The features included CRPF Mahila (Women) Battalion, Home security tips and Defsec: Product updates.

The high profile experts and professionals who contributed to this issue: Dr Vijay Khare, Maj Gen (Dr) Mrinal Suman AVSM, VSM (retd), Dr Ajey Lele, Lt Gen Aditya Singh PVSM, AVSM (retd), Lt Gen O P Kaushik PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd), Mr Kshitij Aditeya Singh, Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd), Dr Venkateshwaran Lokanathan, Lt Gen V G Patankar PVSM, UYSM, VSM (retd), Cmde Ranjit B Rai (retd), Maj Gen V K Singh (retd), Dr Harsh V Pant, Dr Hari Saran, Mr V Balachandran IPS (retd), V Adm Venkat Bharathan PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd), Mr Yogesh Rajendra, Maj Gen (Dr) Sheru Thapliyal SM (retd), Mr Praful S Adagale, Mr Hormis Tharakan IPS (retd), Dr Rajendra Prasad, Brig (Dr) Arun Sahgal (retd), Prof K S Sidhu, Vice Adm Arun Kumar Singh (retd)

The distinguished contributors to this issue were: Mr Claude Arpi, Mr Dattesh D Prabhu Parulekar, Dr Pankaj Jha, Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd), Ms Kalyani Unkule, Mr Praful S Adagale, Dr Rashmi Bhure, Ms Joyce Sabina Lobo, Mr Rai Mahimapat Ray and Mr Rajeev Lala, Ms Pallavi Pal, Mr Rajorshi Roy, Ms Dominika Cosic, Prof K S Sidhu, Col Rajinder Singh (retd) For details of this issue kindly visit the following link of our portal: http://www.dsalert.org/images/web/intro/DSA-MARCH-2011ISSUE.pdf

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June 2011

DSA June 2011 issue was a Stop Press edition: Osama Special. Team DSA received generous applause and appreciation from around the world for brining out this most exhaustive special issue on Osama covering Global Jihad, Al Qaeda's global network, American vengeance!, Operation Neptune Spear, Lessons from operation Osama, Stop funding Pakistan for terror free world etc. Distinguished defence and security experts who contributed to this issue:

Lt Gen V K Jetley PVSM, UYSM (retd), Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd), Dr Ved Pratap Vaidik, Lt Gen O P Kaushik PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd), Maj Gen Afsir Karim AVSM (retd), Mr Manvendra Singh, Dr Rajendra Prasad, Maj Gen (Dr) Sheru Thapliyal SM (retd), Col Rajinder Singh (retd), Dr Tej Pratap Singh, Mr Cecil Victor, Dr Rajiv Nayan, Lt Gen V G Patankar PVSM, UYSM, VSM (retd), Brig Chitranjan Sawant VSM (retd), Dr Venkat Lokanathan, Brig Rahul K Bhonsle (retd), Dr (Ms) Manpreet Sethi, Mr Joginder Singh IPS (retd), Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd), Mr Praful S Adagale, Vice Adm Venkat Bharathan PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd), Mr Pawan Agrawal For details of this issue kindly visit the following link of our portal: http://www.dsalert.co.in/web/DSA-June-2011.pdf

August 2011

Our August 2011 issue was once again a Stop Press Special Edition on Endgame in Afghanistan necessitated by President Obama's announcement of troop withdrawal. The whole issue was conceived, planned and produced on a war footing but finally turned out to be a collector's issue with articles on Endgame in Afghanistan: India's stakes and options, US counter-terrorism strategy: Lessons for India, Pakistan's strategy after Osama, The new great game?, US exit strategy: Recipe for instability?, Growing Af-Pak uncertainties, Drugs and instability conundrum, Role of Russia, China's conticent presence etc. Well known writers who contributed to this issue: Ambassador Rajiv Sikri IFS (retd), Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd), Dr Ahmad Reza Taheri, Dr Jagmohan Meher, Lt Gen V K Jetley PVSM, UYSM (retd), Prof P M Kamath, Brig Rumel Dahiya (retd), Ms Sandhya Jain, Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd), Dr Arvind Kumar, Brig Rahul K Bhonsle (retd), Dr Harsh V Pant, Maj Gen Afsir Karim AVSM (retd), Prof Chintamani Mahapatra, Lt Gen O P Kaushik PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd), Dr Tej Pratap Singh, Dr Prem Mahadevan, Ms Aditi Malhotra, Ms Dominika Cosic, Mr Subimal Bhattacharjee, Dr Monika Chansoria For details of this issue kindly visit the following link of our portal: http://www.dsalert.co.in/files/dsa-issues/DSA_August_2011.pdf

July 2011

September 2011

For July 2011 team DSA turned adventurous and planned a very comprehensive special issue on Disaster Management covering Nuclear and radiological emergencies: Preparedness and response, Medical preparedness, NDMA: Role and function, Chemical warfare, Food protection, CBRN disasters: The aftermath, Fukushima lessons, Armed forces: Pivotal role, Biodosimetry: an effective tool, Role of ex-servicemen etc. This issue was well appreciated for exhaustive coverage and practical solutions suggested.

The last issue of our second year is a landmark edition on Land Forces in India: The Way Ahead. It features an exclusive interview with army chief Gen V K Singh and most illuminating and thought-provoking articles by three former Army Commanders and Director Generals of the Mechanised Forces and the Infantry. Important articles cover defence transformation: A case for mind over matter, Indian army: Urgent need for doctrinal change, Modernisation of the mechanised forces (armour), Modernising the Infantry, Army Aviation: Vital battle winner, Deception And Perception Management: The neglected art, Military diplomacy: Shaping the region, Army air defence: Overcoming obsolescence, Rashtriya Rifles: Dedicated CI force, Indian Army: Internal security role, Deteriorating civil-military relationship: The demise of synergy?, Network-centric cyber warfare etc.

Highly regarded professional experts who contributed to this issue:

This issue also carries an exclusive interview with Maj Gen Ravi Khetarpal, CMD, Bharat Dynamics Limited, a feature by DSA research team on Arms build-up in Asia: India's inadequate response and Industry Monitor.

Dr M C Abani, Maj Gen J K Bansal (retd), Lt Gen V K Jetley PVSM, UYSM (retd), Prof (Dr) M P Kaushik, Dr Rakesh Kumar Sharma, Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd), Dr A S Bawa, Lt Gen O P Kaushik PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd), Prof K S Sidhu, Brig (Dr) B K Khanna (retd), Dr Sanjeev Bhadauria, Dr Rajendra Prasad, Prof Gopalji Malviya, Mr S Utham Kumar Jamadhagni, Dr Ajey Lele, Dr Manju Lata Gupta and Ms Savita Verma, Dr Rakesh Datta, Mr Praful Adagale, Dr Harsh K Sinha

The illustrious line-up of contributors for this issue is: Lt Gen Hardev Singh Lidder PVSM, UYSM, YSM, VSM (retd), Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd), Lt Gen Dalip Bhardwaj PVSM, AVSM (retd), Lt Gen S N Handa PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd), Lt Gen Vinayak Patankar PVSM, UYSM, VSM (retd), Lt Gen Aditya Singh PVSM, AVSM (retd), Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch SM, VSM (retd), Lt Gen Arvind Sharma PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd), Maj Gen V K Singh (retd), Brig (Dr) Anil Sharma (retd), Mr Manish Madaan, Ms Anshu Paliwal, Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd), Col R S N Singh (retd), Maj Gen (Dr) Sheru Thapliyal SM (retd), Dr Rajiv Nayan, Dr Monika Chansoria, Mr Cecil Victor, Mr Nitin Gokhale, Dr Rajendra Prasad

For details of this issue kindly visit the following link of our portal: http://dsalert.co.in/web/Disaster-Managment-July-2011-Issue.pdf

For details of this issue kindly visit the following link of our portal: http://www.dsalert.co.in/files/dsa-issues/DSA_September_2011.pdf

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I have seen some issues of DSA. Truly they are class apart. I have served with the army for 6 years and was into publication before that. Thank you for sending me a copy of your magazine. I particularly liked its contents, presentation and attractive looks. My best wishes to all of you. May you continue to do the good work. Air Chief Marshal S P Tyagi, (retd) Gurgaon

I have gone through the issues of The Defence And Security Alert (DSA) and I have been very much benefited. Let me congratulate you for bringing out a magazine of first-class quality with well researched articles from knowledgeable and well respected authors with vast hands-on experience in defence and security matters. I am sure that the same would be widely welcomed by all concerned with security issues. The articles cover a wide range from domestic policing to international relations which affect the security scenario. The production values are superb with sharp maps in attractive colours, good photographs and with data presented in tabular form. I hope you would keep up the quality and I wish the magazine a large readership and all success. K Padmanabhaiah IAS, New Delhi

Thank you very much for the latest issue of DSA. As a person interested in National Security and Defence matters I was greatly impressed by the quality of articles and the issues dealt with, by eminent authors. I am deeply impressed by the presentation and excellent getup of the Journal. In the Print and Electronic Media, very few people get opportunity to share their views and experience on National Security Matters. DSA fills this void. B V Kumar IRS (retd) Member, Central Board of Excise and Customs, Addl. Sec., Govt. of India, Ministry of Finance Bangalore

DSA is indeed a high class journal which fills a void in the field of defence writing. I was delighted to go through its high quality of content and illustrations. Wishing you total success in this endeavour. Maj Gen Ashok Krishna, AVSM (retd), Director, Amity Institute of Competitive Intelligence (AICI), Noida

I found Defence And Security Alert an excellent publication with good material. Its informative. Ved Marwah IPS (retd) Former Police Commissioner, Delhi

I am pleased to have received copies of your journal “Defence and Security Alert”. I have read with keen interest articles covering a wide range of subjects from 'Internal Security, Military Preparedness' to International Affairs. The contents are interesting, informative and stimulating. I complement you for the quality of the journal and wish you all success in this laudable initiative. S C Mehta IPS (retd) Member, National Security Advisory Board, Government of India, Jaipur

Thank you for sending me three brilliant and enlightening issues of your magazine. Internal and external security situation in the country is grim. Corruption has become a national pastime. DSA is providing lot of information on which governments can act. I hope some people at the top in central and state governments are perusing this magazine. I wish you every success in your effort for making India strong and secure. C S Dwivedi IPS (retd) Former Addl Director General CRPF

Good to see DSA. It has an impressive look and I'm sure it will be popular. Congratulations and all the best. Subimal Bhattacharjee Country Head-India, General Dynamics Ltd.

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Prashant Vishwasrao New Delhi

I am sure that the DSA would fill the blank to some extent. But more important is that the Alert sounded should really alert the policy and decision makers. Let us hope for the best. With warm compliments to you and your team for breaking the ice. Please keep it up. Amitabh Gupta Former DG Police, Rajasthan Jaipur

I have received the copy of Defence and Security Alert (DSA). For bringing out such a comprehensive, in-depth analysis and background information so well in the issue. I have enjoyed reading every article. The selection of theme and authors has been very good. Afghanistan has been covered very well. I am happy to note that you intend to publish research based, authentic writings in future. I may suggest that you bring out special issue on Internal Security, Terrorism and Unconventional war in future. Lt Gen (Dr ) D B Shekatkar PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd) Pune

I received your magazines which I read from cover to cover with great interest. Indeed, if Europe and India face the same problems, ask themselves the same questions, we do not necessarily approach them from the same standpoint. It is very refreshing and thought-provoking to see things from an Indian point of view. Very important too.

Thanks for the pdf of DSA. This is very well designed and convey my thanks to the editorial and design team. They have done an excellent job. This magazine has the potential to become the best in the world in its chosen field of Indian defence and security analysis. I am very happy the way the articles have been shaped. Once again a big thanks to you and your editorial team. Kamala Kanta Dash Monash Asia Institute Monash University Victoria-3145

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Shyam Saran (Special Envoy of PM) Prime Minister ’s Office New Delhi

Yes, I did receive the magazine which I was very impressed by. I will ensure you receive relevant news about General Dynamics UK in future. Andrew Boyle, Senior Manager International Corporate Affairs General Dynamics United Kingdom Limited London

I visited the DSA website and it looks interesting in the defence domain. Philippe Cornez Director at NATO Naval Mine Warfare Centre of Excellence Director of the Belgian Netherland Naval Mine Warfare School

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Manvendra Singh The writer is Editor-in-Chief of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine. He is a well known defence journalist and columnist. He was member of Indian parliament till 2009 from one of the largest constituencies in Rajasthan.

From department appointed spokespersons to Adm Mike Mullen, the outgoing Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the tone and tenor of accusations has been nothing short of surprising. In many ways the language sounds as if spoken by Indian officials or public persons. The principal reason behind this sharp downturn in Pak-US relations is of course the 13 September attack on the US Embassy and International Security Assistance Force HQs in Kabul. The attack lasted almost 20 hours and seemed to have been very sophistically coordinated. While the initial comments accused the Haqqani network of masterminding the attack, the US later changed its position and pointed a finger directly at the ISI

An excellent and very encouraging report from ground zero in Jammu and Kashmir. Our Editor-in-Chief was there personally to get a firsthand feel of ongoing operations and the resultant situation. He reports a record elimination of top level terrorist leaders which is clearly indicative of the flow of actionable information from the local people. However, the number of serious encounters on the LoC is upwards of 60 this year which is clearly indicative of the ISIs desperate attempts to revive terrorism. Concurrently the ISI is going for the endgame in Afghanistan and has stepped up attacks on key targets like the US embassy itself. The ISI has therefore unleashed asymmetric offensives concurrently on its eastern and western borders. The situation in Jammu and Kashmir however has undergone a sea change. The counter-insurgency campaign has shifted into higher gear and it is getting higher value targets. Once fatigue sets in amongst the people they will begin to turn against the cause of the their misery - the terrorist cadres. Is it endgame in Kashmir now? It all depends on how the politicians play the game from now on. Are our interlocutors then preparing a road map for surrender even as we win on the battlefields?

Srinagar sightings

he joint operation by Jammu and Kashmir Police and the Army that finally got Abdullah Ooni in Sopore recently was another indicator of a hugely successful year for counter-insurgency operations in the troubled state. Success in this case is being measured in the number of important militant leaders being killed in operations over the last year. And the list suggests very important things for the Jammu and Kashmir watchers. The number of leaders killed within this year reads like a who’s who of district chiefs upwards. It includes Pakistan born and local terrorists. From the 1st March and the successful operation to get Shabbir Qureshi, battalion commander at Tral, of the Jaish-e-Mohammad, to Ooni recently the successes have been impressive. ●● Sajad Afghani @ Kari Abu Hamid, Pakistan born and Chief of the JeM in Kashmir Valley. ●● Qari Zubair, Divisional Commander of the JeM. Also Pakistan born. ●● Umair @ Hafiz, the Pakistan born battalion commander of the JeM. ●● Ashan Bhai, the Pakistan born district commander of the JeM. ●● Chhota Kalimullah, the Pakistan born divisional commander for Hizbul Mujahideen in north Kashmir. ●● Abu Zaid, the district commander of the HM. ●● Sajjad A Dar, the divisional commander for HM in south Kashmir. ●● Kari Saifullah, the Lashkar-e-Taiba divisional commander in central Kashmir. ●● Zebran @ Amir, the Pakistan born LeT district commander in Rajwar. ●● Chota Saad, a Pakistan born LeT battalion commander. ●● Abdul Rehman, the previous LeT district commander in Rajwar. ●● Saqib @ Sohail, the Pakistan born north Kashmir divisional commander for LeT.

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ENDGAME IN KASHMIR?

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

●● Hamad @ Haneef, the Pakistan born Kupwara divisional commander for LeT. ●● Faadullah, the Pakistan born Rajwar divisional commander for LeT; amongst many other terrorists also neutralised.

Pak complicity It is, therefore, surprising, that

Pakistan would open another front in its campaign of aiding terrorist groups, even as it encourages greater infiltration across the Line of Control with India. None of the terrorist leaders killed as mentioned above, or those who were stopped on the LoC, would have been in that situation without some sort of help from Pakistani officialdom. The number of serious encounters on the LoC is upwards of 60 this year. This is

only the number of encounters on LoC where contact was established between the infiltrating party and troops of the Indian Army. That, in itself, comes to at least one major contact per week. Thus, if numbers of those who have managed to infiltrate are also taken into account, with some ending up in a list of dead like the one above, Pakistan’s continuing role remains negative and inclined toward violent options.

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

second anniversary

ENDGAME IN KASHMIR?

Regional Policy Challenges for India

The number of serious encounters on the LoC is upwards of 60 this year. This is only the number of encounters on LoC where contact was established between the infiltrating party and troops of the Indian Army. That, in itself, comes to at least one major contact per week This has been amply borne out by repeated statements from official United States sources. From department appointed spokespersons to Adm Mike Mullen, the outgoing Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the tone and tenor of accusations has been nothing short of surprising. In many ways the language sounds as if spoken by Indian officials or public persons. The principal reason behind this sharp downturn in Pak-US relations is of course the 13 September attack on the US Embassy and International Security Assistance Force HQs in Kabul. The attack lasted almost 20 hours and seemed to have been very sophistically coordinated. While the initial comments accused the Haqqani network of masterminding the attack, the US later changed its position and pointed a finger directly at the ISI. The accusations have been direct, blunt and without any mincing of words. So it seems strange tactics and national strategy, that Pakistan is busy needling countries on its east and west, simultaneously.

Sea change From the social and political trends over the past year or so, it is clear the situation in Jammu and Kashmir has undergone a sea change. Even as the mishandling of last year's youth protests gave way to peaceful protests, if there were any, the counter-insurgency campaign has shifted into higher gear and it getting higher value targets. All of it has only been made possible because of greater information coming from amongst the common populace. And they would only be sharing information if they had developed a trust and confidence with the Army, firstly and the other security forces secondly. Going by the changes happening in the Kashmir Valley it is clear that there

DIPLOMATIC FINESSE

is greater trust and confidence in the Army amongst the civilian population. As a fruit seller remarked recently, ‘earlier we had to hide as soon as we saw a militant or an Army soldier. Both scared us. Now we are only scared of the militant. The Army doesn’t trouble us anymore.’

A fruit seller remarked recently, “earlier we had to hide as soon as we saw a militant or an Army soldier. Both scared us. Now we are only scared of the militant. The Army doesn’t trouble us anymore” In the insurgency counterinsurgency cycle this is an expected development. Once fatigue sets in amongst the people they will begin to turn against the cause of the their misery - the terrorist cadres. But for them to turn the tables the primary role is that of the security forces, in this case the Army. For if the Army is not sensitive to the changes happening and continues its operations without a greater degree of subtlety, then the changes that are imminent will not appear. And the people will continue their sullen relationship with the security force, which is unproductive in any sense.

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

The writer is an army veteran presently Director of Sasia Security-Risks.com Pvt. Ltd., a South Asian security risk and knowledge management consultancy. His most recent book is, “Securing India: Assessment of Security and Defence Capabilities”.

Regional relations and economy are principal factors which will determine India’s status as an emerging power and also aspirations for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. There are good prospects particularly with the eastern neighbours including Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar, but it is the north-west which may pose difficulties and how the foreign office is able to balance national interests with discontinuities will determine the way ahead

The turnaround, therefore, depends as much on the people as it does on the Army. The timing of which is a sheer chance and confluence of events. Going by the mood and recent operational successes the Kashmir Valley may well have entered that phase now. But for it to be sustained the key element is political appreciation and development. The Kashmir ball is now in the court of the politicians and it is for them to play it well so as to benefit the people. Recourse to hyperbole will not help them or the people anymore. Amongst the most oft-repeated comments amongst the people in Srinagar recently was the status of the Mirwaiz after another round of WikiLeaks revelations. The people were unequivocal in declaring a decline in his standing in light of the WikiLeaks cables. It is for the politicians, thence, to pick up the mantle now that the constitutionally unanswerable are even more discredited than them. The confluence is uncanny, with the Army and the people having developed a working equilibrium. It is for the politicians to get their act together and join the mood of change in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Brig Rahul Bhonsle

A very perceptive environmental scan of the South Asian Region and the challenges it presents to Indian diplomacy. The newly appointed foreign secretary was greeted by Talibani rockets in Kabul and has therefore been battle inoculated. Relations with Pakistan present the biggest challenge and this has ramifications for our future relations with the strategic State of Afghanistan. Nepal also presents major challenges that will need to be resolved in the months ahead. The writer feels that the forthcoming SAARC summit presents opportunities that India must exploit to the hilt.

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

second anniversary

n a globalised world, a month they say is a long time in a job at the helm of the foreign policy establishment of a country. Mr Ranjan Mathai India’s new Foreign Secretary who took over on 1 August may have soon experienced this reality, for even though he is the lead manager of the Foreign Service bureaucracy in the Ministry of External Affairs presently housed in South Block, his principal beat remains South Asia. Thus viewing India’s regional policy challenges from the perspective of the new Foreign Secretary may be relevant at this juncture. With so much happening in the neighbourhood, Mr Mathai may have had a taste of things to come after the rather staid tenure as India’s Ambassador to France. Unlike his predecessors be it Ms Nirupama Rao, Mr Shiv Shanker Menon or Mr Shyam Saran, Mr Mathai does not have a very long exposure in the region which may be an advantage as he could get some fresh perspectives avoiding the stereotype.

term interests is another key vector that would nag the policy makers in South Block. Against this backdrop what would be the challenges in management of regional policy? Pakistan continues and will remain a principal foreign policy challenge for India in the foreseeable future despite resumption of the much heralded dialogue epitomised by meeting between the two Foreign Ministers in the end of July. There is no relief to India on the counter terrorism front from Islamabad as it remains unwilling to address India’s main concern not just in the past and present but also in the near to medium term future keeping in view pull-out of Western forces from Afghanistan in 2014.

Different wavelengths

South Asia in normal times remains a challenged neighbourhood; today with tectonic political and economic shifts in the region, marred by insecurity in the north-west, to sustain India’s national interest would require balancing divergent external and internal pulls and pressures. Given that the region remains geographically, socially and culturally interlinked bilateral differences frequently transgress internal space as was evident in the most recent case of Sri Lanka and Bangladesh where politics of Tamil Nadu and West Bengal respectively has had a major influence in shaping relationship.

The difference in perception on counter terrorism is clearly evident in statements on Indo-Pak Foreign Minister Talks in respective legislatures, the Parliament in India by Mr S M Krishna and National Assembly in Pakistan by Ms Hina Rabbani Khar. While Mr Krishna devoted two full length paragraphs as per the Ministry of External Affairs Press Release on counter terrorism including the Mumbai terrorist attack, Ms Khar’s statement was a one liner at para 11, “The Indian side reiterated concerns on terrorism and Mumbai trial case.” Clearly the two sides are on different wavelengths and Pakistan has rebuffed India’s attempts to put this issue in the front window very deftly. Mr Mathai may find himself clearly challenged to change this perception in Islamabad for tangible progress to be made on other issues despite all that is going on in the form of Confidence Building Measures on Track I and II fronts.

The reality of politics of a coalition government with partners as mercurial as West Bengal Chief Minister Ms Mamata Banerjee and equally unpredictable opponents of sorts as Ms Jayalalitha in Tamil Nadu are factors which have to be nuanced in regional relations. A seemingly weak central government though pursuing a practical foreign policy keeping in view India’s long

Afghanistan is another area where India will have to reshape its policies with reality of reconciliation implying some form of involvement of Taliban in the future order in Kabul. While United States has assured New Delhi during the Strategic Dialogue in July 2011 of protecting India’s interests during the phase of transfer, there would be a need for making realistic assumptions to

Pulls and pressures

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October 2011 Defence AND security alert

ensure that we continue to have a say in the sweepstakes in not just the post West scenario in Kabul but also possibly a post Karzai one. The President’s tenure would be over by 2014 and he has declared that he would not try to push the constitutional envelope which only permits two tenures to seek Presidential office again. Reshaping Afghan policy to meet the transitions underway should be a key challenge for the Foreign Secretary. To the north in Nepal the peace process remains stalled due to differences within the Unified CPN M or the Maoists even though Mr Baburam Bhattarai, Deputy Chairman of the Party has been elected the Prime Minister and he has quickly assumed charge galvanising the moribund administration into action after a long time. But stability depends on support by the Madhesi parties and how much Mr Bhattarai and Chairman Prachanda are able to overcome resistance from Party hardliners led by Mohan Vaidya and willingness to compromise interests of the majority hill community to appease leadership from the Terai. Constitution drafting is another grey area and with 30 November being the deadline.

The South Asian Forum meet in Delhi on 8 and 9 September is a good initiative but conduct of SAARC will determine how various multilateral arrangements fructify. The wheel however may turn full circle with much depending on Indo-Pakistan equations during the Summit India’s Nepal policy has been adrift for some time now due to accusations of interference but with a new Ambassador Mr Jayanta Prasad who has experience of operating in difficult situations his last ambassadorial assignment being in Kabul, there is hope that anti-India sentiment will die down. Nevertheless Kathmandu will continue to remain a headache of sorts for New Delhi. Bhutan which traditionally is the first halt for every foreign secretary on taking over may not pose many challenges given that New Delhi and

Thimpu enjoy trust and have been long term allies. One issue that may come up is settlement of the border issue between China and Bhutan with some indications of a possible swap or recompense by Thimpu which would have to be examined in the light of impact on India’s security concerns astride the Chumbi Valley and also larger boundary parleys with Beijing. With the Prime Minister’s visit to Dhaka on 6 and 7 September, Indo-Bangladesh relations have passed a watershed though not literally for the Teesta River water sharing agreement could not be finalised. This and transit will remain thorny issues which will require patience and many rounds of negotiations. To an extent the National Security Adviser Mr Shiv Shanker Menon and the Bangladesh Foreign Policy adviser to the Prime Minister Mr Gowher Rizvi may take the lead, but ministerial follow up will continue to remain a major factor for conclusion of treaties to meet the diverse requirements of both sides tempered by internal politics. Myanmar reportedly has undertaken operations against the militant groups on its territory from India’s north-east. The government is also under political transition and it would be important to call the right shots as a competition with China appears inevitable in this region rich in resources. Whether India’s parting gift to former de facto head of state, Senior General Than Shwe on a state visit to Bodh Gaya just

before he relinquished power will reap dividends in a regime which is outwardly reconciling with Nobel laureate Aung Suu Kyi remains to be seen. In Sri Lanka devolution of power acceptable to all sides will remain a principal challenge given that there is no compromise solution in sight. The Rajapaksa government enjoying a comfortable majority in the Parliament and staving off international pressures on issues as human rights and crimes against humanity during last phase of the war with the Liberation of Tamil Tigers Ealam (LTTE) with support by China is not yet willing to offer an acceptable solution to the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) representing the Tamils of the north. While India’s peripatetic High Commissioner Mr Ashok Kantha has set a good pace in implementation of various development projects to win over the people, unless there is a change of heart in the top hierarchy his stellar efforts may not fructify into tangible gains. Here balancing occasional tantrums in Tamil Nadu which has an impact on the ongoing dialogue with the Sri Lankan government and poaching by fishermen will be live issues which may take up a lot of time.

Regional relations With the SAARC summit in Maldives in November, guiding the atoll nation may be one of the primary tasks for the Indian foreign

office which has very rightly funded this venture in this small nation of over 3,00,000 people challenged by literally going under the sea due to impact of climate change. The South Asian Forum meet in Delhi on 8 and 9 September is a good initiative but conduct of SAARC will determine how various multilateral arrangements fructify. The wheel however may turn full circle with much depending on Indo-Pakistan equations during the Summit. In Thimpu, Dr Manmohan Singh and his Pakistani counterpart were persuaded to go for a quiet walk in the garden to resolve differences by other SAARC heads of States who were very clearly unhappy the way in which Indo-Pakistan acrimony was holding the regional grouping hostage. There has been some progress thereafter in what is known as the Thimpu spirit. Will Male too generate a similar bonhomie remains to be seen. Regional relations and economy are principal factors which will determine India’s status as an emerging power and also aspirations for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. There are good prospects particularly with the eastern neighbours including Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar, but it is the north-west which may pose difficulties and how the foreign office is able to balance national interests with discontinuities will determine the way ahead.

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

second anniversary

Arundhati Ghose The writer joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1963 and served as Ambassador in Egypt, South Korea and as Permanent Representative to UNESCO and to the UN Offices in Geneva. As Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva she etched in indelible words the sovereign resolve of the Indian nation never to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Her words reverberate in Indian hearts to this day. She told the world in measured, authoritative tones that India would never sign the CTBT. “Not now! Not ever!”.

India is trying to adjust to a friendly relationship with a much more powerful and influential power and the US, with an emerging, democratic country that instinctively shuns alliances. Precisely because both are democracies, there is a limit to which one can push the other in pursuit of its own interests. Conversely, for this reason, there is more in common between both countries in terms of strategic interests

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INTRACTABLE?

An interesting overview of the strategic challenges and opportunities in India’s foreign relations. The writer, a career diplomat argues that India has established fairly equable relations with Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka, as also with the Indian Ocean islands, significant to India’s security perceptions. Pakistan remains the most intractable challenge, notwithstanding the current phase of on-going engagement. Pakistan’s current attitude of defiance on the one hand and indifference to the inevitable consequences of her policies on her own stability on the other, is bolstered mainly by the unquestioning support she seems to receive from China. It needs to be made clear to Pakistan and her supporters that any new Mumbai-like attack will lead to a Cold Start like response. The SinoPak nexus, particularly in the military and nuclear fields, makes India’s relations with both a matter of considerable concern. The dilemma faced by India is to deal with the consequences of China’s assertiveness and its seeming willingness to tweak established global rules.

lobal turmoil and uncertainties having made international relations unpredictable, finding the proper balance between caution and boldness has defined internal decision making and external actions. India may be emerging on the world stage, but she is essentially a developing country in transition, from a low income to a middle income one. As a result, her strategic options are either constrained or, on the other hand, are open to opportunities to previously closed courses of action. This is particularly true in a period of growing globalisation and global interdependence.

India’s objectives In a recent perspicacious speech, India’s National Security Adviser underlined the drivers that determine the country’s internal and external security policies (and, I would add, which would seem to reflect a broad national consensus): he said “the goal of our internal and external security policies (must be) ... the transformation of India ... If we have consistently sought to avoid external entanglements or outside restraints on our freedom of choice and action it is because we have been acutely conscious of this overriding priority (which he had earlier defined as the social and economic development of the people of India) and wanted nothing to come in the way of its pursuit.“ If this is indeed the case, our internal imperatives would, therefore, determine our external policies and this would seem to imply that, in most cases, our initiatives at the international level would be limited to those where only our direct interests are involved; in all other cases, we would have to work to attain the space,

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

India in Transition

Strategic challenges and opportunities

time and elbow room required to reach the goals we have set for ourselves. In a period of transition, with limits to our capabilities, such an approach would appear to be appropriate, requiring, however, delicate, political and diplomatic and even military, coordination, which is not immediately perceptible.

In need of a stable and peaceful environment, instability in the neighbourhood becomes an obstacle to the achievement of India’s objectives. At the moment, India appears to have established fairly equable relations with Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka, as also with the Indian Ocean islands, significant to India’s security perceptions, the Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles The most direct challenges to the attainment of India’s objectives are nowhere more evident than in her immediate neighbourhood. Apart from China, all the other countries are, by and large, nascent democracies in whose perceptions of their own security and well-being India plays a significant role. In need of a stable and peaceful environment, instability in the neighbourhood becomes an obstacle to the achievement of India’s objectives. At the moment, India appears to have established fairly equable relations with Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar and Sri Lanka, as also with the Indian Ocean islands, significant to India’s security perceptions, the Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles. A beginning to reestablish more balanced relations with Nepal, a country where China has already made deep inroads, appears to be underway. Stability in a friendly

Afghanistan is today an international, rather than a bilateral issue; India’s engagement with some of the key players remains opaque. There is an obvious need, without public clarity if the situation so demands, for a more proactive involvement at the regional and international levels to ensure that an outcome reasonably acceptable to us, is reached. While it would appear that some progress has been made in the direction of creating an immediate environment more conducive to a stable region, several extremely difficult problems remain.

Pakistan remains the most intractable challenge, notwithstanding the current phase of on-going engagement. It is not only the hostility towards India that is embedded in that country’s foreign policies, but its internal instability and its economic, social and political spiral towards a situation that may well spill over the frontiers into India. There are no easy or ready solutions to the challenge of cross-border terrorism under a nuclear shield, nor to the turbulence that currently engulfs that country.

US influence in that country is at an all time low; relations with Saudi Arabia are today, perhaps, strengthened as the latter looks to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal for reassurance in a situation where Iran’s nuclear intentions remain opaque. However, Pakistan’s current attitude of defiance on the one hand and indifference to the inevitable consequences of her policies on her own stability on the other, is bolstered mainly by the unquestioning support she seems to receive from China.

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

second anniversary Sino-Pak nexus

It is clear that India will have to deal with this challenge at several levels. Each level would also have to be nuanced; bilaterally, while remaining engaged with Pakistan and seeking to assure her of India’s non-aggressive intentions, this will have to be done from a position of stated strength: risks will have to be taken as it needs to be made clear to Pakistan and her supporters that any new Mumbai-like attack will lead to a Cold Start like response. At the same time, diplomatic emphasis will have to be placed on the US, Saudi Arabia and most difficult, but not impossible, on China, that ‘restraint’ would, in that event, no longer be a viable response. The coordination of the diplomatic and military, the political and, if necessary, the economic and commercial, should be a major objective to enable India to deal with this most complex of situations. The Sino-Pak nexus, particularly in the military and nuclear fields, makes India’s relations with both a matter of considerable concern. While China is an immediate neighbour, it is also a global economic power, a power that has begun to flex her muscle not only bilaterally but globally as well. The dilemma faced by India is to deal with the consequences of China’s assertiveness and its seeming willingness to tweak established global rules - whether those of the non-proliferation regime or of the Law of the Sea - while simultaneously maintaining a balanced relationship with that country which would give us the time and space to deal with her internal imperatives. Seeing itself as a rival hegemon to the US - both globally and in Asia, China has viewed with suspicion India’s growing relationship with the US, a suspicion which seems to have grown stronger after the engagement between the latter countries following the Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement. At the same time, China itself is also facing a period of transition; whether she maintains the current equilibrium or moves towards hard-line postures, fuelled both by her undoubted economic successes and an increase in the say of the military, is a situation being watched with some care and concern by the world and particularly by most of her neighbours.

second anniversary

INTRACTABLE? A kind of fragile balance in the bilateral relationship would seem to exist - constant consultations, a burgeoning commercial relationship and cooperation in groups such as BASIC, BRICS and in the G-20, has not prevented a continuous strain in ties on issues relating to the Sino-Pak nuclear nexus, provocative behaviour by the Chinese in POK, Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh; no doubt the Chinese also view our actions in, for example, the South China Sea, in the same light.

The Sino-Pak nexus, particularly in the military and nuclear fields, makes India’s relations with both a matter of considerable concern. While China is an immediate neighbour, it is also a global economic power, a power that has begun to flex her muscle - not only bilaterally but globally as well. The dilemma faced by India is to deal with the consequences of China’s assertiveness Less threatening but no less complex is the new relationship that is growing with the United States, which for all its current economic woes, continues to be the world’s single super power and whose support is essential to the resolution of the many global challenges. The difficulty in managing the relationship lies in the baggage of earlier adversarial relations; today, India is trying to adjust to a friendly relationship with a much more powerful and influential power and the US, with an emerging, democratic country that instinctively shuns alliances. Precisely because both are democracies, there is a limit to which one can push the other in pursuit of its own interests. Conversely, for this reason, there is more in common between both countries in terms of strategic interests. The process of learning is going to be long and, at times, rocky, leading to disappointment on both sides. There is no doubt, however, that, while India should defend her strategic interests on her own, she will have to, for the foreseeable future, given the obvious current limitations to her power, work in coalitions of like-minded countries on specific issues, including the US.

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

NEW BATTLEGROUND

Damming and Diverting

the Brahmaputra Claude Arpi The writer is a senior journalist and author of repute. He specialises in geopolitics and Indo-EU (Indo-French) relations.

Challenges at the global level are more subtle: international institutions, regimes and rules that exist covering most areas of international relations, have all been set up before India had any significant say in their establishment. Being aware that India has, as has China, benefited from the present world order, there is a universal recognition that some adaptations are inevitable and that some institutions will have to eventually change to reflect new realities. This is not going to be an easy process, as the established powers are unlikely to cede global power with grace; for example, the G-20 which started with such promise, was not convened to deal with the current economic crisis in the West. It was the G-7 which has been meeting, albeit with little success. The discussions on the expansion of the UN Security Council are, at a level, faced with similar problems. India has yet to clearly identify her priorities in the changes she might want and the shape in which she would want the international discourse to flow. While this might be difficult in a period of transition, it is important that at least issues be identified and options, approaches and strategies prepared on those areas that are likely to impact India’s internal priorities the most, so that we are prepared for an appropriate time to advance our interests.

In 1950, the farsighted Chinese seized Tibet, the Water Tower of Asia. This made China the sole upper riparian to all the downstream countries of Asia.

Though the Indian Foreign Minister affirmed in Parliament that the Zangmu dam, the first dam of a string of 6 dams being built on the Yarlong Tsangpo “is no cause of concern to India as it is a ‘run of the river’ dam”, the ‘diversion’ scheme is a serious issue, as is the purported 38 GW power station (nearly thrice the size of the Three Gorges dam) planned at the Great Bend, close to the Indian border. But the diversion scheme and the mega dam are clearly two separate projects

Today, China needs energy. Where does one find the highest hydropower potential in the world? On the Tibetan plateau. China needs water. China can’t import water, but where are the sources of the main Asian rivers? In Tibet. It is now planning a 38,000 MW dam on the Brahmaputra, that will be three times bigger than the Three Gorges dam. The seismic conséquences could be disasterous for the region. Some ten years ago, a Chinese engineer Li Ling and a retired PLA General Gao Kai, seriously worked on the diversion scheme. This was subsequently dismissed. However, in April 2011, the website 2point6billion.com quoted Wang Guangqian, a scholar of the Chinese Academy of Sciences saying: “Chinese experts have raised a new proposal to divert water from the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra River to the country’s north-western province of Xinjiang”. When it makes its calculations, Beijing will also have to take into account the cost of a serious conflict with India. The price of water may then become exorbitant. How prepared are we today for such a serious conflict? Tibet is fast emerging as a serious battleground. October 2011 Defence AND security alert

second anniversary

he Yarlung Tsangpo or Brahmaputra as it is known in India, has an immense bearing on the lives of hundreds of millions in the sub-continent. Originating from a glacier near Mt Kailash, it is one of the longest rivers on the Tibetan plateau. It is considered to be the highest river on earth with an average altitude of 4,000 meters. It runs 2,057 kilometers in Tibet before flowing into India, where it becomes the Brahmaputra. One of its interesting characteristics is the sharp U turn (known as the Great Bend) it takes at the proximity of Mt Namcha Barwa (7,782 meters) near the Indian border. Like the Nile in Egypt, the Yarlung Tsangpo has fed the Tibetan civilisation which flourished along its valleys, particularly in central Tibet. The Yarlung Tsangpo enters in India in Siang district of Arunachal Pradesh. When it penetrates Assam, it is joined by two other rivers (the Dihang and Lohit). In Assam, the Brahmaputra has always been considered as the very soul of the state by poets and ordinary folk alike. The valley has fertile farmland, with large areas covered with sal forests, a valuable tree that yields resin. Entering Bangladesh, the river unites with the Ganga and is known as the Padma, before becoming the Meghna-Brahmaputra after merging with the river Meghna. Finally it divides into hundreds of channels to form a vast delta which flows into the Bay of Bengal.

The hydro projects One needs to understand the rationale of the Chinese government to grasp the importance of mega hydro projects on Tibetan rivers for the Chinese leadership in Beijing. ●● China needs energy. Where does one find the highest hydropower potential in the world? Answer: On the Tibetan plateau. ●● China needs water. China can’t import water, but where are the sources of the main Asian rivers? Answer: In Tibet. A few years ago, the media

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NEW BATTLEGROUND reported that China was planning one of the most important components of the ‘western route’ diversion scheme at the Great Bend. This pharaonic project is to be the most mind-blowing part “of the national strategy to divert water from rivers in the south and west to drought-stricken northern areas.”

engineer Li Ling and a retired PLA General Guo Kai, seriously worked on the diversion scheme. Li Ling published a book called Tibet’s Waters will Save China in which he detailed the diversion scheme, also known as Shuomatan Canal (from Suma Tan in central Tibet to Tanjing in China).

The projects of damming the Brahmaputra and diverting its waters towards the mainland are often mixed up. Though the Indian Foreign Minister affirmed in Parliament that the Zangmu dam, the first dam of a string of 6 dams being built on the Yarlong Tsangpo “is no cause of concern to India as it is a ‘run of the river’ dam”, the ‘diversion’ scheme is a serious issue, as is the purported 38 GW power station (nearly thrice the size of the Three Gorges dam) planned at the Great Bend, close to the Indian border. But the diversion scheme and the mega dam are clearly two separate projects.

At that time, ‘experts’ denounced the plans of Li Ling and Guo Kai; Qin Hui, a professor in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences of Tsinghua University declared: “We have to take the international response into consideration. It is undoubted that the lower reaches of Yarlung Tsangpo River are within India’s Assam Province, where it is a lifeline for local agriculture and backbone of the economy, just as it is further downstream in Bangladesh.”

The mega hydropower plant Let us first have a look at the mega hydropower plant. On July 17, 2003 The People’s Daily published a small item “China to Conduct Feasibility Study on Hydropower Project in Tibet” It ran thus: “China plans to conduct a feasibility study in October on the construction of a major hydropower project on the Yarlung Zangbo River, in the Tibet Autonomous Region … an expert team [was sent] to the area for preliminary work between late June and early July. The Chinese section of the river boasts a water energy reserve of about 100 gigawatts, or one sixth of the country’s total, ranking second behind the Yangtze River. The location for the possible hydropower plant is the U-shaped turn of the river in the south-eastern part of Tibet. The river drops by 2,755 meters in the 500 kilometer-long ‘U’ section.”

The diversion of the Brahmaputra was again in the news in November 2006 when President Hu Jintao visited India. China had decided to assuage the legitimate worries of the Indian government. China's Water Resources Minister Wang Shucheng, a hydraulic engineer himself, affirmed that the proposal was “unnecessary, unfeasible and unscientific. There is no need for such dramatic and unscientific projects.” However in April 2011, the website 2point6billion.com quoted Wang Guangqian, a scholar of the Chinese Academy of Sciences saying: “Chinese experts have raised a new proposal to divert water from the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra River to the country’s north-western province of Xinjiang. The water diversion route in the proposal, named the ‘Grand Western Canal’, is slightly different from the ‘Western Canal’ mentioned in China’s well-known South-North Water Diversion Project.”

The diversion scheme

Wang explained the Chinese rationale: “Faced with severe challenges brought by reduced water resources and a severe drought that has affected a large portion of the country, China has started to consider diverting water from the Brahmaputra River.”

The ‘diversion’ scheme is another story. Some ten years ago, a Chinese

Prof Wang Guangqian seems to say that China has no choice but to do it.

Though very few people noted it, the cat was out of the bag. Later Chinese maps showing a 38 gigawatts plant appeared on the Internet.

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

exchanged places in an instant, hundreds of villages were swallowed up, the Brahmaputra River was completely rerouted and for hours afterwards, sky over the southeastern Tibet glowed with an infernal red light, diffused with the pungent scent of sulphur.“ It is a fact that the course of the Brahmaputra changed during those few hours. In the postFukushima scenario, this is a crucial factor.

Other factors

An article by Zhang Ke, a reporter at China Business News gave more information. Wang Guangqian’s proposal, known as the Major Western Route, has been inspired by the work of Guo Kai: “Everybody gets really excited when they hear about it”. Today, China has less and less water and is looking at how to get it. Scientists can look to two possible directions, from the sea (Bohai Sea1) or the mountains (Tibetan plateau). According to Li Ling, the Institute of Advanced Technology at the Chinese Academy of Sciences is using supercomputers and data modelling to simulate the Major Western Route and evaluate its feasibility. Li admitted that “an initial simulation of the proposal has already been produced in Shenzhen, but limitations in the data used to create it means it cannot be made public.” This lack of data is probably one of the weaknesses of the project, though Li is convinced that it is doable.

Seismic region It is necessary to go back to an event in 1950. In the evening of August 15, a terrible earthquake shook eastern Tibet. "This was no ordinary earthquake; it felt like the end of the world", wrote Robert Ford, the British Radio operator working in eastern Tibet. “Mountains and valleys

Other factors have to be taken into consideration. One, hydropower lobbies have a financial interest in ‘concretising’ the project(s) as soon as possible. Dams, whether in India, Africa or Tibet, mean big business and the large Chinese corporations will continue to lobby hard to get the projects through. The second vital factor is the cost-benefit perspective. The Chinese leadership is very down-to-earth, rational. A friend who worked on the issue told me: “If the price of transferring water is cheaper than conservation or getting water from the sea, China will go ahead.” There is no doubt that in the end it will be a political decision, but the fact remains that China today badly needs water: ●● To stop the desertification in Xinjiang, Gansu and Inner Mongolia ●● To have the Yellow river flowing again ●● To feed its people If such grandiose and seemingly unrealisable projects are even thought of, it is because the situation is quite desperate and nobody is able to foresee any ‘realisable’ solution. But before taking a hurried decision, Beijing should look again into the disastrous performance of the Three Gorges dam. Another issue is that the two first sections of the ‘diversion’ scheme (the eastern and central parts in the mainland) are running into serious technical and human difficulties. The project faces

several problems: the construction has been seriously delayed (a very unusual phenomenon in China). The costs have overshot the estimates and last, but not the least, waters are reaching their destination polluted.

However in April 2011, the website 2point6billion.com quoted Wang Guangqian, a scholar of the Chinese Academy of Sciences saying: “Chinese experts have raised a new proposal to divert water from the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra River to the country’s north-western province of Xinjiang. The water diversion route in the proposal, named the ‘Grand Western Canal’, is slightly different from the ‘Western Canal’ mentioned in China’s well-known South-North Water Diversion Project” The problems may be different for the Great Western Diversion (or even for the ‘Small’ Western Diversion), but the delay and difficulties of the eastern and central parts are certainly an issue to be considered by the political ‘deciders’. When it makes its calculations, Beijing will also have to take into account the cost of a serious conflict with India. The price of water may then become exorbitant.

The solution: A water treaty The only solution seems to lie in bringing the matter to the negotiating table. If a river-water treaty could be signed between India and Pakistan in the early sixties, why cannot a similar agreement be made between China, India and Bangladesh, in order to assure a decent life for all in the region? The Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses adopted by the UN in 1997 (though not yet an international law, because not ratified by enough nations), could serve as a model for bilateral or multilateral treaties / conventions with China. But is Beijing interested?

The diversion of the Brahmaputra is in competition with another diversion: to take water from the Bohai Sea, the innermost gulf of the Yellow Sea on the coast of north-eastern China and push it to Xinjiang.

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

second anniversary

Lt Gen Sudhir Sharma PVSM, AVSM, YSM, VSM (retd) The writer is a graduate of the Staff College at Camberley (UK) and commanded his unit as part of IPKF in Sri Lanka and later Jammu and Kashmir. He was Military Adviser, Indian High Commission at London (UK). He retired as the Quarter Master General of the Army, wherein he made major contribution in modernising the logistic chain management of the forces. Decorated twice by the President for his exemplary service and devotion, he is an MPhil in defence studies. He writes on strategic issues and gives lectures on decision making and positivity to the corporate sector.

China has been facing major draught in recent years and is desperate to garner for itself all possible fresh water resources. It has a unique status as country with the largest number of headwaters and from which maximum rivers flow across its boundaries. It has water disputes with most of its riparian neighbouring States, yet significantly, it is not a signatory by accident or design to any legally enforceable water sharing treaty. It is also not a signatory to the UN water courses convention 1997

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TITANIC RIVALRY

A very timely warning forecast by a former corps commander of the critical 16 Corps. Despite political bonhomie and diplomatic niceties, the distrust between the two countries is growing. Whilst Indo-Pak tensions are more intense, yet they remain localised to South Asia at best. On the other hand Sino-Indian rivalries have the potential of being played out on the international stage and in multiple arenas. China is much more wary of Indian naval growth and its expanding strategic footprint rather than of the Indian Army. The writer lists four critical fault lines that could lead to tensions sooner rather than later. These are energy and mineral resources in the South China Sea and the freedom of the global commons, water wars over the Brahmaputra, the long festering border dispute and China’s hostile stance over Jammu and Kashmir and POK in particular. The strategic space in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean is finite and confrontation or a misadventure is sooner than later inevitable. The mandarins of our Defence Ministry would do well to heed these warnings and speed up the glacial pace of our arms acquisitions.

ndo-Chinese relations tenuous at best seem headed for a period of escalating rivalry and heightened rhetoric. India’s assertive stance in response to the recent face off between the two aspiring super powers in the South China Sea is a pointer to the changing geo-strategic equations in the region. Both countries cruising on a high growth trajectory will increasingly find more areas of divergence in the coming decade as they seek to carve out their respective spheres of influence and affluence. The fault lines papered over in the past by political necessity appear to be widening as the new world order fashioned by world economic downturn brings to fore the growing aspirations of more resilient and confident nation-States. So are we back to the muscle flexing days of bluff and counter-bluff of the 1960’s era? Maybe not, but one can see credible shrinking of space for diplomatic manoeuvre as both sides harden their stance in furtherance of core national interests. A few factors impinge on how the two populous Asian giants deal with each other. The first unnerving feature of the relationship is, that despite being neighbours the two nations hardly know each other as well as they should. Therefore despite political bonhomie and diplomatic niceties, the distrust between the two countries is growing. Another aspect which is at play more so in China is the nationalistic fervour of its people, especially the restive younger generation. It would surprise many in India to know that a fair majority of Chinese people do not much care for Indians and consider the country to be aggressive and anti-China. The communist party is no longer as firmly in control of

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

its populace as in the past. Consequently it has much lesser manouevre space than one would like to believe, to be seen to be making a compromise to an inimical neighbour. The same also holds true for India. Most Indians have a basic mistrust of China and see it not only as an economic and military threat but also as an all weather friend of Pakistan, conspiring with it and harming Indian interests. India also feels that China is jealous of India’s progress and influence on the world stage and at each opportunity thwarts its just aspirations. Any Indian political leader showing any accommodation or softness towards China faces harsh media and political criticism. Thus on both sides strong public opinion leaves limited options to the leadership to carve out acceptable solutions to vexed problems.

The incident underscores acute Chinese sensitivity to the South China Sea where the stakes for it are very high. The most serious incident of course is the latest face-off between the two countries wherein India has firmly decided to go ahead with oil exploration in two blocks leased by Vietnam in its territorial waters in the South China Sea It is worth repeating that while Indo-Pak tensions are much more intense, yet they remain localised to South Asia at best. On the other hand Sino-Indian rivalries have the potential of being played out on the international stage and in multiple arenas. Let me spell out a few existing fault lines, each of which, or a combination of some can

INDIA-CHINA:

EMERGING FAULT LINES

exacerbate latent tensions and bring them to a flash point.

Maritime rivalry Some of us may find it difficult to believe but China is much more wary of Indian naval growth and its expanding strategic footprint rather than of the Indian Army or the

vulnerabilities if any of its long land borders. It has a deep and abiding mistrust of the blue water ambitions of India and its concomitant force projection capabilities. As late as August this year China sailed out for sea trials of its first refurbished aircraft carrier The Varyag, from Dalian which was bought from Ukraine in 1997. While little is known of its weapons

and aircraft load the four day sea trials were reported to be successful. It is building a second carrier which may sail out in a few years. China is also feverishly building submarines and other warships to further augment its naval might. It is believed to have already perfected its submarine based Carrier-Killer ballistic missile with a range of 1,500 Kms. India on

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

second anniversary

the other hand is deeply suspicious of Chinese port building and connected maritime activities in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and of course Pakistan. The deep water port at Gwadar in Pakistan is a major force multiplier for China granting as it does ‘Sovereign Guarantees’ to China for its usage. It is also planning a pipe line from Gwadar to Kashi to avoid using the Indian dominated Straits of Malacca. China is also contemplating a canal at Kra in Thailand to link the Bay of Bengal with the South China Sea, once again to have unhindered access to the Indian Ocean and avoid the Malacca Straits. The Hambantota port and bunker facility it built in Sri Lanka is barely six nautical miles away from an Indian Ocean shipping route. India rightly feels that China, in a well thought out plan is creating a ring around the Indian maritime zone with a view to interfere in India’s rightful area of influence and exclusive economic zone. China too watches with concern the refit of lethal Admiral Gorshkov (renamed INS Vikramaditya) in Russia and the ongoing construction of the two 40,000 ton carriers in Kochi besides the six Scorpene submarines likely to be operational by 2018.

Despite political bonhomie and diplomatic niceties, the distrust between the two countries is growing. Another aspect which is at play more so in China is the nationalistic fervour of its people, especially the restive younger generation It is in this uneasy backdrop that INS Airavat a Shardul class amphibious warfare vessel of the Indian navy paid a visit to Vietnam in July 2011. On 22 July while sailing out from the Vietnamese port of Nha Trang she was reportedly challenged by a Chinese naval vessel and warned that it was in Chinese territorial waters. The vessel as confirmed by Indian reports kept its course and carried on as per plans. The encounter downplayed both by China and India has been noted by analysts and reported by US and Pentagon sources. The incident underscores acute Chinese sensitivity to the South China Sea where the stakes for it are very high. The most serious incident of course is the latest face off between the two countries wherein India has

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TITANIC RIVALRY firmly decided to go ahead with oil exploration in two blocks leased by Vietnam in its territorial waters in the South China Sea. China has reacted rather strongly and in very harsh tones stating that any foray into these waters would be illegal and transgress Chinese sovereignty. As is known the area is disputed and countries like Malaysia, Philippines, Brunei, Taiwan and Vietnam have laid claim to this mineral and oil rich area. India appears determined to assert its legitimate right and proposes to exercise its option for oil exploration with its national oil company ONGC (VIDESH). The coming days are likely to see more dire warnings through Chinese controlled media and an equally tough response from India. China in turn has announced its intent to carry out exploration and mineral search in the South West Indian Ocean in a 10,000 sq km area by its Ocean Minerals Resources Research and Development Association. The stage is thus set in the coming years for the two emerging maritime powers to venture out to dominate their perceived areas of influence, protect their sea lanes, economic interests and scout for energy and minerals to feed their insatiable needs. However the strategic space in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean is finite and confrontation or a misadventure is sooner than later inevitable. This maritime hostility and mutual suspicion is a perennial and widening fault line which may eventually rupture and lead to a confrontation.

Water wars Water is a scarce resource vital to feed the spiralling needs of both nations. China has been facing major draught in recent years and is desperate to garner for itself all possible fresh water resources. It has a unique status as country with the largest number of headwaters and from which maximum rivers flow across its boundaries. It has water disputes with most of its riparian neighbouring States, yet significantly, it is not a signatory by accident or design to any legally enforceable water sharing treaty. It is also not a signatory to the UN water courses convention 1997. It has dammed

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

nearly all of its water bodies and has the distinction of having the largest number of dams in the world. Having saturated its own rivers China is now increasingly looking to dam those rivers which flow across its national boundaries. In this context China’s interest in damming or diverting the mighty Brahmaputra known as Yarlung Tsangpo which emanates from the glacial region of Mount Kailash / Mansarovar 4,000 meters high in Tibet is a cause of grave concern to India and Bangladesh. While China has denied diverting the river waters it has acknowledged the existence of many run of water dams. However most hardnosed skeptics would take these statements with a pinch of salt as China has steadfastly refused to share information or the blueprints of its many water management programmes with India or any other country. It is also guilty of employing ecologically suspect practices in rivers causing environmental damage downstream. The disastrous Three Gorges dam is a case in point. Since Brahmaputra flows through Arunachal Pradesh an area contested by China the possibility of China using this as a pressure point cannot be ruled out. China has behaved arrogantly in its water resource management refusing to consult or share views with affected nations. A united stand against China by downstream countries looks difficult to achieve due to their own disputes. Water sharing thus has the potential to create major tensions in the region. Climate change is further aggravating this problem and water scarcity and its unfair appropriation by China may lie at the root of a significant fault line.

Border dispute Reports of increased incursions by Chinese troops on Indian soil are often overplayed by the media. Yet tensions along the 4,000 km long border are constant and don’t seem to go away. China’s claim on Arunachal which it calls Southern Tibet and Askai Chin are major stumbling blocks in the normalisation of relations between the two countries. After building the Tibet railway and upgrading its infrastructure and defences in Tibet besides huge silos and tunnels for its missiles, China appears more militarily confident and often adopts

a proactive and hostile posture. India in response has announced a major overhaul of its defence infrastructure in the East and has also set in motion the raising of a mountain corps besides plans for deploying additional military assets. It is rapidly moving from ‘Dissuasive Posture’ to one of ‘Strategic Deterrence’. The consequent increase in troop density and military wherewithal and the assertive posture adopted by both, will eventually lead to a major eyeball confrontation with neither side willing to back down or show any tactical weakness. As the defence assets near completion and all the Indian forces get fully operationalised patrol clashes and increased incursions / misunderstandings will manifest along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) leading to tensions, spurred on by a strident media and political opportunism. Patriotism and national pride will raise temperatures and leave little negotiating space. In this emerging cauldron the derailing of the existing status quo cannot be wished away.

having a dubious record of nuclear proliferation shows that China can hardly be expected to have any moral qualms if it suits its own interests. China is seeking out energy in the same areas where India is also looking for, often pipping it to the post by pumping subsidies or grants to companies bidding on its behalf, the gas deal with Myanmar reflects this attitude aptly.

Energy security

Another irritant which exasperates Indians is the ambivalent policy of China related to Kashmir in general and POK in particular. China’s assistance and involvement in infrastructure projects in POK, assistance in upgrading the Karakoram highway and its tacit support to Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir has severe implications for Sino-Indian relations in the long run. The issue of stapled

China tried very hard to block India’s quest for nuclear fuel at the waiver it sought at the NSG. It was very hard lobbying by US that saved the day. On its part it has gone ahead and offered a one Gigawatt nuclear reactor to Pakistan and is on the verge of inking a civilian nuclear energy cooperation agreement with it. This nuclear deal with a country

POK

visas to residents of Jammu and Kashmir exemplifies the misreading by China of Indian sensitivities. This factor too has a major bearing on overall atmospherics.

Conclusion Our affable Prime Minister Mr Manmohan Singh during the visit of his counterpart Mr Wen Jiabao had remarked that there is enough space in the world to accommodate both China and India. Unfortunately the emerging ground situation is much more complex than the PM’s optimistic forecast. Both nations are growing rapidly economically and militarily in each others backyard, with ever shrinking strategic space and dwindling resources. Both will exert every sinew to reach out for their place in the sun and their paths will invariably cross. With confidence derived from military and economic might neither side would like to back off from an issue seen to impinge on national pride or core interests, thus setting in motion a chain of events with a momentum of their own. Events unfolding in the coming years would call for astute diplomacy, sagacity, wisdom and courage from the leaders of both countries else the emerging fault lines would lead to a tectonic shift which may fracture the tenuous balance of power between the two nations and lead to a situation which neither side wants.

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

second anniversary

Dr (Ms) Navniit Gandhi The writer is a freelancer and an author of repute based in Kuwait.

They were taught some hard lessons in International Political Economy by the Arab nations in 1973, when in order to “influence Western policies towards Israel” (In other words, to teach a lesson to the West) the oil-producing nations of the Middle East connived in unison and raised the price of oil four times and curtailed the supply by 5 per cent

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THEORY OF LINKAGE

An interesting survey of the International political economy. International Political Economy is the study of the dynamic and reciprocal relationship between the pursuit of wealth and the pursuit of power. Henry Kissinger of the US, was an ardent practitioner of this Theory of Linkage – he claims they were taught some hard lessons in International Political Economy by the Arab nations in 1973, when in order to “influence Western policies towards Israel” the oil-producing nations of the Middle East connived in unison and raised the price of oil four times and curtailed the supply by 5 per cent. The Americans developed it into a fine art during Gulf war one and two when Saddam Hussein threatened to seek payment of oil in Euros instead of Dollars. This critical subject merits greater study and analysis in India.

nternational Political Economy is the study of the dynamic and reciprocal relationship between the pursuit of wealth and the pursuit of power. It is not a contemporary phenomenon that certain political actions of nations are found to have economic undertones, while certain economic decisions or policies of nations have underlying political currents. It has been known for quite some time that the pursuit of wealth brings more political power and clout in our lap, while greater political power facilitates the acquisition of equally great economic strength.

Henry Kissinger of the US, was an ardent practitioner of this Theory of Linkage – as he would call it. However, he and other US policy makers all along claimed perfect innocence by pointing out that they never initiated such a linkage and that they were taught some hard lessons in International Political Economy by the Arab nations in 1973, when in order to “influence Western policies towards Israel” (In other words, to teach a lesson to the West) the oil-producing nations of the Middle East connived in unison and raised the price of oil four times and curtailed the supply by 5 per cent.

The overlap is evident, as one glances at the history of mankind even centuries ago. We do not need much effort or evidence to understand that when Britain embarked on the mighty crusades of colonial expansionism, the reasons were less related to the spread of democracy or literacy; the reason was not the pursuit of developmental goals but it was all about the control and exploitation of natural resources – the regular supply of which was required to feed its hungry industries. Centuries before the British too, it was known to rulers and regimes that consolidating political rule and acquiring economic strength are two sides of the same coin. One has to come with the other and neither could exist without the other.

The US, till date, maintains that it was one of the early victims of this use of economic instrument to satisfy political ends. It is a different matter though, that since then the US has acquired admirable degree of notoriety in using this reciprocal and dynamic relationship to foster its national interests. Over the years, this useful relationship has been generally abused and misused for fulfilling strategic objectives. And, it is not just the US that uses the political instruments for economic ends and economic instruments (such as its control over the Brettonwoods system) for gaining political mileage. Yes, it has been arm-twisting and pinching nation-States wherever and whenever it could hurt the most. For example, in our own initial years after independence, aid and food grains were offered to us but, in exchange of India committing its allegiance to the Western Bloc led by it. Our independent course of Foreign Policy was initially frowned upon and then smirked at and later, packages were abruptly withdrawn or terminated too. In contrast, Pakistan demonstrated “good” political behaviour by agreeing to be a satellite State and it keeps getting richly rewarded for the loyalty demonstrated, till date.

From the First World War to the modern-day Gulf War, the political decision of going to war has rarely been guided by ideology or avowed political goals alone. A study of International Political Economy can teach us, by a string of examples, that how a careful balance between the pursuit of wealth and the pursuit of power has been sought to be preserved by shrewd policy makers, worldwide.

Hard lessons One

such

master

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Even when we refused to sign the NPT and the CTBT, there was immense economic

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emerging trends arm-twisting behind the scenes. Our exports were rejected on flimsy grounds and we were made to pay a heavy economic price for our independent political stance on the treaties. Even with other big powers, such as the erstwhile USSR, the US has applied the lessons of International Political Economy, at will. During the period of Détente (relaxation of tensions) it had signed grains deal with the Soviets but only in return of not just the economic price of the food grains but ‘good political behaviour’. However, when the Soviets entered Afghanistan and annoyed the US, the deal was immediately called off-though it caused a surplus in the domestic markets of the US and the prices of food grains crashed down and the farmers protested against that decision and the President lost the next election.

Important instrument It is not just the US, which has learnt and practices the principles of International Political Economy. Almost every nation which can, does. Even the former USSR curtailed in the 1960s trade with its closest comrade - China, so as to make it agree on certain ideological issues.

International Political Economy is the study of the dynamic and reciprocal relationship between the pursuit of wealth and the pursuit of power Even India has used the economic instrument for political ends and vice-versa. For instance, while playing the role of a Big Brother in South Asia, it has threatened Nepal, on several occasions with a proposed

closing down of borders, in order to secure political objectives or to indicate our displeasure at certain political actions of theirs. A very important instrument in the hands of the politically powerful nations is the use of ‘economic sanctions’, for extracting the desired political behaviour. The not-so-friendly-to-the-US regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, Libya and Venezuela and in former Eastern Europe reeled for years under the sanctions imposed by the international community, led by the US. Of course, on rare occasions, the purpose was earnest. For example, sanctions were imposed on South Africa in order to end apartheid. However, irrespective of the purpose, sanctions bring further economic hardship on the masses and political pressure on the rulers.

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Another economic instrument, which the rich and powerful nations use for political ends, is “Aid”. Why is Aid given? To whom? For what? The answers may be all political. Not always for humanitarian purposes; not always to the deserving regimes and certainly not always for noble ends. Most often, the agenda is political. The former USSR often extended economic aid to influence outcome of elections and enable communist rulers to come to power, or to help them to continue to be in power. For most of the cold war, economic assistance given by the US rested on the premise that it contributed to American security. Dollars were liberally granted or loaned to countries, which were of special political significance to the US. The funds were used for facilitating the coming into power of pro-US regimes or for bringing about the fall of anti-American ones. Another reason behind liberally doling out funds was purely economic too. For example, the US has provided nearly US$ 350 billion in economic aid ever since the WW II till about a decade ago. An American study now itself reveals that of all the foreign economic aid provided by the US, it saw to it that about 80 per cent of the aid was used to purchase American products or services.

Present trends What are the trends that are emerging in the present times? Profound changes have taken place in the International Political Economy, over the past decade or so. We have moved beyond ‘interdependence’. Today, we live in a tightly integrated world political economy in which no State is immune from the economic challenges and changes other States face. Every economic event has global and far-reaching repercussions. Today, recession cannot remain a national issue or concern; it is a global concern, as the ripples of it - though emanating from one State - spread far and wide. The implications of any major economic or political decision by one nation are regional or quite likely, global. In short, the stakes are higher now;

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THEORY OF LINKAGE the impact of the use of economic instruments for political ends and vice-versa could be far severe than ever witnessed before. Hence, there is a need to be cautious. The stakes are higher for the nation that uses the instrument and higher for the nation at the receiving end too. For instance, when Saddam Hussein was reeling under economic troubles, he used a political instrument and attacked Kuwait. The US felt threatened with the new-found economic clout Saddam could have. He could have controlled one-fifth of the world oil reserves and could very well hurt American interests or even bargain for the Palestinian cause, in exchange. Obviously, the economic stakes must have been quite crucial, that the US mobilised 28 other nations of the world and launched a major offensive on Iraq. The huge army and the terrible destruction were not just meant to liberate Kuwait but teach Iraq and other potential threats to American interests, a lesson. At the end of it, the US made huge economic profits out of this strategic exercise. The costs of using this Linkage will be further grave, in the years to come. Nuclear Weapons, as we know, have proliferated dangerously. There was a political agenda when Pakistan was liberally showered with weapons and aid. Today, we are all reeling under the impact of what that has led to. Today, China can pinch the US harder economically than ever before. The US, conveniently, ignores the excesses happening in Saudi Arabia and China for fear of their using the economic instrument, but the price of repression shall have to be paid universally one day. The 20-year old Afghan conflict visibly reitrates the use of the economic instrument for political purposes. Afghanistan being the world's largest opium producer and a centre for arms trading, supports a multibillion dollar trade in goods smuggled from Dubai to Pakistan. The criminalised economy not just funds both the Taliban and their adversaries, but has transformed social relations and weakened States and legal economies throughout the region. There has to be intensive and

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CONFRONTATION

extensive brainstorming done at International level, about how shall we cope up or how can damages be minimised when the lessons of International Political Economy are applied for fulfilling parochial selfish ends. Of course, a positive trend is also that there being ‘multilateralism’ in the global power structure, no nation can unilaterally anymore go about damaging global interests, unhindered. People all over the world are ‘conscious’, ‘vigilant’ and the former super powers too are accountable to not just their electorate but to ‘global’ public opinion. Even if a mighty power seeks to impose sanctions, the targeted nation can invent alternatives. Today, India cannot threaten Nepal with as much ease as before as Nepal has pragmatically cultivated cozy ties with China, as well. Its survival at least will not be threatened even if India closes the border and stops crucial supplies. Also, globalisation has improved the prospects for many under-developed and developing nations. For instance, the earlier snubbing and jeering in the Indo-US ties seem to have been forgotten and a spirit of camaraderie is colouring the bilateral ties. The economic gains accruing from India is a major reason behind the softening of their stance towards India on many issues including the NPT. From his recent trip to India, President Obama could take back home gains for the US worth US$ 10 billion and the prospects for creating nearly 50,000 jobs there. We are the largest purchaser of defence equipment and of course, ‘customer’ is always the king. Additionally, we also got to hear some warm endorsement to our bid to gain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. There are no rules laid out in the realm of International Political Economy. The pursuit of wealth and the pursuit of power, cannot however, be allowed to go uninhibited and unrestrained. Using one to achieve the other shall always happen, but increased vigilance demonstrated by the people, media, civil society and International organisations could rightfully restrain.

Dr Harsh V Pant The writer teaches at King’s College, London and is presently a Visiting Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania, USA.

East Asian Waters:

China vs India The South China Sea is rapidly emerging as one of Asia’s critical strategic flashpoints. Fears have been rising in Asia that China is seeking to use its growing maritime might to dominate not only the hydrocarbon-rich waters of the South China Sea but also its crucial shipping lanes, the lifeline of regional economies. India’s efforts to make itself relevant to the region come at a time of great turmoil in the Asian strategic landscape. Beijing has started trying to dictate the boundaries of acceptable behaviour to its neighbours. As a result, regional States have already started reassessing their strategies and a loose anti-China balancing coalition is emerging. India’s role becomes critical in such an evolving balance of power. As China expands its presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, India is staking its own claims in East Asia. Most significant in this regard is India’s growing engagement with Vietnam. Just as China has used States in India’s periphery to contain India, Delhi should build States like Vietnam as strategic pressure points against China to counter it.

India’s efforts to make itself relevant to the region come at a time of great turmoil in the Asian strategic landscape. With its political and economic rise, Beijing has started trying to dictate the boundaries of acceptable behaviour to its neighbours. As a result, regional States have already started reassessing their strategies and a loose anti-China balancing coalition is emerging. India’s role becomes critical in such an evolving balance of power. As Singapore’s elder-statesman Lee Kuan Yew has argued, he would like India to be “part of the Southeast Asia balance of forces” and “a counterweight [to China] in the Indian Ocean”

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s reported by London’s Financial Times on August 31, 2011, an unidentified Chinese warship had demanded that the INS Airavat, an amphibious assault vessel, identifying itself and explain its presence in the South China Sea after the vessel left Vietnamese waters in late July. The Indian warship was completing a scheduled port call in Vietnam and was in international waters. Though the Indian navy promptly denied that a Chinese warship had confronted its assault vessel, it did not completely deny the factual basis of the report.

Smaller states in the region are now looking to India to act as a balancer in view of China’s growing influence and America’s anticipated retrenchment from the region in the near future, while larger States see it as an attractive engine for regional growth Sino-Indian strategic relationship is rapidly evolving and tensions are building up as was underlined in an incident in 2009 when an Indian kilo class submarine and Chinese warships, on their way to the Gulf of Aden to patrol the pirate-infested waters, reportedly engaged in rounds of manoeuvring as they tried to test for weaknesses in each others’ sonar systems. The Chinese media reported that its warships forced the Indian submarine to the surface, which was strongly denied by the Indian Navy.

Hegemonic aspirations? China’s military growth over the last decade has exceeded most forecasts with the Chinese military fielding an operational anti-ship ballistic missile, completing a prototype of its first stealth fighter jet and launching its first aircraft carrier for a maiden run over the course of last one year itself. Chinese capabilities are rapidly growing to an extent where it can challenge the status quo in the Pacific. The PLA Navy will be building several additional aircraft carriers so as to enhance its naval fleet in addition to the Kuznetsov-class carrier The Varyag. It is likely that Beijing will have its first indigenous carrier achieving “operational capability” as early

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confrontation as 2015. The US has also suggested that China’s aircraft-carrier-killing ballistic missile, the DF-21D has reached initial operational capability. In response to the latest Sino-Indian naval incident, the US called for a collaborative diplomatic process on resolving the disputes related to the South China Sea underlining its desire to recognise the right of passage to international waters in the South China Sea. Last year, the US Secretary of State had suggested that South China Sea was of strategic importance to the US and offered to act as a mediator. India too is within its rights to transit through the international waters of South China Sea and Beijing has no right to question the passage though these waters. Of course, China claims the South China Sea in its entirety but its confrontationist posture and rhetoric can easily escalate to a major conflict. The South China Sea is rapidly emerging as one of Asia’s critical strategic flashpoints with some even suggesting that it will be the “military front line” of China in the coming years. Fears have been rising in Asia that China is seeking to use its growing maritime might to dominate not only the hydrocarbon-rich waters of the South China Sea but also its crucial shipping lanes, the lifeline of regional economies. The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, used her visit to Asia last year to signal unequivocally that the US was unwilling to accept China’s push for regional hegemony. When Beijing claimed that it considered its ownership of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea as a “core interest,” Clinton retorted by proposing that the US help establish an international mechanism to mediate the overlapping claims of sovereignty between China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia that now exist in the South China Sea. This new US assertiveness vis-à-vis Beijing has been widely welcomed in the region. The other members of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) strongly endorsed Clinton’s call for multilateral commitment to a code of conduct for the South China Sea rather than

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China’s preferred bilateral approach. It was under American guardianship of common interests for the last several decades that China has emerged as the economic powerhouse it is today. Now it wants a new system - a system that only works for Beijing and does not deal with the provision of public goods or common resources. In recent months, China has collided with Vietnam and Philippines over issues related to the exploitation of South China Sea for its mineral resources and oil.

Strategic landscape It is in this context that New Delhi is making an entry into this maelstrom. India’s efforts to make itself relevant to the region come at a time of great turmoil in the Asian strategic landscape. With its political and economic rise, Beijing has started trying to dictate the boundaries of acceptable behaviour to its neighbours. As a result, regional States have already started reassessing their strategies and a loose anti-China balancing coalition is emerging. India’s role becomes critical in such an evolving balance of power. As Singapore’s elder-statesman Lee Kuan Yew has argued, he would like India to be “part of the Southeast Asia balance of forces” and “a counterweight

[to China] in the Indian Ocean.”

India should now build credible strategic partnerships with other regional States so as to prevent a Chinese regional dominance that will undermine the Indian and regional security interests Indian engagement of East Asia in the post-cold war era has assumed significant proportions and remains a top foreign policy priority for the Indian leadership. The government of P V Narasimha Rao launched its ‘Look East’ policy in early 1990s explicitly to initiate Delhi’s re-engagement with East Asia. Over the years, India has come to have extensive economic and trade linkages with various countries in the region even as there has also been a gradual strengthening of security ties. The present Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, has made it clear that his government’s foreign-policy priority will continue to be East and Southeast Asia, which are poised for sustained growth in the 21st century. India too has an interest in protecting the sea lanes of communication that cross the South

China Sea to Northeast Asia and the US. As India’s profile rises in East and Southeast Asia, it is asserting its legitimate interests in the East Asian waters. As China expands its presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region, India is staking its own claims in East Asia. Most significant in this regard is India’s growing engagement with Vietnam. India has decided to work with Vietnam to establish a regular Indian presence in the region as part of a larger Delhi-Hanoi security partnership with Vietnam giving India right to use its port of Nha Trang. Delhi and Hanoi have significant stakes in ensuring sea lanes security and preventing sea piracy while they also share concerns about Chinese access to the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. Indian strategic interests demand that Vietnam emerge as a major regional player and India is well placed to help Hanoi achieve that objective. It has been argued in Indian strategic circles that just as China has used States in India’s periphery to contain India, Delhi should build States like Vietnam as strategic pressure points against China to counter it. A common approach on the emerging balance of power is emerging with India and

Vietnam both keen on reorienting their ties with the US as their concerns about China rise. The US remains distracted by its own economic woes and the challenges unleashed by the Arab Spring in the Middle East. Meanwhile, Japan is proving unable to tackle its political inertia and to emerge as a credible balancer in the region. As such, the regional environment is conducive for Beijing to assert itself. New Delhi’s ambitious policy in East and Southeast Asia is aimed at significantly increasing its regional profile. Smaller States in the region are now looking to India to act as a balancer in view of China’s growing influence and America’s anticipated retrenchment from the region in the near future, while larger States see it as an attractive engine for regional growth. India is right to forcefully reject Chinese claims of sovereignty over the entire South China Sea. It should now build credible strategic partnerships with other regional States so as to prevent a Chinese regional dominance that will undermine the Indian and regional security interests.

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Dr Sanjeev Bhadauria The writer is Associate Professor at the Dept. of Defence and Strategic Studies, Central University of Allahabad, Allahabad, India.

Only three Indian enterprises-Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL), Bharat Electronics Ltd and Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) - made it to the list of top 100 defence outfits in the world. In 1991, India had no companies in the Top 100 Global Defence Industries. By 1999, India had three with a combined revenue of about US$ 1.3 billion. These three companies were Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., Bharat Electronics, and Mazagon Dock Ltd. Annual defence revenues for the largest Indian defence company in 1999 were US$ 625 million. The largest Indian company (in terms of annual defence revenue) was ranked 48th globally in 1999

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PROSPECTS The first three to four decades after our independence saw significant contribution of science and technology in nation building. Critical technology has been a major focus from the beginning. However, except for certain denied technologies in which we were forced to move forward, much remains to be done. Currently, private sector participation consumes only about seven per cent of armament expenditures. Government has allowed private sector participation up to 100 per cent in the defence industry sector with foreign direct investment (FDI) permissible up to 26 per cent, The Indian Parliament’s Standing Committee on defence has proposed raising the FDI cap to 49 per cent. A joint study by the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and the consulting firm KPMG, opines that foreign companies would not be satisfied with anything less than a controlling stake of 51 per cent. DRDO is on the verge of starting its ambitious indigenous project Rustom, the Medium Altitude Long Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (MALE UAV). It will be the first aeronautical programme in which the DRDO will partner a private company.

echnology has become an essential component of national security. It has been accepted as a force multiplier. Science and technology can easily be called its bricks and mortar. The identification and characterisation of significant science and technology advances are essential to promote more anticipatory, proactive policy formulation and to reduce “reactive” policy action.

The challenge While most of the threats to national security need to be countered by dedicated instrumentalities and strategies, they have to be dealt with within the framework of broad-spectrum national security management with emphasis on technology. An armed force equipped with state-of-the-art equipment is needed as an insurance and back-up. Ammunition, armament, guns, tanks, aircraft, ships, missiles, nuclear and satellite surveillance capabilities, radars, electronic warfare, communication, information, nuclear deterrence and new concept weapons form an integral part of this basket. The effort calls for an integrated and structured intelligence assessment and national security management. Only a national security set up with specialist inputs can handle this kind of security management. It is widely recognised that in the future, threats to the security of our nation will be through terrorism, the infusion of sophisticated small arms, organised crime and money laundering, narcotics traffic and norco-terrorism, cyber war and technology denial. National defence is a function of

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TECHNOLOGY POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

national capability and we must learn to combine the two and for this the acquisition and assimilation of technology is the primary challenge.

In retrospect The first three to four decades after our independence saw significant contribution of science and technology in nation building. The organisations like DST, CSIR, ISRO, DRDO and AEC became flag bearers of high technology. Self-reliance in important, critical technology has been a major focus from the beginning. However, except for certain denied technologies in which we were forced to move forward, much remains to be done. Despite many pockets of excellence, collective science and technology performance in India compares very poorly with advanced countries.

Unlike China that has benefited hugely through civil-military integration, Indian R and D in separate compartments has lost out on leveraging the dual-use technologies for rapid technology progress in the country As things stand, India’s defence manufacturing base leaves much to be desired. For instance only three Indian enterprises - Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL), Bharat Electronics Ltd and Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) - made it to the list of top 100 defence outfits in the world. In 1991, India had no companies in the Top 100 Global Defence Industries.

By 1999, India had three with a combined revenue of about US$ 1.3 billion. These three companies were Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, Bahrat Electronics and Mazagon Dock Ltd. Annual defence revenues for the largest Indian defence company in 1999 were US$ 625 million. The largest Indian company (in terms of annual defence revenue) was ranked 48th globally in 1999. Unfortunately, the situation has not improved much till date.

Policy focus Our science and technology Policy 2001 was aimed at bringing focus on revising administrative and

management structures in science and technology departments and institutions. Advanced computers, space technologies, precision strike technologies and network centric capabilities have changed the complexion of war. Perceptions of Security in the environment of techno-economic interdependence are changing the definition of the major threat as asymmetric forces and weapons of mass disruption. The 2003 Revised Policy re-emphasised the goal of self-reliance and added focus on sustainable development, equitable distribution, and recognised the importance of knowledge based development and competition. But, merely acquiring

of technology without the capability to derive it from basic knowledge offers only limited advantages and may negatively impact genuine indigenous capability. Therefore remaining ahead in knowledge and technology requires a continuous and sustained effort. Under the national self-reliance programme - India 2020, strategic objectives have been set to reach high levels, if not complete self-reliance in national production, including defence production over the next 20 years. The Indian armaments industry has no tradition of reverse engineering to establish local production of many of the foreign

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weapons systems in its inventory. Technology development is a long process - foresight and planning is vital. The creation of trained scientific and technical manpower takes even longer. An integrated approach is needed to blend the technology policy with the priorities of foreign policy and national security interests.

Facilitation An important organisation in this sphere is the Defence Offset Facilitation Agency (DOFA). DOFA has been established under the Department of Defence Production (DDP) as a single window agency to facilitate implementation of the offset policy of the Ministry of Defence. DOFA will assist potential vendors in interfacing with the Indian defence industry for identifying potential offset products / projects as well as provide requisite data and information for this purpose.

The first three to four decades after our independence saw significant contribution of science and technology in nation building Unlike China that has benefited hugely through civil-military integration, Indian R and D in separate compartments has lost out on leveraging the dual-use technologies for rapid technology progress in the country. Indian foreign policy and technology priorities have largely remained unconnected. There is also debate within India on future product directions, some argue that we should strive to develop the eventual capability to fully design, develop and produce completed major armament systems. Others argue that India’s considerable scientific and technical talent should be focused more efficiently on component design in conjunction with foreign partners to produce armament systems focused on competitive niche areas. In the latter case, India would continue to depend on an import strategy for acquiring sophisticated armaments. The decision to privatise India’s defence sector has been debated since the early 1990’s. Admittedly India would still require imports of advanced arms. But the major portion

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PROSPECTS of India’s requirements should come from indigenous sources. Currently, private sector participation consumes only about seven per cent of armament expenditures. Even though the issue still continues to be discussed and debated, there is no major movement at the moment toward privatisation of the defence industrial base. A gradualist approach to the privatisation of part of the defence industrial base is argued to be useful, with only incremental strides anticipated towards this goal.

Investment India’s principles in this regard, should also take into account the considerable incentives that India offers in terms of her market-growth potential attraction to foreign investors in terms of infrastructure development and her ambitious plans for considerable expansion of her civil aviation assets, besides her considerable defence acquisition plans. A level playing field has been provided for by the government. Government has allowed private sector participation up to 100 per cent in the defence industry sector with foreign direct investment (FDI) permissible up to 26 per cent, both subject to licensing as notified vide Press Note 4 (2001 Series). The foreign vendor is free to choose his Indian offset partner by making a choice from any of the DPSUs. The Indian Parliament’s Standing Committee on defence has proposed raising the FDI cap to 49 per cent. Similarly, many industry bodies have made a strong case for increasing the FDI limit in the Indian defence sector with a view to boost defence hardware production capability. But without a level playing field it would be impossible to attract a higher level of FDI into the Indian defence sector. After all foreign companies willing to invest in the Indian defence sector should not expect benefits as high as their Indian counterparts. While formulating a policy aimed at boosting FDI in the Indian defence sector, this issue needs to be addressed.

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A joint study by the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and the consulting firm KPMG, opines that foreign companies would not be satisfied with anything less than a controlling stake of 51 per cent. The CII-KPMG study states that foreign investors reject the argument of “national security concerns.” As pointed out by a joint study by the industry body ASSOCHAM and research firm Ernst and Young (E&Y), 26 per cent FDI in defence sector does not provide foreign investors incentives with respect to capacity expansion, buy back guarantee and exports while subjecting them to purchase and price discrimination vis-à-vis public sector enterprises. It is high time that the Indian Defence Ministry realised that for India to stay in step with rapidly changing technological trends in defence production, foreign participation is an unavoidable step.

The UAV initiative The UAV initiative is a unique experiment in the Indian context. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is on the verge of starting its ambitious indigenous project Rustom, the Medium Altitude Long Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (MALE UAV). With the Rustom MALE UAV project, DRDO intends to move away from traditional ways of developing products whereby laboratories under DRDO, like the Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE), which is involved in this project, develop and finalise the product and transfer technology to a production agency. There are several firsts in the MALE UAV programme. It will be the first aeronautical programme in which the DRDO will partner a private company; since independence, public sector giant, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), has monopolised this sector. The DRDO has sent out Expressions of Interest (EoIs) to several private sector companies, including the Tata Group, L&T and Godrej for manufacturing Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) UAVs, which will be developed by the DRDO.

The Indian government has allowed the development of the Rustom MALE UAV project in association with a production agency-cum-development partner (PADP). The ADE officials indicated that the requests for proposals (RFP) would shortly be issued to four vendors which are the Tatas, Larsen & Toubro, Godrej and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited-Bharat Electronics (joint bid) who were chosen out of the 23 firms that responded.

Government has allowed private sector participation up to 100 per cent in the defence industry sector with foreign direct investment (FDI) permissible up to 26 per cent, both subject to licensing as notified vide Press Note 4 (2001 Series) DRDO will follow a practice of concurrent engineering where initial design efforts also take into consideration production issues, with the production agency participating in the development of the system right from the design stage. The agency will also follow up issues related to infrastructure and expertise for the product and its support, thereby overcoming time delays in crucial projects. There is a need to invite more such participation. Industry sources say that the Indian Defence Ministry should support research and development in private sector industries through a variety of measures including appropriate incentives. This step along with an increased FDI flow could galvanise the private sector to increase the quantum of resources and time to develop futuristic weapons systems that Indian defence forces are keen on acquiring.

New environment The information technology revolution has changed the way business is transacted, government operates and national defence is conducted. These three functions now depend on an interdependent network of critical information infrastructures. However, inadequate focus to disaster preparedness and recovery in regulatory frameworks is a cause of concern. No single operator controls

the IT, Telecom or Power sectors and, therefore, responsibility to prepare for and recover from, disasters is diffused. The internet and mobile communications are increasingly being used by criminals to perpetrate crimes threatening our national security. Very often criminals make use of these technologies in unpredictable ways. Very often they are not based within the sovereign territory of our country and sometimes our laws have no teeth to persecute these criminals. The intractability of cyber crimes often leads to situations where technology innovators, law and law enforcement pull in different directions and work in an environment of mutual suspicion. While every one accepts that safeguarding national security is of utmost importance, everyone also accepts that without constant innovation technology will not move forward. For creating an environment in which national security is safeguarded and yet innovation can flourish, the need is for the stakeholders such as policy makers, cyber experts, law enforcement agencies and industry to cooperate in a sustainable manner fully understanding and appreciating one another’s perspectives, strengths and weaknesses and complementing one another / OFB or Indian private defence industry granted an industrial license for such manufacture. The areas targeted for greater indigenisation include missile components, early warning systems, radar, metals, robotics, fiber optics, lasers, UAVs and stealth technology. However progress towards goals of the self-reliance initiatives has been spotty.

The road ahead The key to improving the state of technology in India is through strategic collaboration among government, industry and scientific community. We must build on the success of the public-private partnerships that have been instrumental in the development of critical infrastructure across India. Public-private partnership that combines research, finance and industry is desirable to absorb the

required cutting edge technology. We also need to partner with the best researchers around the world to find the best technological solutions to meet the emerging needs in the country. Though working with global technology leaders helps the country to assimilate new ideas and innovative processes, we cannot remain too dependent on foreign countries to enhance our capabilities in leading technologies. We need to be independent and indigenous in our approach. One sure way of achieving this, is to enhance cooperation with civil bodies. We must increasingly allow the civilian sector to get access to deterrence relationship and developments. These relationships are essential for an eventual two-way sharing of technological capabilities, precision manufacturing and R and D. Technology environment is now changing with private sector playing a major role and government playing the role of facilitator / negotiator. Hence technology controls are getting gradually diluted. India’s technology strengths in priority areas have to grow faster than the average international rate, so as to bridge the gap and catch-up with the world. India must now take bold and confident steps to gain for itself the rightful place in science and technology ranking among the science and technology leaders in the world. The role of technology in India’s transformation has been significant. Sustaining this momentum and achieving numerous national objectives in an atmosphere of changing security dynamics, will be the real challenge.

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STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP

Indo–US relations: the next big idea?

Kautilya, the respected Indian diplomacy and statecraft guru had once said – “Friends and Enemies are born out of circumstances”. This observation is an apt description of the Indo-US friendship in the 21st century. The power game over the last two decades has shifted from the West to the East and more specifically to Asia represented by its huge population, cheap labour and growing markets. India and the United States have reasons to be concerned with China. On the one hand, increasing Chinese investments in Sri Lanka, Nepal, Pakistan and Myanmar, as part of its overall plan to increase its stakes in South Asia, is causing considerable concern for India. On the other hand, increasing Chinese influence in Pakistan is complicating US plans to draw down troops from neighbouring Afghanistan by 2014. India and the United States have a wonderful opportunity to align their visions in Afghanistan so that China and Pakistan’s influence is negated. This will be part of the larger American plan to align with India in an effort to contain China’s global ambitions.

ur o k Y Now o Bo ace Sp 08 – 10 December 2011 | Pragati Maidan, New Delhi, India Some of the Participating Exhibitors: Security. Lifestyle. Technology.

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Dr Venkat Loknathan The writer is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations, Manipal University. He has a PhD from the American Studies Division, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He writes extensively on issues pertaining to US foreign policy in Asia. The views expressed are personal.

US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton’s suggestion for India’s membership into four export control bodies in a “phased” manner rather than “in tandem” as suggested by Indian Foreign Minister S M Krishna has raised concerns. Additionally, the United States has been left unsatisfied with economic barriers for gaining access to certain portions of India’s markets especially agricultural goods, retail, insurance and defence. It has also expressed considerable disappointment by India’s decision to drop Lockheed Martin and Boeing from the short list to purchase Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) for its Air Force

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hrough the first decade of the 21st century, India and the United States have gradually expanded cooperation in the areas where they mutually benefited. The Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) for cooperation in strategic areas such as nuclear, space, defence technology and export control was initiated in January 2004. Subsequently, both countries decided to move beyond the NSSP to a Strategic Dialogue in March 2005. The growing camaraderie in bilateral relations also resulted in Prime Minister Manmohan Singh becoming the first State guest of the Obama administration in November 2009 Subsequently, President Obama visited India in November 2010, within a year of assuming the American presidency. This visit was particularly significant as he is the only American President out of the six, to have visited India in the first half of his first term. The “Strategic Dialogue” for collaboration in a of areas including number energy, climate change, trade, education and counter-terrorism was launched in July 2009. The first and second session of the Strategic Dialogue, held in June 2010 and July 2011 respectively, has led to extensive discussions on areas such as education, science and technology, defence, security and counter-terrorism, trade and women empowerment.

China is a threat to US global ambitions. Alternatively, India, with its thriving democracy, open society, huge market, cheap labour and a strong service sector led by a large English speaking workforce has more commonalities with the United States Ironically, after gaining steady momentum over the last decade, bilateral relations are now poised at the crossroads as things have not always progressed according to the expectations of both sides in the recent past. India has been left disappointed at the lack of complete American support for a permanent seat with veto powers in the United Nations Security Council. Both countries are also disagreeing

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STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP over the pace at which India should gain membership into four influential groups - The Nuclear Suppliers Group, The Missile Technology Control Regime, The Wassenaar Arrangement and The Australia Group - leading the global non-proliferation efforts. US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton’s suggestion for India’s membership into four export control bodies in a “phased” manner rather than “in tandem” as suggested by Indian Foreign Minister S M Krishna has raised concerns. Additionally, the United States has been left unsatisfied with economic barriers for gaining access to certain portions of India’s markets especially agricultural goods, retail, insurance and defence. It has also expressed considerable disappointment by India’s decision to drop Lockheed Martin and Boeing from the short list to purchase Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) for its Air Force. To be truly effective, the Strategic Dialogue needs to clearly refocus on at least one or two long-term ideas which are mutually beneficial. The nuclear deal created a momentum for relations in the last decade. So, are there any critical areas of convergence that will enable both sides to take the next big step forward? Or will recent differences stifle the momentum in bilateral relations?

Shifting power game Kautilya, the respected Indian diplomacy and statecraft guru had once said - “Friends and Enemies are born out of circumstances”. This observation is an apt description of the Indo-US friendship in the 21st century. The power game over the last two decades has shifted from the West to the East and more specifically to Asia represented by its huge population, cheap labour and growing markets. India and China are rapidly emerging as global players in the 21st century. From an American perspective, China with its history of communism and penchant for maintaining secrecy is an antithesis. The unreliability of its political structure, its rapid economic growth, its ability to engage in cyber warfare, its ambitious military, naval, space and air modernisation

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

programmes and its aggressive forays into South, Central Asia and Africa makes China a threat to US global ambitions. Alternatively, India, with its thriving democracy, open society, huge market, cheap labour and a strong service sector led by a large English speaking workforce has more commonalities with the United States. This was clearly evident when during the second strategic dialogue in July 2011, as part of the US-India Dialogue on Open Government launched in November 2010, the two countries committed to jointly create an open source “Data.gov” platform by the first quarter of 2012. This “open source” platform is intended to provide citizens access to government information via a user-friendly website and a package of e-governance applications to enhance public service delivery. Further, India and the United States have reasons to be concerned with China. On the one hand, increasing Chinese investments in Sri Lanka, Nepal, Pakistan and Myanmar, as part of its overall plan to increase its stakes in South Asia, is causing considerable concern for India. On the other hand, increasing Chinese influence in Pakistan is complicating US plans to draw down troops from neighbouring Afghanistan by 2014. Simultaneously, the United States has been highly appreciative of India’s active involvement in supporting international efforts to rebuild Afghanistan. Significantly, during his recent visit to Kabul, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has raised India’s assistance pledge by US$ 500 million to a total of US$ 2 billion. India has also assisted in building critical infrastructure such as the parliament building, power stations and small development projects like healthcare facilities and water wells. Here, India and the United States have a wonderful opportunity to align their visions in Afghanistan so that China and Pakistan’s influence is negated. This will be part of the larger American plan to align with India in an effort to contain China’s global ambitions. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, on the side-lines of the July 2011 strategic dialogue, stated the US support for the rise of India both as a regional and global power and specifically appreciated its

Look East policy. Simultaneously, despite increasing tensions post Osama’s killing, it will actively look to engage Pakistan and push for resumption of peace talks with India as continuous flare-ups will only divert Islamabad’s attention from the Afghan front and push it closer strategically to China.

Science and technology Scientific and technological cooperation between India and the US has been a strong aspect of bilateral relations for more than five decades now. Recently, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has begun cooperation with Indian Space and Research Organisation to help bring monsoon forecasting data to India’s farmers. Additionally a Science and Technology Endowment Fund has been established which will award US$ 2-2.5 million per year to promising technology projects that produce material benefits for both countries. The United States has removed nine Indian space and defence related companies including those from Indian Space Research Organisation and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) from the restircting list in January 2011. Subsequently it has also removed four additional DRDO labs from the restricting Entity List that regulates technology exports in an attempt to expand high technology trade and strategic cooperation in July 2011. However, it has not yet provided any waiver in acquiring technology without licence or any exemption from existing obligations concerning exports. Clearly, this is an area where both countries have numerous benefits to continue cooperation in the future.

Trade Bilateral trade has grown from US$ 5.6 billion in 1990 to US$ 48.7 billion in 2010; a phenomenal growth of around 760 per cent. India’s merchandise exports to the US have increased by 24 per cent from US$ 11.8 billion during the period January-May 2010 to US$ 14.6 billion in January-May 2011. US exports of merchandise to India have increased by 13 per cent from US$ 7.4 billion during January-May 2010 to

US$ 8.4 billion in January-March 2011. Total India-US bilateral merchandise trade in 2011 (JanuaryMay) is already worth US$ 23.1 billion. Another aspect of the economic partnership includes defence deals. India has embarked upon a military modernisation programme and is estimated to spend more than US$ 35 billion over the next five years on defence acquisition. American firms have already won over US$ 8 billion in defence sales in the past four years including the purchase of ten Boeing C-17 airlifters and six C-130J aircraft for the Indian Air Force, transfer of the former USS Trenton to the Indian Navy and the purchase of eight P-8 long range maritime patrol aircraft.

India and the United States have a wonderful opportunity to align their visions in Afghanistan so that China and Pakistan’s influence is negated. This will be part of the larger American plan to align with India in an effort to contain China’s global ambitions Additionally, as part of the “Framework for Cooperation on Trade and Investment” signed in March 2010, both countries have launched an initiative called “Integrating US and Indian Small Businesses into the Global Supply Chain,” which will expand trade and job-creating opportunities for US and Indian companies. Industry chamber Assocham has signed an agreement with the Denver-based National US India Chamber of Commerce (NUICC) with an aim to strengthen economic ties further. Additionally, both countries have also identified a short term goal of doubling bilateral trade to US$ 100 billion in another five years. There has been tremendous progress in the recent past which has opened up numerous opportunities for economic cooperation between both countries.

Space cooperation Recently, building on the successful Chandrayan-1 lunar mission, National Aeronautical Space Agency (NASA) and Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) have reviewed potential areas for future cooperation in earth observation, space exploration, space sciences and satellite navigation. Both sides have agreed for early finalisation of three new implementing arrangements for sharing satellite data on oceans and global weather patterns. Recognising the research opportunities available on the International Space Station, they have agreed to explore the possibilities of joint experiments. NASA has reiterated its willingness to discuss potential cooperation with ISRO on human space flight activities. The two sides have also agreed to expand upon previous work in the area of global navigation satellite systems with the goal of promoting compatibility and interoperability between the US Global Positioning System, India’s Navigation systems, and those of other countries. It might also be useful for both countries to announce a commercial space initiative, similar to the agricultural knowledge initiative in the near future. There is a real opportunity to develop an ambitious Indo-US civil space cooperation programme especially keeping in mind China’s ambitions in space.

Counter-terrorism Both sides have launched the Homeland Security Dialogue in May 2011. They have discussed extensively on cooperation in

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areas such as global supply chain management, mega-city policing, combating counterfeit currency and illicit financing, cyber security, critical infrastructure protection, capacity building and technology upgrading. They have also resolved to strengthen counter-terrorism cooperation, including through intelligence sharing, information exchange, operational cooperation and access to advanced counter-terrorism technology and equipment. Indian and US armies have undertaken joint manoeuvres on counter-terrorism as a part of their joint military exercises. However, although increased cooperation in defence over the last decade has provided the fillip to push the relationship to its current level, it has not culminated in enhanced counter-terrorism cooperation. The complex nature of US relations with Pakistan has always cast a shadow on how much of these discussions have translated into actions in the past. However, the second round of the Strategic dialogue in July 2011 seems to have turned a new page. Both sides while condemning terrorism in all its forms, reiterated that all terrorist networks must be defeated and significantly agreed that Pakistan should move expeditiously in prosecuting those involved in the November 2008 Mumbai terror attack.

Energy The recent guidelines adopted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, in June 2011, banning the sale of enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) technology to NPT non-signatories, in an effort to strengthen nuclear export controls, has raised considerable concern in India. Significantly, the United States has assured India that the NSG guidelines of June 2011 will not affect nuclear commerce with India. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Clinton, during the strategic dialogue in July 2011, has also expressed displeasure over India’s nuclear liability law which makes it possible to seek compensation from suppliers. She has also made it clear that it was absolutely important for India to ratify the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage in the near future to

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STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP ensure that its liability law conforms to international requirements under the convention. India has reiterated that this will be ratified by the Parliament by November 2011. Meanwhile, a Joint Clean Energy Research and Development Centre has been established to mobilise up to US$ 100 million for advancing clean energy. The United States Geological Survey is helping explore options for shale gas development and determine if India’s shale, will allow fracking technology with which it has had success in the US. Simultaneously, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation is exploring initiatives in renewable energy especially in the field of Solar. The United States’ Department of Energy and India’s Department of Atomic Energy have also signed an Implementing Agreement on Discovery Science that provides the framework for cooperation in accelerator and particle detector research and development at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility and Brookhaven National Laboratory. If both countries are sincere in their efforts to strengthen relations, they will back their actions by fulfilling their promises. If that happens, then it will open immense opportunities of cooperation in the area of energy security.

Public diplomacy There has been a tremendous growth in people to people contacts over the last decade. Indians have received almost half of all H1B visas issued worldwide and more than 44 per cent of all L1 intra-company transfer visas in the past four years. About 6,50,000 Indians travelled to the United States in 2010, an increase of 18 per cent from 2009. Over 1,00,000 Indian students have travelled to study in colleges and universities across the United States in 2010. Simultaneously, about 2,700 American students travelled to study in India in 2010. Additionally, the United States has created the ‘Passport to India’ initiative to encourage an increase in the number of American students studying and interning in India. An Indo-US Higher Education

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Summit will take place in Washington in October 2011 where numerous educational institutions from both countries will be brought together to explore potential areas for future cooperation. The summit also aims to foster participation of American students in India’s educational system and look to further increase the growing number of Indian students studying in the United States. It is looking to bring American governors and mayors to India to explore possibilities of more cooperation. Both countries have also planned to expand their higher education dialogue to convene annually, incorporating the private / non-governmental sectors and higher education communities to inform government-to-government discussions. As part of the Barack Obama-Manmohan Singh 21st Century Knowledge Initiative (OSI), the two governments have the publication of requests for proposals from post-secondary educational institutions that support OSI’s goals of strengthening teaching, research, and administration of both US and Indian institutions through university linkages and junior faculty development. The office of the US Special Representative for Global Intergovernmental Affairs is looking to promote sub-national engagements including state-to-state, city-to-city and university-to-university engagements in India. It is becoming increasingly evident that the Indo-US partnership will be one of the defining associations of the 21st century. However, the relationship continues to be dogged by key issues that dampen the growing momentum in bilateral relations. Both countries will have to adopt a holistic approach where they continue to create institutional mechanisms in areas of convergences to establish long term goals on the one hand while exploring options to constantly communicate on areas of divergences on the other. They will have to take concrete steps at consistent intervals in order to sustain this relationship. The areas identified above provide varied options for both countries to generate the next big idea from and sustain relations in the long term.

SECURITY PARTNERSHIP

India and NATO

coming closer

Last year, during a prestigious conference in Munich (Germany) NATO chief Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that NATO should become "the hub of a network of security partnerships and a centre for consultation on international security issues" with closer ties with countries such as China and India. In the middle of September NATO has reportedly offered to share its ballistic missile defence (BMD) technology with India. NATO officials acknowledge that India has a stake in Afghan stability. "India is for NATO one of the most important potential partners". Senior NATO official Michael Rühle said, India is simply too big to be just another partner country to the Atlantic Alliance. So it should be another platform for dialogue.

very year NATO officials, heads of States and important experts take part in Munich Security Conference which is unofficial but very important platform for debates and exchanges of views. Conference from the last year has been concerned on Afghanistan, fight with terrorism and other threats. Naturally, discussion was also about potential partners. The NATO chief said then that in an age of global insecurity, the threats to Europe and North America, including terrorism, cyber attacks, energy cut-offs, piracy and climate change, come from far beyond NATO borders. Mr Rasmussen told “Against such threats, the approaches of a bygone era simply no longer work. Static, heavy metal armies are not going to impress terrorists, pirates or computer hackers” and added “Our success in preserving our shared security, including through NATO, increasingly depends on how well we cooperate with others.” His idea

Dominika Cosic The writer is European correspondent of Polish weekly magazine Wprost. She specialises in NATO and European Union affairs and also the Balkans issues. She is correspondent (Europe) of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine from India.

Mr Rasmussen told "Against such threats, the approaches of a bygone era simply no longer work. Static, heavy metal armies are not going to impress terrorists, pirates or computer hackers" and added “Our success in preserving our shared security, including through NATO, increasingly depends on how well we cooperate with others"

The solution for progress of Alliance is the development of closer relations with countries across the globe, specially with all major global players, including India and China

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was to create a permanent network of consultation and cooperation, with NATO as the hub, in which other important international players, such as China, India and Russia, could take part and discuss views, concerns and best practices on security or even joint training and planning, specially that - as he said “India has a stake in Afghan stability”. Not all European officials agree with such an idea of NATO - for instance Germany did not want to “create NATO into a global security agency”. The same problem and question came back with bigger force few months later, during NATO Summit in Lisbon, when New Strategic Concept of NATO was being presented. The main question was “what is and what should be NATO?”. And the answer was quite clear - the solution for progress of Alliance is the development of closer relations with countries across the globe, specially with all major global players, including India and China.

History Relations between India and NATO during many years were quite neutral. As a non-aligned country during the cold war years, India maintained its distance from bloc politics. Though the international landscape has changed drastically since then, India has retained its policy of not entering into an alliance with any country, though New Delhi does have strategic partnerships with a record number of nations today. While warming to the United States considerably in the last half decade, India is still unlikely to enter into any arrangement that might be perceived as compromising its sovereign autonomy. It may be recalled, after all, that India hasn’t formally accepted the Proliferation Security Initiative because it’s a US-led initiative. A US-led BMD architecture, then, would also be viewed from the same perspective.

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SECURITY PARTNERSHIP potential NATO partners would have led to skeptical reactions not only in Delhi and Beijing, but also in many NATO member countries. Not any more. The Secretary General’s suggestion sparked little debate, let alone controversy.

new common initiative between NATO and India – to share missile defence. There has yet to be any official response to this offer, but its acceptance would make India the only non-NATO ally, apart from Russia, in the Alliance.

The complicated situation in Afghanistan created much greater interdependence between NATO and India.

It’s true that India has been working on the indigenous development of BMD technology and has conducted four successful interceptions since 2006, there has been no shared commonality of threats with NATO. As premised on the US missile threat assessment, threats to NATO are believed to arise from missile proliferation by problem States. BMD is seen as necessary to defend against limited ballistic missile attacks involving ‘up to a few tens of ballistic missiles.’ The United States and NATO have been categorical in assuring Russia and China that the BMD isn’t designed to degrade their nuclear deterrent.

As a major international donor with a considerable civilian presence in Afghanistan, India has a strategic interest not only in the security that ISAF forces provide, but also in the stabilising influence which NATO’s engagement brings to the region.

Closer relations As one of the senior NATO officials Michael Rühle said, India is simply too big to be just another partner country to the Atlantic Alliance. So it should be another platform for dialogue. Since India enjoys close bilateral relations with all major NATO allies and in particular its ever closer ties with the United States, some see little added value in building closer ties to the Alliance. The case for closer cooperation between India and NATO does not rest solely on Afghanistan. There is a growing need for nations and organisations to cooperate more closely in many other areas, too like cyber attacks, energy security, nuclear proliferation, failing States and piracy all compel nations to look for additional frameworks which allow them not only to talk together, but also to work together, including militarily.

Without any doubt, India is for NATO one of the most important potential partners, from many reasons. In Brussels, India is now considered as world’s second biggest country, whose population has just moved past the 1 billion mark.

That is why NATO’s cooperation with the Indian navy in counter-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia will likely be followed by closer cooperation in other areas as well. Another sign of a new dynamic is India’s high-level participation in NATO’s annual seminar on weapons of mass destruction proliferation.

Only a few years ago, any mentioning of India and China as

Very recently September was

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in middle announced

of a

For India, the nature of the missile threat is quite different - it arises from its nuclearised neighbourhood. Both China and Pakistan have established nuclear and missile arsenals of substantive quality and quantity. In fact, both have spent the last decade enhancing their missile capabilities in terms of inventory build-up, range, accuracy, survivability and reliability. In addition, China has invested in its own BMD and countermeasures technology. Therefore, the threats that the Indian BMD will be required to counter are very different from those of NATO and there’s no clarity over whether NATO would be able to accommodate these threat perceptions. As India grapples with finding the best response to its missile threats, the NATO offer to share the ‘technology of discovering and intercepting missiles’ is an interesting development. It comes at a time when the Indian BMD technology trajectory seems to be on an upswing, when the State of Pakistan’s stability is on a downswing and ambiguities on China’s intentions are on the rise. Is there a deeper message in this offer? India must undertake a careful assessment of all dimensions. It is very promising signal for a common future.

ZERO SUM GAME?

Prof Chintamani Mahapatra

Ebb and Flow in US-Pak Alliance The US-Pakistan alliance has gone through many phases of engagement and disengagement. The 21st century anti-terror alliance between the US and Pakistan however, was distinctly different from the earlier experience between the two countries. The alliance of the 21st century was thrust upon Pakistan and the latter consented to cooperate out of fear and apprehensions. Pakistan did not accept the alliance willingly. It continued to maintain its contact with Taliban and other insurgent groups which it regarded as strategic assets. The logic of the alliance was based on false edifice from the outset. Today the entire charade is unravelling as Pakistan seems intent on playing a zero sum game at the cost of its ally and all the regional countries around. This Pakistani overreach may prove to be self-defeating in the long run. However in the short term, the writer feels that due to US dependency on Pakistan for logistics support the present tenuous arrangement may continue till the US elections.

The writer is currently Chairman, Centre for Canada, US and Latin American Studies and Professor at the School of International Studies of Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. He was a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Delaware, USA, Commonwealth Scholar at the University of London, Foreign Policy Fellow at University of Maryland, USA, Salzburg Seminar Fellow in Austria and a Visiting Fellow at the Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra.

While the US realises the importance of working with Pakistan in the ongoing war against the Al Qaeda and the Taliban forces and Pakistan understands the cost of hostility with the United States, the mistrust level is high enough to threaten the rupture of the relationship in the near future

he United States has a host of military alliances with individual countries. Notable among them are with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and a few others. But no alliance partnership has passed through as severe an ebb and flow than the one between the United States and Pakistan. The US alliances with Japan, Australia and South Korea have been strengthened further in the aftermath of the cold war and the disappearance of the Soviet threat through redefinition of alliance goals and appropriate alterations in the terms and conditions of engagement. The US-Philippines strategic alliance took a new shape after the closure

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of two largest overseas American military bases in the Philippines in early 1990s, but the emergence of terrorism as a powerful force in the post-cold war era and the persistent Moro problem in that country has renewed US-Philippines strategic partnership. The US-New Zealand alliance had suffered a setback in the midst of the intense cold war due to differences between the two countries over passage and port call of US naval warships fitted with nuclear weapons. But the primary threat perception that encouraged New Zealand to enter into a trilateral alliance with Australia and the United States petered out after the Soviet disintegration. While the alliance logic became irrelevant, New Zealand continued to be part of the broader Western world on major security matters.

Strategic relevance The intimate US-Pakistan alliance, however, almost broke down after the Soviet withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan in 1989. The strategic relevance of Pakistan eventually faded away with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. But the massive US military and economic assistance to Pakistan, which flew into Pakistan for the latter’s cooperation with the US strategy against the Soviet military in Afghanistan during the 1980s, almost dried up even before the Soviet collapse. The main reason behind Washington’s decision to suspend US assistance was Islamabad’s blackmailing tactics against the US non-proliferation policy. President Zia-ul Haq was well aware of American non-proliferation goals and agenda, yet he took advantage of the US strategic vulnerabilities and violated US law and nonproliferation policy to acquire nuclear weapon capability. The US needed Pakistan’s cooperation so much in fighting the Soviet troops in Afghanistan that the Reagan Administration and the Bush (Senior) Administration had to maintain tight lip over Islamabad’s clandestine nuclear weapon programme and activities. Once America’s Afghan problem was resolved with Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s decision to end Soviet military occupation, George Bush (Senior) came heavily upon Pakistan and imposed the Pressler Amendment. At once

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ZERO SUM GAME? the American gigantic assistance programme for Pakistan dehydrated. Although President Bill Clinton sought to restore a working relationship with Pakistan and promoted the passage of the Brown Amendment in the US Congress, the bilateral alliance had turned totally insignificant. Its implications were critical. Pakistan defied further the US non-proliferation advice and declared itself as a nuclear capable country a few months after the break-up of the Soviet Union. It began to extend its negative influence in Afghanistan with a deceptive doctrine of “strategic depth”. It was flawed because Pakistan had gone nuclear and used terrorism as a tool to wage a low intensity war in Kashmir that literally kept Indian Army deeply engaged within the Indian territory. A responsible power like India was not expected to chase Pakistan to its western border in the midst of a deadly militancy in Kashmir actively backed by ISI and the Pakistani Army. Later Indian behaviour was better demonstrated during the Kargil war. Pakistan in a way used the strategic depth doctrine to carry forward its Islamisation process, extend it to Afghanistan and secure the Afghan front with a friendly regime to perpetuate its “trouble India” agenda.

Pakistani military gained a great deal during both the periods perhaps at the cost of domestic development and growth. The US neglected Pakistan’s nuclear activities during both the phases of bilateral alliance For about a decade since the suspension of the US aid programme to Pakistan and recognised insignificance of Pakistan as a strategic asset, Islamabad developed itself as a de facto nuclear weapon power and a sponsor of terrorism and religious extremism. The Chagai series of nuclear tests in response to Indian nuclear tests threatened to isolate Islamabad further in the international community. Pakistan was just not in a position to weather the American sanctions - first imposed in the wake of the nuclear tests and the second in response to military coup that catapulted General

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Pervez Musharraf to the position of the highest decision maker. But the Pakistani policy of promoting terrorism and religious extremism as tools of national security unfolded in ways that brought Pakistan back as an alliance partner of the United States. The training, arming and financing the Taliban movement initially brought dividend for the Pakistani Army when the Taliban captured power in Kabul after years of fratricidal warfare in Afghanistan.

Clandestine operations But as events turned out, the Taliban regime and its behaviour became the primary cause for the reestablishment of a strategic alliance between the US and Pakistan. Had the Taliban not refused to hand over Osama bin Laden to Washington after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US military intervention in Afghanistan could have been averted. And in that case, Pakistan would not have been pushed to the corner to fight the Taliban and Al Qaeda shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States. The 21st century anti-terror alliance between the US and Pakistan was distinctly different from the earlier experience of the 1980s between the two countries. There are some similarities and a few fundamental differences between the US-Pakistan alliance of the 1980s and the 2000s. First of all, Pakistan was under US sanctions when it was approached by the US during both the periods. Secondly, Pakistan became the recipient of massive military and economic assistance by joining the US in an alliance relationship. Thirdly, the US both the times approached Pakistan for an alliance relationship in order to wage a war against the principal enemy of the time - Soviet Communism in 1980s and Al Qaeda / Taliban terror in 2000s. Fourthly, Pakistani military gained a great deal during both the periods perhaps at the cost of domestic development and growth. Fifthly, the US neglected Pakistan’s nuclear activities during both the phases of bilateral alliance. Earlier it was Pakistan’s clandestine efforts to acquire nuclear weapon capability and this time around it was Pakistan’s connection with nuclear black market. The fundamental differences are,

however, two. First of all, in the 1980s, Pakistan extended its support to America’s war against the principal adversary of the United States in the global power game - the former Soviet Union. Pakistan did that despite the fact Moscow posed no direct threat to Pakistan. But in the war against terrorism, Pakistan stretched its hands of support to the US in the latter’s fight against elements which were created by Pakistan and sustained by it. Secondly, Pakistan accepted the alliance of the 1980s for financial benefits and military gains vis-à-vis India. But the alliance of the 21st century was thrust upon Pakistan and the latter consented to cooperate out of fear and apprehensions. The principal Pakistani phobia was about a possible Indo-US partnership in the battle against Pak-sponsored terrorism.

The alliance of the 21st century was thrust upon Pakistan and the latter consented to cooperate out of fear and apprehensions. The principal Pakistani phobia was about a possible Indo-US partnership in the battle against Pak-sponsored terrorism After about five to six years of US-Pak war against Al Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan, the alliance began to develop cracks. The admission of mistake by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that the US neglected Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal and her promise that the new alliance with Pakistan will be strong and durable could not have stood up to the test of time. The reason is plain and simple. Pakistan did not accept the alliance willingly. It continued to maintain its contact with Taliban and other insurgent groups which it regarded as strategic assets. And the logic of the alliance was based on false edifice from the outset.

Trust erosion A series of developments since 2007 onwards steadily eroded the US-Pakistan alliance, which had been elevated by the Bush Administration to make Pakistan a major non-NATO ally. First of all, Washington discovered that elements of Pakistani ISI were hands in gloves with the Afghan insurgents who

were killing US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Secondly, the US legislators found it hard to bless Pakistan with billions of dollars of tax payers’ money when a portion of the money was diverted to kill Americans. Thirdly, the new Af-Pak strategy of President Barack Obama was resented by Pakistan which felt elated because of its hyphenation with a major emerging power like India earlier and Af-Pak term was interpreted by them as diminution of their status. Fourthly, increased number of drone attacks on Pakistani territory was seen as violation of sovereignty by Islamabad. But when American analysts pointed out that there was tacit backing of the Pakistani government to use of drones, rulers in Pakistan appeared to have felt embarrassed. Fifthly, as the drone attacks were allegedly leading to some collateral damage with civilian casualty, anti-American sentiments multiplied in Pakistan, creating an impression in the country either the government was incapable or in complicity with the operations that killed innocent civilians. Sixthly, the killing of two people in broad day light by an American official, Raymond Davis, in a street of Lahore raised a controversy that witnessed tit-for-tat exchanges between the Obama Administration and the Zardari government. Seventhly and the most powerful, blow to the alliance was struck when the US refrained from consulting or taking on board Pakistani Army or ISI or the civilian government before launching a Special Forces operation by the Navy Seals to kill Osama bin Laden at his hideout not very far from Islamabad and quite close to the military barracks of Pakistan. At once the Pakistani ruling establishment was brutally shaken. The growing trust deficit between the alliance partners further worsened, even as the Pakistani Army and ISI felt humiliated. Caught by surprise, Pakistani military at once became aware of its incompetence to spot the US helicopters entering and then leaving their country. Some Pakistani people suspected that the Army and ISI were in collusion with Osama bin Laden. Others doubted competence of their government in detecting the movement of Al Qaeda operatives in the country.

Stung by the Navy Seals operation, Pakistan once again indulged in tit-for-tat tactics and asked the US to reduce its Special Forces and other military operations in the country. Islamabad also refused to grant visas to US officers liberally. The US in return suspended more than US$ 800 million of assistance to Pakistan. More recently, the Taliban attack on US Embassy in Kabul further widened the confidence shortfall in US-Pakistan alliance.

The intimate US-Pakistan alliance, however, almost broke down after the Soviet withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan in 1989. The strategic relevance of Pakistan eventually faded away with the disintegration of the Soviet Union While the US realises the importance of working with Pakistan in the ongoing war against the Al Qaeda and the Taliban forces and Pakistan understands the cost of hostility with the United States, the mistrust level is high enough to threaten the rupture of the relationship in the near future. Washington and Islamabad are trying their best to restore trust and confidence in each other, but the difficulties are enormous in view of the nature of the battle against terror. The problem is further compounded by increasing Taliban offensive in Afghanistan; the intricacy involved in holding genuine negotiations with the Taliban and the multiplicity of stakeholders in the peace and conflict dynamics of Afghanistan. India was concerned about the US-Pakistan alliance during the cold war years in view of its negative implications for Indian security. But India managed very well the anti-terror alliance between the US and Pakistan partly by establishing a strategic partnership with the United States and partly by increasing its soft power through heavy investment in Afghan reconstruction activities. The uncertainty that may arise in the wake of a US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the probable bitter end of the current level of US-Pakistan alliance needs credible analyses by Indian specialists to enable the Indian leadership to come to terms with the coming eventuality.

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Cecil Victor The writer has covered all wars with Pakistan as War Correspondent and reported from the conflict zones in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in South East Asia as well as from Afghanistan. He is author of “India: The Security Dilemma”.

This was a ploy to cover tactics of tunnelling under the barbed wire fence that India had erected in self-defence all along the international border from Rajasthan in the south and the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir in the north. Sure enough some tunnels were discovered and some petty smuggling revealed in Punjab. But these were all shallow and narrow tunnels just wide enough for one person to crawl through with drugs, small arms and explosives

An interesting article that highlights the North Korean technology of creating deep and wide tunnels beneath the de-militarised zone, that are large enough to permit the passage of tanks, artillery guns and large bodies of troops. These can suddenly emerge in the enemy’s rear and create mayhem. The writer speculates that the Taliban used this Korean deep tunnelling technology to carry out the mass escape from the Kandahar prison. He warns that we should guard against the use of such tunnelling technology on the LC in Jammu and Kashmir as also the fenced international border with Pakistan.

LOOMING DANGER ALONG

INDO-PAK BORDER

rom the very moment of its creation Pakistan has used tactics of deception and subterfuge to grab territory. In 1947 it used tribals from the North West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakthunkhwa) led by Pakistan Army officers into the princely State of Jammu and Kashmir and nearly grabbed the whole state before Indian troops were airlifted to Srinagar and began a rollback. In 1965 it used armed infiltrators to instigate the local Muslim population to rise against the government of India but that fizzled out. In 1971 India helped create Bangladesh in the former East Pakistan hoping that it would be a lesson in good-neighbourliness for the military rulers in Islamabad. In 1999, bolstered by the successful test of its nuclear weapons the Pakistan Army entered the Kargil-Dras salient using Mujahideen salwar-kameez as camouflage. In 2008 it sent terrorists into Mumbai by the sea route. Events far removed from the Indian border coupled with the Indian military establishment’s failure to learn from these events could pose grave danger to territorial security along the border with Pakistan. Illustrative is the failure of the Indian armed forces, more particularly of the Tactics and Air Combat Establishment (TACDE) at Jamnagar in Gujarat, to learn how the Pakistan Army Inter-Services Intelligence and the Afghan Mujahideen dealt with Soviet aircraft and helicopters in Afghanistan. Because of that failure we lost one aircraft and one helicopter to shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles in Kargil. The lesson was: In mountain terrain send in only those aircraft and helicopters that are equipped with missile decoys like chaff and flare dispensers to counter the heat-seeking US-supplied Stinger SAMs.

Get into the mind of the enemy It is a truism of warfare down the ages that success in battle depends on how well one can read the enemy commander’s mind. Here is something for Indian military commanders to chew and, hopefully, digest. On 25 April this year the remaining inmates of Sarposa prison in Kandahar in Afghanistan’s second-largest city were woken to the wailing of sirens that told of an escape from prison. It turned out that 541 Taliban fighters including 210 battle-hardened commanders had escaped through a tunnel in the political wing of the prison. The tunnel was built from outside! A Taliban spokesman later said that the 1180 ft (360 meter) tunnel had been dug in five months from a rented house just outside the jail periphery. He said “the diggers had proper equipment and the support of skilled professionals, people who were trained engineers who advised us on the digging”. It is known that many of the Mujahideen leaders who fought the Soviet Army were engineers by training. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar of the Hizbul Mujahideen is an engineer as was Osama bin Laden of the Al Qaeda. However, given the Pakistan Army’s close association with the jihadis as well as its multi-faceted cooperation with China and North Korea in the proliferation of missiles and nuclear warheads the exactitude with which the tunnel opened underneath the political wing of the sprawling prison smacks of North Korean knowhow.

North Korean tunnel strategy From 1970 North Korean troops spent much of their time digging tunnels under the

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TUNNELLING THREAT

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Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) so as to be able to swamp South Korea with troops from different directions and sweep into its capital Seoul. The tunnels were engineering marvels in the depth that they were constructed and the size of

their passages which where wide enough and high enough to allow the movement of tanks and heavy artillery with the interiors lined with pre-fabricated cement slabs and railway lines. Four tunnels were discovered after a person who

worked in the tunnels defected and revealed the sinister game plan. The first tunnel was 45 meters deep below the surface and 3,500 meters long and opened directly into the DMZ. It was large enough to allow one regiment of troops with heavy artillery to enter

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South Korea every hour. Within a couple of hours a whole division would appear out of the ground on the South Korean doorstep. What a shock that would have been! The second tunnel was twice the size of the first and had a huge congregation hall where troops could relax before an assault. It was 3,500 meters long and up to 160 meters below the surface and 3,000 armed troops, their vehicles, tanks and artillery could move through it every hour. The third was of the same size with five exits opening into South Korea and it could enable 30,000 fully armed troops to move into enemy territory every hour. The fourth, also intended to open up a fourth front inside South Korea was discovered in 1990 using special radio-wave devices.

A news item appeared in the Pakistani media that the government was parcelling out land to retired military personnel east of the Ichhogil canal That North Korea and China helped the Taliban with the technology for accurate tunnel alignment deep underground is a very distinct possibility.

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TUNNELLING THREAT

India beware! How does it affect India? Here are the straws in the wind. A couple of years ago a news item appeared in the Pakistani media that the government was parcelling out land to retired military personnel east of the Ichhogil canal. The surprising part was that a military establishment that wanted “strategic depth” in Afghanistan to be as far away from the reach of the Indian armed forces suddenly wanted to settle down on land which, inevitably, would be overrun by Indian troops in the first flush of warfare. The thought crossed the mind that this was a ploy to cover tactics of tunnelling under the barbed wire fence that India had erected in self-defence all along the international border from Rajasthan in the south and the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir in the north. Sure enough some tunnels were discovered and some petty smuggling revealed in Punjab. But these were all shallow and narrow tunnels just wide enough for one person to crawl through with drugs, small arms and explosives. (Another tactic used by the Pakistan Army Inter-Services Intelligence to deliver packets of RDX explosives and handguns to smugglers on the Indian side was to throw a rubber mattress across the electrified barbed wire fence and

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climb up on a wooden ladder and throw the package across the gap between the two sets of wires).

Now that the Taliban has demonstrated its tunnelling skills in Kandahar Pakistan could put them to use along the Indo-Pak border thereby avoiding dependence on either the Sikhs or the weak-kneed Sufi Kashmiris who are beginning to show a marked aversion to the possibility of merging with a decadent Pakistan On the face of it the distribution of land to ex-servicemen appeared to be in keeping with normal Pakistani practices of granting rights to large chunks of prime property to retiring top brass. However, some of those who received the land gift were those who were earlier handlers of the Khalistani Sikh terrorists and there were clear signs and signals that the Pakistani Army Inter-Services Intelligence was drawing up a game plan for the resuscitation of Sikh terrorism to complement the Kashmiri separatism that was ignited after J F Ribero, K P S Gill and bravehearts from the Army, the Border Security Force, the Punjab Police and the police forces of states bordering Punjab sealed off

the international border and began a “hammer and anvil” operation that caught the Khalistanis is a pincer. Many of the leaders of the Khalistani movement were either killed or taken captive and Sikh separatism slowly died out, giving a severe blow to Pakistan’s attempt to legitimise the “Two-nation Theory” of its own birth and create bushfires in the Union of India on the basis of religion. When it failed in Punjab it tried again in Kashmir hoping that this time co-religionists would bond better and set the Indian nation on fire. It is still trying to grab Kashmir to no avail even twenty years after the Hizbul Mujahideen began ethnic-cleansing of Hindus from Kashmir.

Kandahar paradigm More recently, China and Pakistan conducted joint exercises in the Thar desert opposite Rajasthan. One aim was to practice how to extricate tanks that had sunk into the sand (or into mud made swampy by waters released from irrigation canals). Obvious equipment for that would be tanks equipped with bulldozers, excavators and cranes or what are generally known as tank recovery vehicles. Was China teaching Pakistan some tunnelling tricks?

China’s intention is to keep Indian troops tied down at several different points simultaneously and there is no better way of doing that than taking a leaf out of the North Korean book of deep tunnelling and get the Pakistanis working on it. The Pakistan Army Inter-Services Intelligence has made it known that it has five lakh trained jihadis at its command to bolster Pakistan’s conventional forces with “sub-conventional” (guerrilla) elements. Now that the Taliban has demonstrated its tunnelling skills in Kandahar, Pakistan could put them to use along the Indo-Pak border thereby avoiding dependence on either the Sikhs or the weak-kneed Sufi Kashmiris who are beginning to show a marked aversion to the possibility of merging with a decadent Pakistan.

India should acquire the technology developed by the South Korean Institute of Science and Technology and begin looking for tunnels that may be in the making before it is too late. Like Kargil Deep tunnelling is not easy to discover. For one, it cannot be picked up by the current devices deployed to detect military footfalls and vehicle movements on the surface. It requires specialised equipment like what the South Koreans used to

detect the tunnels opening into their land. Now that military relations between the two countries are being described as “robust” India should acquire the technology developed by the South Korean Institute of Science and Technology and begin looking for tunnels that may be in the making before it is too late. Like Kargil. (There is a footnote as to why TACDE failed to advocate fitting flare and chaff dispensers before sending in aircraft and helicopters to evict the Pakistan Army Northern Light Infantry from the Kargil salient. It could be absolved of blame because it believed that the batteries that are used to push the Stinger missile from its shoulder-fired launcher would have expired in the timelag between the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in February, 1989 and the Kargil invasion in 1999. Little did the saintly men in TACDE know that the US Central Intelligence Agency sold the technology for the batteries to the Chinese who, as with a lot of other things, breached the copyright and made copies and gave them to the Pakistanis to fit on the many Stinger missiles that they had quietly hidden away - even though the Americans were willing to pay good money to buy them back. The lesson here again is that you have got to be a devil to fight a devil.)

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Kautilya as the National Security Adviser delinked from day to day management / routine functions. He focused on intelligence and long term strategy formulation. He carried out highly elaborate net assessments of the various components of the States that opposed him. That is why the lessons of that highly centralised empire are so relevant in this day and age

George Tanham, the RAND scholar, felt that India lacked a Strategic Culture and a tradition of strategic thinking. Nothing could be further from the truth. Kautilya’s Arthashastra in fact provides the framework for an Indian strategic culture and tradition. It relied on mass armies and attrition. The main offensive however was preceded by a prolonged covert campaign to destabilise and destroy the balance of the target State. Once this was achieved a massive conventional attack was launched to simply mop up swiftly in the wake of this covert campaign. War elephants were used in the mass to generate shock and awe and the whole campaign was swiftly concluded in a matter of days. Much the same paradigm of war fighting surfaced unconsciously at the time of the 1971 war for the liberation of Bangladesh. Instead of war elephants airpower was used to generate shock and awe and mass effects.

n China the military assiduously studies the ancient history of the period of the warring kingdoms (some 2,500 years ago) because it feels that the multi-polar world of today is very similar to the situation in the era of the warring states in ancient China when six major kingdoms were engaged in incessant warfare for dominance. Sun Tzu and a host of Chinese military thinkers arose in this period of the warring kingdoms. In 1996, the Director of Research at the General Staff department of the PLA had published six volumes of studies of that ancient period that contained advice on how to comprehend the current and future global security environment in the light of China’s ancient historical experience. Sun Tzu’s writings (The Art of War) today constitute China’s inherited strategic culture.

statecraft were crafted by various Acharyas or teachers. The most famous of them was Kautilya or the redoubtable Chanakya, the teacher and National Security Advisor of Chandragupta Maurya, the first emperor who united India into a great and highly centralised empire and converted it from a civilisational to a political entity. Kautilya in fact taught at the famous University of Taxila, where princes were taught the art of statecraft and warfare. It was here that he had written down the famous Arthashastra which ranks on par with Sun Tzu’s The Art of War as a great classic not just on warfare but equally on Grand Strategy, governance and statecraft. Correctly speaking, Kautilyan theories of warfare, in essence, constitute India’s inherited Strategic Culture.

What exactly do we mean by the term Strategic Culture? Kerry Longhurst defines a Strategic Culture as, “a distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force. A Strategic Culture is persistent over time and tends to outlast the era of its inception”. In his book India’s Strategic Culture George Tanham felt that India lacked a tradition of focused strategic military thought and analysis. There was no coherent military tradition that had come down from the ancient past. Stephen Peter Rosen in his book Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies said: "There is no Primordial Strategic Military Culture in this country". He felt that India lacked a tradition of Strategic thinking.

India is amongst the oldest civilisational States in human history. Herman Kulke and Dietmar Rothermund state, “Indian history is the fascinating epic of a great civilisation. It is a history of amazing cultural continuity. Today, it is the history of one sixth of mankind”. At the very outset it is vital to focus on the first empire of Indian history that for the first time transformed India from a civilisational to a political entity. It must be highlighted that like ancient Greece, India has largely been a civilisational State. Political unity has been a relatively rare phenomenon. Indian history has two opposing trends - a centrifugal impulse towards disintegration, fragmentation and chaos which made it easy prey for foreign invasions. The other equally evident trend has been this impulse towards consolidation and empire formation that asserted itself on three occasions in Indian history:

Is this really true? At around the same time as the period of the warring kingdoms in ancient China, India was divided into 16 Mahajanapadas or major kingdoms which were constantly at war with one another. It was in effect a multi-polar security environment rather similar to what is emerging at the global level today. Many military theorists had arisen in ancient India in this period and many theories of war and

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INDIAN LEGACY

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The Mauryan Empire The Mughal Empire The British Indian Empire The State of India is based on a great

AN INDIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE:

THE KAUTILYAN INHERITANCE

tradition. The Mauryan, Mughal and British Indian empires of history, all contributed to state formation in India. To trace the origins of India’s national military ethos it would therefore be vital to understand and analyse the primal or first impulse towards empire building (or state formation) that came about with the Mauryan empire. One individual who was largely responsible for establishing this highly centralised empire was Kautilya. This empire controlled all forms of economic activity in the State and generated a huge surplus to raise massive armed forces. The State controlled the move of its citizens,

operated mines, brought new land under cultivation and expanded the territory and power of the State to the ultimate geographical boundaries of the Indian sub-continent. Though the Mauryans had a Navy for riverine operations, their outlook was primarily continentalist and insular.

Traditional sources The primary textual sources of military thought in ancient India were: Sadashiva Dhanurveda: This is one of the ‘upa’ or sub-Vedas

and deals with the Art of Archery. This is a repository of the classical Indian military tradition based upon attrition and chivalry. Hast Ayurveda: An upaveda that deals with the management of war elephants. War elephants had become the prime shock arm of Indian armies from the Mauryan period onwards. The Epic: The Mahabharata (Bhisma and Shanti Parva) and Ramayana are key sources of military thought and tradition. The Gita provides an ideological basis for war fighting and management of the disorganising

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emotions of fear and guilt in combat. Besides these are the Nitis or teachings of Shukracharya and Brihaspati Acharya, said to be the military theorists of the demons and Gods.

Kerry Longhurst defines a Strategic Culture as, “a distinctive body of beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force. A Strategic Culture is persistent over time and tends to outlast the era of its inception”. In his book India’s Strategic Culture George Tanham felt that India lacked a tradition of focused strategic military thought and analysis. There was no coherent military tradition that had come down from the ancient past. Stephen Peter Rosen in his book Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies said: There is no Primordial Strategic Military Culture in this country. He felt that India lacked a tradition of Strategic thinking Puranas: The Puranas are characterised as Itihasa or history as opposed to Gatha or legends. The main Puranas dealing with war fighting and military theory were: Agni Purana Matsya Purana Bradharma Purana Kautilya’s Arthashastra: This is the most talked about but least studied and applied source book that outlines an indigenous Indian Strategic Culture that is still relevant, specifically for a multi-polar era. There is an imperative need to study this document in exhaustive detail and formally adopt this as India’s inherited Strategic Culture. The simple fact is that the Strategic Culture outlined in the Arthashastra has tended to outlast the era of its original conception. An analysis of post-independence Indian military history reveals that the primal war fighting paradigm of the Arthashastra has tended to reappear or surface unconsciously, whenever competent political and military leaderships were available in India. The Arthashastra has a total of 15 books. Of these 3 are devoted to military matters (Danda Neeti). While many others also have a bearing on warfare.

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INDIAN LEGACY Central tenets of Kautilyan thought: A comprehensive study of Kautilyan military thought is a vital but long neglected enterprise. Kautilyan strategic throught emphasises: The primacy of economics: The Kosha (treasury) is more important than the Danda (Army). As such Kautilya is in consonance with the Geo-economic theories of our time. Powerful Armed Force can only be created on the basis of a sound economy which can generate huge surpluses. The elephant based armies were hugely expensive and required the massive resources of a highly centralised State with a vibrant and well monetised economy. Kautilya therefore placed inordinate emphasis on economic power as the basis of military power. It was so in the era of the elephant based RMA. It is so today in the second nuclear age. Highly aggressive orientation: The prime duty of the king is to expand his territory / influence. Thus the Kautilyan paradigm enunciates a highly aggressive and proactive doctrine of war fighting which implies that attack alone is the best form of defence. With expanded territory come greater economic resources and power and hence even larger armies. The object of the State is to maximise its power and to that extent the territorial expansion of the State was deemed a policy imperative. Victory by covert means: The king should make every effort to achieve his aim by covert means. Employment of armed force should be the last resort. Miraculous results can be achieved by subversion (this echoes Sun-Tzu - “to fight and win all your battles is not the acme of excellence. Supreme excellence lies in subduing your enemy without fighting”). Wars are costly and Kautilya advised the ruler to use superior strategy to defeat his enemies without fighting by simply attacking their command and control nodes through covert means. The preference always was to collapse the adversarial State organisationally rather than destroy it militarily. Separation of command and staff function: Kautilya as the National

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Security Adviser delinked from day to day management / routine functions. He focused on intelligence and long term strategy formulation. He carried out highly elaborate net assessments of the various components of the States that opposed him. That is why the lessons of that highly centralised empire are so relevant in this day and age. What was remarkable for that era was the sophistication of the tools of analysis. The adversary State was clinically studied as an information system. Its key elements were isolated and examined in great depth and detail - the ruler himself and his key traits, his council of ministers, his Army - in specific its leadership, morale and level of training, the economic power of that State and its demographic features. Special attention was paid to its border population and its border forts. The multi-polar power paradigm: The Circle of States (Raja Mandala) theory of Chanakya is one of his seminal contributions. It was based on a multi-polar power environment and as such has great relevance in the present day. As stated earlier, India was then in its period of the “warring kingdoms”. It was divided into 16 large States or Mahajanapadas that were forever competing for territory, resources and influence and constantly fought to maximise their power. Kautilya had devised tools of analysis for penetrating Net-Assesments of the complex situation. The individual State was treated as an Information System. The Circle of States therefore became the “System of Systems.” The Raja Mandala or Circle of States is his best known analytical tool. Kautilya’s key constituents of power: Kautilya listed the following aspects as the key constituents of a State’s power: Intellectual strength: Analytical power (the power of deliberation). Knowledge to him was a key resource and he laid great store by the analytical process which put information to excellent use. Strength of sovereignty: A Prosperous treasury and strong army. When the means for war fighting were so highly expensive, military power could only flow from

vibrant economic power. Kautilya laid overwhelming emphasis on economic power as the foundation of State power.

One individual who was largely responsible for establishing this highly centralised empire was Kautilya. This empire controlled all forms of economic activity in the State and generated a huge surplus to raise massive armed forces. The State controlled the move of its citizens, operated mines, brought new land under cultivation and expanded the territory and power of the State to the ultimate geographical boundaries of the Indian sub-continent Physical Strength: Martial power, fighting quality of armed forces. This can come from good organisation and realistic training and preparation. The armed forces must be well paid, contented and highly motivated. Their leaders must be men of character and integrity. Ray Cline’s formula: This concept of State power closely resembles Cline’s formula for perceived power PP = (C+E+M) x (S+W) (PP Perceived Power, C - Critical Mass, E - Economic Capability, M - Military Capability, S - Strategic Purpose, W - Will). Four-fold means six-fold policy operation matrix: The Four-fold Means of Kautilya are well known and part of the Indian folklore. These constitute the policy options for a State that seeks to prosper in a multi-polar setting: Sama - Conciliatory Policy Dama - Economic Aid / Inducement / Bribes / Payoffs Danda - Employment of Military Force Bheda - Sowing dissension Six policy operations: Kautilya lists these as: Sandhi (Peace): Peace enables the State to promote development and welfare of the people. When the advantages derivable from peace and war are of equal character, one should prefer peace. Peace alone

can enable the growth of economic power of the State. This is the basis of military power. Vigraha (War): ‘Whoever is superior, will wage war’. Kautilya stresses the need to generate a distinct force asymmetry over the adversary before launching operations. War is an option only once a force asymmetry has first been generated. Kautilya was trenchantly opposed to waging war for the sake of war. War is waged only once military and informational superiority has been gained. However superiority (or asymmetry) once gained must be pressed home ruthlessly, especially against troublesome adversaries. Asana (Neutrality): Whoever thinks no enemy can hurt me nor am I strong enough to destroy the enemy, shall observe neutrality. Yana (Planning): Long term planning and preparation is vital to be prepared for any contingency that arises at short notice or to exploit fleeting opportunities. Kautilya carried out detailed Net-Assessments that analysed the various components of the opposing State e.g. the king (his personality and psychological profile and character traits), his ministers (their relations / equation with the king and one another, the quality of their advice and dissensions between them), his army (its size, morale, armament and state of training, disaffected elements if any) the border forts (state and nature of garrisons, their loyalty), the king's treasury (economic resources of the State) and the population (their attitudes, loyalty and martial qualities). Not only this, detailed

assessments of terrain and weather and their impact on operations were routinely conducted. Humanint was highly prized and chiefly relied upon not just to gain information but equally to spread disinformation and deception. Samsraya (Alliance): Whoever is devoid of the necessary strength to defend himself shall seek protection of another. If a State lacks economic and military power it must protect itself through an alliance system. In modern times this has been Pakistan’s prime strategy - to invoke extra-regional balancers like the USA and China to sustain its military competition with an Indian State that is far larger in size and economic potential. Dvaidhibhava (Double policy): ‘Whoever thinks that help is necessary to work out an end, shall make peace with one and wage war with another (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact before World War II is a classic illustration of this policy option). This deals specifically with India’s current two front situation with China to the north and Pakistan to the west. Arthashastra (Detailed manual): The Arthashastra goes into details of analysis of the key components of the enemy State, terrain analysis and analysis of employment of various arms in different terrain profiles. It analyses the impact of weather on operations and specifies September-March as the best window of operations in the sub-continent. It provides standard operations procedures and duties of various appointments to include Senapati or chief of the army, Gajadhyakshya or

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trainer of Elephants, Ashwadhyksha or trainer of horses, Rathadhyaksha or trainer of chariots and Antapala or chief of border forts, Ayudhakshya or chief of ordinance etc. Sociological profile of the armed forces: There were six categories of troops available in the Mauryan era. These were: ●● Maula: These were the regular troops of the standing Army ●● Bhrta: These were local volunteers or auxillary troops raised in times of war. ●● Sreni: These interestingly were mercenary guilds or corporations of mercenary soldiers. Even today the US is employing such mercinaries (Paramilitaries) in Iraq and Afghanistan. ●● Mitra: Troops of an ally or a coalition. ●● Amitra: Enemy deserters or troops who have been turned over. ●● Atavi balam: These were the tribal levies and were considered the least reliable class of troops. In the Mauryan era they were largely used for scouting and to systematically loot the enemy territory.

Kautilya advised the ruler to use superior strategy to defeat his enemies without fighting by simply attacking their command and control nodes through covert means. The preference always was to collapse the adversarial State organisationally rather than destroy it militarily Kautilya as the National Security advisor, delinked himself from the day to day functioning of the State but focused instead on long term perspective thinking and covert wars to destabilise all likely adversaries. He concerned himself with alliance building to create a favourable balance of forces and pro-actively sought to create opportunities to maximise the State’s power by well crafted covert action campaigns. The emphasis on covert action or Kuta-yuddha or Aprakshya Yuddha was indeed overwhelming. Hence the

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INDIAN LEGACY State’s major reliance on intelligence and information. Spies: The Arthashastra gives details of an elaborate intelligence organisation comprising legals and illegals, wandering monks and mendicants, soothsayers and astrologers, nautch girls and prostitutes etc. Elaborate spy rings kept other spies under surveillance. So vast was this humint organisation that Magasthenes thought that spies were a separate caste all together in India. Kautilya laid overwhelming emphasis on Intelligence and Information Warfare Operations. The most detailed information was collated on key enemy personalities that constituted the enemy’s command and control nodes. These were the primary objectives of covert attack and subversion. Kautilya’s aim was to attack and degrade the enemy’s system per se and not merely the components. A key degrader of an information system was the spread of the disorganising viruses of suspicion and fear or panic.These served to reduce the coherence of responses; these degraded efficiency and could even destroy the State as a coherent information processing system. Assasination of key personnel was a favourite tactic. Snakes and a special class of spies who had great expertise in administering poisons were employed for this task.Spies were also used to sow the seeds of mutual suspicion and distrust in the enemy camp.Spreading the virus of suspicion was a key tactic that carried out soft kills of key command and control nodes in the enemy State. Net assessments: Analysis of intelligence was highly methodical and scientific. The Arthashastra gives a highly structured methodology for carrying out net assessments of friendly and adversarial States. The State was treated as an Information system. It was systematically divided into the key components of the State. For example the personality of the king or the ruler himself, his strong and weak points, exploitable vulnerabilities if any were the most critical inputs. Next the Council of Ministers of the State were analysed in detail for their personality profiles, their intelligence and integrity, their equations with their king and within themselves. Precise intelligence was sought to carry out disinformation operations to create dissensions

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

within the ministerial ranks and sow seeds of suspicion that would alienate the ministers from the head of State. Creating a dissonance in the key command and control nodes was a prime requirement prior to undertaking any offensive operations. The opposing State’s armed forces were then studied in detail, their organisations, force levels, the personalities of the key commanders, the morale and state of equipment and training were analysed in detail. The Forts of the State and its border defences were then examined in depth. The attitude of the border population was studied and their grievances that could be exploited were ascertained. The last but the most essential component was the Kosha - or the Treasury. This implied an analysis of the economic power of the opposing State to wage war. The nature and extent of its resources in terms of human and animal resources and key metals and mines were systematically analysed and above all its agricultural output was studied. For purposes of analysis therefore, the enemy or allied State was treated as an information system and each sub-component was analysed in detail for its own intrinsic strengths and vulnerabilities as also the dynamics of its interaction with the other components of the State information architecture were studied in great detail. In many respects this Systems-Analysis approach resembles the modern Net-Assessment methodology evolved by Andrew Marshall of the US Pentagon Office of Net-Assessment and reveals a very high level of sophistication in the analytical tools of that era. Net-Assessment was reintroduced in India only as late as 2002 with the establishment of a directorate of Net-Assesment in the Integrated Defence Staff. Cultural constants - an Indian way of war: What then are the cultural constants that emerge from our analysis of war fighting in ancient India? Do these constitute a strategic culture? Do these provide the basis for an Indian way of war-fighting? Mass armies: In the ancient period, mass armies of 6,50,000 strong or more are frequently mentioned. Even

larger armies (the Mughal army was over 2 million strong) emerge in the medieval period. In fact the military manpower pool in India at the time of Aurangzeb was said to be close to 4 million. During World War II the British Indian Army had reached a peak strength of 2.5 million. As such, given India’s huge population base, size and resources, mass armies are a key feature of our way of war. They are a key constituent of our strategic culture and occur time and again in our history. The very needs of Internal Security in such a vast population, necessitate mass standing armies which will simply mop up the recruitable male populations to curtail its availability for rebellions against the State. Penchant for attrition: A penchant for attrition and direct force on force engagements persists till this day. Use of the indirect approach has been relatively ever the indirect approach and mobile warfare were used (e.g. Chandragupta Maurya’s unification of India and defeat of Seleukos Nicator and Samudragupta’s defeat of the Huns). There is the need to consciously develop a manoeuvrist orientation and outgrow the attrition mindset in Indian military thought and practice. Slow to change and adapt: The Mahabharatan military organisational paradigm persisted beyond the 10th century AD. Elephants could not stand up to explosives and canon fire but we refused to change and thereby paid a heavy price. Indian history reveals a remarkable constancy of institutions - e.g. the caste system, agricultural, trade and art forms as also techniques of war fighting have remained unchanged for centuries. In military terms this failure to learn and change was a tragic failing. Culturally primed to strong point / fortress / nodal point defence: As opposed to the Chinese penchant for lines (Great Wall of China - China’s naval thinking is still in terms of a series of chains of islands), Indian folklore is centered on the heroic defence of forts like Chittorgarh, Shingarh, Nahargarh, Amber etc. Indian soldiers will give their best in such forts / nodes or strong points

rather than in extended lines of the World War I pattern. Kautilyan paradigm reemerged during 1971 Bangladesh war: A key characteristic of a strategic culture is that it is persistent over time and tends to outlast the era of its inception. Thus we see the Kautilyan paradigm recur again in the 1971 war for the liberation of Bangladesh. It was a historic victory of great significance when indirect approach and manoeuvre warfare were applied. The Kautilyan war fighting paradigm therefore constitutes the primary strategic culture of India that has tended to appear and reappear on the sub-continent. Characterised by mass armies and extensive covert operations, it has succeeded time and again on the sub-continent. Today we must systematically study this Indian way of war-fighting and crystallise our own Strategic Culture from the roots that the Kautilyan Paradigm provides. What are the key elements of the Kautilyan Strategic Culture? The emphasis on covert action to destabilise and break the balance of an adversarial State before undertaking regular operations. The destruction of politico-military balance is an essential prerequisite for initiation of direct military action. The State must be treated as an information system whose key information nodes must be destroyed / disrupted prior to physical attack. These command and control nodes had to be neutralised or soft-killed prior to launching the main offensive.”Viral attacks” in terms of sowing the seeds of suspicion and mistrust within the enemy organisation were highly regarded as means of informational attack to degrade or soft-kill the

enemy organisation prior to attack. ●● The emphasis on information dominance and psychological operations emerged as a cultural constant during the Bangladesh war. Wars are ultimately lost and won in the minds of men. India was first unified by the shock action and mobility generated by an army of war elephants. The pinpoint bombing of Gen Niazi’s meeting in Dacca during the Bangladesh war is a prime example of this tradition. ●● The emphasis on mobility and shock action, on manoeuvre as opposed to classical attrition in fact, was the singular characteristic of the Maruyan era. This fortuitously resurfaced during the 1948 Hyderabad operations and most prominently during the 1971 war for the liberation of Bangladesh. Air power was the prime tool for shock action and the key enabler for mobility. For much of the rest of our military history our mindset has been entirely attrition dominated and this has been a major civilisational failing. ●● War, therefore, is not something that a State launches into blindly and thoughtlessly. It has to prepare for it systematically and patiently over a long period of time, but the denouement must be swift, stunning and paralysing. The Mauryans had unified India by such well crafted and decisive campaigns in a matter of just 25 years. Since India is a sub-continent almost as big as Europe in size, this remains to date one of the most spectacular but least studied episodes of Indian history and in fact the world’s military history.

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echnology has become a crucial influencing factor in our lives today and the security industry is no exception to this. Innovations and technological developments in security and surveillance systems are spurred in direct proportion to evils like terrorist attacks, suicide bombers, thefts and burglaries. Unattended security risks can have a devastating effect on our economy. Security solutions are not a luxury anymore; they have become an absolute necessity.

The second terrorist attack on the Delhi High Court in a three month's time interval only highlights the critical need to revamp our security infrastructure. The article suggests the need to enact a law to make installation of CCTV cameras compulsory at all sensitive buildings and public area and carries out an informative overview of the technologies and solutions available in the market.

The 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attack made the hospitality industry realise how woefully inadequate they were in dealing with such an attack. The bomb blast outside the High Court in Delhi on 8th September 2011 is a grim reminder of the complacency and apathy that dogs the government - to the detriment of the innocent, gullible people. If something like this has happened outside an establishment like the High Court, then this is a clear indication of a serious security lapse.

efforts in the future to adapt to new technologies. Proper designs or laying of cable conduits is given the go-by.

CCTV:

The government and the home ministry need to lead from the front; however their nonchalance and indifference to the installation of CCTV cameras in the vicinity of the high courts and other important establishment is something that is hard to digest.

Key drivers for growth of CCTV industry in India ●● Influx of multinational companies ●● Terrorist attacks

security solutions

●● Tremendous growth in infrastructure sectors ●● Demand for high security surveillance during international sports events ●● RBI ruling for installation of CCTVs in premises of all banks across India The segments driving growth are: ●● Industrial plants and infrastructure

Team DSA

●● Commercial establishments ●● Customers like government offices, airports, railway stations, bus stations, bridges, PSUs, banks, hotel industry, schools, malls, jewellery stores, BPO sector and retail sector etc. Bangalore based security solutions expert Sathiya Seelan feels that the clients still do not value safety with the respect that it deserves. Whether the hotels that were attacked in the Mumbai terrorist attack in 2008 have reinstalled their security systems in a manner that is fit-for-purpose is debatable says the expert. The hospitality industry views security as a necessary evil and so gets away doing what is the least required which is not necessarily the best. For instance, if the requirement is for 600 cameras, the clients insist only on 150 cameras in highly critical areas. Worse still, no provision is made for possible migration / expansion

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In the coming years, the demand from residential sector is expected to surpass the demand from other sectors. The security market pie is getting larger and larger and attracting companies like Godrej and Eureka Forbes. CCTV, Access Control Systems and Video Door Phones are leading the pack.

The technology paradigm Market has new 3 Megapixel cameras that can deliver full HD resolution images. This brings in advanced functionality for the security application whilst minimising bandwidth requirements. Critical areas within a scene can be transmitted at a higher frame rate than the rest. User can be in control of how images are managed. This technology is called as smart compression. The user can set specific area and produce high quality images in that area. A megapixel sensor is something that can offer excellent detail. Space constraints have to be addressed during the design stage itself so that project execution is simplified.

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

Today technology differentiation is such that products that are easy to install are always preferred. Hybrid digital video recorders, mobile digital video recorders, network video recorders, digital video servers, speed domes, network camera, compression card - these are the new and emerging technologies. Essentially there are 2 kinds of sensing technologies: a. CMOS b. CCD CCD (charge coupled device) and CMOS (complementary metal

oxide semiconductor) image sensors are two different technologies for capturing images digitally. Each has unique strengths and weaknesses giving advantages in different applications. Neither is categorically superior to the other, although vendors selling only one technology have usually claimed otherwise. Both types of imagers convert light into electric charge and process it into electronic signals. Nowadays network security cameras are expected to give ●● High resolution ●● Great quality of video image

●● IP network capability CCD sensors are costlier than CMOS. It is important for the end user to understand what sort of sensors are required. But to put it in simple, non-technical terms, CCD sensors are more suited to a closed kind (office) environment while the CMOS sensors are more suited to an environment - mostly industrial that is subject to extremes of temperature, noise, dirt etc. Variety of cameras available in the market is awesome. New network cameras have built-in technology to ensure that

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●● They are vibration resistant (so that they can be used in moving vehicles) ●● They are dust and moisture resistant Some of the cameras are also tamper proof. Images are sharp. Flexible network capabilities allow you to quickly find out exactly what happened and get clear evidence. In case of IP cameras, the acceleration is slow. The market is yet to mature for IP - not just in India, but across the globe. System integrators are reluctant to switch off from analog to IP due to fall in prices of digital video recorders. IP requires knowledge of networking too. IP cameras are costly, though these are the ones that will be prevalent in the future. Now, HD-SDI the new technology has come in. These have high definition cameras, standard co-axial cable and HD DVR. This will provide an output that can equal to a 2.2 Megapixel IP camera. The sad part is that the marketing language adopted by all manufacturers is way too technical and almost all of them appear to be similar with each one of them trying to outdo the other by claiming that their technology is superior. I hope suppliers of surveillance systems make their marketing language much simpler. The end-users or customers really need to work very hard to understand this technology and mark my words, the day the customers become knowledgeable, they will become more demanding and they would want the best technology at a competitive price. We have a question to ask the veterans in the security space. There are many manufacturers who say that their products (cameras, for instance) offer the best quality image, there are mobile digital video recorders that can assure safety under all situations. But we are puzzled that all of these solutions are more reactive. Why is the industry not looking at educating the customer to be more proactive? What is the point of looking at CCTV only as a tool for the police to nab the criminals? Why can’t we look

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try to find out if their experience with the system integrator has been good; learn from their experiences.

at preventing the crime? We need to understand that the smarter the product or the solution, smarter the crooks.

12. In case you are making a large investment, it is not a bad idea to create a compact team of electronic security experts on a full time basis. This step will reward you in the long run, though it might appear to be costly in the short run. This team will also have the accountability for procuring a cost effective solution and successfully implementing it.

Recent innovations ●● Surveillance on mobile (SOM) ●● Remote surveillance ●● IP cameras SOM will help users to remain informed about the security of their premises even when they are on the move. Email alerts and buzzer alerts can be generated based on motion detection on the premises and users can see it live on their mobile. Network cameras will gain market share from 2012 onwards but so far analogue cameras have the highest demand in the market. The trend is such that technological advancement is more towards software based solutions than hardware. High resolution CMOS technology (in high resolution low light cameras) is also penetrating the market fast. Video analytics that integrates various types of security equipment is another technological breakthrough that is gaining popularity.

Challenges Scalability is never considered important enough by clients. Architects end up approving a design that may not be fit-for-purpose. The view coverage for all critical areas is not considered vital. Ideally, the areas have to be classified as “High”, “Medium” and “Low” in terms of criticality. Even this basic requirement is not complied with. In the end, everything boils down to cost. Clients are so focused on costs that they refuse to look beyond low level cameras like Dome Cameras and Pan-Tilt-Zoom Cameras. High level cameras based on laser / radar technology can aid wide area surveillance up to 5 to 10 kms. These cameras let you know - what is the target, where is the target and at what speed the target is travelling. Experts say that in the transition

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

from analog to IP, the security industry is way too fragmented which dilutes available investments. There is still no guarantee that products from different vendors will integrate well and work together. Plug fests help but are usually too late (and sometimes costly if major overhauls are involved) from a product development perspective, as per security expert Hayden Hsu. What exactly is a Plug fest? In practice, they’re about connecting products for testing interoperability to ensure that end users realise the benefits of new technologies. Today is the era of open standards. An open standard is something that is publicly available and has various rights to use associated with it. Confused? Simply think of a mouse or a key board or a pen drive - they can be used anywhere … these applications are the result of open standards. A pen drive can be used in a laptop or on a PC. Isn’t it? Just like YouTube, a similar platform can be created for video surveillance. Software engineering resources can be better utilised to develop smaller applications like video analytics, business intelligence and other alerts on a common architecture. A variety of storage solutions are now available that interoperate in IP-enabled, HD environments. Some important tips for the end users of CCTVs and security surveillance systems: Users need to validate the model of cameras that they need - analog or digital.

1. Always do a cost benefit analysis. 2. Negotiate well with service providers and system integrators. Ask lot of questions. 3. Look at the trade-off between price and quality. 4. Look at the track record of service providers. 5. System integrators who provide end to end solutions are always a better bet. 6. Look at future scalability. 7. Bargain for a good training module from system integrators. Train a team of people well; make training an ongoing exercise and not a one time affair. 8. Understand the scope and design well. Do spend lot of time on this. Remember you are making an investment that can give you returns in the long run, so as well be absolutely sure about what you are getting into. 9. Gather information about cost of spare parts, cost of AMC, risk of obsolescence; generally a thumb rule states that surveillance equipment like CCTV have a life for at least 7 years. 10. Make sure that whatever you install is something that not only meets your current needs but also can meet your future needs. 11. Sometimes the information explosion on internet can confuse you. Go by your instincts. Touch base with security experts - pay them if you need to; engage other users and

13. Remember the cardinal rule - Do not invest on a security system more than what you need and also do not invest less than what an optimum design demands. 14. Clearly document the dependencies post implementation - things like software upgrades, internet bandwidth, network connectivity, the server architecture etc. 15. Look at certifications companies like UL, CE etc.

from

16. Enquire if service support is locally available for the cameras, as if the support has to be obtained from overseas it can cost you a bomb.

Training Ultimately, integrators and installers need to invest in learning and training on new technologies in order to continue to deliver systems and services that meet user expectation and needs. Manufacturers and channel partners need to innovate at all times on all fronts.

The cameras are manufactured according to these standards and that includes the software too. Sathiya Seelan says that even when people install CCTV, they do not think of deriving greater value from it by linking the CCTV with the access control and attendance system. The technology is available, what is lacking is the will. He repeats for the nth time that end users are cost conscious to the point of being thrifty and they do not realise that reduced cost implies reduced efficiency and dilution in standards. This mindset has to change. The future belongs to intelligent cameras that can store data on a hard disk and can transfer data very quickly after sensing the traffic. In general, the future will belong to systems that are intelligent and can talk to each other. Users should focus on Capex-Opex balance. Do you want to spend less on capital cost of equipment now and pay more for recurring operating expenses? The end user has to take a call. It is advisable to invest more in equipment that demands less in terms of maintenance. Even from the financial angle, if we consider the time value of money, this is a much better proposition.

Important observations ■■ The CCTV industry shows great promise; however, the role of unorganised sector and customers who place cost savings ahead of quality installations are a matter of great concern.

End users should keep themselves abreast of the latest technologies. Rather than have a Class XII fail as a CCTV operator, it is better to pay more and have a qualified operator. New types of IP cameras will demand a level of competence that cannot be satisfied by Class XII dropouts acting as CCTV operators.

■■ Innovations and technological breakthroughs are going to rule the market in the future.

There are two standards available in the market - ONVIF and PSIA. Owing to limitations of space, these are not extensively covered in this article - but DSA will definitely cover this in greater detail in future issues.

■■ Service providers in organised sector will need to provide excellent after-sales service, offer customised solutions to end users, use value engineering and value-for-money propositions.

■■ The OE vendors, service providers and IT groups have to work in tandem to provide world-class service to customers and reducing the costs of the security products.

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■■ Despite intense competition, there is room for everyone because of the market size. But a system integrator will be able to provide the optimum benefits to the end user. ■■ Service providers can strengthen their technical teams by way of setting up an independent technical audit department. Technical audits before and after the installations will give the required assurance to the end-user. ■■ System integrators need to learn from the Japanese business model wherein they can recommend those solutions to the customers that they really need rather than thrust something that the customer may not need. However, the system integrators should document this and explain to the client so that a long term relationship based on mutual understanding and trust is created with the clients. This will definitely enable the business of system integrators in the long run though in the short term, it may appear that they are losing value.

Conclusion The demand for IP-based or digital or network video surveillance technology will emerge as fast growing in comparison to analog technology. Asia will dominate the global CCTV market, accounting for a share of over 45 per cent by the end of 2012. IP surveillance, high definition video quality and cutting edge intelligent security solutions have become commonplace in today’s security space. Acceptance of IP cameras is repainting the security picture. India still has a lot of legacy analog based closed circuit television systems which provide for immense potential for conversion to IP-based systems. Even though the world is increasingly connected, the “proprietary jail” that analog cameras had created is not that easy to crack down. Let us accept that analog cameras have been around for some time now. One cannot wish them away just like that. An analog camera transmits the images using a co-axial cable while an IP camera uses other technologies like other cables, wireless etc. This is the simplest way of explaining this.

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The overall market is too small for 300 vendors. Consolidation will facilitate ease of integration and software development while improving user experience with truly standardised compression formats, transmission media, software controls and accessibility. Product innovation in High Definition / Megapixel surveillance is inevitably important. In the security business, guests can arrive anytime unexpected. So, the new cameras have to be effective to detect threats even at night and through haze, smoke, dust and fog. Thermal imaging uses heat and energy to form images - this is not reliant on any light source. Software design, compatibility between devices such as IP cameras, encoders, digital video recorders and video devices are extremely important too. Companies struggle to maximise productivity and stabilise connectivity. Users have to look at scalable updating, virtual storage and clustered data storage. In the long run, people will realise that when it comes to security equipment they need to rely more on quality as against price. Sourcing good products will continue to be a challenge for the system integrators. Due to shortage of bandwidth in India, IP cameras do face constraints, but with the advent of 3G and 4G technology, they will soon be a significant part of the security industry. Insisting on an open platform and getting in writing from the system integrator about risk mitigation in case of technological obsolescence are important factors. Unlike National Fluid Power Association (NFPA) and National Broadcasting Company (NBC) that address fire safety standards and building codes, the security industry has no such body that can create codes or act as a nodal certifying agency that can certify the installations of security solutions. Until this happens, the customers will continue to be on tenterhooks.

October 2011 Defence AND security alert

India vulnerable While the technical matters will evolve over a period of time, the Indian government needs to take actions on war footing following the recent bomb blast outside the High Court in Delhi. The fact is that those who were involved in the bomb blast had the audacity to indulge in such a barbaric attack because of the lack of CCTVs and the fact that following an earlier incident, no action was taken by the government promptly. Had this been done, so many innocent lives would not have been lost. We need to remember that the Delhi blast has occurred even before India could recover from the bomb blast in Mumbai. It is high time installation of security surveillance is made mandatory by the government in view of these incidents in the country. If a law needs to be enacted for the same, so be it. But actions need to be taken quickly. All the important establishments in the country, all the roads, crossings, the toll gates, the entrance and exit points, the octroi posts in the cities, highways - all these should be installed with CCTV scanners of the highest quality to ensure proper vigil. The government should take steps not only to install CCTV cameras but also train people in handling and monitoring these. I would like to stress on “proactive” monitoring to interdict the occurrence of the incidents like the ones that happened in Mumbai and Delhi. Mere installation is not enough; the CCTV cameras need to be maintained as well. Otherwise, as it happened in Zaveri Bazar, Mumbai not much information could be obtained as some of the cameras were dysfunctional. We urge the government and home ministry to take immediate actions to restore the confidence of the people. It is worthwhile to establish a think tank comprising of security experts who can plan an appropriate strategy, so that the government is well equipped to deal with such attacks in the future and save the lives of innocent citizens.

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