DSA October 2012 by Defence and Security Alert

editor-in-chief

“The country comes first - always and every time”.

his month, the Indian Air Force celebrates its 80th anniversary of a glorious and eventful existence as a corporate entity. The core of the current RMA is focused on aero-space power. This revolution was premised upon the exponential increase in the lethality and precision of air power and the vast enhancement in transparency generated by satellites, AWACS and UAVs. No nation today, can aspire to be a regional or global power unless it acquires the prime instrumentality of aero-space power. That is the critical military essence of national power in the 21st century. Aero-space power today is the key to any aspirations we may have for a global / regional role.

India’s entire Asian neighbourhood is engaged in an unprecedented arms build-up and a spending spree to replace old weapons and modernise their inventories of aircraft, ships, tanks and guns. What is cause for serious concern however, is the unprecedented rise in China’s aero-space power. China has mothballed its entire Soviet era fleet of vintage MiGs. The PLAAF now boasts of almost an entire Fourth-generation fighter fleet and the Fifth-generation fighters are being readied for induction much faster than any one had anticipated. It has been building-up not only the Pakistani nuclear and missile arsenals but is also helping the Pakistani Air Force to transit to the Fourth-generation era of fighters. We are living in a dangerous neighbourhood and the need to rapidly enhance our aero-space capabilities could never be more critical and time-sensitive than it is today. Unfortunately, precisely as the Chinese and Pakistani Air Force inventories are surging, ours are rapidly depleting as our aging MiG fleet is retired. It is the unduly sluggish pace of our arms acquisition process that is now becoming a cause for genuine alarm. Hopefully the increase in our Su-30 inventories will not allow dangerous windows of vulnerability to open. However the nation needs its MMRCA and LCAs to roll in as soon as possible. Seeing the rapid strides in the development of the Chinese stealth fighters – that capability acquisition also needs to be fast-tracked in the Indian context. China has the clear quantitative edge in air power. We simply cannot afford to now let the PLAAF also acquire a clear qualitative lead. Quantity generates its own quality. Keeping our two-front situation in mind we need both quality and quantity and we need them urgently.

This anniversary issue of the Defence and Security Alert (DSA) celebrates Air Power and Air Warriors – greets all our boys in Blue and wishes them the heights of glory on the occasion of the 80th Air Force Day. But our celebrations are tinged with concern at the excruciatingly tardy pace at which our aging fighter fleet is being replaced by our mandarins. The Air Chief in his philosophy has put “People First Mission Always”. This emphasis on people enables him to run a happy and motivated team. An interview with the AOP, Air Marshal Anil Chopra, highlights the many initiatives taken to enhance the skills and service conditions of our boys in Blue. The people centric approach has certainly boosted the élan and efficiency of our air warriors and will go a long way in maximising the potential and dynamism of the organisation.

India and Brazil. The Air Chief has taken over as the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee and we look forward to bold new initiatives from him to further Jointness and Synergy between the Services and the political interface. He talks of these and many other important aspects in his rare interview given to this journal. The Air Chief had recently visited Brazil. Coincidentally the Chief of the Brazil Army, General Joaquim Silva e Luna was in Delhi in September and gave an exclusive interview to the Defence and Security Alert (DSA) as one of the leading defence journals in India. The way ahead clearly lies in a transition from an asymmetric Unipolar situation to a Multipolar or Polycentric world order. Surely, as rising economies, India and Brazil will play important roles in that emerging global order. IBSA and other initiatives underline the need for these rising regional powers to bandwagon and hasten the onset of multi-polarity. India and Brazil have a lot to gain from deepening and strengthening their relations – especially military to military ties and explore joint Research and Development projects to develop new weapon systems.

Demographically the youthful Indian civilisation state has tremendous potential. It is sad to see that potential being frittered away in fractious identity politics, ideological polarisation and a rising communism of caste that perpetuates sloth and inefficiency and acts as a drag onto the break out potential of the Indian nation state.

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary TM

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Vo l u m e 4 I s s u e 1 O c t o b e r 2 0 1 2 chairman shyam sunder publisher and ceo pawan agrawal founding editor manvendra singh editor-in-chief maj gen (dr) g d bakshi SM, VSM (retd) director shishir bhushan corporate consultant k j singh art consultant divya gupta central saint martins college of art & design, university of arts, london marketing and sales dhirendra sharma corporate communications tejinder singh creative vivek anand pant administration shveta gupta representative (Jammu and Kashmir) salil sharma correspondent (Europe) dominika cosic production dilshad and dabeer webmaster sundar rawat photographer subhash circulation and distribution mithlesh tiwari e-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscription: subscription@dsalert.org online edition: online@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org editorial and business office 4/19 asaf ali road new delhi-110002 (India) t: +91-011-23243999, 23287999, 9958382999 e: info@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org

disclaimer all rights reserved. reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part by any means without permission from Defence and Security Alert is prohibited. opinions expressed are those of the individual writers and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher and / or editors. all disputes are subject to jurisdiction of delhi courts. defence and security alert is printed, published and owned by pawan agrawal and printed at graphic world, 1686, kucha dakhini rai, darya ganj, new delhi-110002 and published at 4/19 asaf ali road, new delhi (india). editor: manvendra singh.

publisher's view

DSA: Committed to Team DSA Salutes The Air Warriors

nniversaries remind us to review what we have done in the past one year; whether we achieved our set goals and were we able to add value to our Mission. We are celebrating the third anniversary of DSA dear readers and this is the first edition of the fourth year of DSA in your hands. DSA was visualised with a mission in the early months of 2009 to bring awareness on the defence and security subjects and alert our policy makers to the threats and challenges through incisive and thought-provoking writings of experts. DSA was launched when this arena was not as complicated and complex as it is in 2012. Many things have changed in the past three years. From the unending threats and challenges on our frontiers and the deteriorating internal security situation to the unsuccessful attempts to demoralise our armed forces by anti-national elements who want to destabalise India at all levels. The themes covered by DSA since its inception have been the most topical for the respective month each discussing and presenting well researched and in-depth analyses by the most distinguished experts in the defence and security domain. Although all issues of DSA are special some have been exceptional and deserve a mention. DSA published its inaugural edition focused on the Naxal menace in October 2009 to alert our policy makers to the escalating threat of this menace. Unfortunately the Alerts we sounded were not heeded and this menace reached such unprecedented and diabolic savagery as the killing of 75 security personnel in an ambush. The escalation in the Maoist menace spreading its tentacles far and wide across the country and the tepid and inadequate countermeasures by the government prompted team DSA to again dedicate our June 2012 issue on Maoism: Rising Threat Profile, Need For A National Strategy. India saw a massive terrorist attack on 26 November 2008 in Mumbai killing innocent people and many of our security personnel sacrificed their lives to save people in this attack. Remembering this brutal attack and reviewing the entire security apparatus the November 2011 issue of DSA was dedicated to Homeland Security. 26/11 should have been a deafening wake-up call for India forcing our policy makers to stop being complacent and completely overhaul the security planning process leaving nothing to chance a` la the US post 9/11. What is our government waiting for? What will bestir our somnolent police and paramilitary forces to rise and take charge? When will we start learning our lessons? In November 2011 DSA organised a seminar focused on the theme of Limited Wars in South Asia which was addressed by three former Chiefs of the Indian defence forces and blessed by the presence of more than 200 defence personnel serving and retired. Our editorial team decided to publish the following edition on this theme which was highly appreciated by the defence fraternity in India and around the world. DSA has been covering important international subjects dedicated to encourage the peace process and global cooperation. Our March 2012 edition

Defence and Security Worldwide! On The 80th Anniversary Of The Indian Air Force! spotlighted the Crisis In Iran: Impact On India’s Energy Security. It is a crisis still unresolved and the tussle between Iran and Israel is threatening to have a negative impact on the bilateral relations of both the states with other nations. We hope it is resolved peacefully in the near future. For India, Iran and Israel are both equally important as the oil we import from Iran is of critical significance for our energy security and we procure many defence and security products and technologies from Israel. We have long and strong relations with both. Israel has been our strategic partner for many decades and our relationship is poised to leapfrog in many other areas of mutual interest. Depicting this strategic partnership with Israel the May 2011 issue of DSA was well appreciated as it was one of its kind and the first dedicated edition by any defence magazine in India. Our April 2012 issue was dedicated to our brothers of Tibet and their cause. Tibet is not only geo-politically important for India but developments there affect the entire world. This edition was again the first of its kind carrying the candid interviews of His Holiness Dalai Lama and the Prime Minister of Tibet in exile which was very well received in India and internationally. We see an unceasing threat from Pakistan and now China has started flaunting a vicious partnership with Pakistan. Gilgit-Baltistan is almost an unknown name for any common man in India but geopolitically it is very important as is appreciated in the military fraternity. China has reportedly deployed several thousand of its army troops in the Gwadar Port and in Gilgit-Baltistan in the guise of construction workers engaged in repair work on roads and in mines, whereas we very well know that these are the Engineering Brigades of Chinese Army. DSA has seen this development as a major threat to India’s security. Tomorrow the numbers can increase and that will create a whole new dimension in the threat posed to India. This issue of critical strategic importance was exhaustively covered in our July 2012 edition. Our defence forces are fully prepared and alert and India is ready to deal with any eventuality. But it is very important that the modernisation of our defence forces must be planned on a massive scale and executed on top priority. Defence modernisation and the urgent need for Crafting A Defence Industrial Base For India was the theme of our August 2012 edition carrying excellent articles and in-depth analyses by some of the most highly regarded subject experts. China attacked us exactly fifty years back and our editorial team decided to revisit that unpleasant period so as to bring to notice of all concerned what challenges we faced fifty years ago and how well prepared we are now in 2012 to counter any such attack by China on us in the future. September 2012 edition of DSA Remembering 1962: The India-China Balance Today was a real collector’s issue so painstakingly conceived and produced by team DSA. I would like to repeat my words as mentioned in my editorial of 2nd anniversary of DSA that the sole mission of the magazine is to bring more and more awareness and alertness on defence and security subjects not only related to India but globally. DSA is indebted to our esteemed contributors who have played a stellar role in making DSA the most read and respected defence and security magazine in a short span of three years. I am immensely thankful to all our contributors whose guidance and support has been the real strength of DSA and today it has become a distinctive brand in the defence and security journalism not only in India but internationally as well. Many international defence and security experts had been approaching DSA for using this platform to disseminate and share their views with our readers. In June 2012 we introduced a new feature “International Experts’ Opinion” on our website where we post few selected articles, snippets of these experts. I would like to share that this new feature on our website has become quite popular and many more leading experts have started approaching us for inclusion in this feature. I would also like to share that DSA online edition too has become very popular among the international fraternity who keenly look forward to every edition of DSA.

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

founding editor

publisher's view

We have been getting many requests for the past issues of DSA. For our readers who have missed past issues of DSA we have good news. Now all past issues of DSA from October 2009 to December 2011 are available in a CD in PDF format. This CD will be a valuable addition to your reference library and you may procure the same by getting in touch with our sales team. DSA organised its first seminar in November last year and as announced we are moving ahead in this new vertical. Recognising the credibility, prestige, popularity and reach of DSA in the defence and security arena in India a leading global conference organiser Fleming Gulf recently approached us for collaborating with them as Strategic Partner to support their maiden event in India “Defence Modernisation in India Summit (DMI 2012) which DSA has accepted. This is the next step by team DSA to bring more awareness for the cause of safe and secure India. It is heartening to see big ticket announcements by the government for defence procurements worth billions of US dollars. Significant role envisaged for private players is also commendable. This momentum of modernising our armed forces without any let or hindrance must be maintained come what may. Team DSA welcomes our new Chief of the Indian Army who joined just a few months back and I am sure General Bikram Singh is all set to revamp the force, reshape and prioritise the critical procurements for the force and boost the morale of each army personnel. We hope to see path breaking changes in the coming years to strengthen Indian Army. The procurement for the army is a continuing process but as we know the size of our army and its requirements are huge and so are the problems we see in its procurement efforts. I am certain the new Chief has his plans ready to undertake and surmount this urgent and onerous responsibility. We also welcome our new Chief of Naval Staff Admiral DK Joshi who took charge this September. I am sure with his distinguished accomplishments he will motivate his force to excel and under his inspiring stewardship Indian Navy will also procure the best products, technologies and services to make it one of the best naval forces in the world. Our Founding Editor Mr Manvendra Singh and I visualised DSA in the early months of 2009 and he has been actively associated in all the affairs of the magazine on almost day-to-day basis. We together crafted the magazine with all the other team members with complete dedication and commitment to attain the mission of DSA and it was a matter of great honour for us to have Gen GD Bakshi on-board as the Executive Editor last year. Due to his pressing political commitments, Mr Manvendra Singh requested to be relieved of some of his responsibilities and to honour his dedication and contribution I decided to request Gen GD Bakshi to take over as the Editor-in-Chief of DSA which he graciously accepted in August this year. Mr Manvendra Singh is very much with us as our Founding Editor and gives as much time as possible to ensure that the magazine is moving in the right direction. I am sure with Gen Bakshi at the helm DSA is in safe hands and under his exemplary leadership DSA will endeavour to become the first choice of discerning readers in the defence and security arena around the world. I will also like to express my appreciation and gratitude for the unstinted support and cooperation of every team member which has strengthened my hands in carrying the mission of DSA forward. Team DSA works like a family including our esteemed contributors and as a very famous writer has said, The strength of a family, like the strength of an army, is in its loyalty to each other. And I am so happy to see that we all adhere to this. Before I sign off, I would like to convey my grateful thanks to all our contributors, readers, associates around the world who have supported our mission to make India and this world more safe and secure. Once again on behalf of team DSA I salute our valiant Air Warriors on the 80th Anniversary of the Indian Air Force. Jai Hind!

ir warriors are firm in their belief that wars can be won through the effective use of airpower. Their confidence is laudable, for even if that claim, belief, is exaggerated by certain degrees, there is a case for believing in the efficacy of airpower. It does tend to produce results disproportionate to its usage. There is, therefore, every reason to believe in its effectiveness during war. Amongst the key examples of the application of airpower in the Indian context is destruction of Pakistan Army’s logistics base at Muntho Dhalo during the campaign to remove intrusions in the Kargil sector. While air attacks had been launched prior to that, on pickets of troops occupying the heights, it was the destruction at Muntho Dhalo that had the desired effect on Pakistan’s ability to wage the war. It was as decisive an example as ever existed.

Air power is not a static phenomenon and ever evolving as knowledge brings changes to humankind. Evolution of human thought, through natural progression, to growth from greater experience and the resultant technological advances, have all resulted in changing the nature of airpower. It is no more the sum total seen at an awesome flypast during Republic Day parade. In fact there are many aspects of airpower that are not to be seen at all and shouldn’t be seen if it is to remain a potent game changer. The efficacy of unmanned aerial vehicles has been widely reported and documented. It is but one example how effective an air platform can be, even if it is remotely piloted from thousands of miles away. There is now a development in that direction that challenges the conventional wisdom on air deliveries of supplies. Remotely piloted helicopters are in existence that can drop supplies to troops in isolated posts, positions, or even in covert operations. This is as much a game changer as armed UAVs are. The ability to deliver firepower and food without risking the lives of pilots is an airpower revolution that begets many a question.

The principal amongst which is – where is India headed when it comes to the role and development of its airpower? There are certain myths that tend to get promoted in India and which need to be deconstructed if national military might is to grow further. Airpower, for starters, is not service specific, in that it cannot be monopolised by one arm of the state. This is the lesson learnt from 20th century history of war, across the world. Each service needs its assets and each asset assists in the national application of force. Which then means that air assets in India have to be trained jointly, operated jointly and most importantly, developed jointly.

For India to become a global player it has to develop its own airpower assets. There are no shortcuts to this fundamental rule of the game. Throughout history no country has ever become a world leader by importing equipment land, sea or air. Local requirements can only be accurately met by local research and development. Imported equipment undermines one basic principle of leadership – strategic autonomy. Unless that autonomy exists there is no scope for growing into a world leader. That autonomy has to be in thought, as well as technology. Which is also why Defence and Security Alert was born, to develop an autonomous Indian thought in matters of national security. Now it is for the Ministry of Defence and its apparatus to develop that technological autonomy. Only then will India get to be a world player. Unless the desire is to keep the country merely a spectator.

pawan agrawal manvendra singh

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

contents Aerospace power in South Asia

A R T I C L E S young at 80: transformation of the IAF

Indian air force – up up and away

modernising the Indian air force

China’s military aviation industry

the Chinese air force in action: plaaf in Korea

E X C L U S I V E

Indian army aviation corps: today and tomorrow

Chief of Air Staff Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne PVSM, AVSM, VM, ADC

Indian naval aviation: the way ahead

Air Officer-In-Charge Personnel Air Marshal Anil Chopra AVSM, VM, VSM

Chief of the General Staff, Brazilian Army Gen Joaquim Silva e Luna

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh AVSM, VrC, VM (retd) Air Marshal Dhiraj Kukreja PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd)

c o n t e n t s

Air Marshal B K Pandey (retd)

Air Vice Marshal A K Tiwary VSM (retd) Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) Lt Gen B S Pawar PVSM, AVSM (retd) Cmde Ranjit Bhawnani Rai (retd)

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Volume 4 Issue 1 OCTOBER 2012

projection of power from the sea 56 aircraft carriers in Asia Pacific region Rear Adm (Dr) S Kulshrestha (retd)

the ever growing complexities of modern air power

assessment of India’s air power capabilities: reflections in the twentyfirst century

mapping India’s unmanned aircraft system

air power: a question of nuance

the reality of PAF modernisation: a call for immediate focus on IAF

Syria “loosening the blood-dimmed tide”

internal security in India

Dr Harsh V Pant

Dr Jagmohan Meher Dr Ali Ahmed

India: terror outfits and jihad Dr Rupali Jeswal

Pallavi Ade

Amb Arundhati Ghose

V Balachandran, IPS (retd)

I N T E R V I E W S

C O L U M N S aerospace industry: manufacturing challenges Dr Vivek Lall

Dr Arvind Kumar

F E A T U R E S report review: China’s military challenge

103

Dr Shalini Chawla

what can we learn from Kudankulam protests? Dr L V Krishnan

100

India-Nepal-China: geopolitical perspective

104

retaining regional relevance

109

thermal imaging for constant vigilance

112

Dr Sanjeev Bhadauria

Cecil Victor

Peter Banham

for online edition log on to: www.dsalert.org

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

emerging India in Asia Pacific

46 82

Pakistan defence production: attaining self-reliance 92

Col R S N Singh (retd)

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October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

CAS INTERVIEW

Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne PVSM, AVSM, VM, ADC honoured DSA by giving an exclusive interview on the eve of 80th anniversary of the Indian Air Force. In a long and interesting conversation with Major General (Dr) GD Bakshi Editor-in-Chief DSA Magazine Air Chief shares with DSA readers how Indian Air Force is transforming into a potent multi-spectrum strategic force in keeping with India’s national aspirations. DSA: At the time of taking over you had outlined your vision of the air force in the following terms “the IAF envisions itself to be a modern force with cutting edge technologies; flexible, adaptable and nimble.” How much of this vision do you feel you have been able to actualise in your tenure so far? What remains to be accomplished? What lies ahead? CAS: IAF today is confidently moving ahead on its growth path towards acquiring state-of-the-art cutting edge technologies and we have made very good progress in this regard. One must realise that modernisation is a comprehensive and a continuous process which involves new inductions as well as upgrades of existing platforms and equipment. We expect that this process will be completed by 2022. In addition, skill enhancement of air warriors is another important focus area and we are proud of our accomplishments in this area. However, there is still a lot of ground to be covered and we are confident that we will be able to meet all emerging challenges. DSA: We congratulate you on taking over as Chairman of the Chief of staff Committee. How do you propose to use this opportunity to further inter-services cooperation and synergy? The Naresh Chandra Committee has recommended a Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff instead of the CDS – somewhat on the US pattern. Do you feel this will further the cause of inter-services cooperation and jointness in the Indian context? CAS: The Naresh Chandra Task Force proposal to create the appointment of (Permanent) Chairman COSC has been concurred by Air HQ. As per the recommendations, the Chairman COSC would be a four star officer with a fixed tenure of two years and be the single point contact between RM and three Services on matters of policy and training. He would thus be the fourth four star officer. The Service Chiefs will continue to exercise op control over their respective Service and have direct access to RM on service specific issues. This set up will allow HQ IDS under Chairman COSC to function as an effective advisory nodal agency to the government. For total integration of MoD and Service HQ, certain posts have been identified in MoD and at Air HQ where Service and civilian officers can be cross posted. This process will pave the way for full integration of MoD and Service HQ in the future and only then can the creation of a CDS be envisioned. The IAF has concurred with the proposal. DSA: In recent years, the Indian Air Force (IAF) has emphasised on strategic reach, precision strike and all-weather capabilities. What is being done to achieve these capabilities in qualitative and quantitative terms? CAS: The IAF is indeed paying special attention to the capabilities you have listed out as part of our ongoing modernisation drive which received the much needed impetus during the 11th Plan and is expected to continue through the 12th Plan period. The capability building plans of the IAF include induction of state-of-the-art modern equipment and also upgradation of the existing aircraft and systems to boost their operational capabilities and ensure their continued

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

IAF will continue to maintain a combat fleet strength of 34 Squadrons right through the 12th Plan. Modernisation and upgradation is an ongoing process to maintain our combat edge at all times and the Jaguar, Mirage-2000 and MiG-29 fleets are presently being upgraded to meet the requirements of the future. While certain inductions do take time as brought out by you, our presently available combat fleets are capable of performing all envisaged roles and providing us the combat capability to tackle all contingencies in an effective manner. Also, as per our Long Term Perspective Plan, we are enhancing our capabilities and eventually seeking to build-up our squadron strength to 42 by the 14th Plan period The Indian Air Force today is in the midst of transforming into a potent multi-spectrum strategic force in keeping with India’s national aspirations. In consonance with our Vision of ‘People First Mission Always’, I urge all the air warriors to rise to the occasion and embrace all the transformational challenges as unique opportunities for growth of the Service. While successful mission accomplishment is a forgone conclusion, we are seized of the fact that the air warriors, who are our real force multipliers need to be the centre of our focus

I N T E R V I E W operational relevance in the modern day operational scenario. The acquisition of Su-30 MKI, Special ops capable C-130J, New Generation Precision Guided Munitions, Laser Guided Bomb Kits, Sensor Fused Weapons, Harpoon Anti-Ship missiles and weapon systems like BrahMos Surface-to-Surface Missiles have greatly enhanced our all weather precision strike capability, besides enhancing our strategic reach. The future inductions viz. MMRCA, LCA, FGFA and C-17 aircraft will further enhance our capability response options. The all weather capability of the IAF will also be governed by the availability of corresponding facilities on ground to complement the airborne systems. Towards this, the integration of all sensors as a part of IACCS project and the MAFI (Modernisation of Airfield Infrastructure) project is in progress. The first airfield at Bhatinda is likely to be commisioned soon, while the rest of the airfields will be modernised in two phases, thereafter. DSA: Could you elaborate on much talked about MMRCA deal? By when does the air force hope to induct the Rafale? What are the delays / obstacles in the path of this long delayed but vital project? CAS: The MMRCA programme is currently at the stage of contract negotiations with the vendor. The Contract Negotiation Committee (CNC) is presently engaged in discussions on Technical issues, Offsets, ToT, Contract Clauses etc. with the vendor. The scope of MMRCA project is vast and our processes have to be thorough. The CNC is working hard to finalise the contract document and the contract is expected to be finalised by the end of this financial year. There is no delay expected in the finalisation of this Contract and things are progressing on schedule. DSA: A large number of our combat aircraft (to include the MiG-21s, Jaguars and Mirages) are nearing the end of their life spans. While some are being upgraded, the MiGs will certainly have to be retired in bulk. This is resulting in a worrisome depletion of our Squadron strengths at a time when China and Pakistan are rapidly enhancing their air combat power. With the delay in induction of the Rafale and the LCA, this problem is likely to be even further aggravated in the years ahead. What is being done to close this vulnerability gap? CAS: IAF will continue to maintain a combat fleet strength of 34 Squadrons right through the 12th plan. Modernisation and upgradation is an ongoing process to maintain our combat edge at all times and the Jaguar, Mirage-2000 and MiG-29 fleets are presently being upgraded to meet the requirements of the future. While certain inductions do take time as brought out by you, our presently available combat fleets are capable of performing all envisaged roles and providing us the combat capability to tackle all contingencies in an effective manner. Also, as per our Long Term Perspective Plan, we are enhancing our capabilities and eventually seeking to build-up our squadron strength to 42 by the 14th Plan period. DSA: Kindly enlighten our readers on your recent visit to Brazil. What are the possibilities of defence cooperation between these two very important third world countries? With the growing salience of BRICS – do you see the onset of Multi-Polarity in the global order? October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

CAS INTERVIEW

CAS: India and Brazil, being two important growing economies of the present times share an important relation based on shared geopolitical perceptions and common concerns. There have been exchanges and cooperation in all spheres, such as environment, energy, education and science and technology to name a few. Therefore, I definitely see similar cooperation in the defence sector. As you know, we have already procured the Embraer aircraft from Brazil and the first of the 3 x AEW&C aircraft has been delivered in August 2012. There is every possibility of increasing and expanding this bilateral defence cooperation and there is a very keen interest in Brazil in expanding the defence cooperation especially under the aegis of IBSA. Given the current geopolitical order, I think increased engagements between two booming economies certainly ushers in a stabilising effect. DSA: India and Russia are planning to sign the biggest ever deal expected to be worth over US$ 30 billion for the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA). Kindly tell us about the envisaged time frame for the induction of this cutting edge capability – especially as the IAF wants to go in for a two-seat version? By when do we hope to transition to a force that is entirely made up of 4th / 5th generation fighters? CAS: The FGFA programme is progressing well. Negotiations are in progress to sign the R&D Phase contract by the end of this year. The first prototype is likely to be delivered in India in 2014 followed by two more prototypes to follow later in 2017 and 2019. By the end of the 15th Plan period, the IAF fighter inventory would be comprising of large number of 4th / 5th generation aircraft. DSA: What measures are being taken for the upgradation of existing aircraft, equipment and infrastructure as well as induction of new aircraft and equipment, both indigenous and imported? CAS: Continuous upgradation of the combat potential of our fleet both in terms of numbers and lethality, upgradation of the Air Defence network by induction of modern sensors and weapons as well as networking them and enhanced airlift and helilift capabilities are planned to meet the future challenges to our security. Emphasis is also being given to enhance the quality of training by inducting Basic, Intermediate and Advanced trainers and Simulators. Modernisation of the Operational and Technical Infrastructure is another key focus area and would provide the required combat support to the future operations. DSA: As the first of ten C-17 Globemaster III heavy airlifters being built by Boeing for India are being given final shape in California, the IAF will soon have one of the best Strategic Airlift capabilities in the region. What roles do you envisage for this enhanced strategic airlift capability? CAS: The C-17 Globemaster III heavy lift aircraft being procured by the IAF has the capability to convey combat units along with their equipment over long distances in the strategic role. The long range of the aircraft and its capability to operate from high altitude airfields in hot weather conditions will shorten the effective deployment timelines thereby enabling extremely efficient movement of combat units over the entire area of operations. Its excellent inter and intra theatre deployment capability would provide us tremendous flexibility of response both at the national and international levels. DSA: How prepared is the IAF for any contingency of a two-front war? What are the major air exercises being planned, not just in the country but also with foreign air forces to enhance our readiness to deal with such eventualities? CAS: Our present combat assets are fully capable of performing all the envisaged roles and providing us the capability response options to handle a two-front contingency in an effective manner. However, we have a long term plan to enhance our capabilities further and eventually we are seeking to buildup our squadron strength to 42 by the end of 14th Plan period. As regards the major Exercises, IAF will be participating in ‘Ex-Red Flag’

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) has recently accorded the approval for the 56 Avro ac replacement scheme. For the first time in our aerospace industry history, the OEM will choose an Indian Production Agency (IPA) from the Private Sector as its partner. This would be a major step in the direct involvement of the Private Sector in the IAF’s modernisation plan and pave the way for the growth of our domestic aerospace sector in the future One must realise that modernisation is a comprehensive and a continuous process which involves new inductions as well as upgrades of existing platforms and equipment. We expect that this process will be completed by 2022. In addition, skill enhancement of air warriors is another important focus area and we are proud of our accomplishments in this area The acquisition of Su-30 MKI, Special ops capable C-130J, New Generation Precision Guided Munitions, Laser Guided Bomb Kits, Sensor Fused Weapons, Harpoon Anti-Ship missiles and weapon systems like BrahMos Surface-to-Surface Missiles have greatly enhanced our all weather precision strike capability, besides enhancing our strategic reach

Major General (Dr) GD Bakshi Editor-in-Chief DSA Magazine presenting September 2012 issue of DSA to Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne in July 2013 with USAF in Nellis, USA, hosting the French Air Forcefor‘Ex-Garuda’ in India during first half of 2014 and then participate in ‘Ex-Indradhanush’ with the RAF in UK during the latter part of 2014. Notwithstanding these plans, we have been regularly sending our air warriors abroad to witness major exercises world over and they bring back to the system a wealth of doctrinal and operational knowledge which ultimately adds to our capabilities. DSA: What are the latest procurements by IAF in transport aircraft category? What measures is IAF taking to replace its fleet of vintage Avro planes as also the An-32s? What role do you envisage for the indigenous production – especially the Indian Private Sector in this field? CAS: The IAF has already inducted the C-130J aircraft and the deliveries of the C-17 aircraft will commence from next year. The An-32 fleet is undergoing upgradation. The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) has recently accorded the approval for the 56 Avro ac replacement scheme. For the first time in our aerospace industry history, the OEM will choose an Indian Production Agency (IPA) from the Private Sector as its partner. This would be a major step in the direct involvement of the Private Sector in the IAF’s modernisation plan and pave the way for the growth of our domestic aerospace sector in the future. DSA: There have been media reports of some unfortunate accidents involving IAF aircraft. What measures have been instituted to enhance air safety aspects in the light of findings from the recent mishaps? CAS: Aerospace Safety is our important focus area and comprehensive preventive / remedial measures have been put in place by the IAF to address it comprehensively. We have started an outreach programme by the DG (I&S) and ACAS (I) to address the core issues concerning Aerospace Safety with key personnel. Aerospace Safety teams regularly conduct capsules at various flying stations on human factor issues that affect safety in flying. These capsules have been aimed at increasing Aerospace Safety awareness at the Operators’ level. Remedial measures are implemented promptly and an effective feedback system has been put in place. A regular review of the accident prevention programmes of the flying stations is undertaken to ensure safe practices, procedures and identify risk prone and hazardous areas specific to the aircraft fleets and operational environment. Ideally, the ultimate aim for any air force is to have a zero accident rate, but considering the magnitude and diversity of aircraft fleets which the IAF operates, our focus is on fine-tuning our processes and ensuring that the established system operates as designed. Our actions have resulted in a tangible improvement in the flight safety scenario of the IAF in the recent past. These positive trends are due to the focused approach by the IAF in identifying vulnerable areas / hazards in technology, capability, training and environment and systematically managing the risks involved. Specific initiatives which the IAF has

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

CAS INTERVIEW

The future inductions viz. MMRCA, LCA, FGFA and C-17 aircraft will further enhance our capability response options. The all weather capability of the IAF will also be governed by the availability of corresponding facilities on ground to complement the airborne systems. Towards this, the integration of all sensors as a part of IACCS project and the MAFI (Modernisation of Airfield Infrastructure) project is in progress

Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne inaugurating the new Directorate called the Directorate for Air Veterans to look after Pensionary and Welfare issues of the IAF Veterans on 04 October 2012 at Subroto Park, New Delhi ahead of the 80th anniversary of the IAF. undertaken recently are instituting aspects like ORM (Operational Risk Management) which aids in task of mission planning through predefined parameters thereby facilitating decision-making process with minimum risk and AFSEM (Air Force System of Error Management) which is an open reporting system for unsafe acts which helps in managing error. To reduce Bird Hit cases, a dedicated Ornithology cell has been established at Directorate of Aerospace Safety which has completed bird surveys in various bases and introduced anti-bird modules. We have formalised concept of ‘Environmental Management of Airfield Area’ (EMAA) which aims at bird, wildlife and vegetation control over an extended area of 15 km around an airfield. Lastly, procurement of Avian radars (which help in locating, tracking and monitoring movement of birds), microlight ac (for survey of bird activities, monitoring of high rise structures, garbage and carcass disposal sites) and de-vegetation equipment will all contribute towards improving our flight safety records.

IAF will be participating in ‘Ex-Red Flag’ in July 2013 with USAF in Nellis, USA, hosting the French Air Force for ‘Ex-Garuda’ in India during first half of 2014 and then participate in ‘Ex-Indradhanush’ with the RAF in UK during the latter part of 2014

Aerospace Safety is our important focus area and comprehensive preventive / remedial measures have been put in place by the IAF to address it comprehensively

DSA: Your message to the Air Force and the Nation on the 80th anniversary of the IAF. CAS: The Indian Air Force today is in the midst of transforming into a potent multi-spectrum strategic force in keeping with India’s national aspirations. In consonance with our Vision of ‘People First Mission Always’, I urge all the air warriors to rise to the occasion and embrace all the transformational challenges as unique opportunities for growth of the Service. While successful mission accomplishment is a forgone conclusion, we are seized of the fact that the air warriors, who are our real force multipliers need to be the centre of our focus. IAF is fully committed to ensure that the important human dimension of our transformation gets the top priority in all our actions. I believe that the raison d’être for the IAF is to safeguard the sovereignty of the Indian skies. I can assure our countrymen that the Indian Air Force will always remain ready to deliver with speed, precision, honour and pride in our mission.

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

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dsa 3rd anniversary

MOVING WITH THE TIMES

Air Commodore Jasjit Singh AVSM, VrC, VM (retd) The writer is Director General of Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi. He is Fellow of World Academy of Science and Art and has been awarded the Padma Bhushan for a life-time’s contribution to national security and defence.

The Russians at the very top were willing to set up joint ventures and 1990-93 was the real period of their need since as a consequence of the economic and social crises they were not even able to pay the best of designers. The choice was obvious: some would go the United States and Israel and they did. But for the majority the choice was to link up with India or China. The Indian political leadership was more than willing in spite of our own balance of payment (and not an economic) crisis. But somehow we did not go the whole mile; and due to sheer economic necessity Russia went to China with the best of military technologies. And now the world is worried about China’s military modernisation so much so that China is already test flying a fifth generation fighter!

A team from India is already heading to Moscow to negotiate and finalise the details of Indian participation in the development of the Sukhoi T-50, also known by the Russian acronym of PAK-FA, the fifth generation fighter of which the first four prototypes are already flying and undergoing tests and development. India is investing 50 per cent of the expected US$ 11 billion development cost for this aircraft

n the occasion of the 80th anniversary of our Air Force, the doyen of India s strategic thinkers in uniform reflects on some seminal issues. If the Indian Navy can successfully achieve indigenisation of a very high order surely the IAF and for that matter the Indian Army, can also do so. Why can’t this happen in the sister services? Because the Indian Navy has a directorate of design, a controller of warship production, a weapons and systems integration organisation etc. all under the Naval HQ and the DRDO is a supporting institution. After years of debates, the ADA (Aeronautical Development Agency) was established as an ad-hoc institution under a registered society with the DG DRDO as its chairman. But the institution of the government which has the biggest stake in aircraft and aerospace / aeronautics technologies is the Indian Air Force. Should not the ADA be brought under either the HAL or the IAF? All it needs is the appointment of an Air Marshal as the chairman of ADA society and answerable to the Minister of Defence through CAS.

ome people would say that the Indian Air Force is merely around ten years old (when its latest aircraft, the Sukhoi 30 MKI entered service): but it has seven decades of experience in war and peace. In those decades it has flown the Wapitis since early 1932, which as the Marshal tells his tales, flew at only one speed – 75 mph – whether in climb, descent, final approach to land, or cruise! It carried a machine gun that was operated from the rear cockpit by a gunner and had virtually no instruments beyond airspeed, altitude and engine data. The latest aircraft in service, the Su-30 MKI at an all-up weight of nearly 40 tons placing it as the heaviest fighter aircraft to have served the IAF, has a range of hundreds of kilometres, speeds of close to twice that of sound and above all, carries a payload of 8 tons composed of a variety of weapons and other systems. We are on the verge of acquiring an even later aircraft, the French Dassault’s Rafale as our choice of an MMRCA (Medium Multi-Role Aircraft) to fill the middle level gap while the indigenous LCA would fill what its name suggest, the light combat aircraft as the battlefield multi-role combat aircraft. This is not all. The Phalcon AWACS is already In-service and the lighter AEW&C aircraft will soon join the fleet. All the combat aircraft since the Jaguar and Mirage 2000 are capable of being refuelled in the air by a fleet of Il-78 tankers and hence capable of flying for more than half a day or more and cover inter-continental ranges in a single sortie without landing in-between. The Su-30 MKI and the Rafale would be generally clubbed as a shade above a “fourth generation” combat aircraft, a term used to indicate approximately the capability of the aircraft without giving out any specific information about the aircraft or its systems performance.

But the IAF is moving with the times and looking beyond the fourth generation combat aircraft to fifth generation fighters. And this is to be done within the framework of a joint venture with Russia’s Sukhoi design bureau. A team from India is already heading to Moscow to negotiate and finalise the details of Indian participation in the development of the Sukhoi T-50, also known by the Russian acronym of PAK-FA, the fifth generation fighter of which the first four prototypes are already flying and undergoing tests and development. India is investing 50 per cent of the expected US$ 11 billion development cost for this aircraft. The Indian design and development contract worth US$ 295 million for the Indian version is expected to be executed in six months. The Chief of Air Staff has emphasised that “the contract incorporates our specifications, which are very demanding.” The aircraft is thus expected to be somewhat different from the Russian design though both will be what have come to be called the fifth generation combat aircraft. The original plan was to order 166 single-seat and 48 two-seat fighters. But it has now been decided to take all 214 as single seat aircraft which would reduce the cost somewhat. The aircraft should be flying in the IAF by the end of this decade though the full strength of this type would take another decade by which time significant numbers of earlier aircraft In-service would retire. This is because as the fifth generation fighter begins to enter service, obviously we still have

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

Young at 80: Transformation of the IAF many legacy aircraft and systems, many of which are being upgraded to enhance their operational capability for the interim period. With these plans it should be possible to maintain a force level of at least 40 combat squadrons in the coming decade. While it can be argued that ever since its inception eight decades ago, the IAF has always been in the process of transformation caused by expansion of the force level, especially after China’s India War in 1962 and aircraft replacements due to their life expiry, the present process of transformation unquestionably is the most crucial and fundamentally substantive. Over the decades the Air Force has got used to transformations, often through a process of innovations normally referred to as jugaad. Hence one can argue that the major transformation now under way would not pose any special challenge as such. One such transformation executed under the severe conditions of an unexpected war at altitudes of 16,000 to 22,000 ft was witnessed in the summer of 1999 during the Kargil War launched by Pakistan clandestinely. No air force in the world had ever flown to fight especially in support of the ground forces at such heights with their steep valleys. While the IAF undertook flying over the mountains as routine training

exercise, no weapon training for air-to-ground targets had been ever carried out since firing ranges at such altitudes were not available. Lower density affected aircraft performance. The possibility of Pakistan Air Force intervening at any time was a constant factor to be watched. In the event Pakistan did not even try to use its air force in spite of its F-16 multi-role combat aircraft and the decades old propaganda that their air force was far superior and had won the 1965 War! The political constraints laid down for IAF air operations in these high Himalayas were extremely tight and illogical: aircraft were not to cross the Line of Control into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir and yet provide, within a confined zone, close air support to the Indian Army valorously fighting its way up the steep hills that had no cover like trees etc. Since the Pakistani Army had created a bridge-head up to around 8-9 km this left very little space to haul the fighters around and the altitude enlarged the radius of turn of the fighters especially due to the altitude effect. The targets for the air force were literally pinpoint where Pakistani Army had managed to build small sangars. A miss of even less than a metre in weapon

delivery would lead to the weapons overshooting by a kilometre or more. Interdiction of the supply lines was not easy either since most of the storage sites were at the bottom of steep valleys. A last minute decision to urgently acquire laser guided bombs (which had not been done during peacetime) helped further.

If the Indian Navy can successfully achieve indigenisation of a very high order surely the IAF and for that matter the Indian Army, can also do so. Why has this not happened in spite of more than a dozen BRDs (Base Repair Depots) in the IAF and nearly a hundred Workshops and facilities in the Indian Army? On the other hand, it would be imprudent to dismiss the challenges of present transformation as a process of another phase of jugaad. The challenges of technology assimilation, evolution of tactics and doctrines for air campaigns, ensuring maintainability and sustainability, appropriate weapons and sub-systems and a host of other factors that are so crucial to a professional air force are all undergoing changes. Decision-making for building a professional air force and its capabilities for future operations in the coming decades would be quite different from those of even Kargil.

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

announcement

MOVING WITH THE TIMES

As it is, we can expect future wars to take place in and over the high Himalayas which pose qualitative and quantitatively different challenges than those in the deserts of Rajasthan or the densely populated regions of our country, leave alone the maritime environment.

The Phalcon AWACS is already In-service and the lighter AEW&C aircraft will soon join the fleet. All the combat aircraft since the Jaguar and Mirage 2000 are capable of being refuelled in the air by a fleet of Il-78 tankers and hence capable of flying for more than half a day or more and cover inter-continental ranges in a single sortie without landing in-between. The Su-30 MKI and the Rafale would be generally clubbed as a shade above a “fourth generation” combat aircraft, a term used to indicate approximately the capability of the aircraft Similarly, the sheer cost and complexity of military aerospace technology requires that we provide a major push to indigenisation. Unfortunately we have got stuck in the comfort zone of license manufacture. When we bought any new equipment, the government officials were particular in highlighting that we will get ToT, that is, Transfer of Technology, also: but this term hid the reality that this transfer of technology was for production technology and obviously could not be for design and development since the aircraft or weapon has already been designed and developed! We did get a strategic opportunity to make a paradigm shift when the Soviet Union was collapsing. The Soviet design base is one of the best in the world. The political changes taking place implied that the successor state would not be able to spend the same amount of resources to their defence industry. The Russians at the very top were willing to set up joint ventures and 1990-93 was the real period of their need since as a consequence of the economic and social crises they were not even able to pay the best of designers. The choice was obvious: some would go the United States and Israel and they did. But for the majority the choice was to link up with India or China. The Indian political leadership

was more than willing in spite of our own balance of payment (and not an economic) crisis. But somehow we did not go the whole mile; and due to sheer economic necessity Russia went to China with the best of military technologies. And now the world is worried about China’s military modernisation so much so that China is already test flying a fifth generation fighter! Pakistan’s JF-17 is nothing but a slightly expanded MiG-21 (what our LCA was supposed to have been) with a MiG-29 engine. When we complained to Moscow, the Chinese change a few minor things and called the engine by a new name! By the time we got going with the BrahMos, the Russian political-economic situation had changed dramatically and they are now demanding hard currency payments with little or no credit. And, going by the reported move to merge / share EADS and Bar Systems to form a mega European industry indicates that the need of the European countries for joint ventures in aerospace industry perhaps is even higher now. Is there a place at that table for India as the sixth partner? The foregoing would have led the reader, I am sure, to have come to the conclusion that the most critical need in the area of the changes taking place is the transformation of the mind. This transformation has to take place across the full spectrum of decision-making at the political level, civil bureaucracy, military command levels and ultimately at the operational level of young pilots and technicians. Let me take just one example. If you wish to see the aerospace sector growing rapidly to meet the needs of the country in future, some simple but effective steps are needed. The single most important change / capability that is required is the design and development of aircraft, engines, systems, spare parts etc. But what has happened is that design and development of airframes at HAL (the engine Division at Koraput did not have any in spite of thousands of engines having been manufactured) has been nearly wiped out over time (except for helicopters), the Ordnance Factories never had a design department though I am told some sort of a system has now been created. Some of the institutions set for research, design and development (like GTRE, NAL etc.) are involved

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

in design and manufacture. But the central handicap is that while bulk of the aerospace technology has enormous commonality between military and civil sectors, there are a fairly large number of ministries who function independently and with little coordination with other ministries. An aeronautics commission has been talked of during the past five decades but without any progress. Two years ago, the Defence Minister announced that the Indian Navy will not buy any warship in future from abroad. In other words, the navy will have all its warships made in India, though obviously some of the systems on-board may come from diverse sources and integrated in India. Why can’t this happen in the sister services? Because the Indian Navy has a directorate of design, a controller of warship production, a weapons and systems integration organisation etc. all under the Naval HQ and the DRDO is a supporting institution. After years of debates, the ADA (Aeronautical Development Agency) was established as an ad-hoc institution under a registered society with the DG DRDO as its chairman. But the institution of the government which has the biggest stake in aircraft and aerospace / aeronautics technologies is the Indian Air Force. Should not the ADA be brought under either the HAL or the IAF? All it needs is the appointment of an Air Marshal as the chairman of ADA society and answerable to the Minister of Defence through CAS. If the Indian Navy can successfully achieve indigenisation of a very high order surely the IAF and for that matter the Indian Army, can also do so. Why has this not happened in spite of more than a dozen BRDs (Base Repair Depots) in the IAF and nearly a hundred Workshops and facilities in the Indian Army? It may sound funny, but the reason is simple. We inherited our institutions from Britain; and in the UK the Admiralty was in charge of warship construction. Aircraft design and manufacture was with private industry with oversight (just that) by the ministry of Supplies and so it was till the Industrial Resolution was adopted bringing it under defence. Similar situation existed, probably still exists with respect to land forces in the UK, but in India there was a Major General as the CCR&D Defence Production and Supplies till 1957.

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dsa 3rd anniversary

HR CHALLENGES for IAF

‘PEOPLE FIRST MISSION ALWAYS’

I N T E R V I E W

VALUE ADDITION IN THE FIELD OF HRM

Air Marshal Anil Chopra AVSM, VM, VSM Air Officer-in-Charge Personnel in conversation with Major General (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd), Editor-in-Chief, Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine.

To ensure higher visibility of “Brand IAF”, extensive publicity is being undertaken in key metropolitan areas and all across the country. Twenty six recruitment rallies were conducted in the last one year. Informal and informative interaction with serving IAF personnel at these rallies ensures that applicants can make a considered decision to join the IAF. Over 180 motivational lectures at various campuses and 53 Career fairs have been conducted in the last one year. Bulk SMS and e-mail communication on “Brand IAF” were sent to the target youth. A portal on the ‘YouTube’ and ‘facebook’ are proposed to be commissioned shortly. 600 digital cinema halls, 70 FM stations, 12 news channels, 45 magazines and 240 newspapers have been used to project “Brand IAF”. Over sixty six lakh hits were made on the IAF banner on jobs portal timesjobs.com

DSA: Sir, it is said that HRM is the biggest challenge of any organisation. The IAF must be facing HRM challenges as regards to effectively keeping the personnel motivated. How has the air force been keeping up with the changes in the field of HR? AOP: The IAF vision statement “People First Mission Always ”underscores the importance that the IAF places on its Human Resource. We appreciate the fact that the man / woman behind the machine is the “pivot factor” who would eventually decide the outcome of any operational endeavour. Coupled with the technology leap that the IAF is presently undergoing, it is, therefore, essential that we train our air warriors into professionals who can exploit these new systems to achieve the desired operational goals. Hence, there are a gamut of processes spanning the functions of recruitment, training and concept development, to name a few, that are being addressed so as to provide the next generation air warrior with the necessary skill sets to excel in a high technology battlefield. DSA: Sir, in your assessment, what are the major HR challenges that the IAF faces today? AOP: We face challenges that any organisation that is on the path to rapid expansion faces and our HR managers are kept busy to find solutions and develop strategies to ensure that these challenges are well factored in our policies. A few of the major challenges that the IAF faces are as follows: (a) With the dawn of the information age and a booming economy, personal aspirations have grown. Therefore, finding a perfect match between organisational and personal aspirations has become one of the major HR challenges. (b) The second major challenge in my perception is training the next generation air warriors. Indoctrination of service ethos and providing the air warriors with the skills and knowledge to operate and maintain the modern systems needs focus and constant attention. (c) The third is to develop multi-skilled air warriors by methods of training to avoid

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

single system expertise and to give them the capability to adapt themselves to the rapidly changing aerospace environment. DSA: Sir, it is a well known fact that the three services are no longer the first choice for a majority of the youth of this country. Could you please elaborate on the steps taken by the IAF to attract the youth to join the IAF? AOP: To ensure higher visibility of “Brand IAF”, extensive publicity is being undertaken in key metropolitan areas and all across the country. Twenty six recruitment rallies were conducted in the last one year. Informal and informative interaction with serving IAF personnel at these rallies ensures that applicants can make a considered decision to join the IAF. Over 180 motivational lectures at various campuses and 53 Career fairs have been conducted in the last one year. Bulk SMS and e-mail communication on “Brand IAF” were sent to the target youth. A portal on the ‘YouTube’ and ‘facebook’ are proposed to be commissioned shortly. 600 digital cinema halls, 70 FM stations, 12 news channels, 45 magazines and 240 newspapers have been used to project “Brand IAF”. Over sixty six lakh hits were made on the IAF banner on jobs portal timesjobs.com. Thus, by optimum utilisation of TV, Radio and the print media, apart from rallies and campus interactions, we are extending our reach to a larger section of the youth. We also carried out an in-house study on the demographic representation of the air warriors. Based on the study, we have identified low response and low representation areas. We plan to hold more recruitment rallies in these areas. For the officers we are setting up two additional Air Force Selection Boards and for the airmen two additional Airmen Selection Centres are being set up, for which approval has been obtained from MoD. Additionally, a system for submitting applications online has been started for the officers and would start shortly for the airmen. Our efforts are bearing fruit and this year we received over two lakh thirtyeight thousand applications from aspirants willing to join the IAF as officers. The selection procedure has also been rationalised with the introduction of the ‘Air Force Common Admission Test’ (AFCAT). All candidates appear for the AFCAT and are allotted the branch based on their performance in the AFCAT and subject to meeting the other QRs. To sum up, we are presently short of approx 800 officers. Our fill rates are positive for the last three years and with the approval obtained from the GoI to increase our training capacity at the Air Force Academy from its present 480 to 750 cadets, we are on our path to make good our present shortages and also to cater for the new inductions. DSA: Sir, I am sure that the steps taken would address the shortages of manpower in the IAF. Another aspect that merits attention is the training of personnel. With the induction of the modern technology systems, have the training patterns been changed to synergise the training with the requirements of the new systems? AOP: Air warriors today operate complex technological systems with near zero levels of error tolerance. Hence, there is a need to raise the training standards to the level mandated by modern inductions. Towards this, the procurement of the Basic Trainer Aircraft has already been cleared by the government. This coupled with the already inducted Hawk Advanced Jet Trainer

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

Air warriors today operate complex technological systems with near zero levels of error tolerance. Hence, there is a need to raise the training standards to the level mandated by modern inductions. The procurement of the Basic Trainer Aircraft has already been cleared by the government. This coupled with the already inducted Hawk Advanced Jet Trainer would address the issues pertaining to flying training. The setting up of the Air Force Engineering College, which has been cleared by the government, would address the specific requirements of the IAF, in terms of specialisation for operating and maintaining state-ofthe-art systems

An MoU has been signed with IGNOU – The People’s University for ‘Project Akashdeep’ which recognises basic and in-service training imparted to the airmen and NCs(E) for award of Certificates, Diplomas and Associate Degrees. MoUs have also been inked with Pondicherry University and AMITY University. We strive to continuously device means to upgrade the standard of living of all our personnel

HR CHALLENGES for IAF would address the issues pertaining to flying training. The setting up of the Air Force Engineering College, which has been cleared by the government, would address the specific requirements of the IAF, in terms of specialisation for operating and maintaining state-of-the-art systems. On the airmen side, the trades have been restructured for optimal utilisation and also in consonance with the maintenance philosophy of the new systems being inducted. On Job Training (OJT) has been introduced at all units to ensure all air warriors get practical training in their respective trades. Specialised training in certain areas that have been identified as ‘critical’ like armament, electronic warfare, to name a few, have also been focused upon. In-service courses are conducted at various seniority levels. We also inculcate a habit of ‘self-education’ amongst our personnel. E-subscription of Books and Magazines and availability of Internet connections in the Stations Reference and Technical Libraries would also help our air warriors enhance their knowledge. DSA: Leadership in any organisation plays a key role in motivating its personnel to achieve the organisation’s goals. Could you kindly highlight the measures taken by the IAF to improve the quality of leadership? AOP: The Centre for Leadership and Behavioural Studies (CLABS) conducts regular capsules on leadership at various IAF Stations and these capsules also form a part of the In-service courses. At least two capsules are conducted by CLABS in each Command every year. Additionally, leadership seminars are conducted regularly. Leadership courses have also been introduced for the airmen so that they become effective supervisors and leaders. DSA: Sir, the positioning of the right man in the right job plays a vital role in the growth of not only the officer / airman concerned but also the organisation. What are the initiatives taken by the IAF on this aspect for officers? AOP: The need of the hour is to ensure that all officers are made aware of their performance at regular intervals, are guided in their growth in the organisation and the system is as transparent as possible within the existing rules and regulations. To ensure objectivity in criteria selections, the selection of officers is carried out by a panel of officers based upon merit, calibre and demonstrated performance. All officers are given an ‘Appraisal Report feedback’ at specified years of service and also a ‘Performance Review’ is carried out every quarter. Career progression pamphlets for all branches of the IAF have also been published. A comprehensive review of the format, chain and scope of appraisal and conduct of promotion boards has been carried out to make the process more objective. These steps have thus created a reliable system to help the organisation assess the suitability of the officer for tenanting higher appointments. DSA: To ensure better HR management, it is imperative that there is a direct link between the HR managers and personnel in the field. How are the HR Managers in the IAF reaching out to the personnel in the field? AOP: The HR Department of IAF has been on an intensive outreach programme in the recent past to gauge the pulse at field level on the various issues, through personal interaction, websites and various newsletters. HR Seminars are being conducted under the direct supervision of the Air Officer-in-Charge Personnel during which officers from the personnel directorate visit various stations and interact with air warriors posted there. At least two such visits are carried out each month. E-mail IDs have been provided so that an officer may interact directly with the concerned Director. There is an open forum made available wherein any personnel of the IAF can post his / her views and a response on the same is given. Websites that provide information on the progress of applications have also been made available. The feedback received has helped the HR Managers institute certain measures in line with IAF’s Vision Statement. DSA: Today’s environment is extremely stressful. Cases of suicide amongst armed forces personnel are on the increase. How is the IAF addressing the issue? AOP: The incidents of suicide and other stress related issues are an area of concern. To ensure effective stress management, professional counsellors have been employed at all Air Force Stations. Simultaneously, a study team has been formed to identify the stress inducers and to arrive at the personality traits / attitudes to cope with the inherent / perceived stress In-service life. We are ensuring that there is more regular interaction

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

between the men and officers through informal gatherings and organised PT and games. Also, certain air warriors have been trained as mentors to guide the newly enrolled air warriors. The Sports infrastructure is being improved and also 24x7 helplines have been set up. In order to create a system of structured informality and to increase interaction among all ranks, we have also introduced a ‘Cohesion Day’. On this day all ranks get together to maintain their workplace and equipment. The Cohesion Day serves as a forum to exchange ideas and interact with other branches and thus get a better understanding of the work done by other branches and create better bonds, camaraderie and oneness. DSA: Standards of living have improved tremendously in the last few years. Could you highlight certain salient steps that have been taken towards improving the same for the air warriors and also any other welfare measures that have been taken? AOP: The scales of accommodation that govern the facilities that are provided to an air warrior had been revised in 2009. The same are now being implemented and this would lead to a major improvement in the standard of living. The quantum of house building loans has been enhanced. Also, the monthly grant to World War II Veterans / widows, grant for daughters’ marriage and grant to children of Bhuj / Tsunami victims have been increased. Educational facilities in the Air Force Schools are being improved with the introduction of smart classrooms and Internet connections. An Insurance scheme has been introduced for the staff and students of Air Force Schools. An MoU has been signed with IGNOU – The People’s University for ‘Project Akashdeep’ which recognises basic and in-service training imparted to the airmen and NCs (E) for award of Certificates, Diplomas and Associate Degrees. MoUs have also been inked with Pondicherry University and AMITY University. We strive to continuously devise means to upgrade the standard of living of all our personnel. DSA: While I fully appreciate the efforts to improve the living conditions of the serving air warriors, may I take the liberty of asking if any such measures are being initiated for the retired personnel? AOP: We do appreciate that we need to take care of our retired personnel. We understand that they are facing hardships due to the fact that they have to approach different agencies for resolution of their issues. Hence, the IAF has decided to set up a separate single portal under the aegis of a new directorate viz. the ‘Directorate of Air Veterans’ to provide composite information to Air Veterans on pensionary benefits and other welfare subjects. Pensioner Workshops are being conducted till the single point portal is not fully functional. A handbook on Pensionary Benefits for Airmen / NCs (E) has also been formulated. An Air Force Placement Cell helps retired personnel in their resettlement. In the last placement fair held, 168 retired personnel were offered employment. DSA: To sum up, what in your view is the way forward? AOP: In my opinion, sustained effort and focus is required to achieve the desired standard of training, operational prowess, maintenance culture and administrative acumen which will prepare the next-generation air warrior. We have also to sustain the effort of enhancing ‘Brand-IAF’ in order to secure ‘first-option’ priority to attract quality manpower. The issues of vocational training and productive resettlement have also to be proactively addressed. Proactive measures to integrate IAF personnel and the civilian workforce in certain sectors of the industry, such as defence production and R&D, would go a long way in military-civil integration, interchange of work ethics and vocational accretion of IAF manpower. We need to continuously revamp the HRM model, wherein benchmarking of work output, accreditation of professional training while In-service and total objectivity and transparency in assessment would continue to be Key Result Areas. The overall aim is to develop HRM in IAF as a verifiable, objective and transparent process comparable in quality and output to the most advanced models in place.

We do appreciate that we need to take care of our retired personnel. We understand that they are facing hardships due to the fact that they have to approach different agencies for resolution of their issues. Hence, the IAF has decided to set up a separate single portal under the aegis of a new directorate viz. the ‘Directorate of Air Veterans’ to provide composite information to Air Veterans on pensionary benefits and other welfare subjects. Pensioner Workshops are being conducted till the single point portal is not fully functional. A handbook on Pensionary Benefits for Airmen / NCs (E) has also been formulated. An Air Force Placement Cell helps retired personnel in their resettlement

We have also to sustain the effort of enhancing ‘Brand-IAF’ in order to secure ‘first-option’ priority to attract quality manpower. The issues of vocational training and productive resettlement have also to be proactively addressed. Proactive measures to integrate IAF personnel and the civilian workforce in certain sectors of the industry, such as defence production and R&D, would go a long way in military-civil integration, interchange of work ethics and vocational accretion of IAF manpower. The overall aim is to develop HRM in IAF as a verifiable, objective and transparent process comparable in quality and output to the most advanced models in place

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

IAF MODERNISATION

Air Marshal Dhiraj Kukreja PVSM, AVSM, VSM (retd) The writer retired as the AOC-in-C of Tr a i n i n g Command, IAF on 29 February 2012. A pilot by profession, he has flown various fighter and transport aircraft. In his long stint in the air force of about 40 years, he has held many operational and staff appointments. Prior to taking over as the AOC-in-C, he was the Deputy Chief (Operations) in HQ IDS. He has commanded a premier transport squadron in the Northern Sector, Air Force Station, Yelahanka – the main transport training base of the IAF and the Air Force Academy at Hyderabad. He is the first air force officer to have undergone an International Fellowship at the National Defence University, Washington DC, USA. He is a postgraduate in ‘National Security Strategy’ from National War College, USA.

The IAF has the onerous responsibility of safeguarding the national air space and providing the strategic depth to protect the country’s economic interests; it also needs to possess the capability of tackling a wide spectrum of threats – from sub-conventional to nuclear. To address these issues and more, to transform itself from a regional air force to a credible global force, the IAF has to possess capability-based quality assets – weapon platforms and infrastructure. The IAF has already embarked on its ambitious journey to transform from the initial tactical air force to a potent strategic force with full spectrum capabilities in keeping with the national aspirations

he IAF became the first air force in South and SE Asia to be equipped with jets when it acquired the Vampire aircraft in 1948. Modernisation, as always, is a statement of a nation’s economic strength; it is an indicator of the country’s show of power in its area of influence and also in the comity of nations. In the last ten years or so, while China and Pakistan Air Forces were in the process of strengthening their capabilities, IAF was facing a ‘reverse’ process; numbers in the IAF were reducing due to retirement, at times prematurely, of combat aircraft and other aircraft and equipment. The sanctioned strength of 39.5 squadrons was to be seen only in policy documents of the IAF; the actual strength on ground having dropped to even less than 30 squadrons! It was only then that the alarm bells rang in the corridors of power and the acquisition process was initiated. The IAF hopes to form at least six squadrons of the MMRCA and carry on with the ac well beyond 2050. With licensed production finally stabilising at the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL), the Su-30 aircraft inventory is increasing, with about seven squadrons In-service and the expected number to go up to 12 squadrons by 2015. The aircraft being the air dominance fighter, it is expected that the IAF may increase the number to 15 squadrons. Where the IAF is facing hurdles is in the indigenous production of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) to augment its tactical fighting capability.

f a question was to be asked whether the Indian Air Force (IAF) has embarked on the modernisation path a little too late, my answer would be that the modernisation programme for the IAF is an ongoing process – a continuous evolution – and it all began with the IAF becoming the first air force in South and SE Asia to be equipped with jets when it acquired the Vampire aircraft in 1948. Subsequently the air force modernisation programme, depending upon the real or the perceived threats, moved ahead in giant leaps or crawled, depending upon various factors. Modernisation, as always, is a statement of a nation’s economic strength; it is an indicator of the country’s show of power in its area of influence and also in the comity of nations. Right through the decades after gaining independence, the IAF acquired the Ouragon – known in the air force as the Toofani – Mystere, Hunter, Canberra and the Gnat in the 1950s, followed by the MiG and the Su series and other fighter aircraft; there was no hold-up in building its strategic and tactical airlift capability too, with the acquisition of transport ac – Packet, Caribou, An-12, An-32, Il-14, Il-76 and other transport and Communication ac – and helicopters, such as the Bell, Alouette and those of the Mi family. The modernisation / acquisition programmes of the IAF today are a follow-on of, what

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began with the Vampire jets to initially attain, then sustain and, when required, to regain its operational capability vis-a-vis the threats from our adversaries and to meet regional requirements. The modernisation of the Service has not been restricted just to the procurement of ac alone; the IAF has all along been involved in upgrading or phasing out obsolescent equipment, be it for effective communication, radars for surveillance, missiles to ward off intruders or other equipment. The challenges in the modernisation programme of the defence forces, more so the IAF, are many; projects have a long gestation period, the acquisition process is long and cumbersome; each Service is yet to get out of the his-shirt-whiter-than-mine mindset; and the Indian military has to equip and maintain a fighting force to tackle the entire spectrum of warfare from counter-terrorism to nuclear! Being a ‘man in blue’ (OK – now ex), it would be my endeavour to put forth the modernisation programme of the IAF and compare it to the extent possible, with that of our adversarial neighbours.

Motives for modernisation At the turn of the century, the new

INDIAN AIR FORCE – UP UP AND AWAY

millennium was labelled as the “Century of Asia” and not without reason; India’s economic growth in the past decade has been sustained and fast-paced, averaging 7 per cent plus, despite the slowdown in the Western hemisphere. It was no surprise then that in the year 2010-11, India’s standing in the world went up several notches; we hosted a record number of Heads of State and top names from the defence world, in the past decade, especially in 2010-11. It was, therefore, imperative for India to modernise its defence forces to safeguard its expanding economic interests and maintain its growth momentum.

In the last ten years or so, while China and Pakistan Air Forces were in the process of strengthening their capabilities, IAF was facing a ‘reverse’ process; numbers in the IAF were reducing due to retirement, at times prematurely, of combat ac and other ac and equipment. The sanctioned strength of 39.5 squadrons was to be seen only in policy documents of the IAF; the actual strength on ground having dropped to even less than 30 squadrons! It was only then that the alarm bells rang in the corridors of power and the acquisition process was initiated – but to be strictly following the procedures specified. The continuously evolving extraordinary geo-political and security scenario actually calls for a strength greater than the sanctioned figure; whether the IAF progression matches the security evolution, however, remains to be seen The process of modernisation has been shaped by many congruous factors. New technology has led to an increase in the knowledge levels and skills, leading to a change in the nature of conflict and further rapid advancements have mandated constant upgrading. Indian military cannot be left behind in the realm of stealth, networking, beyond-visual-range (BVR) precision munitions and other such technology, if it has to maintain a strong and realistic deterrence; the threat of non-state actors having access and capabilities to exploit the new technologies has added an urgency.

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

IAF MODERNISATION

The security dimension has not altered very much over the years. The adversarial neighbours continue to keep border issues alive and create incidents just as our foreign policy mandarins drop their guard. If India has shown a remarkable growth in the past decade, China has also been showing an unprecedented economic growth rate with a matching military rise and belligerence. Its continuing support to Pakistan and the latter’s response in providing logistical assistance to it, has compounded India’s security problems. Pakistan has been recognised as the main sponsor of terrorism; cross-border terrorism from Pakistan continues to be the main irritant of Indian security issues be it on the Western Frontier or through Nepal or Bangladesh. The close cooperation between China and Pakistan is a cause for concern enough for the Indian military to revise its doctrines and prepare for a ‘two-front’ future.

Modernisation in the IAF With such drivers for modernisation, IAF embarked to regain its full operational capability with a long term acquisition plan; it had to procure new equipment and upgrade the existing weapon platforms, lest it be caught on the wrong foot – it was a challenge to convince the government, but successfully met. The IAF, apart from meeting the challenges mentioned earlier, had also to start at the very beginning to meet the numerical challenge. Its strength of operational squadrons had been on a steady decline with the phasing out of obsolescent weapons and weapon platforms; it, today functions with a strength of about 35 combat squadrons against the sanctioned strength of 39.5 squadrons and a desirable strength of 45 squadrons. The IAF is facing a capability shortage of not only fighter ac but also a gap in its strategic airlift potential, combat and heavy-lift helicopters, trainer ac, in-flight refuelling ac, radars, missiles and other equipment, due to either obsolescence or mid-life upgradation or general lethargy on the part of the government. How is the IAF going about this mammoth task of regaining its operational capability? With the indigenous industry woefully inadequate, the IAF is dependent on imports; as per the Swedish think-tank, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India is the leading importer of defence equipment in the world with about 10 per cent of the world’s arms imports business! Notwithstanding the logistics and maintenance nightmare, what goes to IAF’s credit (and also India’s) is that it has finally been able to break away from the Russian stranglehold and is now purchasing equipment, not just based on the lowest cost factor, but the lowest life-cycle cost factor, from any supplier in the world, with contractual offsets that the supplier would have to provide. The IAF is pursuing its agenda vigorously, successfully bringing some major acquisitions to realisation. The long-awaited MMRCA contract for 126 ac, though yet to be signed, is in its final stages. The entire procedure has gone off without any major glitches, though there were some hiccups – with the losers showing their desperation to grab the deal. The aircraft is expected to be In-service in the IAF in another three years or so. The IAF hopes to form at least

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

six squadrons of the MMRCA and carry on with the ac well beyond 2050. With licensed production finally stabilising at the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL), the Su-30 ac inventory is increasing, with about seven squadrons In-service and the expected number to go up to 12 squadrons by 2015. The ac being the air dominance fighter, it is expected that the IAF may increase the number to 15 squadrons. Other existing ac in the inventory, namely Jaguars, Mirage-2000, MiG series are either being augmented in numbers or capability, through new acquisitions or mid-life upgrading of avionics, armament delivery systems or both. Where the IAF is facing hurdles is in the indigenous production of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) to augment its tactical fighting capability. After attaining the Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) in early 2011, it was hoped that the final clearance would only be a matter of time, but the progress has been tardy. The IAF hopes to have 200 ac to form six squadrons – the timeline is, however, doubtful. Another indigenous ac that has posed problems for the IAF is the Intermediate Jet Trainer (IJT). Apart from the programme being behind schedule, it suffered a setback with the crash of a test ac in 2011. The programme has not progressed much thereafter making the IAF to look for alternates in the market. To enhance its strategic airlift capacity, the IAF has already inducted six C-130J ac with a plan to induct another six. This has significantly boosted the airlift capability of the IAF; with the acquisition of C-17 ac, the first likely to be delivered later this year and the upgradation of its existing An-32 and Il-76 fleets, the strategic airlift capability of the IAF would be an envy of the air forces of the region. In addition, it has enhanced functioning capabilities across the board, through the acquisition of helicopters in large numbers and force multipliers; IAF has made its AWACS and Flight Refuelling fleets fully operational and is fast moving towards becoming a networked Service. The IAF is also acquiring new trainer ac, so direly needed, to replace the prematurely grounded HPT-32 aircraft; training is being given the due importance having realised that even with the best of technology and the most advanced fighter and other ac in the fleet, a poorly trained aircrew is more of a burden than an asset. The IAF is not just concentrating on acquiring aircraft; it has other major acquisitions in the pipeline to overcome the issues of obsolescence of equipment and to keep pace with new technology; equipment such as radars, missiles, stealth, networking, BVR precision munitions and such others, are on its shopping list.

IAF vs the adversary neighbours India exists in a unique security environment; while maintaining internal security is the task of the police and the paramilitary forces, where required the military pitches in for the short term or the long term, as the situation demands. The IAF capabilities, existing and those that are being acquired, are indicative of the uncharacteristic security issues that exist along the borders with our adversary neighbours, China and Pakistan.

In the ‘Century of Asia’, China has emerged as a major challenge to India, both economically and militarily; it considers itself as the predominant power in Asia with India being a minor irritant and has aspirations of being the sole super power in the world by 2050. In the last decade and even earlier, China has been giving enough indications, within the sub-continent and otherwise of its disdainful attitude towards India. It has been building its military capabilities not only in mainland China, but also in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), to contain India within South Asia.

The IAF, apart from meeting the challenges mentioned earlier, had also to start at the very beginning to meet the numerical challenge. Its strength of operational squadrons had been on a steady decline with the phasing out of obsolescent weapons and weapon platforms; it, today functions with a strength of about 35 combat squadrons against the sanctioned strength of 39.5 squadrons and a desirable strength of 45 squadrons. The IAF is facing a capability shortage of not only fighter ac but also a gap in its strategic airlift potential, combat and heavy-lift helicopters, trainer ac, in-flight refuelling ac, radars, missiles and other equipment, due to either obsolescence or mid-life upgradation or general lethargy on the part of the government The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) of China has evolved as the third largest force after USA and Russia. Figures put out by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), indicate that PLAAF currently has in excess of 3,00,000 personnel and more than 2,500 ac of which more than half are combat ac. This capability is augmented by the naval aviation which has more than 25,000 personnel and about 300 combat ac. As with the IAF, PLAAF is also striving for better training ac, retiring old ac and acquiring and developing new technology. Even though aircraft operations from TAR airfields pose a major operational challenge, with most being at elevations of more than 13,000 ft, PLAAF is ready to meet the test with extended runways to take-off with minimum fuel and maximum armament payload and then go in for in-flight refuelling from its large indigenous and acquired tanker fleet. Any likely conflict with India would have the existing 14 airfields and whose numbers would be increasing in the future, launching ac to prevent the IAF from interfering in the campaign on ground, be it in the Aksai Chin or Arunachal Pradesh. To sustain operations in the TAR, PLAAF is well supported by a logistic lifeline of a well-established road and rail network; the Golmud-Lhasa rail link which is being extended right to the Indian border at Nathu La. The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) is primarily tasked with the air defence of Pakistan and to provide support to the army and navy. The PAF may not match the numbers of the IAF, but, courtesy the “gifts” from USA, it has comparable technology. With China’s active assistance, it has already begun the manufacture and induction of the fourth-generation fighter, JF-17; it is also likely to get another of the fourth-generation fighters from China, the J-20, a variant of the PLAAF J-10, especially developed for it. It is aggressively pursuing the acquisition of

force-multipliers, such as smaller versions of AWACS, flight-refuelling ac and UAVs. The PAF also provides the nuclear capability of the nation through aircraft and an assorted assemblage of ballistic missiles. With continuing supply of weapons and platforms from China and the generosity of USA, PAF is closing the capability gap with the IAF. In the last ten years or so, while China and Pakistan Air Forces were in the process of strengthening their capabilities, IAF was facing a ‘reverse’ process; numbers in the IAF were reducing due to retirement, at times prematurely, of combat ac and other ac and equipment. The sanctioned strength of 39.5 squadrons was to be seen only in policy documents of the IAF; the actual strength on ground having dropped to even less than 30 squadrons! It was only then that the alarm bells rang in the corridors of power and the acquisition process was initiated – but to be strictly following the procedures specified. The continuously evolving extraordinary geo-political and security scenario actually calls for a strength greater than the sanctioned figure; whether the IAF progression matches the security evolution, however, remains to be seen.

The future The IAF shopping list contains a wide-ranging programme; the professionals of Air HQ have managed to convince the Ministry of Defence officials that mere fighter fleets do not provide the ‘all-round’ capabilities for a modern air force to execute the diverse tasks that are expected of it. The IAF strategy is to develop comprehensive operational capabilities with matching infrastructure to indicate to the unfriendly neighbours that IAF continues to be a force to reckon with. The major challenge for the IAF will continue to be to reach, sustain and build upon the authorised combat squadron level of 39.5; the MMRCA contract will hopefully be signed this FY and it would take a minimum of three years for the aircraft to start flying in the Indian skies. The government, on its part, has to continue to provide the IAF with the necessary funds and the push to the PSUs to maintain deadlines, or else, even with the induction of the MMRCA, combat squadron figures will continue to remain low. The IAF has the onerous responsibility of safeguarding the national air space and providing the strategic depth to protect the country’s economic interests; it also needs to possess the capability of tackling a wide spectrum of threats – from sub-conventional to nuclear. To address these issues and more, to transform itself from a regional air force to a credible global force, the IAF has to possess capability-based quality assets – weapon platforms and infrastructure. The IAF has already embarked on its ambitious journey to transform from the initial tactical air force to a potent strategic force with full spectrum capabilities in keeping with the national aspirations. In the words of the Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal N A K Browne on his assuming charge, “ ... the IAF envisions itself to be a modern force with cutting edge technologies; flexible, adaptable and nimble” (SP’s Military Yearbook 2010-11).

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

FRONTLINE CAPABILITY

T Air Marshal B K Pandey (retd) The writer is former AOC-in-C HQ Training Command, IAF, Bengaluru and served for three years in a Diplomatic Assignment at the Indian Embassy during the years of turmoil (1989-1992) in war-torn Afghanistan. He was responsible for setting up the only English Medium School in Kabul at that point in time. He has also been Operations Manager at ARC, an intelligence organisation. The emerging geopolitical and security scenario requires our nation to possess comprehensive military capability, characterised by flexibility and speed of response, the mobility and transportability of all forms of national power, long-reach, precision targeting, minimum collateral damage and reduced visibility. Aerospace power fits the bill perfectly. The 21st century belongs to aerospace power and given the Indian situation, concerns and aspirations, the need for a strong and comprehensive aerospace capability is inescapable

There is therefore an imperative need for total revamp of the fleet with fourth and fifth generation aircraft beginning not later than 2015 and to build-up to the sanctioned level of 42 squadrons by 2022

he induction of the first fourth-generation aircraft, the Su-30 MKI began in 1997 and the IAF is expected to build-up to full strength of 230 by 2014. It is understood that another 42 have been ordered taking the total fleet strength to 272 aircraft. There is a proposal from Russia to eventually upgrade the IAF Su-30 MKI fleet to fifth generation standards. In the meantime, the MiG-23 fleet has already been phased out and the MiG-21 fleet with its different variants would be extinct in another five to seven years at best. The fleet of Jaguars, MiG-27, MiG-29 and even the Mirage-2000 all with upgrades, would last for another 10 to 15 years; but being of third generation vintage, would not really be able to project frontline capability. The strength of the combat fleet currently is reported to be down to 34 squadrons as against the authorised 39.5 and by 2015, is expected to reduce further to possibly well under 30 seriously eroding combat capability of the IAF. This situation will be incongruous for an emerging regional power and catastrophic in two-front war scenario.

acked by a resurgent economy, two decades into the post-cold war era, India is beginning to emerge as a regional power and given competent political and bureaucratic management, has the attributes to rise to the status of a super power. The growing status of the nation is accompanied by enhanced responsibilities wherein India may be called upon to intervene decisively in the region militarily to safeguard national interests that transcend our geographical boundaries and extend from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca. As a regional power, the nation may be called upon to respond to calamities, man-made or natural, to humanitarian crisis, to restore order or to ensure peace and stability.

While economic strength is the main pillar of national power, the military capability of a nation must be enhanced in tandem to secure its economic status and provide the environment for further growth. This philosophy was echoed by Air Chief Marshal F H Major, the then Chief of Air Staff, Indian Air Force (IAF) on the occasion of its platinum jubilee celebrations in October 2007 when he said “The emerging geopolitical and security scenario requires our nation to possess comprehensive military capability, characterised by flexibility and speed of response, the mobility and transportability of all forms of national power, long reach, precision targeting, minimum collateral damage and reduced visibility. Aerospace power fits the bill perfectly. The 21st century belongs to aerospace power and given the Indian situation, concerns and aspirations, the need for a strong and comprehensive aerospace capability is inescapable”. Stated in simple terms, the nation’s aerospace power must possess the capability to project power effectively in the region for which it must have combat aircraft with adequate reach, lethal firepower through modern stand-off / precision guided munitions and stealth characteristics. It must have strategic airlift aircraft with the capability to move large forces by air over long distances, tactical transport aircraft to operate over shorter distances and a fleet of helicopters to provide mobility and firepower in the tactical battle area. Two things follow from this, one being that the nation must possess multi-layered air defence system to protect its offensive operations capability and secondly that development of aerospace power must not only cater to perceived threats but more importantly, must be capability-based to respond to a wide variety of threats, existing or unforeseen. What then is the picture today with regard to the IAF, the primary constituent of national aerospace power?

Combat fleet of the IAF The IAF went through a partial upgrade of its combat fleet between the period 1979 to 1989

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MODERNISING THE INDIAN AIR FORCE

when its fleet of Gnats, Hunters and Maruts were approaching the end of their Total Technical Life and were due to be phased out leaving only the MiG-21 as the mainstay. In this period, the combat capability of the IAF was upgraded through the induction of the British Jaguar, Russian MiG-23, MiG-27, MiG-29 and the French Mirage-2000.

The C-130J has the capability to undertake deployment of Special Forces in all-weather conditions by day or night even in complete darkness. It is capable of receiving fuel in flight at low level and apart from special operations, can be employed for airborne assault, air transported operations The induction of the first fourth-generation aircraft, the Su-30 MKI began in 1997 and the IAF is expected to build-up to full strength of 230 by 2014. It is understood that another 42 have been ordered taking the total fleet strength

to 272 aircraft. It is also understood that there is a proposal from Russia to eventually upgrade the IAF Su-30 MKI fleet to fifth generation standards. In the meantime, the MiG-23 fleet has already been phased out and the MiG-21 fleet with its different variants would be extinct in another five to seven years at best. The fleet of Jaguars, MiG-27, MiG-29 and even the Mirage-2000 all with upgrades, would last for another 10 to 15 years; but being of third generation vintage, would not really be able to project frontline capability. The strength of the combat fleet currently is reported to be down to 34 squadrons as against the authorised 39.5 and by 2015, is expected to reduce further to possibly well under 30 seriously eroding combat capability of the IAF. This situation will be incongruous for an emerging regional power and catastrophic in two-front war scenario. There is therefore an imperative need for total revamp of the fleet with fourth and fifth generation aircraft beginning not

later than 2015 and to build-up to the sanctioned level of 42 squadrons by 2022. As there was considerable uncertainty at the turn of the century with regard to the operationalisation of the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft, Tejas, over a decade ago, the IAF had projected a requirement of six squadrons of fighter aircraft to replace part of the MiG-21 fleet being phased out. It has been five years since the tender was issued by the Ministry of Defence and nine months since selection of the French Rafale was made public, contract with Dassault is yet to be signed. If all goes well, the contract may be concluded sometime in 2013 at the earliest and delivery will commence four years later. Thereafter it may take a decade for the Rafale fleet to reach full strength and operational status. All this presuming that there are no fresh impediments. In

the

meantime,

Hindustan

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

FRONTLINE CAPABILITY

Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has entered into a contract with Russian companies Rosoboron export and Sukhoi to develop the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), a stealth fighter in the class of the American F-22 Raptor. A derivative of the Russian PAK FA whose single-seat prototype T -50 is already undergoing flight tests, the FGFA will be a twin-seat version customised to conform to the new doctrine of the IAF. To be produced in India by HAL, the initial order by the IAF will be for 214 aircraft (roughly ten squadrons) at a cost of US$ 100 million per aircraft and the total outlay of US$ 25 billion apart from development cost. Series production of the FGFA is scheduled to commence in 2019. The IAF can hope to have the complete initial order delivered and squadrons fully operational by 2029 at the earliest.

Over a decade ago, the IAF had projected a requirement of six squadrons of fighter aircraft to replace part of the MiG-21 fleet being phased out. It has been five years since the tender was issued by the Ministry of Defence and nine months since selection of the French Rafale was made public, contract with Dassault is yet to be signed. If all goes well, the contract may be concluded sometime in 2013 at the earliest and delivery will commence four years later. Thereafter it may take a decade for the Rafale fleet to reach full strength and operational status The IAF has plans to induct by 2017, a total of 120 LCA Tejas aircraft of which the first 40 would be the Mk I version powered by the GE F404 engine. The remaining 80 would be the Mk II version powered by the more powerful GE F414 engine. Production of the Mk I has already commenced and a contract with GE for 99 F414 engines has also been concluded. Building on the experience of the Tejas programme, the Indian aerospace industry is embarked upon developing its own home-grown fifth-generation platform by way of the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) that was initially conceived as a fourth-generation Medium Combat Aircraft (MCA). The AMCA will be a twin-engine stealth multirole combat aircraft. The project being yet in a concept stage, it

would be much too early for the IAF to spell out any specific plan for its induction. In the event that all planned inductions are completed on schedule, by 2030, the frontline combat fleet would possess the necessary attributes of long range as all these aircraft types would be capable of receiving fuel in flight, would be equipped with modern weapons systems and the FGFA would be stealthy. The strength of the combat fleet would be as under: a.

Su-30 MKI

272

Rafale

126

FGFA

214

LCA Tejas

120

Total

732

This would be the equivalent of 37 squadrons, five squadrons short of the authorised fleet strength of 42. The shortfall could be made up with the AMCA should that be a reality by then or through induction of more of the type or types In-service.

Airlift capability The fleet of 17, 43-tonne payload capacity Il-76 strategic airlift aircraft that were acquired from the USSR in the mid-eighties to replace the 15-tonne payload capacity An-12, has now dwindled to just a few leaving the IAF with practically no capability for strategic airlift. Fortunately, in June last year, a US$ 4.1 billion contract has been signed with Boeing for ten, 77-tonne payload capacity C-17 Globemaster III Strategic Airlift Aircraft. With a range of 5,600 km and nearly twice the payload capacity of the Il-76, the fleet of C-17 will provide the IAF with transcontinental range and humongous airlift capability, a quantum jump indeed! Delivery is scheduled to commence in June 2013 and the tenth aircraft should arrive in India by the end of 2014. The IAF is considering induction of another six of these mammoth airlifters. Early 2011, the IAF formally inducted the first of its latest acquisition from the US, the Lockheed Martin 20-tonne payload

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

capacity C-130J Super Hercules tactical transport aircraft, the most potent and versatile aircraft that will help the IAF move towards maintaining aerospace dominance. Contract for six of these aircraft worth US$ 1.2 billion was signed in 2008 through Foreign Military Sales programme of the US government. The IAF is to acquire another six to make up full squadron strength. Equipped with special devices, the C-130J has the capability to undertake deployment of Special Forces in all-weather conditions by day or night even in complete darkness. It is capable of receiving fuel in flight at low level and apart from special operations, can be employed for airborne assault, air transported operations, air supply, air maintenance of forward locations and disaster management. The aircraft can operate from unprepared surfaces, has phenomenal short-field operations capability and has self-protection devices to cope with hostile environments. As per A K Antony, Minister of Defence, “This formidable aircraft would add muscle to the IAF and help in its modernisation. The government is fully committed to provide the latest and best equipment and will not spare any effort to ensure the IAF retains its qualitative edge”.

Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has entered into a contract with Russian companies Rosoboron export and Sukhoi to develop the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), a stealth fighter in the class of the American F-22 Raptor

Multirole transport aircraft With the ongoing upgrade of the remaining 90 odd aircraft of the 104, five-tonne payload capacity An-32 aircraft acquired since the mid eighties, the fleet is expected to remain In-service for another decade at best. However, HAL has already signed a tripartite agreement with the United Aircraft Corporation – Transport Aircraft (UAC-TA), the Russian partner and their JV – Multirole Transport Aircraft Ltd (MTAL), to develop a high wing, rear loading, twin-engine Multirole Transport Aircraft (MTA) in the 15 to 20 tonne class for the IAF to replace the An-32 fleet. The IAF will order 45. HAL will carry out the design and development of the MTA at

Bangalore while its Transport Aircraft Division at Kanpur will manufacture the prototypes and undertake serial production for which dedicated facilities are being set up there. Maiden flight of the prototype is expected in 2017 and commencement of regular production in 2019. The IAF hopes to have all 45 aircraft on its inventory and operational by 2030. Meant for tactical employment, the MTA will be nudging the strategic airlift capability regime and add a new qualitative dimension to the transport fleet of the IAF.

Replacement for Avro fleet In July this year, the Ministry of Defence has cleared a proposal worth over Rs 12,000 crore for the procurement of 56 transport aircraft of ten-tonne payload capacity for the IAF to replace its fleet of vintage Avro aircraft acquired in the 1960s. The first 16 of the new aircraft are to be procured off-the-shelf from the foreign vendor identified through a tendering process. The remaining 40 will be license-produced in

India by the indigenous aerospace industry in the private sector.

Rotary wing segment Inductions planned or underway in the rotary wing segment of the IAF are no less profound than those in the fixed wing regime. The 80 Mi-17 V5 armed helicopters procured under a US$ 1.34-billion deal in 2008 to augment the existing fleet of Mi-17, have begun to arrive and delivery should be completed by 2014. The four-tonne payload capacity Mi-17 V5 is an upgrade of Mi-17 in the medium-lift category and is equipped with state-of-the-art avionics and navigation systems. It will enhance the capability of the IAF to undertake high altitude air maintenance operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief missions and logistic support. The IAF is in the process of ordering another 59 machines costing US$ 1 billion taking the total to 139. The tender for 197 Light Utility Helicopters in the three-tonne class for the Indian Army and the IAF is in the final stages. The selected helicopter, either the Eurocopter Fennec or the Russian Kamov KA226 when finally selected, will replace the fleet of vintage Cheetah / Chetak helicopters procured in the 1970s. The IAF will receive 67 of the 197 helicopters tendered for. HAL has been tasked to develop and supply

187 machines in the LUH class for the IAF and the Indian Army. Should HAL fail to deliver in time, customers will be free to order additional machines from the selected vendor. The IAF has selected Boeing’s Apache AH64D Longbow Attack Helicopter to replace the ageing fleet of Mi-35. 22 of these are to be acquired for US$ 1.4 billion. The Apache is far more advanced than other attack helicopters in the world and is combat proven in the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. To replace its ageing fleet of Mi-26 heavy lift helicopters, the IAF has selected the 12.7-tonne payload capacity Boeing CH-47F Chinook. This is a twin-engine, tandem rotor heavy lift helicopter proven in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. 15 of these will be procured for US$ 2 billion. Time frame for induction will be specified once the contract is signed. On the indigenous front, the IAF and the Indian Army have placed orders for 159 of the improved Mk III version of the ALH Dhruv utility helicopters and for 76 of its heavily armed version designated as the Rudra. HAL is also developing the Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) of which the IAF will get 65. The LCH will be capable of operating at high altitude.

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

EMERGING SUPER POWER?

I Air Vice Marshal A K Tiwary VSM (retd) The writer commanded a MiG-29 Squadron in late 80s. His various command and staff appointments like Chief Operations Officer at a major Wing, operational planning at Command level, Director Concept Studies at Air HQ, Command of a major flying base, Head of the Training Team (Air) at Defence Services Staff College and Senior Directing Staff (Air) at National Defence College have conferred a rich practical experience. The air staff course at DSSC Wellington (TN), Command and Air War Course at the Air University, Maxwell Airbase, Montgomery (USA), all inducted and accelerated his interest in air war studies.

PLAAF focus is on six combat capabilities: air superiority, ground attack, transporting troops and supplies, AEW and reconnaissance, electronic countermeasures and maintenance and logistics. Now these goals drive the military aviation industry

The Jian-20 stealth fighter’s first flight in early 2011 has put China at the forefront of latest in military aviation. The simultaneous development of AWACS and AEW types (KJ-2000, KJ-200) point to their amazing capability in this high-tech arena. The all around development in armament, missiles, UAVs (laser bombs, PL-10, 11, 12 air to air missiles, HALE UAVs / UCAVs) signify a new emerging super power only decades away from pole status

n last few years glimpses of China’s latest military aviation products have taken China watchers with utter surprise. The Jian-20 stealth fighter’s first flight in early 2011 has put China at the forefront of latest in military aviation. The simultaneous development of AWACS and AEW types (KJ-2000, KJ-200) point to their amazing capability in this high-tech arena. The all around development in armament, missiles, UAVs (laser bombs, PL-10, 11, 12 air to air missiles, HALE UAVs / UCAVs) signify a new emerging super power only decades away from pole status. Just two decades back nobody took China’s capability seriously. A Rand report of 1995 stated, “The (aviation) ministry is likely to build what can be domestically designed and manufactured, rather than incur the technical risk and development costs to provide an aircraft with superior combat capabilities. Internal rivalries within the aviation industry have also impeded timely development.”1 This has changed. In 1993, Jiang Zemin the General Secretary of Communist Party put RMA at the heart of Chinese strategy. The concept of defensive “Peoples War” changed to offensive / defensive mix for, “local wars under high-tech conditions”. This changed the priority not only within PLA, PLAN and PLAAF, but also gave direction to the defence industry. Over the next few years, China plans to spend a quarter of a trillion dollars building the aerospace industry of the future. It is the aim of this article to analyse capabilities of China’s military aviation industry. The Communist China of 1949 was totally bereft of military aviation. So much so, that only a few years earlier, American Volunteer Group comprising ex-military fliers of USA, under the most able leadership of US Gen Claire Chennault were flying fighters in China against Japanese Air Force. And it was again the American transports which were flying in war material into China “across the hump” from north-east India. The strong relationship with Soviet Union soon after China’s independence helped start an industrial revolution in China. China’s aviation industry benefited immensely. China acquired latest aeroplanes like An-2 transporters, Mi-4 helicopters, Yak-18 trainers, and combat fighters namely MiG-15, MiG-17, MiG-19 and MiG-21s, Il-10 ground attack and Il-28, Tu-2, Tu-4 and Tu-16 bombers. China was given license production rights for MiG fighters and Il-28 and Tu-16 bombers. However, the

sudden souring of relations between China and Soviet Union resulted in China receiving incomplete technical, material support and no machines for producing these aircraft. Along with aircraft China also received SAMs (SA-2) and air to air missiles (AA-2).

The development of new technology in China follows the route of import of few complete systems, followed by semi-knocked down kits to be followed by indigenisation of components, ultimately leading to full manufacturing capability. Having mastered this, now the focus shifts to improve this system further

Massive reverse engineering To acquire latest in technology, China took all possible help from countries like France, Israel, Russia etc., especially after the break up of Soviet Union. Israel helped in a major way giving Lavi fighters (F-16 version) technology and the technology for AWACS before being pressured by the USA to suspend further help. As another example after having bought 50 Su-27 Flanker aircraft from Russia, Chinese went the path of Sukhoi supplied kits, to building the aircraft more or less from scratch with only engines and few other parts imported.2 China reverse engineered in a massive way all the systems she received. Unfortunately the Cultural Revolution (1966-1977) disrupted the aviation industry also. It is to the credit of Chinese that they not only persisted in their efforts, they also undertook bold steps in experimenting to improve the quality of what they had received from the Soviets. The MiG -21 alone had many types of variations. Official documents claim that in 1971 alone, 27 types of aircraft were authorised to be developed even without their blueprints existing.3 The A-5 derived from MiG-19 was produced successfully in mere 7 years and later exported to many countries including Pakistan. One cannot help but wonder that while both India and China got the Soviet equipment at the same time, how come Chinese succeeded and Indians failed in reverse engineering them. A case in point is the SA-2 SAM. China developed CSS-8 (M-7) from SA-2. Indian attempt called project Devil failed. This in spite of upheaval of Cultural Revolution and break from Soviets in case of China. Even counties like Iran, Croatia and Serbia developed ballistic missiles building on the SA-2 Guidelines.4 Our cooperation

1. Kenneth W Allen, Glenn Krumel, Jonathan D Pollack, “China’s Air Force Enters The 21st Century,” Project Air Force, RAND. 1995. P. 144. 2. Zalmay M Khalizad, Abram N Shuleskey, et al, “The US and a Rising China- Strategic and Military Implications”. Project Rand Air Force. 2000. 3. Ibid. Rand. P. 145. 4. Jane’s Strategic Weapon System, UK 2000, P. 46.

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

CHINA’s MILITARY AVIATION INDUSTRY A

n incisive look at the Chinese military aviation industry. Over the next few years, China plans to spend a quarter of a trillion dollars building the aerospace industry of the future. One cannot help but wonder that while both India and China got the Soviet equipment at the same time, how come Chinese succeeded and Indians failed in reverse engineering them. A case in point is the SA-2 SAM. China developed CSS-8 (M-7) from SA-2. Indian attempt called project Devil failed. Where possible the Chinese bought bankrupt aviation companies abroad to acquire latest / desired technologies. AVIC is the mother company comprising Defence divisions. Under it, Chengdu and the Shenyang Aircraft Co., China’s main fighter concerns, manage both stealthy and conventional fighter programmes. China bought 176 Su-27 SK/UBK / Su-30 MKK/MK2 fighters from Russia and co-produced another 100 (J-11) under license. By 2008 Shenyang started delivering J-11B with indigenous engines, radars and weapons. Shenyang’s J-15, a near copy of Sukhoi’s Su-33 carrier based aircraft is being produced for PLAN. It also has factories at Xian, all of Hongdu Aviation Industrial Group and possibly part of Guizhou Aviation Industry Corp.

with Soviets continued, yet we did not produce even the much needed spares for Russian equipment! The end of Cultural Revolution and emergence of Deng Xiaoping at the helm brought about start of yet another revolution. This was the commencement of four major modernisations in which military

modernisation was given the last priority. It is only when the Chinese economy started sustaining itself in unbelievable double digit yearly growth that more resources became available for the aviation sector. This corresponds to 1990s. Meanwhile Chinese kept reorganising the aviation industry to increase its efficiency. The aviation industry is totally state

owned. If a set of reforms did not produce desired results Chinese were bold enough to reject them and try another approach. Where possible they bought bankrupt aviation companies abroad to acquire latest / desired technologies. In 2009 AVIC (Chinese Conglomerate) acquired Fisher Advanced Composite Components, a leading European

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

EMERGING SUPER POWER?

aero structures suppliers that addressed China’s weakness in advanced materials and complex mechanical systems. In 2010, they bought Epic Air and in 2011 Continental Motors, the second largest producer of piston engines.5

Consolidation Competitiveness was brought in amongst the various wings of the aviation industry even while attempting consolidation. The present arrangement is as follows: AVIC is the mother company comprising Defence divisions. Under it, Chengdu and the Shenyang Aircraft Co., China’s main fighter concerns, manage both stealthy and conventional fighter programmes. China bought 176 Su-27 SK/UBK / Su-30 MKK/MK2 fighters from Russia and co-produced another 100 (J-11) under license. By 2008 Shenyang started delivering J-11B with indigenous engines, radars and weapons. Shenyang’s J-15, a near copy of Sukhoi’s Su-33 carrier based aircraft is being produced for PLAN.6 It also has factories at Xian, all of Hongdu Aviation Industrial Group and possibly part of Guizhou Aviation Industry Corp. COMAC looks after the development of civil airliners. TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT CO. also builds civil aircraft like MA-60, MA-600 etc. AVICOPTER builds all helicopters. General Aviation Co. builds light aircraft and business jets. Aviation Engine Industry Corp. produces various engines.

It is only when the Chinese economy started sustaining itself in unbelievable double digit yearly growth that more resources became available for the aviation sector. This corresponds to 1990s. Meanwhile Chinese kept reorganising the aviation industry to increase its efficiency Since the entire aviation industry is state owned, its twin objectives are to equip PLAAF and to export it’s products to sustain itself in addition to the state funding. After the fiasco of 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War and watching the spectacular display of airpower might since Gulf War 91, Chinese leadership at all levels has

come to realise the importance of air power in modern wars. PLAAF has determined in crafting itself in the best mould. The PLAAF focus is on six combat capabilities: air superiority, ground attack, transporting troops and supplies, AEW and reconnaissance, electronic countermeasures and maintenance and logistics. Now these goals drive the military aviation industry.

Over the next few years, China plans to spend a quarter of a trillion dollars building the aerospace industry of the future Self-reliance has been the goal of every Chinese aircraft procurement programme since 1950s. Chinese acquire new technology in small numbers and thereafter aim to incorporate this in their technology to produce indigenous weapon systems. Between 1950 and 1993 China acquired 12 types of aircraft and 11 types of missiles (surface to air, air to air, air to surface) in order to learn new technology. In last decade flush with surplus dollars, China has started acquiring available aviation companies. Does PLAAF always buy what Chinese aviation industry produces? The answer is no. PLAAF is selective and wants modern technology often in the form of western avionics. In the past for such an arrangement the PLAAF had to pay in dollars to the company importing from abroad. The government did not provide dollars. Rather it permitted PLAAF to engage in commercial activities to earn itself the needed foreign currency. These experimental arrangement during the 80s and 90s have been now done away with since China has created enormous dollar surpluses. The development of new technology in China follows the route of import of few complete systems, followed by semi-knocked down kits to be followed by indigenisation of components, ultimately leading to full manufacturing capability. Having mastered this, now the focus shifts to improve this system further. While this has led to production of obsolete systems earlier, it served two

5. Aviation Week & Space Technology, p. 58. 6. Aviation Week & Space Technology, p. 62.

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

important purposes. First it gave them learning into new technology and secondly the so called obsolete system was still good enough for export to third world countries. It earned them both dollars and political influence. To make this process more efficient and competitive, even PLAAF was allowed to export weapon systems. Polytechnologies Inc is the import-export arm of the Military which competes with China National Aero-Technology Import Export Corporation representing aviation ministry. The current notable aviation programmes are listed below: 1. J-20 Stealth Fighter 2. J-10 Multi-role Fighter 3. J-11B Twin Seat Multi-role Fighter 4. J-15 Carrier based Fighter 5. KJ-2000 AWACS 6. KJ-200 AEW 7. Changhe Z-8 AEW&C Helicopter 8. FC-1 / JF-17 Fighter What we need to appreciate is that China has been bold and aggressive in innovation and in reorganising it’s institutions to suit the needs of the times. Also bold experimentation has enabled them and given self-confidence. This has permitted them venturing into their own designs and development. They are still decades away from being the best in the world in military aviation, yet one cannot shy away from the fact that they have narrowed this gap substantially and are poised on take-off path. The A-5 and MiG-21 upgrades, namely – F-7II, J-7E and G, J-8-I, J-8-R represent the stage of experimentation and indigenisation. The J-10, a fourth generation fighter signifies Chinese catching up with the aviation world. The J-20 puts them in same league as the USA. The trend is towards attaining the top slot in military aviation industry in near future.

dsa 3rd anniversary

TACTICAL EVOLUTION

T Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Poonch districts. He has served two tenures at the DGMO. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 24 books and over 100 papers in many prestigious research journals. He is Editor-in-Chief of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine. This defensive phase is now over with the transformation of the PLAAF into an all Fourth Generation Air Force. It is likely to be far more aggressive in future conflicts and will not confine itself to air defence. It is likely to compensate for reduced take-off loads from Tibetan airfields by in-flight re-fuelling (and full bomb loads) or striking from airfields in Chengdu region with on-board cruise missiles. The most recent Chinese air exercise over Tibet in September this year is most instructive

he Chinese PLAAF is on the cusp of a transformation into a potent and contemporary fighter force. Almost its entire Fighter Fleet across the board is being upgraded to Fourth Generation status. The Fifth Generation stealth fighters are already on the horizon, much sooner than most observers had expected. The PLAAF today has AWACS and AEW aircraft and credible refuelling capabilities. What is far more impressive is the creation of an RMA standard Reconnaissance-Strike Complex in terms of an array of reconnaissance and Geo-positioning Satellites backed up now by Intermediate range DF-21D Precision missiles that could become game changers as Aircraft Carrier Killer Missiles. China has demonstrated ASAT capabilities and has rudimentary Ballistic Missile Defences in terms of the Russian S-300 PMV-1 and S-400 systems as also its indigenous HQ-10 and HQ-15 missiles with ranges of 150-200 km. It has some 1,600 interceptor missiles and 300 launchers. Five such SAM batteries are deployed around Beijing, 6 opposite Taiwan Straits and others around major cities like Shanghai, Chengdu and Dalian. What is of far greater and immediate concern to India however, is the augmented Chinese fighter fleet of Su-27s, Su-30, Su-33, J-10 and J-11s, all credible fourth generation fighters. The PLAAF had emerged as a credible air power in the course of the Korean War. For long it remained a vast fleet (4,500 aircraft) of vintage MiG Fighters ranging from the venerable MiG-15, MiG-17, MiG-19 and Mig-21s and their Chinese variants. Though dated it was a formidable force and it would be essential to see how it performed in the intensive combat environment of Korea. It is essential to take a look at Chinese military experience in that war because after the hiatus of a few decades, the Chinese have returned to the theme of modernisation with a vengeance and are closely examining the lessons of their first modern war. It may be recounted that Peng Dehuai, the legendary commander of the Chinese Peoples Volunteers (CPV) in Korea, had tried to initiate the process of modernisation after the Korean War but was purged by Mao in 1959. The economic failure of the Great Leap forward and then the havoc of the Cultural Revolution deranged the Chinese Military modernisation process. It could resume only in 1980 (after the rude shock of the war with Vietnam) and gained unstoppable momentum after 1990. Today it is fast becoming a security nightmare for all of China’s neighbours. China always had the quantitative edge over India. Its massive fleet of some 4,500 aircraft however was largely vintage and outclassed by the Indian Air Force due to the generous support of the Soviets, who were trying to build India as a counterweight to China. Our MiG-21Bis, MiG-23, MiG-27s and later the MiG-29, all outclassed the earlier era MiGs of the Chinese Air fleet. Besides we had the Jaguars and Mirages

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

and a clear edge in software and electronics. All this qualitative edge is now history. Today military professionals are seriously concerned by the qualitative and quantitative edge that the PLAAF is rapidly acquiring over the IAF. In the month of September this year the Chinese media published photographs of frontline Chinese fighters like the J-11 and Su-30 carrying out “live fire” exercises in Tibet. As the combat inventories of the Chinese and Pakistani Air Force are rising ominously – those of the Indian Air Force are depleting as the vintage MiG-21 fleet is retired and replacements in terms of Rafale and LCA remain distant pies in the sky. Our inability to untangle bureaucratic red tape would seem to ensure that these gaps are not plugged in a hurry. In the light of these developments and transformative changes in the PLAAF, it would be essential to look in detail at the actual combat experience and performance of this air force as witnessed in Korea – their first and seminal conflict under modern conditions.

Korea Korea was a Limited war but the Chinese had thrown in virtually one million troops. Their Fifth campaign had seen the combat employment of almost 7,50,000 troops of four Army Groups with a total of 15 Corps of Infantry and some five Artillery Divisions and four Air Defence Divisions. Xiaoming Zhang, writing in the book “Chinese War-fighting: The PLA Experience Since 1949” has given us an invaluable account of the PLAAF operations in Korea and this account is largely based on his excellent paper. The PLAAF official history divides the Air Operations in Korea in three phases as under: Phase 1 Preparation: October 1950-August 1951 Phase 2 Learning Period: September 1951-May 1952 Phase 3 Engagement: July 1952-27 July 1953 The fledgling PLAAF had no combat experience whatsoever to fall back on. It was in the process of being raised as the war started. It was totally subordinate to the PLA and felt its primary mission in Korea would be ground support (flying artillery). Hesitant about fielding their fledgling air force against combat tested and most modern USAF, the Chinese nervously sought Soviet support. Joseph Stalin however reneged on his promise to provide air cover to Chinese troops in Korea. The PLA was sent in nevertheless, as Mao felt that Korea was a traditional invasion route and China would simply not countenance the American overrunning North Korea. As per Chinese Intelligence the USAF had committed over 1,100 combat aircraft in Korea. Most of its pilots were World War II veterans with over 1,000 hours of flying under their belt.

Phase 1 operations The PLA initially sent in four Air Regiments

THE CHINESE AIR FORCE IN ACTION: PLAAF IN KOREA

n incisive account of the PLAAF operations in Korea – China’s first experience of modern war. By the time of the July 1953 Armistice, the Chinese Air Force had expanded to 27 Air Divisions (70 Regiments) with about 3,000 planes, many of which were highly advanced for their times. The PLAAF had flown more than 25,000 sorties over Korea and claimed to have shot down over 330 UN aircraft with losses of 231 of its own planes. Ten fighter divisions (21 Regiments) and 2 Bomber Divisions with some 800 pilots and 59,700 ground personnel were engaged in air operations in Korea. This experience against US / UN Air Forces in Korea yielded mature Chinese combat pilots and prepared the PLAAF for future conflicts. However it also set a pattern of the Chinese Air Force being unable to provide direct support for ground forces (some 120 x MiG-15s) to provide air cover for its transportation lines between the Chinese border and Anju in North Korea in Jan-Feb 1951. By mid April 1951, 6 x Fighter Regiment, 2 x Il-10 Attack Regiments and 4 x Tu-2 bomber Regiments had entered Korea (Total 360 aircraft). The PLAAFs problem was lack of airfields in North Korea. These had been comprehensively bombed by the Americans and rendered inoperable. The PLAAF had to rapidly construct airfields. 10 Army Divisions were employed in January 1951 to construct / repair six airfields in the area between Pyongyang and Anju. Even as these airfields were being readied the PLAAF began an intensive training programme emphasising aerobatics, formation, training, cruise and operational unit training. Bomber crews concentrated on Regimental Formations and bombing training. Attack squadrons trained to fly various formations and practice ground attacks.

Korea was a Limited war but the Chinese had thrown in virtually one million troops. Their Fifth campaign had seen the combat employment of almost 7,50,000 troops of four Army Groups with a total of 15 Corps of Infantry and some five Artillery Divisions and four Air Defence Divisions

The first air engagement: Accordingly the first air engagement of the PLAAF with the USAF occurred on 21 January 1951. The Chinese MiGs surprised four US F-84 Thunder Jets that were bombing the bridges along the Chengchon river. One F-84 was hit and damaged in this engagement. The PLAAF claimed its first kill a week later when an F-84 was shot down over the sea off North Korea. This was a tremendous morale booster for the PLAAF. Chinese pilots they felt, could defeat the more experienced US Pilots – even as the land forces had done on the ground. The PLAAF now sent in the rest of the 4th Air Division to Andong. Poor coordination between ground control and pilots aloft however, was a major constraint and prevented interception of US planes. Despite claims of downing one US plane and damaging two others in this phase, the Chinese lost two MiG-15s and a pilot. Poor flying skills led to many accidents and mid-air collisions in this initial phase of some two months. The PLAAF concluded that its pilots would not be ready for combat until they received additional training. Hence when the PLA launched its massive Fifth Campaign on the ground, the Chinese Air Force was not able to assist as it had planned to. Despite throwing in some 7,50,000 troops, it became a massive meat grinder battle of attrition and by early summer of 1951 a stalemate had set in along the 38th Parallel. The

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

TACTICAL EVOLUTION

18 CPV Armies (Corps) were divided into two groups for rotation through the frontline every two to three months. The PLAAF now came under tremendous pressure to enter the war. Establishment of CPV air force HQ: On 15 March 1951 the CPV Air Force HQ was formally assembled at Andong in North Korea. It was commanded by Army veteran Liu Zhen. His Deputy Commander was the Soviet trained pilot Chang Quarankun and the Chief of Staff was Shen Quixian. It was allotted the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Fighter Divisions and two Bomber Divisions ((8th and 9th) and assumed operational command around April 1951. The whole aim was to rapidly gain operational experience . The best training, it felt would be in live combat. In order to implement their plan of ground air operations they planned to do it in two phases. Units would first move into Andong and gain combat experience. Then to implement ground support operations they would stage forward to Anju by November 1951 and then further down to Pyongyang. Chinese pilots would be rotated by divisions to gain combat experience.

Today military professionals are seriously concerned by the qualitative and quantitative edge that the PLAAF is rapidly acquiring over the IAF. In the month of September this year the Chinese media published photographs of frontline Chinese fighters like the J-11 and Su-30 carrying out “live fire” exercises in Tibet. As the combat inventories of the Chinese and Pakistani Air Force are rising ominously – those of the Indian Air Force are depleting as the vintage MiG-21 fleet is retired and replacements in terms of Rafale and LCA remain distant pies in the sky August 1951: The PLAAF was however upstaged. In August 1951 the US Far Eastern Air Force began major interdiction operations against rail communications between Pyongyang and the Chinese border. The Central Military Commission (CMC) now ordered PLAAF into the war beginning with a small number of the best trained pilots who had earlier gained combat experience in early 1951.

Phase 2 operations: The learning period On 12th September 1951, the Chinese 4th Air Division moved to Andong. It was initially placed under Soviet command due to its lack of combat experience. However language difficulty made coordination of fast moving air combat very difficult and the Chinese soon realised that they were on their own. First major combat engagement: The first major, large scale dogfight took place on 25 September 1951. 16x Chinese MiG-15s took off along with Russians to stop a large force of US bombers and fighter bombers that were attacking across Congchon River at Anju – a key link on the Chinese supply line. Due to lack of combat experience 6x Chinese MiG-15s were boxed in by the US F-86 Sabres. One MiG was shot down and another damaged. The Chinese claimed their first kill of an F-86. Between 12 September and 19 October 1951, the PLAAF 4th Air Division flew 508 sorties and had 10 engagements with US aircraft. On seven occasions the Chinese fighters engaged in air battles that involved over 200 aircraft. The PLAAF claimed

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

that Chinese fighters destroyed 8 US aircraft and damaged three others in the air battles of 05 October and 10 October. These claims however are questionable as US Records show no losses in that period. During this short but intense tour of duty at Andong the Chinese 4th Air Division lost a quarter of its strength (14 out of 55 x MiG-15s shot down). The Division claimed 20 kills and 20 damaged US aircraft. The PLAAF was convinced that its pilots had withstood their test by fire and had gained valuable combat experience so vital for the fledgling air force. In November 1951, the Chinese assessed that there were prospects of a truce. Hence the PLAAF now decided to expose maximum number of aircrews to combat while they had the chance. Thus on 20th October itself the 3rd Division had replaced the 4th Air Division at Andong. In November, the 2nd and 14th Air division also entered the conflict. By early 1952, four more Air Divisions based in China (15 Air Div Shenyang, 12 Air Div Shanghai, 17 Air Div Tangkhon and 18 Air Div at Kinangzhau) had also joined air combat around the Yalu. Thus from November 5 till the cease fire the PLAAF maintained some three to four Air Divisions totaling 150-200 x MiG-15s at airfields on the Chinese side of the Yalu River.

Tactical evolution The PLAAF studied the USAF tactics of flying in pairs or 4-8 aircraft formations with planes at different altitudes for supportive interaction. In contrast the Chinese had been using Soviet World War II tactics flying large formations that appeared rigid and inflexible. In air combat the enemy could easily break up such formations. Chinese pilots were thereby being forced into single aircraft disadvantageous situation. In November/December 1951, the PLAAF commander Liu Yalon went to the front to study the situation at first hand. After extensive discussion and debate he came up with the one Zone, multi-layers-four aircraft formation tactics. To combat US aircraft, the MiG-15s were divided into attack and cover pairs in order to improve flexibility and safety. Along with deployment of a great number of air units the PLAAF also made efforts to improve command and control. Early operations had revealed many low level gaps in radar coverage and Chinese pilots often failed to intercept US aircraft even when they were very close. In December 1951 the PLAAF established two Front Air Command Posts at Pakhon and Pyongyang with Ground Control Intercept Radar and communication equipment. Observation Posts were set up at known Radar blind zones to improve efficiency of Chinese Pilots in interception of enemy aircraft. Setback: Despite these improvements the PLAAF suffered a major setback in this phase of air operations. The USAF carried out sustained bombardments against the airfields in North Korea. This prevented the PLAAF from carrying out its planned re-deployments into Korea. As a result the PLAAF had to abandon its plans for air to ground support and was confined to airfields within China from which to engage the Americans over Korea. Without airfields in North Korea the short range MiG-15s were restricted to an area no more than 100 miles from their home bases. This lack of air cover did

effect the morale of the Chinese ground forces throughout the war. Bomber operations: Chinese air war strategy also no longer considered using bomber aircraft to attack American targets south of the 38th Parallel. In Spring 1951, Beijing had sent two Bomber Divisions to Korea. However their targets were US warships off the coast of North Korea and airfields in Seoul. Chinese leaders however were aware that USAF had restrained itself from bombing North of the Yalu. In reciprocal fashion they confined Chinese air operations to defence and refused to allow attacks on US safe havens South of the 38th parallel. In fact, as per Chinese sources on 08 February 1952, three Tu-2 bombers were assigned to attack Kimpo airfield near Seoul. Their mission however was called off by Zhou Enlai himself just a few minutes before take-off from Beijing due to political considerations. Thereafter, all bomber units were released from combat duties in Korea. This is a classic Chinese ruse of making a virtue out of weakness in the air. The same was done in 1962 and in 1979.

Phase 3: PLAAF escalates the air war Beginning in mid 1952, Chinese air operations entered a new stage of intensity. Chinese pilots continued to be insufficiently experienced to present a significant threat to the Americans. However, after three to four months long training / rotation, Chinese pilots gained the proficiency to conduct independent operations without top-cover by Soviets. On 19 May 1952, the PLAAF leaders decided to redouble the air force efforts in Korea with emphasis on actual combat rather than training. Since Chinese aircraft were very vulnerable to attacks while landing or taking-off from bases along the Yalu, the primary intent was to push the line of battle to the south of the Chongchon River – so that the Chinese Air Force could avoid air battle over its own bases. Another objective was to send their MiGs deep into the Pyongyang and Nampo (Chinampo) areas, to protect ground troops from enemy bombers.

It is essential to take a look at Chinese military experience in that war because after the hiatus of a few decades, the Chinese have returned to the theme of modernisation with a vengeance and are closely examining the lessons of their first modern war To implement this plan, the PLAAF planned to employ 9 Fighter Divisions in 19 Regiments. They first deployed 8 fighter Regiments at the Andong base to handle frontline battles while they stationed six Regiments at airfields in Shenyang and Liaoyang as reserves. These Regiments were to rotate every three months. Replacement pilots would be chosen from aviation graduates and MiG-15 units. In order to compete with the upgraded F-86s of the Americans in Korea, Five Chinese Air Divisions were re-equipped with improved, faster MiG-15bis. In January 1952, the USAF scaled down its attacks on Chinese supply lines as these were proving futile due to vigorous Chinese defence and their ability to rapidly repair the damaged supply lines. US aircraft now shifted to bombing selected strategic targets. The primary task of the PLAAF was now air defence for the bridges and logistical arteries as also for the key dams and hydroelectric power stations on the Yalu. The Chinese MiGs however became far more aggressive and often

headed Southward to the Anju area initiating engagements well before US aircraft could reach their targets on the Yalu. Chinese tactics included experienced units engaging the American F-86 Sabres while others attacked the less manoeuvrable Fighter Bombers such as the F-84s. The Chinese pilots however were still handicapped by the short ranges of their MiGs. To stay in prolonged combat new tactics were devised. MiG flights of 12-16 fighters each were sent into combat in tandem. Thus consistent pressure was maintained on attacking US aircraft. Meanwhile PLAAF also dispatched flights of four to eight planes under clouds cover to Chinampo or even Sariwam to target slow and unprotected fighter bombers. Over the Winter months of 1952 to 1953, the PLAAF set its best record against the Americans. With emphasis on tactics and techniques, Chinese pilots increasingly appeared more proficient in air combat and fighting against the F-86s now became a less formidable challenge. In December 1952, Lu Min of the 12th Division became a PLAAF ace by shooting down five F-86s. By the end of April 1953, the Chinese claimed to have shot down a total of 70 enemy aircraft and damaged another 21. This record included the downing of Capt Harold E Fisher, the double jet ace of the USAF 51st Fighter Wing by 21 year old Wingman Han Decai of the 15th Air Division. The Chinese 3rd, 4th, 12th and 15th Air Divisions emerged during this war as the most capable combat units of the air war. The PLAAF had started the Korean War with absolutely no experience of arieal combat. It had like the World War I era pilots, only soldiers experienced in ground combat flying its aircraft. The Chinese pilots however quickly learnt on the job. The PLAAF very deliberately made actual combat its prime theatre of learning. It prepared methodically, tested the waters and then trained rapidly to become a fairly formidable jet air force. By the time of the July 1953 Armistice, the Chinese Air Force had expanded to 27 Air Divisions (70 Regiments) with about 3,000 planes, many of which were highly advanced for their times. The PLAAF had flown more than 25,000 sorties over Korea and claimed to have shot down over 330 UN aircraft with losses of 231 of its own planes. Ten fighter divisions (21 Regiments) and 2 Bomber Divisions with some 800 pilots and 59,700 ground personnel were engaged in air operations in Korea. This experience against US / UN Air Forces in Korea yielded mature Chinese combat pilots and prepared the PLAAF for future conflicts. However it also set a pattern of the Chinese Air Force being unable to provide direct support for ground forces. This pattern persisted through the 1962 War with India and the 1979 War with Vietnam. The memories of UN air attacks in Korea and the threat from American nuclear armed bombers continued to drive the PLAAF to emphasise air defence and fighters would constitute the largest and most important element of the Chinese Air Force.

Conclusion This defensive phase is now over with the transformation of the PLAAF into an all Fourth Generation Air Force. It is likely to be far more aggressive in future conflicts and will not confine itself to air defence. It is likely to compensate for reduced take-off loads from Tibetan airfields by in-flight re-fuelling (and full bomb loads) or striking from airfields in Chengdu region with onboard cruise missiles. The most recent Chinese air exercise over Tibet in September this year is most instructive.

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

INDUCTION CHALLENGES

Lt Gen B S Pawar PVSM, AVSM (retd) The writer is an alumnus of Rashtriya Indian Military College and National Defence Academy and was commissioned into Artillery in June 1968. He fought the 1971 war as an Observation Post Officer in the Uri sector of Jammu and Kashmir. He was the Brigade Major of an Infantry and Mountain Brigade and a Director in the Perspective Planning Directorate. He commanded a Rocket Regiment and has the distinction of commanding the largest Artillery Brigade in Jammu and Kashmir. He was Maj Gen Artillery, Western Command during Operation Parakram. He also headed the Army Aviation Corps and was the Commandant, School of Artillery. He hung his boots in September 2008. A defence analyst, he writes for a number of defence journals and publications. He is a member of the Governing Council of the Rotary Wing Society of India.

The development of the light combat helicopter (LCH) by the HAL is a milestone achievement. The LCH aims to gatecrash the exclusive club of the state-of-the-art light attack helicopters which includes Eurocopter’s Tiger, Bell’s AH 1Z Super Cobra and China’s ultra secret Zhisheng 10 (Z-10). The LCH is a derivative of the ALH and the weaponised ALH. The LCH is being designed to be able to operate at high altitudes (16,000 feet), a distinct advantage over other attack helicopters and an asset for our mountain formations.

former Director General of the Army Aviation Corps takes a hard look at the current and future growth profile of the Army Aviation Corps (AAC). The biggest advantage the AAC has is the indigenous capability of the HAL to meet the bulk of its requirement in terms of helicopters and supporting systems like the ALH, ALH-WSI, LCH etc. For majority of the equipment to be inducted ex import the trials have been completed and decisions awaited. However, if any of these projects get stalled, specially the replacement of vintage Cheetah / Chetak helicopters, the modernisation plans will take a nosedive with disasterous consequences. The biggest challenge before the AAC is to be able to absorb the induction of this modern state-of-the-art equipment in the short period of time available – 2030. The writer makes a strong pitch for all light, medium and heavy lift helicopters and fixed wing assets like the Dorniers to be allocated to the AAC.

he Indian Army Aviation Corps (AAC) completes 26 years of its existence on 1st November this year. From operating the Auster / Krishak two seater fixed wing aircraft as part of air force (erstwhile air observation post units) to the induction of light observation helicopters (Chetak / Cheetah) in early 1970s, the birth of the Corps in 1986 and induction of the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) manufactured twin engine Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) in 2002, has been a challenging journey. However its growth has been plagued by many infirmities, foremost being the steadfast opposition of the air force to AAC’s expansion plans, related to both its role and assets. The recent media reports on the Army Chief meeting the Defence Minister on this vital issue have highlighted the army’s priority and concern. Despite its stunted growth and curbed status the Indian Army Aviation continues to receive accolades for its performance, from the Kargil conflict to counter-insurgency operations and the unrelenting operations in the Siachen Glacier, the highest battlefield in the world.

TODAY AND TOMORROW

the Tactical Battle Area (TBA). While the induction of the light utility helicopter (ALH) is underway, the medium and heavy lift helicopters which form the core of the tactical lift capability continue to be with the air force. A similar situation exists with regard to attack helicopter units, which despite being an integral part of the land battle, remain with the air force. Their optimum employment is not possible in the present set up. The army’s requirement of small fixed wing aircraft [Dornier class], in limited numbers for roles like command and control, aerial communication hubs, logistics including casualty evacuation and communication flights has also not fructified due to objections of the air force. This, despite the fact that even the Coast Guard and Border Security Force have fixed wing aircraft in their inventory. A survey of military aviation organisations worldwide reveals the inadequacies of the Indian AAC.

Present structure

The army aviation needs to play a vastly enhanced role in land operations in the coming years. This is only possible if the arm grows both quantitatively and qualitatively. The need is to create a dedicated and operational Army Aviation Corps capable of night operations, with aircrew who are not only proficient in flying but are associated full time with army manoeuvres, operational thinking and ground tactics as well as spend time in the field

Presently the AAC has in its inventory the largest number of helicopters amongst the three Services, majority being the light observation class (Cheetah and Chetak). These helicopters are obsolete and have been In-service for 40 years requiring immediate replacement. Keeping this fleet operational itself is becoming well-nigh impossible due to its vintage and spares criticality. The Corps today has few helicopters to carry out a number of extremely specialised roles in

All major armies of the world including our adversaries China and Pakistan have a full fledged air arm of their own, comprising all types of helicopters and fixed wing aircraft. The Pak Army Aviation boasts of an inventory consisting of all class of helicopters, including attack and fixed wing aircraft. In contrast, the Indian AAC remains a reconnaissance and observation force with a few light utility helicopters. At present the army aviation assets are inadequate for the size of the Indian Army and the tasks it is required to perform. The expansion of the AAC is therefore imperative.

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

INDUCTION CHALLENGES

The army aviation should possess a mix of light fixed wing aircraft and all categories of helicopters including attack / gunships for various roles like reconnaissance, surveillance, combat fire support, airborne command posts, combat service support, special operations and logistics.

The Indian Army Aviation Corps (AAC) completes 26 years of its existence on 1st November this year. From operating the Auster / Krishak two seater fixed wing aircraft as part of air force (erstwhile air observation post units) to the induction of light observation helicopters (Chetak / Cheetah) in early 1970s, the birth of the Corps in 1986 and induction of the Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) manufactured twin engine Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) in 2002, has been a challenging journey. However its growth has been plagued by many infirmities, foremost being the steadfast opposition of the air force to AAC’s expansion plans, related to both its role and assets

Army aviation – 2030 The operational diversities of the Indian Army coupled with a variety of terrain, extensive deployment in mountains / high altitude areas require assets that are capable of operating across this environmental spectrum. To make the army aviation a potent force capable of supporting the Indian Army operations across the entire spectrum of conflict in the TBA it must have a mix of both, helicopters and fixed wing aircraft with helicopters available in larger numbers. The helicopter fleet should consist of attack and armed helicopters, heavy, medium and light utility (lift) helicopters and light observation helicopters. There also would be a need for specialised helicopters suitably modified for special operations. The aim is to make the force a capability based organisation rather than equipment and inventory based structure, implying commensurate induction of man, machine, organisational and infrastructural requirements. New dimensions in tactical night operations as a direct result of sensor and avionics

capabilities, with the ability to operate at low levels at night will yield great dividends. In view of the above what are the broad structures and force levels that the army aviation should possess to make it a potent arm of the Indian Army whereby its combat efficiency is enhanced to the maximum extent. There is a requirement for a dedicated Reconnaissance and Observation unit for every Division to cater for recce of commanders, direction of artillery fire and casualty evacuation from inaccessible areas. The present Cheetah / Chetak fleet is vintage and needs immediate replacement. The trials for their replacement have been completed with the French Eurocopter (Fennec) and Russian Kamov (Ka-226) in fray. Both helicopters being evaluated are night capable and modified for fitment of sensors for transmitting real time information to ground stations during reconnaissance missions. Utility / lift helicopters: The army needs to develop capabilities for lifting up to a company at Corps, a battalion at command and a brigade at army level. For this the assets required would be light, medium and heavy helicopters as well as some light fixed wing aircraft. In the light utility category four units of ALH have already been raised and are operational including one in high altitude, while the fifth is presently under raising. A total of eight such units are planned for induction, each having ten helicopters. This gives the capability to the field force commander to move within the TBA a company level force at the critical juncture of the battle without having to look over his shoulders. The ALH being an all weather, night capable, twin engine machine with state-of-the-art avionics will give additional tactical capability to the field commanders in planning and execution of their operations. The ALH has also been test evaluated for high altitude operations with a more powerful engine ‘Shakti’, being produced by HAL in collaboration with French Turbomeca. This will give a major boost to enhancing the load carriage capacity while operating in high altitude areas specially the Siachen Glacier. In the medium

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

lift category the air force continues to stonewall all attempts of the army to acquire a suitable helicopter in the 10-12 ton class. This capability is basically required for intra-theatre move of reserves and equipment including ammunition and for special operations. The HAL is looking at the feasibility of a joint venture with a foreign vendor for a 10-12 ton class multiple purpose utility helicopter, but very little progress has been made in this regard so far. The army needs to pursue this approach more vigorously to acquire this class of helicopters. In the heavy lift capability the resources are almost non-existent with only one unit of Russian Mi-26 helicopters presently held with the air force. The induction of the Ultra Light Howitzer into the army (trials completed – induction likely soon), for deployment in the mountains has triggered the requirement for suitable heavy lift capability, with helicopters capable of carrying these howitzers under slung in the mountains. The process for acquisition of this class of helicopters has already commenced under the aegis of the air force. In fray are the American Chinook CH 47 and the Russian Mi-26. The requirement is to have four to five such units with 10 helicopters each at Command level to give the capability to the Theatre Commander to move up to a battalion, as well as for transporting / lifting heavy equipment / light guns intra-theatre including logistical support. The operational tasks and roles of this class of helicopters leave no doubt with regard to their ownership. Attack / armed helicopters: Mechanised warfare in the plains and desert terrain requires the integration of the third dimension with the mechanised forces in terms of attack and armed helicopters. These helicopters would also be required to undertake operations in the mountains – the Kargil conflict is an apt example where this weapon system was ideal for employment. However, the available Mi-25 / Mi-35 were not capable of operating at those altitudes. There is a requirement for each strike corps including in the mountains to have a dedicated, state-of-the-art attack helicopter unit. The pivot / holding corps in the plains and deserts should have armed helicopters / gunships as part of their aviation assets. This will provide a formidable weapon system to the force commander to be applied in the TBA.

New dimensions in tactical night operations as a direct result of sensor and avionics capabilities, with the ability to operate at low levels at night will yield great dividends. In view of the above what are the broad structures and force levels that the army aviation should possess to make it a potent arm of the Indian Army whereby its combat efficiency is enhanced to the maximum extent ? Armed ALH: The armed version of the ALH called the ALH Weapons Systems Integrated (ALH-WSI) has completed trials and is likely to enter service by end of this year. Though not a typical attack helicopter, it has an array of comparable weapons systems to include gun, rockets, air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles (ATGM). Integration of the weapons systems less the ATGM is currently going on at HAL. The indigenously produced Nag anti-tank missile (air version Helina), stated to be a third generation fire and forget missile, is not ready and not likely to be available in the near future. As an interim measure the army is planning to equip its initial armed ALH units with a suitable air-to-ground missile ex import. Trials for the same have been completed – in fray are the French PARS-3 and Israeli Spike ER. Thereafter, it is expected that the Helina would be ready for induction into the armed forces. The armed ALH units would be part of the key Pivot / Holding Corps, ideal for employment in the cold start strategy. Attack helicopters: This is the weakest link in the capability of the AAC. The meagre resources held – two units of attack helicopters Mi-25 / Mi-35, though under the nominal command of army, are in fact manned, controlled and operated by the air force. These helicopters of Russian origin are vintage, though a certain amount of upgrade has been carried out to make them night capable. The trials for their replacement have been completed. In fray are the American Apache Longbow AH 64D and the Russian Mi-28 (Havoc). Both are state-of-the-art modern day attack helicopters with an array of lethal weapon sub-systems to include guns, rockets, air to air and air to ground missiles as well as helmet mounted targeting systems and advanced

self-protection suite. The Apache has been extensively used in both the Iraq wars as well as Afghanistan. As per reports the Apache has been selected and the induction will commence soon to replace the existing Mi-25 / Mi-35 attack helicopters. In this context, the development of the light combat helicopter (LCH) by the HAL is a milestone achievement. The LCH aims to gatecrash the exclusive club of the state-of-the-art light attack helicopters which includes Eurocopter’s Tiger, Bell’s AH 1Z Super Cobra and China’s ultra secret Zhisheng 10 (Z-10). The LCH is a derivative of the ALH and the weaponised ALH. The LCH is being designed to be able to operate at high altitudes (16,000 feet), a distinct advantage over other attack helicopters and an asset for our mountain formations. Unlike the ALH the LCH will have tandem seating cockpit and stealth features, but will carry the same weapons package now being qualified on-board the ALH-WSI. The helicopter is expected to enter service by 2014. The LCH / Attack helicopter units will be the main punch of the land force commander and must form part of the Army Aviation Corps. Organisations: Army aviation needs to develop organisations that enhance aviation capabilities and are suitably tailored to meet the evolving operational requirements. Each Corps should have an Aviation Brigade to provide proper command and control and ensure optimal utilisation of all diverse aviation assets located within the Corps. In fact unlike the air force which operates out of their bases during war, army aviation units will require to operate from Forward Composite Aviation Bases which would cater for the security of helicopters as well as provide essential maintenance, fuelling and arming facilities. There would also be a requirement of some forward armament and refuelling points to be established in the forward zone for helicopters operating on specific missions, to cater for their replenishment in terms of fuel and ammunition. Infrastructure development: There is an urgent requirement to build suitable infrastructure and have it in

place to absorb the new equipment and organisations. Support services like air fields, air traffic control, met equipment, maintenance equipment etc. would also need upgrading and refurbishing. Lastly the most important facet, the training facilities for the training of aircrew and ground crew need modernisation. The importance of simulators for this purpose cannot be over emphasised. Currently the HAL in a joint venture with a Canadian firm (CAE) has come up with a full motion simulator for training of ALH pilots (civil / military). Keeping in mind the vast expansion plans of the AAC in the coming years and induction of sophisticated state-of-the-art equipment, the Simulators will be the way forward for future training methods as they are cost and time saving.

Conclusion The army aviation needs to play a vastly enhanced role in land operations in the coming years. This is only possible if the arm grows both quantitatively and qualitatively. The need is to create a dedicated and operational Army Aviation Corps capable of night operations, with aircrew who are not only proficient in flying but are associated full time with army manoeuvres, operational thinking and ground tactics as well as spend time in the field. Most of the modernisation plans for replacement / induction of new equipment are in the final stages. The biggest advantage the AAC has is the indigenous capability of the HAL to meet the bulk of its requirement in terms of helicopters and supporting systems like the ALH, ALH-WSI, LCH etc. For majority of the equipment to be inducted ex import the trials have been completed and decisions awaited. However, if any of these projects get stalled, specially the replacement of vintage Cheetah / Chetak helicopters, the modernisation plans will take a nosedive with disasterous consequences. The biggest challenge before the AAC is to be able to absorb the induction of this modern state-of-the-art equipment in the short period of time available – 2030.

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

INTERVIEW: Brazilian Army chief

INTERVIEW General Joaquim Silva e Luna Gen Silva e Luna became the Chief of the General Staff, Brazilian Army, on May 10th 2011. He was born in Barreiros, Pernambuco. He graduated from the Agulhas Negras Military Academy, in Resende, on December 16th 1972, as an Engineer Officer. His subsequent military education includes the Brazilian Army Junior Staff Course, the Command and General Staff Course and the Army War College. He also completed the Signal Officer Course and the Jungle Operations Course. Gen Silva e Luna earned a postgraduate degree in System Project and Analysis from the Brasilia University (UNB). In Israel, he completed the Basic Combat Course, Israel Defence Forces. He was an instructor at the Brazilian Army Junior Staff School and at the Command and General Staff College. He served as an Intelligence Officer at the Land Operations Command, Chief of the Press Section at the Army’s Public Affairs Centre and Chief of Cabinet at the Engineering Department. As a Colonel, he commanded the 6th Construction Engineering Battalion. As a General Officer, he commanded the 16th Jungle Infantry Brigade, both units located in the Amazon. He also served as the Real Property Assets Director and the Chief of Cabinet of the Army Commanding General. He participated as an Engineer Adviser in the Brazilian Military Instruction Mission in Paraguay and he was the Defence, Naval and Army Attaché to Israel. He has been awarded many national and foreign medals. Gen Luna was in India from 17th to 21st September 2012 and visited Delhi and South Western Command HQ at Jaipur. During his stay at Delhi he gave an exclusive interview to DSA. DSA: What is your agenda for this India visit? What are the issues you discussed with the Indian Army officials and what are the areas you foresee where Brazilian and Indian Armies and industry can cooperate and add value? Gen Luna: We discussed the following:

Today, the proximity between the countries already allows exploratory missions of the Ministries of Defence to visit the industrial and technological park to identify the best opportunities for cooperation in the defence industry sector India is very advanced in the area of cybernetics (in security issues for Information Technology and software development). There is great interest from Brazil in this area

• Ground weapons systems; ballistic and tactical missiles; Cyber sector; Area of communications and electronic warfare; Collective and individual equipment; Vehicles; Future soldier. • Exchange between the high studies schools (War College, Army Command and General Staff College); Postgraduate studies exchange (Military Engineering Institute) and •

Exchange in Peacekeeping Operations areas.

DSA: Recently Brazil has asked India to help train its space scientists for its space programme. The Brazilian National Security Advisor has proposed that the Brazilian scientists should be trained at ISRO (Indian Space Research Organisation) for the remote sensing data earth station set up by India in Brazil. What are your views on this? Gen Luna: Any cooperation in Science and Technology is positive. There are programmes for fellowships abroad. The issue involves the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Defence and the Brazilian Air Force and is beyond the scope of the Brazilian Army.

DSA: We are partners in a tri-nation South-South grouping, IBSA or India-Brazil-South Africa that connects the peoples of three important nations from Asia, South America and Africa. How important is this alliance or partnership to Brazil? How do you see this relationship maturing in the years ahead? Gen Luna: A review of the international conjuncture allows foreseeing that in not so distant future, IBSA, considered as political-economic group, will be the 3rd or 4th largest economy on the planet. This stresses the political significance of the selection of defence products projects branded “IBSA” emblematic of South-South cooperation, more than just a partnership between two or three of those countries, or products developed with cooperation among them.

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi, Editor-in-Chief DSA magazine, presenting the August 2012 issue of DSA to Gen Joaquim Silva e Luna, the Chief of the General Staff, Brazilian Army. The tripartite cooperation in Defence should take place not only in terms of industrial exchange, but also scientific and technological, with the participation of students from the three countries. They should have the opportunity to enroll in programmes in the areas of knowledge related to the selected projects. Today, the proximity between the countries already allows exploratory missions of the Ministries of Defence to visit the industrial and technological park to identify the best opportunities for cooperation in the defence industry sector. Brazilian Army has established strategic priorities in areas related to the Border Monitoring Integrated System (SISFRON), to the New Family of Brazilian Army Armoured Vehicles (Medium and Light) (GUARANI), New Capabilities for Fire Support (ASTROS 2020) and the Integrated System for Protection of Strategic Ground Structures (PROTEGER). For example, the ORBISAT radar, the AVIBRAS missile system, the Cyber Defence Centre and the Software-Defined Radio (SDR) can benefit from such cooperation. The maturing of the mutual approach will strengthen ties in defence. It will also be possible to strengthen the links relating to peacekeeping missions – individual and troops (today India is in the 3rd place, Brazil in the 11th and South Africa is in the 14th place in the ranking of troops contributing countries). India is very advanced in the area of cybernetics (in security issues for Information Technology and software development). There is great interest from Brazil in this area. DSA: If we talk about Modernisation of the Indian Army, what are the cutting edge technologies which Brazil can offer to Indian Army? What can Brazil offer to improve Indian Army Aviation?

The Army Aviation Instruction Centre provides the necessary equipment, such as training aircraft and simulators, which allow the excellent training and development of the crew. We know the Indian Army Aviation’s excellence and we clearly see possibilities of mutual cooperation

Gen Luna: The Brazilian Army, just as the Indian Army, has traditionally supported the technological development of the country. Army institutions, such as the Military Engineering Institute, pioneered technology teaching and have developed high technology engineering projects. The Brazilian Army has great experience in construction, electronic equipment, military equipment, weapons and nuclear power. The Army Technological Centre assesses and conducts projects on equipment of interest to the Army, such as the GUARANI

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

Brazilian Army has established strategic priorities in areas related to the Border Monitoring Integrated System (SISFRON), to the New Family of Brazilian Army Armoured Vehicles (Medium and Light) (GUARANI), New Capabilities for Fire Support (ASTROS 2020) and the Integrated System for Protection of Strategic Ground Structures (PROTEGER). For example, the ORBISAT radar, the AVIBRAS missile system, the Cyber Defence Centre and the Software-Defined Radio (SDR) can benefit from such cooperation. The maturing of the mutual approach will strengthen ties in defence

INTERVIEW: Brazilian Army chief armoured vehicle, anti-tank missiles, radios, small weapons and light weapons. Cyber Defence requires software know-how. Computer engineers are on the frontline at the Cyber Defence Centre, as indicated by the National Strategy of Defence directives. The Brazilian Army Aviation was created in the 1980s. In more than 30 years, it has acquired great experience in flights over the continent, due to sophisticated governance, based on certified maintenance provided by manufacturers. Crews are well trained both for the flight itself and for military deployments. The Aviation counts many hours of flight, with low rates of crashes or minor accidents. The Army Aviation Instruction Centre provides the necessary equipment, such as training aircraft and simulators, which allow the excellent training and development of the crew. We know the Indian Army Aviation’s excellence and we clearly see possibilities of mutual cooperation. DSA: Brazil and India are members of the BRICS group of emerging powers (along with China, Russia and South Africa). What should be the “strategic priorities” of both the countries? Gen Luna: The BRICS concept, created by economists, allows the approach of regional powers.

Brazil and India have their own perceptions within their regions. Their approach is suitable and provides various opportunities for commercial and knowledge exchanges. We continue in the process of identifying the best partnership opportunities in order to develop them. DSA: During your Defence Minister, Mr Celso Amorim’s visit to India, he discussed naval cooperation with his Indian counterpart, particularly plans to build aircraft carriers and Scorpene-class submarines, in addition to expand exchanges between military academies of the two countries. May we have your kind views on this? Gen Luna: Like the Indian Army, the Brazilian Army has great tradition and experience in high level military education. At the graduation level, the Agulhas Negras Military Academy and the Military Engineering Institute originated in the 19th century. The Command and General Staff College and the War College are strategic military thought centres, they educate officers for high level decision-making positions. The Army military schools receive officers from friendly nations in cooperation exchanges, strengthening relationships and enhancing doctrinal evolution. DSA: There is a school of thought that the world is transiting from a Unipolar world order to a Multipolar world where India and Brazil will be some of the future poles of power. Do you agree with this formulation and in what time frame do you see this transition to multipolarity. What can India and Brazil do to hasten and cement such a global trend? Your comments. Gen Luna: The world order is in continuous evolution. A position of relevance in the international community will result from the effort of our countries. The economic growth of both countries allows better meeting the needs of the respective populations. After all, what everybody wishes is living a better life. In this process, many challenges will be faced. I understand that it is necessary to have answers to the upcoming demands. I see new responsibilities in the world panorama as natural results of development. Brazil wishes stability and peace in the South American Continent. For this, Brazil has had a close relationship with all South American countries, with the strategy of cooperation.

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

right ecosystem

Aerospace Industry: Manufacturing Challenges

here are a number of aeronautics organisations like HAL, NAL, DRDO laboratories, engineering colleges etc. in the country. Moreover, the sector is divided into defence and non-defence segments. With the entry of private companies, an institutional arrangement becomes necessary which could harness the knowledge residing in these various entities. Such an institution could map indigenous capabilities, identify knowledge gaps, direct resources efficiently to address critical technology gaps. The offset policy can become a significant contributor and catalyst to the development of the Indian aerospace sector. The successful implementation of offset policies of countries like Brazil and South Korea provides some encouragement of a similar success in India.

The columnist is President and Chief Executive Officer, New Ventures, Reliance Industries Limited and Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation. Earlier he was Vice President and Country Head, Boeing Defence Space and Security and had also served as Managing Director of Boeing Commercial Airplanes in India. Prior to Boeing he worked for Raytheon and with NASA Ames Research Center in various multidisciplinary engineering fields. He has his PhD in Aerospace Engineering from Wichita State University in Kansas and his MBA from City University in Washington. He served as Chairman of the Defence Committee of the Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM). He also served as the Chairman, Defence Equipment Committee, AMCHAM and is on the panel of the FICCI Defence Task Force. He had the distinct honour of representing 2,500 companies as Regional President of the Indo-American Chamber of Commerce, the only US-India bilateral chamber. In April 2012, he has been appointed as Chairman of the Indo-US Strategic Dialogue by the Indo-American Chamber of Commerce. The columnist has recently been appointed Co-Chair of the FICCI Homeland Security Committee along with Sh Gopal Pillai, Former Home Secretary, Government of India.

Dr Vivek Lall

erospace manufacturing is a high technology and capital intensive industry. Its value chain is characterised by a long project life cycle spanning R&D, engineering design, manufacturing, assembly, maintenance, repair and overhaul. Intensive technology and safety requirements require significant investments in R&D and quality control.

Traditionally, most aerospace OEM value chain activities were conducted in the domestic market – engineering and R&D activities were almost exclusively done in the home market. Most manufacturing also took place in the home market with selected sourcing of complete components like aeroengines from foreign suppliers. Similarly, MRO and service parts distribution facilities were also established in home market, with some secondary international service centres.

Global supply chain However, with the need to cut costs and deliver products faster, aerospace design, development and production globally continues to undergo significant change. Firms producing commercial aircraft have reduced development time drastically through computer-aided design and drafting (CADD), which allows firms to design and test an entire aircraft, including the individual parts, by computer; the specifications of these parts can be sent electronically to subcontractors around the world who use them to produce the parts. Increasingly, firms bring together teams composed of customers, engineers and production workers to pool ideas and make decisions concerning the aircraft at every phase of product development. OEMs are increasingly making use of a global supply chain. There are various other reasons for this – lower trade barriers, falling communication and transport costs, the emergence of global service firms and talent shortage in home markets. Today, OEMs are not only farming out a big chunk of machined and sheet metal parts production, but also expecting vendors to supply large aircraft subassemblies and even design expertise.

When we look at India, we see most elements of the ‘ecosystem’ in place. Overthenext decades India undoubtedly has the potential to become a significant part of the global aerospace supply chain that India offers cost advantages of between 15 to 25 per cent in manufacturing, depending on the type of component. Indian industry today has the technological capabilities to undertake complex manufacturing required for the sector – indeed there has been a remarkable growth of this sector, as a large number of private players have entered the sector While OEMs have been looking at leveraging manufacturing and service capabilities across various countries, some countries have made focused effort to scale up their capabilities in manufacturing and services. Not every market is equally well-positioned to develop a robust aerospace industry. When we look specifically at ‘aerospace ecosystem’ – factors like the supply and quality of engineers, the supply and cost of blue collar workforce, the depth of the supply chain and the potential to reach critical mass is important. However, infrastructure and government support are critical inputs for success.

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

Different countries and governments have taken different approaches to develop their aerospace industry – some countries have begun to specialise more within a particular tier and potentially around particular systems of types of technology. That means that industry clusters may develop around a system or type of technology, like aerostructures, engines, interiors, avionics, control systems or landing gear and potentially also focusing on a particular platform type.

The JV Guidelines issued by the Ministry of Defence early this year has articulated a set of guidelines for establishing JV companies by the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) with companies in India and abroad. The major emphasis of the Guidelines is on institutionalising the outsourcing part of the existing orders of the DPSUs to the private sector or foreign companies, with the aim to ensure that contract execution becomes faster. One hopes that the private industry will have a bigger role to play in aircraft projects in the years to come On the other hand, some countries have adopted an integrated approach to the aerospace sector, encompassing comprehensive manufacturing to MRO services through collaboration agreements with global OEMs to leverage the expertise necessary for a high-tech, end-to-end technology and manufacturing base.

Private players When we look at India, we see most elements of the ‘ecosystem’ in place. Over the next decades India undoubtedly has the potential to become a significant part of the global aerospace supply chain, that India offers cost advantages of between 15 to 25 per cent in manufacturing, depending on the type of component. Indian industry today has the technological capabilities to undertake complex manufacturing required for the sector – indeed there has been a remarkable growth of this sector, as a large number of private players have entered the sector. However, the SMEs face hurdles due to the high capital cost, low volumes and long gestation period of projects.

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

right ecosystem

Aerospace manufacturing is a high technology and capital intensive industry. Its value chain is characterised by a long project life cycle spanning R&D, engineering design, manufacturing, assembly, maintenance, repair and overhaul. Intensive technology and safety requirements require significant investments in R&D and quality control The success of the Republic of Korea and Taiwan in developing their technology shows the importance of technology transfer. In the early phase of their development, they acquired technology from overseas. Now, with their ability to master foreign technology, they are not only the most advanced among developing countries, but also major suppliers of high technology goods to the world. Technology can be transferred to Indian industry through various channels: production linkages in the form of subcontracting arrangements; technical licensing agreements; the import of intermediate and capital goods; training; technical consultancies by consulting firms; or simply from the migration of workers. There are a number of aeronautics organisations like HAL, NAL, DRDO laboratories,engineering colleges etc. in the country. Moreover, the sector is divided into defence and non-defence segments. With the entry of private companies, an institutional arrangement becomes necessary which could harness the knowledge residing in these various entities. Such an institution could map indigenous capabilities, identify knowledge gaps, direct resources efficiently to address critical technology gaps.

Everything that goes into making an aircraft, from the screws to the engine components, has to meet stringent quality controls for safety. Any compromise on quality, which in other industries may be inconvenient, can be fatal in aerospace We need to establish an organisation at the central level that articulates our vision for aerospace manufacturing sector and then acts as facilitator for investments and coordinates various activities and initiatives towards that goal. We can expand this further: What should be India’s vision for this sector? The organisation should articulate whether India should take an integrated approach to aerospace manufacturing, or, should we look at our areas of strength and concentrate our efforts on certain systems or components? This organisation can act as a facilitator to investors for obtaining requisite permissions and approvals like the Industrial License, FIPB approval for foreign partnership, export clearances etc.

Transfer of technology We know the importance of technology and the need for ToT especially in developing our aerospace manufacturing capabilities. However, just transfer of technology is not adequate – we have to build the ability to innovate. For this we require a very strong technical manpower base. With its educational and research institutions India has an inherent advantage (over 380 universities, 11,200 colleges and 1,500 research institutions), India has the second largest pool of scientists and engineers in the world. Every year, over 2.5 million graduates are added to the workforce, including 3,00,000 engineers and 1,50,000 IT professionals. This human resource pool can give an advantage in this sector. However, the quality of graduates being qualified by these institutes remains a subject of concern. Several educational institutes are setting up aeronautical departments, but active involvement of the government, as well as the private sector is required to develop industry specific courses that are relevant and effective. This is where a central coordinating body can play an important role. India so far has been restricted mainly to a Tier-3 supplier to the industry with a focus of low-tech design and engineering services. Also, currently India imports most the raw material for manufacturing. There is an urgent need for the industry to take a long-term strategic view and develop capabilities in new material technologies for the development of composites. Getting certifications for processes and parts is a challenge for India-based suppliers. It is also a deterrent for OEMs to outsource some of their components to India, since approvals for parts / components made in India can sometimes take too long eroding cost efficiency. If the industry is to grow, the quality and robustness of the certification organisations – CEMILAC and DGCA – also need to be strengthened. The certification process is both complex and expensive and the government needs to step in with schemes to create awareness among SMEs and also part finance the process.

Quality assurance Everything that goes into making an aircraft, from the screws to the engine components, has to meet stringent quality controls for safety. Any compromise on quality, which in other industries may be inconvenient, can be fatal in aerospace. As a result, constant and stringent quality assurance is another critical requirement of the aerospace industry. Manufacturers must meet strict quality standards to guarantee parts are of high quality material for safety and durability and made to precise specifications. Directorate General of Aeronautical Quality Assurance (DGAQA) performs this function for the defence sector; DGCA is responsible for the non-defence sector. While quality control in Indian manufacturing has improved significantly, a mature

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

supplier base is still being developed in the country. Both organisations need to be strengthened and scaled up and to create awareness amongst SMEs, the government needs to support the industry by launching schemes.

What should be India’s vision for this sector? The organisation should articulate whether India should take an integrated approach to aerospace manufacturing, or, should we look at our areas of strength and concentrate our efforts on certain systems or components? From quality assurance perspective too, creating clusters makes greater economic sense in this industry. Such enclaves or zones may be set up with the requisite infrastructure like airfields and traffic free air space. The opportunities for the domestic industry that offsets will bring in, can be efficiently utilised in such zones. The aerospace manufacturing sector in India is fragmented. There are various organisations in public and private sector and often one organisation does not know what the others are doing, the capabilities and knowledge residing with them. There is information gap between the defence and non-defence sectors. DRDO and HAL are predominantly confined to the defence sector while NAL and other civilian aerospace companies remain insulated from the developments in the defence sector. If a mechanism is put in place that facilitates greater interaction among the two sectors, it will bring about synergies yielding benefits to all. Similary, various aeronautics organisations like HAL, NAL, DRDO laboratories, engineering colleges etc. are divided into defence and non-defence segments. Private companies have also entered the arena in a significant way and an institutional arrangement becomes necessary which could harness the knowledge residing in these entities. Once there is active engagement of stakeholders, it could facilitate formulation of a national aeronautics policy to strengthen the aerospace industry.

OEMs are increasingly making use of a global supply chain. There are various other reasons for this - lower trade barriers, falling communication and transport costs, the emergence of global service firms and talent shortage in home markets. Today, OEMs are not only farming out a big chunk of machined and sheet metal parts production, but also expecting vendors to supply large aircraft subassemblies and even design expertise

JV guidelines As most of the work in aerospace manufacturing has traditionally been done by government organisations, the PPP model by forming JVs should be encouraged in order to fully exploit their knowledge base coupled with entrepreneurship of the private sector. The JV Guidelines issued by the Ministry of Defence early this year has articulated a set of guidelines for establishing JV companies by the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) with companies in India and abroad. The major emphasis of the Guidelines is on institutionalising the outsourcing part of the existing orders of the DPSUs to the private sector or foreign companies, with the aim to ensure that contract execution becomes faster. One hopes that the private industry will have a bigger role to play in aircraft projects in the years to come. This will lead to an expansion of aeronautical industrial base in the country and help make the Indian aviation sector efficient. The offset policy can become a significant contributor and catalyst to the development of the Indian aerospace sector. The successful implementation of offset policies of countries like Brazil and South Korea provides some encouragement of a similar success in India. The Defence Offset Guidelines issued this year provide clarity and have made offset obligation less onerous to the OEM through a number of provisions. Synergy between offsets in the defence and civil aviation sectors needs to be developed through effective mechanisms.

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

MARITIME MUSCLE

Cmde Ranjit Bhawnani Rai (retd) The writer is a former Director Naval Intelligence and Director Naval Operations. Presently he is Vice President of Indian Maritime Foundation, New Delhi.

Both the Indian Navy and the Chinese PLA(N) are racing to become true blue water navies, India with the arrival of INS Vikramaditya with MiG-29Ks and PLA(N) with the 65,000 ton Liaoning (Varyag) though details are not forthcoming of which fighter aircraft the Chinese refitted carrier will operate. Both carriers will be STOBAR, i.e. short take-off and arrestor landing and the INS Vikramaditya has taken a lead with ten proven arrestor landings in the sea trials in the White Sea off Russia

he current aircraft carriers are a new class of ships, requiring an entirely new approach to shipbuilding and are on a scale unlike anything constructed before. Developing the aircraft carrier building culture where thousands of workers are on-board and in doing so creating an environment where different suppliers of equipment can work with each other and alongside the navy which is the customer, has to be a planned success. It’s a credit to everyone involved that the Indian Navy and the shipbuilding has taken the challenge. The additions of INS Vikramaditya in 2013 ( since delayed for delivery due to boiler brick work damage during high speed delivery trials in the Barents Sea) and later ADS INS Vikrant to Indian Naval Aviation fold will enable the navy to strengthen and climb higher heights In Service of the nation.

f Britain (read India) as a nation is going to be able to continue to engage in world affairs to be able to go where the causes of conflict and hardship are developing and do something about it and not just wait until the effects hit us at home, then it needs the tools for the job … Lead speaker introducing The Aircraft Carrier Conclave. The above lines extracted from a speech in 1986 in UK sum up the importance of aircraft carriers for a nation. Large Ocean spaces require vast swathes of sea areas to be covered from the air for any naval power to operate with impunity and to gain superiority called ‘sea control’. Hence air power of USA over the seas was major factor in the victory in the Second World War and continues to be vital for most offensive operations for large navies. In peacetime a large platform is a boon for evacuation and expeditionary operations of personnel or humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) and to show the flag and exert influence. This makes naval aviation an integral element of any large navy. This capability is factored in to India’s naval maritime strategy and doctrines. Fortunately for India, naval aviation was introduced early into the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) soon after Independence with Sealand flights at Cochin and Sulur in South India with Indian naval pilots where Royal Navy had operated in the war. Indian naval aviation ambitions were reinforced by Lord Earl Mountbatten soon after Independence. Mountbatten scripted the long term plan for the Indian Navy and included three aircraft carriers in the template, to enable two carriers to be operational at any one time on each coast and asked for the 19,500 ton HMS Hercules to be transferred to the Indian Navy

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

INDIAN NAVAL AVIATION:

THE WAY AHEAD

in 1961. The carrier was fitted with arrestor wires for hook landings and equipped with catapult launched Seahawk jet fighters and French turbo-prop Breguet Alize. The Alize were equipped with a radar for surveillance and ARRAR EW antennae to pick up transmissions, anti-submarine sonar buoys and attack capabilities which ensured that Indian Naval Aviation was in tune with the more modern navies in 1960s. The Hercules was commissioned accident free as INS Vikrant in record time in UK and worked up off Malta and set the stage for the future of naval aviation in the IN by setting a high bar which has been maintained. The INS Vikrant arrived at Ballard Pier in Bombay in 1961 to be received by Prime Minister Pandit Nehru, Vice Admiral R D Katari and Fleet Commander Rear Admiral B S Soman and it was the day that marked the emergence of the Indian Navy aspiring to possess blue water capabilities. This writer was Flag Sub Lt to Admiral Soman and had joined the Vikrant 200 miles off Mumbai with the custom clearing party and saw the crowds cheer as the ship proudly sailed into then Bombay. The high point of INS Vikrant was that she served alongside the Indian Air Force in the skies in the Eastern Theatre in the 1971 Bangladesh war to ensure the Pakistani Air Force was decimated within the first three days of that war. Today the war horse is a floating museum in Mumbai, with plans to be grouted off Sunk Rock at the entrance to Mumbai harbour. The Indian Navy needed a replacement aircraft carrier to keep alive, hard learned aviation operations which takes years to assimilate and settled on the 24,500 ton HMS Hermes of Falklands war fame the British called a through deck cruiser, which successfully operated the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) BAe Sea Harriers.

The Hermes was renamed INS Viraat and was commissioned in UK in 1987 and received off Bombay in monsoon seas by PM Rajiv Gandhi in the same year with a flying demo of Sea King and Sea Harriers in choppy waters. Rajiv Gandhi an experienced pilot admired and was impressed with the proficiency of the UK trained Indian naval pilots. The ship has served well and has been refitted with new radars, a new CIC and upgraded accommodation and Barak anti-missile system. The grand old carrier and Sea Harriers are now aging, but will serve till 2014-15 and give way to the INS Vikramaditya (Ex Admiral Gorshkov). INS Viraat’s high point was when it joined the nuclear powered USS Nimitz and Kitty Hawk in Malabar-07 in multinational exercises in the Bay of Bengal

off Visakhapatnam in September 2007 and surprised US aviators in the operations. Soon the Indian Navy can be dubbed a true ‘Blue Water Navy’, when the 44,000 ton fully worked up INS ViKamraditya joins the fleet in early 2013 (since delayed for delivery due to boiler brick work damage during high speed delivery trials in the Barents Sea).

Besides the PSUs, large firms like Godrej, Larsen and Tubro Ltd and Tatas and many small suppliers of sub-systems of aviation equipment around Bangalore can gain immensely with their participation

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

MARITIME MUSCLE

A ‘Blue Water Navy’ is defined as a navy that can operate in whatever part of the adjacent Oceans it wants with surface escorts and submarines and replenishment tankers and for as long it wants. Blue water navies exercise sea control as opposed to ‘sea denial’. The underlying principle in sea control is that a navy can control only what it can patrol and reconnoiter, otherwise a navy has to rely on anti-access capability which the Indian Navy has with a large missile force especially when its sole aircraft carrier is not operational. Sea control also needs well equipped maritime reconnaissance (MR) aircraft support and composite air power with fighters at sea to prosecute aerial and surface targets at distances beyond missile range. Both the Indian Navy and the Chinese PLA(N) are racing to become true blue water navies, India with the arrival of INS Vikramaditya with MiG-29Ks and PLA(N) with the 65,000 ton Liaoning (Varyag) though details are not forthcoming of which fighter aircraft the Chinese refitted carrier will operate. Both carriers will be STOBAR, i.e. short take-off and arrestor landing and the INS Vikramaditya has taken a lead with ten proven arrestor landing in the sea trials in the White Sea off Russia.

equipment around Bangalore can gain immensely with their participation, as they are already suppliers to the air force. Indian war shipbuilding can come of age with this challenge if steered well. It is the cross experience of these advanced projects that will benefit the shipbuilding industry, the navy and the nation in the long term.

Indian Navy’s indigenous aircraft carrier story

INS Vikramaditya for blue water capability

Aircraft carriers are expensive machines to operate for the fuel the platform consumes especially at high speed when the carrier turns in to the wind to generate wind on deck for take-offs and planes too consume costly aviation fuel. US and French navies have nuclear powered carriers. It was in 2003 that the government first sanctioned the design and construction of the indigenous Air Defence Ship (ADS), a misnomer for an aircraft carrier employed to ward off IAF’s objections to the navy’s carrier project. Many skeptics had raised objections calling carrier a ‘white elephant’ and the steps delayed the project. The IAF in one of its concept studies had underscored that the Su-30 MKI could perform the tasks of a carrier at sea cheaper and tabled it to the government. In early 2000 the already sanctioned amount of Rs 3,261 crore (US$ 600 million) for the indigenous aircraft carrier project stood suspended, which project commenced in 2007 is now budgeted at over Rs 7,000 crore and escalating for the 37,500 ton STOBAR new INS Vikrant (ADS) under construction at the Cochin Shipyard Ltd. The final cost due to delays beyond 2015 is bound to see escalation as the cost of the MIG-29Ks air complement from Russia, is likely to be higher with depreciation of the rupee.

The tentative date for commissioning / handing over of INS Vikramaditya which has cost the nation US$ 2.3 billion is 4th December, 2012, which is ‘Navy Day’ and arrangements have been made in India for guarantee support with agencies of the Russian OEMs like Krasny Marine and Rosboron service as has been the practice. The ship will arrive Indian waters in 2013 (since delayed for delivery). The CCS-MKII communications and Link II/X command and control systems are from Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL) with allied EW suites. Vladimir ‘Vovick’ Karnozov and Leonov, the construction managers of Project 11430 aircraft carrier at Sevmash yard worked overtime goaded by a visit by President Putin to maintain delivery schedules.

The construction of an aircraft carrier which is heavier on one side with super structure on its starboard side, is technologically challenging and is the most prestigious and ambitious shipbuilding project which the Indian Navy and Indian shipyards have taken up for the first time. Fincantieri is assisting in the gear box and LM-2500 assembly, which is similar to the Italian carrier Cavour but the spinoffs to civil industry for ancillary supplies and sub-contracts is proving beneficial, like the Leander project of shipbuilding has been for India’s maritime industry since the 1970s. Besides the PSUs, large firms like Godrej, Larsen and Tubro Ltd and Tatas and many small suppliers of sub-systems of aviation

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

The underlying principle in sea control is that a navy can control only what it can patrol and reconnoiter, otherwise a navy has to rely on anti-access capability which the Indian Navy has with a large missile force especially when its sole aircraft carrier is not operational The inputs for support and compartments in respect of MiG-29K will be provided by the Russian side who will also assist in the associated design work for aviation facilities such as Flight Deck, Hangar, Aircraft Lifts, Ammunition Lifts, Aircraft Launch and Recovery systems etc. The Indian Navy will have the experience from the operation and long refitting of INS Vikramaditya in Russia, which was overseered by Indian naval officers and men.

The training programme for the officers and ship’s company has been extensive and detailed for 632 out of the total 1,400 on-board. The key training modules were kept at 27 for the commanding officer and air element officers, 23 for engineering and 15 for electrical officers and 12 for NBCD specialists. The 118 senior and junior weapon sailors, 280 engineering mechanics and 157 maintenance and automation maintainers underwent shorter courses, many at the village of Pushkin near St Petersburg. The rest of the crew would be provided ‘on-board training’ to operate and maintain the Vikramaditya when she is in commission. INS Vikramaditya will take the place of INS Viraat and its powerful 12 twin RD33MK engine fitted MiG-29Ks which will operate off the Vikramaditya’s deck and are true 4th generation multirole fighters that the Indian Navy chose from the original Su-33. The planes are fitted with the powerful Zhuk ME multi-mode radar, OLS multiple MFDs with nine weapon stations which can load K-73 and RVV-AE BVR missiles, bombs and KH-35 Uran anti-ship missiles, which the Indian Navy has in numbers for its ships and Kilo submarines. The pilot’s task has

been made easier with quadruple fly by wire FADEC controls and a ‘Topsight-E’ Helmet-mounted sight for target designation. This makes the flying platform quite different from the MiG-29s that the Indian Air Force acquired in the 1980s. The 4,800 kg fuel tank can give the plane over 35 minutes on task with full load in tropical conditions and more, with lighter loads. For self-protection and light actions the plane has the single sided GShSh 30 mm fast firing gun. For missile warning the indigenous Tarang RWR and an Elta supplied ASPJ is fitted. The embarking pilots already in date with carrier flying have arrived at INS Hansa at Goa and the squadron has been commissioned and the fighters are being tested and flown by the Indian naval pilots who have been trained in USA on US aircraft carriers for straight take-off with arrested landing (STOBAR) and with Indian Air Force MiG-29s. INS Vikramaditya will also have a complement of five Ka-31 AEW and the ship has been fitted with the massive 3D Salyut JSC Podberezovik ET2 radar antenna for early air and surface warning and direction of aircraft, which will be an asset to the fleet for BrahMos targeting by the linked KA-31s. The Indian Navy eagerly looks to the successful sea trials of the ‘Brave as the Sun’ Vikramaditya and her joining the fleet so that the Indian Navy can call itself a true ‘Blue Water Navy’ and in due course the ADS from Cochin will also join.

Conclusion The current aircraft carriers are a new class of ships, requiring an entirely new approach to shipbuilding and are on a scale unlike anything constructed before. Developing the aircraft carrier building culture where thousands of workers are on-board and in doing so creating an environment where different suppliers of equipment can work with each other and alongside the navy which is the customer, has to be a planned success. That sort of change does not come naturally in Indian shipyards building ships on cost plus basis and it requires considerable change in thinking and approach, but it’s a credit to everyone involved that the Indian Navy and the shipbuilding has taken the challenge. The additions of INS Vikramaditya in 2013 (since delayed for delivery) and later ADS INS Vikrant to Indian Naval Aviation fold will enable the navy to strengthen and climb higher heights In-service of the nation, as the navy chants its motto, Shano Varuna, translated ‘may the Sea God and Seas be kind unto us.’

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

THE ERA OF THE CSGs?

Projection of Power Aircraft Carriers in

“ When word of crisis breaks out in Washington, it’s no accident the first question that comes to everyone’s lips is: where is the nearest carrier? ” — Bill Clinton

Rear Adm (Dr) S Kulshrestha (retd) The writer joined Indian Navy in the year 1975 and was awarded Silver Medal at the Naval Academy, the Telescope and the Sword of Honour for being adjudged the best Naval Officer during initial training. He did his specialisation in Quality Assurance of Naval Armament and adorned various key appointments at Naval Command Headquarters, DRDO establishments, Ordnance Factories and finally rose to become the Director General of Naval Armament Inspection (DGNAI) at the Integrated Headquarters of Ministry of Defence (Navy). He is an alumnus of the prestigious National Defence College (NDC). He has superannuated from Indian Navy in 2011. He has been writing in defence journals on issues related to Armament technology and indigenisation.

A CSG is a sovereign territory of the country to which it belongs and can position itself in international waters in close vicinity of expected conflict zones. This provides it with tremendous flexibility of operations and makes it a powerful diplomatic negotiating tool. It can declare presence, project power ashore or actively associate in stabilising a conflict environment. Thus the CSG has at its disposal, about 9 / 10 ships, 70 / 80 aircraft and about 7,500 / 8,000 trained naval complement to accomplish its designated task.

researcher at the Chinese Naval Research Institute, Senior Captain Li Jie has said “Aircraft carriers are incomparable and cannot be replaced by other weapons; “ …”If a big power wants to become a strong power, it has to develop aircraft carriers.” Secretary of Defence Robert Gates requested Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead and Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz to explore how US air and naval forces could combine and integrate their capabilities to confront increasingly complex threats to US freedom of action. The 2010 Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) as part of its guidance to rebalance the force, directed the development of the air-sea battle concept to defeat adversaries across the range of military operations, including adversaries equipped with sophisticated anti-access and area denial capabilities.

n the Asia Pacific region, currently there are only two regional powers which have been operating aircraft carriers, namely India and Thailand. The Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning has been launched on 25 September 2012 and in the words of Rear Admiral Yang Yi, the carrier will be “mainly responsible for scientific research and training missions.” A few words about a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) would be in order at this stage. An aircraft carrier is akin to a mobile naval air station along with 70 to 80 fighters, bombers and support aircraft, which can sail to any place on the earth within a span of about two weeks travelling 650 to 700 nm per day. An aircraft carrier is however vulnerable to attacks from air, sea and underwater and therefore it normally travels with a protective escort comprising of two guided missile destroyers capable of firing missiles like the Tomahawk, two destroyers, a frigate, two submarines and a supply ship. This group of ships along with the aircraft carrier is called a CSG. The composition of a CSG is however mission centric and can vary depending upon the situation and foreseeable threats that may be encountered. A CSG does not need permissions from any sovereign power for landing / overflying its aircraft, when it is operating in international waters. A CSG is a sovereign territory of the country to which it belongs and can position itself in international waters in close vicinity of expected conflict zones. This provides it with tremendous flexibility of operations and makes it a powerful diplomatic negotiating tool. It can declare presence, project power ashore or actively associate in stabilising a conflict environment. Thus the CSG has at its disposal, about 9 / 10 ships, 70 / 80 aircraft and about 7,500 / 8,000 trained naval complement to accomplish its designated task. The air element of the carrier comprises of strike fighter jets (eg F/A-18 Hornet), fighter jets for gaining air superiority (eg F-14 Tomcat), an electronic warfare aircraft (eg EA-6B Prowler), a tactical warning and control system aircraft (eg E-2C Hawkeye), A subsonic antisubmarine jet aircraft (eg S-3B Viking) and an ASW /SAR helicopter (eg SH-60 Sea Hawk). A CSG is a formidable awe inspiring force centre representing its country and that is one of the reasons why China shelved its plans to convert Varyag into a floating casino and has instead refurbished it for naval use. A researcher at the Chinese Naval Research Institute, Senior Captain Li Jie has said “Aircraft carriers are incomparable and cannot be replaced by other weapons; “ …”If a big power wants to become a strong power, it has to develop aircraft carriers.” Needless to state that when Varyag becomes operational and if it is deployed in South China fleet it will considerably shift the balance of power in the territorially disputed region. It is an established fact that nations build-up large navies to protect their flourishing sea trade and not the other way round, therefore it would be of interest to get a perspective into economics of the region with reference to oil imports and reserves as well as trade data pertaining to the

from the Sea Asia Pacific Region

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United States and South Asian countries. Further it is also necessary to take a look at the access denial perception that the US has about China which would provide clarity into the reasons why the United States has announced a prominent Asia Pacific shift with practically no cuts in the Naval Budget and also as to why China is forging ahead with its plan to build a truly blue water navy.

Economic factors that warrant a continuous maritime presence and projection The South East Asian Region is predominantly maritime region, with maritime issues taking centre stage in bilateral and multilateral dialogues between SE Asian countries. The geography of the region makes it very problematic to delineate the maritime boundaries of the countries, with the result that only about 20 per cent of the boundaries have been marked till date. As far as EEZs are concerned hardly any progress has been made so far. The islands in the region constitute a major cause of unresolved sovereignty disputes especially in the South China Sea; other examples in the region include northern Malacca straits, eastern approaches to Singapore Straits and Ambalat region east of Borneo. All these have a bearing on the current and future economic development of the region as well as triggering a disruption to vital oil supplies to China, Japan and other countries east of Malacca. Even though sea piracy has declined considerably, issues like trafficking of drugs, arms and people, maritime terrorism, marine pollution etc continue to plague the seas. The areas of concern are the Northern Malacca Straits, southern part of South China Sea, the Riau Archipelago and the Sulu Archipelago. These areas are put under surveillance by maritime and air patrols (including UAVs) in addition to the shore based coastal radars. A glance at the oil and gas imports in the region in the last 10 years as per the table below reveals the phenomenal growth of oil imports by South Asian countries and the fact that all this oil has to transit through the SLOCs in this region. World Imports of Petroleum Products by Country COUNTRY Australia China Hong Kong India Japan New Zealand Singapore Others

1960 25.2 38.6 23.8 30.0 54.5 38.1 100.1 189.3

2007 252.9 680.8 364.5 415.2 954.2 50.7 1648.5 2084.6

2008 337.3 803.5 330.8 408.1 933.5 44.3 1978.2 2275.9

(Thousand barrels per day)

2009 339.0 777.2 388.9 283.0 829.3 44.7 2210.3 2261.5

2010 303.8 835.2 432.5 325.7 929.7 36.2 2214.8 2265.6

2011 334.2 960.1 398.8 319.7 1300.3 41.5 1764.9 2258.1

Source: http://www.opec.org/library/Annual%20Statistical%20Bulletin/interactive/current/FileZ/Main.htm

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THE ERA OF THE CSGs?

A glance at the table below in respect of proven crude oil reserves reveals that considerable quantities of oil reserves are held in this region. World Proven Crude Oil Reserves by Country in Million Barrels Asia and Pacific 50,097 Brunei 1,100 China 20,350 India 9,043 Indonesia 3,990 Malaysia 5,800 Vietnam 4,400 Australia 4,158 Others 1,256 Source: http://www.opec.org/library/Annual%20Statistical%20Bulletin/interactive/current/FileZ/Mai htm

US imports from this region have increased at an even faster rate than exports. Imports from Malaysia have shown a fivefold increase to ~ US$ 26 billion in 2010, overtaking Singapore and Thailand. Further Vietnam’s exports to the United States have grown from ~US$ 200 million to ~ US$ 15 billion in the last ~ 15 years. China and Japan have also seen increases in trade volume with the United States: from US$ 20.0 billion in 1990 to US$ 176 billion in 2010 for China and from $138 billion in 1990 to US$ 181 billion in 2010 for Japan. China’s share has increased from 2.3 per cent in 1990 to 14.3 per cent of total US foreign trade in 2010. Whereas Japan’s share of total US foreign trade, declined from 15.6 per cent in 1990 to 5.7 per cent in 2010.

It is anticipated that it may be quite some time before PLAN is able to operationalise the carrier for power projection role. There are reports of indigenous Chinese aircraft carriers under design / construction, which would take some time to be inducted US Trade volume with Southeast Asia has tripled over the past two decades, from ~ US$ 45 billion in 1990 to ~ US$ 175 billion in 2010. America’s largest Southeast Asia export relationship is with Singapore. US exports to Singapore have grown from ~ US$ 8 billion in 1990 to ~ US$ 29 billion in 2010. US exports to Vietnam and Malaysia have increased four times in the last two decades.

Source: Foreign Trade, US Census Bureau Today, Japan ranks as fourth export market after Canada, Mexico and China, as also the fourth import source for US goods after Canada, Mexico and China. As far as mineral wealth in the Indian Ocean region is concerned Bhupinder Singh states that “The region accounts for 80 per cent of world extraction of gold, 52 per cent of tin, 28 per cent manganese, 25 per cent of nickel, 18 per cent bauxite, 12 per cent zinc and 77 per cent of natural rubber production in the world.” 1 The EEZ resources have not even been assessed till now.

Anti access / area-denial (A2 / AD) perception in asia pacific “The success of any major operation or campaign depends on the free movement of one’s forces in the theatre. Without the ability to conduct large-scale movements on land, at sea and in the air, operational warfare is essentially an empty concept.” Source: Foreign Trade, US Census Bureau

An aircraft carrier is akin to a mobile naval air station along with 70 to 80 fighters, bombers and support aircraft, which can sail to any place on the earth within a span of about two weeks travelling 650 to 700 nm per day

—Dr Milan Vego

The rapid rise of China despite global recession, the accelerated rate of its military modernisation and its assertion of island territorial claims has increased the perception that it is likely to impinge upon the freedom of movement at sea of the US and its allies. China already has air assets, land and space based systems to project A2 / AD regime in areas of its choosing, this coupled with rapid modernisation of its navy by acquiring carrier operation capability, land based ASBMs and a credible submarine fleet would make it a force likely to impinge upon US interests in the Asia Pacific region. This in turn would lead to reduction in dominance of the US to project power; weaken faith of allies in US influence and 1. Bhupinder Singh, The Indian Ocean and regional Security. (Punjab: BC Publishers, 1984),

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THE ERA OF THE CSGs?

The US Air Force and the US Navy together are developing the ASB concept for deterring and prevailing upon foes across a range of military operations, including enemies equipped with potent anti-access and area denial capabilities The above perception has gained ground further due to the Obama administration’s decision to reduce / shift emphasis from war on terrorism, phased pull out from Iraq and Afghanistan and the economic slowdown. The “guns versus butter “debate has sharpened the focus on; the capacity of US military wherewithal to deter and prevail over adversaries like China; and if better synergetic operations between the army, navy, air force and the marines could achieve the bearing down of projected power on the adversary utilising the existing resources. This fundamentally amounting to, achieving much more with much less in times to come. Air Sea Battle Concept (ASB): With the above background in mind Secretary of Defence Robert Gates requested Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead and Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz to explore how US air and naval forces could combine and integrate their capabilities to confront increasingly complex threats to US freedom of action. The 2010 Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) as part of its guidance to rebalance the force, directed the development of the air-sea battle concept to: [Defeat] adversaries across the range of military operations, including adversaries equipped with sophisticated anti-access and area denial capabilities. The concept will address how air and naval forces will integrate capabilities across all operational domains – air, sea, land, space and cyberspace – to counter growing challenges to US freedom of action. 2 The US Air Force and the US Navy together are developing the ASB concept for deterring and prevailing upon foes across a range of military operations, including enemies equipped with potent anti-access and area denial capabilities.

Status of aircraft carriers in the Asia Pacific region The above brief discussion on economics of the region and A2 / AD perception brings to fore the need for the United States of America to keep projecting its power from the sea if it wants to maintain its supremacy in the area. The status of aircraft carriers in the region only underpins the fact that it may be in the best interests of the countries in the region to ensure that balance of power does not tilt in favour of China at a later date. India currently operates one carrier (INS Virat) which is reasonably potent and can project sufficient power to cover India’s areas of interest. However with second carrier joining hopefully by October 2013 and the indigenous carrier a couple of years later, India will become a potent regional force in the coming decade. Thailand currently operates HTMS Chakri Naruebet, however since the Sea Harriers were retired in 2006, it operates only helicopters. China has launched its first aircraft carrier christened Liaoning (ex Varyag) on 25 September 2012. However it is anticipated that it may be quite some time before PLAN is able to operationalise aircraft carriers for power projection role. There are reports of indigenous Chinese aircraft carriers under design / construction, which would take some time to be inducted. Russia does not have an aircraft carrier positioned in the region. USA currently has three carriers in the region with one based in Japan. The Asia Pacific shift would entail pivoting of 60 per cent of its naval forces to the Asia – Pacific region, implying thereby that 5 / 6 aircraft carriers can be mobilised for power projection at very short notice. This amounts to about 45 squadrons of fighters (~ 350 a/c). The region will become a beehive of activity with US regional maritime exercises, port calls, disaster relief operations etc. Needless to assert that the US will keep projecting tremendous power ashore from the sea for a long time to come in this area. The region is becoming more volatile by the day and one can only hope that the Air Sea Battle concept does not play out in Asia Pacific and that all disputes are resolved peacefully through cooperative engagement leading to lasting prosperity for all stakeholders. 2. Department of Defence, Quadrennial Defence Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defence, 2010),

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

BrahMos: The Universal Cruise Missile T

he Indo-Russian cruise missile joint venture, BrahMos Aerospace, is working towards crossing yet another milestone with the works related to modification of Su-30 MKI nearing completion. The JV is all gung-ho to start the flight trails programme within a period of six months. The two Indian Air force (IAF) Sukhoi-30MKI fighter jets provided by the Indian Air Force are undergoing retrofit in HAL. This programme would enable them to launch the aerial version of the BrahMos and provide an unmatched capability to strike targets on land or sea within 300 km distance from launch point. Once the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile crosses this particular milestone it will become a “universal cruise missile” as it is already capable of being launched from land and sea based platforms, including submarines. Apart from the submarine version all other land and naval versions have already been inducted for service with the Indian Army and Indian Navy. The aerial version of BrahMos is coming along very well. After being programmed, the missile will be released from the aircraft and will auto-launch towards its target when it drops to an altitude of 50 metres from aircraft which ensures complete safety of the launch platform says Dr Pillai CEO and MD of BrahMos Aerospace. The modifications related to the interface with the aircraft are expected to be complete by end of 2012 he added. Apart from other operational capability building measures, one of the most significant and dividend paying action on part of Indian Air Force has been, the induction of BrahMos weapon system in its inventory. While the work on integration of air launched BrahMos missile with Su-30 MKI is in progress, the mobile land attack version has been intended by the Indian Air Force. The combination of these two versions of BrahMos weapon system is bound to prove as force multiplier for Indian Air Force, as with this weapon system the reach of Indian Air Force will be enhanced substantially. The mobile land version, on one side will be a potent weapon system with Indian Air Force to deal with hostile war waging machinery on ground especially the air bases, important installations contributing towards operational and logistics support to hostile air force and other objects of high value deep inside the adversary’s territory, while on the other, the air launched BrahMos missile will give Indian Air Force a much awaited capability of engaging all type of land / sea targets much beyond the reach of other available weapon systems. Intelligent exploitation of the combined capabilities of Indian Air Force and the BrahMos weapon system will ensure unmatched flexibility with speed, accuracy and destruction power.

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DOCTRINAL flexibility

T Dr Harsh V Pant The writer is Reader in International Relations at King's College London and an affiliate with the King's India Institute.

Four fundamental air power roles are generally acknowledged in modern air forces: control of the air; air mobility; intelligence and situational awareness; attack and most modern air forces are configured to reflect them. These are directed into achieving influence, which doctrine acknowledges to be in the cognitive domain. Influence operations affect behaviours, protect operations, communicate intent and project accurate information across the cognitive domain. The desired outcome is a change in behaviour or in an enemy’s decision-making process

Doctrine is a set of guiding principles that provide a basis and a framework for intellectual input – to assist in interpreting situations faced by military professionals and to assist them in finding the appropriate solution

he asymmetric nature of recent and ongoing conflict may call into question the relevance of air power capabilities intended for high-intensity conventional warfare, while the rise of significant regional air powers may emphasise the need for them. Regional powers are investing in significant air power capabilities, for example the Chinese J-20 stealth fighter has been described as a ‘game changer’ and the tactical equal of the US F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. An increasing doctrinal maturity and sophistication will inevitably accompany this investment and development trend. Air power is at a critical stage in its evolution and nations which are serious about its utility will have to think more creatively to better configure it to serve their national security priorities. India is no exception.

he 1991 and 2003 conflicts in the Gulf demonstrated the ability of air power to overcome a lesser but conventionally armed and configured opponent. While these campaigns largely vindicated western military capabilities and doctrine, they provide models that reflect only part of the conflict challenges that have confronted air power in general over the last two decades. A major challenge has been to adjust to a pattern changing towards intra-state conflict that generally blurs distinctions between combatants and non-combatants and that emphasises the human terrain and perception factors as potentially decisive. Experiences include the transition from Peace Keeping through to Peace Support and Peace Enforcement (Bosnia), a major coercive air campaign transposed upon an internal conflict (Kosovo and, more recently, Libya), the imposition of ‘no fly zones’ (post 1991 Iraq) and the advent of high-intensity counter-insurgency campaigns (post 2003 Iraq and Afghanistan). Concurrent with these experiences has been the doctrinal journey towards emphasising ‘influence’ and stabilisation in configuring the role of air power. The application of air power, including in the ‘Attack’ role with use of kinetic firepower, has occurred in complex circumstances with ethical and consequently political, sensitivities and constraints very much to the fore.

Asymmetry Overall, air power has responded to these varied challenges with considerable success. However, the experience has also indicated the potential for asymmetric responses by opponents unable to match air power capabilities of major powers on anything like equal terms. A characteristic of these conflicts, in stark contrast to 1991 and 2003, is that of duration: they are ‘long wars’, with time as a factor likely to be exploited by an opponent seeking to undermine political resolve. In military terms, passive measures such as skilful camouflage and deception can

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

undermine the situational awareness upon which an air campaign depends. The Serbians were particularly adept at this during the Kosovo campaign. The significance of ground based air defence systems – particularly light and comparatively ‘cheap’ portable systems (MANPADS) and their potential to deter and restrict freedom of operation, especially when the risk to aircraft and rotary assets can be heightened, has been a source of much debate. Of equal significance is the asymmetric opponent’s potential to exploit and even potentially dominate, the media-intensive perception battleground, a phenomenon experienced by the Israelis in their 2006 Lebanon conflict with Hezbollah. When ‘influence’ is a predominant factor, democratic states cannot afford to lose legitimacy or the support of their own societies, yet this can be a vulnerability exploited by an opponent concealed among the people and placing them at risk to collateral damage. While such asymmetric tactics may not be decisive in military terms, it is important for states to consider their effect and the extent to which the character of conflict is itself becoming a deterrent to state intervention.

Non-air power specific capabilities such as space and cyberspace are also challenging the relevance of air power. An example such as the ‘Stuxnet’ virus of 2010 indicates both the vulnerability of state network systems to attack and how the conflict offence-defence dynamic has moved into the cyber realm The asymmetric nature of recent and ongoing conflict may call into question the relevance of air power capabilities intended for high-intensity conventional warfare, while the rise of significant regional air powers may emphasise the need for them. Regional powers are investing in significant air power capabilities, for example the Chinese J-20 stealth fighter has been described as a ‘game changer’ and the tactical equal of the US F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. An increasing doctrinal maturity and sophistication will inevitably

The Ever Growing Complexities of

Modern Air Power accompany this investment development trend.

and

Readjustments It is, therefore, important to consider how these air power developments and the proliferation of technologies are likely to compel readjustments in the overall balance of power. This in turn is likely to

affect options available to Western policy makers who have had recourse to air power as the principal military lever of power in recent decades is at the heart of the emerging debate. Non-air power specific capabilities such as space and cyberspace are also challenging the relevance of air power. An example such as the ‘Stuxnet’ virus of 2010 indicates both the vulnerability of state network

systems to attack and how the conflict offence-defence dynamic has moved into the cyber realm. Implications for air power include the dependence upon and vulnerability of, networks upon which capabilities and concepts such as Combat-ISTAR depend, with an imperative to protect data and systems while potentially bringing

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those of an opponent under attack. These developments do not necessarily question the relevance of air power, but the cyber domain has increasingly become part of the context in which air power effectiveness is determined. A further point for consideration is the extent to which cyber attack may substitute for conventional kinetic attack against capabilities and the systems supporting them, with evident linkage to the asymmetric nature of warfare. It is important for states to critically assess how air forces shape the nature and conduct of air campaigns, the implications of this and the extent of the linkage between achieving the intended influence outcome and the capabilities possessed and employed by air forces.

In military terms, passive measures such as skillful camouflage and deception can undermine the situational awareness upon which an air campaign depends. The Serbians were particularly adept at this during the Kosovo campaign. The significance of ground based air defence systems – particularly light and comparatively ‘cheap’ portable systems (MANPADS) and their potential to deter and restrict freedom of operation, especially when the risk to aircraft and rotary assets can be heightened Four fundamental air power roles are generally acknowledged in modern air forces: control of the air; air mobility; intelligence and situational awareness; attack and most modern air forces are configured to reflect them. These are directed into achieving influence, which doctrine acknowledges to be in the cognitive domain. Influence operations affect behaviours, protect operations, communicate intent and project accurate information across the cognitive domain. The desired outcome is a change in behaviour or in an enemy’s decision-making process. Gaining the control of the air vital for the joint force may require a largely ‘independent’ air force campaign, (particularly against an opposing air force), though this is debatable and moreover such a campaign has not been at the forefront of recent conflict experience. Perhaps

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DOCTRINAL flexibility more suggestive and reflective of the early linkage between independent air forces and a ‘strategic’ offensive role, is the ongoing emphasis upon the significance of coercion within the concept of influence. The hard edge of influence is represented by coercion, which hinges upon the capability and willingness to bring offensive combat power to bear. Coercion is central to the effective employment of air power. It is not entirely evident the extent to which independent air forces that have considerable experience of applying coercive pressure in a strategic context in campaigns have been predominantly ‘independent’. Recent and ongoing campaigns (high-intensity COIN in Afghanistan) are hardly ‘independent’ campaigns and may require influence to be achieved more at the operational and tactical levels closely integrated with the activity and influence of land forces. If the core air power roles do not indicate a specific role linked to an independent service, it may still be argued convincingly that they are best delivered through the core professional competencies nurtured by an independent air force and nations should be prepared to examine and articulate this.

Doctrine The experience and doctrine of independent air forces shape the conduct of air campaigns and air forces have become more flexible in their approach to achieving ‘influence’ and in interpreting the unfolding dynamic of a joint campaign and prioritising effort. Experience, assumptions and doctrine have been reflected by a strategic emphasis in the perception of centres of gravity and in the application of air power, sometimes generating targeting controversies and differing perceptions of priorities within air forces and the wider joint arena – there was evidence of this during the Gulf War of 1991 and also in the shifts in targeting during the Kosovo campaign. Doctrine is a set of guiding principles that provide a basis and a framework for intellectual input – to assist in interpreting situations

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CREDIBLE DETERRENCE

faced by military professionals and to assist them in finding the appropriate solution. Policy is prescriptive (it has to be) but doctrine that is prescriptive risks becoming dogma – the antithesis of what doctrine is for. Doctrine is not merely a reflection of experience. Though it must reflect experience but there is more to the formulation of doctrine and its relevance than merely ‘capturing’ experience. Experience has not only to be ‘captured’ but also assimilated and interpreted and so it’s the intellectual process that is critical. The value of doctrine depends upon the critical lens applied to experience – the way it is interrogated and the critical questions applied to it.

It is, therefore, important to consider how these air power developments and the proliferation of technologies are likely to compel readjustments in the overall balance of power It is deceptively easy for military professionals possessing operational experience to decide that doctrine has become irrelevant or of little use, but this may reveal a lack of understanding of what doctrine is actually for and of the doctrine process. It may be a subconscious and uncritical assumption that doctrine should be ‘prescriptive’. Success achieved in operations may actually reflect the utility of the guiding framework provided by existing doctrine, intelligently applied. Doctrine can never be truly ‘current’, as it may not be ahead of unpredicted experience, but also that it may not need to be. It will have fulfilled its role if it assists in the interpretation of a situation. Doctrine, therefore, must be flexible, in application and in evolution. It adjusts in response to changes at all spectrums (from the political and strategic levels to the tactical) and to all types of change – from the nature of conflict to the technologies that are evolving. However, this process of assimilating change through experience inevitably takes time. Air power is at a critical stage in its evolution and nations which are serious about its utility will have to think more creatively to better configure it to serve their national security priorities. India is no exception.

Dr Arvind Kumar The writer is Professor and Head of Department of Geopolitics and International Relations at Manipal University, Manipal, India.

Assessment of India’s Air Power Capabilities: Reflections in the Twentyfirst Century

ndia’s air power capabilities remain as the prime repository of India’s credible conventional deterrence capabilities. It also to a greater extent provides critical components of credible nuclear deterrence. The capabilities have changed India’s position from a subcontinental, geographically limited force to one with continental reach and effect. India has also enhanced its ability to exploit space capabilities for making the military operations effective. The 21st century has seen India transforming itself from a pure line of sight capability to beyond visual range capabilities.

Such aerospace power capabilities enable a nation state to undertake punitive military action beyond the borders independent of the actions taken at the ground or sea. It becomes a dominant military asset for national defence. The dominance in air power capability provides a nation state the unique capability of long-range air mobility and precision strike. Such unique capabilities enhance and support the deterrence through denial and provide a nation state with the deterrent capability through the threat and employment of punishment

The prevailing and dominant view in India has been that India became so dependent on Soviet military technology that it could not enhance its own indigenous production

ver the years, the technological advances in the field of air power are making air power and aerospace capabilities increasingly important, effective and dominant during the case of any eventuality. Such reflections are seen in the efforts of a number of countries, which have been to a larger extent struggling for dominance in air. Air superiority provides a distinct and significant edge in the modern and contemporary warfare. Air superiority with a greater focus on the top-end military technology provides a nation state the concept of force multipliers by possessing Airborne Warning and Control Systems, aerial refuelling capabilities, net centric warfare and the capabilities for precision strike. Hence, air superiority leads to asymmetry in power equations. China’s ongoing strategic and military modernisation has led to the advantage in the field of its balance of force multiplication. The military technological advances in China will have lot of advantages for Pakistan. It is evident and well known about the contours of

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CREDIBLE DETERRENCE

Sino-Pak strategic and military nexus. Pakistan, too, seems to have been investing heavily in force multipliers across the board. These developments in India’s neighbourhood have negative consequences for India’s national security. Despite the fact that India attaches lot of importance especially as a national strategic priority in evolving a deterrent capability, it has not been able to signal its intent to its neighbours. The objective has been to achieve credible deterrent capability both at the conventional as well as at the nuclear level. The intensification of aerospace power capability will have its significant role in maintaining the nuclear as well as conventional deterrent capability.

Dominant military asset Undoubtedly, emerging military technology to a greater extent has been making aerospace power increasingly important. Such aerospace power capabilities enable a nation state to undertake punitive military action beyond the borders independent of the actions taken at the ground or sea. It becomes a dominant military asset for national defence. The dominance in air power capability provides a nation state the unique capability of long-range air mobility and precision strike. Such unique capabilities enhance and support the deterrence through denial and provide a nation state with the deterrent capability through the threat and employment of punishment. Despite the fact that the air power is an essential component of modern warfare, India evolved the doctrine of limited role for air dominance because of its defensive orientations. It must be emphasised here that the campaign for air superiority requires offensive action. The evolution of air power capabilities in India has been directly linked with its threat perceptions and the articulation of its requirements. It is, therefore, important to note that in the existing scenario of regional security environment, India needs to be better equipped with the defensive systems which would be required in any eventuality. These defensive systems could also help in building a deterrent capability, which ultimately would help in containing the crisis. The danger during the crisis arises

only when the defender lacks the capacity or resolve to meet its commitments or is determined and powerful enough but fails to signal to its adversary about the capabilities. Under this condition, it becomes necessary for India to acquire all the possible gadgets for the readiness in modern warfare. It is generally believed among the members of strategic community that without having air superiority, it would be a difficult proposition for any nation state to sustain itself during any crisis. Undoubtedly, Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) is an important ingredient of air power. At the same time, AWACS will have no great role to play if there is no air superiority. The goal of the warning mission has always been to alert national forces of any air vehicle attack, which ultimately helps in preserving strategic bomber forces. The adequate warning can only escape strategic bomber forces from the probable attack during the crisis time. Under this scenario, a very legitimate question could be, “why India should worry about warning of attack by slow air vehicles when a strategic attack on India would clearly first be manifested by the obvious arrival of ballistic missile nuclear warheads”? There might be couple of responses to this question and which to a greater extent expound the theory that air power capabilities make a nation determined and confidant during both crisis and peace time. First, India should not leave an “open door” for Chinese cruise missiles or aircraft to fly completely undetected to strategic bomber bases and other important targets. If India leaves the door open, it would be naïve to anticipate that it would never be exploited in a strategic attack. Secondly, the massive strategic attack from China has not been the only concern for India’s national security. One needs to be concerned about possible future air vehicle attacks from lesser powers like Pakistan, which is also a nuclear weapon state and is very much hostile towards India and also constantly creating problems across Indian borders. Airborne surveillance radars are being viewed increasingly as a

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fundamental asset for use during missions ranging from all-out war to peacekeeping operation. The possession of airborne surveillance radar enhances air power capabilities. The possession of AWACS in particular has been viewed as a vital force multiplier. Despite the fact that, India so far has not been able to achieve AWACS indigenously, the Phalcon based radars of Israeli origin have been mounted and perform operations as and when it is required.

Defensive defence Bearing in mind that any future conflict with India’s adversaries would require the level of India’s defence preparedness at a very higher degree, the military planners and strategists in India would require to put a greater emphasis on self-reliance. India in this case would certainly need to acquire force multipliers like night-fighting sensors, better air-defence equipment, real-time command, control, communications and intelligence systems in addition to a modern electronic warfare capability. There seem to be glaring operational gaps in India’s overall defence capabilities as far as air defence and air capabilities are concerned. The need of the hour is to upgrade the air-defence system in the eastern part of the country in view of China’s expanding air power projection.

The objective has been to achieve credible deterrent capability both at the conventional as well as at the nuclear level. The intensification of aerospace power capability will have its significant role in maintaining the nuclear as well as conventional deterrent capability India has pursued a strategic doctrine which rests on the concept of defensive-defence and minimalist approach to defence capability and use. The force structures over the years are being guided mostly by the doctrine of territorial defence. However, the doctrine for the employment of military forces are designed in such a way where the concept of the use of force usually does not exist and even if it exists, it comes as the last instrument in statecraft.

An elaborate ground infrastructure to facilitate rapid transfer / re-deployment of the air force between the west and east against Pakistan and China needs to be put in place at the earliest possible time period. The perilous scenario under which India has been undergoing with regard to air power is not very satisfactory. The report about the existing fleets of the aircraft which keeps appearing in the world media presents a very precarious picture about the Indian Air Force. For the last five decades, MiG-21s have been the backbone of the Indian Air Force. It is a well known fact that most of the MiG-21s in possession with Indian Air Force are basically the Russian aircraft of the earlier era. The prevailing and dominant view in India has been that India became so dependent on Soviet military technology that it could not enhance its own indigenous production on the one hand and it could not even show willingness to cooperate with other countries. The recent decision to buy 126 medium multi role combat aircraft (MMRCA) Rafale from France has been a byproduct of long endeavours of the modernisation of India’s air power capabilities. Such short listing after careful scrutiny done by India on the other contenders like Swedish Gripen, F-16s, F-18s, Eurofighter reflects India’s growing concerns for enhancing its air power capabilities. The short listing must have factored the technical specifications and a number of other parameters including manoeuvrability, acceleration and flight envelopes. The primary sensor system and high-tech electronic devices in the combat aircraft become very important in terms of understanding the endurance and survivability. India certainly would be able to achieve primacy if it will finally have 126 MMRCA in its inventories. There is also a growing pressure from the Indian Air Force to buy a number of additional MMRCAs. The current situation of all the air-defence squadrons in India clearly reflects that despite the fast changing international security environment and various advances made in the technological sector, India seems

to be mostly banking on its existing fleets of obsolete MiGs.

India has pursued a strategic doctrine which rests on the concept of defensive-defence and minimalist approach to defence capability and use. The force structures over the years are being guided mostly by the doctrine of territorial defence

Technical challenges The urgent necessity for India in the existing milieu would be to prevent airborne reconnaissance and then provide enough active defence to deter or interdict aircraft attacks by terrorists or other hostile adversaries. A demonstrated ability to place a manned interceptor in a position to engage an unidentified aircraft before it reaches the Indian coastline or border should be the general goal and in the process India would be able to enhance its air power capabilities. These tasks would be accomplished by the network of radars and manned interceptors described for the warning mission. The technical challenges before India are very substantial which require to be addressed by the key policy makers and the scientific community. Efficient coverage of India’s earth surface requires radar operation keeping in mind the border related problems at ranges of 200 to 300 km and these long ranges might be a challenge for detecting low-observable vehicles. It would be possible only when India will have air superiority. With air superiority, aircraft can drop their smart bombs with less fear of coming under attack while guiding them to their target, thereby offering a greater probability of a successful strike. There has always been a quest to find out the enemy’s plans and moves well in advance in order to develop one’s own operations effectively since the early days of warfare. In other words, domination of the high ground was sought which gave a commander knowledge of the enemy’s strength and disposition. This has become very complex in the existing environment where sophisticated technologies have

been invented. These complexities by and large have been addressed by radar, which has the effect of forcing air operations down to lower levels to stay below the radar horizon and ultimately helps in evading detection. Over the years, it seems that India’s offensive operations priority is being upgraded along with the air defence. The concept of air defence in India has been gaining momentum. There seems to be a consensus in India among the key planners that India would require to maintain point air defence in addition to the ability to build a strategic or deterrent air defence. India would certainly require a number of long range aircraft in addition to having a capability of air-to-air refuelling. There is no doubt in saying that air defence is a central responsibility of the Indian Air Force. India has also been working towards having overall improvements in the command, control, communications and intelligence structure in addition to a revamped modernised air defence and communications network. The technological edge in air warfare would become an essential component of India’s air power capabilities. India’s defence purchases and acquisitions over the years have reflected the major concerns shown by the Indian Air Force. India’s air power capabilities remain as the prime repository of India’s credible conventional deterrence capabilities. It also to a greater extent provides critical components of credible nuclear deterrence. The capabilities have changed India’s position from a subcontinental, geographically limited force to one with continental reach and effect. India has also enhanced its ability to exploit space capabilities for making the military operations effective. The 21st century India has seen itself transforming itself from a pure line of sight capability to beyond visual range capabilities. India will keep emphasising its air power potential to match up with the advances in the aerospace technology.

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

REDEFINING AIR POWER

A Dr Jagmohan Meher The writer teaches Political Science, International Relations and Area Studies at National Defence Academy, Khadakwasla, Pune, India. He is a former Fulbright Fellow at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and author of the books, America’s Afghanistan War: The Success That Failed and Afghanistan: Dynamics of Survival.

The only option for India is to fast-track our procurement of UCAVs, both from outside sources as well as from indigenous research. First, given India’s strategic ties with the United States and Israel, New Delhi could pitch for their advanced UAS. But as always, Washington’s decision will certainly be weighed by Pakistani reactions, which may not be positive. Israel, however, poses no such strategic and geopolitical issues for India. Second, apart from expediting the DRDO’s AURA (and other) projects, private companies like the TATAs could be pushed through advanced drone research and developments within the country. Tata Advanced Systems Limited (TASL) and Israel Aerospace Industries have already lined up a joint venture; named NOVA Integrated Systems Ltd., which is developing a family of Mini UAVs for various defence and civil applications

n interesting article on UAVs and UCAVs. There is certainly a need to induct such unmanned systems in our Armed Forces to perform tasks that are Dull (require sustained attention spans – like flying bomber missions for over 24 hrs) Dangerous (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences – SEAD) or Dirty (involving operating in Radiation / chemical / biological environments). These are also being used for deception tasks. However of some 550 UAV designs fielded by many countries only some ten models are currently combat proven. We must see through commercial hype and only go in for proven systems – of the Predator, Heron or Searcher Mk II class. We must explore the potential of our Private sector producing proven designs under license in the country. The UCAV is still a work in progress, even in the USA. However we must keep pace with rapid advances in this field. We must field Satellite communications and Tactical and Micro Aerial Vehicles (MAVs) in the mass as soon as possible.

ne ground-breaking dimension of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) – where India is yet to synchronise – is probably the ongoing passing phase of costly fighter planes and gigantic bombers and their replacement by the cost effective and smaller Unmanned Combat Areal Vehicle (UCAV) which, with its increased sophistication, has been coined as Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS). Experts believe that the American F-22 Raptor and the Russian 5th generation T-50 are possibly the last of the manned fighters and now all

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

research efforts are being directed towards UAS. In the US, drone pilots would outnumber those in cockpits in the foreseeable future as the air force is already training more drone pilots than fighter and bomber pilots combined. The US Navy has already opted out of the 5th generation F-35 Joint Strike Fighter programme and is planning to deploy the unmanned Northrop Grumman X 47-B Unmanned Combat Air System. There is serious thinking in the Royal Air Force that 30 per cent of the present strength of fighter aircraft be replaced by UCAVs. Clearly, UCAV has begun to substitute for manned aircraft and the future air warfare is witnessing a definite ‘transformation’ in force structures, doctrines, training methodology and the management of human resources. This global avionics momentum – preceding the success of American Predator operations in Yemen, Iraq and Afghanistan in the first decade of the new millennium – has moved the debate in India from “should the UCAVs be acquired” to “how soon can UCAVs be acquired and deployed.” If that is indeed the case, then it is very pertinent to explore our understanding of this sophisticated flying machine, our current status thereof and the role it could possibly play in India’s volatile geo-political situations and strategic environment.

The nomenclature UCAV is the logical progression of UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle). The UAV is an aerial vehicle with no pilot to man controls. They are remotely controlled by personnel on ground or by pre-programmed flight plans. They are technologically less sophisticated, smaller in size, relatively low-priced and accessible in the international market. UAVs are limited to support functions such as reconnaissance and intelligence gathering. They are not designed to deliver weapons against enemy targets. But they act as major force-multipliers for their ability to send back real-time imagery of enemy targets with their sensors and cameras. On the other hand, the advent of UCAVs has transformed the very philosophy of modern warfare by demonstrating their new and unique war fighting capabilities. They are redefining the contemporary concepts of air power and would potentially revolutionise its future use. They are much more advanced, almost like fighter jets in the sense that they let loose missiles on enemy targets before returning to home bases to re-arm themselves for the next mission. The advocates of using UCAVs in a precision air attack role routinely cite the potential of high-speed and its highly manoeuvrable platforms to outperform manned aircraft. They also eliminate risk of aircrew being killed since they are remotely-

Mapping India’s Unmanned Aircraft System

piloted. The US Department of Defence has to ascertain thus: “a UCAV is a powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable and can carry a lethal or non-lethal payload.” In fact, when UAVs are armed and used as weapon delivery systems to take offensive action with lethal weaponry, they are called UCAVs.

Some reports suggest the possibility of a Predator equivalent being jointly produced by China and Pakistan. As such, the Chinese have already featured their Chang Hong-3 UCAV platforms in various defence exhibitions in recent years. Considering these developments, one could easily visualise that the day is not far when Pakistan will receive these Chinese built aerial systems The UCAV came of age when the United States Predators fired Hellfire missiles against al-Qaeda

and Taliban strongholds during Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan in 2001. But the remote-control war showcased its potential as an effective anti-terrorist platform when a black sports utility vehicle carrying six al-Qaeda terrorists in the desert of Yemen suddenly exploded by a CIA operated Predator using a Hellfire precision missile in November 2002. The operation was controlled from the US Central Command HQ in Florida and satellite and UAV imagery was used to track a moving vehicle in real time after ground operatives had tipped off the CIA about the presence of terrorists in it. Subsequently, the use of military drones controlled through satellites from thousands of miles away became a routine affair of the US Air Force arsenal both in Iraq and Afghanistan wars. It amply signifies that these platforms, sensors and weapons technologies have matured enough to permit low risk, rapid and low-cost application of armed UAVs. The US has already used jet-powered UCAVs In-service which maintain the speed and manoeuvrability of

the fighter planes and can deliver both air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles with full accuracy. Over the years, this cutting edge technology has further sharpened itself. In June 2012, Los Angeles Times reported that the US military has issued to soldiers in Afghanistan pint-sized drones, small enough to be carried in backpacks, but used in battlefield in place of airstrikes. The weapon dubbed the ‘Flying Shotgun’ is small enough to fit in soldiers’ rucksacks, but packed with tiny explosive warheads, enough to blast targets with pinpoint accuracy. The new drone christened “Switch-blade” weighs less than six pounds and takes out a sniper on a rooftop without blasting the building. It enables soldiers in the field to identify and destroy targets much more quickly by eliminating the need to call in a strike from large drones that may be hundreds of miles away.

India’s present status India has been procuring UAVs since the India-Pakistan Kargil War in 1999.

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

REDEFINING AIR POWER

It has been estimated that the Indian armed forces have inducted over 160 drones in the last thirteen years. But these are mainly used for detecting incoming missile attacks or border incursions. It includes a fleet of Searcher and Heron UAVs to perform surveillance and reconnaissance roles vis-à-vis enemy territory. However, soon the IAF began exploring “add-ons or attachments” to this fleet to upgrade them from their present surveillance and precision-targeting roles into some sort of combat drones.

The advent of UCAVs has transformed the very philosophy of modern warfare by demonstrating their new and unique war fighting capabilities. They are redefining the contemporary concepts of air power and would potentially revolutionise its future use Of late, Indian defence forces dedicated satellite links and channels for the use of UCAVs and inducted a few Israeli-made Harpy and Harop which are now known as India’s first UCAVs for offensive strikes. This induction, for the first time, provided IAF the capability to take down enemy positions without having to send its manned fighters to hit ground targets. Harop is an upgraded and larger version of the Harpy, an anti-radiation seeker designed to loiter, detect and home in on enemy radar positions. But unlike the fully-autonomous Harpy, the Harop is controlled in flight by a remote operator. Rather than holding a separate high-explosive warhead, the Harop drone itself is the main munition and is designed to loiter over the battlefield and attack targets. Harop, a 23 kg warhead, is 2.5 meter long with a 3 metre wingspan and has six hour endurance. It endows the IAF the capability to hit high value targets such as enemy missile and radar sites and even terrorist hideouts. These drones basically act as cruise missiles by detecting and then destroying specific enemy targets and radars by exploding into them. This self-destructive feature makes it a very expensive option. The moves to acquire UCAVs gained momentum among the defence forces and policy makers only after the Mumbai terror attacks in November 2008 when the country’s military leadership pressurised the

government for their procurement. In 2010, the IAF issued a global RFI (request for information) to armament giants worldwide for procurement of combat drones. The RFI clearly specified that the IAF is looking for state-of-the-art stealthy and high-endurance UCAVs, with precision weapons and satellite data links. “They should have good arrested take-off and landing capabilities, with a high service ceiling. They must have a total technical life of more than 20 years,” it says. Over the longer term, India will look to procure or develop the next generation UCAVs that will substitute missile-fitted fighter jets for conventional attack missions. It has been reported in the media that India is quietly going ahead with an ambitious programme to develop its own stealth UCAVs or ‘smart’ drones capable of firing missiles and bombs at enemy targets with precision. But this secretive project, AURA (Autonomous Unmanned Research Aircraft) of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) will take seven / eight years to develop the UCAVs. DRDO sources have revealed that with on-board mission computers, data links, fire control radars, identification of friend or foe and traffic collision avoidance systems, the AURAs will be highly intelligent drones. It will be capable of flying at altitudes of 30,000 feet and weighing less than 15 tonnes and will have rail-launching for the missiles, bombs and PGMs (precision-guided munitions) they will carry. But unlike American Predators, which are like aircraft, AURAs will be more of ‘a flying-wing’ in design aimed at ensuring to have a low radar cross-section to evade enemy sensors. DRDO has also developed Nishant, Lakshya and short-range smaller ones named Pawan and Gagan tactical spy drones. Recently, it has developed Rustam, a Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) variant; some compare it with the US MQ-9 Reaper.

Role India already extensively uses UAVs to snoop along its borders with Pakistan and China, as also to track militants in the north-east and Kashmir. Counter-insurgency,

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

coastal surveillance, EEZ monitoring, disaster relief monitoring etc. have been the primary areas of UAV applications so far. Following the deadly attack on paramilitary forces in Chhattisgarh in September 2009 that killed 76 security personnel, some surveillance UAVs were deployed in Maoist-infested areas. In last few years, the army, navy and air force have deployed UAVs mostly for reconnaissance and intelligence gathering purposes. News reports over the last decade suggest that all three branches – after their initial phases of UAV deployments that include Israeli “killer” drones designed to detect and loiter over enemy targets before exploding into them like cruise missiles – are keen to induct armed drones and full-fledged UCAVs in the years ahead. The army has inducted slightly bigger mini and micro spy drones in a major way for short-range surveillance and intelligence-gathering missions as well as detection of NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) contaminants in the battlefield. Two UAV squadrons of high-altitude, long endurance Herons, with eight drones each for Srinagar-based 15 Corps and Leh-based 14 Corps are already on operation in India’s most volatile but strategically significant region. These drones can remain airborne for 16 hours and have a maximum range of 150 kilometers at the relatively high altitude of 18,500 feet, making it especially suitable for missions over the Himalayas. The 1.13-million strong army wants some of these man-portable micro spy drones to be capable of even hitting small but high-value enemy targets in keeping with its plan to induct such UCAVs in phases right down to the battalion-level by the end of the 12th Plan (2012-2017). Being stealthy because of their small size, these drones are to be used to equip army’s Para (Special Forces) battalions for “covert missions beyond enemy lines, counter-terrorism operations and `beyond-the-hill’ surveillance.” The army has also planned to acquire 500 micro- and mini-UAVs with an endurance of 30 minutes and the ability to be operated by two soldiers. These robotic flying machines are specially considered suitable for operations in the Naxalite-infested

areas against which intelligence gathering has become very difficult because of the nature of the terrain the Maoists extremists inhabit. Since low intensity conflicts are increasingly being used as a means to challenge the security forces by rebel groups who cannot face an open war, the micro-UAVs are now being considered by the army as an integral part of the force deployment for counter-terrorism operations.

check unlawful intrusion into the country’s coastline. As part of navy’s three-tier aerial surveillance grid for the Indian Ocean Region, the drones are being used for innermost layer reconnaissance. The navy’s Searcher II and Heron UAVs played an important role in the rescue operations for the 2008 tsunami. They allowed for the detection of survivors and bodies off the coast of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal.

The navy has to keep a close watch on its 7,516 km coastline, 1,197 islands and a huge 2.01 million sq km Exclusive Economic Zone, which is expected to increase further after the delimitation of the Continental Shelf over the next few years. In order to provide a foolproof medium-range surveillance up to 200 nautical miles, it operationally deployed its first-ever squadron (INAS 342) of Israeli spy drones with eight Searcher-II and four Heron UAVs, which were formally commissioned at Kochi in early 2006. Since then, the navy has come a long way in deploying naval spy drones on its long coastlines. In the western front, the naval UAV squadron (INAS 343) with a mix of Israeli Searcher and Heron drones was formally commissioned at Porbandar in January 2011. The purpose of deploying these drones on the Gujarat coast was to detect terror and conventional threats emanating from sea from across the border in real-time as timely detection of maritime threats is critical to neutralise them with countermeasures before they come anywhere near the coast or crucial offshore installations. Navy has also inducted two more advanced Herons, which are strategic MALE UAVs and carry a payload of 250 kg for around 50 hours of continuous flight to boost its maritime snooping capabilities. After Kochi and Porbandar, a new naval UAV squadron (INAS 344) was formally commissioned at Uchipuli in Tamil Nadu in April 2012. Port Blair in Andaman and Nicobar Islands has also been earmarked for yet another squadron. All these initiatives are aimed at plugging holes in India’s coastal security architecture, which were exposed by the 26/11 terror strikes in Mumbai. Now that these drones can transmit imagery in real-time to their ground control stations day and night and help

Similarly, increasingly threatening strategic environment is pushing the IAF to increase its dependence on UAS as some reports suggest the possibility of a Predator equivalent being jointly produced by China and Pakistan. As such, the Chinese have already featured their Chang Hong-3 UCAV platforms in various defence exhibitions in recent years. Considering these developments, one could easily visualise that the day is not far when Pakistan will receive these Chinese built aerial systems. The simmering conflict between India and Pakistan in South Asia, the contentious India-China border issues and the push for strategic space between the two Asian giants in the South-East Asian region has fuelled the requirement of making a more secure air environment. To meet these emerging threats, the IAF is trying to bolster its UAV force and in the process of integrating its UAVs with weapon platforms for delivering precision-guided munitions. According to foreign news reports, some of the UAVs used by the IAF also have the ability to fire air-to-surface missiles. Externally, UAVs have played a dominant role in IAF operations on various fronts – including Lebanon and the Gaza Strip – and account for a quarter of the IAF’s overall flight hours. Reports suggest that a specific “drones” unit will soon be established in the IAF.

Conclusion UCAV can be manufactured and operated at a tiny fraction of the cost of manned fighters, as it needs only to be flown during wartime, high tension periods or on special surgical strikes. It is difficult to understand that at a time when most nations – including the United States and China – are increasingly phasing

out or fielding smaller quantities of 5th generation fighters, Indian military planners are preparing to sign the US$ 35 billion, biggest-ever defence project with Russia for the supply of over 200 such stealth fighters over the next 20 years; the planes to be made available from 2022 onwards. IAF officials argue that this swing-role fighter will meet its future operational needs with all its “fully blended features” such as 1.7 Mach speed, “deadly mix of ultra-manoeuvrability and supersonic cruising ability,” long-range strike, high endurance air defence capabilities etc. But it can be envisaged that given RMA’s pace, the UAS technology would have completely replaced the 5th generation planes and would well be doing the role of that of the manned aircraft by the time these fighters are inducted into the IAF.

UCAV is the logical progression of UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle). The UAV is an aerial vehicle with no pilot to man controls. They are remotely controlled by personnel on ground or by pre-programmed flight plans Eventually, the only option for India is to fast-track our procurement of UCAVs, both from outside sources as well as from indigenous research. First, given India’s strategic ties with the United States and Israel, New Delhi could pitch for their advanced UAS. But as always, Washington’s decision will certainly be weighed by Pakistani reactions, which may not be positive. Israel, however, poses no such strategic and geopolitical issues for India. Second, apart from expediting the DRDO’s AURA (and other) projects, private companies like the TATAs could be pushed through advanced drone research and developments within the country. Tata Advanced Systems Limited (TASL) and Israel Aerospace Industries have already lined up a joint venture; named NOVA Integrated Systems Ltd., which is developing a family of Mini UAVs for various defence and civil applications. These flying machines are likely to be fully equipped with a wide variety of mission-specific payloads. Given the ever changing geo-strategic environment and threat scenarios, the present UAV fleets should comprise a “bigger dose” of attack drones.

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

THE GRAMMAR OF WAR

K Dr Ali Ahmed The writer is Assistant Professor at the Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.

The best war aim is a better peace. A better peace in an India-Pakistan context would be one that minimally ensures the retraction of Pakistan’s policy of proxy war and maximally ushers in democratic peace by assisting Pakistan to democratise. In both cases it would involve the application of combat power in such a manner as to degrade the Pakistani Army, not only as a significant fighting force in the context of the conflict underway, but more important from India’s political aims point of view, as a post conflict political player in Pakistan. This is a considerably nuanced task. While the Pakistani Army is to be setback, it is not to be to such a level as to leave a vacuum in Pakistan for extremist forces

The third edition of the air doctrine readying for release, perhaps as early as Air Force Day this year, it can provide an opportunity and a setting for a renewed discussion of the place of force in India’s repertoire and that of the arguably more consequential air power within it

argil War provided an opportunity for discerning contours of the utility of air power in modern conflict. The contribution of air power in retaking the heights was a very visible one. This was true not only of the beating from the air the objectives were subjected to prior to assault, but also in the reduction by fire of the support base, Muntho Dhalo. Over time and amidst a degree of controversy it emerged that its very application in first place was after considerable deliberation over its escalatory potential. Even when employed the constraining political parameters were strictly enforced. This would then qualify as the second point of significance for future war. In effect, there were two carry aways from the war: one is that air power would be of critical consequence to a war’s outcome and two that this criticality accounts for its escalatory potential. Pakistan’s choice of location for intrusion, Kargil, suggests as much. The area was rightly reckoned to be marginal to India’s consciousness. A more salient location could well have prompted a more violent and extensive Indian reaction. This would have made for a less bridled employment of air. In the event, the terrain at Kargil also ensured that when and if employed, the air force would face a challenge, albeit one not insuperable. Clearly, the significance of air power was not lost on the adversary.

Implacability of air power But, a review of the past is only as useful as what it suggests for the future. Therefore, while the Kargil War has its nuggets that reinforce the known implacability of air power, Kargil War was at best a minor war. What then is the significance of the two lessons from that war: destructive potential and escalatory possibilities? The two are inextricable, for the former informs the latter. This article will view air power through its contribution to gaining a war’s political aims in a hypothetical India-Pakistan War. It is a trite to observe that the best war aim is a better peace. A better peace in an India-Pakistan context would be one that minimally ensures the retraction of Pakistan’s policy of proxy war and maximally ushers in democratic peace by assisting Pakistan to democratise. In both cases it would involve the application of combat power in such a manner as to degrade the Pakistani Army, not only as a significant fighting force in the context of the conflict underway, but more important from India’s political aims point of view, as a post conflict political player in Pakistan. This is a considerably nuanced task. While the Pakistani Army is to be set back, it is not to be

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

to such a level as to leave a vacuum in Pakistan for extremist forces. In other words, there is as much punishment to be administered as held back. While a joint challenge for the three Services, the answer of the air force to this will be consequential to India’s success in its political aims. Word is that the forthcoming edition of doctrine would be in the open domain. An advance worth appreciating, this would reveal whether the air force has arrived at the right answer to the challenge. In the event, the air campaign would be part of a joint orchestration of military power to sensitise the Pakistani military leadership that worse is in store. The air force fit into this picture would be one of causing unmistakable hurt in quick time, one it is in a better position to deliver than certainly the army. Equally, power held back or targets that are yet to be hit that will, as Thomas Schelling has famously reminded in the nuclear context, influence the decision makers’ mind. Clearly, the air forces’ doctrinal task is cut out for it in figuring out the balance, one it cannot carry out autonomously. While it has to fight parallel campaigns – supporting the land campaign even while having a strategic campaign going – it cannot fight parallel wars. The Pakistani decision-maker would be subject to inputs of army advances on multiple fronts, in keeping with India’s Cold Start doctrine. He would be assessing the significance of naval manoeuvre. He would be receiving input of heightened internal turmoil, hopefully some of which would also have the hallmark of an Indian intelligence agency for a change. While the decision-maker would be reassured by India alongside also communicating its limited and very reasonable aims, there would be considerable internal nationalist and extremist pressures from within Pakistani polity. The air force would need bearing in mind that such would be the psychological environment that it would be seeking to influence.

Calling Pak bluff? The nuclear threshold would perhaps at this stage figure in Pakistani consideration, if only to be discounted as premature. The air force’s actions would be more consequential in such considerations since the air force, due to its reach and lethality, would be having the strategic reserves in its sights. Degrading these beyond a point may prompt a move towards the nuclear first use end of a proverbial nuclear use continuum. Fine-tuning degradation to a level in which Pakistan does not feel disarmed is the issue. In effect, leaving Pakistan at least initially only bleeding at the mouth, rather than dislocating its jaw, is what is required.

Air power: A question of nuance T

he writer, a former soldier with operational experience in Jammu and Kashmir , analyses the use of Air power in the Kargil conflict – a Limited war against a nuclear backdrop. He uses this to surmise some lessons for the nuanced use of air power as the decisive component in such conflicts. He speculates on the content of a new air power Doctrine. The best war aim is a better peace. A better peace in an India-Pakistan context would be one that minimally ensures the retraction of Pakistan’s policy of proxy war and maximally ushers in democratic peace by assisting Pakistan to democratise. In both cases it would involve the application of combat power in such a manner as to degrade the Pakistani Army, not only as a significant fighting force in the context of the conflict underway, but more important from India’s political aims point of view, as a post conflict political player in Pakistan.

A graduated plan to break its jaw without knocking it down and to knock it down but not out for the count needs to be preplanned. The rethink this will prompt in the Pakistani Army is to retrieve as much as it can from the deteriorating situation. In the circumstance, it could settle for the peace talks, diplomatically on offer simultaneously. Not degraded beyond a point, it will prevent an extremist exploitable vacuum from developing. Yet, degraded enough, post-conflict it would not be able to reclaim its privileged space in polity, thereby allowing democracy to deepen. The saliencies built into the air campaign will provide it a fire break to throw in the towel without appearing to do so. It would be churlish not to allow it to save face. After all, both states would be sharing a common interest against a spiral. Bringing this about is indeed a tall order for the HQs IDS and the Air Force. However, provisioning political aims in a conflict with a nuclear backdrop cannot be any less. Indeed, only if the military is

able to furnish a plausible answer to this can the political leadership even countenance war as a means. If deterrence does not quite work, it is not a given that compellence will either. While any answer would no doubt carry risks, the usual refrain that Pakistan’s ‘bluff’ be called through an exhibition of political will is unconvincing. The military leadership – and that of the air force in particular – would require coming up with answers in the form of doctrines adapted to the nuclear age.

The air campaign would be part of a joint orchestration of military power to sensitise the Pakistani military leadership that worse is in store. The air force fit into this picture would be one of causing unmistakable hurt in quick time, one it is in a better positioned to deliver than certainly the army For its part, there is an onus on the political leadership too. The grammar of war being inescapable, the political head must not assign the military instrument a task it cannot perform. Political aims must be conditioned

by the nature of the military instrument and the environment of its application. The affordability of any risks will have to be viewed in light of the nuclear backdrop. Therefore, a consideration of the joint and individual answers of each service, in particular the air force, needs perusing. This is a political function, that can be enhanced no doubt with the able input of the national security bureaucracy, but nevertheless is in the political domain. The doctrinal domain is therefore one that is not entirely the military’s preserve. Doctrines can do with political imprimatur. Its stellar performance in the Kargil War, matching that of air warriors, firepower wielders and the ‘poor bloody infantry’, suggests that a productive review is not beyond India’s political leadership. The third edition of the air doctrine readying for release, perhaps as early as Air Force Day this year, it can provide an opportunity and a setting for a renewed discussion of the place of force in India’s repertoire and that of the arguably more consequential air power within it.

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

WAKE-UP CALL

Pallavi Ade The writer is currently the Publications Manager at Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi. Before joining CLAWS, she has worked with Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security (RUSI), London. At RUSI, she researched on India and its neighbourhood and also worked as project manager for projects related to India. She has completed her MA in International Studies and Diplomacy from School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London. Her current research interests lie in strategic aspects of Indian Defence, India’s defence modernisation and study of India’s relations with its neighbours. India is confronting not only the danger of a two-front war with Pakistan and China but also the danger of two-front modernisation programmes of these two countries. There is a need for the government to make sure that the critical acquisition projects are not caught in the red tape but are processed at a quick speed, after necessary evaluation of the acquisition process

With its newly acquired strength, the PAF is moving away from being only a defensive force to being an offensive and defensive one, in equal measure. With new precision weapons, the PAF will be able to conduct limited strikes to achieve maximum damage on India

he writer sounds a clear wake-up call Is the IAF losing its traditional edge over the PAF? Caught in the infamous Indian bureaucratic red tape, the procurement process of IAF has been considerably delayed. To add to the woes, is the inadequate performance of India’s indigenous production capabilities. A few wrong or misjudged decisions might make a top-notch air force like IAF lose its strategic advantage over its adversary. The IAF has squadron strength of around 29 squadrons against the authorised strength of 39.5 combat squadrons, as approved in late eighties. This was an interim agreement against the approved strength of 50 combat squadrons which was sanctioned in 1963, after the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Analysts fear the numbers might drop down even further before going up, which is unlikely to happen before 2020. What works for PAF is the rapid induction process which its government follows. Critical defence deals are cleared faster as compared to India, where government and bureaucrats have been accused of sitting on key acquisition files for years. Given the post-2014 scenario, modernisation of Indian defence structure needs immediate attention. The danger of future wars with Pakistan and China persists and India’s defence establishment must plan and prepare accordingly. Denial won’t work.

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

s the Indian Air Force (IAF) losing its traditional security advantage over the Pakistan Air Force (PAF)? Is PAF finally achieving its much desired and long cherished parity with its arch-rival, IAF? Given the size and capability of the IAF, it has traditionally had an upper hand over the PAF but the numbers and capability advantage that the IAF always enjoyed seems to be rapidly dwindling. The PAF, on the other hand, seems to be progressing rapidly, on its path to modernisation with procurement of fighter aircraft, force multipliers, long-range missiles and improving its training programme, thus reducing the technology gap between the two nations, to an all time low. The most disturbing of all is the combat force ratio which is presently at 1:1.7, with some analysts fearing that it might drop further lower to 1:1.2. The squadron ratio is also at an “historic low” at 9.5:11, which is almost equal. This is a wake-up call for the Indian military planners. Caught in the infamous Indian bureaucratic red tape, the procurement process of IAF has been considerably delayed. To add to the woes, is the inadequate performance of India’s indigenous production capabilities. A few wrong or misjudged decisions might make a top-notch air force like IAF lose its strategic advantage over its adversary. In Pakistan, the army has always been on the forefront of Pakistan’s modernisation programme and received the maximum benefits. After the Kargil War, efforts were made to modernise the PAF, given the operational failures the air force encountered during the war. With its newly acquired strength, the PAF is moving away from being only a defensive force to being an offensive and defensive one, in equal measure. With new precision weapons, the PAF will be able to conduct limited strikes to achieve maximum damage on India.

Numerical advantage With 1,27,000+ strong personnel strength, the Indian Air Force has always had numerical advantage over Pakistan Air Force, which has a personnel strength of about 45,000. IAF has a combat aircraft strength hovering around the 600 mark while for PAF the number hovers around the 400 mark. The IAF has squadron strength of around 29 squadrons against the authorised

The reality of PAF modernisation: A call for immediate focus on IAF

strength of 39.5 combat squadrons, as approved in late eighties. This was an interim agreement against the approved strength of 50 combat squadrons which was sanctioned in 1963, after the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Analysts fear the numbers might drop down even further before going up, which is unlikely to happen before 2020; which is when the Indian Air Force is proposed to complete induction of the MMRCA acquisition and the much delayed Light Combat Aircraft (LCA), Tejas. This makes the implementation of the MMRCA acquisition for which Dassault’s Rafale has been chosen, to be inducted at the earliest. The Rafale and Tejas together, could help push the combat squadron strength of IAF to 42+ squadrons. The PAF has a squadron strength of 22 combat squadrons, which presently gives near parity to PAF against the IAF. Building of the squadron strength is extremely important given the rapid pace of modernisation of the PAF, working in conjunction with the Chinese Air Force, which is, on its own rapid path of modernisation. In

their modernisation efforts Pakistan has access to both US and Chinese technologies, which makes the scenario even grimmer.

IAF has a large contingent of high-performance aircraft, operates more Beyond Visual Range (BVR) capable platforms, its aircraft are equipped with better on-board sensors and EW systems and its pilots are believed to be more proficient in advanced air combat tactics as compared to their Pakistani counterparts. The IAF possesses superior combat support aircraft, better infrastructure and a continually improving integrated air defence network. However, where IAF is failing is the depleting number of its combat aircraft due to aging fleet The qualitative changes in the acquisition programme of PAF, makes these numbers even more troubling. After 9/11, Pakistan, by virtue of being the partner with USA in its ‘war on terror’, has gained

access to high-quality US products. PAF is acquiring a new F-16 fleet with purchase of F-16C/D Block-52 aircraft, fitted with advanced radars, electronic warfare (EW) systems and advanced aerial weapon systems. PAF is also improving its present F-16 fleet with purchase of F-16A/B Block-15 aircraft from the US as part of its Mid-Life Upgrade (MLU) standard. PAF has modernised its air defence structure by acquisition of TPS-77 High Level Radar from US. Along with this, from US, PAF has ordered 500 IAM-120C5 Advanced Medium Range Air-toAir Missiles (AMRAAM) and 200 AIM-9M Sidewinder Short Range Air-to-Air Missiles (SRAAM) to arm the F-16, necessary to maintain air superiority. With US imports, there is a quality enhancement of the products of PAF, which increases the anxiety as higher quality would mean better survivability of the aircraft and weapons, less maintenance and it also gives Pakistan a strategic linkage with the US.

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

WAKE-UP CALL

If USA provides Pakistan with the quality enhancement and a strategic partner in the Western World, then in China, Pakistan has the “all-weather friend,” on whom it can depend to provide the quantity and quality of products and also have a friend who will side with Pakistan in adversities. Enemy’s enemy is a friend. This statement holds true for the strategic partnership of China and Pakistan, where both sides have a common adversary, India. From the Chinese, PAF is scheduled to acquire 250 new JF-17 aircraft (commonly known as Thunder) which will form the core of its future combat capability. Together with the F-16 and JF-17 fleets, PAF could own some 350 fourth-generation combat aircraft, armed with advanced sensors and air-to-air weaponry. Such a large number of fourth-generation combat aircraft, can be punch to any enemy of Pakistan, which in present circumstances is only India.

Given the size and capability of the IAF, it has traditionally had an upper hand over the PAF but the numbers and capability advantage that the IAF always enjoyed seems to be rapidly dwindling. The PAF, on the other hand, seems to be progressing rapidly, on its path to modernisation with procurement of fighter aircraft, force multipliers, long-range missiles and improving its training programme, thus reducing the technology gap between the two nations, to an all time low. The most disturbing of all is the combat force ratio which is presently at 1:1.7, with some analysts fearing that it might drop further lower to 1:1.2. The squadron ratio is also at an “historic low” at 9.5:11, which is almost equal According to some news sources, the JF-17 is already under production in Pakistan, thus tremendously benefiting Pakistan and helps it to enhance its domestic defence production capabilities. This learning experience means an increase in the indigenous defence production capabilities of Pakistan which, in future, will help Pakistan build an indigenous defence industry, leading to self-reliance. The Pakistan strategy is pretty clear. It first enters into a joint partnership of defence production to

provide its domestic industry with much needed learning experience and then in future, concentrate on its indigenous capability.

Unholy alliance What has got many Indian defence experts and decision-makers worried is that the Chinese plan to raise a squadron of advanced, multi-role, all-weather fighter aircraft J-10B, to Pakistan. Pakistan will be the only other country in the world, other than China to possess this sophisticated fighter aircraft. Right now, by raising just one squadron, Pakistan might not benefit much but there is no denying the fact that in future, given the Sino-Pak strategic partnership, this can be a cause of concern for India. The strategic partnership of China and Pakistan means that India is in a vulnerable position with its two big adversaries and neighbours, collaborating together. Air Commodore (Retd) Jasjit Singh, Director at the New Delhi-based think-tank, Centre for Airpower Studies (CAPS), in an interview to the newspaper DNA told, “India now not only faces the possibility of a two-front war but has to also deal with a two-front military modernisation programme with China supplying its latest weaponry to Pakistan.” The China partnering with Pakistan is no-longer the China of the eighties who possessed vintage aircraft and weaponry. This China is a far cry from that one and is a nation which is at the forefront of the technological developments happening in the defence industry. Presence of an AEW&C system increases the situational awareness of the fighter and bomber aircraft and yields better results in any campaign. PAF felt the strong need for AEW&C systems during the Kargil War in 1999. Pakistan has opted for four Saab-2000 AEW&C systems from Sweden and four additional Y-8 AEWs from China. Pakistan has also enhanced its Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities by acquiring a Falco Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) from Italy. With PAF inducting the Il-78M aircraft, India no longer has the mid-air refueller advantage. These acquisitions will improve for

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

PAF, survivability of ground-based air defence and enable combat aircraft to operate more effectively in both defensive and offensive missions against India.

Is the Indian Air Force (IAF) losing its traditional security advantage over the Pakistan Air Force (PAF)? Is PAF finally achieving its much desired and long cherished parity with its archrival, IAF? PAF is participating in various multinational exercises to assess the training standards and skills of PAF’s pilots and crew. Joint exercises help in the learning experience of the pilots as these pilots get to fly world’s highly advanced combat aircraft which include F-15, F-22, Rafale, Eurofighter, F-16, and Mirage-2000-9, among many other advanced combat aircraft. International and joint exercises also help to enhance the interoperability capability of PAF. In recent years, PAF has held international and joint exercises with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, United States and Jordon among many other nations. PAF has a few years before it can achieve any kind of parity with the IAF. The IAF still enjoys significant advantages over the PAF. IAF has a large contingent of high-performance aircraft, operates more Beyond Visual Range (BVR) capable platforms, its aircraft are equipped with better on-board sensors and EW system, and its pilots are believed to be more proficient in advanced air combat tactics as compared to their Pakistani counterparts. The IAF possesses superior combat support aircraft, better infrastructure and a continually improving integrated air defence network. However, where IAF is failing is the depleting number of its combat aircraft due to aging fleet, which possess high degree of threats and reduce the air force’s flexibility in a war-like scenario. While these limitations might be less significant in a scenario of a limited war but will be critical and damaging in event of a full-scale war. The risks are even more critical due to the danger of two-front war that India faces, collectively, from China and Pakistan. India’s

conventional

arms

build -up has always made Pakistan feel threatened. It is due to this reason that Pakistan has so vigorously pursued its nuclear and missile programme. It is the same reason why Pakistan has sought to partner with China, providing China access to its Gwadar port and help China set shop in the Pakistan-occupied region of Kashmir (PoK). India’s growing strategic partnership with USA and its global stature of an emerging power, threatens Pakistan. India’s defence modernisation programmes hence seem to make the Pakistani establishment, insecure. Take for example India’s recently concluded MMRCA deal. The MMRCA is threatening for Pakistan because it augments India’s air power and worsens the conventional arms asymmetry which exists between the two nations. It is to counter India’s increasing air power, that PAF has followed a multi-pronged modernisation strategy which involves modernisation and upgrade of its combat aircraft fleets, acquisition of force multipliers like AEW&C systems and multirole tanker transport aircraft, inducting UAVs and enhancing the skills of its pilots through training and participation in national and international exercises.

In recent years, PAF has held international and joint exercises with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, United States and Jordon among many other nations What works for PAF is the rapid induction process which its government follows. Critical defence deals are cleared faster as compared to India, where government and bureaucrats have been accused of sitting on key acquisition files for years. The decision on the MMRCA deal was reached ten years after the IAF raised the urgent needs for fighter aircraft to replace its aging fleet. The lack in quick decision-making for critical defence acquisitions is coupled with a dismal state of India’s indigenous defence industry. This is highlighted in the delay in induction of the LCA, Tejas which has been in the making for the longest time and unfortunately, there is still no end date for when this aircraft will be “successfully” inducted in the IAF fleet.

Air Power has played a crucial role in all wars of the past century or so. Air force provides to any nation speed, reach, flexibility, mobility and lethality, in event of a war. Even though given its sheer size, the Indian Army has always been the focus of India’s modernisation programmes, Indian decision-makers have increasingly realised the importance of air power and hence the recent shift in focus towards large-scale acquisitions for the IAF. In the prevailing scenario with Pakistan, with the possibility of limited war under the nuclear shadow being more likely, the role of IAF is critical to keep the war short for India, with minimum damage to the nation. India is confronting not only the danger of a two-front war with Pakistan and China but also the danger of two-front modernisation programmes of these two countries. There is a need for the government to make sure that the critical acquisition projects are not caught in the red tape but are processed at a quick speed, after necessary evaluation of the acquisition process. A recently released report by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on the Kargil War titled “Airpower at 18,000: The Indian Air Force in the Kargil War” talks about the myriad of challenges that IAF faced during this war. It brings to light the initial near-total lack of transparency and open communication between Indian Army and Air Force. Also, the report says that the Kargil conflict was a “poor test” of India’s warfare

capability. The report highlights that in the future too India’s defence planners might find themselves ill-prepared for any war-like scenario given their lack of will to focus on the dangers looming on the nation. A modern Indian Air Force would be important to provide India’s ground forces the much needed support to carry out operations in event of a war with Pakistan or China. It is important for India to not only focus on its own modernisation programme but to keep a look out on what both Pakistan and China are doing, separately and together. Finally, as the NATO forces withdraw from Afghanistan by 2014, India needs to prepare for the post-2014 scenario. The experience of the first Afghan War should serve as a wake-up call; when in the early 1990s, at the end of the Afghan War, insurgents had crossed over to the Indian side of Kashmir, starting an insurgency which the Indian state is still fighting. We need to keep in mind that insurgents are much stronger and confident this time around, after what they perceive as a victory over the Western forces. India would, naturally, be their next target in their war against – as claimed by them – anti-Islam forces. Given the post-2014 scenario, modernisation of Indian defence structure needs immediate attention. The danger of future wars with Pakistan and China persists and India’s defence establishment must plan and prepare accordingly. Denial won’t work.

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

PERILOUS GEOPOLITICS

A Amb Arundhati Ghose The writer joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1963. Served in various capacities in MEA and in Missions abroad in Austria, the Netherlands, Bangladesh and Permanent Mission of India in New York. Was in charge of economic relations as AS(ER) when economic reforms were launched in 1991. Served in the Branch Secretariat of the Ministry to liaise with the Bangladesh government in exile in Calcutta. Served as Ambassador in Egypt, South Korea, as Permanent Representative to UNESCO and to the UN Offices in Geneva. Was also Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament. Was Member and Chairman of UN Secretary General’s Disarmament Advisory Board from 1998 to 2001. Currently on Global India Forum Kolkata as Vice President and Member of its Executive Council and Adjunct Fellow at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore. Was member of Task Force set up in 2007, by MEA on non-proliferation and Disarmament.

The Syrian crisis cannot be easily disentangled from the ones facing Iran; if one looks at some of the albeit worst case scenarios, any military action against Iran or against Syria, even declaring ‘no-fly zones’ as proposed by France, would have major global spillover effects. The forces that have been let loose would almost certainly spread to territories outside the Middle East

n excellent analysis of the emerging fault line conflict between the Shia and Sunni countries now playing out in Syria. The Second Gulf War and the invasion of Iraq led to consequences which are today determining the outlines of the current crises – in the Arab world in general and in Syria in particular. There were at least three major consequences. These were, the so-called Arab Spring, the hardening of the Shia-Sunni divide within the Ummah and the emergence of Iran as a regional power. The ease with which Saddam Hussein’s regime was dismantled – with foreign intervention, was an important factor in the impulses which resulted in the revolt of the peoples of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya against the dictatorial though secular regimes in these countries. The new element has been the use of the social media when mainstream media faced controls; this has caused concerns in other states and not only those of centralised states such as China. All these trends have coalesced in Syria, where the Shia-Sunni divide has divided the Arab world and threatens to spillover worldwide. Turkey has reportedly joined Arab Sunni states like Saudi Arabia and Qatar in funding and arming and providing ‘safe havens’ for the opposition ‘rebels’. There are credible reports that many of these ‘rebels’ are not Syrian, but an unholy mix of Sunni Chechens, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Yemenis, with groups of al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood among the more organised elements in the otherwise disorganised Free Syrian Army. Syria’s strongest regional supporter is, of course, Iran. The recent personal invitation to the Iranian President from the Saudi King to the emergency session of the OIC, might indicate some backroom efforts to stabilise the situation. Action against Syria under the aegis of the UN has been effectively stalled by vetoes by both Russia and China. It is in India’s interests to prevent such a fault line war in the Muslim Ummah.

n anniversary issue gives one an opportunity to step back from viewing the ebb and flow of the current and to take a wider view from a not-too-distant shore and to try and read the portents of the welling of the sea, the threatening of a tidal wave. A ‘tide’, for some accuracy, has been variously described primarily as ‘the alternate rising and falling of the sea due to the attraction of the moon and sun’ and ‘a powerful surge of feeling or trend of events’. Today, events in the Middle East in general and in Syria in particular, are viewed by most commentators mainly through immediate and bloody events, with different interpretations of these events by countries with differing goals. India’s votes in the UN, with the Arab League and the West in the Security Council and abstaining in the vote in the General Assembly, have been judged from this perspective, reflective of a short or medium term judgement of India’s interests. But what if the tide swells and spreads, what if it becomes a global tsunami and the “Syrian moment’, as it were, becomes as portentous as the assassination, almost a hundred years ago, in Sarajevo? The likelihood is no longer only a probability; there are currents that would seem to make this a near and ‘blood-dimmed’ certainty.

The tide has started lapping at our shores; Malaysia has suspended its diplomatic relations with Syria after the OIC suspended Syria’s membership and Pakistan, where sectarian violence is endemic and which has been seen by many commentators as the epicentre for the export of terrorists, has seen a rise in the hunting down of minorities especially Shias

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

“loosening the blood-dimmed tide”* Emerging fault lines Without going into pre-history, – which one would have to if the issues were related purely to religious sectarian rivalries, or indeed only political and ideological ones, (after all, it has long been conventional wisdom that the next worldwide war would start in the Middle East) – it would have to be admitted that the fault lines becoming apparent today might be traced to years more recent, when ambitions for power and control began to be stoked by the sudden and almost unexpected wealth created by the first oil shock in the 1970s and the interventions by outside powers upset delicate balances in complex regional rivalries. What started as diplomatic jostling for leadership within the Ummah between Saudi Arabia, made newly powerful not merely by immense oil wealth but by its courting as a power in global affairs by the established old powers of the West and the Iran of the Shah who saw a revival of dreams of the Persian Empire of old, injected the concept of ‘political Islam’ into international discourse. The use of ‘political Islam’ to oust the failing

Soviet rule over Afghanistan, encouraged in part by the Iranian revolution that saw the establishment of a purely theocratic state, engendered the arming and funding of disparate groups, which were led to believe they were in the vanguard of defending Islam against the atheist. As the Soviet Union withdrew, these groups were lauded as ‘mujahideen’ victors of the war for Islam.

Turkey has reportedly joined Arab Sunni states like Saudi Arabia and Qatar in funding and arming and providing ‘safe havens’ for the opposition ‘rebels’. There are credible reports that many of these ‘rebels’ are not Syrian, but an unholy mix of Sunni Chechens, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Yemenis, with groups of al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood among the more organised elements in the otherwise disorganised Free Syrian Army. It cannot be discounted that the Kurds are similarly supported by Syria and Iran The second Gulf War and the

invasion of Iraq led to consequences which are today determining the outlines of the current crises – in the Arab world in general and in Syria in particular. Whether the US could have, should have or whether it ignored the possibility of these consequences is not the issue here: there is no doubt there were at least three major consequences which unsettled such stability as had existed in the region before the invasion. These were, at a level, the so-called Arab Spring, the hardening of the Shia-Sunni divide within the Ummah and the emergence of Iran as a regional power. According to some influential Arab commentators, the ease with which Saddam Hussein’s regime was dismantled – with foreign intervention, to be sure, was an important factor in the impulses which resulted in the revolt of the peoples of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya – three neighbouring but very different countries – against the dictatorial though secular regimes in these countries. Iraq had also been a ‘secular’ country, though a Sunni minority formed the elite

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

PERILOUS GEOPOLITICS

in power and the majority Shia were ruthlessly suppressed. The equally ruthless dismantling of the structures of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq by the American occupation forces turned Iraq into a Shia majority country closely allied to Iran. The introduction of religion, specifically the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood into the governing structures of these countries was also presaged by the changes in Iraq. The new element making the mixture more complex has been the use of the social media when mainstream media faced controls; this has caused concerns in other states and not only those of centralised states such as China.

Today Israel appears to be straining at the leash to mount an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities; faced with an impending election, the US, in an effort to restrain such a disastrous step, has tightened sanctions on Iran almost effectively isolating Iran economically

Shia-Sunni divide All these trends have coalesced in Syria, where the Shia-Sunni divide has divided the Arab world and threatens to spillover worldwide. Turkey, which had envisaged a leadership role for itself following the early days after the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, presenting itself as a ‘model’ of a democratic, modern Islamic state, has found its support for the Sunni rebels in Syria being challenged not only among its Alevi (Alawite-Shia) minority – 15 per cent of its population, but threats from Syrian Kurds who have been trying to make common cause with the Turkish Kurds (20 per cent of its population). Syria is reported to have ceded control over several areas in its north to its Kurds, with the latter raising the Kurdish flag over governmental buildings. Turkey has reportedly joined Arab Sunni states like Saudi Arabia and Qatar in funding and arming and providing ‘safe havens’ for the opposition ‘rebels’. There are credible reports that many of these ‘rebels’ are not Syrian, but an unholy mix of Sunni Chechens, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Yemenis, with groups of al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood among the more

organised elements in the otherwise disorganised Free Syrian Army. It cannot be discounted that the Kurds are similarly supported by Syria and Iran. Shia Iraq has its own problems with its Kurds, but the country has been more supportive of Arab Shia Syria than other Sunni members of the Arab League. Sunnis and Alawites are already fighting in Lebanon with Hezbollah threatening armed retaliation if Syria were to be attacked and Jordan is on the edge. Syria’s strongest regional supporter is, of course, Iran. The strengthening of Iran is also a direct consequence of the collapse of the Sunni led regime of Saddam Hussein. That the current hostilities between both major sects poses a threat to Islamic unity, vis-à-vis the US and the West for Iran and from movements to topple established regimes from Saudi Arabia, seems to have been recognised by both countries; the recent personal invitation to the Iranian President from the Saudi King to the emergency session of the OIC, the high level composition of the Iranian delegation, the seating of Ahmedinijad on the right of King Abdullah might indicate some backroom efforts to stabilise the situation. Iran is also reported to have announced that it had a proposal to sort out the situation in Syria at (at the time of writing) the forthcoming NAM Summit to be held in Iran would seem to be a pointer in this direction. However, given that the situation has now several non-regional countries and non-state actors involved any such attempt might be difficult to implement. Iran of course faces challenges on two-fronts – in the Syrian situation and, long predating even the invasion of Iraq, with Israel, the US and the West over Iran’s alleged determination to develop nuclear weapons. Today, whether for domestic political reasons or not, Israel appears to be straining at the leash to mount an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities; faced with an impending election, the US, in an effort to restrain such a disastrous step, has tightened sanctions on Iran almost effectively isolating Iran economically. In Syria, the US sees an opportunity to weaken Iran further and has supported the Sunni Arabs and Turkey, even

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

threatening military action in the event Syria uses or even moves its chemical weapons, in addition to other support already being extended to the so-called ‘rebels’. Action against Syria under the aegis of the UN has been effectively stalled by vetoes by both Russia and China. Apart from Russia’s close friendship with Syria, the experience of NATO action in Libya and its fear of Chechen militants becoming empowered to act in Central Asia, the many initiatives taken by Russia would seem to signal a more assertive global role by Putin’s Russia. China has been less active, but has consistently opposed the involvement of outside powers to effect regime change using the UN for military action. Some China watchers feel that China is being cautious, as officially, at least, it has cited the Libyan case; it is possible that it would change its stance once its change of guard is smoothly accomplished in October. Others feel that notwithstanding its global stature, there is a degree of nervousness about possible external incitement in its restive provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang. Whatever the reasons, the world is gradually becoming divided as the impact of the trends in the Middle East as a whole but in Syria in particular, starts spilling over outside the region, even into Africa. The tide has started lapping at our shores; Malaysia has suspended its diplomatic relations with Syria after the OIC suspended Syria’s membership and Pakistan, where sectarian violence is endemic and which has been seen by many commentators as the epicentre for the export of terrorists, has seen a rise in the hunting down of minorities especially Shias. Indeed, India’s stake in stability in the region has increased manifold.

Perilous geopolitics The Syrian crisis cannot be easily disentangled from the ones facing Iran; if one looks at some of the albeit worst case scenarios, any military action against Iran or against Syria, even declaring ‘no-fly zones’ as proposed by France, would have major global spillover effects. The forces that have been let loose would almost certainly

spread to territories outside the Middle East. This would also be the case if the perilous geopolitical situation described earlier, continues at the current bloody levels. Taking an overview of the situation, it appears that, unlike other recent crises – Iraq and Afghanistan, the major powers are no longer the major determinant of a possible solution: today, most US positions seem to be taken in the throes of Presidential election fever, tempered into trying to ensure that while Iran can be weakened by a Syrian implosion with the provision of a limited number of arms to the ‘rebels’, Israeli hawks need to be restrained from actually attacking Iran. The UK and France are merely mischief-makers, with little power to act on their own; given the stalemate in the Security Council, they (and Turkey) may try to energise NATO, as in the case with Libya. In the Libyan case, however, the centrality of the West in settling disputes in the Middle East had already started to erode, presaged by the split within NATO on the issue of Iraq. Russia and China may have the veto, but China is unlikely to get directly involved, given its clashing ideological and economic interests in

the region and Russia is hardly likely to have the stamina of facing down the West and the Sunni world alone. The crucial countries in a possible solution are Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Action against Syria under the aegis of the UN has been effectively stalled by vetoes by both Russia and China. Apart from Russia’s close friendship with Syria, the experience of NATO action in Libya and its fear of Chechen militants becoming empowered to act in Central Asia, the many initiatives taken by Russia would seem to signal a more assertive global role by Putin’s Russia. China has been less active, but has consistently opposed the involvement of outside powers to effect regime change using the UN for military action. Some China watchers feel that China is being cautious The forces of extremist groups which were let loose in Afghanistan, have gained in power and ambition. India has been subject to their vicious depredation for decades. There is no doubt that in addition to India’s own economic interests and its expatriate

population in the Gulf, the dangers of a Global War of Terror would pose extreme challenges to India’s security, should it, as it is bound to, if the worst case scenarios happen – unless India, having first-hand experience of dealing with these forces, at least tries to do more than merely ride out the storm. One possible direction could be for India to mediate between Iran and Saudi Arabia – the countries that have the power to limit the stalemate or escalation. It is just possible that, notwithstanding the public action of the OIC, given the unusual cordiality of the interaction between the King of Saudi Arabia and the Iranian President at the OIC meeting in Riyadh, some deal was negotiated; at the very least, it is clear that both countries would see a continuation of the Syrian crisis as being harmful to themselves and to the Ummah. All India would need to do would be to support the initiative and press for its implementation – on whatever lines agreed to – by both countries. If there is any give on the part of both and, India could use the challenges she faces at the moment in the current situation, as bilateral leverages for encouragement, other countries, the US and Russia, for example, could also be asked to support an Iranian-Saudi led solution. If we fail, there is near certainty that the war will go global – and unlike any of the earlier World Wars, it will be a war without clearly defined armies, state against state, state against non-state actors and non-state actors against other similar groups with no loyalties except to their own ambitions. It will be a war without end. * W B Yeats: The Second Coming “Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world, The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere The ceremony of innocence is drowned; The best lack all conviction, while the worst Are full intensity.”

passionate

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

HOMELAND SECURITY

India: Terror Outfits and Jihad T

he transnational links amongst various militant groups and criminal organisations due to geographic overlap of operations requires a great deal of understanding on transnational links between terrorist outfits and criminal organisations. The environment for these overlaps and points of opportunities are Prisons, Cyberspace, Social Network sites, territories and regions with no governance and more corruption, border regions (IDP – Internally Displaced People – also causes a concern), conflict or post-conflict zones, overcrowded mega cities and poverty, last but not the least – hostile governments who sponsor and support terrorist activities to use this MO as a strategic tool for political agenda.

ndia has the potential to be a true global power and the potential to dominate the global economy. 21st century Asia could be led by India or China on it’s own.

The Achilles’ heel is the internal instability, serious challenges from the armed Naxal rebels,

insurgent and separatist groups such as ULFA and other international terrorist groups such as LeT, JeM with it’s fidayeen attacks and proximity to two key terrorist strongholds, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Armed both sides with NW (Nuclear Weapons), Indo-Pakistan border is the most tense area on the planet. Lashkar-e-Taiba, also known as Army of the Righteous, is one of the largest and most proficient of the militant groups, which poses a significant threat to India. Progressively targeted from outside and with internal unstable security India is one of the world’s most distressed countries. Kashmir remains the site of the world’s largest and most militarised territorial dispute with portions under the de facto administration of China (Aksai Chin), India (Jammu and Kashmir), and Pakistan (Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas)1

The columnist is an Intelligence and Terrorism Analyst, Clinical Psychologist and Clinical Hypnotherapist based in SouthEast Asia. She has also received training in specialised areas including counter-terrorism, intelligence and tactical operations. She specialises in cognitive learning processes and neural pathway response and how these factors apply to specialised trainings. She is an expert in the field of non-verbal micro and macro expression for deception and detection and also using non-verbal assets for psychological self-assessment in conjunction with Emotional Intelligence to enhance the human mind, personality, image and spirit. She is a member of ICPA (International Corrections and Prisons Association), IACSP (International Association for Counter-Terrorism and Security Professionals) and a member of APA (American Psychological Association), APP (Association of Professional Psychologists), UK Certified Hypnotherapist and General Hypnotherapy Register.

Dr Rupali Jeswal

Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad, a Pakistan-based Islamic fundamentalist missionary organisation founded in the 1980s to oppose the Soviets in Afghanistan. Since 1993, LeT has conducted numerous attacks against Indian troops and civilian targets in the disputed Jammu and Kashmir state, as well as several high-profile attacks inside India itself, and concern over new LeT attacks in India remains high. The United States and United Nations have designated LeT an international terrorist organisation.2 The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) is an extremist organisation that splintered from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in the early 2000s and is currently based in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The IJU, which is committed to toppling the government in Uzbekistan, conducted two attacks there in 2004 and one in 2009. The IJU is also active in Afghanistan, where the group operates alongside the Taliban-affiliated Haqqani Network. The group has had particular success in recruiting German nationals and achieved international notoriety following the 2007 disruption of an IJU plot by the so-called Sauerland Cell to attack various targets in Germany. 2

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) also known as the Army of Mohammed, Khudamul Islam and

Group profiles of FTOs (Foreign Terrorist Organisations) as of 27th December 2011, from the National Counter Terrorism Center’s website2 are given below:

Tehrik ul-Furqaan among other names – is an extremist group based in Pakistan. It was founded by

Group profiles

Masood Azhar in early 2000 upon his release from prison in India. The group’s aim is to unite Kashmir with

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), also known as Army of the Righteous, is one of the largest and most proficient of the Kashmir-focused militant groups. LeT formed in the early 1990s as the military wing of 1. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html

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Pakistan and to expel foreign troops from Afghanistan. JeM has openly declared war against the United States.2 2. http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/index.html

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Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is an alliance of militant groups in Pakistan formed in 2007 to unify groups fighting against the Pakistani military in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. TTP leaders also hope to impose a strict interpretation of Qur‘anic instruction throughout Pakistan and to expel Coalition troops from Afghanistan. TTP maintains close ties to senior al-Qa‘ida leaders, including al-Qa‘ida’s former head of operations in Pakistan.2

Haqqani network “In a press statement issued on September 7, 2012, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton sent a report to Congress saying that the Haqqani Network meets the statutory criteria of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) for designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation (FTO). This action meets the requirements of the Haqqani Network Terrorist Designation Act of 2012 (PL 112-168). Based on that assessment, I notified Congress of my intent to designate the Haqqani Network as an FTO under the INA. I also intend to designate the organisation as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity under Executive Order 13224.”3 While the LeT and JuD are viewed as separate entities, the two groups are likely the same, enabling the JuD to increase its da`wa (missionary) and jihad activities under the LeT framework. The JuD’s leader, Hafiz Saeed, has made this point clear in his written work and public statements. In the magazine Takbeer, Saeed wrote, “Islam propounds both da`wa (proselytise) and jihad. Both are equally important and inseparable. Since our life revolves around Islam, therefore both da`wa and jihad are essential; we cannot prefer one over the other.” The symbiosis of education (da`wa) with jihad forms the basis of LeT/JuD’s political and religious power.4 Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation on October 8, 1997. HuM seeks the annexation of Indian Kashmir and expulsion of Coalition Forces in Afghanistan. Based in Muzaffarabad, Rawalpindi and several other cities in Pakistan, HuM conducts insurgent and terrorist operations primarily in Kashmir and Afghanistan. HuM trains its militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan.5 According to NCTC (National Counter Terrorism Centre), information available as of March 12, 2012 – reported attacks on India in 2011 were a total of 673. 351 attacks were from Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist). From the list of top 15 countries, shadowed with terrorist attacks, India ranked 4th. The overall number of armed attacks remains high in countries that suffer from civil disorder and insurgency and also creates an atmosphere for acts of terrorism.

According to GTD (Global Terrorism Database) there were 116 incidents caused by LeT, from 1998 to 2010 and majority of the attack type were through bombings and armed assault. Target type-ranking highest on Private citizens, Police and the Military. Weapon types in majority of the incidents were – Explosives, Bombs, Dynamite and Firearms.6

Ashley J Tellis, in his testimony before United States House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia said, “LeT today operates in Kashmir, Afghanistan, Chechnya and has been noticed in Iraq. It has fund raising operations in western Europe and in Africa”.7

capabilities, reducing it to its weakest in 10 years. However, the Taliban, the Haqqani Network and LeT remain potent threats to American interests in the region, he said “Pakistani and Afghan militant groups – Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Haqqani Network and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) continue to pose a direct threat to US interests and our allies in the region, where these groups probably will remain focused,”8 Bruce Riedel, Senior Fellow Foreign Policy at Brookins Institution (Washington based think tank) wrote in “The Daily Beast” that Mumbai attack marked the maturation of LeT from a Punjab-based terror group targeting India exclusively to a member of the global Islamic jihad targeting the enemies of al-Qa’ida: the Crusader West, Zionist Israel and Hindu India.9 On September 2, 2011, the FBI’s Washington Field Office arrested and charged a resident of Woodbridge, Virginia, with providing material support to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a designated foreign terrorist organisation. According to Federal Crime Defence Lawyer’s blog, “Mr Ahmed received religious training from LeT as a teenager in Pakistan and later attended LeT’s basic training camp.” The course he took was called, “Dora Suffa”, which according to the Deccan Herald,”is where he received instruction in religious dogma and proselytising.” The FBI investigation contends Ahmed, further received additional training at Dora A’ama”a location at which he would listen to lectures, offer prayers, exercise, study guns, fire them and he added is “where I got training from”. “They do the commando training there,” he told the FBI.10

The US State Department lists three Islamist groups active in Kashmir as foreign terrorist organisations: Harakat-ul-Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba. The first group has been listed for years and the other two were added after the December 2001 Indian Parliament attack. All three groups have attracted Pakistani members as well as Afghan and Arab veterans who fought the 1980s Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.11 LeT is not a single jihadist force, under this banner various loosely affiliated groups and individuals come into play with coordination such as JeM, TTP, Al-Q, various Deobandi groups, pro-Al-Q and the Haqqani Network leading to successful terror attacks. According to the LeT tract “Why We Do Jihad”, “if we declare war against those who have professed Faith, we cannot do war with those who haven’t.” The group seeks gradual reform through dawa. The aim is to bring the people of Pakistan to LeT’s interpretation of Ahl-e-HadithIslam and by doing so, to transform the society in which they live. Taken together, the Danish plot, the growth of LeT’s footprint in Afghanistan and its target selection there and the German Bakery bombing in India point to several trends that characterised the evolving nature of the threat in the wake of Mumbai. The first was the geographic expansion of its operations and the integration of global jihadi targets with Indian ones. The second is the fungible nature of its networks and military capabilities, which increasingly were used to strike Afghan, Indian and Western targets. The third, highlighted by the Headley case, is the possibility that personal connections might enable individuals or factions to use these networks for freelance operations. As a result, by this time the threat came not only from LeT as an organisation, which was expanding the scope of its jihad, but also from elements within it who could use the group’s capabilities if they believed the leadership was not expanding aggressively enough.12 The Deobandi clergy is the most powerful in Pakistan, partly because it attracts those clerics who oppose the state. The roots of this attraction can be found in the Deobandi domination of militant training camps in Afghanistan and Kashmir (Daily Times [Lahore], June 14, 2009).

No longer is LeT a single Kashmir-focused outfit, its international collaboration, coordination and expanded ideology makes it a transnational terrorist organisation and poses a global threat.

Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), which forms part of the current government, also subscribe to the Deobandi world view and are led by clergy who studied at Deobandi seminaries and run many seminaries themselves. Sectarian movements like the anti-Shi’a Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and the anti-Ahmadiyya Alami Majlis-i-Khatm-i-Nabuwat (AMKN) are affiliated with the Deobandi school of thought. 13

In a testimony during a Congressional hearing, Matthew G Olsen, Director of the National Counterterrorism Centre, said: Sustained counter-terrorism pressure has systematically degraded Pakistan-based al-Qa’ida’s leadership and operational

Deobandi groups have overlapping membership with each other and with the Deobandi Islamist political party, Jamiat-e-Ulema Islami (JUI). Thus, a member of JM may also be a member of LeJ (Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) or even an office holder at some level with the

3. http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/09/197474.htm 4. Lashkar-i-Tayyiba Remains Committed to Jihad, 2009. Authors Farhana Ali, Mohammad Shehzad. http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/lashkar-i-tayyibaremains-committed-to-jihad 5. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2010/170264.htm 6. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2011). Global Terrorism Database [http://www.start.umd.edu/ gtd/search/Results.aspx?chart=overtime&casualties_type=&casualties_max=&perpetrator=20275 ]. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd 7. “Bad Company–Lashkare-Tayyiba And The Growing Ambition of Islamist Militancy In Pakistan” Testimony by Ashley J Tellis Senior Associate Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 11, 2010.

8. Haqqani network, LeT the new potent threats: US Washington, September 20, 2012 http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/Americas/Haqqaninetwork-LeT-the-new-potent-threats-US/Article1-932907.aspx 9. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/07/01/mumbai-terror-attack-group-lashkar-e-tayyiba-now-more-dangerous-than-al-qaeda.html 10. http://federalcrimesblog.com/2011/09/02/jubair-ahmad-arrested-on-allegedly-providing-material-support-to-terrorist-organization-and-makingfalse-statements-in-a-terrorism-investigation/ 11. http://www.cfr.org/kashmir/kashmir-militant-extremists/p9135 12. National Security Studies Program Policy Paper: Lashkar-e-Taiba, Past Operations and Future Prospects. Author: Stephen Tankel, April 2011 13. The Deobandi Debate Terrorist Tactics in Afghanistan and Pakistan Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 21, May 28, 2010. By: Tayyab Ali Shah.

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JUI. Second, Deobandi groups have in recent years begun operating against the Pakistani state following Pakistan‘s participation in the US-led global war on terrorism. JM and LeJ (Lashkar-e-Jhangvi) for instance have collaborated with the TTP by providing suicide bombers and logistical support, allowing the TTP to conduct attacks throughout Pakistan, far beyond the TTP‘s territorial remit. Both LeT and several Deobandi militant groups have also been operating in Afghanistan against US, NATO and Afghan forces. There are several kinds of militant groups operating in and from Pakistan. Drawing from the vast descriptive literature of Pakistan‘s militant group, the militant milieu can be – and should be – meaningfully disaggregated across several dimensions, beginning with their sectarian background (eg Ahl-e-Hadith, Deoband, Jamaat Islami, etc.). They can also be distinguished by their theatres of operation (eg Afghanistan, India, Pakistan) by the makeup of their cadres (eg Arab, Central Asia, Pakistani and ethnic groups thereof) and by their objectives (eg overthrow of the Pakistan government, seize Kashmir, support the Afghan Taliban etc.) among other characteristics.14 In contrast, other Kashmiri groups are operating under the influence of the Islamist political party Jamaat-e-Islami, such as al-Badr and HM, which tend to be comprised of ethnic Kashmiris and have retained their operational focus upon Kashmir.

From a psychological and anthropological view, the shape-shifting scenarios makes one wonder about TMT (Terror Management Theory).

According to TMT (Terror Management Theory) all humans are motivated to suppress the potential for innate terror of non-existence due to the human awareness of vulnerability and mortality by investing in cultural belief systems (or worldviews) that instill life with meaning. Terror Management Theory rests on two main hypotheses. On the one hand, people who are threatened with death and the fear or issues of marginalisation (which is occurring more in today’s time due to globalisation and acculturation) that relates to it are more ready to embrace cultural values and belief systems which gives them a sense of security, identity and camaraderie. They are more likely to cling on to that which affirms and provides meaning to their existence. This is known as the mortality salience hypothesis. On the other hand, studies have also found that people tend to build self-esteem and positive self-image in order to assuage the fear of their own mortality. The latter is known as the anxiety-buffer hypothesis.

The history of the group of militants and preachers who created LeT and the connections with other groups helps us understand how militant groups develop and work together. Markaz al-Dawa wal-Irshad (MDI) and its militant wing, LeT, was founded with the help of transnational militants based in Afghanistan and aided by the Pakistani government. This allowed it to become a financially-independent social-service organisation that was able to divert a significant portion of its funding to its militant wing.

Research in Counter Terrorism and Security made me come across a fascinating piece of work and two of the authors of this study, V S Subrahmanian and Aaron Mannes have been very gracious to lend the brief for this column.

The first stirrings of militancy within this network began in 1982, when Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi travelled from Punjab, Pakistan, to Paktia, Afghanistan, to fight with Deobandi militant groups. Lakhvi, who is considered to have been the military commander of what was known as LeT and is awaiting trial for his alleged role in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, adheres to an extreme version of the Ahl-e-Hadith (AeH) interpretation of Islam, which is the South Asian version of the Salafist-Wahhabist trend in the Arab world. In the simplest of terms, AeH is more conservative and traditional than the doctrines of most militant groups operating along the Durand Line. Militants there tend to follow an extreme brand of the Deobandi branch of South Asian Sunni Islam, similar to the extreme ideology of al Qaeda’s Salafist jihadists.15

“This is the first paper that collects data and analyses LeT ’s behaviour in a systematic and structured manner. This process will ultimately allow policy-makers to apply the same kinds of data analytic tools to counterterrorism and other critical national security functions that companies like Google and Amazon already use to advise customers on how to make their next purchase.”

According to SATP (South Asia Terrorism Portal), a terrorism database on the region,

LeT’s professed ideology goes

beyond merely challenging India’s sovereignty over the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Lashkar’s ‘agenda’, as outlined in a pamphlet titled: “Why are we waging jihad” includes the restoration of Islamic rule over all parts of India. Anti-Semitism is intrinsic in Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) ideology, along with anti-Western and anti-Israel sentiment. The terrorist group’s agenda, as explained in an LeT pamphlet titled, “Why are we Waging Jihad,” is to eliminate the “existential enemies of Islam,” which are Israel, the US and India. The terrorist group has publicly advocated violence, especially against India and the United States and the destruction of Jews worldwide.16

Conclusion The transnational links amongst various militant groups and criminal organisations due to geographic overlap of operations requires a great deal of understanding on transnational links between terrorist outfits and criminal organisations and the emerging black hole of terror and threat. The overlaps will create new opportunities from one thought to another, one group to another or a combination of few or more. The environment for these overlaps and points of opportunities are Prisons, Cyberspace, Social Network sites, territories and regions with no governance and more corruption, border regions (IDP – Internally Displaced People – also causes a concern), conflict or post-conflict zones, overcrowded mega cities and poverty, last but not the least – hostile governments who sponsor and support terrorist activities to use this MO as a strategic tool for political agenda. Risk factors remain high that expanded Islamic movements similar to al- Qa’ida will converge with local insurgents, separatist movements and with technology boom, coordination and collaboration in a jiffy and morphing into decentralised, fluid cells, groups and lone-wolves. Faceless and stateless enemies dispersed everywhere to carry out operations, single acts of terror without requiring a structured training centre as more and more virtual training camps and fund-raising organisation go online with instruction / trainings materials, weapon knowledge, poisonous substances to create recopies of mass terror.

Computational analysis of Lashkar-e-Taiba: Research brief

Computational Analysis of Terrorist Groups: Lashkar-e-Taiba (Springer, September 2012) by V S Subrahmanian, Aaron Mannes, Amy Sliva, Jana Shakarian and John Dickerson is the only in-depth analysis of a terrorist group using data mining to learn temporal probabilistic rules about the group’s behaviour. These rules allow decision-makers to both make predictions about Lashkar-e-Taiba’s (LeT) behaviour and to identify policies that might reduce the group’s violent activities. It is an important step forward in using computational techniques to augment traditional human analysis. The computer model, using a dataset of 770 variables, coded monthly over twentyone years, identifies conditions under which terrorists were likely or unlikely to undertake a given action within 1-3 months of certain conditions being true in LeT’s operational environment. One example of a typical rule shows that two months after a month in which LeT was providing political support to other Islamist organisations and not engaged in intra-organisational conflicts, LeT was 91 per cent likely to carry out 1-3 attacks against Indian security installations. A Policy Computation Algorithm was used to identify those conditions that could be changed through government action which were most likely to reduce the probability of LeT violence. Overall, traditional security tools such as arrests, raids and killing LeT operatives have limited effectiveness in reducing LeT attacks. The rules did indicate that Pakistani support for LeT was a major factor – and that Pakistani crackdowns can be effective. But policy makers have found it difficult to identify the means to pressure Pakistan to cut its ties to its jihadi proxy. However, the model suggested another approach as well. LeT was less likely to attack during periods of intra-organisational disarray such as splits and internal conflicts. Fostering splits and divisions within terrorist groups is a difficult operation, but has been done before. The strategies for doing so depend on the particular group. In some cases the paranoia of top terrorist leaders was exploited, in other doctrinal differences were exacerbated. At least some of LeT’s past internal disputes revolved around allegations of corruption and nepotism. This is an organisational vulnerability that could be exploited. More information about the book can be found at http://www.umiacs.umd.edu/research/LCCD/let/index.html. More information about the Lab for Computational Cultural Dynamics can be found at: http://www.umiacs.umd.edu/resea Further Reading: Andrew G Bostom’s book “Legacy of Jihad” examines the role of institutional Islamic jihad and it’s ultimate regulation of Muslims and non-Muslims to this day. http://www.andrewbostom.org/book1/ To better understand the roots and threat of militant Islam, see http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/modern.html

14. C Christine Fair, ― Antecedents and Implications of the November 2008 Lashkar-e-Taiba Attack Upon Mumbai, testimony presented before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection on March 11, 2009. RAND Corporation testimony series. 15. http://tacstrat.com/content/index.php/2011/09/15/birth-of-militant-networks-in-pakistan/ 16. http://www.adl.org/main_Terrorism/Lashkar-e Taiba.htm?Multi_page_sections=sHeading_4

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Foreign Terrorist Organizations: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm

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V Balachandran, IPS (retd) The writer is a former Special Secretary of the Cabinet Secretariat. He was also a part of the high level committee appointed by the Maharashtra government to enquire into Mumbai 26/11 terror attacks. He is a prolific writer on intelligence, terrorism and insurgency issues and has also given lectures on these subjects at several institutions in India and abroad.

The chain of events beginning with the clashes in our north-east from July onwards and which caused very serious riots in Mumbai on August 11, 2012 and mass exodus of north-east population from several Indian cities has revealed the fragility of our national cohesion

As in the Assam affairs, we have thought of using this channel only negatively by banning certain sites or links. This is ineffective since new links can always be formed. We have not thought of using this medium positively for conveying correct information. For that we should have an alert and coordinated intelligence and technical capability which should foresee such developments including trans-border events

A I D N I IN

he chain of events beginning with the clashes in our north-east from July onwards which are still continuing as this is written and which caused very serious riots in Mumbai on August 11, 2012 and mass exodus of north-east population from several Indian cities has revealed the fragility of our national cohesion. It also exposed the weaknesses of our internal security mechanism in ensuring safety and security of our citizens, which is the basic requirement in any democracy. Our institutional mechanism to deal with such disorders failed, the chief among them the National Security Council system which was set up in 1998 with great fanfare to improve our security. It further demonstrated how ineffective were the whole series of systemic improvements introduced in our security after the 1999 “Kargil” military attack and the 26/11 terrorist attack in Mumbai. Above all it also revealed how ineffective was our Home Ministry and their powerful organs in coordinating inter-state security.

Security organisations without legal charter or accountability

e saw in the Assam related developments the power of some sections of the media in distorting facts and creating adverse public opinion. The power of media and the process of public opinion formation in a free society had undergone radical change due to Internet and faster means of communications like TV or FM Radio. Serious law and order problems had started occurring well beyond the control of regulatory authorities when instant adverse opinion was formed. It also exposed the weaknesses of our internal security mechanism in ensuring safety and security of our citizens. This should not have been so had we taken care to effect meaningful improvements in our national security system instead of copying some models from abroad without insisting on their legality and accountability which were codified in the original models. Even now we do not know how our NSC, which has no legal basis, although working directly under the PM, shares their charter over internal security with the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), which is legally charged with that responsibility. For some time, our NSC under high profile National Security Advisers (NSAs) used to overshadow the MHA and MEA in making policy pronouncements but this ended in 2008 with a new Minister of Home Affairs who insisted on his being the Chief strategist for security policy.

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This should not have been so had we taken care to effect meaningful improvements in our national security system instead of copying some models from abroad without insisting on their legality and accountability which were codified in the original models. When the NDA government introduced the NSC system in 1998 for coordinating security policy decisions and integrating intelligence on the model of US National Security Council, it was thought that the ambiguity by way of effecting piece-meal decisions and parallel intelligence processing by different ministries and agencies would end. Unfortunately this did not happen. Even now we do not know how our NSC, which has no legal basis, although working directly under the PM, shares their charter over internal security with the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), which is legally charged with that responsibility. For some time, our NSC under high profile National Security Advisers (NSAs) used to overshadow the MHA and MEA in making policy pronouncements but this ended in 2008 with a new Minister of Home Affairs who insisted on his being the Chief strategist for security policy. However even as late as 2011 our NSC has not even released “an official document outlining a National Security Strategy for India”. 1 In 1998 well before the creation of our NSC, I had written an op-ed in a leading national daily 2 recommending that our NSC should be legally empowered with a clear charter for coordinating policy and intelligence. Unfortunately this was not done. Our NSC failed in their very first test, i.e., developing a holistic assessment on the Kargil threat by integrating bits and pieces on intelligence already available with our government and evolving policy. They could meet only on June 8, 1999 a month after the incursions were noticed. 3 They similarly failed to integrate available intelligence prior to the 26/11 terror attack on Mumbai. This terror attack also saw the strange spectacle of some wings of the central government like Mumbai branch of the Intelligence Bureau and Special Protection Group (SPG), who were present in one of the affected hotels till as late as 8 pm on November 26, 2008, not knowing about the impending serious terrorist attack, which, it was claimed by a responsible media leader, the NSC secretariat already knew. 4 As regards Maharashtra government, the then Home Minister Shri Jayant Patil had told the Legislative Assembly on December 19, 2008 that the Central Advisory on the alert was sent only to the navy and not to the state or Coast Guards.5 Do we need any more examples of lack of coordination in security management? The strangest irony in the entire process was to see our first National Security Adviser (NSA), who was also doubling up as Principal Secretary to the PM during the Kargil Crisis, telling years later to a national TV channel 6 that there was no need to have set up an Indian National Security Council at all! The fact that he had held the charge of NSA for 1. (Arvind Gupta, IDSA paper dated Oct 20, 2011). http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ANationalSecurityStrategyDocumentforIndia_arvindgupta_201011 2. (V Balachandran: Times of India, April 1, 1998- “A Defunct Defence-Toothless NSC will not do”). 3. (V Balachandran: Times of India 15 July 1999- “No Strategic Canvas- Undermining the National Security Council”). 4. (Vir Sanghvi: Hindustan Times, Dec 1, 2008, “26/11 could have been stopped”). 5. (Asian Age Dec 20, 2008: “Attack advisory sent to navy, not Govt: Patil”). 6. (NDTV, January 19, 2010: “Be accountable: Vice President to Security Bosses”).

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6 years from 1998 despite the Kargil Review Committee’s recommendation of not combining these two busy assignments made it all the more bewildering. It only indicates how casually our national security is being managed.

Too many reports with no implementation It is not that we did not know how to affect security reforms. We had several working papers. In February 2001 NDA’s high level Group of Ministers (GoM) consisting of Shri L K Advani, Minister of Home Affairs, Shri George Fernandes, Minister of Defence, Shri Jaswant Singh, Minister of External Affairs and Shri Yashwant Sinha, Minister of Finance formulated their recommendations after studying the reports of 4 “Task forces” set up by them for examining improvements in Intelligence, Internal Security, Border Management and Defence. These four Task Forces were led by very eminent persons in the respective fields who did a thorough job of their assignments. The GoM made many important recommendations including a reorganisation of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) which should be restructured for assuming more responsibility on internal security, which is presently managed by the states. 7 Other recommendations were (a) strengthening emergency provisions under Article 352 and 359 for central intervention (b) tapping potential to issue “directives” under Articles 256/257/352/355 (c) specifying situations constituted as failure / breakdown of constitutional machinery in a state (d) deploying suo moto (sic) central forces (e) upgrading Central Intelligence agencies (f) constituting a “Federal Agency” to investigate grave, inter-state and nation-wide crimes, (g) consulting state governments to replace the existing Police Act and (h) ensuring close collaboration between State Special Branches and Intelligence Bureau etc. 8

We saw in the Assam related developments the power of some sections of the media in distorting facts and creating adverse public opinion. The power of media and the process of public opinion formation in a free society had undergone radical change due to Internet and faster means of communications like TV or FM Radio. Serious law and order problems had started occurring well beyond the control of regulatory authorities when instant adverse opinion was formed However the NDA government could not implement many of their own ideas till 2004 especially on a “Federal Agency”. The UPA I and II governments also ignored this important aspect but partly re-invented the wheel by asking Punchhi Commission (“Second Commission on Inter-State Relations” – April 2007 – March 2010) to go into the same issue i.e., centre-state relations during serious security situations. Among the major internal security recommendations made by Punchhi Commission were (a) amending Articles 355 and 356 of our Constitution to enable the centre to bring specific trouble torn areas under its rule for a limited period (b) “localising” emergency provisions under Articles 355 / 356 to enable even a district or part of a district to be brought under Governor’s rule instead of the whole state for 3 months (c) prosecution of errant ministers even against the advice of state governments and (d) amending the Communal Violence Bill to allow deployment of central forces without the state consent for a short period. 9 It was only after the 26/11 attack that a fresh look on this issue was given by the then Home Minister Shri P Chidambaram who set up the “National Investigating Agency” for investigating inter-state crime and terrorism. He also amended the “Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Bill in December 2008. This gave legal backing to the central initiative in such situations. However the state-centre consensus in effecting internal security reforms vanished soon after 26/11. When the former Home Minister unveiled his plan to set up a National Counter-Terrorist Centre (NCTC) it was vigourously opposed by the states on the ground that it encroached into their jurisdiction. It was James Baker, former US Secretary of State who had coined the expression “Window of Opportunity” during the October 1991 Madrid Peace Conference to lay emphasis that such “windows” in dealing with complicated situations did not last long. 10 Our rulers have a poor sense of history and it was the failure of the UPA government not to have taken advantage of the national consensus which was our “window of opportunity” to bring about speedy reforms after the Pakistan sponsored 26/11 attack on the nation. The public are the worst sufferers in this confusion.

Our security system yet to realise the 21st century challenges Our security institutions including state police have not kept themselves updated with the 21st century challenges to internal security. On 12 October 2007 I had delivered a key note lecture (“A new paradigm for internal security management”) to the Maharashtra Chapter of the Indian Institute of Public Affairs (IIPA) on the new threats faced by our country in the wake of globalisation, privatisation and communication revolution. I had said that globalisation had loosened states’ control over their polity as the corporate sector and non-state actors had encroached into the security arena, wresting some areas from government, such as vital industries, communications, financial and commercial management, which were also subject to trans-border developments. I had also told the audience that it was only for this reason that The United States had acknowledged, after 9/11, that 100 different sectors, including private industries had vital roles to play in national security. A new structure of national security was set up in that country to incorporate 7. (“Reforming the National Security system-Recommendations of the Group of Ministers”-Feb. 2001). 8. (Ibid Pages 43- 49). 9. (https://sites.google.com/site/errajanikantissuediscussion/committee-commissions/punchhi-commission-second-commission-oncenter-state-relations). 10. http://www.haaretz.com/weekend/week-s-end/you-negotiate-peace-with-your-enemies-not-with-your-friends-1.339708

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

these diverse sectors in a participatory security management system. In our country the entire responsibility is on the overburdened and ill-equipped state police. I had narrated the systemic difficulties in our police system which made them incapable of handling inter-state turbulences like the present Assam riots or terrorism in an earlier article in Defence and Security Alert. 11 I had particularly laid stress on the “Non-Traditional” security threats like climate change, migration, disaster, epidemics, diseases like “SARS”, HIV and AIDs, human trafficking, small arms, transnational crime and environmental security, which the law and order authorities are asked to tackle in addition to “traditional” security issues like crime control, security of vital installations and personnel, insurgency and terrorism and espionage. I had quoted Harvard professor Stanley Hoffman who called it as “The emergence of a transnational Society that includes multinational corporations, non-governmental organisations, criminals and terrorists” and had said that pressures on national security changed quite often beyond the control of national governments on a kaleidoscopic pattern in a fast changing “Wired world”.

Power of faster communications and “social media” to create security problems We saw in the Assam related developments the power of some sections of the media in distorting facts and creating adverse public opinion. In my address to the IIPA I had also pointed out that the power of media and the process of public opinion formation in a free society had undergone radical change due to Internet and faster means of communications like TV or FM Radio. Serious law and order problems had started occurring well beyond the control of regulatory authorities when instant adverse opinion was formed. I had illustrated the problem by quoting the “Danish Cartoon” controversy in 2006, which caused riots in more than 12 countries including India. Similarly the alleged derogatory remarks by a Delhi based FM Station on “Indian Idol” Prashant Tamang resulted in very serious riots in Siliguri on September 29-30, 2007. The Supreme Court judgment on August 29, 2012 confirming the death sentence to Kasab, the surviving 26/11 terrorist gave a “stinging rebuke” to the electronic media. “They were acting in their own commercial interest, putting national security in jeopardy”. 12

Our NSC should be legally empowered with a clear charter for coordinating policy and intelligence. Our NSC failed in their very first test, i.e., developing a holistic assessment on the Kargil threat by integrating bits and pieces on intelligence already available with our government and evolving policy. They could meet only on June 8, 1999 a month after the incursions were noticed. They similarly failed to integrate available intelligence prior to the 26/11 terror attack on Mumbai The chain of events beginning from the July Bodo-Muslim settlers clashes had followed this pattern catching the state and central security management off guard. They are yet to realise that the old method of public opinion formation through print media or radio / TV has radically changed in India. Our arrangements in assessing public mood through slower means of communication are outdated. It is like chasing a Lamborghini with a bullock cart. 35 per cent of our population is below 20. Young people use more of social media to communicate than even e-mail. They want everything instantaneously. A national daily 13 had reported that scrap dealers, auto rickshaw drivers and cyber cafe operators were using / downloading / circulating such video clips through cell phones. In June 2012 India had 93 crore cell phones for a population of 121 crore. China has 104 crore cell phones for a population of 134 crore. USA has 32 crore cell phones for a population of 31 crore. That is the communications revolution we are facing in which we are able to get what we want while we are at home or at place of work or going in a bus, train or otherwise. The youth has no time to watch TV or read a newspaper. Their opinion formation takes place while they are on the move. In countries like India this has a great bearing on law and order. We have not realised this. India which had only 5,000 “Tweets” per day in 2007 had 140 million Tweets per day in March 2011 which rose to 200 million per day in June 2011. It must have increased manifold now. 14 All over the world 4 billion hours of video are watched on YouTube.15 Indonesia, a big country like ours is the 4th largest user of “facebook” in the world and number 1 Twitter user in Asia. It generates 15 per cent of the world’s Tweets. Indonesia has 23 crore population and has 19 lakh sq km of land area but also has 17,508 islands making internal security management very difficult. India has 121 crore population with 32 lakh Sq km of land area. Indonesia is thinking of using this medium for conveying correct news whenever there is a controversy. As in the Assam affairs, we have thought of using this channel only negatively by banning certain sites or links. This is ineffective since new links can always be formed. We have not thought of using this medium positively for conveying correct information. For that we should have an alert and coordinated intelligence and technical capability which should foresee such developments including trans-border events. We should also have an effective decision making body to take proactive decisions rather than scrambling after the events. I regret to say that the existing mechanism in India for achieving this is not adequate to meet the challenges.

11. ( V Balachandran: Defence and Security Alert , November 2011 – “ Internal Security and Police Reforms”). 12. (Times of India August 30, 2012: “Reckless 24 x 7 TV Coverage put security at risk”). 13. (Times of India August 27, 2012 : “ Malegaon made first arrest over doctored clips”). 14. (http://www.marketinggum.com/twitter-statistics-2011-updated-stats/). 15. (http://www.labnol.org/internet/youtube-statistics-2012/20954/).

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

STEALING A MARCH?

P Dr Shalini Chawla

The writer is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS), New Delhi. She joined CAPS in 2006 and specialises in Pakistan studies. She is a frequent contributor to various journals and magazines on defence and security issues.

Starting with an establishment at Wah in cooperation with British Royal Ordnance, a number of defence production facilities were developed in Pakistan. Today, there are over 20 public sector units and over 100 private sector units engaged in the production of defence related products. Major public sector units have expanded significantly and contributed towards self-reliance of the defence industry

Pakistan’s journey in the field of indigenous production is indeed commendable. While the initial focus was restricted to small arms and light weapons, primarily, to ensure the supply during war against India and also reduce dependence on foreign supplies. Eventually, Pakistan defence production has progressed towards producing not only major land equipment but also, the 4th generation aircraft

akistan, which ranks number 12 on the world’s list of failed states, has a surprisingly vibrant DIB. Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), comprising of 14 factories is the oldest and the largest complex of defence production units in the country. Arms exports has been adopted as a major policy measure for the development of the POF and it has been exporting to more than 30 countries across the world to include Bahrain, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Hong Kong, Switzerland, Singapore, Sri Lanka, UAE, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Myanmar, Saudi Arabia, UK and USA.

Attaining Self-Reliance

Notable are the Heavy Rebuild Factory Project (P-711) which produces the Tank Al-Khalid, Tank Al-Zarrar, which is again a product of Chinese assistance, came into being to keep the fleet of T-59 and T-69 tanks technologically and operationally compatible with modern tanks and APC Talha. The Fatehjung plant facility was completed in 1997-98 and is believed to produce the Hatf-III / Ghaznavi (M-11) and Hatf-IV / Shaheen-I (possibly M-9) solid fuelled ballistic missiles. Remarkable is Pakistans ability to export its small arms and other military products.

akistan’s early efforts towards indigenous defence production can be traced to the tenure of first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, who issued a directive to establish an ordnance factory to manufacture .303 calibre rifles and its ammunition in Rawalpindi. After his assassination, the second Prime Minister of Pakistan, Khawaja Nizam-ud-Din proceeded with the plans and in 1951 foundation stone of four industries at Wah Cantonment was laid and four workshops were opened. Presently, Pakistan has 14 large factories and subsidiaries fulfilling the defence needs of its armed forces.

Eventually building the industrial complex set up at Wah was started and by 1954 a few other facilities were completed. The production of various stores such as 25 Pdr and 40 mm Anti-Aircraft guns ammunitions, 2” and 3” mortar bombs etc. was started. In the early 1960’s the explosive factory, which included the manufacture of nitric acid, sulphuric acid recycling plants for recovery of waste acids and plants for production of intermediates such as acetone, ether and plant for production of propellants and explosives, was set up with the foreign assistance.1 However, the decades of 1950s and 1960s did not witness much

growth of defence production facilities and the nation’s defence needs were met mostly by the United States. The suspension of military aid and the arms embargoes during and after the 1965 war was a major driving factor for the nation to go for self-reliance in the military production and also for the diversification of the sources of arms procurement. President Zulfiquar Ali Bhutto pursued a conscious policy towards domestic arms production. Bhutto was motivated towards the indigenous production because, firstly, he realised that being constantly hostage to external powers meant that war–fighting potential was severely restricted (as happened in 1965 and 1971). Secondly, he wanted to control the Bonapartist tendencies in the Pakistan Army. Thirdly, he thought the defence infrastructure development would have a positive effect on the overall economic development of the country. And, fourthly, he viewed Pakistan as an influential actor in the Islamic world in the future and modern weaponry, he believed would enable Pakistan to successfully play the role of the praetorian guard of the Islamic bloc. 2 A Defence Production Division in the Ministry of Defence was created in 1972. The 1980’s under General Zia and the 1990’s saw a wide expansion of defence production activities

1. Abdul Qadeer, “POF-Through The Decades”, Defence Journal, Vol. XIX, No. 9-10, 1993, as cited in Strategic Digest, April 1994, pp 564-567. 2. Aabha Dixit, “ Defence Production in Pakistan”, Asian strategic Review 1991-92, ( New Delhi, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 1992) p. 287.

Pakistan Defence Production:

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

and a large number of varied projects were undertaken in this period.

Facilities Starting with an establishment at Wah in cooperation with British Royal Ordnance, a number of defence production facilities were developed in Pakistan. Today, there are over 20 public sector units and over 100 private sector units engaged in the production of defence related products. The major public sector units which have expanded significantly and contributed towards self reliance of the defence industry are briefly outlined as following:

40,000 personnel. This complex has helped to establish and develop a number of sister defence production facilities. All the factories are controlled by the Pakistan Ordnance Factories Board comprising of a Chairman, a Financial Advisor and two career technical members. The POF Board lays down the basic guidelines to be followed in the functioning of the factories. The 14 factories in the complex of POF which are ISO 9001 certified consist of the following facilities: 3 1. Weapons Factory 2. Machine Gun Factory

Pakistan Ordnance Factories

3. Small Arms Ammunition Factory

Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), comprising of 14 factories is the oldest and the largest complex of defence production units in the country. Progressively set up after 1950 on the model of Indian Ordnance Factories, meeting almost total ordnance needs of Pakistani armed forces. The POF complex is spread over a radius of 100 km and employs more than

4. Tank and Anti Tank Ammunition Factory 5. Medium Artillery Ammunition Factory 6. Heavy Artillery Ammunition Factory 7. Brass Mill

8. Steel Foundry 9. Tungsten Carbide Factory 10. Tungsten Alloy Factory 11. Explosives Factory 12. Propellants Factory 13. Filling Factory 14. Clothing Factory for Uniforms The POF has eight subsidiaries for cartridges, detonators, explosives, chemicals etc. POF produces around 70 major items and millions of components for supply to Pakistani Army, Navy and the Air Force. Initially, POF products were mostly of the British origin produced under license. But, with the infusion of massive arms aid from the US since mid 1950s and eventually, the increasing procurement of Chinese products did allow the POF products to follow both the NATO and other international standards.4 POF has been engaged in joint ventures with UK, Germany, China, Czechoslovakia (in the past) and Sweden.

3. http://www.pof.gov.pk/history.htm 4. Golden Jubilee of Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF) Wah, at, http://www.pakpost.gov.pk/philately/stamps2001/pof.html

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

STEALING A MARCH?

Pakistan’s indigenous defence production has been expanded significantly in the last three decades. The small arms and light weapons industry has been developed significantly fulfilling the requirements of not only Pakistan’s military but also of more than 30 nations which are presently importing weapons from Pakistan Arms exports has been adopted as a major policy measure for the development of the POF and it has been exporting to more than 30 countries across the world. Nations importing from POF include: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Hong Kong, Switzerland, Singapore, Sri Lanka, UAE, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Myanmar, Saudi Arabia, UK and USA. Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT): In 1971, a Heavy Rebuild Factory Project (P-711) was conceived with Chinese assistance and technology to rebuild T-59 tanks. As the fleet of T-59 tanks manufactured by China grew, Heavy Rebuild Factory was established in Taxila in the late 1970’s, mainly to undertake rebuild and modernisation of tanks.5 The facility is spread over 48 acres of land and is capable of rebuilding tanks and power packs as well as manufacturing individual optical and electrical components. When the production started in 1981 the HRF had the capacity to rebuild 100 tanks and 250 engines every year and by October 1990, that capacity had been able to service 1,000 tanks and 2,000 engines.6 It is claimed that out of 11,000 components used in the overhaul of the T-59 approximately 8,000 are now manufactured locally.7 Eventually, the Heavy Rebuild Factory (HRF) at Taxila was

renamed Heavy Industries Taxila. HIT, which employs over 7,000 workers and is basically devoted to land combat systems witnessed a rapid growth in 1980s when it started to produce the T-69 MBT (Main Battle Tank) with Chinese help. The production (current and future) of the HIT include: Tank Al-Khalid, which is an outcome of decade long Sino-Pakistan efforts; Tank Al-Zarrar, which is again a product of Chinese assistance, came into being to keep the fleet of T-59 and T-69 tanks technologically and operationally compatible with modern tanks; APC Talha, which is an indigenously designed and manufactured all terrain, amphibious infantry support vehicle with 12.7 mm Machine Gun as its main armament.8 Apart from these, Pakistan has developed at least two additional variants of the M-113 series APC for the usage of the Pakistan Army.9 A six wheeled road version APC called Saad has been developed and, Infantry Fighting Vehicle Al-Hamza – has been developed with a Chinese made one-man turret and 25 mm cannon and ARV-W653 have been manufactured at the HIT, the license for which was obtained from China. Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC): Pakistan Aeronautical Complex at Kamra, north of Islamabad was established in 1973. This facility is the nucleus of the aeronautical industry in Pakistan and is dedicated to overhaul and repair of Chinese and French aircraft in Pakistan Air Force inventory. It also undertakes the manufacture of light aircraft and assembly of ground based radars. PAC consists of the following factories: The Mirage Rebuild Factory (MRF)

began operation in 1978, when it started to overhaul the Mirage III EP combat aircraft and their SNECMA engines. MRF has a site area of more than 8,10,000 sq metres and employs approximately 2,000 engineers and technicians. It can undertake complete overhaul of Mirage III/5 aircraft, Atar 9C turbojets and all associated aircraft components and engine accessories.10 The F-6 Rebuild Factory (F-6RF) is an important facility at Kamra, established with Chinese assistance in 1980. The primary purpose of F-6RF has been the overhaul of PAF’s Shenyang F-6 aircraft and their accessories. (Soviet MiG-17 built under license in China and sold to Pakistan).

Pakistan has been projecting itself as the major defence manufacturer but as far as the major defence equipment is concerned Pakistan defence industry has yet to come up with an indigenous design The Aircraft Manufacturing Factory (AMF) was established in 1975, with the objective of assembling Mushshak (MFI-17) light aircraft/ basic trainer with knockdown kits received from foreign sources. It is the only aircraft manufacturing concern in Pakistan and since 1981 it has been engaged in the manufacture of the light, robust, basic trainer-cum-surveillance aircraft Mushshak, the super Mushshak – a variant with a more powerful engine, cockpit air conditioning, electric instruments and several other improvements.11 By early 1989, the AMF was producing around 16 aircraft per year.12 AMF also, entered into production of Karakoram-8 jet trainer, in collaboration with the China

5. FAS, Taxila, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan,facility/taxila.htm 6. Mushahid Hussain, “Pakistan’s heavy armour; Upgradation/modernisation programme,” Defence Journal, October 1990, p. 7, as cited by Aabha Dixit, p. 293. 7. John Kaniyalil, “Defence Industries in Pakistan”, Strategic Analysis, May 1993, pp 229-247. 8. Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2005-2006, p. 359. 9. Jane’s Armour and Artillery 2005-2006, p. 359. 10. “Indigenisation of Pakistan Air Force’s Weapon Systems”, at internet site, http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/3023/defence_ production.html 11. Janes’s All the World’s Aircraft 2005-2006, p. 357. 12. n 10. The 156.6 KW uprated variant, first flown in June 1988, has completed its flight trials. All new production aircraft are expected to conform to this standard. It was reported in early 1989 that about 20 Mushshaks had been ordered by the UAE Air Force and procurements by other countries are being discussed.

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

National Aero-Technology Import & Export corporation (CATIC). The Joint Fighter (JF-17) Thunder, also known as the Fighter–China-1 (FC-1) Fierce Dragon in China, is a single seat multi-role fighter aircraft and designated to be a low cost fighter is co-developed by Pakistan and China. Pakistan plans to acquire 250 JF-17s. There have been reports that the design was developed by MiG complex in Russia and transferred to China after Russian Air Force cancelled procurements.13 It is fitted with RD-33 engine (also installed in MiG-29 fighters). Reports suggest, that initially only the assembly of the aircraft was being done at Kamra but presently, quite a few parts are being manufactured at Kamra. Pakistan has been marketing the JF-17 quite aggressively and several countries including Algeria, Sri Lanka, Egypt and Malaysia have shown keen interest in the acquisition of the aircraft. Kamra Avionics and Radar Factory (KARF) began operating in 1987 and deals with radar manufacturing, radar overhauls, building complex components and doctrine modules, Caterpillar / Siemens power generators and high-tech airborne avionics for the PAF. The key production areas for the KARF cover Radar Warning Receiver and Grifo-7 Radar. Heavy Mechanical Complex LTD (HMC): It is located in Taxila but is not officially part of defence production establishment since it is a major heavy engineering subsidiary of the State Engineering Corporation (SEC), controlled by the Ministry of Industries and Production, Government of Pakistan. This was established in 1979 with Chinese assistance and is the largest undertaking of this type in Pakistan.14 But the Heavy Forge Factory at this complex is significantly important for Pakistan’s defence production requirements. HMC is capable of undertaking the designing, engineering and manufacturing of 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

industrial plants and machinery. It manufactures equipment for a large variety of area including, hydro-electric power plants, thermal power plants, oil and gas processing plants, steel structure and railway equipment etc. 15 Institute of Optronics: Institute of Optronics was established to assemble / manufacture the night vision devices for the armed forces in 1985 at Rawalpindi. The Institute has established production and testing facilities, “based on second generation Image Intensifier Tubes” to meet a series of military specifications and needs for night vision devices. Margalla Electronics (ME): Based in Islamabad, Margalla Electronics was established in 1984 as a self-reliance project under the defence Production Division to support the Defence Services in the field of electronics. This facility has been working on a slow pace and it’s utility has been under question. Air Weapons Complex: IT was established in 1992 with the main focus on generation of indigenous capabilities for evolving core technologies. It’s products include battlefield interdiction and tactical support weapons, airfield attack and denial weapons, navigation and communication systems, EW systems, infantry support equipment, UAV’s and air defence systems.16 Naval Dockyard: While Pakistan Navy’s position has received varied attention over time, overall it has been accorded low priority in the country till recent years. The navy’s share is believed to be around 10 per cent in the defence budget of Pakistan. Pakistan Naval Dockyard is the main facility for naval weapon systems production and maintenance. It was established in 1952 and undertakes repair works, modernisation and refit of Pakistan Navy ships, submarines and crafts. The Dockyard provides technical assistance and repair of wide variety of equipment.

In 1971, Naval Dockyard began indigenous construction activities with support craft (1,000 tons floating dock). Over the period of time the dockyard has produced, various auxiliary and naval vessels. These include, Midget Submarines, Demagnetiser Ship and 200 tons Missiles Craft Mines Counter Measure Vessels. The most prestigious production of the Dockyard is the assembly under license of the French submarine AGOSTA 90–B, which is a state-of-the-art submarine with latest sensors and combat systems. The PN Dockyard has successfully built Jalalat Class (Fast Attack Craft-Missile) (PTG), named, Jalalat and Shujaat, commissioned in 1997 and 1999, respectively. The Larkana Class (Large Patrol Craft) was also commissioned in 1994.17 Although, majority of the Pakistani naval capabilities have been supplied from China, France, Japan and Turkey have also been regular contributors. Karachi Ship Yard & Engineering Works (KSEW): It was established in 1975 with the help and technical assistance of West Germany, to boost the naval manufacturing industry and fulfil Pakistan’s indigenous shipbuilding and heavy engineering requirements. It undertakes shipbuilding, ship repairs, submarine and warship construction and construction of infrastructure of power plants.18 The services of the KSEW include: Shipbuilding, General Engineering and Foundry and Ship Repairing Facilities. In 2006, the Pakistan Navy ordered four F-22P type frigates from China. Reportedly, the fourth F-22P will be manufactured in Pakistan at a Karachi shipyard in 2013, to fulfill a pledge to transfer Chinese shipbuilding technology that was part of the April 2005 agreement to build the frigates. National Development Complex (NDC): The foundation of the NDC (Integrated Defence Systems) was laid in 1993 with the object of developing an infrastructure for indigenous development and production of

Janes’s All the World’s Aircraft 2005-2006, p. 81. FAS, Taxila, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan,facility/taxila.htm Ibid Air Weapons Complex, at internet site, http://www.awc.com.pk/main.html Jane’s Fighting Ships 2005-2006, pp. 543-544. “Karachi Ship Yard and Engineering Works Ltd” at, http://www.depo.org.pk/index.php?a=profile&id=13

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

dsa 3rd anniversary

modern weapon systems. The NDC in fact, consists of a cluster of research, development and manufacturing units under the aegis of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). The units were consolidated for the indigenous development and manufacture of modern weapon systems for Pakistan. 19 The Complex manufactures a large variety of products which include missile systems, launchers, specialised aerial weapons like area denial bomb PSD-1 and fuel-air explosive Bomb FAE-1 and defence electronics.20

Research and development establishments

In the late 1980s, Pakistan signed an agreement with China for the purchase of M-11 (estimated range of 300 km) and possibly M-9 ballistic missiles. China, in turn facilitated the agreement by building a turnkey facility in Pakistan where such missiles could be produced. 21 In 1994, US intelligence agencies detected the construction of such a facility in Fatehjung, 40 km west of Islamabad. The configuration and design of the Fatehjung plant matched the M-11 missile facility in Hubei province in China. Technicians and engineers from China Precision Machinery Import / Export Corporation were sighted at the plant. 22 The facility was completed in 1997-98 and is believed to produce the Hatf-III / Ghaznavi (M-11) and Hatf-IV / Shaheen-I (possibly M-9) solid fuelled ballistic missiles. Some reports suggest the sourcing of the missile parts from the cities of Lahore, Karachi and Gujranwala and finally their assembly at Fatehjung plant. It is believed that the facility now manufactures the Chinese M-11 and M-9 ballistic missiles. The facility is developing the medium-range Shaheen-II with Chinese assistance. 23

Military Vehicles Research Establishment (MVRDE)

National Radio Telecommunication Corporation (NRTC): It was established with the Japanese collaboration (Nippon Electric Company) and has been producing high quality telecommunication equipment for the defence services, Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Ltd (PTCL) and other organisations since 1965-66.24 Some of the important products in the field of defence are: digital electronic field telephone exchanges PFX-3208 and PFX-6416 for usage in harsh environment, Automag 412, HF and VHF military version radios, VHF single channel radio, VHF / UHF dual channel radio, VHF mobile / base radios, DP boxes and towers. 25 Pakistan Machine Tool Factory (Pvt) Ltd (PMTF): It is a precision engineering goods manufacturing facility, established in technical collaboration with Oerlikon Buhrle & Co of Switzerland and commenced production in 1971. PMTF with a workforce of approximately 1,900 personnel is engaged in the production of machine tools, automotive transmissions and axle components, gears for locomotives, pressure die cast parts and other products. Facilities in the factory include, designing, machining, forging, heat treatment, assembly, die casting etc.26 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

dsa 3rd anniversary

STEALING A MARCH?

The main research and development organisations include: Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DESTO) Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE) and

Development

Naval Research and Development Authority (NRDE)

Conclusion Pakistan’s indigenous defence production has been expanded significantly in the last three decades. The small arms and light weapons industry has been developed significantly fullfiling the requirements of not only Pakistan’s military but also of more than 30 nations which are presently importing weapons from Pakistan. POF follows the NATO / US standards and the Chinese standards, specifications and calibres in their production. This provides Pakistan with a larger market for it’s products. Pakistan has been projecting itself as the major defence manufacturer but as far as the major defence equipment is concerned Pakistan defence industry has yet to come up with an indigenous design. Most of the major weapon systems which are reportedly manufactured by the Pakistan defence industry are restricted to overhaul / repair assembly of the major components and license manufacture of some of the weapons. The research and development in Pakistan defence industry still needs to grow in order to get to the final steps in indigenous defence production, which implies the ‘design and development of the weapon systems’ followed by the ‘design and development of the components’. Increasing indigenous capabilities for production (under license etc.) of major weapons would certainly provide Pakistan some element of self-reliance. Pakistan’s journey in the field of indigenous production is indeed commendable. While the initial focus was restricted to small arms and light weapons, primarily, to ensure the supply during war against India and also reduce dependence on foreign supplies. Eventually, Pakistan defence production has progressed towards producing not only major land equipment like the Al-Khalid and Al Zarrar but also, the 4th generation aircraft, the JF-17s and the frigates.

Missile Facilities: National Defence Complex (NDC) at, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Pakistan/Missile/3294_3327.html http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/facility/fatehjung.htm http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/facility/fatehjung.htm Ibid. Ibid. Internet site, http://www.nrtc.com.pk/index_1.htm Ibid Internet site, http://www.pmtfl.com/profile.htm

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

ENERGY SECURITY

What can we learn from Kudankulam Protests? T

he writer throws light on the agitation that has delayed the commissioning of the Kudankulam reactor. How much of this agitation is foreign sponsored / inspired? How genuine are the fears expressed by the agitators? The writer points out that there is little recognition of the fact that while four reactors in Japan were badly damaged by the combined effect of earthquake and tsunami, ten other reactors in the same region remained unscathed. In fact three of these were much closer to the epicentre of the earthquake and tsunami. There are serious lessons to be drawn from a study of the genesis and course of the protests as they have relevance to other major projects now on the anvil that are of great importance to the country’s development and security.

ublic protests have considerably delayed the commissioning of the Kudankulam nuclear reactors for the much needed power generation. There are serious lessons to be drawn from a study of the genesis and course of the protests as they have relevance to other major projects now on the anvil that are of great importance to the country’s development and security. These too could get stuck if proper steps are not taken to carry the public along.

The protests When plans were made for the Kudankulam Project in 1987-88 and India signed an agreement with the Soviet Union for the purpose, protests by the local community began, led by a pastor and his Social Equality Movement. The protesters cited the disastrous accident to a Russian designed reactor at Chernobyl two years earlier. The significant difference in the design between that reactor and those proposed at Kudankulam site was ignored. For good measure, the protesters added their objection to nuclear weapons as one of the reasons for the protest, though the project is in no way connected to the weapons. The reactors are governed by IAEA safeguards. Between

Dr L V Krishnan The writer is former Director, Safety Research Group, Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research, Kalpakkam, Tamil Nadu. A physicist by training, he has served in the DAE for nearly four decades, the first half of which was spent in BARC at Trombay engaged in safety analysis and review of various types of nuclear installations. In the second half of service he was engaged in setting up a Safety Research Laboratory at IGCAR, Kalpakkam. Post-retirement, he has co-authored two books. One of them is a historical chronicle titled Atomic Energy in India – Fifty Years. It was published by the DAE in 1998 and had C V Sundaram and T S Iyengar as the other contributors. The other book titled Elements of Nuclear Power with R Ramanna as the co-author was published by Gandhi Science Centre of Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan. He is also the co-author of the report published by CSTEP titled ‘Nuclear Power – The Road Ahead’.

Despite advances in the design of nuclear reactors like those under construction in Kudankulam and in our understanding of biological effect of radiation, concern about nuclear power plants among the public is unlikely to disappear. But steps can be taken to prevent the concern from becoming an impediment to the nuclear power programme

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ENERGY SECURITY

1988 and 1991, when land acquisition for the project was in progress, protest meetings were held all over Tamil Nadu but tapered off subsequently, when the collapse of the Soviet Union led to shelving of the project. Protests commenced again soon after the Project was revived in 1998. The Project sought fresh water from a dam at Pechiparai about 65 km away to meet its requirements. This antagonised people including farmers from farther regions fearing curtailment of their water supply from the dam. The protesters also linked up the nuclear tests of 1998 in Pokhran with the Kudankulam Project. There was no proper basis for it.

The basis for all protests against nuclear power plants is the fear of radiation exposure. Nuclear weapons deliver instantaneous high doses that kill at once. But, nuclear power plant accidents can only cause low levels of exposures to the general public. These can be further reduced through proper emergency plans The protests were organised by Groups with diverse interests until 1999 when a Nuclear Power Project Opposition Movement was formed, specifically directed against the Kudankulam Project. Two years later construction work began at the site. At about the same time, on returning to India S P Udayakumar, a political scientist and social activist became the leader of the protests and formed “Peoples Movement Against Nuclear Power” with a broader objective 1. Chapters of the Movement were set up at several places in the state and numerous protest meetings were organised under his leadership. Plans for more reactors at the site and acquisition of more land heightened the protests. A member of the Movement is reported to have met a Sri Lankan Minister to apprise him of the perceived dangers of the Project. In 2004, the Movement also participated in the World Social Forum held in Mumbai to draw the attention of the rest of the country to its activities. The tsunami that hit the Coromandal Coast in December 2004 raised further fears about Kudankulam. The plant was under construction then. The tsunami wave at the site was not high enough to raise concern about safety of the plant. Nevertheless it generated fear among the people about the danger to the plant. Following more recent instances of tsunami warning in the wake of milder quakes in the Bay of Bengal, PMANE claims to have carried out a study of the damage potential of tsunami to Kudankulam and submitted a report to government authorities. The protests continued at a low key until 2006 when a public hearing on the Project was announced. The question of the Project drawing water from the Pechiparai dam was again raised, although the Project had by then decided to build a dedicated desalination plant for its fresh water requirements. Construction of this plant began in 2005 and was completed in 2009. After a postponement, the public hearing was held in 2007. Protesters in very large numbers gathered at the

venue and sought an opportunity to speak. There was commotion on account of dissatisfaction at the way the hearing was conducted. Following the combined impact of earthquake and tsunami last year that destroyed four of ten reactors in Fukushima, Japan, the protests came to a boil. A long series of vitriolic articles against atomic energy in general and nuclear plants in particular was published by Udayakumar in a popular Tamil biweekly, whipping up public emotion. This helped in significant measure to win wider support for the protests. An inadequately planned emergency exercise provided further basis for the protests. Large numbers of people participated in a long drawn hunger strike demanding closure of the Project. News media provided good day to day coverage to the protests throughout the country. Protests received support from some intellectuals, who petitioned the Supreme Court against the Project. But, protesters were disappointed at the lack of response from government quarters, though the State Chief Minister declared she was with the protesters. Protesters forcibly prevented Project staff from attending to their work at the site. The government side alleged that the protests were being supported by Agencies from outside the country. Some of the protesters were arrested. Finally, the state government constituted an Expert Group to submit a report. On the basis of the report, the state government has chosen to support the continuation of the Project. Protesters have not given up.

Plant safety aspects The Chernobyl accident continues to be invoked by protesters. There is little appreciation of the real cause of that accident and the differences between the Chernobyl reactor and those elsewhere in the world in design as well as operating culture. They also cite the fuel meltdown accident in Three Mile Island, USA. Yet, it resulted in negligible environmental release of radioactive material, though there was needless panic among the public. The Kudankulam reactors are of a more advanced design and have significant additional safety features. There is little recognition of the fact that while four reactors in Japan were badly damaged by the combined effect of earthquake and tsunami, ten other reactors in the same region remained unscathed. In fact three of these were much closer to the epicentre of the earthquake and tsunami. They not only survived, but also provided within their site safe shelter for three months to several hundreds of people from neighbouring villages who had lost their homes due to the tsunami. Some particular observations about the design of the Kudankulam reactors become relevant here: (a) Each reactor is housed in a robust steel-lined, thick concrete containment building capable of withstanding a large rise in internal pressure arising from any rupture of a coolant pipeline; (b) If this results in loss of cooling for the fuel, any hydrogen that would be produced is made to recombine harmlessly with oxygen present within the building, precluding an explosion; (c) Should the

1. It is not clear when the name was changed to “Peoples Movement Against Nuclear Energy”, PMANE.

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fuel melt, it is collected in a contained space beneath the reactor vessel with enough provision for cooling; (d) A passive arrangement enables removal of the heat generated within the containment building on the basis of convective cooling without need for external coolant or power source to operate pumps. Thermal ecology studies show little effect of warm water discharges from the plant to marine life. Several coal-based power stations already exist on Tamil Nadu coast and discharge warm water to the sea and more are planned. Why single out nuclear plants? The reactor is designed to withstand an earthquake of magnitude 6 occurring at a distance of 35 km from it.

The Chernobyl accident continues to be invoked by protesters. There is little appreciation of the real cause of that accident and the differences between the Chernobyl reactor and those elsewhere in the world in design as well as operating culture The island of Sri Lanka lies in the path of tsunami waves originating from the Western coast of Sumatra (as in December 2004) and serves to screen Kudankulam location from their impact. As a result, the wave height to be expected tends to be not as high as at other locations on the Tamil Nadu coast. The basis for all protests against nuclear power plants is the fear of radiation exposure. Nuclear weapons deliver instantaneous high doses that kill at once. But, nuclear power plant accidents can only cause low levels of exposures to the general public. These can be further reduced through proper emergency plans. The exposures are estimated to be in the same range as what people in some parts of the world – including India – receive from the natural environment around them. Exhaustive studies of the health of these people have not revealed an adverse impact. Some radioactive releases do occur during normal operation of reactors, but the doses to the public are much lower. Allegations have appeared of adverse impact from reactor operation to neighbouring communities. In several countries, these have been investigated in detail by independent expert groups. They found similar health impact in other locations in those countries well away from the reactors. It was therefore concluded that the basis for the allegations was weak. Causes other than radiation for the observed impact were also cited in support of the conclusion. Impressive advances in our understanding of the ways in which radiation causes damage within a living cell and of the remarkable capacity of the cell to repair the damage also suggest that concern about health impact of low level radiation exposures is perhaps needless. Allegations by Protesters of health effects around operating plants in India are based on cursory surveys of a handful of cases. This is in great contrast to the practice in many countries where such allegations are examined using comprehensive health databases of the population. The databases are scrupulously maintained with data going back to many years.

Lessons from the Kudankulam protests Despite advances in the design of nuclear reactors like those under construction in Kudankulam and in our understanding of biological effect of radiation, concern about nuclear power plants among the public is unlikely to disappear. But steps can be taken to prevent the concern from becoming an impediment to the nuclear power programme. Implementation of a central government Project in a state requires considerable help from the state authorities. Central government departments executing the Project cannot take state help for granted but have to take some initiatives themselves. This is particularly important when an opposition political party is in power in the state. In the case of nuclear projects, conduct of public hearing, testing of emergency preparedness plans, grant of clearance by State Pollution Control Boards are areas where state authorities cannot act on their own without proper spadework by the Department of Atomic Energy and the Regulatory Board. Any objections for the Project raised by people of the state, particularly those residing in the vicinity of the site must be heard and answered without getting frustrated by unverified information that is often trotted out by protesters. All relevant details must be made available not merely in English, but in the local language. There is nothing secret about civilian nuclear programme. Careful monitoring of media reports published in the local language would help in identifying what details are sought by the public. Objections have to be addressed in time. Otherwise, it becomes a case of ‘A spark neglected burns the house’. India’s capability in nuclear reactor technology is highly regarded in the world. Not so, the ability to win clear public support for the power programme, unlike that of many countries that have successfully adopted innovative ways. Many years ago, Britain conducted a two year public inquiry before building a reactor. Canada, Sweden and Finland have now been able to garner support for a waste storage repository. Nuclear pundits cannot afford to steer clear of debates anymore though the debate may be asymmetric with respect to technology expertise. They must make more effective use of websites to provide answers, which must be in the regional language as well. The absence of prompt response to the series of articles that the leader of the protests wrote in a Tamil weekly gave the public the wrong impression that the author was right on all counts. The government must encourage and support the establishment of health databases of people at least in the districts where nuclear plants are in operation and are being planned. Until nuclear expertise develops in our academic community, there can be no true independent advice for the Regulatory Body. But a high level of transparency can make up for it in the meanwhile.

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STRATEGIC COMPETITION

W Dr Sanjeev Bhadauria The writer is Associate Professor, Dept. of Defence and Strategic Studies, University of Allahabad, Allahabad, India.

The latest Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) makes a very strong statement of India’s importance for the US in the emerging global security architecture. While a concern with China’s rising military power is palpable throughout the defence review, it is instructive to note the importance that the QDR has attached to India’s rising global profile. For the US, India is now a crucial player in the emerging balance of power in the Pacific. It would like a strong US–India alliance to act as a bulwark against the arc of Islamic instability running from the Middle East to Asia and to create much greater balance in Asia. How far India would be willing to go would, in many ways, be determined by the domestic political dynamics in India

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hile attention has focused on the rise of China and its impact on relationships in East Asia, the emergence of India is now attracting increased attention and there is growing concern about the possibility of strategic competition between China and India and its possible impact on the region. While most analysts earlier saw India as a stagnant economy, the transformation of the Indian economy in the past decade has led to India’s current ranking as one of the world’s top economies and predictions are that if India can sustain the present pace of growth, it will emerge as the second largest economy by 2050, after China. Another factor which has lent importance to the argument about India’s rise is the burgeoning US-India relationship which has highlighted the use of balancing strategies by these two powers.

Asia-Pacific do impinge on Indian interests. Hence, one can expect India to pay greater attention to this region in the coming years.

India’s position

India’s Look East policy is a diplomatic success story and India is likely to further strengthen its links with the Asia-Pacific. India has certain disadvantages as well as advantages to be a power of consequence in the Asia-Pacific region. One, unlike the other three great powers, India’s involvement in the region has been minimal. Two, geographically India is on the periphery. Three, India’s political, economic and strategic linkages with the rest of the Asia-Pacific are weak. Four, India’s Look East policy of engagement with the region has not been satisfactory – more often it appears tentative rather than rooted in long-term strategy and planning. Five, India has spelled out its interests, concerns and strategic stakes in unambiguous terms. India’s advantageous position is because its involvement, however insignificant it may be, has always been benign. Unlike China and Japan, it does not have to worry about its past. Second, India has always supported any regional move that was aimed at peace and stability – ASEAN’s creation, for instance – and opposed cold war alliance politics. India never perceived a threat emanating from the Asia-Pacific (except China) nor did it ever pose a threat to any country. India’s Defence capabilities are formidable (its navy is the largest in the Indian Ocean littoral) and its economy is one of the fastest growing. It is the only country in the region that can match China in terms of size and military power. In a major shift, India acquiesced to support the ARF multilateral initiative. Because of these reasons, India is uniquely placed to play a significant role in the Asia-Pacific balance of power. The recent period has witnessed a rapid growth in Indian interests – economic, political and strategic – and there is a growing realisation that developments in the

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Indo-US ties The strengthening of India-US relations and the highlighting of their shared democratic heritage contrasts with US congressional criticism of the Chinese political system and US wariness of China’s growing economic capabilities. This has reinforced China’s concern that a new US “containment strategy” is being developed aimed at isolating China and preventing the rise of China while promoting US alliance relationships with a rising India. Nevertheless, India’s desire to remain an independent actor should not be under-estimated.

India’s growing closeness to the US is also making Japan take India seriously and both are well aware of the Chinese strategy to contain the rise of its two most-likely challengers in the region. Japan has made it clear that it considers China a potential military threat that would have to be faced and countered in the coming years. This was followed by Japan’s announcement that a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue is a strategic objective that it shares with the United States, signalling to China that it might help America defend Taiwan in the event of a war. It is against this backdrop that burgeoning India-Japan ties assume new significance.

The rise of China is a major factor in the evolution of Indo-Japanese ties as is the US attempt to build India into a major balancer in the region. Both India and Japan are well aware of China’s not so subtle attempts at preventing their rise. It is most clearly reflected in China’s opposition to the expansion of the United Nations Security Council to include India and Japan as permanent members

Other contenders Within the region, China and Japan are the major contenders for the leadership role. China is the fastest growing power in the

EMERGING INDIA IN ASIA PACIFIC W

hile India is still a long way from becoming a true global power, it is a major player in the Asia-Pacific regional balance of power along with the US, China and Japan. According to the United States National Intelligence Council Report titled “Mapping the Global Future,” by 2020, international community will have to confront the military, political and economic dimensions of the rise of China and India. This report likened the emergence of China and India in the early 21st century to the rise of Germany in the 19th and America in the 20th, with impacts potentially as dramatic. The CIA has labelled India the key “swing state” in international politics and predicts that by 2015 India will emerge as the fourth most important power in the international system.

world and sees itself as a candidate for the position of a super power. China looks at recent American policies, especially the Revised Defence Guidelines with Japan and plans to build a TMD system in Northeast Asia as attempts aimed at containment of China. Japan, on the other hand, not only lacks strategic autonomy (and strategic depth), but also has to live with the fact that there is the rise of a major power in its neighbourhood and the growth of that power’s influence is at the cost of Japanese interests. The rise of China is a major factor in the evolution of Indo-Japanese ties as is the US attempt to build India into a major balancer in the region. Both India and Japan are well aware of China’s not so subtle attempts at preventing their rise. It is most clearly reflected in China’s opposition to

the expansion of the United Nations Security Council to include India and Japan as permanent members. China’s status as a permanent member of the Security Council and as a nuclear weapon state is something that it would be loathe to share with any other state in Asia. As India and Japan are the two most likely contenders to challenge China’s regional predominance it has propelled China to prevent their rise. India and Japan have decided to invigorate all major aspects of their relationship ranging from investment, defence, science and technology to civilian cooperation in space and energy security. Even on the issue of civilian nuclear cooperation, Tokyo has agreed to play a constructive approach. India’s “Look East” policy of active engagement with ASEAN and East Asia is largely predicated upon Japanese support. India’s

participation in the East Asia Summit was facilitated by Japan and the East Asia Community proposed by Japan to counter China’s proposal of an East Asia Free Trade Area also includes India. While China has resisted the inclusion of India, Australia and New Zealand in the ASEAN, Japan has strongly backed the entry of all three nations. In the light of the growing interests of these two powers in the Asia-Pacific, the US would have to play a delicate balancing role. India is the odd man out as far as the Asia-Pacific security is concerned. Its limited involvement and its geographic periphery offer a peculiar role for India. It can emerge as one of the important poles provided it qualitatively improves its economic and strategic bonds with the region. India’s capability to counter-balance

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China is recognised, but its policies should not be centred on the narrow confines of this perception. India’s interests are growing and that warrants greater attention to the developments in the Asia-Pacific.

India’s projected capabilities While India is still a long way from becoming a true global power, it is a major player in the Asia-Pacific regional balance of power along with the US, China and Japan. According to the United States National Intelligence Council Report titled “Mapping the Global Future,” by 2020, international community will have to confront the military, political and economic dimensions of the rise of China and India. This report likened the emergence of China and India in the early 21st century to the rise of Germany in the 19th and America in the 20th, with impacts potentially as dramatic. The CIA has labelled India the key “swing state” in international politics and predicts that by 2015 India will emerge as the fourth most important power in the international system. According to the assessment of Goldman Sachs, by 2040, the four largest economies will be China, the US, India and Japan.

The US sees India as a close partner in enhancing security cooperation against maritime threats in the Indian Ocean area, preventing piracy, carrying out search and rescue operations, responding to natural disasters and enhancing cooperative capabilities, including through logistical support. The Indian Navy is expected to assume a substantive role in this joint effort to ensure security of the Indian Ocean India will overtake the G-6 economies faster than earlier expected and India’s GDP, in all likelihood, will surpass that of the US before 2050, making it the second largest economy after China. After decades of marginalisation imposed by the structural realities of the cold war, its pursuit of an economic paradigm that retarded its growth potential significantly and its obsession with Pakistan that made sure that India was viewed primarily through the prism of Indo-Pak rivalry, India is

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STRATEGIC COMPETITION finally coming into its own with a self-confidence that comes with growing capabilities. Its global and regional ambitions are rising and it is showing aggressiveness in its foreign policy that had not been its forte before. As a consequence, its security policy towards the Pacific is also becoming more proactive. The latest Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) makes a very strong statement of India’s importance for the US in the emerging global security architecture. While a concern with China’s rising military power is palpable throughout the defence review, it is instructive to note the importance that the QDR has attached to India’s rising global profile. India is described as an emerging great power and a key strategic partner of the US. Shared values such as the two states being long-standing multi-ethnic democracies are underlined as providing the foundation for increased strategic cooperation. This stands in marked contrast to the unease that has been expressed with the centralisation of power in Russia and lack of transparency in security affairs in China. It is also significant that India is mentioned along with America’s traditional allies such as the NATO countries, Japan and Australia. The QDR goes on to say very categorically that close cooperation with these partners (including India) in the war on terrorism as well as in efforts to counter WMD proliferation and other non-traditional threats ensures not only the continuing need for these alliances but also for improving their capabilities. For the US, India is now a crucial player in the emerging balance of power in the Pacific. It would like a strong US-India alliance to act as a bulwark against the arc of Islamic instability running from the Middle East to Asia and to create much greater balance in Asia. How far India would be willing to go would, in many ways, be determined by the domestic political dynamics in India.

Conclusion As the above discussion makes clear, India’s ambitions as a major player in the Pacific have increased in recent years in consonance with an increase in its economic and

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

military capabilities. India’s foreign policy towards the Pacific is also shaping up in light of these factors. As China continues to be the main actor whose rise is shaking up the security dynamic in the Asia-Pacific, India, like most other states, is trying to calibrate its ties with China. There is nothing really sinister about China’s attempts to expand its own influence and curtail India’s. China is a rising power in Asia and the world and as such will do its utmost to prevent the rise of other power centres around its periphery like India that might in the future prevent it from taking its rightful place as a global player. This is not much different than the stated US policy of preventing the rise of other powers that might threaten its position as a global hegemon. Just as the US is working towards achieving its strategic objective, China is pursuing its own strategic agenda. In many ways, it is natural for China to view India as a potential rival for foreign capital, export markets, political influence and aspirations for regional leadership. There is also nothing extraordinarily benign in China’s attempts to improve its bilateral relations with India in recent times. China would not like to see India coming close to the US in order to contain China. As a consequence, India’s foreign policy in the Pacific is now aimed at curtailing the influence of China and establish itself as a major player. Towards this end, it has taken the help of the US and Japan with whom it shares many values and interests in the region. It has been suggested that India would like to prevent the emergence of another dominant power between Singapore and Aden. While it may be difficult for India to prevent the rise of China in the region, given its current capabilities, it certainly would like to make it difficult for China to have complete sway over the region. It makes sense for India to stress cooperation while working to narrow the power disparity with China and build greater stability in Asia through strategic ties with other democracies, including the US and Japan. The US and Japanese interests also converge with India on this count and it is this dynamic that will go a long way in shaping the security architecture in the Pacific in the coming years.

REPORT review

A research document by The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle and Washington DC Reviewed by Major General (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) Editor-in-Chief

DSA Magazine

he National Bureau of Asian Research in the US has just released an exhaustive research document entitled “China’s Military Challenge”. Rarely has the need for a thorough analysis of the rising military power of China been more pressing and urgent than at this historic juncture, when the United States is re-balancing towards the Asia-Pacific theatre. The world’s attention is increasingly getting riveted on the implications of China’s rapid military modernisation and equally on the growing strategic emphasis of America on East Asia. Towards that end this excellent analytical research volume on “China’s Military Challenge” is a must read for all members of India’s strategic establishment – both in and out of uniform. The editors of this magnum opus lament the erosion of American primacy / hegemony and carry out an objective appraisal of China’s rising threat to America’s ability to protect the Global Commons of the Sea, Outer Space and Cyberspace, as also its ability to project power towards the Asian land mass and littoral. “Three decades of relentless Chinese economic growth has provided the country’s leaders with the resources required to transform what was a relatively obsolete military force during the cold war into a modern and dramatically improving instrument of coercive power”. Its investment in anti-access / area-denial (A2 /AD) capabilities is manifested in the formidable land based “Reconnaissance-Strike Complex” that China has assiduously built during the last two decades. “This capability is based on an extensive ISR system that includes territorial and space based sensors to detect, track and target mobile US military systems at great distances from Chinese territory as well as actively at fixed bases throughout the Pacific”. The authors are alluding to the formidable array of reconnaissance and Geo-positioning satellites put up by China to track American Carrier Battle Groups and attack them with their salvos of Dong Feng-21D Carrier killer missiles. These asymmetric capabilities could well prove to be a game changer in naval warfare and seriously erode American abilities to intervene in a Taiwan centric conflict or aid their allies in North East or South East Asia. These US abilities are now under a huge question mark. No wonder Chinese behaviour towards its Asian neighbours has, in recent years, been marked by a striking assertiveness that is rooted both in its expanding capabilities and interests and in a growing Chinese perception of a global balance that seems to be shifting in its favour. “The focus of the current strategic friction is the near seas and the air space above them where China seeks to carve out a zone where it is exempt from the international legal norms of the global commons”. From ‘Near Coast Defence’ the PLAN has graduated to ‘Near Sea Active Defence’ and ‘Regional Anti-Access’. In the years ahead it will expand to extended Blue Water Anti-Access (East of the Second Island Chain) and then perhaps from ‘Limited Expeditionary’ to ‘Blue Water Expeditionary’ capabilities. The report examines the emerging Chinese capabilities of the Land forces as also the PLAN and PLAAF as well as the Second Artillery Corps. It examines China’s advances in Space, Cyber and Electronic warfare. It then examines the regional impact and responses from the countries in North East Asia, South East Asia and Australia as well as India to China’s military modernisation. It then examines US response options to the rise of China and takes a look at China’s vision and envisaged world order.

DSA comment Where does the accretion in Chinese capabilities and power leave India? Out in the cold. Our Strategic Pundits are hysterically proclaiming their Non Alignment (2.0 version) in the emerging US-China spat and waving the flag of an abject and craven surrender – without a shot being fired. This is what happens when you deliberately delay the acquisition of much needed military capabilities. You emasculate your response options and lower your dignity as a civilisational state. This research volume should be made compulsory reading for all those who have anything to do with India’s national security. October 2012 Defence AND security alert

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DRAGON ON THE PROWL

R S N Singh The writer is former Research & Analysis Wing (R&AW) officer and has authored books on strategic and military aspects.

A former Chief of Nepal Army lamented that the Maoists betrayed the country at every stage and finally came close to the capture of the state towards their establishment of a totalitarian regime. He warned the Indian policy makers that India, at the moment may not see the Maoists problem as pernicious because the country has the strategic space, which Nepal did not have

he buffer status of Nepal, is being challenged by the sheer weight of technology by China. In fact, the entire discourse on ‘buffer status’ needs to be reviewed in the backdrop of the technology driven infrastructural changes in Tibet. There are 46 landlocked countries in the world. Most of them are in the throes of underdevelopment and have to contend with serious internal problems. The absence of sea in their surround has not only made these countries economically dependent, but engendered an insular and inward bent of mind. China has brought about a paradigm shift in the situation of Nepal by its technological intervention in Tibet. The most outstanding and redefining feature of China’s development thrust in Tibet is the 1,142 km Qinghai-Tibet railway, completed in 2006 at the cost of US$ 4.27 billion. China’s infrastructure development in Tibet, rather than benign considerations has been motivated by strategic reasons. It is driven by the Chinese strategic emphasis on ‘logistics to fight 21st century wars,’ the key ingredients being ‘rapid response’ and ‘strategic mobility’. The writer discusses the most destabilising impact of Maoism and the erosion of Nepal’s Hindu national identity.

epal shares 1,751 km boundary with India and 1,414 km with Tibet (China). The religious and cultural orientation of Nepal has however been intimately and inextricably linked with India. Hinduism served as the potent symbol for the monarchy, i.e. the Shah dynasty for nation building. Ironically and intriguingly, it is this very enduring pillar that was knocked down by the Maoist led government on assuming power in 2008. It was an intriguing move because there were never demands from any quarter for repudiating the ‘Hindu state’ status of Nepal. It has not been without consequences. Religious conversions and proselytising, which was banned in Nepal has now given way to unbridled conversion by Christian missionaries. As far as Muslim minority is concerned its population in Nepal was two per cent in 1981, 3.5 per cent in 1991, 4.2 per cent as per the census of 2001 and at present is reckoned to be around 5 per cent. It is pertinent to mention that Nepal has a Uniform Civil Code. It is the play of the geopolitical forces impacting on Prithvi Narayan’s bid to capture Kathmandu that defined the religious moorings of Nepal as a Hindu state. As a prelude to its capture, Prithvi Narayan had laid siege to the Kathmandu Valley in 1767. Physically and economically isolated, the king of Kathmandu, Jayaprakash Mallah, pleaded with the East India Company for help. The King’s request was endorsed by the Capuchin missionaries, who had been active in the Kathmandu Valley since their expulsion from Tibet in 1745, where they had made inroads in the beginning of the 16th century. They, however intermittently maintained their presence in Lhasa till 1760. The Capuchins began as a reform order of the Franciscans in 1528 and were constituted as a separate order by the order of Pope Clement-VII. The economic isolation had also affected the Company’s earnings that accrued from its trade with Nepal and Tibet. It launched a military expedition under one Captain Kinloch, but was defeated after some intense fighting with the Gurkha forces at Sindhuli. After the capture of Kathmandu Valley, the Capuchin missionaries who had become suspect under the new dispensation were compelled to leave. The Capuchin missionaries failed to convert any significant number of people, barring few Newaris. Similarly, the Kashmiri traders, who benefited greatly from the trade between Bengal and Tibet, also left, fearing religious persecution. In the unification process, Prithvi Narayan Shah was apprehensive of mainly two powers i.e. the Muslim power in India and the East India Company. The rise of the British in India disconcerted him and he believed in the popular saying of that period in the Indian subcontinent: ‘With the merchant comes the musket and with the Bible comes the bayonet’. In his reckoning, therefore, the salvation of his newly created country lay in insulation from Islam and Christianity, bolstering of the Hindu religion as a political expedient vehicle and, above all, in forging a unity rooted in a strong religio-national identity.

The landlock factor There are 46 landlocked countries in the world. Barring some Asian, European and Central Asian

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Republics, most of them are in the throes of underdevelopment and have to contend with serious internal problems. The absence of sea in their surround has not only made these countries economically dependent, but engendered an insular and inward bent of mind. The maritime nations on which these countries are dependent enjoy critical leverages and so is the case with Nepal vis-à-vis India. It is this very geographical leverage, i.e. maritime status of India in respect to Nepal that the Chinese are trying to challenge through technological prowess in establishing road, rail and air links. The fact that Shanghai port is more than 4,000 km away from Lhasa is hardly an undermining factor for the Chinese policy makers. The 1,142 km Qinghai-Tibet railways (completed in 2006) at the cost of US$ 4.27 billion has annihilated any geographical constraint and altered the notion of time and space in China’s strategic thinking.

Manifestations of geography Very few countries in the world of the size of Nepal, which is approximately 800 km long and 175 km wide have such a diverse and variegated land mass. This geographical truism directly impacts on the nationhood and nation building process in Nepal.

India-Nepal-China:

Geopolitical Perspective

The country has three distinct physiographic regions, i.e. the Northern Himalayan region, Middle (Hill region) and the Terai region. The Northern Himalayan region constitutes 35 per cent of the area and has the forbidding high altitude characteristics. The region is in the shadow of some of the most imposing mountain peaks of the world. About 200 of these peaks are more than 6,000 meters in height and 13 more than 8,000 meters, which includes Mount Everest. The temperature in this region varies from 0°C to -16°C.

The buffer status of Nepal, which Pt Nehru famously underscored is being challenged by the sheer weight of technology by China. In fact, the entire discourse on ‘buffer status’ needs to be reviewed in the backdrop of the technology driven infrastructural changes in Tibet. In the context of Nepal, India may continue to enjoy the economic advantage vis-à-vis China by virtue of favourable geography, but the fact that China relegates economic considerations in favour of considered strategic imperatives should not be lost out on Indian planners. Nepal is mirror image of India and as such our thrust and ability to maintain our benign primacy in Nepal will determine our ability to neutralise growing Chinese inroads and influence in the South Asian region and elsewhere To the south of the North Himalayan region, is the Hill region, whose climate is more agreeable. It constitutes 42 per cent of the area (600 meters to 3,000 meters) and has traditionally been the home to the ruling class. The capital Kathmandu lies in this region. In the threat perception of Nepal, the defence of Kathmandu has invariably evinced the central focus, something which the Maoists exploited.

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Further south is the Terai region, which constitutes only 23 per cent of the area, but arguably 48 per cent of the population. In certain parts of the region, temperature goes up to as high as 47°C. This region is the agricultural backbone of Nepal. With only 18 per cent of Nepal under cultivation, the importance of the region, from the point of food security gets accentuated. When India till 70s was grappling with food security, it had its direct impact on Nepal as well. Old timers in Terai maintain that such was the food scarcity in Nepal then, that people from the Northern Himalayan and the Hill region were available to be hired only for one square meal a day. These extremely variegated characteristics of the Nepal’s land mass have been manipulated to pose as fissures especially after the Maoists made inroads.

Geography and nation building Every country is impacted by its geography in its own unique way with regard to nation building and so has Nepal. Not too distant in the past, Nepal was near absolutely a ‘closed country’. In the north lay the forbidding Himalayas and in the south the heavily forested Terai was treated as the ‘Malarial Curtain’. This curtain was so deterring that the peoples from the hills did not venture in the region and instead chose to make demographic aggression in Sikkim and Bhutan. The region abounded in wild animals, so much so that King George during his visit to India in 1911 bagged as many as 21 tigers from an elephant’s back. From 1860 onwards, Indians were encouraged to settle in Terai, who made the region hospitable in the years to follow. Terai is now splitting at its seams with the density of population growing six fold at places. Regretfully, there has been very little reverse migration from Terai to the hills, a factor detrimental to nation building. The nature of terrain of Nepal has adversely impacted on the process of nation building. Two-third of Nepal is hilly and mountainous, thus making road construction extremely expensive. Further the orientation of river is from North to South, making East-West communication very difficult. It is rather easier in some areas for people to travel from one part of Nepal to other through India. The country has only 8,500 km of paved road, which compares poorly to the 58,000 km network developed by Chinese in Tibet, the northern neighbour of Nepal. 22 out of 75 districts have no road links to speak of. In fact, the all important Kathmandu Valley is connected by only one road. 63 per cent of the roads are in Terai. There is a meagre 59 km railway in the country, that too in Terai. The only somewhat redeeming feature with regard to the connectivity of the country is by way of airfields, some 48 of them, of which 10 are paved.

The example of Nepal cannot be missed out by any sensible Indian in the backdrop of the fact that nearly one-third of the Indian land mass, i.e. 243 districts are impacted by the Maoists problem. It may be mentioned that in the last CCOMPOSA (Coordination Committee Meeting of Maoist Parties in South Asia) meeting held in India, a resolution was passed that Nepal was critical for validating the Maoist modus operandi for capture of state power in South Asia. The Maoist leadership has sought to create socio-political fault line running along the East-West highway, exacerbating the plains-hill-people-ethnic (Janjati) divide – all in naked pursuit of capture of state power. The East-West highway fault line, in the Maoists scheme, also entails creating the spectre of two opposite pulls by fabricating the Indian machinations in Terai and compelling the hill people in the embrace of China. The Maoists in conformity with their political design abused and destroyed every symbol of Nepalese nationalism, the most critical being the monarchy and the Hindu state status of Nepal. It is the monarchy, to be precise the Shah dynasty, which in the 18th century overcame 50 different principalities / petty kingdoms to create Nepal. Kathmandu Valley itself had three kingdoms, i.e. Kathmandu, Patan and Bhadgaon. It had taken 25 years for Prithvi Narayan Shah to capture these three kingdoms.

The China factor The Tibet Autonomous Region was established in 1965 covering an area of 1.23 million square miles. The Tibetan entity was diluted by merging of large parts of Tibet with Quinghai, Gansu and Sichuan provinces. Tibet thus lost almost 1.3 million square miles. Since the late 80s, the infrastructural development in Tibet has been unprecedented rather breathtaking. It has introduced a completely new paradigm, as Chinese authorities have annihilated and redefined the age-old notion of inhospitable or difficult terrain. The infrastructural development is in consonance with Deng’s development philosophy “let them coastal China get rich first and you Western China get rich later”. As per the defence minister, A K Antony, China has developed 58,000 km of road network in Tibet. Other authentic sources maintain that most of the towns (more than 90 per cent) and nearly half the villages in Tibet have been linked by road.

Nepal shares 1,751 km boundary with India and 1,414 km with Tibet (China). The religious and cultural orientation of Nepal has however been intimately and inextricably linked with India. Hinduism served as the potent symbol for the monarchy The most outstanding and redefining feature of China’s development thrust in Tibet is the 1,142 km Qinghai-Tibet railway, completed in 2006 at a cost of US$ 4.27 billion. This engineering feat can be gauged from the fact that the railway line at its highest point Tanggula Pass traverses 16,640 ft. There are plans to extend this railway to Dromo opposite Nathu La Pass and to Shigatse at a cost of US$ 1.2 billion. Both Nepal and China are keen to extend the

The Maoists in conformity with their political design abused and destroyed every symbol of Nepalese nationalism, the most critical being the monarchy and the Hindu state status of Nepal. It is the monarchy which in the 18th century overcame 50 different principalities / petty kingdoms to create Nepal

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Tibet Railway to Kathmandu and a series of discussions have been held in this regard. In fact, the proposal has caught the imagination of the people of Nepal. For China it would be yet another means to neutralise the traditional and deep-rooted Indo-Nepal relations.

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In addition to the railway and road network in Tibet, there is equal emphasis on construction and upgradation of airfields. There are five airfields inside Tibet and 15 in the surrounding area of which only three are open to civilian activity. Gonggar (Lhasa) and Bangda are being upgraded to handle one million passengers each annually. The world’s highest airport is being constructed at Nagqu (14,639 ft.) at the cost of US$ 263.5 million. This airport will have three dimensional network to link entire Tibet. In Nagqu itself, the biggest logistic centre was completed in 2009 at a cost of US$ 1.5 billion. This centre will handle 2.3 million tonnes of cargo by 2015 and 3.1 million tonnes by 2020.

dsa 3rd anniversary

an unfought war?

Retaining regional relevance

It is this very geographical leverage, i.e. maritime status of India in respect to Nepal that the Chinese are trying to challenge through technological prowess in establishing road, rail and air links. The fact that Shanghai port is more than 4,000 km away from Lhasa, is hardly an undermining factor for the Chinese policy makers. The 1,142 km Qinghai-Tibet railways (completed in 2006) at the cost of US$ 4.27 billion has annihilated any geographical constraint and altered the notion of time and space in China’s strategic thinking China’s infrastructure development in Tibet, rather than benign considerations has been motivated by strategic reasons. It is driven by the Chinese strategic emphasis on ‘logistics to fight 21st century wars,’ the key ingredients being ‘rapid response’ and ‘strategic mobility’. The Tibet railway, by modest reckoning will enable the Chinese to mobilise 12 divisions in a month’s time. Significantly the Tibet railway has drastically reduced the travel time for troops from Golmud to Lhasa from 72 hrs to 16 hrs. The average capacity of a single train is 1,200 tonnes (20 bogies x 60 tonnes). Working on an average of eight trains operating one way, one division (15,000 tonnes) can be inducted in 36 hrs.

Nepal-Tibet road connectivity: Implications Of the five highways in Tibet, only Qinghai-Tibet Highway and Sino-Nepal Friendship Highway are open to foreigners. A second highway Syabrubesi–Rasuah located 135 km northwest of Kathmandu is under construction. The Friendship Highway or Arniko–Kodari Highway (155 km) was built by China in 1966. The distance between Kathmandu and Lhasa is 920 km and involves 3–5 days of travel. Nevertheless, as a consequence of this road link, Nepal’s trade with Tibet increased by 90 per cent. In 2011, the entire foreign trade of Tibet was worth US$ 87.6 million, of which Nepal accounted for US$ 60 million. Therefore, the new Syabrubesi–Rasuagadi Road (2,600 mtrs above sea level) will provide further impetus to Nepal-Tibet linkages and trade. This road will cut distances drastically between Tibet and Nepal. Such is China’s strategic premium on this new linkage that it is spending almost US$ 20 million to construct 19 km segment in the most formidable segment in Nepal.

It is the difficult terrain and Kathmandu centric threat perception of Nepal that facilitated the growth and spread of the Maoists. In one of the seminars in Delhi, a former Chief of the Nepal Army maintained that they (the Nepal Army) could have vanquished the Maoists, when they made initial inroads. Regretfully, he said that the Nepal Army was restrained by the policy makers on the plea that the Maoists were ‘own people’ The North Himalayan Region, also referred as ‘Himalayan Rim’ is more antiquated and remote land mass than Tibet. Dolpa, Humla, Mugu and Mustang on the northern borders of Nepal are part of this Rim. It may be mentioned that of 12 major passes along Nepal-Tibet border, four are in Mustang. In 2001, the Nepalese dispensation started food supplies to these hill districts through Tibet. Therefore, their dependability is overwhelmingly on the road access coming from Tibet in the north rather than from the south of their own country. The infrastructure development in Tibet has engendered unprecedented socio-economic churning in these districts on the Himalayan Rim. These areas have been flooded with Chinese goods and the economic dimension of this road connectivity can be gauged from the fact that the Chinese beer costs only Rs 20 as against Rs 120 of Nepalese beer. There is a clamour in the villages on the Himalayan Rim to carve out road connectivity to Tibet.

Conclusion The Chinese thrust in Nepal is best illustrated by a hoarding of Chinese tourism at the Kathmandu airport which says “Welcome to Nepal, Gateway to China”.

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Cecil Victor The writer has covered all wars with Pakistan as War Correspondent and reported from the conflict zones in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in South East Asia as well as from Afghanistan. He is author of India: The Security Dilemma.

he writer cites Brig Dalvi in a quote that perhaps sums up the essence of the 1962 humiliation.”The advice of capable generals who counselled caution, restraint and adherence to the basic principles of war was ignored and the principles of war violated. Such generals were labelled pro-West, alarmist or overcautious. With the eclipse of General Thimayya, General Thorat’s claims to be the Chief were waived aside and General Thapar’s seniority was invoked to promote him in April, 1961. General S D Verma, who was commanding Ladakh and who held similar views to General Thorat was superseded. The truth is that officers who opposed the indiscriminate opening of posts were earmarked for elimination. There was no room for practical professional views in Mr Nehru’s quest for political survival in the face of a militant opposition”.

There has been a sea-change in Chinese strategic thought since 1962. It has broken the 20 km mould of self-restraint along the Line of Actual Control more than 500 times in recent years; and is now set to use Indian territory in Jammu and Kashmir as a springboard into the Indian Ocean Region. Its “string of pearls” of maritime facilities stretching from the Pacific seaboard to Gwadar on the Balochistan coast of Pakistan is complete and ready for use by its naval forces as and when required

The Chinese did not need an excuse. They were determined to drag India into a conflict at a time and place of their choosing. They saw the disarray within the Indian military ranks and exploited the conditions to the full in a swift campaign that brought them to the gates of Tezpur

n 1962, the parameter of a Chinese victory was defined by a 20 km wide area of separation between the victorious People’s Liberation Army and an Indian Army in disarray. The Chinese themselves did not want to be seen as claiming more territory than what they had done in 1954 and appeared satisfied if the Tawang tract along with its Buddhist monastery in Arunachal Pradesh was delivered to its suzerainty. Not so in 2012. Half a century later India appears unable to prevent the nibbling of its perimeter by a collusive arrangement between China and Pakistan and Beijing wants the whole of Arunachal Pradesh – for starters. China is preparing to gobble up the whole of Asia from the Karakorams to the Indian Ocean on one flank and the Pacific seaboard on the other and India appears prepared to accept the fait accompli, its halting foray into the South China Sea notwithstanding. The stakes in 2012 are immensely higher than they were in 1962. The Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian nations in Indonesia in 1955 which became the cradle of the Non-Aligned Movement was the high point of Indian diplomacy. Jawaharlal Nehru was seen as the orchestrator and coordinator of a movement that brought Soekarno of Indonesia, Gamal Nasser of Egypt and the grand old man of Yugoslavian consolidation Josip Broz Tito into close association with each other. China, kept out of the UN Security Council by western machination against Communism, was a pariah waiting to break in. Peking, as it was then known, was green with envy and itching to cut Jawaharlal Nehru down to size and show India up as a paper tiger not fit to be a leader of the emerging Non-Aligned Movement.

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Nehru’s forward policy effect Nehru made the cardinal mistake of misjudging the Chinese mind. He was faulted for the “Forward Policy” which was, in its very essence, a response to a perceived threat from China. His desire for a fixed boundary was the foundation of his policy of spending more on national development than on national defence. To his mind in the north-east the McMahon Line satisfied that requirement. In the western sector he had to choose between the Johnson alignment and the MacDonald–McCartney Line. He chose what he thought would satisfy India’s security considerations and gave orders to man the outposts and provided the military wherewithal to do the job. An indicator of the type of preparations that had been made to defend the forward outposts is available in the Government of India’s 1962 war history which shows that the Chinese returned 21 guns of 23-pounder calibre (the predecessor of the 105 mm indigenous Indian Field Gun which is still in service) and 41 three–inch mortars, 16 medium machine guns and 200 light machine guns in the North-East Frontier Agency as Arunachal Pradesh was then known. Clearly, the Chinese had used the favourable landscape on their side of the Tibetan plateau to bring in very heavy artillery – 160 mm heavy mortar was deployed in the Aksai Chin sector in the west. There is no gainsaying the fact that we were outgunned and swamped in manpower and Chinese human-wave tactics. However, that there were other political factors at work comes straight from the horse’s mouth: Brigadier John Dalvi, commander of the 7th Infantry Brigade that was deployed to defend Tawang. He was taken prisoner when he walked into the waiting arms of the Chinese. He wrote the “Himalayan Blunder” in defence of himself. In Chapter V titled The Army Mans the Border – 1959-60 he writes: “Although the Prime Minister had announced in August 1959, to the Lok Sabha, that the army had taken over the NEFA border, it was only in November of that year that the actual moves of regular troops could take place. The gap of three months in implementing the

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Prime Minister’s order is most revealing and can be explained in the army’s reluctance to get implicated precipitously in the Himalayas …” (Emphasis added) While the blame for misreading the Chinese mind and preparing for the consequences of the Forward Policy must lie with Nehru there is need to assess the subterranean factors that contributed to the debacle at Chinese hands. Brigadier Dalvi writes (Page 76) “The advice of capable generals who counselled caution, restraint and adherence to the basic principles of war was ignored and the principles of war violated. Such generals were labelled pro-West, alarmist or overcautious. With the eclipse of General Thimayya, General Thorat’s claims to be the Chief were waived aside and General Thapar’s seniority was invoked to promote him in April, 1961. General S D Verma, who was commanding Ladakh and who held similar views to General Thorat was superseded, his seniority being ignored. The truth is that officers who opposed the indiscriminate opening of posts were earmarked for elimination. There was no room for practical professional views in Mr Nehru’s quest for political survival in the face of a militant opposition”.

Failure to use weapons One effect of this background was that the author himself did not use the weapons that he had in his possession – two 3-inch mortars and two machine guns – while the Chinese were butchering his men in the battle of Tseng-Jong on the Namka Chu River right before his eyes. His explanation was that he did not want to give the Chinese an excuse for a massive attack along a 12 mile front; that it was his responsibility to protect the main force rather than a “small detachment”. Here are his reasons for not using the weapons at his disposal even while the Chinese were shooting up his men: “I was soon called upon to go through the most agonising hour of my life. Major Chaudhury made a desperate appeal for mortar and machine gun fire to extricate his force. Col Mishra relayed this request to me and added his own urgent plea for help. I was standing very near our machine-guns and mortars at

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Bridge IV. The crews of these weapons also begged me to allow them to open fire and help their brethren. “I and I alone, am responsible for the decision not to allow the mortars and machine-guns to open up. My aim was to extricate this patrol without further loss of life and without exposing the main body to massacre. As Commander on the spot I had to take a broader view of the pros and cons of escalating a minor engagement into an all-out battle along a 12 mile front. It is a cardinal principle that the security of the main body is the prime responsibility of the commander and this security must not be jeopardised for any reason whatsoever and never to assist a small detachment.

The truth is that officers who opposed the indiscriminate opening of posts were earmarked for elimination. There was no room for practical professional views in Mr Nehru’s quest for political survival in the face of a militant opposition “My first and overriding reason was that Tseng-Jong was out of range of effective fire. The range of both weapons is approximately 2,700 yards and Tseng-Jong was beyond that range. Besides the patrol had no mobile fire controllers to engage targets. So on purely technical grounds I could not guarantee to assist the patrol by covering fire. “I could possibly have taken on by direct observation the Chinese reinforcements moving to Tseng-Jong, after the failure of the first Chinese assault. This movement could be clearly observed by me and weapons crews. But by doing so I would be igniting the entire front and inviting retaliation and reprisals against my force on the south bank without being certain that I would actually be helping the small detachment …” Brigadier Dalvi explained.

An unfought war? It was this kind of mindset and the spate of books written by those intent on laying all the blame on the government of the day (Nehru) that invited the counter-blast from Lt Col J R Saigal who alleged in his “Unfought War” that senior military commanders were derelict in their

duty and that was what caused, what was supposed to be an orderly retreat to more defendable positions in the Himalayan foothills, into a disgraceful rout. The cat was let out of the bag by British author Neville Maxwell who wrote the most damning account of the debacle in his “India’s China War” published in 1970. He admits to receiving access to classified information through disgruntled sources. In the preface of the book Maxwell admits: “Wherever possible, I have given references to statements or quotations, but it will be seen that the density of such notes falls off sharply in the sections dealing with the border war and its preliminaries. In those (and some other points in the book) I have drawn on material from unpublished files and reports of the Government of India and the Indian Army; I was given access to these by officials and officers who believed that it was time a full account was put together and who trusted me to write it fairly. I cannot, of course, name them nor cite the documents or files from which I have drawn the material; I can only thank them and hope they will not be disappointed.” Such was the state of civil-military relations before, during and after the events of 1962. It was fully exploited by the Chinese to fulfill their strategic goal – to show India up to be a “paper tiger” unfit to be the leader of the so-called “Third World”.

Chinese strategic plan As it turned out the Chinese did not need an excuse. They were determined to drag India into a conflict at a time and place of their choosing. They saw the disarray within the Indian military ranks and exploited the conditions to the full in a swift campaign that brought them to the gates of Tezpur in the Assam plains. Having achieved their objective of discrediting the political leadership of India led by Jawaharlal Nehru, the Chinese withdrew post-haste knowing full well that its forces south of the Himalayas would soon be decimated by Indian troops seeking revenge for the humiliation. It announced a unilateral ceasefire and effected a swift withdrawal but it created a cordon sanitaire of a 20 km disengagement

zone between the two armies that ensured that India would not try and wrest the fruits of invasion. As the Government of India’s 1962 war history records: “The ceasefire proposals made by the Chinese on 21 November 1962 also gave out their plan to quickly withdraw from the captured territory. The issue probably was an urgent one as the Chinese could not maintain their troops in such large numbers through the winter, specially in NEFA. The Chinese in their lengthy note repeated their 24 October proposal, for both sides to withdraw 20 km from line of control all along the frontier. This would keep the Chinese still in occupation of Aksai Chin area of Ladakh sector. Both sides should respect the line of actual control and undertake not to cross it and negotiations should again commence. India had rejected these proposals as it meant China keeping the fruits of her aggression. “After accusing the Indian Government of aggression and blaming it for the current conflict, the Chinese side made two major decisions: (a) Beginning from 00.00 hours on 22 November, 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will ceasefire along the entire Sino-Indian border. “(b) Beginning from 1 December, 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw to the position 20 km behind the line of actual control which existed between China and India on 7 November, 1962. “In the Eastern Sector the Chinese promised to withdraw 20 km behind the McMahon Line into their own territory. The Chinese also declared their intention to set up check posts in the vacated zone (between line of actual control and 20 km zone on its own side).

China in expansion binge There has been a sea-change in Chinese strategic thought since 1962. It has broken the 20 km mould of self-restraint along the Line of Actual Control more than 500 times in recent years; and is now set to use Indian territory in Jammu and Kashmir as a springboard into the Indian Ocean Region. Its “string of pearls” of maritime facilities stretching from

the Pacific seaboard to Gwadar on the Balochistan coast of Pakistan is complete and ready for use by its naval forces as and when required.

It was this kind of mindset and the spate of books written by those intent on laying all the blame on the government of the day (Nehru) that invited the counter-blast from Lt Col J R Saigal who alleged in his “Unfought War” that senior military commanders were derelict in their duty and that was what caused, what was supposed to be an orderly retreat to more defendable positions in the Himalayan foothills, into a disgraceful rout For India, an especially bitter pill is what is happening on land that it occasionally says is an integral part of itself – Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The posting of elements of the People’s Liberation Army disguised as engineers and workmen sent to help repair landslide damage of 2010 that dumped part of the Karakoram Highway into a huge lake caused by dammed debris. There was hardly any protest from India about this development unlike the warning issued to an Indian naval ship that it was entering Chinese territory in the South China Sea. The underlying message to the world is distasteful to contemplate – “dare you to stop us”. The raising of two Mountain Divisions to defend Arunachal Pradesh could prove to be too little too late. The state of defence preparedness and civil-military relations appear to be almost similar to what they were in 1962. The General V K Singh contretemps with the government, the long list of corruption cases against military personnel, the veiled threat by a senior functionary of an ex–Servicemen’s organisation over demands related to the sixth pay commission … He prophesied: “If the matters National Security and functioning of Defence Forces are not resolved on priority, the Nation will creep into pre 1962 disastrous situation” (direct quote). As they did in 1962 the Chinese must have noted all this with a great degree of satisfaction. October is upon us and India is as vulnerable as it was in 1962.

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iven the huge increase in thermal imaging camera use in the UK, Europe and the US you could be forgiven for thinking that this is a comparatively new technology, but for those in the know, it has been around for many years.

Peter Banham The writer has been associated with the sales and marketing of thermal imaging systems for over 30 years. Having gained a background in mechanical, electrical and electronic engineering he is also a Fellow of the Institute of Sales and Marketing Management. He originally set up Focus 2000 as a thermal imaging service support company, but soon progressed to selling thermal cameras and cores. Producing bespoke systems followed with them supplying their first systems to the US Air Force. He was approached by FLIR to sell their products and in 2008 Focus 2000 was appointed sole UK distributor for the core products. PTZ style products have been a mainstay for the past ten years with new RaptiR and SentineliR security products and Fire Guardian being released over the last twelve months. The key advantage for thermal imaging systems is range – providing true and accurate remote monitoring. In the security sector, range equates against time: time to react, time to adjust, time to respond. Thermal security cameras detect the minute differences in heat that are all around us, all the time. This heat energy is easier to detect over longer ranges than visible light, giving thermal cameras their advantage

Perimeter protection is an ideal scenario, whether for airports, ports, commercial or military sites. It can also be used for individual buildings, such as iconic buildings and government buildings needing constant vigilance

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Key advantages Unlike the human eye, or conventional CCTV cameras, thermal imaging cameras don’t use visible-light to make a picture, they use heat. This gives thermal security cameras distinct advantages over low-light and daylight cameras when lighting is impractical, too expensive or where long-range performance is required. For years, thermal security cameras have been seen as too expensive and have remained relatively expensive; so many security professionals have compromised with less expensive – and less capable – options, including CCTV, night-vision devices and infrared illuminated cameras. Thermal imaging should be used intelligently, often combined with wider systems as a complementary technology, but in many instances can successfully replace more traditional alternatives such as CCTV. The key advantage for thermal imaging systems is range – providing true and accurate remote monitoring. In the security sector, range equates against time: time to react, time to adjust, time to respond. Thermal security cameras detect the minute differences in heat that are all around us, all the time. This heat energy is easier to detect over longer ranges than visible light, giving thermal cameras their advantage. Critically someone trying to breach a more conventional security system may use camouflage or hide or obscure themselves against buildings or other opportunities for disguise, but for thermal imaging there is no existing way to hide body heat source, or heat signature as it is sometimes known. For many security professionals, the process of evaluating thermal cameras for purchase or recommendation is a new undertaking that exposes them to a whole new set of specifications and performance parameters that they are unfamiliar with. So, how can you get the right cameras? The quality of the images a given camera produces is a function of a number of factors including detector resolution, optics and image processing. The detector is the heart of any thermal security camera. It’s the part that gathers the infrared energy and allows the creation of an image made from this energy. A thermal camera’s detector plays the same role as the CCD detector chip in a standard video camera. The detector’s resolution is the number of individual detector elements found on that chip, usually measured in horizontal and vertical dimensions. The low-end options for thermal resolution typically offered are the 160 × 120 detector or the 320 × 240 detector formats, but the

October 2012 Defence AND security alert

Thermal imaging for constant vigilance Affordable and viable technology for Security and surveillance

he writer, takes a look at the potential impact of a new generation of lower cost, high performance, thermal imaging cameras and how these can make a difference in security and surveillance in the Indian context.

standard has quickly become the 640 × 480 detector. There is a good reason for this as a detector’s resolution is the first vital element in determining a camera’s ability to generate a high-quality image. The more detector elements a detector has (meaning, the higher its resolution), the more energy will be gathered and the more detail you’ll be able to see in the image.

Lower cost with better performance Also, if you were to compare a camera with 640 × 480 resolution and a camera with 320 × 240 resolution that use the same size of lens, you’ll find that the 640’s angular field of view will actually be wider, yet will also detect threats from further away. In the real world, this means that you’ll be able to cover the same amount of area with fewer cameras using 640 resolution and still be able to detect intruders from farther away. In other words: lower cost with better performance.

Thermal imaging should be used intelligently, often combined with wider systems as a complementary technology, but in many instances can successfully replace more traditional alternatives such as CCTV But just where should you be looking to use thermal imaging? The applications of thermal imaging are almost as broad as security applications themselves and thermal imaging can also be used in complementary tasks, such as fire prevention, alerting changes in temperature before a fire has actually started. The most beneficial uses of thermal imaging systems play on the advantage of range and reduced cost, plus the need

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HOMELAND SECURITY

for 24/7 protection. Therefore, perimeter protection is an ideal scenario, whether for airports, ports, commercial or military sites. It can also be used for individual buildings, such as iconic buildings and government buildings needing constant vigilance.

What we have seen recently, however, is development in this technology making cameras smaller and much more affordable, which are both of obvious benefit to the fast-developing Indian marketplace. Importantly, for first-time Indian users, it allows them now to look at much higher specification equipment, at much lower costs, than just a few years ago Thermal imaging is also playing a valuable role in protecting critical infrastructure, especially where there is a risk of terrorism, typically this can include power stations and sub-plants, oil processing and other energy and processing sites. One of the most high-profile uses of thermal imaging cameras in the UK is a major project taken-care of by Focus 2000 Infrared – the London Eye, which used Focus enclosure with FLIR cores. The London Eye is a giant revolving wheel that carries passengers in capsules, providing a unique experience and fantastic views of the capital. However, like all iconic buildings and attractions worldwide, it is also at risk of potential terrorist attack, or vandalism. Just like at an airport, all passengers that want to go in one of the 32 capsules are thoroughly screened. Security staff keep an eye on all visitors waiting in line to board the capsule. In a control room security staff monitors the images coming in from CCTV cameras installed at multiple locations around the London Eye. Numerous other security measures, not all visible to visitors, are in place. However, since safety and security is the biggest priority for this high-profile attraction, the owners wanted to even further increase security for visitors to a maximum. As with most potential targets, the highest risk times are at night and in poor light conditions, the times when thermal imaging is at its best! The requirement was to be able to highlight anyone trying to gain access to the structure itself, but before they are able to gain any entrance.

Video analytics The images produced by the thermal imaging cameras are not only being watched by security staff. In order to eliminate human errors, they are also combined with Video Analytics. Reliable intrusion detection is based on the ability of a system to discriminate between background activity and unusual events that require investigation by security guards. Thanks to thermal imaging, the London Eye has become even safer than before. Visitors to this major attraction can be assured that everything is in place to guarantee them a first class and safe, experience.

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A great example of the new breed of thermal imaging camera is the new RaptiR series, a dual sensor PTZ (pan, tilt, zoom) camera with both thermal and optical systems for 24/7 surveillance. The camera’s main advantage is its combination of ultra-small size (less than 265 mm high) and class leading thermal performance (at 640 x 512 pixels) which makes it ideal for security, covert and surveillance / counter-terror applications.

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Designed, developed and manufactured in the UK, the camera takes un-cooled thermal imagers a step further. It uses a new pan and tilt positioning platform combined with the high performance Tau™ range of thermal camera cores from FLIR. For greater flexibility in the field, a Sony x 36 block camera takes care of the visual / low light requirements.

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With the benefits of small size and light weight, thermal cameras can be deployed successfully on a temporary basis as well as being engineered into more permanent set-ups. Relatively temporary deployment is ideal for protection of areas susceptible to theft, vandalism or terrorist attack, such as stores areas, especially roadside or rail side. Other applications include surveillance applications where thermal imaging systems can ‘see inside’ trucks and other vehicles to ensure that there are no additional ‘hidden’ passengers who may pose a security or terrorist threat.

The RaptiR 640 T35 provides the user with a thermal field of view, (18°) for medium range work, detection range out to 1,540 m with recognition at 380 m for a man sized object. For the future, Indian security professionals will be using thermal imaging to take the concept of surveillance and intruder prevention to a new level, with true 24/7 operation at an affordable cost with ease of deployment.

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October 2012 Defence AND security alert

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