DSA September 2010

SAARC COUNTRIES : US$ 20 REST OF THE WORLD : US$ 25

INDIA : ` 120

SEPTEMBER 2010

VOLUME 1 ISSN

ISSUE 12

0976-206X

9 770976 206003

NUCLEAR SPECIAL ENERGY

WEAPONS

Indo-US nuclear cooperation Nuclear power programme Table-top nuclear energy!

Nuclear technology

TRADE

-3 S T S IZE E T S PR N U .

COULO No A AB ge S D IN F Pa W 86

editor-in-chief

mission The power of a King lies in his mighty arms…

Security of the citizens at peace time is very important because State is the only saviour of the men and women who get affected only because of the negligence of the State.

— Chanakya

DSA is as much yours, as it is ours!

N

uclear sciences are still regarded as one of the pinnacles of human intellectual achievement. The sheer expanse of their properties is indeed a field of knowledge that adds diplomatic prestige to a country. And when coupled with their destructive potential they bring a military stature that is difficult to ignore. Hence the globally restrictive regimes that continue to be in place, even after the horses have bolted, so to say. Knowledge is sought to be denied, even when it is available in school textbooks. For it is the destructive nature of its misuse that brings nightmares to policy makers around the world. Human beings continue to battle each other through the realms of knowledge and technology denial regimes as though they are the masters of their fate and of this earth!

Nowhere has this notion been more destroyed and no pun intended here, than in the daily tragedy that are the Pakistan flood. Nature, gods or deities, whatever suits the analyst, have responded in a quiet fury that is unprecedented in the modern era. No geographical or political landmass has been as inundated in living memory as has Pakistan. It is a flood that could quite easily fit the bill for footage of The Great Flood of the Noah’s Ark. Nothing in human reminiscence can match the scale of nature’s fury in Pakistan. It is a tragedy that is playing before the eyes, in all its elements. And which begs the question about the role of humankind in the pursuit of knowledge, the sciences, research and development for destruction. The invincibility of human attitudes has been laid bare by the outpouring of the skies. Making intellectual achievements redundant when exposed to the most elemental of nature’s giving, rain.

All the aircraft, missiles, tanks, artillery guns and rifles, on display across Pakistan’s urban traffic space are aimed in the direction of India. As if the only worry that the country has is its eastern neighbour. National, provincial or municipal governance has only looked eastwards in its threat perceptions. Never within, or upwards. It remained so mired in its anxieties that there was never an attempt at analysing its own direction, as a State, or as a society. But moments come in history that provide just such an opportunity to pause and ponder.

Pakistan has been given precisely that chance by the elements of nature conspiring with the absence of rudiments of the State. Will it take the chance is the question that torments all those concerned about the direction of that State, and its society.

It is an opportunity not just for Pakistan, but also for the world at large. And Pakistan knows it all too well, so it is making precisely veiled threats about extremism as it has since it evolved a foreign and security policy based on the use of terror as an instrument of diplomacy. Ignoring the social conditions of Pakistan has cost valuable human lives across the world. But now the threat that looms from that flooded land is far greater than a possible dirty nuclear bomb. Pakistan is truly a global problem now and not just because it has traded nuclear secrets.

manvendra singh

September 2010 Defence AND security alert

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announcement

publisher’s view

Volume 1 Issue 12 September 2010

chairman shyam sunder publisher & ceo pawan agrawal editor-in-chief manvendra singh director shishir bhushan corporate consultant k j singh art consultant divya gupta central saint martins college of art & design, university of arts, london corporate communications monika kanchan representative J&K salil sharma creative vivek anand pant correspondent (europe) dominika cosic production dilshad & dabeer webmaster sundar rawat photographers subhash, deepak circulation & distribution prem gupta ranjeet, sandeep, vikram system administrator vikas e-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscri ption: subscription@dsalert.org online edition: online@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org editorial & business office 4/19 asaf ali road new delhi-110002(India) t: +91-011-23243999,23287999 f: +91-11-23259666 e: info@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org

disclaimer all rights reserved. reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part by any means without permission from Defence And Security Alert is prohibited. opinions expressed are those of the individual writers and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher and / or editors. all disputes are subject to jurisdiction of delhi courts. defence and security alert is printed, published and owned by pawan agrawal and printed at graphic world, 1686, kucha dakhini rai, darya ganj, new delhi-110002 and published at 4/19 asaf ali road, new delhi (india). editor: manvendra singh

­The word “nuclear” has acquired an everyday familiarity largely because of the intense debate and far-reaching effect of the Indo-US deal on the civilian uses of the atom. Otherwise, for most Indians it was a word used in physics textbooks which, by the very nature of the “streaming” of education, left many of those who did not choose science in school to be just vaguely aware of the peaceful uses of nuclear or atomic energy. There was no way that they could not have but been acutely aware of the destructive power of the atom after the bombing by the US of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, slaughtering millions in a jiffy and leaving those who survived outside “ground zero” to suffer the after-effects of the blast, the burns and the radiation effects till death released them from their pains. One is not sure that America and the rest of those who have acquired nuclear weapons technology are really serious about the Nonproliferation they speak so glibly about but make no move towards nuclear disarmament that could rid the world of the threat of self-destruct in one moment of madness.

Madness reminds us of what was done to Iraq on the specious excuse of removing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) from the hands of an unstable dictator. The dictator of Iraq is no more and till date they could not find a single nuclear device and the worst that they could point to as evidence was a factory producing milk powder for children. Something similar is apparently being prepared to be done to neighbouring Iran which is being charged with converting its nuclear power facilities to bomb-making factories. Yet, inexplicably, not a finger is being raised against Pakistan which has a huge weapons stockpile; a proven tendency to proliferate weapons of mass destruction and eager to use nuclear weapons if terrorists nurtured in its madrassas are not allowed to succeed in creating “strategic depth” in neighbouring territories. The terrorist groups on the other hand are threatening to steal nuclear weapons from Pakistan’s arsenal and use them directly for their nefarious ends.

Pakistan is in such a pathetic situation today that there is no way of preventing it from happening and even its mentor, the US, is quite jittery about the prospects of nuclear weapons falling into jihadi hands. If it happens then I am sure that it will be the last nail in the coffin of humanity. Are the people of Pakistan ready for this? The world has already seen how North Korea acquired nuclear weapons with Pakistani assistance and is now openly threatening to use them.

But one thing is very evident that India is the only nation-State with a proven record of using the atom for peaceful purposes be it in power generation or agriculture or medicine for the greater good of humanity. India’s first Atomic Energy Act was passed and Atomic Energy Commission was set up in 1948 and India’s first nuclear reactor apsara was commissioned in 1958. At present we have 17 reactors in operation and 6 under construction. Beside the generation of power through nuclear means, India is also using this strong tool for the benefit of humanity. The Institute of Nuclear Medicine and Allied Sciences (INMAS) is one of its kind which is dedicated to the usage of nuclear technology to cure many ailments and is continuously conducting research in the use of the atom and isotopes in the medical field.

India believes in peace and therefore has always tried to steer the world towards the peaceful uses of the atom in the interest of humanity so as to make this beautiful world a haven of peace and prosperity.

We have tried to cover nuclear technology in all its aspects by including articles by India’s topnotch experts to make this issue interesting and informative for every reader.

DSA will be completing a year this month and this will be our 12th issue being offered to you. Though DSA faced many challenges from the date of its inception but with the great support of our contributors, readers, admirers, advertisers and the entire team of DSA we could get through these challenges and we are resolutely marching ahead to the second year and I assure you, dear reader, that we shall always endeavour to deliver more than you have come to expect from DSA, no matter what.

We all at DSA take this opportunity to pay our respectful homage to Dr. Homi Bhabha for his grand vision and laying a strong foundation for India’s development in nuclear technology.

JAI HIND!

pawan agrawal

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September 2010 Defence AND security alert

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contents

ISSUE

NUCLEAR SPECIAL

SEPTEMBER

Volume 1 Issue 12 September 2010

A R T I C L E S Indo-US nuclear cooperation: an analysis Krishnamurthy Santhanam nuclear technology: for defence and energy Dr. P. K. Iyengar nuclear systems: the road ahead Dr. L. V. Krishnan table-top nuclear energy!

Dr. M. Srinivasan jihad and nuclear weapons: apocalyptic?

K. Subrahmanyam nuclear treaties and ground realities Arundhati Ghose nuclear power programme: mortgaging the future?

Prof. Ashok Parthasarathi Sino-Pak nexus Dr. Harsh Pant Pak nukes: how safe?

Brig. Gurmeet Kanwal arms reduction conundrum Dr. Rajiv Nayan Chernobyl lessons Dominika Cosic Indo-US nuclear deal: harnessing Indian potential Dr. Sanjeev Bhadauria India’s two-track approach Dr. Manpreet Sethi India and non-proliferation Dr. Arvind Kumar India’s next nuclear frontier: reactors Ramtanu Maitra nuclear medicine: a boon for humanity Dr. Anupam Mondal radiological terrorism Dr. Rakesh Kumar Sharma nuclear weapons free world?

Dr. Rajendra Prasad Pakistan's nuclear complex: threatening world peace?

Aditi Malhotra

08 12

2010

contents O T H E R S

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September 2010 Defence AND security alert

September 2010 Defence AND security alert

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nuclear world

NATIONAL INTEREST

Fears over a curtailment of nuclear weapons testing in the future appear to be overblown given that India is currently exercising a selfimposed unilateral moratorium. However, even the Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement acknowledges that a substantial change in the security environment on India’s periphery will allow India to test to improve its nuclear arsenal in defence of its supreme national interests.

Krishnamurthy Santhanam

Indo-US nuclear cooperation: an analysis T

he Indo-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement has been hailed as historic and simultaneously, panned as abridging India’s autonomy in decision-making.

It was also strongly invested with “political” colour because India’s Left which critically supported the minority government in New Delhi - had chosen to question and confront the agreement. A vigorous debate followed in the media. There were some critics in the USA as well. They say that the agreement rewards a country that sneered at the nuclear non-proliferation regime in 1974 and 1998. Secondly, they say it damages the structure of the nonproliferation regime.

Marxist criticism The main point being made by critics in India is that it would inhibit India’s ability to conduct nuclear tests in the future. Secondly, India would get “sucked” into the vortex of the USA’s

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September 2010 Defence AND security alert

global security plans and interests – a point which was forcefully advanced by the left parties, especially the Communist Party of India (Marxist), or CPI(M).

It is appropriate to mention that the CPI(M) had opposed India’s nuclear tests of 1974 and 1998 because it felt that they were directed at the People’s Republic of China, a country rather close to the party’s heart. So, to see CPI(M) carrying the banner of India’s “autonomy” to support tests in the future is rather ironic, to say the least. Indeed, politics makes strange bedfellows.

Failsafe delivery Experimental validation of theoretical designs of new weapons is a sine qua non for technical, military and strategic reasons. But the nuclear weapons dropped over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 fall into an

interesting category because they were preceded only by one full-scale test in the Nevada desert. It is also useful to note that they were delivered over Japan by transport aircraft under circumstances of air superiority. They did not face the severe environmental or flight stresses characteristic of modern air combat or the threat from accurate surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).

The situation today is different from 1945. The orbit of even a modest Third World nation today bristles with surveillance radars, fire control radars, reconnaissance aircraft, SAMs, interceptors and electronic warfare systems.

Under these circumstances, vector survivability becomes as important a matter as design of the nuclear weapon itself. A lumbering transport aircraft as a nuclear vector is a sitting duck these days. The shift to combat aircraft as vectors occurred and they were

September 2010 Defence AND security alert

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nuclear world

NATIONAL INTEREST

invested with protective cover from escort aircraft and electronic countermeasure systems. Regardless, aircraft attrition in battle is a worrying factor in air delivery of nuclear weapons.

SAM success The technological debut of accurate surface-to-air missiles occurred when the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft flown

by Francis Gary Powers was brought down by a Soviet SA-2. It shook decision-makers and their advisers out of a complacent slumber. The second

It needs to be emphasised that an MCD (minimum credible cannot

deterrence) be

static

because of the dynamic nature of any security environment.

And,

technology obsolescence would have to be met in a phased manner. Parity (or near parity) between paired adversaries would bring

some

sobriety

and force both to rethink political strategies because of the realisation that "More is not better, when less will do" debutant was the long-range surface-tosurface missile (SSM). To reduce SSM vulnerability, deployment was silobased; later, road or rail mobility was conferred. There is no effective defense against SSMs even today, though research and development continue in

10

many countries.

Submarines best The truly survivable nuclear vector is the Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM). In the early stages, there were technological issues like reliability in non-explosive pop-up from the submerged submarine under different sea states. These were solved and the ability to be at a proper staging post in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans to engage targets in the USSR was perfected by the USA. The USSR lagged behind a bit but caught up with the USA. If India is to have a credible deterrence, it will inevitably have to invest in an SLBM programme through either acquisition or development.

Acquisition is likely to be difficult; so, sustained indigenous development could be expected.

Political decision There is a wide spectrum of activities in nuclear testing procedures. At the far end is a full-scale, underground nuclear test at a well-instrumented site. But no matter how desirable full-scale tests may be from the technical perspective, the final decision to allow such tests is fully and finally political. The government of the day would have to weigh the pros and cons before giving the green signal.

In recent years, the USA has initiated a Stockpile Stewardship Programme to ensure that its nuclear weapons are up to current standards of safety, security and survivability. Vintage weapons are being retired or revamped with improved triggers and safer detonators.

It is reasonable to expect that similar projects are being pursued in Russia, China and France. It is reasonable, also, to expect that India would be engaged in these activities.

A signal Here is another politico-strategic rationale for nuclear testing by a debutant. It is the definitive signal of crossing the nuclear threshold – an index of arrival. Seismic signatures of the test would be picked by the worldwide array of seismometers which would confidently confirm the test.

The conduct of a test would pitchfork nuclear capability to banner headlines

September 2010 Defence AND security alert

in newspapers and in the electronic media. Whatever may be the definition of “national security interests” of the aspirant as espoused in “sponsored” bilateral or multilateral discussions, these would be dispatched to the dustbin of history after the tests have been conducted.

If the armed forces of a country are not in the loop of nuclear capability, they are entitled to be rather skeptical about scientific claims on nuclear capability. To them, nuclear weapons are “political” in nature and they would not have full and direct control over deployment and use. However, a nuclear test would demonstrate to officers and men of the armed forces that the country’s nuclear capability is not a paper tiger. A psychological barrier would be crossed and more so, if the adversary claims nuclear superiority.

The golden rule of “Trust but Verify” applies to nuclear weapons and nuclear vectors. The verification process includes testing, qualification and clearance to military specifications.

Nuclear testing It would be fair to say that if changes to the nuclear core or the explosive trigger assembly were to be introduced for improvements in the yield-toweight ratio, the need for a full-scale nuclear test would arise. Confidence may exist over these design changes through sub-system testing but assurance of performance would indicate the need to test and clear the improvements.

There are seven important features in the Agreement which deserve to be highlighted: ■■ Both parties will cooperate in creation of a “strategic reserve” of fuel “to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of the reactors.”

There will be no automatic fall of the guillotine.

■■ There will be prompt “consultations” to avoid actions or resolve disputes that could have “adverse effects.” Implicitly, it means that if India conducts nuclear tests in the future, the consultations would cover aspects like changes in the security environment or nuclear testing by another country.

■■ To avoid any disruption of fuel supply for safeguarded power reactors, the USA will work with Russia, France and the United Kingdom to ensure that no discontinuity occurs.

■■ Reprocessing by India of spent fuel from imported turn-key power reactors will be permitted and India will build a new, safeguarded reprocessing facility for this purpose.

■■ If India’s security environment changes drastically and the need arises to conduct nuclear tests, consultations with the USA will precede actual testing. (Obviously, the USA would not be taken by surprise).

The Indo-US agreement acknowledges that such developments may call for a reconsideration by India of its policies and action options. It also says that the two governments would get into a huddle. And, in the event that India needs to respond with a test (or a series of tests), the USA would not be taken by surprise – unlike 1998.

MCD Most new nuclear States (e.g., India) have declared a doctrine of Minimum Credible Deterrence. Ironically, the phrase was first used by the USA. It may be instructive to explore the

nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework; ■■ supporting bilateral approaches to reducing nuclear tension between paired adversaries; ■■ cooperating with bilateral / multilateral initiatives to prevent WMDs from falling into the hands of extremist / terrorist organisations.

It needs to be emphasised that an MCD (minimum credible deterrence) cannot be static because of the dynamic nature of any security environment.

And, technology obsolescence would have to be met in a phased manner.

■■ Termination of the agreement will need one year’s notice and be preceded / followed by consultations. There will be no automatic fall of the US guillotine.

■■ The validity of the agreement is for 40 years, extendable by 10 years.

These features address, comprehensively, India’s concerns over stability and continuity of fuel supplies.

India’s options India has managed to live with a nuclear China since 1964 and, adjusted itself to a nuclear Pakistan after 1990.

But what should India do if there are dramatic changes in its nuclear environment? Indeed, what could these changes be?

The emergence of a nuclear Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, or Myanmar through collusive arrangements with China or any other nuclear-weapon State would certainly force a re-think of policies.

Hopefully, such a development would be of widespread concern and many nations, especially supplier countries, would forsake a bit of commerce for the larger interest of non-proliferation and regional stability. If this does not happen, it is natural to expect that Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), however patchy, would be promoted to avoid a nuclear war by error or accident in the sub-continent.

If another of India’s neighbours goes nuclear, what could be the impact on India’s Minimum Credible Deterrence? What, also, would be its impact on the Indo-US agreement?

method(s) for a new nuclear State to ensure that its “Minimum Credible Deterrence” is perceived by other nuclear States as credible and continues to be credible as time goes by. At the technical level, the following elements would appear to be of importance: ■■ sustained R&D for phased implementation of essential improvements of the stockpile; ■■ indigenisation of critical components and materials which are denied by export control regimes; ■■ repackaging, testing and clearance of the payload for new vectors and ■■ adherence to the rule that “The better is the enemy of the good.”

■■ At the politico-diplomatic level, some initiatives need to be considered and implemented as long as nuclear weapons continue as the currency of power; ■■ working with the international community to seek elimination of

Parity (or near parity) between paired adversaries would bring some sobriety and force both to re-think political strategies because of the realisation that “More is not better, when less will do.” Further, after nearparity has been reached, the natural and inevitable process of confidencebuilding measures may be expected to commence. These could be useful to ensure that a nuclear war is not triggered by misperceptions, miscalculations and ignorance – or worse.

The writer is a physicist from the BARC cradle with acknowledged contributions in radiation transport theory, reactor shielding and hazard analysis. He is an alumnus of the International Institute for Nuclear Science and Engineering, Argonne, Illinois. He made pathbreaking revelations on the emerging Sino-Pak nuclear and missile nexus. He was Programme Coordinator of the Pokhran II campaign while, simultaneously, spearheading the effort in DRDO to reduce the size and weight of the 1974 device design. He was also Director General, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses IDSA, New Delhi. Presently, he is President of the India-Central Asia Foundation. He has authored / edited more than 12 books. He was honoured with Padma Bhushan award in 1999.

September 2010 Defence AND security alert

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nuclear world

NATURE’S BOUNTY

India has long been at loggerheads with the “nuclear haves” over the uses of the atom. The fact is that nuclear energy is amenable to both mass destruction as well as civilisational improvements and this “dual use” has been employed to try and keep India in check. But for the foresight of Dr. Homi Bhabha and India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru this nation could have succumbed to such pressures. Thanks to them our position that if threatened we will use the atom for defence otherwise the first option is for the well-being of the people of India, has found acceptance.

nuclear technology: for defence and energy

H

uman perception of the things around us makes quantum jumps, on the basis of scientific investigations of the laws of nature.

It was only early in the last century that we recognised that solar energy comes from a nuclear process which we now call nuclear fusion, even though earlier civilisations did recognise the importance of the sun as providing energy and sustaining organic life on this planet. The concept of the constitution of matter around us in terms of indivisible atoms, arose from early philosophers, but were confirmed only by modern science, of identifiable atoms from hydrogen to uranium and their composition in terms of the nucleus and the orbital electrons moving around it in each atom became evident. The composition of the nucleus itself, in terms of protons and neutrons, made it look as if we now know all about matter. The physical laws also brought out the fact that there are four types of forces in nature – gravitation, electromagnetism and the weak and strong interactions between nucleons at very short distances.

Revolutions in knowledge The equivalence of energy and mass was shown by Einstein, by his famous formula E=mc2, where E is energy, m is mass and c the velocity of light – a revolutionary concept at that time. This revealed the mutual transformation between mass and energy which gives us a lead as to how energy can be produced. The most useful transformation occurs with nuclear particles and leads to an inexhaustible source of energy. The process that is happening in the sun is one such example, where protons combine into helium, with the release of copious amounts of energy. It is also known, from the Big Bang theory of the origin of the universe, that other nuclear processes and other bodies in the cosmos, could be more concentrated

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September 2010 Defence AND security alert

forms of energy and could be exploited if only man finds out how they can be replicated on this planet.

Release of nuclear energy The neutron, a nucleon inside the nucleus, neutral in its charge, with a mass almost equal to that of the hydrogen atom, was discovered in 1932. Because of its neutral character, it could penetrate other nuclei and bring about changes – like the alchemists dreamed about. Further investigations revealed that some of the nuclei on this planet, especially the heavier ones like uranium, could naturally decay in a random process, or can be induced to transform into another nucleus by the neutron, with high probability. It is not surprising that later scientists discovered remains of a naturally occurred reactor in Gabon in Africa.

Military uses The splitting of uranium into two fragments, with the release of more than two neutrons per fission, brought a new dimension in the release of nuclear energy. The quantum of nuclear energy released was 200 million times greater than chemical energy and the fact that more than two neutrons are released showed that a chain reaction could be established. This led to the concept of a nuclear explosive sustained by these neutrons. Since the time required for a series of multiplications is extremely small, it could in fact be an almost instantaneous release of a tremendous amount of energy.

This is what is now known as the atomic bomb.

World War II triggered intense research in this area, with the blessings of Einstein in the US. By 1942, a chain reaction was proven in Chicago, and by 1945, the first atomic bomb was tested in the USA. The competition between Germany and the Allied countries was so inimical that efforts were highly concentrated in the Manhattan

Dr. P. K. Iyengar

project. For scientists, this was a great opportunity and they discovered many facts about nuclear fission, fusion, radiation etc.

The Americans also demonstrated, at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, how a nuclear weapon could have a decisive influence on the result of a war and this led to emphasis on acquiring nuclear technology by several powers in the world. The Soviet Union, followed by UK, France and China, demonstrated their ability very soon. The world had to live with such weapons of mass destruction being now available, in principle, to big and small countries alike.

Peaceful uses The physics behind a nuclear bomb opened up a number of applications in its use for peaceful purposes and controlled nuclear fission became an easy exercise, provided one had natural uranium and a team of able scientists.

Reactors which produce electrical energy of the order of megawatts were soon demonstrated. Just like the internal combustion engine led to several types of engines for transportation, several types of nuclear reactors were designed, built and operated successfully, for the production of electricity and propulsion of vehicles. The nuclear submarine received high priority and resulted in the design of very small compact reactors releasing tens of megawatts of power, which could be accommodated within the hull of the submarine. The control of this reactor, long-life fuel and steam generation systems, were innovations made in a short time. These were turned over to commercial outfits such as Westinghouse and General Electric, who scaled it up to 1,000 mw units, which made it highly economical as an energy-producing station in the electricity grid of any nation. Even though a whole variety of reactors were built using natural uranium,

September 2010 Defence AND security alert

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nuclear world

NATURE’S BOUNTY

enriched uranium and plutonium, the light-water reactor programme gained considerable support from private industry and has dominated the nuclear energy scenario in the world, with 200 reactors of this type operating in the US alone. The smaller size, light-water coolant for removing the heat and turning it into steam made it attractive, except for the need for enriched uranium of around 4 per cent 235U, which required a technology developed for weapons purposes.

Dual-use fears The fast reactor is another attractive option, which produces more fuel than it burns, by converting 238U or 232Th into 239 Pu and 233U respectively. Even though several of these reactors were built and brought into commercial operation, the fear of the spread of technology for plutonium production, which is the basic material for the atomic bomb, prevented further commercialisation. It

14

is worth noting that while a commercial fast reactor might use 2 tonnes of plutonium, a nuclear bomb, releasing 15 kilotonnes of explosive power, needs only 5 kg of Pu. The politics of nuclear energy arose out of this fact. The Indian programme in this field is brought out in another article in this issue of DSA.

some others have not been so open. It is recognised that the NPT alone cannot restrict the spread of this capability. So many other treaties have been proposed to abolish nuclear weapons from this planet.

Political fallout

The growth of nuclear technology for electricity production in this country, is summarised in another article.

However, one would like to discuss briefly what nuclear physics offers for further development in this area, for energy production and new weapon designs. It was clear to the pioneers that the future does not depend entirely on one isotope of uranium alone. Nature could not have designed nuclei in the periodic table with a single characteristic of neutron-induced fission in 235U. If one builds up heavier nuclei, most of them turn out to be favourable for neutron-induced fission and can be used for several practical

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was promulgated in 1968, in order to restrain all nations except the five that had already demonstrated the atomic bomb, from entering into efforts at enrichment and reprocessing. By the 1980s, most of the countries had signed this treaty. India took a strong position in not acceding to this discriminating treaty and maintaining its option to become a nuclear power. In spite of the best efforts internationally, many countries in the world have acquired the capability to make nuclear weapons – some have openly demonstrated it,

September 2010 Defence AND security alert

Other experiences

With a large R&D base, scientific m a n p o w e r, creative thinking and generous support from the government, India and China are poised to make inroads into the growth of technology in the future, whether it is in energy production or for devices in defence purposes. For example, there could be a reactor on a satellite producing nuclear power for the operation of the communication system.

You could design nuclear reactors for propulsion in commercial transport vehicles like ships. One could use small energy sources in far off, isolated, places, with very long lifetime, or could make very small batteries which could

be stitched into the heart for controlling the heart beat. Thus, nuclear research spans over a large area in innovations and new gadgets for the advance of human civilisation. The most important of these is the ability to generate electric power from a fusion reactor so that the fuel could be made very cheap by using the water in the oceans. This requires a large international effort and we have not succeeded in achieving this.

Of fission and fusion However, the hydrogen bomb and its successors have been brought into the nuclear arsenal since 1952.

That makes use of very cheap lithium as the fuel and has tremendous energy, of the order of megatons of TNT. Progress in this area is now directed to prove that this fusion device need not be triggered by a fission explosive.

If that happens, then of course one doesn’t need enriched uranium or plutonium. The basic ideas of nuclear interactions, if understood properly, can result in such a device.

Future possibilities What about other nuclear processes which also produce energy in the form of gamma rays, charged particles and finally heat? It is indeed feasible, even without making an unstable, critical, reactor. Nuclear physics does not demand that you need a critical system to produce copious energy. All it demands is a neutron flux which allows the energy density of mw / litre to be produced, so that it can effectively be converted to electricity. If the neutron production could be assured by using high-energy accelerators in which a proton beam of 1 GeV hits a heavy target of lead, producing more

than 30 neutrons per interaction and if these neutrons hit a sub-critical reactor system, then several thousand mw of energy could be produced from a single device.

This requires development of highenergy accelerators and large proton current (of the order of 10 mA). Efforts are on in several countries to achieve this. The highest energy proton accelerator, built by an international collaboration, is presently operating at CERN - European Organisation For Nuclear Research (CERN), Geneva.

They would be willing to share the technology with several countries.

In the fusion process, as it is presently understood, two deuterons are supposed to collide with energies of the order of hundreds of keV. If this energy comes from the temperature or heat generated, then the deuterium plasma has to be heated to a 100 million degrees. This is based on our belief that the two deuterons having unit charge, repel each other when they approach close-by. This is called the potential barrier. In the parlance of quantum mechanics, there is a term called ‘tunnelling’, by which one particle, behaving like a wave, is able to penetrate this barrier and cause fusion.

This very often happens in semiconductors which use electrons for their characteristics. However, if one

September 2010 Defence AND security alert

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nuclear world

nuclear world

NATURE’S BOUNTY

POWER GENERATION

nuclear systems: the road ahead

Dr. L. V. Krishnan

Simultaneously with construction of large capacity fast breeder and advanced heavy water reactors India needs to accelerate reprocessing facilities that extract plutonium from spent fuel.

The recent agreement with the US on reprocessing spent fuel from nuclear projects set up in collaboration with US firms has helped. Using nuclear reactors to produce hydrogen for cars of the future will ensure a large dose of security because transportation is dependent on imported hydrocarbons.

I could find a mechanism by which this charge could be partially neutralised by negative charges in the immediate environment, then this tunnelling could also take place between two deuterons.

The medium in which this could easily happen is in condensed matter. For example, deuterons getting into the palladium lattice at high densities, in palladium metal. This is known as Cold Fusion.

In 1989, this was discovered in electrolytic cells, electrolysing heavy water using palladium electrodes.

However, the reproducibility was very poor and it came under strong criticism. Nonetheless, this work has gone on for the last 20 years and it shows the same effect in a variety of environments of condensed matter.

This is being discussed in greater detail in the accompanying paper by Dr. M. Srinivasan. Some experiments have even created micro explosions of the type of the hydrogen bomb, which opens up a different scenario in the area of nuclear security. Already tritium production in Cold Fusion has been shown, which is the raw material for a hydrogen bomb. More surprises are

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expected.

Nature’s bounty The development of modern science is in conformity with the belief that as more and more scientists delve deeper into the laws of nature, we discover many new facts which result in innovation and methodologies for practical applications.

The development of information technology, communications systems and the growth of biotechnology in health, hygiene and agriculture, are all examples of how a scientific community with an open mind, unrestricted by bureaucratic control and competitive with international efforts, can be the initiator for new technologies. With a large R&D base, scientific manpower, creative thinking and generous support from the government, India and China are poised to make inroads into the growth of technology in the future, whether it is in energy production or for devices in defence.

Dr. Robert Wilson, who proposed to the US government, to build the highest energy accelerator in the 1960s,

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was asked by a group of Senators as to how the project would help in the defence of the country. His answer was: ‘This project will make this country worth defending’. It is this attitude which our politicians have to accept, in order to make independent progress, worthy of calling ourselves a great power.

The writer is former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission. He joined the Department of Atomic Energy in 1952 as a young research scientist. As Director, Physics Group at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, India’s premier research centre, he played a leading role, both scientifically and in terms of planning and coordination, in the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion at Pokharan in 1974, for which he was conferred the Padma Bhushan in 1975. He took over as Director of the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in 1984. As Director, one of his first tasks was to take charge of the construction of the DHRUVA reactor, the completion of which was then in question and bring it to a successful conclusion.

During his tenure as Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission and Secretary to the Department of Atomic Energy he initiated proposals for the export of heavy water, research reactors, hardware for nuclear applications, etc., to earn precious foreign exchange.

f India has to maintain the current economic progress over the next two or three decades, energy supply and security is crucial. Energy supply is inadequate. As it is, the country is far too dependent on oil import and is increasingly turning to coal import as well. Mitigation of this dependence by expansion of nuclear power in this time period is possible through large light water reactors of foreign design.

Continuous import of nuclear fuel is inescapable even if technology of such reactors is assimilated. How can we keep nuclear fuel import to a minimum?

In addition, what new technologies are likely to be useful over the next two decades?

India has always had a clear plan for harnessing nuclear power. Elsewhere in the world, nuclear power became embroiled in a mix of issues that were political, economic and environmental.

Greater reliance was placed on fossil fuel. Climate change concern has now brought in renewed interest in nuclear power. New reactor systems – known as Generation 4 systems – are being developed through international cooperation. The focus is on sustainability, waste transmutation, economics and also non-proliferation.

Thirteen countries are engaged in this cooperation. India should be but is not fully involved in it.

Current Indian scene On the back of the experience gained over the last four decades, there is confidence that we can switch to larger capacity heavy water reactors, up from 220 MWe to 700 MWe, with indigenous technology. With shorter construction times, eight such units are planned before 2020. The target of 10,000 MWe through this type of reactors has been cited often and that should be realisable, now that we have access to natural uranium from external sources.

There has been mention of an addition of 40,000 MWe of generation capacity through large light water reactors of advanced design, importing the first few and gradually increasing the indigenous content. Indian industry seems ready and capable to undertake the task. Funding, land acquisition and timely safety clearances are challenges to be met.

Realisation of both the targets would mean construction of 35 to 40 new reactors over the next two decades.

Ten construction teams will have to be deployed besides as many for operations.

Feedstock?

What about the fuel supplies?

Mineable uranium resources in India

are not adequate to support a large programme and production is not keeping pace with present demand.

But, vendors of the light water reactors are assuring lifetime fuel supply.

Considering that the reactors would have a 60 year life, many things can intervene to affect the supply.

As more countries turn to nuclear power, competition for uranium will increase. There is no guarantee that all of the reactors to be built would have assurance of supply. It is prudent to try to get more out of the fuel and to stockpile reserves.

How much fuel would be needed?

The heavy water reactors would need about 1,400 tonnes annually to support generation of 10,000 MWe at 75 per cent capacity factor. The yearly requirement for light water reactors would be about 6,000 tonnes of natural uranium.

Together, they would account for about 12 per cent of current rates of world uranium production.

Spent fuel from these reactors would accumulate rapidly unless it is reprocessed. A larger contribution from nuclear power without further dependence on external fuel supply can come only through fast reactors.

India has long been talking of reprocessing the spent fuel to recover plutonium for building fast breeder

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reactors. A prototype fast breeder is now under construction at Kalpakkam.

It can produce enough plutonium to sustain operation with no further supplements beyond the initial supply.

Its success can pave the way for more such units provided plutonium availability is assured. It is estimated that a tenfold expansion of the present capacity for spent fuel reprocessing would be needed i.e., from about 200 tonnes per year to 2,000 tonnes per year, within the next two decades.

Reprocessing route Reprocessing plants take time to build and several would be needed.

Vendors of light water reactors like Russia, France and the US have indicated their consent for India to reprocess locally the fuel supplied by them. There is as yet no sign of plans for new reprocessing plants. Any delay in building them would seriously limit the breeder programme.

US had shunned reprocessing considering it as an aid to weapon proliferation, preferring to store away spent fuel as waste. Other countries too were discouraged from resorting to reprocessing. But, now it is considered as a means to aid waste disposal by chemical separation of long-lived radioactive elements contained in spent fuel.

There are ongoing efforts to design fast reactors that have significantly greater breeding capability than the prototype being built. They are expected to produce up to 15-20 per cent more plutonium than is consumed.

A fuel cycle facility built as an adjunct to the reactor would reprocess the spent fuel and recover the plutonium for new reactors, but in a form unfit for weapons.

With these, it should be possible to maintain a high level of nuclear power generation with no further import of uranium. The challenges in producing a commercially viable design of reactor and fuel cycle facility that also satisfies the safety requirements are great.

Even with several countries working together, it takes about 15 to 20 years.

India is presently working alone on such a design.

Interestingly, China had until recently planned to develop a commercial fast breeder on its own efforts. Last year, that plan was abandoned in favour of immediately buying two reactors of Russian design with assurance of help in fuel supply and reprocessing technology. Construction is expected to start next year.

Thorium reserves India’s large thorium reserves have raised expectation of achieving energy security through thorium. Stocks of thorium, produced in large quantity

as a by-product from beach sand processing, are piling up.

By itself thorium cannot drive fission chain reaction. It must first be converted to a form of uranium – uranium 233 – through absorption of neutrons in an operating reactor. Yield of uranium 233 from thorium is greater in reactors fuelled with enriched uranium or plutonium. Indian R&D activity has focused on plutonium fuel for uranium 233 production.

BARC is actively pursuing the Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) project capable of generating 300 MWe and expects to build it soon.

The design is attractive because it incorporates several features that significantly enhance safety as well as economics. A switch from plutonium, as originally proposed, to enriched uranium is also under consideration, since plutonium is more effectively used in fast breeders.

Large scale thorium utilisation will have to wait until after the fast breeder programme grows in size. Delays in fast breeder programme would push thorium farther into the future.

Uranium imports It is possible to take small effective steps in the meanwhile to reduce the uranium needs of light water reactors

and heavy water reactors. Among the new concepts that are being studied as part of Generation 4 systems, a design in which the reactor is cooled by water at higher temperature and pressure offers improved conversion efficiency of heat to electricity from 30-33 per cent seen in conventional water reactors to 45 per cent. In effect, this means that to generate the same amount of electricity, less uranium would be needed.

The design, which is not very different from the present day reactors, calls for selection of new materials that can resist associated corrosion effects.

This is an area that can be addressed with Indian expertise that is strong in materials research. Careful attention to safety is needed since the coolant water is at higher temperature and pressure.

Choice of a mixture of thorium with enriched uranium for fuelling the light water reactors could reduce the initial natural uranium requirement by about 9 per cent. Preliminary estimates indicate that the reduction in annual requirements can be more significant leading to a saving of about 40 per cent.

Fuel cells It is in respect of energy for transportation sector that India depends most on external sources. Measures to reduce this dependence are important for energy security. With hydrogen being billed as a likely replacement fuel for vehicles, nuclear reactors are being designed for hydrogen production.

So as not to be left behind if this idea succeeds, BARC in India is working on a Compact High Temperature Reactor capable of producing 600 MW of heat that can yield about 160 Te of hydrogen per day, besides nine million litres of desalinated water. Assuming success in world efforts in development of efficient fuel cells, three such reactors would be needed to support a million cars doing about 10,000 km in a year.

The number of cars, jeeps and taxis in India was estimated at 13 million in 2007 and it continues to grow.

This does not include other types of automobiles. Other options also have to be examined for addressing energy needs of transportation sector.

The HTR is included in the Generation 4 systems now being studied but its commercialisation is again about two decades away.

Accelerator driven systems Neutrons are needed to convert thorium into uranium. Other than nuclear reactors, particle accelerators can serve as a source of neutrons.

When high energy protons from the accelerator are made to impact on a target of lead or tungsten, a burst of thirty neutrons per proton can be produced. If the target is surrounded by thorium, uranium 233 is produced in sufficient quantity to undergo fission in situ and generate power in the process.

Many countries including India are working on such a system. But, it does not form part of the Generation 4 effort.

High energy accelerators with needed reliability for continuity of operation are yet to be developed. Target development is not an easy task either.

But, it can be a long term solution to thorium utilisation.

Successful expansion of the nuclear power programme over the next two decades, as envisaged, would provide valuable addition to energy supply in the country. Dependence on outside sources for the needed fuel supply is unavoidable. Action on the reprocessing front as well as R&D activities on new reactor designs initiated now, if pursued with vigour, will determine further growth in nuclear power in the subsequent years

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without such dependence.

Twenty seven reactors are presently in operation or in various stages of construction. More heavy water reactors are planned at new sites. Several more light water reactors are also on the anvil. A total of about 50,000 MWe of nuclear generation capacity, is anticipated by 2030, i.e. a quinquennial addition rate of over 10,000 MWe. This is comparable to the expected addition from all sources in the current five year Plan. Its realisation would depend on timely site and safety clearances, availability of human resources and funding.

According to a report published by the Centre for the Study of Science, Technology and Policy, Bangalore in 2008, nuclear power generation of up to 42,000 MWe through light water reactors and heavy water reactors by 2030 is well within in the realms of possibility, but depends on various factors including external fuel supply. Fast Breeder Reactor estimates given here become unrealistic without the needed reprocessing capacity for plutonium separation from spent fuel. (Figure is from CSTEP report, “Nuclear Power – The Road Ahead” accessible from www. cstep.in)

serial construction of similar reactors.

The reactor building is within the circle.

The Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor of 500 MWe capacity, designed by Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research, is being built at Kalpakkam by Bharatiya

Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam. The reactor coolant is liquid sodium. The fuel consisting of a mixture of oxides of plutonium and depleted uranium is being manufactured by BARC. Participation by Indian industry in this exacting venture has been commendable and can pave the way for

The writer is former Director, Safety Research Group. Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research. Kalpakkam, Tamil Nadu. A physicist by training, he has served in the DAE for nearly four decades, the first half of which was spent in BARC at Trombay engaged in safety analysis and review of various types of nuclear installations.

In the second half of service he was engaged in setting up a Safety Research Laboratory at IGCAR Kalpakkam. Post-retirement, he has coauthored two books. One of them is a historical chronicle titled 'Atomic Energy in India - Fifty Years'. It was published by the DAE in 1998 and had C. V. Sundaram and T. S. Iyengar as

the other contributors. The other book titled 'Elements of Nuclear Power' with R. Ramanna as the co-author was published by Gandhi Science Centre of Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan. He is also the co-author of the report published by CSTEP titled 'Nuclear Power - The Road Ahead'.

Private participation

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A ‘Critical Facility’ has already been set up at BARC to carry out detailed studies on the arrangement of fuel in the core for different possible compositions.

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table-top nuclear energy!

Dr. M. Srinivasan

This raised hopes among physicists: Would it ever be possible, perhaps sometime in the future, to release large amounts of nuclear energy on a macroscopic scale for the practical use of mankind, by making many atoms (or rather nuclei to be precise) disintegrate on demand? Surprisingly, when asked this question the great Rutherford had remarked that all such talk was “moonshine”! He was seized of the fact that being positively charged, for the nucleus to be tampered with, one needs to bombard it with a very high velocity atomic projectile to overcome the repulsive “Coulomb repulsion” and Rutherford could not envision a scenario of how this could be done on a large scale.

If ever there was a flash in the pan, Cold Fusion was in 1989. Two chemical scientists announced to the world that they had experienced excess heat in a test tube electrolysis experiment at room temperature. It conjured up visions of the disappearance of massive ironclad Calandria vessels to contain massive heat and pressure to start an atomic chain reaction in a reactor. Hopes of desktop reactors bloomed till an official US experts group said it found no proof to substantiate the claims. Since then, experiments in Cold Fusion which has now come to be known as Condensed Matter Nuclear Science (CMNS) are producing exciting new discoveries and some say the results could be earth-shaking.

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Stanley Pons (L) and Martin Fleischmann (R) testify at a Congressional hearing about their cold fusion research in 1989

“N

uclear” science was born a century ago when the budding physicist Ernst Rutherford and his young student Marsden discovered, during experiments studying the scattering of alpha particles (which are emitted by some radioactive substances) by a thin gold foil, that some of the alpha particles were being scattered (or diverted) by a surprisingly large angle with respect to the direction of the incident particle.

This deeply puzzled Rutherford who after much debate came to the startling and insightful conclusion that this could happen only if the entire positive charge of the atom was concentrated in a very small central region of the atom, which Rutherford dubbed the “Nucleus”.

Rutherford published this brilliant discovery in a landmark paper in Philosophical Magazine

in 1911 and this was the origin of “Nuclear” physics!

Within a span of a few years following this finding, the now familiar picture of the atom, often called the Bohr planetary atom, wherein electrons orbit around a central nucleus, like our solar system with planets revolving around the sun, evolved. Some years prior to that Einstein’s theory of the equivalence of mass and energy, epitomised in his famous equation E = MC2, had been published; this had since been found to be validated by the phenomena governing the natural disintegration of radioactive nuclei such as Radium wherein very energetic subatomic particles were being emitted.

It was thus confirmed that during radioactive decay a small amount of matter vanishes and appears as nuclear energy.

We however now know that the futuristic vision of even a genius such as Rutherford was limited; within a few decades man had learnt to release nuclear energy on a large scale both for power production as well as for military use. Most readers of DSA are surely acquainted with Fission, Fusion and all that!

Chain reaction In the case of fission, neutrons which carry no electrical charge are easily able to penetrate the Uranium-235 nucleus and cause it to “split”, releasing in the process both energy and more than two additional neutrons which could then be induced to carry on the chain reaction process. The story of the rapid progress of science and technology which enabled the fission chain reaction to be transformed into nuclear power reactors as well as atomic bombs during the Manhattan Project (1940-45) in the USA, forms one of the most fascinating and gripping episodes in the history of science. The well known “Three stage” nuclear power programme of

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India formulated by Homi Bhabha is a direct consequence of these exciting developments. Other writers in this issue have dealt with in detail various aspects pertaining to the promise and prospects of fission reactor technology in India.

Second route The second route to releasing nuclear energy on a large scale, as we all know, is the fusion reaction; the trick here is to raise the temperature of a hydrogenous plasma (comprising a mixture of the heavier isotopes of hydrogen

Every now and then the citadel of science is rocked by the discovery of a new phenomenon that the scientific community finds difficult to digest.

“The Theory of Relativity” and “Quantum Physics” were two such paradigm shifts that shook the very foundations of physics in the 20th century, although when first propounded they too had many detractors known as deuterium and tritium) to hundreds of millions of degrees, under which conditions a fraction of the deuterons and tritons in the plasma have sufficient energy to overcome the Coulomb repulsion and undergo fusion reactions, releasing nuclear energy in the process. Hence the term “thermo-nuclear” which is commonly used to refer to such fusion devices, a term which the readers of DSA are possibly also well acquainted with by now!

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While the explosive version of fusion in its avatar as the hydrogen bomb or thermonuclear weapon was demonstrated as early as 1951, the applied industrial embodiment of thermonuclear reactors has not yet seen the light of day anywhere in the world.

India is one of six countries that are participating in the construction of the world’s first fusion reactor, the so-called International Experimental Thermonuclear Reactor (ITER) at Cadarache in France the total cost of which is reported to be close to 10 billion dollars. There are many who wonder whether such complex and expensive fusion reactors will ever become a practical commercial reality. But that is a different story.

Cold fusion Why am I dragging the reader through all this textbook stuff which most readers with a physics background probably know all too well? The reason for this will become apparent shortly!

Most people who discuss nuclear technology related issues are probably aware of only the above two approaches, namely the fission chain reaction and the thermo-nuclear fusion system, as being available to mankind to unlock the energy stored in the atomic nucleus.

In this article we discuss a drastically new approach to tapping nuclear energy which has emerged during the last two decades. This is based on a new branch of science which has now come to be known as Condensed Matter Nuclear Science (CMNS) but which used to be called as “Cold Fusion” when it was first revealed in 1989.

Controversial Unfortunately the subject of Cold Fusion became entangled in a world wide scientific controversy the reasons for which are briefly touched upon below. However in the last few years great strides have been made in this field. In fact this writer is presently organising the 16th International Conference on Condensed Matter Nuclear Science (ICCF 16) which is to be held in Chennai at the GRT Grand Convention Centre, T. Nagar during 6th to 11th February 2011. It is fortuitous that the dates of the ICCF 16 Conference coincide with the centenary of the discovery of the atomic nucleus by Rutherford.

Details of the Conference and the three satellite meetings associated

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with it are available in the conference website www.iscmns.org/iccf16. This conference is being organised by the International Society for Condensed Matter Nuclear Science (www.iscmns. org) in collaboration with the Indian Physics Association (IPA) and the Indian Nuclear Society (INS). We expect about a hundred international experts in the field to participate in this conference and present scientific papers on their latest research findings in the field. We heartily welcome interested scientists from India also to join in the deliberations.

Acceptance It is our firm conviction that this novel “third” route to tapping nuclear energy can have a great impact on the future scenario of energy security in India.

Unfortunately not much attention has been paid to date to this breakthrough science, since the powers that be have taken the position that Cold Fusion or CMNS is unproven and discredited science, at least so far. However it does appear that in recent months our efforts have partially helped change the negative perception in India, yielding place to a cautious and more open minded approach with a readiness to listen to and have a dialogue with those who have carried forward the flag of this new branch of science in the last two decades.

History In March 1989 two chemists, Martin Fleischmann and Stanley Pons, of the University of Utah announced that they had observed the generation of significant amounts of “Excess Heat” (quantum of energy above what is input to the device) in a test tube electrolytic cell wherein a thin Pd rod was the cathode and LiOD was the electrolyte. Their claim was that during electrolysis deuterons get implanted into the Pd lattice and eventually undergo nuclear fusion reactions there, releasing measurable amounts of “excess energy”. The popular media dubbed the phenomenon as “Cold Fusion” and this name caught on!

It was truly an astounding claim as here was a method which apparently did not require millions of degrees temperatures as in thermo-nuclear fusion. The implication was that within the metallic Pd somehow fusion reactions were taking place, catalysed

by the ordered Pd atomic lattice. The discoverers admitted that the physics behind this strange phenomenon was not yet fully understood. But they were absolutely certain of their calorimetric measurements which clearly pointed to the generation of energy at levels far beyond chemical sources and which could only be attributed to be of nuclear origin. Fleischmann and Pons became instant celebrities, at least for a few weeks!

Skepticism However when most groups in the world who attempted to replicate the experiments failed, the initial euphoria soon gave way to intense skepticism and even condemnation. The physics community raised searching questions: (a) How could the Coulomb barrier between the deuterons be overcome at room temperature? (b) Even if fusion reactions do somehow occur, where are the fusion products such as

neutrons, tritium, gamma rays etc.?

The Fleischmann-Pons claim clearly violated key elements of commonly accepted knowledge regarding nuclear reactions firmly established over the last 80 years.

Rejection!

The expert panel set up by the US Department of Energy in May 1989 to investigate the claim came to the conclusion that the whole affair was an error, mistake, incompetence and perhaps even fraud on the part of Fleischmann and Pons. They surmised that there was no evidence for the occurrence of fusion reactions in these electrochemical experiments. Cold Fusion was thus given an “official burial” with most major Physics and Science journals refusing to publish any papers pertaining to Cold Fusion.

Unfortunately majority of physicists and nuclear scientists in India, it appears, still subscribe to such a

negative view of the Cold Fusion phenomenon, a hangover from the events of 1989!

Real status The truth however is quite different.

Over the years, a small minority of groups in about eight countries have continued investigations of the phenomenon and found positive results. The nuclear reactions which appear to be taking place within a metallic lattice are presently referred to as “Low Energy Nuclear Reactions” (LENR) a term that is perhaps more representative than the name Cold Fusion. During 1989-90 a dozen groups from BARC had entered the fray and indeed confirmed observing both neutrons and tritium, telltale signatures of the occurrence of nuclear reactions.

These results were first published in 1989 as report BARC 1500 which is now available online (see www.lenr.org).

Two comprehensive review papers on

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the early BARC work have just been republished by the American Chemical Society and the American Institute of Physics respectively. But sadly the BARC work too was shutdown in the early 90s following global trends.

Revival As of today 15 International Conferences of the ICCF series have been held on this subject. Several science journals have now begun publishing papers on this topic. The website www.lenr.org lists over 2,000 papers published to date. Since the last few years both the American Chemical Society and the American Physical Society have included sessions on LENR at their annual meetings. The name “Condensed Matter Nuclear Science” (CMNS) was coined at the ICCF 8 Conference held in Beijing in 2002 to describe the occurrence of nuclear reactions inside a solid lattice.

Some people prefer to allude to this phenomenon as “Lattice Assisted Nuclear Reactions” (LANR). Presently it is estimated that over 300 scientists are engaged in research in this field, primarily from eight countries (USA, Italy, France, Russia, Ukraine, Japan, China and Israel).

Since the focal theme of the present issue of DSA is the defence and security implications of nuclear technology, a recent (November 2009) assessment report prepared by the US Government Defense Intelligence Agency* on the reality and potentiality of Low Energy Nuclear Reactions (LENR) would be of topical interest to the readers. The abstract of this report is reproduced at the end of this article and a URL link given to the full original unclassified document for the benefit of the inquisitive DSA reader.

Third route We summarise below the main experimental findings which clearly show that science has indeed stumbled upon a new route to tapping the energy locked in the nucleus. It is however cautioned that the discussion may appear to be somewhat technical, but in view of the fact that the field has been largely ignored by mainstream scientific institutions and journals and consequently not much is known about its recent progress, it is felt that the technicality may be pardoned.

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Summary Of Essential Findings Of LENR Research: ■■ It has by now been clearly established that heat is generated through nuclear reactions that can be made to occur when deuterium is “heavily” loaded into certain selected metals such as Pd, Ti, Ni etc. However for significant and measurable amounts of nuclear heat to be released, some basic conditions have to be met, the most important of which is the so-called loading ratio, namely the (D/Pd) atom ratio. This has to exceed a threshold value of about 0.92. Achieving this in a simple electrolysis experiment is not easy.

■■ After loading, the system has to be appropriately “triggered”; the deuterons within the lattice have to be induced to migrate up and down, in and out etc. Deuteron dynamics is very important. These findings explain why most people failed to replicate the “Fleischmann-Pons effect” during the initial days as the early researchers were not aware of these factors and did not pay attention to them.

■■ It has been established now that the phenomenon is a surface phenomenon and that nuclear reactions occur only at certain selected “hot spots” where a unique “Nuclear Active Environment” (NAE) is created. The exact nature of the NAE is still elusive. Do impurities play a role? Do lattice defects have an influence? These questions are presently under further investigation.

■■ It has been found that electrolysis is only one of the methods of loading deuterium into the metal; gas loading is increasingly being preferred.

■■ Since surface is important, nano powders have been found to give more reproducible results rather than bulk metal. One of the most impressive new techniques pioneered by Prof. Arata of Osaka University is the use of nano powders of Pd-Ni in a Zirconia matrix of 5 to 10 nm size. Load such a powder in an SS tube and introduce D2 gas into it and lo and behold you have an LENR nuclear reactor producing excess heat for days at a stretch!

■■ What is the product of these nuclear reactions? Many groups in the world have by now independently confirmed that non-radioactive He4 is the primary

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nuclear ash. Proportionality between excess energy generated and total amount of helium gas produced has been established both in electrolytic and gas loading experiments. Although the most obvious explanation for helium production in excess heat generating devices is the occurrence of the fusion reaction “d + d → He4 + 23.4 Mev”, alternate nuclear reaction pathways that could lead to helium production, have also been identified. The exact mechanism of helium generation is thus still an open question.

■■ A surprising new finding emerged in the mid 90s. Until then it appeared that the Pd lattice did not play any direct role in these nuclear processes.

The Pd appeared to be a “passive witness” playing only a catalytic role, enabling these reactions between deuterons to take place. But soon evidence started piling up that Pd too is getting involved. New elements (and isotopes) not present before the experiment began were observed and could only be explained as arising from nuclear transmutation reactions taking place involving the “host metal” lattice.

These observations were dubbed “isotopic anomalies” since the isotopic composition of the newly detected elements on the Pd surface were very different from their natural abundance ratios.

■■ Transmutation reactions have been observed in a wide variety of simple experimental configurations.

Electrolysis, glow discharge, gas loading and even simple deuterium gas permeation through multilayer foils. This has completely changed the character of the LENR phenomenon.

■■ Iwamura of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries has demonstrated that during the simple process of room temperature diffusion-permeation of deuterons through a thin multilayer foil complex which contains alternate layers of Pd and CaO etc. atoms of Cesium deposited as a thin layer on the surface, are found to capture and gobble up 4 deuterons each to yield the element Procedemium. Such a complex multibody heavy ion fusion reaction has never been observed even in the most advanced nuclear laboratories of the world.

■■ Thus where once questions were raised about the occurrence of a simple

fusion reaction between two deuterons, we are now witnessing Pd which has a nuclear charge of 46, involved in nuclear reactions with deuterons at room temperature. There seems to be evidence even for deuteron induced fission of the Pd nucleus in some LENR experiments!

■■ Clearly something “megical” is happening within the ordered atomic lattice that is somehow enabling the repulsive Coulomb barrier between reacing nuclei to be effectively overcome. All this is totally new physics, totally unexpected. The theoretical pundits are grappling with the mystery. But is’nt all this the essence of breakthrough scientific discoveries? *For the full report see http://newenergytimes.com/v2/ news/2009/2009DIA-08-0911-003.pdf

Paradigm shift Every now and then the citadel of science is rocked by the discovery of a new phenomenon that the scientific community finds difficult to digest. “The Theory of Relativity” and “Quantum Physics” were two such paradigm shifts that shook the very foundations of physics in the

20th century, although when first propounded they too had many detractors. The phenomenon of “Low Energy Nuclear Reactions (LENR)” is yet another example of a paradigm shift in science which has not yet been fully comprehended by scientists.

This discovery is too important to be neglected by the Indian scientific community.

By all accounts, radiationless nuclear reactions, starting from stable atoms and ending in stable atoms, seem to be taking place. The nuclear energy released appears to be transferred directly to the lattice as atomic vibrations (called “phonons”).

Incredible elemental transmutations appear to be occurring. In some LENR devices power densities (watts per gm of Pd fuel) comparable to that in nuclear power plants have already been demonstrated, with output to input power gain ratios exceeding 30! A Silent Revolution in Nuclear Science is clearly under way.

Table-top energy!

Prospects of developing captive decentralised and mass produced table-top nuclear power packs, generating power in the range of 10 to 100 Kw looms on the horizon with the

potentiality of private industry taking a leading role in mass manufacturing and marketing these power packs. Is all this merely a pipe dream or could it become a reality? It all depends on whether Indian science and private entrepreneurship is going to jump on the bandwagon and lead the way or sit back and let some other country, possibly China, to race ahead and become the world leaders in the field!

Formerly Associate Director, Physics Group, BARC, Mumbai the writer is from the first batch of the BARC training school. He served as a Reactor Physicist and an experimental Nuclear Physicist at BARC, Mumbai for 40 years (1957 to 1997). His specialisation was in the general area of Nuclear Science and Technology, focusing on the "Physics of Fission Chain Reactions and Fusioning Plasmas". At the time of his retirement he was Head, Neutron Physics Division of BARC and also Associate Director of its Physics Group. His main contributions were in the design, construction and experimentation with the three Purnima series of experimental nuclear reactors at Trombay and played a key role in the 1974 Pokhran nuclear explosion experiment. He was responsible for initiating Fusion Plasma experiments culminating in the building of the huge 500 KJ Capacitor Bank Facility at Purnima laboratories. During the last seven years of his research career at BARC he was deeply involved in the study of the controversial new field of "Cold Fusion".

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nuclear world

DISARMAMENT

jihad and nuclear weapons: apocalyptic?

K. Subrahmanyam

While there has always been a lot of talk about disarmament and abjuring nuclear weapons few nuclear weapons powers have taken the first step by declaring a policy of “no-first-use” of nuclear weapons. India is an absolute exception: It wants disarmament and has announced a policy of no first use. In fact it would not have “gone nuclear” had it not been for the continuing cooperation in creating nuclear bombs between two of its neighbours China and Pakistan – one a regional power and the other the cradle of jihad.

T

hough in his Prague speech President Obama strongly came out in favour of a nuclearweapon-free world he also conceded that he may not be able to realise it in his lifetime. In the latest Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) the US President stated that US recognised that the greatest threat to US and global security was no longer a nuclear exchange between nations, but nuclear terrorism by violent extremists and nuclear proliferation to an increasing number of States.

Moreover, US further recognised that its national security and that of its allies and partners can be increasingly defended by America’s unsurpassed conventional military capabilities and strong missile defences. While the US entered into a new START agreement with Russia reducing the number of warheads and launchers yet the two powers will still possess some 80 per cent of the world nuclear stockpiles.

The latest NPR emphasises keeping the laboratories modernised, infrastructure updated and on ballistic missile defence. These steps will indicate that a nuclear weapon-free world is not in the immediate calculation of even US where President Obama has come out in favour of the concept.

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September 2010 Defence AND security alert

Disarmament It is reported that Obama lost the argument with the US strategic establishment on adopting no first use policy and he had to content himself with the declaration that nuclear weapons were essentially meant for deterrence. Other nuclear weapon powers - Russia, UK, France, China, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea - are not even conceptually in favour of a nuclear weapons free world, while India has always been in favour.

Russians face an expanding NATO on the west and rapidly rising China in the east and not being in a position to maintain as large and efficient conventional force they had during the Cold War have switched to a doctrinal position similar to the one NATO used to have in the Cold War era that nuclear weapons are necessary for them to deter conventional threats. Without the US and Russia giving up their nuclear weapons the Chinese are hardly likely to do so. UK and France consider nuclear weapons as a symbol of their dwindling great power status. Though they are reducing their arsenals they have indicated that they intend to stick to their arsenals. In the recent NPT Review Conference the NPT nuclear

weapon powers refused to agree to any timelines for disarmament. In these circumstances the vision of a nuclear weapons free world is nowhere on the horizon.

Off on tangent The international community and the NPT Review Conference have tended to focus increasingly on nuclear proliferation on the basis of the Obama thesis that nuclear terrorism and proliferation to new nuclear States constitute today’s greatest threat to international peace and security. It is not adequately appreciated by most of the leaderships of the developed nations that the second round of nuclear proliferation is radically different from the first round which comprised of 7 nations. They were US, Russia, UK, France, China, Israel and India. Their proliferation was dictated by national security concerns.

New logic By mid seventies China decided to proliferate nuclear weapon technology to Pakistan. This was followed by Chinese attempts to proliferate to North Korea and Iran. The Chinese motivation appears to be to countervail India

September 2010 Defence AND security alert

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nuclear world

DISARMAMENT

and US influence in South Korea and Japan and to extend its influence in the Islamic world. In the same period Israel and Germany decided to proliferate to South Africa. Iraq, too initiated a major effort in weapon acquisition making use of western European firms which were prepared to export nuclear weapon related technologies clandestinely.

supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Apartheid in South Africa collapsed and a democratic black majority regime emerged. The white minority regime did not want the emerging black majority State to have nuclear weapons. They voluntarily surrendered the weapons and came under full IAEA inspection regime.

Proliferation

Iran new target

US decided to look away from ChinaPakistani proliferation as it needed Pakistani support for the Mujahideen campaign against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. The Pakistani proliferation

Iran felt the need for nuclear weapons as it had been attacked with a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) - chemical weapons during the long Iraq-Iran war when the west supported Saddam Hussein’s aggression and took no action on his use of WMD. Iran also had reason to worry about Pakistan-Saudi tacit alliance since simultaneously with nuclear proliferation to Pakistan China supplied long range CSS-2 missiles to Saudi Arabia in the late 80s.

Those missiles made sense only with nuclear warheads. In this proliferation game China had no compunctions in playing both sides, supplying missiles and nuclear technology to Sunni Pakistan and Saudi Arabia on one side and Shia Iran on the other. In spite of their professed adherence to NPT the western European countries were permissive of export of nuclear weapon related technologies to Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and South Africa.

The problem of how to control a nuclear war once it starts and how to terminate it has not been satisfactorily solved. The nuclear weapons today are like chemical weapons which, if possessed on both sides of a conflict could not be used to bring about a militarily meaningful result was the most successful one. Pakistan acquired the nuclear weapon in 1987 and the Chinese conducted a nuclear test for Pakistan at their Lop Nor test site in May 1990. Following this and since they no longer needed Pakistani support in Afghanistan the US broke off its economic and military ties with Islamabad. Pakistan resorted to nuclear proliferation to Iran partly to make up for the loss of US aid.

The first Gulf War in 1991 resulted in the Iraqi defeat and was followed by nuclear disarmament of Iraq under the

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CTBT trap The five nuclear weapon powers managed to get their weapons formally legitimised in 1995 when they managed to get the NPT, a treaty meant for 25 years which treated the nuclear weapons as a Cold War necessity, extended indefinitely and unconditionally. This was followed by their getting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) adopted in order to ensure that there will be no more nuclear powers. Till then, they had been bitterly opposed to the CTBT. At that stage India conducted its Shakti tests and declared itself a nuclear weapon State. This became necessary as India was the only country facing two nuclear adversaries (China and Pakistan) between the two of whom there was on-going proliferation relationship and the NPT community was extremely permissive of Chinese proliferation. Pakistan followed suit, conducted its nuclear tests and declared itself as a nuclear weapon State

September 2010 Defence AND security alert

with its weapons being India-specific.

Pakistani blackmarketeers Pakistani proliferation to Iran, North Korea and lastly to Libya could not be whitewashed by US and its allies after they intercepted a cargo of nuclear weapon manufacture related equipment and Chinese bomb design originally supplied to Pakistan on its way to Libya. The Libyans agreed to abandon their proliferation plans. US and UK leadership totally obfuscated the role of Pakistani army and the government in proliferation and accepted the cock and bull story of A. Q. Khan and his network being solely responsible for the proliferation activity. The former Dutch Prime Minister Rudd Lubbers has disclosed the link between the CIA and Dr. A. Q. Khan and that on two occasions when the Dutch arrested Dr. Khan they had to let him go free on CIA’s intervention. Today Khan has been totally exhonerated by the Pakistani judiciary and is a free man.

North Korean belligerence North Koreans carried out two nuclear tests in 2006 and 2008. The non-proliferation community could not punish them for having breached the NPT of which they were earlier a party. The six nation talks on the issue involving the North and South Koreas, China, US, Russia and Japan have not yielded any meaningful results.

China with its growing power, forms a powerful shield for North Korea.

Iran is proceeding with its centrifuge enrichment process and has expanded its facilities. While Iran denies any intention of acquiring nuclear weapon capability the Western powers suspect it is on the road to make n-weapons. The IAEA is not in a position to certify that Iran has revealed all its nuclear facilities or accounted for all enriched uranium.

Meanwhile there are reports of China selling Saudi Arabia long range solidfuelled missiles and Pakistan making Plutonium warheads with Chinese help.

With the thirteen centuries old ShiaSunni animosity the large scale sectarian Shia killings in Pakistan by Wahabi extremists and possibility of facing two front Sunni nuclear adversaries, the Iranian nuclear concerns are understandable. They are not being addressed by US which allowed Pakistani proliferation with Chinese

help. However the Iranian of nuclear weapons will breach of its international voluntarily undertaken as NPT.

acquisition be a clear obligations a party to

Al Qaeda nukes?

There have been credible reports of the Al Qaeda being interested in the acquisition of nuclear weapons and contacts between two very senior Pakistani nuclear scientists of Khan Laboratories and Osama bin Laden. There are also concerns of the jihadis using radio-active materials disbursing devices (dirty bombs).

While the US and Pakistani leaderships assert that the nuclear weapons in Pakistani arsenal are safe at present there are speculations of pro-jihadi leadership of Pakistani army emerging in future. President Obama said in the Washington nuclear summit “Two decades after the end of the Cold War, we face a cruel irony of history - the risk of a nuclear confrontation between nations has gone down, but the risk of nuclear attack has gone up…Terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda have tried to acquire the material for a nuclear weapon and if they ever succeeded, they would surely use it. Were they to do so, it would be a catastrophe for the world - causing extraordinary loss of life and striking a major blow to global peace and stability.”

Real threats This is the present situation in which the real nuclear threat arises from the new nuclear States Pakistan and North Korea and potentially from Iran and Saudi Arabia if they go nuclear, the latter with Pakistani and Chinese assistance. The nuclear threat will be connected with the jihadi threat. If the world is able to survive the jihadi threat the possibility of reaching a nuclear weapons free world, though somewhat remote is reasonable.

As far back as 1985 President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev jointly declared that a nuclear war cannot be won and therefore should not be initiated. Since then the Cold War has ended, the world has become increasingly globalised. No major power US, Russia, China, UK, France or India are likely to think in terms of use of nuclear weapons, though excepting India - and with some caveats - China

no other nation has adopted a no first use policy. However in the last 65 years since their first use, the weapons have not come in for use.

Deterrent effect The problem of how to control a nuclear war once it starts and how to terminate it has not been satisfactorily solved. The nuclear weapons today are like chemical weapons which, if possessed on both sides of a conflict could not be used to bring about a militarily meaningful result. Therefore came the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which was a no first use and delegitimisation agreement. The chemical weapons were not used in World War II although both sides had enormous stockpiles of very deadly agents. They got mutually deterred. Sixty eight years after Geneva Protocol the international community outlawed the chemical weapons. It is quite possible a similar development may happen for the n u c l e a r weapons too. But that will take time, several decades.

It will come a b o u t only after the jihadi terrorist t h r e a t is eliminated and a prolonged delegitimisation of the use of nuclear weapons follows.

Obama doctrine Therefore President Obama is right in concluding that the nuclear weapons free world is not likely to happen in his lifetime. However as Dr. Condoleezza Rice the former US Secretary of State wrote, “Our statecraft today recognises that centuries of international practice and precedent have been overturned in the past 15 years: For the first time since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the prospect of violent conflict between great powers is becoming ever more unthinkable. Major States

are increasingly competing in peace, not preparing for war. To advance this remarkable trend, the United States is transforming our partnerships with nations such as Japan and Russia, with the European Union and especially with China and India. Together we are building a more lasting and durable form of global stability: a balance of power that favours freedom.”

The recent global financial crisis proved the foremost global rivals, US and China have a symbiotic relationship between them, in which each has to pay attention to the other’s concern and welfare. It is in these circumstances 47 global leaders got together in April in Washington and pledged cooperation to safeguard the nuclear materials falling into the hands of nonState-actors and address the issue of

further nuclear proliferation. Though the nuclear weapons free world may be a distant goal we should not falter in our efforts to advance towards it as we hope to do in respect of democracy, pluralism, secularism, genderequality and increasing integration of humanity.

The writer was Director, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). He served as Secretary, Defence Production; worked as Convenor, National Security Advisory Board; Chairman, Kargil Review Panel and Consulting Editor, Times of India. The writer made the recommandations to the government for the Indian National Defence University (INDU) in June 2002.

September 2010 Defence AND security alert

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Nuclear digest Nuclear energy and Nuclear weapons Team DSA Nuclear energy is nonrenewable energy source. Given below are some interesting facts about nuclear energy and nuclear weapons.

The facts...

■■ Nuclear energy is released either by splitting atomic nuclei or by fusing the nuclei of atoms together.

■■ Nuclear energy was first discovered by French physicist Henri Becquerel in 1896 accidentally, when he observed that photographic plates stored in the dark near uranium were blackened like X-ray plates.

■■ By 2004, nuclear power provided 6.5 per cent of the world’s energy and 15.7 per cent of the world’s electricity.

US, France and Japan being major players accounting for 57 per cent of nuclear generated electricity.

■■ France has the most widespread use of nuclear power, supplying 80 per cent of the country’s electricity.

■■ Nuclear power can be generated from the fission of uranium, plutonium or thorium or the fusion of hydrogen into helium. As of now it is almost all uranium. The fission of an atom of uranium produces 10 million times the energy produced by the combustion of an atom of carbon from coal.

■■ On June 27, 1954 the then USSRs Obninsk Nuclear Power Plant became the world’s first nuclear power plant to generate electricity for a power grid and produced around 5 megawatts electric power.

■■ Nuclear energy is released by the following exothermic processes: Radioactive decay, where a proton or neutron in the radioactive nucleus decays spontaneously by emitting a particle.

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Fission, the breaking of heavy nucleus into two nuclei.

Fusion, two atomic nuclei fuse together to form a heavier nucleus.

■■ Nuclear energy is the energy of the future because it has virtually none of the greenhouse gases emission and therefore is not heating the planet and causing global warming like certain other energy sources.

■■ Nuclear power is the safest and least polluting energy industry and the only one which takes full responsibility for all its wastes and costs this into the product.

■■ As of now there are still some 26,000 odd nuclear warheads in the world, enough to destroy most life and property on earth. Nuclear weapons make humans an endangered species!

■■ More than 95 per cent of all nuclear weapons stockpiled are in the arsenals of the US and Russia.

■■ There are presently nine countries with nuclear weapons (US, Russia, UK, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea).

■■ Reportedly there is around 20,00,000 kg of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) in global stockpiles. It takes just 15-24 kg to make one nuclear weapon. There are 28 countries with at least one bomb’s worth of HEU and 12 countries with at least 20 bombs’ worth.

■■ Plutonium produced in nuclear power reactors is one more source of bomb grade material. It takes 3-5 kg of plutonium to create a nuclear weapon. There is now around 5,00,000 kg of separated plutonium in global stockpiles. Plutonium stocks are continuously to increasing due to civilian ‘spent’ fuel reprocessing.

September 2010 Defence AND security alert

...and the myths ■■ Nuclear threats have vanished since the end of the Cold War. Since then many new nuclear threats have emerged: Increased chances of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists eager to use them; Use of nuclear weapons by accident, particularly because of decaying infrastructure and lack of security safeguards.

Spread of nuclear weapons to other countries that may try to go nuclear to match more powerful adversary.

■■ Nuclear weapons make a country safer. No guarantee. Threatening massive retaliation nuclear weapons States prevent an attacker from starting a war. There are many ways, though, in which deterrence could fail, including misunderstandings, faulty communications, irrational leaders, miscalculations and accidents.

nuclear world

BEYOND NPT

nuclear treaties and

g ro u n d re a l i t i e s

Arundhati Ghose

“Sub rosa” is a phrase very apt to the American position on nuclear weapons proliferation. It means “under the rose bush” and implies opacity, non-transparency and downright deceit. The Bush family’s contribution to Pakistani nuclear proliferation is stark in the face of repeated warnings by US experts that it is “just two screwdriver turns away” in perfecting the bomb-in-the-basement through A. Q. Khan’s nuclear thuggery. Even today US policy is skewed against Iran even as terrorists are converging on Pakistan’s nuclear stockpile.

■■ Nuclear weapons are a cost-effective method of national defence. Nonsense.

Only one country, the US has spent over US$ 7.5 trillion on nuclear weapons research, development, testing, deployment and maintenance etc.

■■ Nuclear weapons are well protected and there is little chance that terrorists could get one. No guarantee. A coup in a country with nuclear weapons, such as Pakistan, could lead to a government coming to power that was eager to provide nuclear weapons to terrorists.

■■ Nuclear weapons are needed to combat threats from terrorists and rogue States.

The threat of nuclear power cannot act as a deterrent against terrorists because they do not have a territory to retaliate against. If the leaders of a rogue State do not use a rational calculus regarding their losses from retaliation, deterrence can fail.

September 2010 Defence AND security alert

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nuclear world

BEYOND NPT

I

t had long been expected by the international community that international arms control and nonproliferation treaties would provide a safety net against the spread of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. All that was needed was strict monitoring of ‘compliance’

Even if the FMCT continues to be stalled, it would seem evident that India should move from the defensive mode in multilateral negotiations to a proactive one in seeking to protect our security through a rule-based system moulded in the IAEA where India is a permanent member of the Board of Governors of obligations undertaken by those countries to whom the weapons were not supposed to spread. These treaties were most assiduously promoted and supported by the US, its allies and much of civil society.

Bush connivance During the years of the Bush Administration, however, the treaties

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were treated with a degree of contempt and were often ignored, with some spokesmen even consigning them to the dustbin of history. Today the treaties are either inoperative or considerably weakened. India, too, with its otherwise strong support of a rule based international system, had distanced itself from the major nuclear non-proliferation treaties, though it has been a supporter of other universally applicable, multilaterally negotiated treaties such as the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention. (India had also supported the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963).

Non-proliferation Of late, however, the situation has undergone a distinct shift; on the one hand, the non-proliferation regime is characterised by individual exceptionalisations, both with regard to cooperation agreements and with pressure on selected countries to halt their nuclear programmes resulting in a weakening of the non-proliferation treaties; on the other, India, despite her refusal to become party to the two major ones - the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) - has become concerned by recent developments on the ground in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. I argue in this essay that India should seek ways to strengthen the non-proliferation regime in her own security interests, though this need not and probably cannot, be through the mechanism of the NPT. As expected, the stirring debates and discussions on the need to ensure a nuclear weapons free world which took place prior to the May 2010 NPT Review Conference have all but dissipated. The Review Conference has been called a success because it did not fail. The focus was on non-proliferation through the IAEA safeguards system and the two treaties - the CTBT which is yet inoperative and the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (on which negotiations are still to start) on disarmament a repetition of earlier commitments; there was little discussion on terrorism but much hot air on universalisation of the NPT. Though led by the Arab Group targeting Israel, the strong language covered India and Pakistan as nonmembers of the Treaty, demanding that they join as non-nuclear weapon States.

There was, therefore, little progress on

September 2010 Defence AND security alert

the real challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation regime and almost no progress on concrete action towards a nuclear weapons free world.

Deceptive build-up Yet the build-up to the Review Conference had been almost frenetic; groups of elder statesmen, particularly the famous four from the United States, yet another Commission on Nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and of course, US President Obama’s speech in Prague in April 2009. It seemed that a change of attitude of the nuclear weapon powers recognised as such by the NPT were serious about moving towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. Some steps were indeed taken - the US-Russia agreement on the New START Treaty, the nuanced approach of the US Nuclear Posture Review and a general atmosphere in Europe that nuclear weapons on their soil should be moved out.

Discrimination remains That the emphasis on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons to States without them would remain, became clear with the unanimous adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1887 at a session chaired by the US President himself and the Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington in April of this year to focus on the need to control the availability of fissile materials which could lead to weapons manufacture. The latter meeting in fact bypassed the NPT almost totally, in what would appear to be a realisation of the realities on the ground, offering, by the way, the promise of a possible alternative approach to the challenges of proliferation and nuclear terrorism.

Yet, even that Summit did not face up to the core of the problem, the intersection of terrorism and nuclear proliferation in countries such as Pakistan, which has single-handedly held up negotiations on a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes in the Conference on Disarmament and which was present at the Summit. This challenge is dealt with later, as the real challenges to international peace and security are examined below.

Energy source The present scenario is dominated by the evidence of the ever-widening

implementation of the so-called ‘nuclear renaissance’. For a variety of reasons, a significant number of developing countries have taken the decision to opt for nuclear energy as a part of their energy mix; amongst the industrialised countries too, many of which had turned away from nuclear energy, particularly after the incident at Chernobyl, there is a refocus on their nuclear industry, with countries like Italy, Sweden and even Germany, which had all but abjured nuclear energy, opting to revive their reliance on nuclear energy.

While the latter are looking at nuclear energy as a source of clean energy, in the context of climate change, some are also looking at a time when fossil fuels, particularly oil is likely to ‘peak’ and are likely to be less available. The US too, after a hiatus of almost three decades is aiming to reduce dependence on oil imported from areas of instability, such as the Middle East and parts of Africa.

Double standards In Asia, too, the demand for civilian nuclear energy has increased, with Vietnam, Indonesia and even Myanmar entering into discussions on such cooperation. While the countries of South East Asia are bound by the Bangkok Agreement which declared South East Asia a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, there is already comment internationally that the recent US-Vietnam cooperation agreement is but a signal, at the very least, to China, which has been flexing its muscles in the region of late. Vietnam has reportedly refused to formally accept

Why should these developments be a cause of concern, internationally and to India? Once the nuclear arena becomes one in which a nation’s security is not the only reason for weaponisation, when geopolitics, particularly of the region surrounding us, starts to use the nuclear renaissance to establish power balances, whether regional or global, India’s carefully crafted nuclear doctrine may need to be revisited.

There is not very much that India can do alone to stabilise a potentially destabilising situation which would inevitably affect her plans for economic growth; choices will have to be made to

Nuclear umbrella Most industrialised countries, particularly in the West, are unlikely to go in for weapons programmes as they are already covered by the US nuclear umbrella. Yet, despite the current attitude of Japan to nuclear weapons, if the situation on the Korean peninsula or in China challenges its security, a change in approach cannot be ruled out.

As far as the developing countries are concerned, some of the same reasons for turning to nuclear energy might very well apply.

Middle East However, it is remarkable that the interest in the countries of the Middle East appears to have blossomed in the wake of the controversy over Iran’s nuclear programme. Many of these countries, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the UAE have publicly declared their intention to go in for civil nuclear energy; whether spurred by Israel’s continued reluctance to even discuss its nuclear arsenal or by the ambiguities surrounding Iran’s programme, these intentions, to restrict themselves to peaceful uses might very well be temporary. All these countries are members of the NPT.

any restrictions on its right to enrich uranium while stating it had no wish to do so and the US has apparently accepted this, as the NPT permits such activity. What has raised eyebrows is that the US insisted on and got in the text of the agreement with the UAE, a pledge that that country would not seek to develop enrichment technology.

These new developments are, of course in addition to the plans of China to significantly increase the number of reactors, the NSG’s waiver of the rules against civil nuclear cooperation with India and more recently, China’s intention to supply two nuclear reactors to Pakistan, together with fuel for them, under IAEA safeguards.

find spaces where India can cooperate with others to build a framework of rules, perhaps in the IAEA, which could permit the growth of nuclear energy while reducing the risks of outright weaponisation, diversion of equipment or material or unauthorised access to such material.

The NPT does none of these things; it has been suggested that the NPT be replaced by a Nuclear Weapons Convention, a proposal India has supported. Yet it is clear that such a Convention lies far in the future, if it ever materialises. What is required is a new approach including new rules ensuring non-proliferation and we should be at the forefront to promote it.

September 2010 Defence AND security alert

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nuclear world Pakistani menace

At another level, the US, still the leader on non-proliferation issues globally, is concentrating on selected countries like Iran and the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea or North Korea. There is no doubt that these countries merit such focused attention, but are they as immediately dangerous to international peace as Pakistan? One understands that the war in Afghanistan has made Pakistan an important partner of the US and its allies; but the advantage taken by Pakistan in halting the start of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) surely calls for a stronger response than has been forthcoming so far from the international community. Should India be concerned at this delay?

According to a report from SIPRI, Pakistan has been increasing her production of fissile material significantly and probably has more stocks today than India. While this in itself does not really affect India’s own deterrent, the chances of diversion of such material, whether intentional or inadvertent, surely increases, given the evolving situation in Pakistan.

As mentioned above, not only did the NPT Review Conference not deal with this issue, nor did the Washington Summit on Nuclear Security. Pakistan is in fact a much more dangerous country than Iran; the terrorist groups which appear to have free play in that country and the gradual influence of religious extremism on the general population which forms the pool for recruitment to the military, while the nuclear assets of Pakistan may be under strict control today as we are given to believe, a degree of firewalling of those assets and indeed, an FMCT would appear to be essential if the international community is to be able to forestall a potentially catastrophic situation.

The dangers of nuclear terrorism have been usually dismissed by many; terrorists cannot, it is said get hold of delivery vehicles for a nuclear weapon.

The chances of a radiological weapon or a ‘dirty bomb’ of course remain, especially as a tool of blackmail and political coercion of other States.

According to Pakistani spokesmen, their nuclear arsenal should not worry the world overmuch, as it is Indiacentric! This would certainly be a cause

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nuclear world

BEYOND NPT of concern to India! At the Washington Summit it was agreed that actions would be taken in the IAEA and that the Summit would reconvene in Seoul in 2012.

IAEA Even if the FMCT continues to be stalled or if the negotiations take an unconscionable time, it would seem evident that India should move from the defensive mode in multilateral negotiations to a proactive one in seeking to protect our security through a rule based system moulded in the IAEA where India is a permanent member of the Board of Governors.

This defensive frame of mind has made us allergic to all international treaties in the nuclear arena. As we have seen, the NPT is not of much use in dealing with the challenges of today.

Its foundations have been crumbling for some time, but it remains iconic to some of its members, even though it exists only as a symbol of an ordered world. It is, after all, the only Treaty which forbids the spread of nuclear weapons and, however obliquely, supports nuclear disarmament.

India in NPT? Just before the Review Conference, there was some excitement about a reported comment by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that India would consider an offer to join the NPT as a nuclear weapon State if such an offer were to be made. India had laid down some conditions during the negotiation of the NPT more than 40 years ago: these included security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States by the UN, disarmament, including a CTBT and non-proliferation of weapons and material to non-nuclear States. Today India is a nuclear weapon State and does not require security assurances; she still holds that the elimination of nuclear weapons is in her security interests and that of the international community. Non-proliferation, on the other hand, which she has viewed as controls on non-nuclear States without any obligations on the then existing nuclear weapon States is an area where India today has to support actions in her own interests, without accepting the imbalance present in the NPT. Since the NPT apparently cannot be

September 2010 Defence AND security alert

amended without the fragile consensus on it tearing it apart, India cannot accept being a part of that Treaty. She can, however, work on structures outside the NPT to meet present day challenges and do so with countries which are interested in genuine nonproliferation rather than the use of it as a part of global power play.

Back to CTBT The CTBT on the other hand, is a different matter. It is universally applicable and contains provisions not only for verification of those who might wish to cheat, but an article which enables withdrawal in the ‘supreme national interest’. Should the US and therefore, China ratify the Treaty, there would be little reason for India not to do so, on condition that the ‘secret’ agreements arrived at by the P-5 during the CTBT negotiations are shared with India. Some legal way would also have to be found to deal with the illegality of Article XIV which perhaps would not remain illegal if India decided to sign.

India’s own interests and her position have changed over the years and that is as it should be. We cannot be fighting battles that have already been won.

India’s status as a nuclear weapon State is not in doubt and she today is able to cooperate with the world on civil nuclear projects. It is extremely unlikely that any government will find it necessary to test again, unless direly provoked. The right to do so would remain even after signing the Treaty.

The world has changed and is changing; India too must adapt herself to face the new challenges.

The writer joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1963 and served in various capacities in the Ministry of External Affairs and in Indian missions abroad. Was incharge of economic relations when economic reforms were launched in 1991. Served in the Branch Secretariat of the Ministry to liaise with the Bangladesh Government-in-exile in Calcutta during the birthpangs of that nation-State. Served as Ambassador in Egypt, South Korea and as Permanent Representative to UNESCO and to the UN Offices in Geneva. As Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva she etched in indelible words the sovereign resolve of the Indian nation never to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Her words reverberate in Indian hearts to this day.

She told the world in measured, authoritative tones that India would never sign the CTBT. “Not now! Not ever!”.

MONUMENTAL MESS

nuclear power programme:

mortgaging the future?

Prof. Ashok Parthasarathi

A former Science Adviser to Indira Gandhi lays bare a scenario of neglect and grave errors that could bring even the hard-won indigenous reactors of Homi Bhabha’s “third stage” - the thoriumbased Fast Breeders also within the scope of IAEA safeguards and perpetual intrusive inspections under the Indo-US civil nuclear deal.

The inexplicable s l o w d o w n in exploration and exploitation of indigenous natural uranium mines set the stage for future errors.

September 2010 Defence AND security alert

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nuclear world

MONUMENTAL MESS

R

ight from its inception in 1948, when our first Atomic Energy Act was passed and the Atomic Energy Commission chaired by Homi Bhabha was set up, the primary mission of the atomic programme was nuclear power. Towards that end, in 1954 a separate Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) was set up with Bhabha

Our Three Stage Nuclear Power Programme of Bhabha fame are all intimately interconnected. Once the initial Plutonium 239 is covered by the so called “safeguards” but, actually, highly intrusive international inspections by the IAEA, is fed as a key component of the composite PlutoniumThorium fuel into the Fast Breeders, those reactors would ALSO come under PERPETUAL INSPECTION and the same applies to the Uranium 233 which is the key element of the fuel for the Thorium Breeders!!

This is the Frankenstein of PURSUING SAFEGUARDS / INSPECTIONS! as its Secretary and the Prime Minister as the Cabinet Minister incharge. The very next year, 1955, an embryonic integrated nuclear R&D Centre called the Atomic Energy Establishment Trombay (AEET) at what was then one of the outermost suburbs of Bombay, was set up with an initial nucleus of 100 nuclear scientists and engineers.

Most of them had been trained in the meanwhile in a special Atomic Energy Training School, while the leaders were trained in various countries e.g. the UK, France and the USA.

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Concurrently, an extensive survey of the country was launched by an Atomic Minerals Division of the DAE to locate deposits of uranium, the basic raw material for making fuel for nuclear reactors and to assess the size and quality of such deposits.

In 1958 the atomic programme achieved its first major milestone in the indigenous design, engineering and construction of a “Swimming Pool” Reactor with the highly enriched uranium fuel needed for its Core supplied by the UK Atomic Energy Authority (AEA) due to the longstanding and close relationship between Bhabha and the first Chairman of the UK AEA, Sir John Cockcroft.

Much tom-tommying was done by the Government of India and the DAE that this reactor, named Apsara, was the first nuclear reactor in Asia. Little did we know, that a full three years earlier, i.e. in 1955, the Chinese had already started their nuclear weapons programme!

Natural uranium Then, in 1960, Bhabha once again used his extensive international contacts to conclude an agreement with the Atomic Energy Canada Ltd. (AECL) under which AECL was to set up at Trombay a large 40 megawatt Research Reactor on a turnkey basis including extensive training of our nuclear scientists and engineers to operate and maintain the reactor. Known for obvious reasons as the Canada-India Reactor or CIR it was fuelled with natural uranium and moderated and cooled by heavy water.

Bhabha had carefully chosen Canada as our collaborator for this to-be-keyreactor precisely because the Canadian design was based on natural uranium and that meant we would not have to depend on continuing supplies of imported fuel or raw material there for and use our own natural uranium to fuel the reactor, thereby ensuring maximum self reliance.

The collaboration agreement, with AECL was a broad one including regarding what was later to become a major issue viz use of the plutonium produced in the reactor from the original natural uranium fuel to make nuclear explosive devices. All that the agreement contained was a general clause that “the reactor would be used for peaceful purposes”. Over 1960-61 to 1966-67 CIR was built at AEET although with very little indigenous content. It was used for

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basic and applied nuclear research and for producing nuclear isotopes for use in medicine and agriculture.

Bhabha’s building the first stage of our nuclear programme in the 1950s consumed a considerable quantity of not only rupee resources but also the then extremely scarce foreign exchange.

It therefore came to be increasingly scrutinised and criticised by the famous P. C. Mahalanobis, then the key Member for Perspective Planning and Science and Technology in the Planning Commission and another right hand man of Nehru.

Cost-benefit analysis Mahalanobis argued that commercial nuclear power was nowhere on the horizon anywhere in the world and so the atomic programme should be scaled down to very much more modest physical and hence financial levels. He also argued more fundamentally, that the Planning Commission’s studies had shown that the economics of nuclear power was extremely adverse when compared to power from our abundant resources of coal and the many hydro electric projects then being built and which Nehru had called the “Temples of Modern India”. Similar doubts and criticisms were being raised by other segments of the scientific community notably the CSIR and the universities and in Parliament and the media. Nehru and Bhabha were, therefore, under increasing pressure to “demonstrate” that nuclear energy could produce large amounts of electricity and feed electric grids like coal and hydro power and, what is more, at a very low cost.

Commercial reactor Consequently, under Nehru’s instructions, Bhabha went ahead to undertake a foreign procurement of our first commercial nuclear power station. Offers to set up such a station were sought and obtained by the DAE from the embryonic British, French and German AEC’s. Even while their offers were being formulated, Cockcroft promised Bhabha that the reactors which the British would offer would be the cheapest in terms of both capital cost and the cost of electricity production. The French who had not built even one such reactor in their own country at that time, were far more hesitant to give Bhabha the Cockcroft

assurance. The reactors that the UK offered were duplicates of the two 190 mw plants which Britain had set up at a place called Calder Hall in the Central UK in 1956 and which were the world’s first commercial nuclear power reactors. They were natural uranium fuelled, graphite moderated and light water cooled. The French reactors were a variant of the British design.

The shock came however, when the British and French bids were opened. The cost of the British offer was far far higher than what Cockcroft had promised Bhabha, while the French offer was even higher. Both countries accompanied their bids with government-to-government credits but on quite onerous terms. If we had chosen either, Bhabha would never have been able to counter the charges of Mahalanobis. So, he was stumped and so was Nehru.

US offer At this critical juncture, the USA entered the fray. Its sole nuclear power reactor manufacturer General Electric made an unsolicited offer for two “Boiling Water Reactors” of 210 mw each thereby making the total capacity of our first nuclear power station, which in the meanwhile had been decided by the DAE and AEC to be located at Tarapur on the Maharashtra

coast. The initial reaction of both Nehru and Bhabha to GE’s offer was to reject it out of hand because the fuel in it was enriched uranium. This meant that, as we did not have uranium enrichment technology, we would have had to purchase the fuel for the reactors from the United States government for the entire 30 year lifetime of the reactor.

But, the US government then came in with a very soft loan involving: (a) an interest rate of only 0.5 per cent and (b) a repayment period of 25 years.

This was far far more concessional to us than anything either the British or French were able to offer. As mentioned earlier, in the early 1960s, when all this was taking place the country was facing an extreme foreign exchange crunch.

The mandarins in the Finance Ministry therefore jumped at the American offer despite the strong aversion of Nehru and Bhabha to the perpetual dependence on US fuel supply which it would entail. In the event, the US government financing package won the day.

Tarapur We signed three agreements with the USA for the Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS): (a) A turnkey supply, installation, commissioning and trial operation agreement with GE for 2 X 210 megawatt reactors to constitute TAPS, (b) an agreement with

the US government for 30 year supply of enriched uranium fuel and (c) the ultra concessional inter-governmental loan agreement. These were done over 1962-63.

Construction by GE started in early 1963. Although GE had promised a 5-year completion schedule, there were numerous problems in the construction phase and the reactors could be completed only in early 1969. Power from the reactors began flowing into the Maharashtra and Gujarat grids (200 mw each) only in October 1969.

Teething troubles Meanwhile, in 1965, even before the CIR had stabilised, Bhabha opened discussions with AECL for the supply of a 200 mw commercial power reactor of the CIR design to be put up on the banks of a lake (for drawing cooling water) at Rawatbhatta in Rajasthan.

After protracted negotiations, a Canada India Agreement for what came to be called the Rajasthan Atomic Power Project-I (RAPP-I) was concluded in early December 1967. As in the case of Tarapur, where our station was only the second such power station ever built

by GE - it was a follow-on of the first such station at Oyster Creek in New Jersey on the US East Coast, - RAPP-I was also a follow-on of Canada’s first commercial power reactor at Douglas

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Point in Central Canada. Consequently RAPP-I like TAPS went through enormous problems - the Americans and Canadians were learning at our cost! RAPP-I promised for completion in 6 years: from ground breaking, took almost 9 years with numerous troubles continuing to plague the plant for a further three years even after the reactor was connected to the Rajasthan electricity grid.

Indigenous fuel However, despite Nehru’s demise at the end of May 1964 and Lal Bahadur Shastri succeeding him, Bhabha went ahead tenaciously and mindlessly to tie-up with Canada for a second 200 mw unit at the Rajasthan site viz RAPP-II. This was again on a turnkey basis by Canada except that, this time, the uranium fuel was from indigenous production. Moreover, despite all that we - and more importantly the Canadians!! - had learnt on RAPP-I of the design and engineering of large CIR type commercial power reactors, RAPP-II continued to have endemic problems even in the early stages of construction.

Indira Gandhi era Meanwhile, in January 1966, two momentous events took place. Indira Gandhi became Prime Minister and Bhabha died in an air crash over the Alps. As all the contractual arrangements including the credit financing for RAPP-II were in place and the reactor was under construction, Indira Gandhi did not disturb the project.

As the whole world knows, on May 18, 1974 we undertook a Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Experiment (PNEE).

As a result, all hell broke loose. The Canadians immediately withdrew their entire workforce from RAPP-II and also their residual support for RAPP-I. Supply of all equipment, components, materials etc. for both reactors were stopped with immediate effect. So we had a limping RAPP-I and a half – if that – built RAPP-II. The US, the UK and France also withdrew all support and ceased all interactions with us in the nuclear field.

As a result, our nuclear power programme entered an entirely new phase. We faced a total global

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embargo and we had to pursue the programme completely on our own. This consisted of completion of: RAPP-II, the already under construction 230 mw Madras Atomic Power Project MAPP-I and build the whole of MAPP-II where ground had just been broken. Neither the nuclear programme itself nor our industry was at all ready for this massive task.

However, gradually and progressively we built up the necessary technical capabilities and industrial capacity to undertake it through the 1970’s and well into the 80’s. After blood and sweat, RAPP-II was commissioned in 1981, MAPP-I in 1984 and MAPP-II in 1986.

Meanwhile, the Government of India decided in 1976-77 to start work on the next atomic power station to be located at Narora in Uttar Pradesh. NAPS was also to consist of two units of 230 mw each. As a result of the RAPS’ and MAPS’ experience, NAPS moved ahead somewhat faster and its two units became operational in 1986 and 1987 respectively.

With its enhanced confidence and capability in building nuclear power stations the Department of Atomic Energy proposed to the government in 1987 a long-term plan to set up a total nuclear power generating capacity of 10,000 mw by the year 2000. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had resolutely stood by the Nuclear Power Programme in its early grim years, without which the programme would have collapsed. Fortunately, in 1987 Rajiv Gandhi was Prime Minister and, after many rounds of technical presentations and discussion at various levels, he approved the 10,000 mw by 2000 plan.

With this major shift from a powerstation-to-power-station approach to an integrated plan, things improved on all fronts - except one viz ensuring adequate domestic availability of uranium ore and the uranium oxide made from it. CIR and the entire nuclear power programme using the natural uranium-heavy water technology had been based on extensive geological surveys of the entire country having revealed the existence of uranium deposits – albeit of very low uranium content – in Bihar – first at Jaduguda and then at Narwapahar, the former in the 1950s and the latter in the 1960s. Our

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first and second uranium mine and mill were accordingly set up at those sites. It was uranium oxide from these sources converted into reactor fuel rods by the Nuclear Fuel Complex at Hyderabad using its indigenously developed special technologies needed to deal with such poor ores, which fuelled CIR and then RAPS and MAPS. Much better grade uranium ores were, meanwhile, discovered by the Atomic Minerals Division of DAE in Meghalaya and at four sites in Andhra Pradesh.

Prime Minister Deve Gowda, who was making a rare Prime Ministerial visit to BARC, an announcement that the new target for nuclear power production would now be 20,000 mw by 2020! However, this “new” target –

full well that the then established uranium reserves were enough to support a natural uranium reactor capacity of only around 12,000 mw of reactors at the very most by 2020!! and the 20,000 mw by 2020

“comfortably forgot the fate of the 1987 – set target of 10,000 mw by 2000 - as DAE was nowhere near attaining it!! and the Prime Minister involved in the latter had either died or were no longer in power!! So the 20,000 mw by 2020 “plan” was got approved by the DAE from a pliant and disinterested AEC, a PM (Vajpayee, who was only interested in weapons!) and a Union Cabinet which anyway was used to putting its chhap on anything “nuclear”! Uranium availability for such a doubling of the nuclear generating capacity compared to the 1987 – approved programme was again not established in either the DAE’s Note for the AEC nor the Cabinet Note nor were any questions relating to this key issue raised by the AEC!!

plan contained little if anything to go by way of a crash plan to augment that uranium production capacity to an entirely attainable 18,000 mw by 2020! Instead, the plan was predicated on a totally unrealistic projection that the 20,000 mw would include a prototype and then three commercial Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) of 500 mw capacity each and 6,000 mw of imported reactors when we were under a total global embargo on nuclear trade! These (FBRs) reactors are fuelled by a mixture of natural uranium and plutonium, the latter extracted from the first generation thermal reactors such as MAPS or NAPS. There were no timeliness for this massive Fast Breeder Reactor programme and consequently to its basic feasibility of achievement, nor its synchronisation with the operationalisation of the thermal reactors so as to ensure availability of

Feedstock However, unforgivably, a series of Chairmen of Atomic Energy Commission failed to give the uranium programme the top priority it needed to enable us to feed our series of upcoming power reactors adequately in terms of quantity and timeliness. This failure did not receive the attention of top policy makers as the reactors themselves - RAPS, MAPS and NAPS - were struggling to run at high Plant Load Factors and therefore requiring maximum uranium supply. However, when the long term programme of 10,000 mw by the year 2000 was approved in 1987 there should have been an integrated and long term assessment and strategy for ensuring adequate uranium availability including the opening of new mines and the setting up of new co-located mills. This was not done.

Monumental failure The reasons for this monumental failure have not been given by any of the three Chairmen of AEC who were involved in the programme and responsible for assuring Rajiv Gandhi that we had all the resources - skills, technology, raw material and industrial capacity - to achieve 10,000 mw by the year 2000.

Reactors at new sites such as Kakrapar in Gujarat and Kaiga in Karnataka were merrily sanctioned by the Cabinet on the recommendation of the AEC without any independent assessment of the above factors. In fact, horribly, an excellent mine at Turamdih, was shut down in 1992-93 on the ground that it was not needed to meet the 10,000 mw by 2000 target!! Even more horribly, in 1996 the then Chairman AEC, Dr. R. Chidambaram almost got included in the Address of the then

Wishful thinking This when the Secretary DAE knew

adequate capacity to extract plutonium from the natural uranium fuel rods used on those Thermal Reactors to fuel the Fast Breeders!

It is thus that today (2010) we are in the appalling condition of the total generating capacity of TAPS, RAPS plus our 14 indigenous natural uranium reactors in operation being barely 4,560 mw and that of the five natural uranium reactors under construction is a mere additional 2020 mw. If we add the two 1,000 mw Russian enriched uranium reactors under construction at Koodangulam in Tamil Nadu and the indigenous 500 mw Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor Bhawani due to go into operation in 2012, we should have, hopefully, a total nuclear power generating capacity of 9,080 mw in 2016.

Indo-US civil nuclear deal In July 2005, the Prime Minister and the then US President George W Bush signed a historic agreement under which the USA agreed to amend its laws to enable us to be able to import uranium and other nuclear materials and nuclear reactors and technology without adversely affecting our nuclear weapon programme demonstrated by the “tests” of 1998 and without requiring us to sign the NPT, but provided we placed all our nuclear reactors, including our own entirely indigenous reactors under IAEA “safeguards” i.e. comprehensive inspections, in perpetuity!

The Singh-Bush Agreement also committed the US to get the 45 member countries of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) - a cartel of suppliers of nuclear

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technology and materials which regulated international nuclear trade in these areas - to remove all restrictions on such trade solely for India without requiring the application of full scope safeguards which was a pre-condition for such trade both under US law and the NSG Guidelines

the fact that the main US manufacturer and supplier, Westinghouse Inc. has publicly stated that it expects to get the clearance of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission only by 2017 whereafter alone it can set up and prove its first 1,000 mw power plant in the US itself let alone abroad - etc. etc.

This watershed development has enabled us to participate in international trade in nuclear materials, crucially natural uranium, the botched lack of which as outlined earlier was almost bringing our nuclear power programme to a total halt. The Indo-US Agreement and the NSG exemption have also enabled us to conclude agreements with Russia, France and the USA to import complete nuclear reactors with assured supplies of fuel for them over their approximately 40 year lifetime amounting to 10,000 mw from each of the three countries but over an unspecified time frame in the future!

The current actuals plus the projected to 2022 generating capacity from conventional power plants – coal, gas, hydro and renewables according to the nation’s electricity supply demand planning agency, the Central Electricity Authority is around 2,60,000 mw. In other words, nuclear power would constitute a mere 6 per cent of total grid connected power in 2022 assuming the 15,000 to 16,000 mw nuclear power generating capacity worked out earlier is met. Even wind and solar grid connected power is already 8.5 per cent and would be 10-11 per cent by 2022!!

So much for the much vaunted and ad nauseum repeated contention that the Indo-US Nuclear “Deal” would constitute our “Nuclear Renaissance”!!

As for the cost of that nuclear power, would I be too rhetorical in saying “God Only Knows”?

Max 16,000 mw Almost all our former top nuclear scientists and engineers are of the considered view that, when numerous realities and practical considerations are taken into account, the optimistic installed nuclear reactor generating capacity would not exceed 15,000 to 16,000 mw by 2022. What are some of the main considerations? Selection of the precise sites for the French and American reactors (the site for the second two Russian reactors will also be Koodangulam); securing land clearances and actual possession by NPCIL; review and approval of the designs of the French and US reactors, not only from the technical viewpoints but also the safety and environmental impact angles by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board and realistic actual construction times of the reactors.

The first two Russian 1,000 mw VVER reactors have taken nine years to build and are also already three years behind schedule; the construction time of the first French 1,650 mw ERS reactors in France itself took nine years and the second such reactors coming up in Finland have already been under construction for six years and the French company building the reactors - Areva - itself projects a further three years for completion, while the Finnish Electric Power Utility, which is the customer, projects this time frame as five years;

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Bondage But there is a much more serious and eternal “price we would be paying for that measely 6 per cent. That is the fact that to get that 6 per cent we would have by 2014 to put all our existing reactors – including, unforgivably the 16 wholly indigenous nuclear power plants under international IAEA inspection and regulation IN PERPETUITY!! What is more, this would also apply to all future indigenous reactors including the FBRs! Equally, if not more deleteriously, our Three Stage Nuclear Power Programme of Bhabha fame - first stage thermal reactors, second stage Fast Breeder Reactors and third stage Thorium Breeder Reactors - are all intimately interconnected - the plutonium 239 from the first stage fuelling the second and the Uranium 233 derived from the Thorium “blanket” in the second constituting the fuel for the third stage.

Safeguards Therefore, once the initial Plutonium 239 is covered by the so called “safeguards” but, actually, highly

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intrusive international inspections by the IAEA, is fed as a key component of the composite Plutonium-Thorium fuel into the Fast Breeders, those reactors would ALSO come under PERPETUAL INSPECTION and the same applies to the Uranium 233 which is the key element of the fuel for the Thorium Breeders!! This is the Frankenstein of PURSUING SAFEGUARDS / INSPECTIONS!

PROLIFERATION

SINO-PAK nexus Dr. Harsh V. Pant

Furthermore, by the time we move from stage two to stage three in the 2040-2060 time frame, many countries would be following us (who knows not leading us) and so the “international inspections” would have a clear industrial espionage dimension.

Paranoia? Perhaps. But how many members of even our security think tanks are aware of the massive R&D and production programme, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) of the US Department of Defense has been promoting and funding for many years now on the military applications of Genetic Engineering? It is not for nothing that the most famous policy think tank funded by the US Air Force, the RAND Corporation, has as its motto.“ We Think about the Unthinkable” The writer is a physicist and electronics engineer by original training and a social scientist and science policy analyst by subsequent training.

Joining the Department of Atomic Energy in 1967 as Special Assistant to the then Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, he also set up the Programme Analysis Unit, as an interdisciplinary policy planning and management services unit to the AEC. In mid 1970, he joined the Secretariat of Prime Minister late Mrs. Gandhi as Special Assistant for Science and Technology. For the next five years he dealt with a wide range of science and technology policy planning and management matters. These included the setting up of the Department of Science and Technology, the Department of Electronics and the Department of Space, the preparation of the nation's first comprehensive S&T plan under the auspices of the National Committee on Science and Technology and several major projects in the areas of atomic energy space, electronics and defence. He is the only person to have held such a position to date.

After retiring from the Government of India in the year 2000, he was invited by the Jawaharlal Nehru University to be a Professor in the Centre for Studies in Science Policy. Over 2002-03, he was a member of the Task Force set up by the Government of India under the Chairmanship of the then Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission K. C. Pant, to draw up a plan for making India "A Knowledge Super Power".

If, as is generally accepted, Pakistan’s duality in the War On Terror was intended to retain for the jihadis of every hue and nationality the upper hand in Afghanistan, it has been achieved in the backdrop of a nuclear arsenal made possible by generous proliferation of pre-tested warheads and delivery systems from China. One would have thought that Beijing would see the danger in pandering to jihadi sentiments given the unrest in its own Muslim Uighur community in Xiangiang province.

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t is not entirely clear what transpired at the 46-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group meeting in New Zealand in June in so far as the much-talked about China-Pakistan nuclear deal is concerned. In a statement, the NSG merely reiterated “the value of ongoing consultation and transparency” referring to the discussions on the proposed sale of nuclear reactors by China to Pakistan. It is likely that China will go ahead with its nuclear pact with Pakistan especially now when the NSG

members have failed in speaking in one voice opposing the pact.

NSG inert Despite all evidence to the contrary, China has proclaimed that its proposed two new nuclear reactors are “totally consistent” with its international obligations under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and supervision. At a time when nuclear proliferation is a major area of concern

for the international community and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference has ended in New York at the United Nations in May with lofty declarations, reports that China is all set to allow its State entities to supply two new nuclear reactors to Pakistan should be a matter of grave concern.

China’s State-owned, China National Nuclear Corporation has signed an agreement with Pakistan for two new

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nuclear reactors at the Chashma site in Pakistan’s Punjab province – Chashma III and Chashma IV. This is in addition to two nuclear reactors already built

by China at the same site. This action of China will be in clear violation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines that forbid nuclear transfers to countries not signatories to the NPT or adhere to comprehensive international safeguards on their nuclear programme. But the China of today is willing to pursue its interests more assertively and its actions are a challenge to the American ability to maintain the current global order, including the non-proliferation regime.

Indo-US deal Ever since the US decided to conclude the civilian nuclear energy cooperation pact with India, China has indicated its displeasure by various means. With the exception of China, other major global powers such as Britain, France, Germany and Russia supported the US-India nuclear deal as they were eager to sell nuclear fuel, reactors and equipment to India. China, on its part, made its displeasure clear by asking India to sign the NPT and dismantle its nuclear weapons. Since the US-India deal is in many ways a recognition of India’s rising global profile, China, not surprisingly, has not been very happy with the outcome and quickly declared that it will be selling new nuclear reactors to Pakistan. It was a not so subtle message to the US that if Washington decided to play favourites, China also retained the same right.

Now China is suggesting that the deal to supply two new reactors is in fact a continuation of its pact with Pakistan before it had joined the NSG in 2004!

American ambivalence Pakistan, for its part, had also demanded an India-like nuclear pact from Washington. The Bush Administration had made it clear that given Pakistan’s abysmal nuclear proliferation record exemplified by the A. Q. Khan network, there was no question of treating Pakistan on par with India. When Islamabad reiterated its demand recently in its ministerial level “Strategic Dialogue” with the Obama Administration, it was again turned down. Yet a number of voices in Washington policy circles have made a case for a civilian nuclear pact with

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Pakistan, especially as Islamabad’s support remains crucial to winning the war in Afghanistan at the earliest.

The US Ambassador to Pakistan, Anne Patterson, has been reported to have suggested that the US was “beginning to have a discussion with the Pakistan government” on the country’s desire to tap nuclear energy.

capability in response to a Sunni Pakistan-Saudi Arabia collaboration on nuclear issues. No prizes for guessing who is supplying missiles to Iran even while providing nuclear capability to Pakistan: China, of course!

Countering India

And there have been indications that the Obama Administration is likely to accept China’s nuclear commerce with Pakistan in return for China’s help in containing Iranian nuclear ambitions and will not be an obstacle in the process. But the Obama Administration soon realised that its non-proliferation and larger strategic agenda would suffer grievous damage if it was viewed as supporting the deal. Of course, none of this mattered in the end.

Pak-China bonds China shares a special relationship with Pakistan. Based on their convergent interests vis-à-vis India, China and Pakistan reached a strategic understanding in mid-1950s, a bond that has only strengthened ever since.

Sino-Pakistan ties gained particular momentum in the aftermath of the 1962 Sino-Indian war when the two States signed a boundary agreement recognising Chinese control over portions of the disputed Kashmir territory and since then the ties have been so strong that the Chinese President Hu Jintao has described the relationship as “higher than mountains and deeper than oceans.”

Maintaining close ties with China has been a priority for Islamabad and Beijing has provided extensive economic, military and technical assistance to Pakistan over the years. It was Pakistan that in early 1970s enabled China to cultivate its ties with the West and the US in particular, becoming the conduit for Henry Kissinger’s landmark secret visit to China in 1971 and has been instrumental in bringing China closer to the larger Muslim world.

Military-industrial inputs Over the years China emerged as Pakistan’s largest defence supplier.

Military cooperation between the two has deepened with joint projects producing armaments ranging from fighter jets to guided missile frigates.

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China is a steady source of military hardware to the resource-deficient Pakistani Army. It has not only given technology assistance to Pakistan but has also helped Pakistan to set-up mass weapons production factories.

Pakistan’s military modernisation process remains dependent on Chinese largesse. In the last two decades, the two States have been actively involved in a range of joint ventures including JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft, K-8 Karakorum advance training aircraft, Babur cruise and missile the dimensions of which exactly replicate the Hong Niao Chinese cruise missile.

The JF-17 venture is particularly significant given its utility in delivering nuclear weapons. In a major move for China’s indigenous defence industry, China is also supplying its most advanced home-made combat aircraft, the third-generation J-10 fighter jets to Pakistan, in a deal worth around US$ 6 billion. Beijing is helping Pakistan build and launch satellites for remote sensing and communication even as Pakistan is reportedly already hosting a Chinese space communication facility at Karachi.

Nuclear nexus The Pakistani nuclear weapons programme is essentially an extension

of the Chinese one. China’s crucial role in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure is well documented.

Although China has long denied helping any nation attain a nuclear capability, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, A. Q. Khan himself has acknowledged the crucial role China has played in his nation’s nuclear weaponisation. The China-Pakistan nuclear relationship is perhaps the only case where a nuclear weapon State has actually passed on weapons grade fissile material as well as a bomb design to a non-nuclear weapon State. Sino-Pak collusion on nuclear issues has continued despite China being a signatory to the NPT.

Pakistan as proxy The Sino-Pak nuclear pact underlines a number of issues. It highlights once again the growing assertiveness of China in global politics and its willingness to take on Washington. It also showcases China’s penchant for viewing Pakistan as an important asset in countering India. Sections of the Indian policymakers have been dreaming about a Sino-Indian rapprochement and have not shied away from blaming the Indian government for a downturn in China-India ties. But China will keep relying on Pakistan to counter India’s

growing regional and global profile.

Meanwhile, the global nonproliferation regime is virtually dead.

Sino-Pak nuclear relationship has been the single most important factor in wrecking the foundations of NPT. China’s nuclear programme was the reason why India initiated its own nuclear programme and Sino-Pak nuclear and missile duopoly in the 1990s forced India to go overtly nuclear in 1998.

Arms race

India has been the main factor that has influenced China and Pakistan’s policies vis-à-vis each other. Whereas Pakistan wants to gain access to civilian and military resources from China to balance the Indian might in the subcontinent, China, viewing India as potential challenger in the strategic landscape of Asia, views Pakistan as its central instrument to counter Indian power in the region.

The China-Pakistan partnership serves the interests of both by presenting India with a potential two front theatre in the event of a war with either country. In their own ways each is using the other to balance India as the disputes with Pakistan keep India preoccupied failing to attain its potential as a major regional and global player. China meanwhile guarantees the security of Pakistan when it comes to its conflicts with India thus preventing the latter from using its much superior conventional military strength against Pakistan.

Not surprisingly, one of the central pillars of Pakistan’s strategic policies for the past four decades and more has been its steady and ever-growing military relationship with China. And preventing India’s dominance of South Asia by strengthening Pakistan has been a strategic priority for China.

China appears willing to dismiss its obligations to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) - which it joined in 2004 - by privately claiming that the prospective sale is ‘grandfathered’ under a Sino-Pak contract dating back to the 1980s! If Beijing believes that helping Pakistan, a country that has never shied away from illegally exporting nuclear technology, to serve its strategic agenda is not problematic, then there is little hope that it will ever become a guarantor of a regime that seeks to stabilise the global nuclear order.

With India’s ascent in global hierarchy and American attempts to carve out a strong partnership with India, China’s need for Pakistan is only likely to grow. A rising India makes Pakistan all the more important for Chinese strategy for the subcontinent.

It’s highly unlikely that China will give up playing the Pakistan card vis-à-vis India anytime soon. Indian policy makers would be well advised to disabuse themselves of the notion of a Sino-Indian rapprochement.

China doesn’t exercise sentimentality in foreign policy, India should follow suit.

Not surprisingly, an arms race is underway in West Asia between a Shia Iran intent on acquiring the nuclear

The writer teaches at King’s College London.

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JIHADI ANGLE

Pak nukes: The debate on whether Pakistan’s nuclear weapons will fall into jihadi / extremist hands is oxymoronic. If it is agreed that the Pakistan Armed Forces were the cradle of jihad against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan then how can the current lot of fundamentalist cut-throats be external to the Pakistani military milieu? Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal even at this moment is being used to further the jihadi cause in Afghanistan. If it is allowed to succeed there, the prototype would have been established of recessed nukes serving jihadi ambitions.

how safe?

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ncreasing urban terrorism and uncontrollable radical extremism in the tribal areas in NWFP and FATA in the tribal areas in the north-west have contributed to the unstable political and internal security situation in Pakistan.

The ongoing crisis can be attributed to the resurgence of fundamentalist forces and the army’s inability to fight them effectively. Consequently, the world faces the spectre of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist organisations.

Western commentators have begun to call for contingency plans to physically secure or destroy the nuclear warheads in the event of a meltdown in the country. The seriousness of the threat of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands and the feasibility of successful intervention to secure or destroy these, need to be analysed in detail.

Nuclear 9/11?

The possession of nuclear weapons

by Islamist fundamentalist terrorists will pose a grave danger to international security. The Al Qaeda has declared war on the United States (US) and its allies and Osama bin Laden and Zawahiri are known to have made attempts to buy nuclear warheads. Whether the Al Qaeda leadership will actually detonate nuclear warheads over civilian targets or plan to use them for coercion can only be speculated upon; however, given their predilection for senseless terrorist strikes, they are unlikely to be averse to actually exploding a bomb or two to achieve their nefarious goals.

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Islamabad through a coup with support from radical elements within the Pakistan army. The Pakistani military authorities are extremely concerned about such eventualities and have made elaborate arrangements to ensure that all their nuclear warheads are stored safely. General Musharraf and his lieutenants had reiterated several times that Pakistan’s nuclear warheads are safe and are in no danger of falling into the hands of radical extremists.

They had claimed that carefully formulated personnel reliability policies and electronic safety mechanisms have been developed and incorporated by Pakistan’s Nuclear Command Authority (NCA). Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a recent statement: “As a responsible nuclear weapon State Pakistan has always attached great significance to the security of its strategic assets. These assets are completely safe and secure under multi-layered security and Command and Control structures that are fully indigenous.”

India’s concerns

Separate storage

Among Pakistan’s neighbouring countries, India will be particularly vulnerable if hard-line LeT or JeM terrorists and their Al Qaeda and Taliban brothers ever lay their hands on Pakistan’s nuclear warheads. India is one of the nations that the Al Qaeda has named as an enemy. Being a contiguous land neighbour, it is also easier to target even if sophisticated delivery systems like ballistic missiles are not available.

Pakistan’s nuclear warheads (about 60 to 80 in number) are reported to be stored at six to eight separate locations.

The warheads are stored separately from the launchers so as to guard against accidents and unauthorised use. Kenneth M. Luongo and Naeem Salik have written that the warheads are equipped with electronic locks (Permissive Action Links). A three-tier security system has been instituted for the physical protection of the various components of the warheads. The fissionable atomic core made of highly enriched uranium and the high explosive trigger assembly are handled only by the respective agencies and are in their custody.

Islamist terrorists can gain possession of nuclear warheads by physically breaching the security ring around them, by subverting the personnel on guard duty or if they succeed in overthrowing the regime in power in

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Brig. Gurmeet Kanwal

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JIHADI ANGLE

These are stored in fortified underground storage sites. Entry and exit into these “bunkers” is controlled by armed and well-equipped specially selected and meticulously trained personnel of the Security Directorate of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD).

These personnel form the second tier.

As part of the Personnel Reliability Programme (PRP), these personnel are screened carefully before induction, are kept under constant surveillance and are frequently rotated.

Impenetrable?

The third tier comprises a wellguarded and fortified perimeter fence with strictly controlled entry. Most of these sites have air defence assets allotted to them to defend against attacks from the air. Personnel selected for the security of the outer perimeter are reported to belong to elite infantry

A three-tier security system has been instituted for the physical protection of the various components of the warheads. The fissionable atomic core made of highly enriched uranium and the high explosive trigger assembly are handled only by the respective agencies and are in their custody 48

battalions of the Pakistan army. The possibility of any of these personnel being subverted is guarded against by counter-intelligence teams who keep them under constant surveillance.

Military regimes have very strong survival instincts and the Musharraf regime had ensured that hard-line radical elements are ruthlessly weeded out from the nuclear security detail.

Hence, it can be concluded that if some rogue elements were to try to gain control over the nuclear warheads, they would have to be prepared to fight their way through several layers of highly motivated personnel who are armed to the teeth.

Technical safeguards The delivery systems of Pakistan’s Strategic Forces Command, comprising Chinese supplied M-11 and M-9 and the North Korean Nodong and Taepo Dong nuclear-capable surface-to-surface missiles and their launchers, are also based at well dispersed locations. They are well defended against possible commando raids. In the improbable eventuality that radical hard-liners take over Pakistan in the near future, their rag-tag fighters will have to fight the elite army guards to the bitter end before they can lay their hands on the delivery systems. A terrorist organisation must get hold of both a nuclear warhead and a launch system and must acquire the expertise to mate the warhead with the launcher. Or, it must smuggle a warhead undetected to the target and somehow break the electronic code to activate it. These are all extremely complex challenges as highly sophisticated expertise is required to test, mate, activate and launch a nuclear warhead.

Indian connection?

Soon after General Musharraf’s military coup in October 1999, reports of joint US-Israel plans to seize control of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons had made headlines the world over. Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh of Watergate fame had written in The New Yorker that commandos of Israel’s elite Unit 262 and US Special Forces had been rehearsing plans to prevent Pakistan’s nuclear warheads from falling into the hands of Islamist fundamentalists within and outside the Pak army (“Watching the Warheads,”The New Yorker, November 5, 2001).

September 2010 Defence AND security alert

It had even been speculated that India would willingly provide logistics support for such a venture (Steven Mufson, “U.S. Worries about Pakistan Nuclear Arms”, Washington Post, November 4, 2001). These reports continued to circulate for many years.

Similar stories have again been appearing in the media, particularly the Western press. Contingency plans are reported to exist for the Special Forces to “take out” or “secure” Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, even though it is acknowledged that it is a complex and daunting challenge. Thomas E. Ricks quotes retired Marine Colonel Gary Anderson as having said: “The bottom line is, it’s the nightmare scenario...

It (Pakistan) has loose nukes, hard to find, potentially in the hands of Islamic extremists and there aren’t a lot of good military options.” Planners in the Pentagon sometimes fail to appreciate that even though Pakistan is bleeding from serious blows struck by the Frankenstein monster of radical extremism, it still has a professionally trained combat-ready army that will fight tooth and nail to defend Pakistan’s strategic assets against foreign intervention. Hence, a joint US-Israel commando operation to secure or take out Pakistan’s nuclear warheads in the event of a serious crisis is a far-fetched idea that does not have even a remote chance of succeeding.

Warheads decimation There is a possibility that an Islamist fundamentalist regime might overthrow the civilian government with support from a radicalised faction of the army. In such an eventuality, the US and its allies may justifiably form another ‘coalition of the willing’ to bomb the nuclear warhead storage sites in Pakistan from the air. The coalition forces could employ cruise missiles and fighter-bombers from stand-off ranges to physically destroy the warheads with deep penetration bombs. Several repeat bombing runs would be required after strike damage assessment and even then there will be no guarantee that all the warheads have been destroyed or rendered ineffective. In fact, a non-kinetic option that employs high-energy microwaves to “fry” the electronic circuitry of the nuclear warheads may also be considered, either in conjunction with physical destruction of the warheads

or as a stand alone strike. These options presuppose that accurate information of the locations of all the warhead storage sites would be available in advance for accurate targeting. The intelligence fiasco about the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and other recent revelations do not generate confidence that this might be so.

Pros and cons Some Pakistani commentators have been scathing in their criticism of Western doubts about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear warheads. Adnan Gill has called it mass hysteria and loose talk. However, others like Farah Zahra make out a case for bolstering Pakistan’s nuclear safety.

Indian political leaders and analysts have shown restraint in commenting on Pakistan’s nuclear worries.

Former National Security Advisor, M. K. Narayanan, had rated the probability of Pakistan’s nuclear warheads falling into the hands of extremist elements as remote.

radiation waste from cancer facilities in large hospitals and irradiation centres, such as Cobalt 60, could be used.

Bharat Karnad laments the lack of Indian capability to intervene deep inside Pakistan if it becomes necessary to do so: “The Indian Army has ten Special Forces (SF) battalions, four of them parachute commando, but absolutely no capability to inject commando teams deep into Pakistan via high-altitude air-drop or by helicopters flying extremely fast and low to avoid Pakistani radar.” It is a moot point whether a weak coalition government in India will have the political courage to join a coalition of the willing to secure or destroy Pakistan’s nuclear warheads.

Though such dirty bombs will not cause horrendous casualties initially, they will cause long-term damage from residual nuclear radiation. They will also serve to create a fear psychosis that will add to the paranoia that has already got a deep hold over ordinary people in this age of terrorism. If there is even the slightest suspicion that the terrorist organisation that orchestrated the attack had the backing of a State, an RDD strike could set into motion a chain of events that may eventually lead to an inter-State conflict. It is imperative that commercial nuclear materials are also stored safely and are fully accounted for at all times.

Nuclear terrorism

Rogue scientists

The clear and present danger, however and one that continues to be underestimated, is from nuclear terrorism. Terrorist organisations may assemble radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) – ‘dirty bombs’ in which high explosives (RDX or TNT) are used to blow up and scatter uranium or other radioactive materials over a densely populated area, or to pollute a major water source. Crude RDDs do not require a very high degree of technological sophistication and can be assembled quite easily. Spent nuclear fuel rods that are stolen and commercial

Another area of concern is that one or more Pakistani nuclear scientists with fundamentalist inclinations may have volunteered to work for the Al Qaeda, as has been reported off and on over the last few years. Three Pakistani nuclear scientists were arrested and handed over to US intelligence agencies for questioning in 2001. Two of the three were senior scientists who had set up an NGO called Ummah Tamever-e-Nau (Reconstruction of the Muslim Ummah) in Afghanistan after retirement. This NGO, with its membership comprising mainly nuclear scientists and military

officers, is known to have had close links with the Taliban and the Al Qaeda. It is possible that these scientists may have been actively engaged in assembling rudimentary nuclear weapons for the Afghan terrorists with fissionable material smuggled from the former Soviet States or stolen from Pakistan’s nuclear power plants. Other reports have affirmed that at least one Central Asian nuclear weapons expert works for Osama. Hence, the possibility that a crude, untested, nuclear warhead may have been developed by Osama's Al Qaeda cannot be ruled out.

Contingency plans Finally, contingency plans must be debated, analysed, made, approved, rehearsed and readied for execution to meet unforeseen eventualities.

Maximum cooperation must be extended by the nuclear weapons States (NWS) to Pakistan by way of technology, intelligence and training to help Pakistan to secure its own nuclear warheads. While the world waits with bated breath for the crisis in Pakistan to blow over, the government of Pakistan would do well to ensure that all possible measures are adopted to further enhance the safety and security of the country’s nuclear warheads and delivery means.

The writer is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.

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nuclear world

NEW START

Rajiv Nayan

arms reduction conundrum

Arms reduction is an archane affair. What is actually reduced may never matter because an overkill exists hidden somewhere in the stockpile. It was not for nothing that the Russians bristled at US attempts to plant antiballistic missile (ABM) batteries in Poland and Czech Republic. At the very least it would have facilitated the eastward flow of NATO which appears at this point to have been largely contained. Thus a covert give and take could be facilitated for other geopolitical reasons.

S

trategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) continues to be in the limelight. At present, it is hogging the attention of the western media (strangely, not Indian) because the Senate Foreign Relations Committee pushed back the voting to mid-September. In the United States (US) decision making system, Senate ratification is necessary for any treaty the US signs. Senate is the lower house of the US bicameral federal legislative body Congress. For ratification of a treaty, at least 67 Senators have to vote in favour of the treaty. Also, at least one of the Senate committees scrutinises any agreement or legislation before it is sent for voting to Senate.

The new version of the START is known as the New START. The announcement of its conclusion after several rounds of negotiations was

made on March 26, 2010. The Joint Understanding on the New START limited each side to keep deployed strategic warheads to a number between 1,500 and 1,675 and each side’s strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to between 500 and 1,100. The New START carries a verification regime of the START series of treaties.

On April 8, 2010, the US President Barack Obama and the Russian President Medvedev signed on the treaty. The signing of the New START became necessary because of the lapse of the START-I in December 2009. In fact, in the early 2009 or even before, no one expected that the replacement of START would take so long. The general understanding of the US strategic community was that before the lapse of the START-I, the new treaty would come up. However, it did not happen.

It indicates that all is not well with START.

Just Russia-US The first version of the START was concluded after the end of the Cold War. On July 31, 1991, the US and the Soviet Union signed the START-I. Five months after signing the treaty the Soviet Union dissolved. Russia and three more Independent States Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine were left with strategic nuclear weapons on their soil. The break up delayed the process of ratification of the treaty.

The Lisbon Protocol of the treaty made the four States, which had strategic nuclear weapons on their soil, parties to the START. However, the three Independent States other than Russia either removed or destroyed

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NEW START

the nuclear arsenals from their soil later. Russia is now the sole inheritor of nuclear weapons, including strategic weapons legacy of the Soviet Union.

ICBMs START-I aimed at both reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons. Although the phrase -

Republicans view that a myth is being spread that “New START will reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads from the levels required under the current Moscow Treaty with Russia by 30 per cent.” They say: “This is wrong, because while the Moscow Treaty counted real warheads, New START uses an ‘accountable’ warhead standard that would permit both sides to exceed the Moscow Treaty limits” strategic offensive weapons - was not defined in the treaty, yet it was used for those weapons which did not fall in the category of short or intermediate range of weapons. It means all the weapons which have longer range, generally, more than 5,500 km are considered strategic weapons.

Different countries may have different yardsticks for categorising the range of weapons as there is no definition in international law accepted by the international community as of today. Article II of the START-I provides ‘central numerical limits’ of strategic weapons. The parties, according to the provision of the treaty, should not have more than the prescribed number after seven years of entry into force of the treaty.

Ambience The limit of the START was a total of 1,600 deployed intercontinental

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ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and their associated launchers, deployed submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and their associated launchers and deployed heavy bombers. These limits are also called a limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) or deployed strategic offensive systems, or strategic delivery vehicles. However, the treaty did not have these popular phrases in its text. It also limits 154 deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers for the member country. Because the US did not possess this category, the provision was meant only for the Soviet Union and its successor States.

Another limit was on warheads on the deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers. Its number was not to exceed 6,000. The treaty also had a very intrusive verification regime. Both the countries reduced their nuclear weapons arsenals as per the treaty’s provision. However, a large number of nuclear warheads removed from delivery vehicles continued with both the countries as the treaty had not provided for their destruction.

Numbers game Later, a couple of more nuclear arms control treaties were signed between the two countries. First, START-II was signed in January 1993 using the counting method of START-I. The idea of this treaty was to reduce deployed strategic nuclear warheads of the two countries to 3,000-3,500. The START-II never entered into force. In March 1997, the two countries also decided to negotiate START-III, but after the failure of the second version of the START, the two countries stayed away from negotiations to draft the third version of START which otherwise would have reduced deployed strategic weapons of the two countries to 2,0002,500. The US and Russia also signed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) or the Moscow Treaty in 2002 to reduce deployed strategic nuclear weapons in each country to between 1,700 - 2,000 by 2012. However, it is without verification system and with different counting rules.

New START limits The New START, if implemented, would bring down the number of strategic nuclear arsenals. The attached

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verification regime is also supposed to generate confidence in the two parties of the treaty. However, it is facing resistance in the US policy making community. It has divided the community predominantly on partisan lines. There are a few exceptions like Richard Lugar in the Republican Party.

This stiff opposition would make the task of ratification difficult, if not impossible. It is too early to say that it would meet the fate of START-II or Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

NPT connection It seems the New START was able to see the light of the day because of the 2010 Review Conference (RevCon) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Both the countries appeared under pressure to avoid the 2005 fiasco of the RevCon and to demonstrate to the world that they were serious about nuclear disarmament. Together these two countries possess approximately 95 per cent of the world’s nuclear warheads. The 2005 RevCon failed basically because the NPT-defined nuclear weapon countries refused to abide by the Article VI of the treaty.

from elsewhere to prove the point that Russia is a defaulter.

The State Department is further compounding the problem by stating that there are a number of long standing issues which are still unresolved and at the same time, maintaining that there has never been violation of any broad obligations of the START-I by Russia and other three independent States of the former Soviet Union. Critics are encouraged to build up the case of the violation of the spirit of the treaty.

They point out the development of a multiple-warhead SS-27 missile variant as an example of cheating of the letter,

the treaty has fixed a ceiling of 700 for ballistic missile launchers. Currently, the US has 850 launchers and Russia less than 700. So, in practical terms, critics find that Russia is not conceding anything. Only the US is giving concessions.

Republicans view that a myth is being spread that “New START will reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads from the levels required under the current Moscow Treaty with Russia by 30 per cent.” They say: “This is wrong, because while the Moscow Treaty counted real warheads, New START uses an ‘accountable’

possession of tactical warheads at least 10 times more than the American.

Ratification Critics are insisting on additional hearings and over 700 questions have been put on record by Republicans during the Senate hearings. The Obama Administration tried to project this treaty as a move towards nuclear disarmament that it was not. In fact, ever since his election campaign Obama, after supporting nuclear disarmament, has been declaring that it is an impractical agenda. The entire effort seems to discard old redundant

Worse, the US declared nuclear disarmament is impossible, so it should not be tried by the international community. The US policy making community, including opponents of the New START, kept a tactical silence before the 2010 RevCon. Admittedly, there were some murmurs against the new treaty, but it was not allowed to take the center stage.

Trust deficit After the management of 2010 RevCon, the attention has been shifted to the analysis and evaluation of the START in the US. Opponents argue that Russians cannot be trusted even with the elaborate verification regime. They charge Russia for cheating the previous START agreement. It is alleged that Russia did not allow inspection of some of its strategic warheads covered under the START-I. The critics of the treaty cite the Compliance Report released by the State Department apparently to garner support for the New START Treaty. But the report resulted in providing ammunition to critics of the treaty. They are quoting facts from the report and other facts and figures

if not the spirit of the START-I.

Ambiguities Supporters of the New START have been highlighting the improved counting rules of the treaty. It is maintained that it is an improvement not only over the first version of START but also SORT. However, critics believe that there are several problems with the rules as well. For example, the treaty calculates a strategic bomber as a single weapon notwithstanding the number of weapons it carries. Critics say that it would lead to conundrum over the agreed ceiling and may lead to violation of the spirit and understanding of the treaty. Similarly, it is pointed out that

warhead standard that would permit both sides to exceed the Moscow Treaty limits in terms of real warheads if both sides choose to structure their forces under the treaty in certain ways.”

ABMs Besides, Republicans have many more grievances such as a possibility of Russia using the loophole to keep 2,100 strategic nuclear warheads and the US just 1500, scrapping of the Bush Administration’s Europe-based missile defense system in Poland and Czech Republic to get the Russian support for the New START, the absence of even a more limited system at defending against possible attack and the Russian

weapons and replace with the modern versions. Critics of the treaty are in fact helping him in this regard. In an apparent bid to win over critics, he has announced modernisation of the US nuclear arsenals. Like any arms control treaty, if the New START is ratified, it will just pave the way for modernisation of nuclear weapons in the US and possibly, in Russia.

The writer is a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi since 1993, where he specialises in export control, non-proliferation and arms control. He was a Visiting Research Fellow at Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, where he published his monograph - NonProliferation Issues in South Asia.

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nuclear world

DISASTER

I

n 1986 after the accident in the nuclear power plant in Chernobyl, the Soviet Union understood that it was a defining moment for radical change: That they need and must accept, help from the Western World. It was also a lesson for Europe - the only way is co-operation and responsibility.

This disaster was like a cold shower for everybody - “memento” that nuclear

the country’s nuclear industry was “accident-free.” Moreover, it was assumed that, unlike in the West, an accident could not happen. On April 26, 1986 the whole world saw the truth.

The Chernobyl Power Complex,

Dominika Cosic

power is not only a great idea of the human mind but also an unknown danger.

lying about 130 km north of Kiev, Ukraine, and about 20 km south of the border with Belarus, consisted of four nuclear reactors of the RBMK-1,000 design, units 1 and 2 being constructed between 1970 and 1977, while units 3 and 4 of the same design were completed in 1983. It was the oldest of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants and the only one of the graphite-moderated reactors. A chemical explosion at the station’s fourth reactor and an uncontrolled graphite fire that followed led to the release of more than 450 radionuclides, comprising about 3.5 per cent of the fuel stored in the reactor core. Official reports put the immediate death toll at 31, but it is widely believed that many more died in the first hours and weeks after the explosion. The Ukrainian government has estimated the number of deaths among clean-up workers alone as 7,000-8,000. Total civilian casualties are not known and may never be known. Nobody knows how many people died many years after this disaster because of the postnuclear illness. Most of the released material was deposited closeby as dust and debris, but the lighter material was carried by wind over the Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, also Poland and to some extent over Scandinavia and Europe.

where radiation-related fatalities occured. Soviet Union denounced people “of base motives” who were propagating rumours of thousands of deaths, instilling panic among the population. When it became clear that an accident of major proportions had indeed occurred at Chernobyl, the Soviet propaganda campaign switched tactics and underscored the country’s alleged support for global nuclear disarmament and international controls on the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

Soviet politicians understood that they needed cooperation with Europe and United States. But not immediately.

Similarly, aid offered from longestablished “friends of the USSR” abroad was also accepted, while that of individual governments was turned down.

The story During the Cold War the Soviet Union was a global power in nuclear technology. For the Soviets nuclear energy and power was not only a source of energy, useful in life, not only a potential weapon but also a symbol of domination and power. In the Soviet mentality everything must be the best and without any faults.

Moscow had an obsession for greatness.

Ex-Russian dissident, writer and essayist, Vladimir Bukovski has explained in one of his books that United States and their president Ronald Reagan understood very well the Soviet way of thinking. And Reagan was able to use it against Kremlin. According to American documents, during Reagan presidency United States deceived the Soviet Union. America has only simulated progresses in arms race. On the contrary, Kremlin was wasting money for competition which was only provoked by the White House. This idea looks like a childish game, but it is a historical fact. What was the result of the American trickery? Huge financial problems of Soviet Union were one of the most important reasons of the collapse of Soviet Union. But at the same time communist regime was cutting costs in other areas of public life. According to Soviet propaganda,

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NEW AMITY

The disaster

The lesson The Chernobyl disaster was a unique event and the only accident in the history of commercial nuclear power

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This tragedy happened in a moment of biggest weakness of the Soviet Union. So it was a time when politicians in Moscow understood that it is impossible to continue imperialistic policy and that communism and domination of Soviet Union is going to end. The other side understood it as well. After collapse of Soviet Union, United States gave money for denuclearisation in Belarus and Ukraine. But it was also lesson for Europe – after time of competition, in this special one area it was finally a time for cooperation.

The writer is correspondent (Europe) of Indian magazine Defence And Security Alert (DSA).

Dr. Sanjeev Bhadauria

Indo-US nuclear deal: harnessing Indian potential As the breadth of this Special Issue of Defence And Security Alert will illustrate there are widely divergent and fervently-held views about who won and who lost and the ultimate effect on India’s standing as an independent, self-respecting nation-State. That this epochal event has taken place itself indicates that there is nothing forever permanent in international relations. Perceptions change, nations change.

T

he Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement has been discussed and undergone scrutiny by analysts in the academic field as well as by the media extensively. But, it would be worthwhile to decipher the compulsions of the United States for accommodating India to the extent which sounded unreal in the first place.

The exuberance which the leader of the first world showed was not without sound reasoning and materialistic along with strategic gains that were inherent in the agreement.

Balanced equation After almost two and a half years

of negotiations, the US and Indian governments struck the deal that recognised India as a de facto nuclear weapons power. Critics say Washington gave up too much too soon and at a great cost to non-proliferation efforts.

Perhaps, India could in time become a valuable security partner. So despite the deal’s flaws and the uncertainties surrounding its implementation, Washington decided to move forward with it.

Washington gave something away on the nuclear front in order to gain much more on other fronts; it hoped to win the support and cooperation of India - a strategically located

democratic country of growing economic importance - to help the United States confront the challenges that a threatening Iran, a turbulent Pakistan and an unpredictable China may pose in the future. Washington’s decision to trade a nuclear-recognition for a strategic partnership status was a reasonable move.

American perception India’s importance was underlined when the Bush Administration vowed to “help India become a major world power in the 21st century” and US-India relations are conducted under the rubric of three major “dialogue”

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areas: strategic (including global issues and defence), economic (including trade, finance, commerce and environment) and energy. President Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States while setting the background stated that “US interests require a strong relationship with India.” The 2006 version which was more flattering claimed that, “India now

The Indian Planning Commission in its Integrated Energy Policy has set electricity generation capacity through nuclear means from a mere 3,000 mw at present to 63,000 mw in the next 25 years, which alone would require new plant investment of more than US$ 100 billion.

Sensing a lucrative market in India, the US nuclear lobby was widely believed to have acted behind the scenes for the smooth passage of the nuclear co-operation bill is poised to shoulder global obligations in cooperation with the United States in a way befitting a major power.”

Indian diaspora Recognition of India’s increasing stature and importance - and of the growing political influence was the fact that some 2.3 million Indian-Americans were living in the US where the IndianAmerican Caucus was then the largest amongst all country-specific caucuses.

The potential benefits and costs as enumerated by the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice appeared before key Senate and House committees in April 2006 to press the Bush Administration’s case for civil nuclear cooperation with India and offered five main justifications

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for making changes in US law to allow for such cooperation, contending that doing so would: -benefit US security by bringing India into the non-proliferation mainstream; -benefit US consumers by reducing pressures on global energy market, especially carbon-based fuels; -benefit the environment by reducing carbon emissions /greenhouse gases; -benefit US business interests through sales to India of nuclear reactors, fuel and support services and -benefit progress of the broader US-India “global partnership.”

Fair play Teresita Schaffer, Director of the South Asia Programme with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, opined that the agreement should be supported for two reasons: First, removing India from the list of “nuclear outlaws” is an essential step in securing India’s energetic participation in preventing the spread of nuclear-weapons technology. Second, the US could not have developed a real partnership with India - one that could stabilise Asia and strengthen the region’s democratic orientation without breaking the nuclear taboo.

Similarly, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nick Burns underlining the importance of the agreement said the United States sees India’s civil nuclear programme as a special case and doesn’t envision entering into an agreement with any other States.

He said, “I can assure you that the United States is not going to suggest a similar deal with any other country in the world. We have always felt of India as an exception,” Burns said. “We’ve made the argument that India has not proliferated its nuclear technology.

That India, in effect, outside the system, has played by the rules and the system would be strengthened by bringing it in.”

Hence, we see that the US had strong and pressing reasons to conclude the deal.

Global player India was one of the fastest growing

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economies of the world with a robust growth rate of 8-9 per cent per annum.

India too enjoys good clout amongst the third world nations and various regional organisations like SAARC, ASEAN, Commonwealth nations etc. India too is the second highest contributor of troops for the peacekeeping missions around the world and perceptibly possesses potential to contribute in conflict situations. Islamic terrorism had victimised both countries and drawn them closer. The US intended to benefit from the Indian experience on combating terrorism and wished that India plays a greater role in its Global War on Terror. These realisations had prompted the US to harness Indian potential at global level and it desired India to play a greater role.

The new relationship with India contained important advantages for international non-proliferation efforts - a goal very dear to the US. Looked at it broadly, the US would have an additional ally in the international effort to restrict the flow of nuclear technology. One manifestation of India’s approach was founded on its adherence to the NSG and MTCR guidelines. As India would further develop its technology, ensuring that it takes part in international agreements to limit the spread of this technology will enhance international security.

IAEA safeguards The agreement with India contained a second valuable element, in that it recognised the value of safeguards and the role of the IAEA in ensuring against diversion of sensitive technology.

India has accepted this norm by agreeing to separate its civilian and military facilities, agreeing to place safeguards on its civilian reactors and accepting IAEA monitoring of the civilian facilities. A long-sought item on the international non-proliferation agenda has been to end fissile material production worldwide and to sign an FMCT. India’s commitment to work with the US towards this longstanding objective represents another key advantage in the new partnership.

Taken as a whole, these measures demonstrate India’s endorsement of key non-proliferation objectives. The price to the US for these changes and the inclusion of India as a member of the non-proliferation community (though not of the NPT) appeared to be

high. The US Congress had to change or amend certain laws, which was no small accommodation.

Geopolitical motives Following India’s nuclear tests in 1998, the US had two options: Firstly, continuing to believe the Indian nuclear engine could be put back, or secondly, harnessing India’s evident strategic weight for its own geopolitical aims before that power grew too immense or was harnessed by others like Europe or China. The US chose the latter option of cementing a serious strategic relationship with India and bringing India’s power and political strength more fully into the world’s non-proliferation efforts. In the realm of geopolitics, much of the Administration’s argument for moving forward with the US-India nuclear initiative appears rooted in an anticipation / expectation that New Delhi will in coming years and decades make policy choices that would be more congruent with US regional and global interests (a desire for such congruence is, in fact, written into (P.L. 109-401). Proponents suggested that this US “gesture” will have significant and lasting psychological and symbolic effects in addition to the strictly material ones and thought that Indian leaders require such a gesture in order to feel confident about United States as a reliable partner on the world stage.

In the chequered relations between two democracies, retrospection would reveal that the relationship quickly flourished as a result of 9/11 incident and the BJP overture to use the US clout to stop Pakistan from supporting militancy in Kashmir. By late 2002, we heard both Indian and American officials talk of “strategic partnership” and a recent Pentagon report describes India as a “key strategic partner.”

Security relationship US wish was to engage India in its global schemes. India was already a military partner of the US by the time the deal was in fruition. The June 2005 “New Framework for the US-India Defense Relationship” listed “defeating terrorism and violent religious extremism” as one of four key shared security interests and it called for a bolstering of mutual defence

capabilities required for such a goal. An April 2006 session of the US-India Joint Working Group on Counterterrorism - the seventh such meeting since the group’s founding in January 2000 ended with a statement of determination from both countries to further advance bilateral cooperation and information sharing on such areas of common concern as bioterrorism, aviation security, advances in biometrics, cybersecurity and terrorism, WMD terrorism and terrorist financing. Expanding military-to-military links have included company level joint counterinsurgency training of army units.

The Security relationship could be gauged from the fact that since 2001, India had by then carried out 35 joint military exercises at sea, land and air, both in the US and in India. Indian Navy ships were already providing escort and security facilities to the American military ships passing through the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean on their way to and from the Pacific through the Straits of Malacca in Southeast Asia.

Strategic stability The rise of China and India was transforming Asia. Even with a policy of friendly engagement with China, the United States needed to build strong relations with other Asian powers, especially India whose relations with China blend cooperation and rivalry.

Thus, those in India who marvel at how Mr. Bush could blithely walk away from 40 years of non-proliferation policy do not understand the tectonic shift that was taking place in the bilateral relationship as a result of increasing fears in US business and strategic circles about China. Giving India anything less, or insisting that it cap or scrap its nuclear weapons, was seen

by Washington’s neo-conservatives as tantamount to strengthening China in the emerging power balance in Asia. “By integrating India into the non-proliferation order at the cost of capping the size of its eventual nuclear deterrent” Ashley Telis argued, “the US would threaten to place New Delhi at a severe disadvantage vis-à-vis Beijing, a situation that could not only undermine Indian security but also US interests in Asia in the face of the prospective rise of Chinese power over the long term.”

Economic imperatives With the end of the Cold War and accelerated Indian economic growth, the United States found India as one of the most important relationships, since India’s foreign policy was driven largely by global security and long-term trade, investment and energy needs.

The remarks of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, R. Nicholas Burns on the US and India Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 2, 2005 bore ample testimony to this fact when he said “India is a rising global power with a rapidly growing economy.

Within the first quarter of this century, it is likely to be included among the world’s five largest economies. It will soon be the world’s most populous nation and it has a demographic distribution that bequeaths it a huge, skilled and youthful workforce.”

The economic imperatives could further be broken up as under: ■■ Trade and investment as a strategic factor: As India’s largest trade and investment partner, the United States strongly supported New Delhi’s continuing economic reform policies; a US-India Trade Policy Forum was created in November 2005 to expand bilateral economic engagement and provide a venue for discussing multilateral trade issues. The United States accounted for about one-sixth of all Indian imports. India was the 21st largest export market for US goods in 2006 (up from 22nd the previous year). Levels of US-India trade, while relatively low, are blossoming; the total value of bilateral trade has doubled since 2001 and the two governments intend to see it doubled again by 2009. US exports to India in 2006 had a value of US$ 10.1 billion (up 27 per cent over 2005), with aircraft; business and telecommunications equipment; pearls, gemstones and jewelry; fertiliser and chemicals as leading categories.

Imports from India in 2006 totalled US$ 21.8 billion (up 16 per cent over 2005). Leading imports included cotton apparel; textiles and pearls, gemstones and jewelry. According to Indian officials, about one-seventh of foreign direct investment in India since 1991 had come from US firms; over the years, the major US-based companies Microsoft, Dell, Oracle and IBM announced plans for multibilliondollar investments in India. They had

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plans to strengthen this trend.

■■ Vast potential in bilateral trade and commerce: Despite significant improvement in economic ties, the actual potential for bilateral trade and commerce between India and the US was not fully harnessed as many highly lucrative sectors like space, defence, pharmaceuticals, energy and biotechnology remain untapped because of the absence of a favourable political index, which has prevented greater movement of capital. The US was the largest economy in the world with a GDP of US$ 12.5 trillion; India’s GDP was only US$ 1 trillion. While the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected a slow economic growth rate of 2.9 per cent for the US economy during 2007, it had predicted a robust growth rate of 7.3 per cent for India making it one of the fastest growing economies of the world. However, according to the then Central Statistical Organisation (CSO) estimate, the Indian economy grew by 9.1 per cent in the first half of this fiscal year (April-September, 2006) and was all set to close out the year at 9 per cent, the highest since 1996-97.

It was also believed that the Indian economy had the potential to grow by at least 7-8 per cent in the next decade.

This tremendous Indian growth story was coupled with burgeoning foreign exchange reserves and increased amounts of foreign investment flows to India, the latter being determined by the lucrative returns generated in the host country.

■■ India and China twin engines of world economy: Realising India’s economic potential and the shared benefits of economic co-operation, both India and the US had an incentive to move economically closer, putting in place various mechanisms that work at government-to-government and business-to-business (B2B) levels.

However, it is the B2B interaction that has played the greater role in the successful conclusion of the Indo-US nuclear deal. Earlier, greater economic interplay was handicapped by the question of India’s nuclear status.

Despite the denial regime led by the US, India achieved significant growth rates and now it was widely regarded as an engine of world economy along with China. Given that the US economy was not moving in the direction that its policy makers wished it to do, economies like those of India and China

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NEW AMITY provided investors greener pastures for investments.

■■ Stagnating nuclear industry of the US: The nuclear industry in the US had been going through a stagnant phase in recent years as was evident from the fact that no new commercial nuclear reactor had come on line there. Having one of the largest nuclear industries in the world, such stagnancy did not bode well in the business-oriented minds of US policy makers and certainly not for the nuclear industry there. With the Henry Hyde Act permitting trade and commerce in nuclear technology and fuel with India, the US nuclear industry stood to gain substantially from the nascent but emerging Indian nuclear market, which was so far constrained by technological and fuel gaps. Moreover, the Indian Planning Commission in its Integrated Energy Policy has set electricity generation capacity through nuclear means from a mere 3,000 mw at present to 63,000 mw in the next 25 years, which alone would require new plant investment of more than US$ 100 billion. Sensing a lucrative market in India, the US nuclear lobby was widely believed to have acted behind the scenes for the smooth passage of the nuclear co-operation bill.

■■ Structural and financial reforms in US arms industry: Since the end of the Cold War, the US arms industry had been undergoing structural and financial reforms due to increased rationalisation of defence budget and dwindling global arms demand. The external arms market which accounted for a bulk of the US defence industry’s commercial operations a decade ago has now come down significantly, placing added pressure on the need to find new markets to remain competitive.

Here, India’s growing shopping list of defence equipment fitted well in the strategies of US defence industries, which saw it as a long-term partner with credible purchasing power. It, therefore, made economic sense for companies like Boeing to make extra efforts in lobbying the US Congress for the smooth passage of the nuclear bill.

■■ Threatening islamic fundamentalism: Threat from the fundamentalists in Islamic countries to the US was not ephemeral and may have compelled the US to see a role for India to support the US in future to fight this menace on more than one front. India too was

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the victim and considered by the US as the natural ally with vast experience in combating terrorism.

■■ Weaning India away from Soviet camp: The US was of the opinion that time was ripe to wean away India from the Soviet camp. After the 1991 disintegration of erstwhile USSR, its power projection capacity had weakened, NAM was at low ebb and new organisations like SCO had not taken India into its effective fold to form Russia-China-India axis which would be inimical to the US interests in Asia in particular and in the world in general. This deal thus may result in realignment of powers in the world arena.

■■ Efforts to bring India into nonproliferation fold indirectly: Teresita Schaffer, Director of the South Asia programme at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, while participating in a debate on “The administration’s approach to nuclear cooperation with India” in May 2006 stated that Congress Should Focus on Bringing India into Non-proliferation Fold. It suggested that the US administration wanted to give priority to preventing new entrants from joining the nuclear club over dealing with the three principal “outliers” outside the NPT i.e. Israel, India and Pakistan. It was also stated that in some ways, the non-proliferation system has already lost its virginity as a result. It would be useful to hear how India plans to participate in international efforts to close down the grey market in nuclear goods and technology. The deal would enable international community to enlist India in more vigorous international efforts to prevent deeply irresponsible countries from joining the nuclear weapons club.

Clearly, this was a transformation from The Cold War mindset, when India was the ultimate non-aligned nation and the United States the ultimate aligned nation is long past. It was time to shift the US-India relationship to a new, strategic partnership for the decades ahead and the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement was a great opportunity not to be missed.

The writer is Associate Professor, Dept. of Defence and Strategic Studies, Allahabad Central University, Allahabad.

Dr. Manpreet Sethi

India’s two-track approach An ardent protagonist of universal nuclear disarmament from the moment of its emergence as an independent nation, India has been forced to nuclearise its arsenal because of neighbourhood developments. But it has used No First Use and Mutual Assured Destruction to keep even the Pakistan / China use of terrorists as proxies to manageable limits. By example it can make No First Use a stepping stone to the eventual goal of universal disarmament and delegitimisation of nuclear weapons.

­­­I

t is ironical that while the prospect of a nuclear weapons free world (NWFW) generated much interest in the international fora and the global strategic community over the last few years, it did not evoke excitement in India, a country that has long been a champion of nuclear disarmament.

Why was this so? Why did India prefer to maintain silence amid the growing cacophony of speeches by influential leaders, governmental and nongovernmental reports and conferences in the US and elsewhere?

country’s sense of déjà vu with such cycles of interest and neglect of nuclear disarmament in the past. India has a long history of offering several initiatives for disarmament, including a comprehensive plan on a nuclear free and non-violent world order in 1988 by the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi at the Third UN Special Session on Disarmament. But mostly, India’s ideas proved to be ahead of time and the States possessing nuclear weapons have shown no desire to renounce their arsenals.

Credible deterrence

Meanwhile, blatant proliferation in its own neighbourhood led India to demonstrate its nuclear deterrent in 1998. Subsequently, the nation’s foreign

At one level, the Indian response is not really surprising given the

policy has been more inclined towards realism and greater investment in enhancing the credibility of nuclear deterrence rather than pursuing ‘unfeasible and idealistic’ ideas of nuclear disarmament. There is also a sense of cynicism that the recent interest in global zero is more a tactical move of the nuclear weapon States (NWS) to retain the commitment of NNWS to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) rather than a genuine desire for a world free of nuclear weapons.

However, irrespective of the state of global interest or disinterest in universal nuclear disarmament, this article argues that India must continue to pursue its vision of a non-nuclear world since

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an NWFW is good for India’s national security. It is an unfortunate reality that as long as nuclear weapons pose a threat to India’s security, it will have to maintain its own nuclear weapons to safeguard against nuclear coercion.

This, however, need not stop India

The universal adoption of no first use (NFU) would be a crucial step towards the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. If the adversary is under constant threat that a nuclear strike is imminent, its own temptation to use nuclear weapons would be higher. But an NFU posture would remove this temptation for self and the adversary. If all nuclear weapons States accept NFU, then none would be tempted to initiate a nuclear strike because of fear of the other’s use first from aspiring for an ideal that holds the promise of better security. Even if the goal appears unfeasible at the moment, its desirability certainly makes it worth pursuing. Therefore, there is no inherent contradiction in India’s nuclear policy as it pursues credible minimum deterrence for today and genuine nuclear disarmament for tomorrow.

Moral high ground India has long campaigned for the universal elimination of nuclear weapons on the grounds of morality and humanitarianism. While this logic shall hold eternally, in the present world of realpolitik, there is an equally sound case for universal nuclear disarmament on the grounds of national security. In fact, the presence of nuclear weapons complicates India’s security

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calculations and this can be proven for both Pakistan and China.

Islamabad makes good use of its nuclear weapons to deter not just India’s nuclear weapons, but to checkmate the possibility of India using its conventional military superiority in response to its proxy war. Pakistan believes its nuclear capability has tied India’s hands and curtailed its ability to use its conventionally superior force. Islamabad is convinced that its perpetration of cross-border terrorism could continue unchecked since India’s retaliatory options are limited

by Pakistan’s projection of a risk that any Indian retaliation would quickly and automatically spiral into a nuclear confrontation.

Hair-trigger Besides the risk of escalation to a nuclear level, the presence of nuclear weapons also carries the threat of a nuclear war brought on by an unintended accident or miscalculation.

In fact, modern day communication and sophisticated delivery systems have short lead times between the political decision to use nuclear weapons and the ability to bring it down on the predesignated target. This carries the inherent risk of a nuclear weapon being inadvertently launched during a crisis or in the heat of the moment. Also, there is the danger of unauthorised nuclear launch or the possibility of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons slipping out of the control of the legitimate authority as a result of prolonged political instability and degradation of institutionalised structures. Elimination of nuclear weapons would obviate such dangers.

Chinese coercion As regards China, if India can maintain a consistent approach of military modernisation, a non-nuclear China could not enjoy any substantial advantage in terms of its conventional strength. Certainly, no nuclear coercion or blackmail would be possible by China. Meanwhile, in conventional war-fighting too, the scales would be in India’s favour for several reasons.

For instance, it is quite likely that a future war between the two would be a limited one in terms of scope, space and time. It would also likely be in the north-east and further up in the disputed Himalayan reaches where

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the terrain would provide an inherent advantage to India since its lines of communication in the area are shorter and more secure.

It is in support of this viewpoint that this article offers a few steps towards an NWFW. The first of these would be the extension of comprehensive

foreign policy (Russia and China). This tendency to expand the role of nuclear weapons motivates proliferation by raising threat perceptions of others.

Even though China has invested in building infrastructure on its side of the border to mitigate some of its vulnerabilities, India too can plug its gaps through a well thought out and sustained effort, including by raising more mountain divisions. So, in the absence of a nuclear China, India could deter and even handle a conventional onslaught.

Therefore, a nuclear free India can more than match its nuclear free neighbours. Such a situation would also obviate the risk of nuclear war brought on by an accidental, unauthorised or miscalculated use of nuclear weapons.

This can be explained through an analogy. When driving in chaotic conditions one has to be responsible for not only one’s own driving (which is easy) but also remain constantly alert to driving mistakes that others could make (which is infinitely more difficult) and which could endanger one’s own security and existence.

By the same logic, if nuclear weapons are available with others in the region, India must not only develop an effective command and control system for its own weapons, but also hope that others too have foolproof measures in place.

But, if there are no nuclear weapons with anyone, it would not only obviate the threat of their deliberate use, but also eliminate any possibility of their inadvertent use through an accident or a miscalculation. This is even more crucial given that India, Pakistan and China lie in close vicinity to one another and radioactive fallout from a nuclear explosion cannot be limited in space.

Therefore, it seems logical that an NWFW would ensure a safer regional security environment for India.

Supernumerary The desirability of nuclear disarmament, however, does not make it any easier to achieve. While the NWS look at a steady reduction in arsenals to eventually rid the world of nuclear weapons, India believes that by reducing the value or attraction of nuclear weapons for the NNWS and by reducing their relevance for NWS, these weapons could be made redundant.

the attraction of nuclear weapons, a universal acceptance of NFU by nuclear weapon possessors would remove the possibility of a nuclear exchange between NWS too. Overall, an NFU has the potential to lessen inter-State tensions, increase mutual confidence and thus reinforce a cycle of positives.

It would enhance the inclination towards non-proliferation by sending a strong signal of the diminishing utility of nuclear weapons. It would lessen the drive of each NWS for new and modernised nuclear arsenals.

Meanwhile, the NFU would also allow the NWS to retain the notional sense of security that they derive from their national nuclear arsenals. They would have the theoretical freedom to possess the weapons but would pledge not to use them first. Gradually, the desire to possess, or improve an unusable weapon would lessen, making it easier to give up the weapon. Therefore, this step would work towards enhancing the gradual irrelevance of the nuclear weapon, especially when reinforced by a ban on use or threat of use of the weapon, quite as the 1925 Geneva Convention did for chemical weapons.

Delegitimisation security assurances to all NNWS that they would not be subject to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as the promise that others would come to their aid in case they were threatened with nuclear use. Such a pledge would reduce the attractiveness of the weapons for the non-possessors.

These assurances would also be far more credible for the NNWS than a mere reduction in arsenals of the NWS, which though useful, are of little relevance since even a few hundred warheads are as threatening as several thousands.

No first use The second step would call for NWS to revisit and redefine their nuclear doctrines to reduce the utility that they attach to nuclear weapons. For instance, as per current doctrines, several countries see them as weapons to offset their conventional inferiority (Russia and Pakistan), to deter chemical and biological weapons (USA, Russia, France and India), to guard against regime change (North Korea) and to deter interference in the conduct of their

However, if the nuclear doctrines of all NWS could confine the role of nuclear weapons to the basic purpose of nuclear deterrence alone then, over time, the attraction of the weapon would reduce, enabling their renunciation.

Thirdly, the universal adoption of no first use (NFU) would be a crucial step towards the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. This would be even more relevant as nuclear weapons reduce. With smaller nuclear forces, the temptation to launch a disarming first strike would be high because of the ‘use or lose’ compulsions. If the adversary is under constant threat that a nuclear strike is imminent, its own temptation to use nuclear weapons would be higher. But an NFU posture would remove this temptation for self and the adversary. If all NWS accept NFU, then none would be tempted to initiate a nuclear strike because of fear of the other’s use first.

Notional security?

While security assurances to the NNWS would significantly reduce

Therefore, a progressive devaluation of nuclear weapons and their eventual delegitmisation can be credible and meaningful milestones on the path to nuclear disarmament. New Delhi must continue to press for moves in this direction so that its security could best be assured in an NWFW. The prospects may appear dim at the moment, but the desire must not be allowed to wane. The destination makes the journey worth taking.

The writer heads the project on Nuclear Security at the Centre for Air Power Studies. She is author of the books Nuclear Strategy: India’s March towards Credible Deterrence (2009) and Argentina’s Nuclear Policy (1999); co-author of Nuclear Deterrence and Diplomacy (2004) and editor of Towards a Nuclear Weapons Free World (2009), Global Nuclear Challenges (2009). Her research papers on nuclear energy, nuclear strategy, proliferation, disarmament, ballistic missile defence and related issues have been published in national and international academic journals and books. She regularly lectures at training establishments of Indian Armed Forces and has participated in Track II meetings.

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Dr. Arvind Kumar

T

he recently concluded eighth nuclear non-proliferation treaty review conference left many questions unanswered like previous review conferences. As always, there was a lack of consensus among the States party to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In its “conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions”, the comprehensive text contained a 22-point Action Plan on Nuclear Disarmament. It has also outlined concrete steps in a number of areas including principles and objectives, disarmament of nuclear weapons, security assurances, nuclear testing, fissile materials and other measures in support of nuclear disarmament. In the current milieu, the efficacy and relevance of almost all the existing and probable non-proliferation regimes require an introspection and careful assessment.

India in spotlight There is a consensus worldwide that

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the nuclear non-proliferation regime (nuclear non-proliferation treaty, hereafter referred as NPT) in the current international security environment is in a serious crisis. Many members of the non-proliferation regime seriously feel that India has been rewarded in terms of providing civil nuclear cooperation and treated as a special case by the United States in particular despite the fact that India vehemently opposed the regime from day one by citing it as discriminatory and acquired nuclear weapons. One of the major elements of NPT mentioned in Article VI dealing with the cessation of nuclear weapons and achieving nuclear disarmament has not been taken seriously by the acknowledged nuclear weapon countries.

Discriminatory It should be reiterated here that it was India, which pioneered the concepts relating to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation way back during

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mid-1950s and actively participated in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) meeting in 1965 where the blueprint of the NPT text was prepared. Somehow, whatever India had envisaged to be the part of the NPT was left out. One of the clauses of the NPT clearly highlighted the selfish interests of the then nuclear weapon States (US, former Soviet Union, France, UK and China). This clause put a ceiling on the number of nuclear weapon States and it said that those countries which have gone nuclear prior to 1 January 1967 can only be called de jure or acknowledged nuclear weapon States. It made the whole treaty highly discriminatory and that is why India so far has not joined NPT.

India’s record However, one must not forget that India despite not being a signatory to the NPT has followed all the provisions of NPT. India’s credentials in terms of non-proliferation are so high that even

The framework of India’s nuclear policy has, from the moment of its inception, been universal and complete disarmament. It has seen non-proliferation being reduced to a farce in its own neighbourhood and it has had to reserve options in the supreme national interest. After the signingof the Indo-US deal will non-proliferation of the NPT kind become the be-all and end-all? What of disarmament? a country like the US has acknowledged India as a responsible nation with advanced nuclear technology. It was the selling point for the US to conduct nuclear trade and commerce and also allow others in the nuclear suppliers’ group to follow suit. India has never proliferated nuclear technology to any other country.

India has always been a part of the solution rather than a part of the problem. India’s role in enhancing the profile and strengthening the overall structure of NPT has certainly increased in the current context. The responsibility has grown in the context of the Indo-US civil nuclear cooperation.

NPT The basic purpose of the treaty was to

contain the development of additional nuclear weapon States. The current strategic landscape is not exactly the same as it used to be during the decade of sixties when this treaty was negotiated. The academic community has been debating whether the NPT is sufficiently responsive to the evolving strategic environment. It would be correct to emphasise here that the NPT regime in the last little less than four decades has seen both ups and downs in the international system. It always occupied crucial importance for the simple reason that so far it had been able to keep the larger structure and members (around 187 nations) by and large intact. With the possible exception of North Korea and few Middle East countries, the purpose and objectives of NPT have been met. Otherwise, the world would have seen many more

nuclear weapon States.

The three main tenets under which the NPT was structured and envisaged were a) States without nuclear weapons pledged not to acquire them; b) The nuclear weapon States committed in the NPT that they would get rid of nuclear weapons eventually; and c) The treaty allowed for the peaceful use of nuclear technology by nonnuclear weapon States under strict and verifiable control. Many States among the signatories to the NPT certainly do not want to break the pledge and acquire nuclear weapons. It is ironical that countries can acquire technologies for peaceful uses and such technologies bring them to the threshold of nuclear weapon capability without violating the provisions of the treaty and can then come out of the treaty by giving

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six months notice under the supreme national interest clause and go nuclear.

Hence, one can say that in the last 40 years of NPT (NPT came into force in 1970), nothing of that sort has happened in the larger scale.

There is certainly a greater amount of disgruntlement among the signatories to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty with regard to the nuclear weapon States’ adherence to the Article VI of the treaty which talks about nuclear disarmament. There is a lack of seriousness and genuine commitment on the part of the acknowledged nuclear weapon States with regard to getting rid of nuclear weapons from their arsenals and making the world a safer place to live in. The commitment made in the Article VI by the nuclear weapon States is only a mere lip service. This issue has always featured in the previous NPT review conferences which take place once in five years.

Status symbols Unfortunately, the role and salience of nuclear weapons in the current international security environment have been enhanced instead of getting decimated. The US intelligence recently has predicted that nuclear weapons use is more likely in future. The use of nuclear weapons will grow increasingly by 2025. Undoubtedly, the NPT over the years led several States to abandon their nuclear weapons ambitions including Argentina, Brazil, Sweden, South Africa and other CIS States. The major challenge in the context of the US intelligence report would be to devise some sound process by which the role of nuclear weapons in the international system would become less important than whatever has been visualised now.

Despite the fact that intrusive international inspections and safeguards against diversion of nuclear material for nuclear weapons exist in the form of additional protocol of IAEA, the recent cases of North Korea and Iran have both demonstrated the need to revisit the existing mechanism and see how best one can improve further. It would be a real challenge for the NPT.

Pakistani danger The current danger has been posed by the possession of nuclear weapons

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by Pakistan. The global community knows it well that Pakistan has led to the intensification of nuclear black market networks commonly called “nuclear Walmart”, based out of Pakistan’s government run nuclear weapons laboratories, which has covertly aided the nuclear programmes of Libya, Iran, North Korea and perhaps many others which might be known to the international community in due course of time.

It must be reiterated here that the NPT has been weakened to a greater extent by the US itself by not adhering to the provisions made in the Article VI. It should be noted here that the greatest threat currently comes from the existing global stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. There are approximately 1855 metric tonnes of plutonium and 1900 metric tonnes of highly enriched uranium worldwide in civilian and military stockpiles. These materials are highly vulnerable from the terrorists’ point of view. The fear always exists that some of these materials might fall in the wrong hands. The cooperative threat reduction programme between the US and Russia has been looking into the complexities involved with the management and control of the fissile materials.

Indian input The challenge before India would be to work with the US in strengthening the existing non-proliferation regimes.

India through its WMD Act passed in June 2005 would put more effective controls on technologies that can be used to produce materials for nuclear weapons. India has also made promises in the Indo-US Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 and subsequent agreement on the nuclear deal that it would participate in the negotiation process on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Unfortunately, there is a lack of consensus on the nature and scope of the FMCT among the members participating during the debates at the Conference on Disarmament (CD), Geneva. India is fully committed to sign a prospective FMCT. On testing of a nuclear device in the future, India would be mostly guided by the changing international security environment. India has put unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing since 1998.

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Dilution of disarmament?

The onus for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) lies on the US. It was not ratified by the American Senate during September 1999. The US President Barack Obama from time to time keeps opening the closed chapters.

The major contradiction between India and the US has been that India always argued for nuclear disarmament and the US always talked about nonproliferation. India in the context of the Indo-US nuclear deal would now converge on the non-proliferation mechanism rather than nuclear disarmament.

All States at the Eighth NPT Review Conference have also agreed that the Conference on Disarmament (CD) at Geneva should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work. The realisation of nuclear disarmament would be imminent only when there is a genuine commitment from the acknowledged nuclear weapon States.

The dissatisfaction among the signatories to the NPT and the weakening of the regimes has been largely because of such factors.

However, the strengthening of the non-proliferation regimes has not only become necessary in the existing international security environment but also significant and important in the larger interest of the world security and stability. India’s role in putting its effort in strengthening the non-proliferation regimes in the current phase has been enhanced and its responsibilities have grown despite being a nonsignatory to the NPT. India’s security interests would best be served in a nuclear weapons free world. Hence, India may like to argue strongly for a nuclear weapons convention, which would usher in a totally different world.

The writer is Professor and heads the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations at Manipal University.

EXPORT MARKET

In e xnt n u cdl e a r if r oan t i esr :

Ramtanu Maitra

reactors L

ast September, India’s then Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Chairman Anil Kakodkar told an audience in Vienna that New Delhi’s programme to develop the thorium-fuelled Advanced Heavy Water Reactors (AHWR) includes export of some of those reactors to other nations.

Export potential

India is on the verge of keeping a tryst with destiny in atomic science. It is a destiny that has been charted with such cogency and accuracy that it would appear to have been drafted but yesterday instead of decades ago. It is the predicted use of thorium as the final feedstock in the nuclear fuel cycle and the creation of advanced heavy water reactors that will be stand-alone systems that can be erected and forgotten for three decades and buried safely thereafter without fear of spillage or leakage of radioactive material.

Earlier, Business Line of The Hindu news group, in a June 20 article, reported that the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL) has embarked on a “marketing blitz” to hard-sell India’s mainstay first-generation natural uranium-fuelled 220 mw and 540 mw Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWR). Stated Business Line: “A proposal for reactor sales to Kazakhstan is already on the anvil, with discussions between NPCIL and the Central Asian nation’s nuclear utility Kazatomprom at an advanced stage. According to government sources, while feelers have also been received from Southeast Asian countries, Kazakhstan is likely to

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be the first breakthrough.”

Already, GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy Ltd. and Westinghouse Electric Co. plan to use India as a low-cost supplier of parts for reactors for export to the US and Europe, other media reports claim.

India’s well-established nuclear fuel cycle was a good enough reason for the country to look for an export market for reactors. But being a non-signatory of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), India had been stuck in a groove of isolation until the US-India nuclear deal - and particularly

India’s experience and specialisation in smallersize reactors is critical for a successful export strategy. The greatest demand for nuclear power reactors will increasingly come from smaller nations with weak transmission grids and small industrial bases. Furthermore, the beauty of these smallersize reactors is that they can be clustered as and when power demands grow the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s (NSG) approval in 2008 - opened up not only an opportunity to buy nuclear reactors and fuel from other countries, but also laid the foundation for export of those reactors India has already developed and tested over the years, as well as those now under development.

Self-sufficiency The strength of India’s nuclear

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power programme is the country’s long experience in this area. India began its research and development to establish the full nuclear fuel cycle in the 1950s, overcoming one hurdle after another.

New Delhi decided on a three-stage nuclear programme at the outset: In the first stage, natural uranium (U-238) was used in pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWR). In the second stage, the plutonium extracted through reprocessing the spent fuel from the PHWRs would be used to run fastbreeder reactors (FBR). The plutonium was used in the FBRs in a 70 per cent mixed oxide (MOX) fuel to breed uranium-233 in a thorium-232 blanket around the core. In the final stage, the FBRs would use thorium-232 and produce uranium-233 for use in the third-generation reactors, which have been named as Advanced Heavy Water Reactors (AHWRs).

To a certain extent, India has completed the first stage, although the country has produced only a few more than a dozen nuclear power plants so far.

The second stage has only been realised in an experimental setting in a small fast breeder reactor (13 mw) at Kalpakkam.

Meanwhile, Indian authorities have cleared the Department of Atomic Energy’s (DAE) proposal to set up a 500 mw prototype of the next-generation fast-breeder nuclear power reactor at Kalpakkam, thereby preparing the ground for the commercial exploitation of thorium as a fuel source.

One reason for India’s commitment to switch to thorium is its large indigenous supply. With estimated thorium reserves of some 2,90,000 tonnes, or even more, India ranks second only to Australia in thorium reserves.

Furthermore, the nation’s pursuit of thorium helps to bring independence from overseas uranium sources, since India has very small reserves of natural uranium.

Independent N-policy Because India is a non-signatory of the NPT, its leaders foresaw that its civil nuclear energy generation programme would be constrained in the long term by the provisions laid down by the commercial uranium suppliers. The 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) requires purchasers to sign the NPT and thereby gains enough

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oversight to ensure that the fuel (or the plutonium spawned from it) is not used to make nuclear weapons.

India was effectively isolated from the international nuclear trade from 1992 until 2008, when a US-led initiative resulted in special arrangements for India under the Nuclear Suppliers Group, based on an India-specific safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the United Nations nuclear regulatory body. Overseas firms can now do nuclear business with India, which is keen to import uranium and large power reactors. In turn, India may now offer its goods and services to the outside world.

Small reactors The opening up of international civil nuclear cooperation, which has technically cleared the decks for India to enter the global nuclear trade, the potential for export of indigenous reactors and services is being viewed in certain quarters as a viable commercial proposition. One unnamed NPCIL official told the news magazine, Asian Nuclear Energy, an Indian media venture, last July: “Currently, India is perhaps the only country to have an actively working technology, design and infrastructure for manufacture of small reactors with a unit capacity of 220 MWe. These units have a great potential for exports, particularly to nations with small grids that are planning nuclear forays with relatively lower investment levels.”

Thorium Significantly, India’s mastery of the thorium fuel cycle puts its nowdeveloping reactors on top of the list of preferred reactors in the world. Thorium is perhaps three times more abundant than all isotopes of uranium combined.

And it is theoretically possible to turn all of the available thorium into fissile material. That means the total supply of thorium on any human time scale is vast.

Besides availability, thorium has three distinct advantages over uranium fuel - to date the preferred fuel in the rest of the world. To begin with, thorium fuel elements can be designed in a way that make it difficult to recover the fissile uranium-233 (used in making weapons) that is produced through

breeding of thorium-232. This reduces the likelihood of spreading nuclear weapons.

Second, the waste stream from the thorium-fuelled reactors is considerably smaller because unlike the uraniumfuelled reactors currently in use, which use up only about 2 per cent of the available fuel, thorium-fuelled reactors with optimal design could burn nearly all of the fuel. This is one of the primary reasons why existing thorium supplies could be expected to provide almost unlimited fuel to nuclear power reactors.

Finally, the waste from the thorium fuel cycle has potentially a much shorter life-span than that produced by the uranium-fuelled reactors. In the case of the thorium fuel cycle, reprocessed waste will be no more radioactive than thorium ore after about 300 years. This claim is based on the idea that virtually all of the long-lived radioactive products created during the breeding of fissile uranium-233 from the fissionable thorium-232 will be consumed in the reactor before any reprocessing even takes place.

Market In addition to India’s own domestic requirement for hundreds of nuclear reactors in the next decades, the depletion of fossil fuels, such as coal, for bulk power generation will prompt other nations to look for alternatives.

In the case of coal - the fuel of choice for most developing nations - the need for vast amounts in order to keep the power plants going and the capital outlay needed to develop exclusive infrastructure to import it by sea from coal-rich nations, make the kind of largescale power generation programme essential for the population’s survival and welfare difficult, if not prohibitive, for many nations to undertake.

Across the world, a large number of nations that earlier considered nuclear power reactors too “exotic” are now leaning towards acquiring nuclear power plants from abroad. Take, for instance, the African nations, a prime potential destination and market for future Indian nuclear power exports.

Among the African nations that have shown keen interest in introducing nuclear power generation in their

power generation mix are Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, Namibia, Algeria, Ghana, Senegal and Guinea, to name a few.

Farsighted view Reports indicate that Nigeria is conducting discussions with the nuclear scientists associated with the IAEA on installing West Africa’s first nuclear power plant. Nigeria already runs two nuclear research centers one in the northern town of Zaria and another outside Abuja - which were set up under IAEA supervision. Although Nigeria is Africa’s leading oil and gas producer and the world’s eighth-biggest oil exporter, Nigerian government officials have acknowledged that the country cannot rely on its natural gas, coal and hydroelectric resources alone to meet future energy needs and that nuclear is the vital new component to meet those requirements.

Kenya is seeking investors and technical know-how to build a small nuclear plant to meet its growing electricity needs. According to Energy Minister Kiraitu Murungi, Kenya

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can generate 1,100 mw of electricity compared with peak-time demand of 1,050 mw, including emergency supplies from independent power producers. But the fact remains that in the decades ahead Kenya will have to generate a lot more electrical power to advance its fledgling agro-industrial capabilities and provide meaningful employment to its population.

Africa wakes Similar reverberations are also heard from Tanzania and Namibia. Tanzania is yet to make a formal claim to nearfuture generation of nuclear energy, but there are rising voices calling for nuclear power. One such voice is that of Professor Peter Msaki of the University of Dar-es-Salaam’s physics department, who told Tanzania’s Daily News recently that “nuclear energy is the permanent answer to Tanzania’s ailing electricity situation that consumes billions in taxpayers’ money to buy from private power plants… And with constant power rationing that most urban centers face countrywide, the importance of modern energy sources cannot be overemphasised, as it is the nucleus of socio-economic development globally.”

Algeria has signed a nuclear cooperation accord with the US, while Libya has made a similar deal with France. Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade says he is determined to build a nuclear reactor before his term ends in 2012. Guinea has opened talks with the IAEA on a nuclear energy programme after a recent discovery of uranium east of its capital, Conakry.

Similarly, Ghana has had a Chinesebuilt research reactor since 1994 and is currently considering a formal nuclear energy generating capacity. Today the country’s energy is generated by hydro, oil and gas - at considerable cost.

Afro-Asia ambience But when India develops the capability to build small thoriumfuelled nuclear reactors in large quantities, African nations won’t be the only buyers. Undoubtedly, a large number of buyers from smaller Southeast Asian, Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries will also be attracted by such a unique and timely offering.

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EXPORT MARKET To prepare for large-scale export of nuclear reactors, India must concentrate on building a capacity for assembly line manufacturing of two sizes of reactors.

Since India has already developed the capability to manufacture 220 mw PHWRs, this size reactor should constitute one product line. India will also have to develop assembly line manufacturing capacity for about 100 mw AHWRs. Hopefully, the calandria size for the 100 mw AHWRs proposed here will not be much different from the calandrias now manufactured for 220 mw PHWRs.

Fix-and-forget reactors India’s experience and specialisation in smaller-size reactors is critical for a successful export strategy.

Manufacturers in the West developed large-size nuclear power reactors, particularly those that are exported, because almost all of them were used in developed nations with a strong industrial base and transmission grids that incorporate large amounts of power without becoming unstable. These nations’ requirement is to generate bulk power from a single unit, primarily to feed their industrial sector. As a result, US, French and other advanced sector manufacturers of nuclear reactors developed a line of 1,000 mw reactors and are now moving towards building even larger ones.

But the greatest demand for nuclear power reactors will increasingly come from smaller nations with weak transmission grids and small industrial bases. The smaller reactors will benefit these nations in more than one way. In the first place, setting up small reactors requires a relatively small infrastructure. And because the energy output will be commensurate with needs and activities of the local population, power generated from these reactors will be consumed locally.

This will eliminate the 12-15 per cent line losses that occur regularly when power is put on large and long grids and it will prevent the instability often produced in a crucial national electrical power grid when a huge amount of power is dumped, or withdrawn, from that grid.

Equally important is the fact that since these reactors are small, their construction and operation will not disrupt people’s lives in the way that

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installation of large infrastructurebased power plants do. The populations living in the rural areas will be able to maintain their way of life, traditions, and environment and at the same time, have a quality of life presently denied them because of an endemic shortfall of power and water. A well-organised and well-planned programme will allow these reactors to be set up within 3 years.

Dr. Anupam Mondal

nuclear medicine: a boon for humanity

Furthermore, the beauty of these smaller-size reactors is that they can be clustered as and when power demands grow.

Boom ahead?

As in India, in Africa and Southeast Asia 80 per cent or more of the country’s population live in rural areas and almost 60 per cent of the workforce depends on agriculturerelated activities. A vast majority of the rural population’s water consumption is in the agricultural sector and the entire population depends very heavily on rainfall, which can be extremely irregular, causing devastating droughts.

Many of the African nations, though located along the coasts, have perennial water shortages. These countries will be keen to acquire small nuclear power plants to desalinate saline and brackish water using the nuclear reactor’s waste heat, as well, as to generate power for agricultural and domestic consumption and lay the foundation for small and medium-size industries.

It was the huge shortages of power and massive shortfall of water in India and the potential to pull millions out of poverty within the span of a generation that motivated New Delhi’s research on thorium reactors in the first place.

The persistence of those same realities in large parts of the world can fuel an Indian nuclear export boom in the years ahead.

The writer is Virginia based analyst on South Asian strategic affairs. He contributes regularly to the Washington-based news weekly, Executive Intelligence Review. He also contributes to Aakrosh and Agni, the Japanese monthly, Foresight, Vijayvaani.com, Asia Times Online and the Italian strategic journal, Eurasia Rivista di Studi Geopolitici.

PANACEA?

Etched in people’s psyche are images of the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the after-effects of blast, heat and radiation on habitat and humans. So terrible is the effect that it forced sane minds to say “Never again!” On the other end of the scale (on which India has always placed the greatest emphasis) lie the peaceful uses of the radiation from the split atom. Nuclear Medicine sounds like a contradiction in terms but its effects are as spectacular as its obverse.

N

uclear Medicine is a branch of medical science where radionuclides are used for diagnosis and treatment of human diseases.

Discovery of artificial radioactivity and development of nuclear reactors and particle accelerators have played a significant role in radiotracer technology. Organ / tissue specific compounds, known as radiopharmaceuticals, are administered to the patient for diagnostic and therapeutic procedures.

Nuclear medicine specialists use safe, painless and cost-effective techniques to image the body and treat disease. It harnesses the energy emitted by the splitting of atom for the assistance of mankind.

Nuclear imaging Nuclear medicine imaging is unique, because it provides doctors with information about both structure and function. It is a way to gather medical

information that would otherwise be unavailable, require surgery, or necessitate more expensive diagnostic tests. Nuclear medicine imaging procedures often identify abnormalities very early in the progress of a disease - long before many medical problems are apparent with other diagnostic tests. Ultrasonography, computed tomography (CT) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) continue to define disease on the basis of abnormal structure. Single photon emission tomography (SPECT) permits 3D reconstruction of data, increasing the sensitivity and anatomical localisation of lesions in the skeleton, brain and heart. The sensitivity of localisation of tumors is also increased.

Radioactive tracers of glucose, fatty acids and amino acids make it possible to examine the growth and development of the organs of the body, the regeneration and repair

when injured and the response to drugs. Advances in molecular biology have made a dramatic impact on the practice of medicine. This has led to the birth of “Molecular Nuclear Medicine”. Studies with receptor based radiopharmaceuticals provide insight into the biochemical processes of proteins as they carry out instructions from genetic coding. These studies are possible with the help of positron emission tomography (PET). The amount of radiation in a typical nuclear imaging procedure is comparable with that received during a diagnostic x-ray and the amount received in a typical treatment procedure is kept within safe limits.

In nuclear medicine imaging, the radiopharmaceuticals are detected by special types of cameras that work with computers to provide very precise images about the area or organ of the body being scanned. In treatment, the

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PANACEA?

radiopharmaceuticals go directly to the organ being treated. Today, nuclear medicine offers procedures that are essential in many medical specialities, from pediatrics to cardiology to psychiatry. New and innovative nuclear medicine treatments that target and pinpoint molecular levels

In the years to come SPECT and PET scanning will prove to be invaluable tools in the diagnosis and treatment of some of the most critical diseases challenging modern medicine. We can conclude by saying that the split atom which has brought so much of destruction, if harnessed and used judiciously, can serve humankind extensively in the field of medical sciences within the body are revolutionising our understanding of and approach to a range of diseases and conditions.

Early detection In diagnostic nuclear medicine procedures, radionuclides are either used directly or combined with other chemical compounds or pharmaceuticals to form radiopharmaceuticals.

These radiopharmaceuticals, once administered to the patient, can localise to specific organs or cellular receptors which allows nuclear medicine the ability to image the extent of a disease-process in the body, based on the cellular function and physiology, rather than relying on physical changes in the tissue anatomy which usually takes longer time once any disease sets in and thus in some diseases nuclear medicine studies can identify medical problems at an earlier stage than other diagnostic tests.

Nuclear medicine imaging studies are generally more organ or tissue specific (e.g.: lungs scan, heart scan, bone scan, brain scan, etc.) than those in conventional radiology imaging, which focus on a particular section of the body (e.g.: chest X-ray, abdomen /

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pelvis CT scan, head CT scan, etc.). In addition, there are nuclear medicine studies that allow imaging of the whole body based on certain cellular receptors or functions. Examples are whole body PET scan or PET / CT scans, gallium scans, indium white blood cell scans, MIBG and octreotide scans.

The radiopharmaceuticals used in Nuclear Medicine therapy emit ionising radiation that travels only a short distance, thereby minimising unwanted side effects and damage to noninvolved organs or nearby structures. Most Nuclear Medicine therapies can be performed as outpatient procedures since there are few side effects from the treatment and the radiation exposure to the general public can be kept within a safe limit. Common Nuclear Medicine therapies include 131I-sodium iodide for hyperthyroidism and thyroid cancer, Yttrium-90-ibritumomab tiuxetan (Zevalin) and Iodine-131-tositumomab (Bexxar) for refractory Lymphoma, 131 I-MIBG (metaiodobenzylguanidine) for neuroendocrine tumors and palliative bone pain treatment with Samarium-153 or Strontium-89.

History Although the naturally occurring radioisotopes of radon and radium were used in the first quarter of last century, Nuclear Medicine came under prominence during the 1930’s and subsequent years with the development of the Cyclotron and Fission Reactor.

Artificially produced radioisotopes were immediately used for therapeutic and laboratory procedures. Radiation monitoring equipment were developed which allowed the distribution of the radioisotope to be determined, either in-vivo or in-vitro. These devices output the results as a count-rate over the organ or sample. With improvements in technology that occurred over this time, these devices became more sophisticated and automated systems of scanning were developed - the Rectilinear Scanner.

Gamma cameras In the 1950’s, the first gamma camera was produced and which did not rely on continuous motion. This became the predecessor of the present day gamma cameras where the input is stored on the hard disk of a computer and the output can be manipulated and recorded on

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a variety of media. Single and multiheaded cameras are now common-place in most Nuclear Medicine Departments.

The improvements in gamma camera design allowed dynamic - count versus time - studies to be performed as well as static or planar imaging of present day.

Tomographic hardware and software, being able to view sections of an organ or allow three-dimensional imagery, have also improved the sensitivity and specificity of Nuclear Medicine techniques far beyond the dreams of the early pioneers.

Technetium-99m Among many radionuclides that were discovered for medical-use, none were as important as the discovery and development of Technetium-99m.

It was first discovered in 1937 as an artificial element to fill space number 43 in the Periodic Table. The development of generator system to produce Technetium-99m in the 1960s became a practical method for medical use.

Today, Technetium-99m is the most utilised element in Nuclear Medicine and is employed in a wide variety of Nuclear Medicine imaging studies.

Whole body By the 1970s most organs of the body could be visualised with nuclear medicine procedures, including liver and spleen scanning, brain tumor localisation and studies of the gastrointestinal tract. In the 1980s, radiopharmaceuticals were designed for such critical diagnoses as heart disease and cancer. Also in the 1980s compounds were developed, including monoclonal antibodies and FDG, that carried radioactive elements directly and specifically to cancer cells. At small doses, these radiopharmaceuticals can be used to identify the existence and location of cancer cells long before they are visible using traditional imaging methods. At higher doses, radiolabelled monoclonal antibodies are used today to deliver a therapeutic dose of radiation directly to cancer cells.

More recent developments in Nuclear Medicine include the invention of the first positron emission tomography scanner (PET). The concept of emission and transmission tomography, later developed into single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT), was introduced in the late 1950s. Innovations

led to fusion imaging with SPECT and CT and the first PET / CT prototype in 1998. At present, numerous SPECT and PET-CT cameras are installed in our country and all over the world.

and assess the response of cancer to treatment,

Radiation as medicine

■■ i d e n t i f y abnormal brain lesions without exploratory surgery,

The use of radiation in the procedures offers a safe and costeffective means to provide doctors with information that would otherwise require exploratory surgery, necessitate more costly and invasive procedures or simply be unavailable. The risks of not performing a needed medical exam are usually much greater than the risks of the radiation exposures associated with the exam.

In Nuclear Medicine the radioisotopes are used for detecting the specific functions of the organs or for treating the diseases. The reasons for its widespread use are: ■■ Diagnosis is quick and accurate about the illness of the patient; ■■ Organs like thyroid, bones, heart and liver can get damaged pretty easily and disorders in their functioning can be detected using radiations; ■■ As many as five Nobel laureates were associated with development of radioisotopes based detecting methods in medical science; ■■ More than ten thousand hospitals across the globe use radioisotopes in medicine; ■■ 90 per cent of these uses are for diagnostic purposes; ■■ Common radioisotope used in diagnosis is the technetium-99m that is used in over thirty million procedures a year accounting for over 80 per cent of all medicine procedures in the world.

A few examples of the uses of nuclear medicine are: ■■ determine whether or not organs are functioning normally, ■■ show whether the blood supply to the heart is adequate, ■■

detect cancers at an early stage,

■■

determine the extent of cancer

■■ determine whether the heart can pump blood adequately,

Thus nuclear medicine has come a long way to provide critical diagnostic and therapeutic procedures in a safe and cost effective manner to serve the human population. The

■■ d e t e c t w h e t h e r the brain is receiving an adequate blood supply and if brain cells are functioning or not, ■■ c h e c k whether or not kidneys are functioning n o r m a l l y and whether the stomach is emptying properly, ■■ a s c e r t a i n lung function and bone density and ■■ locate a bone fracture before it can be seen on an X-ray.

increase in awareness about their use and availability of instruments and radiopharmaceuticals in the country is leading to better patient treatment.

Dosage

The future

A patient undergoing a nuclear medicine procedure will receive a radiation dose. The amount of radiation from diagnostic nuclear medicine procedures is kept within a safe limit and follows the “ALARA” (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) principle. The amounts of radioactivity administered to the patient are relatively small and are designed to provide the highest quality diagnostic information possible while minimising the radiation dose to internal organs. The radiation dose to different patients and internal organs varies with procedure. A typical nuclear medicine procedure may impart a radiation dose to the patient comparable to about one to four years of natural background radiation depending on the type of study. As with X-rays, the value of diagnostic imaging is great and the risks are negligible compared to the health benefits of having the procedure.

In the years to come, as more is learned about the fundamental processes of diseases and as new radiopharmaceuticals and analysis tools are developed, SPECT and PET scanning will prove to be invaluable tools in the diagnosis and treatment of some of the most critical diseases challenging modern medicine. We can conclude by saying that the split atom which has brought so much of destruction, if harnessed and used judiciously, can serve humankind extensively in the field medical sciences.

The writer is Scientist "F" and Jt. Director, Head, Division of Pet Imaging, Molecular Imaging Research Centre, INMAS, Delhi.

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Dirty bomb the radioactive material is deposited on surfaces.

Human body

Delhi experienced what could have been a “dirty bomb attack” and an “orphan” device containing a radioactive component was sold to a kabari (junk dealer) and found its way to Mayapuri. All those who handled it suffered radioactive burns and radiation sickness and it took days to clean up the radiation in a crowded commercial district.

T

he world is facing a persistent threat from terrorists whose purpose is to intimidate a population of combatant military / paramilitary forces and / or the undefended civilian targets by causing serious bodily harm resulting in death, injury, disease and disability.

Terrorists seeking to unleash massive violence and destruction may graduate from using conventional explosives to release an industrial chemical or a military chemical / biological agent, use of a ‘dirty’ bomb or climb the escalation ladder to the highest rungs by detonation of a nuclear weapon.

cause great disruption of society.

Today there is a high risk of radiation exposures due to terrorism. Terrorist attacks shall impact people in the form of acute illness and after such nuclear events, the health effects will not only affect the people but also shall have long term psychosocial implications.

Orphan sources

A terrorist attack involving toxic radioactive material (TRMs) differs from other attacks involving conventional or improvised ‘explosives’ as it presents specific health hazards to the people in the shortest possible period. The likely purpose is to create great panic / hysteria, kill, injure, incapacitate or destroy life and cause damage to critical infrastructure, contaminate men and material and pollute the environment.

Some sources of radioactive materials lack adequate regulatory control, sufficient accountability and proper disposal. They possess sufficient radiological hazard but are not under regulatory control because they have never been so, or have been abandoned, lost, misplaced, stolen or transferred without any paper authorisation. Found or abandoned sources are described as “orphan” when their identifying marks have been removed or damaged.

Sometimes vulnerable sources can be regarded as the orphan sources when its regulatory control becomes weak.

Orphan sources can cause multiple serious injuries if it is ill perceived by the individuals who find them.

Radiological weapons can be deployed by terrorists in several ways (e.g., dispersion of radioactive aerosol; detonating radioactive material with conventional explosives and as Radiological Exposure Device). In the event of the use of Radiation Explosive / Dispersal Device or a ‘dirty bomb’ also called as RDD, there shall be potential exposures to unknown amounts of radiation from unknown radioactive materials. Thus, radiological terrorism is a ‘typical’ type of terrorism that can

These ‘orphan’ sources are becoming a matter of concern to one and all as increased radiation monitoring has uncovered a growing number of them. These sources might be used for malevolent purposes as there is strong reason to believe that nuclear technology is being transferred from the rogue countries to either directly between State to State, State to nonState actor, non-State actor to State, or through clandestine and / or criminal supplier networks.

Health hazards

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The TRMs may enter inside the body through mouth, nose and intact / broken skin. Thus, the radiation exposures are expected both from external and internal contamination including possible radioactive shrapnel. The radiation affected population would

Improvised nuclear device Another area of concern is an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) that incorporates nuclear materials designed to produce a nuclear explosion. Fallout besides blast and heat from these weapon detonations may lead to contamination of an even greater number of persons with significant levels of radiation exposure from radioactivity contamination.

Dr. Rakesh Kumar Sharma

large numbers (~1,00,000) of ‘orphaned’

There are reports that A. Q. Khan the ‘father’ of the Pakistani nuclear bomb, was at the centre of two illicit supplier networks - one bringing sensitive technology into Pakistan and the other transferring it out of Pakistan to Iran, Libya, North Korea and elsewhere.

The spread of nuclear technologies and expertise is also generating concerns about the potential acquisition of nuclear materials by terrorist groups.

There are equally important questions regarding the ability of terrorists to control and secure TRMs from vulnerable places / countries. These orphan sources are a constant fear for the future as they can be used by the terrorists.

Radiological dispersal device An RDD or ‘dirty bomb’ is dispersed with conventional explosives or some other dispersal mechanism (like aerosol / aerial sprayer) to spread radioactive contamination. RDDs are frequently characterised as ‘weapons of mass disruption’ rather than weapons of mass destruction as normally they are likely to affect relatively small areas compared to a nuclear detonation.

Though an RDD would be designed to disperse TRMs over a large area, a bomb that uses conventional explosives would likely have more immediate lethal effect than the radioactive material. At levels created from most probable sources, not enough radiation would be present to cause severe illness or death. The immediate environment, materials and persons in the affected area, will become ‘contaminated’ as

depend on the type of radioactive material used and dispersal technology adopted. It is highly unlikely that persons in the contaminated area will have medically significant levels of contamination, but fear and concern regarding personal safety will lead to psychological stress.

Sealed sources spread in the environment generally do not present a contamination hazard. These sources can result in low-level exposures to persons who come near an individual source and involve external exposure only. However, persons who handle these sources may suffer significant local radiation injury to the skin and underlying tissues.

A test explosion and subsequent calculations done by the United States Department of Energy found that assuming nothing is done to clean up the affected area and everyone stays in the affected area for one year, the radiation exposure would be ‘fairly high’, but not fatal.

Doses to person will likely be due to both internal and external exposures.

Medical resources will be quickly overwhelmed as most survivors will be exhibiting combined injuries from blast and thermal burns. The impact of radiation exposure will be secondary to medical management of conventional trauma.

Access The intelligence challenge posed by such a structure is daunting, particularly if further compartmentalisation on special weapon-related activities ensues. The sufficiency of finances and other resources available to terrorist organisations for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) acquisition is not a big issue for terrorists. Many terrorist groups are well organised, technically sound, have well connected global networks and have demonstrated their reach to easily accessible methodologies for preparing explosive items and improvised explosives. There is an availability of

radioactive sources in the world, more than thousands of which are sufficiently strong to cause harm.

Al Qaeda’s interest Al Qaeda’s plans for constructing radiological weapons are well established after arrest of suspected radiological terrorists.

As per International Atomic Energy Agency’s report, there have been nearly 300 attempted radioactive materials smuggling incidents during the last decade. All this indicates towards a very high level of threat perception of radiological attack in the near future.

There have only ever been two cases of cesium-containing bombs and neither was detonated. Both involved Chechnya. The first attempt at radiological terror was carried out in November 1995 by a group of Chechen separatists, who buried a cesium-137 source wrapped in explosives at the Izmaylovsky Park in Moscow.

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In December 1998, a second attempt was announced by the Chechen Security Service, who discovered a container filled with radioactive materials attached to an explosive mine. The bomb was hidden near a railway line in the suburban area Argun, ten miles east of the Chechen capital of Grozny. The same Chechen separatist group was suspected to be involved.

India vulnerable This modern era can also be characterised by the rising threat of indiscriminate terrorism. India is equally vulnerable to such threats as any other country in the world having extensive and varied programme for peaceful uses of nuclear energy in power generation, non-destructive testing in industry, agriculture, medicine, research etc.

Assured targets In present scenario, there is a very likely possibility that terrorists can use the (TRMs) against important persons, densely populated and crowded locations such as marketplaces, religious congregations, public functions, convention centers, overcrowded mass transportation systems and during sport events. Important government institutions including key economic, military, scientific and other sensitive installations etc., are also preferred targets for terrorist attacks.

Heightened threat A deep analysis of the organisational structures employed by terrorists using conventional weapons is that of loose networks of independently-operating, specialised cells which come together on an ad hoc basis to execute a specific attack is likely to be replicated in acts of radiological terrorism. Rogue countries like Korea and Pakistan are sources for terrorists to gain CBRN materials.

Literature suggests that a nuclear black market emanating in the erstwhile USSR, provides access to radioactive material and perhaps even sufficient quantities of fissile materials. There can now be little doubt that if such terrorists could acquire weapons-usable nuclear material clandestinely and learn how to make nuclear weapons, they would like to employ them at appropriate time.

The major obstacle to terrorists

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Dirty bomb intending to use nuclear devices is the acquisition of nuclear materials.

Training of security personnel at facilities handling TRMs shall be an important deterrent. The increasing availability of fissile material is a key factor and primary determinant as to whether or not a terrorist group will resort to nuclear terrorism. There could not be even a little doubt that if a terrorist group acquires weapons-usable nuclear material from thieves and learn how to make nuclear weapons, they would tap into the nuclear phobia of people without necessarily causing mass casualties, in order to employ them in their attention-seeking tactics.

Non-State players Anti-national actors may possess sufficient technical and financial resources to develop an active terrorist organisation such as Iran provided financial support to Hezbollah and Hamas and Al Qaeda received assistance from Sudan and Talibanruled Afghanistan. Furthermore, each of these three groups is thought to be interested in CBRN weapons; certainly, evidence uncovered in Afghanistan and elsewhere has underscored Al Qaeda’s CBRN efforts. A State sponsor of terrorism, may be happy to employ a terrorist group using conventional weapons for State purposes, providing a group, over which it might have only incomplete control, with CBRN weapons may be too great a risk for many States. The possibility that a truly massive attack could be traced back to the sponsor, or that the group might turn on its sponsor, could prove a deterrent to CBRN sponsorship.

State sponsorship In the end, however, most experts would agree that if a group did receive significant assistance in developing CBRN weapons from a sponsor State, that group would have the best chance of acquiring real capability of radiological terrorism. State-supported groups are often assessed to have the greatest potential for successful acquisition and effective use of radiological material.

State players provide technical / professional skill set to succeed in CBRN development. Although there are numerous disagreements about what level of proficiency is needed or

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what level of resources may suffice estimates of likelihood of success vary considerably.

Very real threat The threat of nuclear terrorism has moved from hypothetical to reality in twenty-first century. Rising issue of the radiological terrorism scenario employing the Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) / Radiological Exposure Device (RED) or Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) needs to be addressed.

NON-DISCRIMINATION

nuclear

weapons free world?

Dr. Rajendra Prasad

What is a dirty bomb?

The term dirty bomb refers to a speculative radiological weapon that combines toxic radioactive material (TRM) with conventional explosives.

When such a bomb is detonated, besides the deaths and damage caused by the initial blast, the explosion also creates a small plume of radioactive particulates around the explosion site that can ‘contaminate’ a wide area, hence the attribute ‘dirty’.

Why is it a threat?

Even if a dirty bomb does not kill a large number of people, it can have a major impact on the society or community and economy. Depending upon the half-life of toxic radiological materials involved - a dirty bomb attack can do major damage to the global economy (if it is targeting, for example, a key port or major financial district). Moreover, analysts say even the fear of a dirty bomb attack can have a disproportionate psychological impact and panic. If militants manage to acquire radioactive material they can cause considerable disruption. Hoax bomb alerts may shut down major operation / business / cities for hours together.

Radiological emergencies Any radiation incident results in or having a potential to result in exposure and / or contamination of the medical persons, responders and civilian domain in excess of the respective permissible limits can lead to a nuclear / radiological emergency.

The writer is Scientist ‘G’, Additional Director and Head, Division of CBRN Defence, Institute of Nuclear Medicine and Allied Sciences, Delhi.

The moment may have come to make the assault to the “top of the mountain” and achieve universal and complete nuclear disarmament given that the US and Russia have taken additional steps towards arms limitation to 1,500 warheads each. Bringing in the other nuclear weapons States – both overt and clandestine ones – into the fold through proportional reductions is a scenario worth framing.

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More significantly, the threat of nuclear terrorism looms large in South Asia, given the nuclear proliferation history in the region, especially Pakistan and A. Q. Khan connection, Al Qaeda network and probable diffusion of nuclear materials and technology through illegal channels in the region.

In such situations, the Asian dialogue process on nuclear disarmament must involve the need of developing appropriate nuclear forensic techniques as well as overcoming important strategic, political, diplomatic and organisational challenges in the region

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he advent of nuclear weapons in the form of ‘fission’ and ‘fusion’ devices in the past century and their spread represented a quantum jump in creating catastrophic arsenals of infinite offensiveness but without credible defence against these weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Thus, the entire humanity is in grave danger on account of the catastrophic nature of nuclear weapons.

To my mind, the true answer lies in a secure and nuclear weapons free world (NWFW), which in turn requires comprehensive nuclear security management and threat reduction and,

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in due course, gradual and time-bound elimination of all existing nuclear arsenals of fission and fusion devices along with their delivery systems. This should be coupled with worldwide efforts to create effective and verifiable ban on the testing, production, development, stockpile and use of such weapons. It can happen only when all nuclear, near-nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States make joint endeavours.

The political and military leadership in these States did realise the sensitivities of ‘Nuclear Winter’ as fourth catastrophic dimension of nuclear effect in the form of long-term synergic consequences, particularly when simulation-based scientific findings of Turco, Toon, Ackerson, Pollock and Carl Sagan, popularly known as TTAPS group, were made public. Eventually, it was confessed that “a nuclear war cannot be won and therefore shouldn’t be fought”.

New proliferators Nuclear weapon arsenals have multiplied, but they got more prominence as a political weapon rather than a military weapon. Consequently, the number of nuclear weapon States (NWS) in the nuclear club has gone up to nine - counting the US, the Russian Federation, the UK, France, the People’s Republic of China, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. Iran is going to be another one amongst potential proliferators. If Iran cannot be stopped from building a nuclear arsenal, we will cross over a nuclear tipping point sooner or later, largely increasing the threat of a nuclear catastrophe in the world.

A global ban on the production of weapon-capable fissile materials or other nuclear explosive devices would further underpin the process.

The urgent adoption of the treaty on banning the production towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons and use of weapon-grade fissile materials for military purposes can become the corner-stone for the enhancement of the effectiveness of existing non-proliferation regime.

New regime As a new step forward, it is in the fitness of things to encapsulate the idea of concluding a new universal,

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comprehensive and non-discriminatory regime on global vertical, horizontal and crypto / clandestine proliferation in order to eliminate nuclear weapons gradually from the arsenals of the nuclear weapon States and to curb rising or unstated nuclear ambitions, without jeopardising the sovereign rights of the parties to utilise nuclear power for peaceful purposes in the service of humanity at large. The new regime should incorporate enough guarantees on banning “double standards” and at the same time suggest definite liabilities of members, along with evolving new non-discriminatory mechanisms of sanctions towards its violators.

For long, the discourse on nuclear weapons free world (NWFW) as a viable possibility is continuing, especially as an integral part of the campaign to eliminate nuclear weapons. We may recall that the General Assembly of the United Nations already in January 1946 - in its very first resolution unanimously emphasised the necessity for a commission to make proposals for “the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.” While the international community enjoys satisfaction in concluding global prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons by the Conventions of 1972 and 1993 respectively, we must not ignore the fact that nothing similar has happened in respect of nuclear weapons in the past half century.

NAM initiatives The majority of leaders in many non-nuclear nation-States, of course, have never favoured the spread of nuclear arms. Even so, despite their limits, there has been willingness in them to question the policies of nuclear weapon States. For instance, the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) during the 1950s lodged powerful international pressure upon the nuclear powers for an end to the testing, development and deployment of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, as compared to the advocacy of nuclear disarmament in the past, the progressive assertiveness towards a nuclear weapons free world surfaced heavily on account of massive popular pressure from peace and disarmament organisations. In the United States, groups like the National

Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), Women Strike for Peace, the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign and Physicians for Social Responsibility helped generate a national consciousness over the intricacies of nuclear arms race and formulation of nuclear war fighting doctrines.

They were joined in their protest ventures by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in Britain, the Congress Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikin) and the Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyo) in Japan, Project Ploughshares in Canada, the Trust Groups in the Soviet Union and hundreds of similar organisations around the world. This activist pressure, followed by substantial anti-nuclear sentiments of the general public, led the ruling political elites in many nationStates to abandon many of their nuclear ambitions. It is reasonable to note that the temperature of popular sentiment must remain anti-nuclear to promote a massive campaign for attaining the ultimate goal of nuclear weapons free world (NWFW).

The NWFW debate gained further ground and acquired significant momentum through the promising initiative taken by the four former senior US government officials: George Shultz (Ronald Reagan’s secretary of state), Henry Kissinger (Richard Nixon’s secretary of state), William Perry (Bill Clinton’s secretary of defense) and Sam Nunn (former chairman of the senate armed services committee). In January 2007 and, again, in January 2008, they published their views in the Wall Street Journal to encapsulate the urgent necessity for a nuclear-free world (NWFW), as well as steps to be taken in that direction. Since that time, there has been important follow-up to this initiative by other former US national security officials, nuclear experts and policy analysts on nuclear issues. The true aim of the initiative should be to make the goal of a nuclear weapons free world “a joint enterprise.”

Part of the response in the changing situations is predominantly embedded in their threat perception and assessment that terrorists will eventually acquire and use nuclear weapons to instill fear and alarm in the hearts and minds of people in order to

fulfill their projected or unstated ends.

Nuclear terrorists As they emphasised in the first paragraph of their 2008 article: “We face a very real possibility that the deadliest weapons ever invented could fall into dangerous hands.” Of course, for decades, many sensitive and informed minds have intimately observed the agonising core of the Cold War nuclear legacy and continued to hold the view that nuclear technology of weaponisation has already reached

in dangerous hands of some rogue States and potential proliferators.

Furthermore, one must admit that growing danger of nuclear terrorism and addition of new nuclear-capable national actors to the list of ‘nuclear haves’ will eventually multiply and exacerbate the probabilities of nuclear risk factor, especially by nuclear terror, irrational calculation and inadvertent nuclear triggering or by accidental nuclear start and failure of the command, control and communication systems.

US superiority Another significant factor that might explain why a distinguished band of the US national security elites has become so inclined towards the elimination of nuclear weapons than in the past is now based on the realisation that US conventional military prowess continues to remain far superior to

that of any other nation-State of the international system. In reality, some highly respected US scientists had already warned in 1945 that the US national security could be maintained better in a non-nuclear world than in a world bristling with nuclear weapons.

Naturally, many sensitive and informed people of goodwill might welcome the Shultz-Kissinger-Perry-Nunn initiative, because it does enhance the prospects for human survival.

The influence of this extraordinary initiative was destined to percolate

in the election campaigns of the US President Obama and the policies of other countries like Britain. The Norwegian government also hosted a meeting of global experts in Oslo to carry the initiative further. The need for broader support is thus obvious.

Global Zero A movement called Global Zero gained prominence to promote just that goal. It was institutionalised in the light of January 2007 newspaper article by George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry and Sam Nunn advocating a nuclear weapons free world (NWFZ). A group of 100 signatories (not including the above four) established Global Zero in Paris in December 2008. The objective of this forum is to get rid of nuclear weapons by 2030 through a multilateral, universal, verifiable mechanism, with negotiations on the Global Zero treaty

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beginning by 2019.

As noted earlier, the ideas about eliminating nuclear weapons are as old as the advent of the weapon itself. But Global Zero sought to gain strength from the initial endeavours to design a land-mine treaty and from the grass-root service of philanthropists towards their global anti-poverty pursuits. Of course, it also derived inherent strength from several nonproliferation ventures, including the 1996 report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. The ongoing movement can be significant in the sense that it is likely to employ a serious strategy for moving forward - not at some distant time when some new inventions might make nukes obsolete, but by the end of this decade, even if it would take at least another decade to put a treaty into effect.

Obama agenda Will the US President Obama really pursue such a goal during his incumbency? Hopefully, he delivered an inspiring speech in Prague early in his first year in office, agreed to modest cuts in deployed nuclear forces with Russia in the New Start Treaty and modestly lowered the profile of nuclear weapons in the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report.

Those steps are not insignificant, but they require a substantial range of compatible continuity with past policy and still leave us very far from nuclear zero. President Barack Obama has taken a further step towards his goal of a world without nuclear weapons after he and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev signed a landmark treaty in Prague which will commit the two former Cold War adversaries to new cuts in their nuclear arsenals. He has unveiled a new US policy which would reduce the US nuclear stockpiles, halt its nuclear tests and ban its use of nuclear weapons against countries that do not possess them. Notably, for futuristic steps towards nuclear zero, short-term, middle-term and long-term actions will be irrevocably required in all probability to reduce the risks of nuclear exchange, theft, accident and terrorism and so on.

The International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament’s latest report,

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Eliminating Nuclear Threats - A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers, has outlined practical policy options designed to make progress on today’s proliferation challenges, produce positive outcomes, ensure the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and move to a world free of nuclear weapons. The report’s main findings are grouped into short, medium and long-term steps governments should take to abolish nuclear weapons. These steps consist of the following:

leverage to all the stakeholders to think creatively and gainfully towards a nuclear weaponsfree world. It gives a conceptual background for the immediate steps, which can be harmonised with those measures that are far-flung on the climb to the top of the mountain. In the “Project Base Camp”, the idea of proportional reductions will bear positive results whereby the dilemma of “you go first or I go first” can be addressed creatively and constructively.

Short Term

Following this approach, different States will be disarming at varied rates so that at the end of a pre-determined time all States will have to remain content with the same number of reduced weapons.

■■ Unilateral changes in nuclear doctrine to deemphasise the role of nuclear weapons in national security strategies.

■■ Multilateral efforts such as securing the entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).

■■ Resolution of the standoffs with Iran and North Korea.

Medium Term ■■ Deeper arsenals.

reductions in nuclear

■■ Progress on “parallel security issues” such as missile proliferation, conventional and biological weapons and space policy.

Long Term (post 2025) ■■ Creating and implementing a satisfactory verification and enforcement regime to detect and penalise violators of the ban.

■■ Addressing the geopolitics of a world without nuclear weapons.

■■ What is of decisive urgency is the inclination of engaging all nuclear weapon States (NWS) in the debate over nuclear disarmament. The ensuing debate is often confined to strategic arms reductions between the US and Russia, thus making it a bilateral concern. The need of today is to accentuate that nuclear disarmament is a collective task and all nuclear weapon States (NWS) are required to join their hands together towards attaining this goal. The prime focus of the “Project Base Camp” is that it provides

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Delegitimising nukes The primacy of nuclear weapons has to be de-valued as a currency of power or, in other words, nuclear weapons have to be delegitimised. There has to be brought out a general disincentive towards nuclear weapons and in this task a normative vision of a nuclear weapons free world (NWFW) would gear up the process significantly. Such delegitimisation has to be coupled with doctrinal shifts and transformations where a comprehensive restructuring of NWS national security strategies and military organisations would be required in all probabilities. Further, the delegitimisation processes will accentuate an ethical aspiration which would necessitate some sort of sacrifices from all the stakeholders.

Nuclear weapons can possibly be dismantled but it is absolutely impossible to make zero the possessor’s scientific knowledge and technical know-how of making these devices and therefore to debate that irreversibility as an ideal goal is very likely to enlarge the logic too far. In all such cases, transparency will be irrevocably required in their behaviour and actions.

Dealing with deceit

Shared responsibilities

Eventually, the emergence of that situation is extremely significant in which the world succeeds in getting the elimination of all nuclear weapons. The most serious apprehension at that point of time would be the risk of someone amongst the stakeholders deceiving in the process. To appreciate the dream of a nuclear weapons free world (NWFW) these problems need to be tackled right now. In this context, first the nuclear weapon States (NWS) and the nonnuclear weapon States (NNWS) have to function in unanimity to enforce agreements in letter and spirit that are already concluded. This will necessitate stricter enforcement measures and defiance of any sort need to be tackled more seriously and conclusively.

Conceptually, the “Project Base Camp” is pre-occupied with a number of issue-oriented challenges. First, is the issue of shared responsibility.

For example, it can gain renewed momentum through the NPT Review Conference, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) framework or the special sessions of Disarmament in the UN. However what needs to be observed is that very often mutuality of shared responsibilities is confronted with a predisposition of biased responsibilities. Mutuality of shared responsibilities without structuring the individual responsibilities of different NWS and NNWS can culminate into elusive roles. Just like the discourse on global warming and climate

change, the emerging issues of nuclear disarmament in the current situations encompass responsibilities especially on the part of permanent members of the UN Security Council to pursue negotiations in good faith to disarm.

The US and Russia have to go ahead on both qualitative as well as quantitative cuts and others may join them later on the road to nuclear disarmament.

The issues of how and when others contribute to the inputs of the US and Russia need to be ascertained.

Asian situation Moreover an Asian discourse on nuclear disarmament is the need of the hour, especially when 21st century is marked as the century of Asia due to the rise of China and India as economic giants, without elaborating regional instabilities and contradictions in the nuclear and other fields in the post 9/11 situations. The nuclear discourse in Asia should be one which is allencompassing in nature and should not be limited to the NWS because the possession and proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Asian continent may not be free from the challenge of covertness adopted by the possessors

and threshold proliferators. There can be threshold States possessing the technology to go nuclear and eventually their inclusion is very important.

Proportional reductions Second, there are urgent needs and opportunities for removing functional ambiguities and implementing viable measures by the nuclear weapon States (NWS). This may lead to feeling among the NNWS that no concrete steps are being taken to ensure progress towards nuclear disarmament. Hence, substantial preparation has to be made for the successful follow-up of 2010 NPT Review Conference at the practical levels in the foreseeable future.

Third is the challenge of proportional cuts or numerical reductions of nuclear weapons and capabilities on the part of the States to reach the point “global zero”. The real challenge facing the world today is not of going ahead towards a fixed cut in the nuclear arsenals but that of averting any employment of nuclear weapons anywhere by States or any non-State actors. Presently, the non-use of nuclear weapons can be a contentious issue

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in any nuclear debate, but making a distinction between civilian combatants and non-civilian combatants is an uphill task and, therefore, substantial steps to appreciate the moral issue on relative basis should be discussed by analysing different targeting plans.

Fourth, delegitimisation essentially involves devaluing nuclear weapons as currency of power to deny their eventual

the possibility of clandestine spread and use of “dirty bombs”. More significantly, the threat of nuclear terrorism looms large in South Asia, given the nuclear proliferation history in the region, especially Pakistan and A. Q. Khan connection, Al Qaeda network and probable diffusion of nuclear materials and technology through illegal channels in the region.

In such situations, the Asian dialogue

step towards the US-Russia shared mutuality and nuclear reductions in the years to come. Clearly, President Barack Obama’s decision to abandon the Bush administration’s missile defence plan came about because of a change in the US perception of the threat posed by Iran. The Obama Administration perceives that short and medium range missiles from Iran now pose a greater near-term threat than the intercontinental ballistic missiles that the Bush plan addressed. President Obama has already taken a predictable move of key importance towards a new strategic arms reduction treaty (START) between the US and Russia, replacing the 1991 START agreement.

The signing concludes almost a year of negotiations on arms reduction between the world’s two largest nuclear powers, limiting operationally deployed nuclear warheads to 1,550.

No time frame

use. The issue which then needs to be tackled is why the delegitimisation has not witnessed progression with nuclear weapons. The simple reason is that nuclear weapons have provided exclusive political and security dividends by their internationalisation as the currency of power for over six decades. The debate on nuclear disarmament in the past has been encapsulated in very strict framework of either a cut within some predetermined time or has been negotiated within the confines of moral overtures and therefore delegitimisation needs to follow a balanced approach.

Non-State actors Fifth is the impinging uncertainty in the behaviours of non-State actors, especially after 9/11. In the post 9/11 situations, a new dimension of global insecurity is persistent on account of growing dangers of nuclear terrorism, whose cadres are not worried about earthly punishments. The diffusion of technology and smuggling of radioactive materials and items through illegal channels can increase

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process on nuclear disarmament must involve the need of developing appropriate nuclear forensic techniques as well as overcoming important strategic, political, diplomatic and organisational challenges in the region.

Geopolitical shifts Lastly, an incessant challenge is that there will be changes in the global politico-strategic milieu and it remains uncertain that how the “Base Camp” approaches will cope with such changes and consequential shifts to reach the Top, i.e. the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Notably, dis-invention of nuclear weapons is not possible.

But their possession and production can be curbed by building a global, comprehensive, non-discriminatory inter­national regime of nuclear disarmament. This sort of regime should find a viable way to ensure delegitimisation and de-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The US President Barack Obama’s decision to shelve the East European missile shield must be taken as a positive

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Nuclear weapons free world (NWFW) is a grand goal, which can’t be attained in the shortest possible time.

Its prospect hinges greatly on the future international nuclear order to be shaped by nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear power. Real progress towards the attainability of nuclear weapons free world depends first of all on the cooperative approaches and positive steps taken by the nuclear weapon States, firstly led by the United States and Russia, accounting for 95 per cent of global nuclear weapons. Others will only join in when these two principal nuclear weapon States (NWS) cut their nuclear stockpiles and delivery systems drastically and move towards the grand goal of nuclear weapons free world.

NWFW will not remain a mirage if all nations and peoples join together to take required steps and offer support in good faith, whether they have nuclear technologies or not.

rogue actors

Pakistan's nuclear complex:

Aditi Malhotra

Finally the realisation is dawning that the proposition that because Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is under the exclusive control of the Pakistan Army it is safe and secure and not likely to fall into terrorist hands is fundamentally flawed. Simple arithmetic will prove that since military dictator Gen. Ziaul Haq introduced the imported Saudi brand of Wahabi Salafi-ism as the credo of the armed forces every soldier from the Chief of Army Staff down to the soldier has been dyed in the deepest shade of Islamic fundamentalism. The recent Rand Corporation study has underscored that the Pakistan Army is using the nuclear arsenal to help jihadi operations against India.

The writer is Professor in the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies (DDSS) and Dean, Faculty of Science, DDU Gorakhpur University, UP, India. He is author of five books, has edited three and has contributed seventeen chapters in the books edited by distinguished Indian and foreign scholars. He has the privilege of receiving special Fellowship given by the United Nations as participant in the training programme on Arms Control and Disarmament (1996), administered jointly by the Department of Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, New York and Juniata International Centre, Williamsburg, Penn, USA.

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outh Asia is yet again in the spotlight for its ‘enthusiastic’ nuclear attitude. With the recent unveiling of China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation, the issue of Pakistan’s nuclear security has once again gained momentum.

Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi proclaimed that post-nuclear summit “the world is comfortable with them” [Pakistan’s nuclear assets] and Pakistan “attaches the highest importance to the security of nuclear materials and facilities.”

Some officials in the West seem to regard their [Pakistan] nuclear assets as safe but it would not be wrong to state that this belief prevails primarily owing to the strategic importantce of Pakistan in US’s Af-Pak policy. The overriding concern about Pakistan’s nuclear security is overtly pronounced in the reports of some Western analysts.

Army-jihad complex As internal turmoil dominates the political landscape of Pakistan, the criticality about the safety of its nuclear complex needs to be revisited. Pakistan’s nuclear discourse has many dimensions and this article will explore certain crucial aspects. Specifically, they are the Army-Jihadi complex, supra-national individuals like A. Q. Khan, intentions of terrorist groups, theft of nuclear material and lastly, assassination of key nuclear commanders.

One of the most (seemingly) comforting arguments lies in the belief that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are safe, purely because they remain under the jurisdiction of the Army. Examining the Pakistani case, there seems to be a serious susceptibility from individuals and factions within the military and intelligence services, who are in cahoots with terrorist groups. What places the vulnerabilities at the peak is the dangerous relationship between the army, intelligence services and the terrorist groups. While a segment of Taliban may be against some sections of Pakistani society; several elements in Taliban continue to maintain a cosy relationship with

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the Pakistani Army, especially its intelligence establishment. Therefore, the struggle within the Pakistani Army and the perils of Army-jihadi complex pose a serious security problem for Pakistan‘s nuclear arsenals.

Zia’s legacy Tracing historical accounts, extreme religious ideas penetrated the military during the rule of General Ziaul Haq, which led to ISI’s strong links with religious groups. Extreme Islamisation became a part of Pakistan‘s foreign policy and was evident with unbound support given to the mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan war.

When the US imposed sanctions on Pakistan for establishing its covert nuclear programme, the young officers of those times bore anti-American sentiments. Additionally, they were most receptive to Islam fundamentalist ideology and anti-Americanism.

Unfortunately, those young officers today are two and three-star generals.

Taking into account the extreme Islamisation that dominated the army for decades, there is a clear-cut dichotomy in the present demand of a ‘moderate Islam’ outlook.

The “war on terror” has compelled these same officers to crack down on Islamists. This reaction is obviously something new to the officers who were indoctrinated to support the mujahideen in Afghanistan and then in Kashmir. The allegiance of some officers does remain with the current objectives, while some consider it as anti-Islamic.

This is evident by the rising ‘bear count’ in the armed forces that reflects their strong religious attitude. The case of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed best reflects the connection between terrorist groups and the military. Khaled, the alleged mastermind of 9/11, after escaping many arrests was finally arrested in 2003, at a ‘safe house’ of a serving army officer with links to Jamaat-i-Islami. For this reason, this dangerous link cannot be forestalled.

Pakistan established the practice of Personnel Reliability Programme (PRP) to weed out terrorist sympathisers and ensure a high degree of reliability among its members. It is stated that any personnel that do not adhere to PRP standards are not allowed access to nuclear facilities. The PRP standards

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include religious orientations, personality complications, sexual deviancy etc. Further, the Pakistani Army has introduced the practice of two-man rule system which ascertains that it is mandatory to have at least 2 personnel at a sensitive area at all times.

Such preparations are believed to guarantee that no unsound individual gains control of nuclear weapons.

Rogue actors The practice in itself is commendable and theoretically assures a high degree of security, but its application is questionable. What is not in the public domain is how well these procedures are implemented and if any defectors have ever been identified or removed.

It is true that unreliability can crop up in various forms and even if all individuals are not a threat, some are likely to be. The unknown figure is what causes added anxieties and results in severe doubts about Pakistan‘s claims.

According to Asian News International, civilians that access highly enriched uranium (HEU) are not scrutinised as thoroughly as the military personnel involved in weaponry operations.

It is important to bear in mind that Pakistan‘s nuclear evolution relied on illicit nuclear procurements, which reveals its inherent dependence on rogue actors. Therefore, it would become difficult to weed out the inappropriate personnel easily, from a system so deeply entangled with rogue elements. It is partially reassuring that former President Musharraf purged many top and middle level officers of the ISI because of their links to the Taliban or Al Qaeda but it is not unreasonable to believe that none are aware of the actual number of Islamic sympathisers in the military or ISI presently. As the line goes, “Who watches the watchmen?” Allied to the intentions of terrorist groups to employ WMD for mass killing, these connections and links are a cause of grave concern.

The secrecy surrounding Pakistan’s nuclear assets and procedures to safeguard them has added to the international unease. Even though the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review focuses on the issue of nuclear terrorism and illicit nuclear trade, little has been done in Pakistan to ensure such regulations.

The case of A. Q. Khan is one such

Another major situation involves the fears that fundamentalists could assassinate the most important personnel of nuclear command and control, thus creating a gap in the organisation, making it more vulnerable to unauthorised usage.

This fear gained much momentum and weight with three attempted assassinations of Musharraf in 2000, 2003 and 2007

Myanmar.

However, A. Q. Khan’s case is not in isolation. Another example is that of Sultan Mahmood, an Islamist who eventually gave up his position as director of Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). He reportedly revealed some rough designs of creating a nuclear weapon to Osama bin Laden in 1999. Apart from this case, Prof. Chaudhry Abdul Majeed and Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, two renowned nuclear scientists in the region, with deep religious orientation, have also been involved in leaking nuclear information to the Taliban.

These reports contradict Pakistan‘s

to acquire an atomic bomb. Adding to the scare was a fatwa issued by Sheikh Nasir bin Hamid al-Fahd, allowing the use of WMD, even if it involves killings of innocent Muslims.

An important and rather intimidating characteristic of Pakistan‘s nuclear infrastructure is that major nuclear sites are in close proximity of violence prone regions on their western frontiers.

The establishment of the same away from the eastern border was originally intended to minimise the likelihood of an Indian attack on the infrastructure.

Unfortunately, this has got the facilities closer to the instable Af-Pak region.

These areas remain the hub of terrorist

incident. Khan, who was never actually “punished”, was kept under house arrest till the Pakistani court recently declared him a ‘free citizen’ and allowed him to ‘move freely and continue his activities’. Dr. Khan, known as the father of Pakistan‘s nuclear programme, eventually became the ringmaster of a nuclear black market, which was revealed in February 2004.

Musharraf’s testimony When former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf was questioned on this case, he maintained that the army did not know about such activities. He said, “...if there was some individual who for personal gain wanted to sell national assets ... it could be possible because it was not under strategic checks and controls.” The statement reveals a daunting fact. In case the army wasn’t aware about the activities (a highly unlikely scenario), it reflects that the army did not exercise serious control over its nuclear establishments.

Pakistan remains a serious concern because the black market network established by A. Q. Khan has been instrumental in nuclear proliferation.

Most of the States that have relied on this network for their nuclear efforts are prone to instability, viz North Korea, Iran, Libya and allegedly

continuous pronouncements that their nuclear assets are in safe hands.

activities and sectarian violence in the country.

WMD’s allowed

Dirty bombs

Another worrying dimension is the intentions of terrorist networks and their reach. Although Al Qaeda has, so far, employed conventional explosives for destruction, reports reveal that they may be willing to employ nuclear weapons for the same.

American accounts have reported that Osama bin Laden has declared the possession of nuclear weapons as a religious duty. Furthermore, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reported about his efforts

According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, there are approximately 47 terrorist and extremist organisations in Pakistan. While some are involved with strong ties to infiltration into Jammu and Kashmir, others are a part of Pakistan’s Taliban with strong ties to Afghanistan’s Taliban or foreign jihadis.

Apart from these, there are groups involved in sectarian violence, specifically, insurgents involved in

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Baluchistan, Shia / Sunni and Punjabi / Sindhi violence. Consequently, the presence of such groups contributes to security threats to the nuclear facilities.

Numerous attempts have been made by terrorist groups to accumulate enough nuclear fuel to create dirty bombs or a nuclear weapon (which is highly unlikely to happen in the near future).

Pakistan is capable of making plutonium and HEU for nuclear use.

The potential theft of nuclear fuel directly implies the ease for the terrorists to make a dirty bomb. Pakistan has been unable to account on the quantum of nuclear fissile material within its boundaries. This further leads to worry because without a record of the nuclear material present, it would be difficult to track stolen material (if any).

Presently, no available accounts declare that a terrorist group, functioning independent of a government, have the skills to develop a nuclear weapon.

Certainly, developing a nuclear weapon is not easy even if the terrorists gather the needed nuclear material. Besides, one cannot deny that outsiders cannot get access to nuclear fissile material.

There have, however, been numerous recorded cases of thefts. According to UN agency reports, in 2005 and 2006 alone, there have been more than 250 cases of unauthorised possession, theft or loss of nuclear or related materials reported to the UN IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB). Having noted this, it is particularly important for Pakistan to keep a track of its fissile material, strictly monitoring the movements of fuel. There are strong reasons to believe that Pakistan does not have fissile material protection, control and accounting (MPC&A) systems installed at its nuclear facilities.

These systems are easily available but seemingly Pakistan neither will be able to afford nor possess the expertise to produce a similar technology.

Control by assassination Another major situation involves the fears that fundamentalists could assassinate the most important personnel of nuclear command and control, thus creating a gap in the organisation, making it more vulnerable to unauthorised usage. This fear gained much momentum and weight with three attempted assassinations of Musharraf in 2000, 2003 and 2007. All attempts had links to army personnel

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and Al Qaeda. Benazir Bhutto’s killing is also considered as an evidence of Islamic anger and also points towards the role of Pakistan army.

One cannot ignore that in order to fulfil their plans of eliminating key commanders the fundamentalists will have to resort to simultaneous attacks on numerous commanders.

Despite the pattern of previous attacks, eliminating all key leaders seems highly improbable. As mentioned before, many back-up plans and contingency remain untested, therefore adding an element of uncertainty to the scenario.

Based on reports, there have been three suicide attacks at, or close to Sargodha Air Base (nuclear weapons and missile storage facilities). Other attacks were in Punjab, NWPF and Wah Cantonment ordnance factory. It is important to note that the sites targeted provided security facilities for Pakistan‘s nuclear programme. Clearly, Pakistan is at war with itself. In view of the drone attacks in the tribal agencies of Pakistan and the offensives launched by the Pakistani Army, acts of violence by insurgent Taliban forces will continue to escalate and be a source of constant threat for Pakistan’s nuclear security.

Dual-key system It is prudent to consider that no security arrangement is foolproof but Pakistan should adopt measures to minimise its vulnerabilities and direct its efforts to a relatively more

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secure nuclear complex. Primarily, it is essential to ensure the existence of stable democratic institutions in the country. Serious efforts should be made to implement a version of ‘dual-key system’, with a balance of civilian and military participation in it. To facilitate enhanced security, a guardianship system that was once practiced by the US in 1940s should be adopted.

Pakistan should adopt a more rigorous PRP in order to identify their malcontents better. Accordingly, Pakistan should adopt a much more transparent attitude regarding their nuclear doctrine, nuclear assets, PRP defectors etc. This will facilitate its relationship of trust and cooperation with the international community.

Genuine efforts should be directed towards employing internationally trusted systems like the MPC&A. Such systems provide higher guarantee of nuclear safety internally and externally.

It is important for Pakistan to practice recessed deterrence and comply with it even under extremely tensed situations. This reduces the chances of any potential theft or unauthorised usage. In the nutshell, Pakistan should not evade the issue of nuclear security but rather work towards a more secure nuclear complex.

The writer is a research assistant at Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), New Delhi.

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