DSA September 2012 by Defence and Security Alert

editor-in-chief

“The country comes first - always and every time”. Déjà vu: Non-alignment 2.0 – A Policy Prescription for Disaster

he 1962 India-China War evokes painful memories of a deep and traumatic national humiliation. In military terms it was just a tactical battle with a mere 2-3 divisions involved from both sides. The problem lay in the sheer incompetence and ineptitude displayed by the Indian political and military leadership of that period and the tragic anchor premise of that era – China would not wage war! 1962 was a watershed which mercifully led to the demise of Nehruvian liberalism. It led to the rise of Realism and Realpolitik in the Indian state. To that extent 1962 was a great blessing in disguise. It paved the way for the military stalemate of 1965 and then the historic victory of 1971 Bangladesh War. The 1962 War had started in September – some 50 years back. Why remember it now? Because half a century past we are seeing a familiar pattern of events repeat themselves in a manner that is cause for serious national concern. We are seeing a return of the Nehruvian state with a new version of Non-alignment 2.0 and a new found conviction that war is just not possible. While rejecting the Indian Army’s proposal for the mountain strike corps, the Finance Ministry had asked as to how durable was the Chinese threat? It was astounding to learn that the mandarins of our Finance Ministry expect China to disappear / fade away after a few years. The air of Déjà vu is ominous. Consider these: ● In 1960 there was a serious Civil-Military clash between the then RM and Gen Thimayya over the issue of lack of military preparedness to take on China. The government had reduced defence expenditure then to just 1 per cent of the GDP. ● We have just had a similar spat in Civil-Military relations. One of the precipitating factors again was the excruciatingly slow pace of our defence acquisitions process that is opening serious windows of vulnerability vis a vis the China-Pakistan combine. ● In 1962 the prime cause of the disaster was a deeply entrenched mindset – China wouldn’t attack – so it was ok to do tokenism via the Forward Policy and placate inflamed public opinion. ● In 2012 we have the NSC sponsored paper called Non-alignment 2.0 that starts from a premise that we must sit on the fence in the geo-political competition between USA and China. ● What is worse is the assumption that there is virtually zero probability of any Chinese attack because we are now a nuclear power. Military operations by China, if any, will only be in the form of small nibbles / bites. So we do not need any sound defences / counter-attack capabilities on our Himalayan border but only a tripwire / a thin red line. ● What is even more amazing is the policy prescription that should China or Pakistan attack we dare not think of a proportionate military response for we will get nuked. (Apparently our nukes will deter no one from a nuclear release.) ● This policy prescription enters the realm of the fantastic when it says that we train the Monpas, Adu Mishims and other tribes like the Bodos for guerilla warfare in the Chinese rear. Till here it sounds fine – what is preposterous is the assumption that apparently the Chinese will be so terrified of our tribal guerillas that they won’t dare attack. The author, unfortunately, forgets that from 1956-1961, the Chinese had ruthlessly crushed the Khampa rebellion in Tibet and then attacked us in 1962. So the notion that the Chinese PLA is terrified of asymmetric warfare is indeed fantastic. ● These policy prescriptions become disturbing when they are used to stop the raising of a strike corps for the Himalayas on the plea that it would provoke China. The authors of the paper want a thin red line – a military tripwire in the Himalayas to draw the Chinese in and then let our NE tribals launch guerilla warfare in their rear. Meanwhile, they want the Indian Navy to launch a grandiose counter-attack on the Chinese SLOCs in the IOR. The Indian Navy will do well in any such attack on the Chinese SLOCs. Unfortunately, it will do little to alter the outcome of any land battle in the Himalayas. The concept that we tamely surrender on land and fight on the sea is not sustainable. ● The whole Non-alignment 2.0 paper exercise is a policy prescription for kowtowing to a rising China and waving the flag of surrender even before the hostilities begin. ● One would have thought that this bizarre, theoretical kite flying exercise was merely an attempt at appeasing China for the time being to buy time to complete our inordinately delayed military build-up. However, with the stalling of our Strike Corps, this kite flying has assumed dangerous proportions that could derail our much delayed military build-up. The need for a counter-offensive option against China had been keenly felt as far back as the 1980s during the tenure of the highly professional Gen Krishna Rao as the Chief. It has already been critically delayed. ● We thought we were heading for a Multipolar World Order where we would be one of the Poles of Power. We now see our security establishment’s official vision of a new Bipolar world with USA and China as the sole super powers and a cowering, quivering India pleading that it is Non-aligned – so as not to annoy a rising China. It is a pathetic and defeatist vision and no one has the right to impose this Munich mentality on our country.

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) September 2012 Defence AND security alert

founding editor

publisher’s view

History teaches us hard lessons

istorical mistakes teach us lessons in our lifetime. It is a blessing in disguise if we are able to use it like a mirror to reflect our past to remind ourselves of the error of our ways, the shortfalls that we had shown and the grief that we had caused to ourselves or our nation. Reflections, both physical and esoteric, help us skirt the shortfalls of the past and make our present less burdened with psychological baggage and our future more assured and secure.

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Volume 3 Issue 12 September 2012 chairman shyam sunder publisher and ceo pawan agrawal founding editor manvendra singh editor-in-chief maj gen (dr) g d bakshi SM, VSM (retd) director shishir bhushan corporate consultant k j singh art consultant divya gupta central saint martins college of art & design, university of arts, london marketing and sales dhirendra sharma corporate communications tejinder singh creative vivek anand pant administration shveta gupta representative (Jammu and Kashmir) salil sharma correspondent (Europe) dominika cosic production dilshad and dabeer webmaster sundar rawat photographer subhash circulation and distribution mithlesh tiwari e-mail: (first name)@dsalert.org info: info@dsalert.org articles: articles@dsalert.org subscription: subscription@dsalert.org online edition: online@dsalert.org advertisement: advt@dsalert.org editorial and business office 4/19 asaf ali road new delhi-110002 (India) t: +91-011-23243999, 23287999, 9958382999 e: info@dsalert.org www.dsalert.org

disclaimer all rights reserved. reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part by any means without permission from Defence and Security Alert is prohibited. opinions expressed are those of the individual writers and do not necessarily reflect those of the publisher and / or editors. all disputes are subject to jurisdiction of delhi courts. defence and security alert is printed, published and owned by pawan agrawal and printed at graphic world, 1686, kucha dakhini rai, darya ganj, new delhi-110002 and published at 4/19 asaf ali road, new delhi (india). editor: manvendra singh.

The war with China in 1962 was one such historical mistake which we cannot forget. There were some shortfalls at our end because of which we could not win the war against China at that point in time. But today, after almost 50 years, things are radically different; we are more confident, prepared and ready for any challenge. However, the Chinese attack of 1962 was what was known as a conventional attack. Today we are being confronted by what is called a pseudo-war – unconventional, undeclared and clandestine in its methodology. It is being organised by China in conjunction with Pakistan with the intention of destabilising India through a thousand lethal cuts as per Chinese philosophy. Attempts to destabilise India ‘by other means’ has been a persistent factor over this past half century but India has withstood it with resilience and confidence. The situation has changed drastically in 50 years on both sides of the Line of Actual Control created by the Chinese invasion of 1962. China has completed the ‘four modernisations’ of its military and infrastructure and India has, belatedly, begun improving its manpower capability and infrastructure facilities. India’s defences have improved and our economic growth is an acknowledged fact. China may have developed the best technologies for its land forces and improved its aero power and naval forces and equipped them with the best of munitions but over the last five decades Indian forces have won three wars and are acknowledged to be the most battle-hardened in Asia. Today our forces are absolutely ready to take up any challenge by China or any other country for safeguarding our sovereignty. The times have changed. Our scientists and the research teams of the Defence Research and Development Organisation have developed cutting edge technologies for our defence forces and have made the forces tough and strong to take up any challenge on land, air or seas. Our nuclear programme has been on the right track and we are about to complete the nuclear triad of strategic forces on land, in the air and soon in the sea as well and have created a credible nuclear deterrent albeit of the minimal requirement. So China knows that India is no longer the pushover it was in 1962 and evidence of that was given to it in the short and sharp battle at Nathu La in 1967. And above all the morale of Indian forces is at the highest level and our defence establishments are well equipped with the best technologies developed within the country and some obtained from other countries which have made our forces one of the best armed elements in the world. So we are not worried for any reason that China may try to attack us in the near future because if it tries, this time it will be a debacle for them. I would like to mention here that the status of China in the UN is because of the soft attitude we had for them 50 years back. We insisted that China, a pariah at the time, should have its due place within the UNO but now we are the wiser and tougher and we have learnt from our history and we are not going to make such mistakes again. Dear readers, DSA will be completing three years this October and I wish to assure you that team DSA is committed and dedicated to bring to you non-partisan and dispassionate analyses, views and perspective on defence and security issues of national and global importance. I am also happy to inform you that we have recently tied-up with a world renowned organisation, Fleming Gulf, as the Strategic Partner for their first conference on “Defence Modernisation in India Summit” on 29th and 30th November, 2012 at New Delhi. I am sure it will be of great interest to the defence personnel and our friends in the defence industry. Please get in touch with team DSA for sponsorships and delegate registration. I invite you to be an active partner in India’s defence modernisation.

nniversaries are always something to savour, reminisce, enjoy and to learn from. And more so when it relates to military anniversaries. For these are occasions for the young to gain inspiration and the nation to acknowledge the sacrifices of its braves. Veterans get to be recognised on these days, these ceremonies. Even if they’re forgotten for the rest of the year. Memorials are decorated and the citizenry of India feel as one with those who aren’t with them anymore. These are essential blocks of the nation building process, one of pride and association. Alas, none of this can be said for the memories of the 1962 War.

It was a war that needn’t have been fought. It was a war into which late Jawaharlal Nehru dragged India, unprepared and confused. The result of which has been that India is still living in a denial about the war. Of course India lost the war, of that there is no doubt. But it was a war, even if India had to fight it, in which victory was possible if the Prime Minister of India and his military leadership been prepared for a fight. That wasn’t the case and till today the country has a skewed sense of the war, mixing up history with emotion.

The genesis of the war is the McMahon Line and China’s misgivings with it as far as India was concerned. It was in the process of, or had already agreed with, other countries afflicted by the same Line. In India’s case there was a hesitation and that was on account of the peculiar politics of PM Nehru. On the one hand he would bend over backwards to please Beijing, when India declined permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council because China was not a member (!), or shutting down India’s consulate in Lhasa; while on the other he would give refuge to the Dalai Lama and appear as the champion of Tibetan rights. This mixed up sense of self and of India’s place under the sun, pushed China into a position that needn’t have been the result in any case.

It is a fact that the Chinese did more to avoid conflict than the supposedly peace loving and non-aligned Nehru. But such was the self-image of Nehru that he wouldn’t believe India was walking into an abyss. Surrounded by those who didn’t know better, Nehru pulled and pushed India into a crisis that needn’t have been the end result. Incompetent military leadership and insufficient military advice compounded the errors. The saga of Lt Gen Kaul has been much written that there is no reason to repeat it here. Suffice to say that whoever advised and somebody did, that the Air Force should not be used, was fit for a court martial and worse. At the end of the day all that separated India from at least a stalemate, if not a victory knicked out of the jaws of defeat, was the fact that Nehru did not think airpower should be used ‘since it would escalate the conflict’. A bizarre logic as ever existed.

The end result being that India is still to fight the ghosts of the defeat of 1962 and realise that China is no greater than our own country. The determining difference then and now, is only the quality of leadership, civil or military.

manvendra singh

Jai Hind!

pawan agrawal

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

contents REMEMBERING 1962 September 2012

contents

An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Magazine

Volume 3 Issue 12 September 2012

A R T I C L E S India-China preparing for the inevitable

Amb K V Rajan

C O L U M N S empirical glimpse: the global theatres of jihad Indiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s internal security challenges are significant

Dr Rupali Jeswal Dr Vivek Lall

54 60

Chinaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s new military leadership

the nuclear factor in the evolution of relations

non-alignment 2.0: a policy prescription for placating China?

the ghosts of Henderson Brooks and Bhagat double, double toil and trouble

a changing trajectory: Chinese tracking of India and aerospace Dr Lora Saalman

India-China equation

the China-US-India dynamic: geopolitical jostling begins Dr Harsh V Pant

geo-strategic balance

India and China: new great game in the Indo-Pacific ocean region Cmde Ranjit Bhawnani Rai (retd)

the two-front threat and warning intelligence Dr Prem Mahadevan

cyberspace management getting critical in India Subimal Bhattacharjee

the debacle at Se La: a classic example of military incompetence Maj Gen V K Singh (retd)

India China: naval balance Rear Adm (Dr) S Kulshrestha (retd)

Sino-Indian dispute and our preparedness Air Vice Marshal A K Tiwary VSM (retd)

F E A T U R E S

India-China relations: strategic stability, tactical aggressiveness Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd)

the 1962 India-China war a case study of Chinese decision-making process lessons for future conflicts 78 DSA Research Team

Jayadeva Ranade

Amb Arundhati Ghose

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd)

Vice Adm Vijay Shankar PVSM, AVSM, ADC (retd)

Maj Gen Afsir Karim AVSM (retd)

Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee AVSM (retd)

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September 2012 Defence AND security alert

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@dsalert September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

STRATEGIC COMPETITION

A Amb K V Rajan The writer has served as India’s Ambassador in France, USA, UK, Zambia, Algeria and Nepal. He has also held senior positions in the MEA including as Secretary (East) and Advisor to the Minister; led the Indian delegation, including as the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy, to various international conferences and summit meetings; was co-Chairman of the India-Iran Joint Committee on the Iran-Pak-India Gas Pipeline, Member of the Oil Diplomacy Group set up by the Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas. He is widely travelled and is a specialist on South Asian, Asian, European, American and African issues. He was Member, National Security Advisory Board and also President of the Association of Indian Diplomats. He writes and lectures regularly on foreign policy issues. India’s only option is to nip the Chinese threat in the bud, through systematic modernisation, intensification and expansion of its own military capabilities and projections, strategic tie-ups with friendly nations and, as necessary, substantive information sharing and coordination arrangements with the US

nother Sino-Indian conflict is an unnecessary, unthinkable, unpleasant, unlikely or simply unacceptable proposition for many in India – or for that matter, in China. Both countries have other, more pressing priorities, in the domestic as well as foreign policy context. The logic of an “Asian Century” built on the foundations of a relationship of peaceful cooperation between the two billion plus peoples of India and China has a strong win-win appeal for both countries.

compatibility between China’s historical track record on the one hand and current ground realities and evolving trends on the other. To pick up the latter category first, there are a number of ingredients in the relationship which are potentially combustible. To name a few that come immediately to mind:

While it is true that the border remains unresolved and the Chinese continue to be somewhat unhelpful on issues like Arunachal Pradesh, the overall consolidation and expansion of bilateral relations is proceeding apace. China is already India’s largest (or second largest, after the EU) trading partner; the business community is certainly quite upbeat about the future; high level visits, people to people contacts, cultural exchanges, cooperation on multilateral issues are all on a positive trajectory.

China’s problems in Tibet and the perceived linkages with the Dalai Lama;

Moreover, China’s priorities and challenges would seem to favour a reasonably even expansion and diversification of cooperation with India, given its focus on sustaining its own economic growth, rather than on fuelling India’s sense of insecurity through a test of nerves or muscle flexing on the border, or in India’s backyard, or on the high seas. China will also be busy in managing internal tensions in an environment of market liberalisation with minimal political reform; containing ethnic dissent and consolidating its hold on Tibet; ensuring that Taiwan continues to be an economic partner without challenging the overarching political arrangement of modus vivendi between Communist China and democratic Taiwan; dealing with difficult neighbours like South Korea, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines; above all, managing growing defiance of Chinese authority in Tibet. Chinese scholars do argue that no particular national interest would be served for China to invite a major distraction and expend precious energy and resources, through confrontational policies with India. In fact, the yearning to be a “different kind of super power by 2020, one that is responsible, trustworthy, attractive” is being increasingly articulated. In response, Indian scholars can also be heard voicing (cautious) optimism regarding the future relationship between Asia’s giants.

Evolving trends On the other hand, while one should be careful not to sound unnecessarily alarmist or demonise China, it is important not to be dismissive of those who see a certain disturbing

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

The unresolved border dispute; China’s military bases and other activities aimed against India from Tibet;

China’s strategic support for Pakistan directly threatening India’s security; Competition for energy and resources; Chinese provocations in the Indian Ocean; Chinese attempts to fish in troubled waters in India’s immediate neighbourhood whenever there is an opportunity in deliberate disregard of Indian sensitivities (Nepal is the current theatre for such activities);

India-China Preparing for the Inevitable D

espite recurring exhortations from diplomats and politicians on both sides to build a relationship between India and China of “strategic mutual trust”, “strategic maturity”, “strategic stability”, it is reasonably clear that the coming decades will witness intensifying “strategic competition”. Whether this can degenerate into a confrontation at some point in time, or worse, a conflict which neither country can afford, will largely depend on the extent to which China gives up the Middle Kingdom mentality and accepts its responsibilities as an equal member of the comity of nations, even if it is more powerful than most. The problem, of course, is that by the time it is clear what China’s intentions really are, say in a decade or so, it might be too late for India to salvage its interests. This is the principal reason why India must prepare now for a possible conflict which it does not want, but cannot afford to lose.

Chinese reactions to India’s increasing profile in its neighbourhood; Chinese over-reactions to Indo-US strategic ties. Another potential source for serious friction arises from the fact that China has the capacity to disrupt the flow of major Indian rivers. Its construction of mega-dams, its water management projects and its dismissive attitude to suggestions for water-sharing cooperation arrangements. A similar list of areas of convergence or complementarities which are in the mutual interests of India and China, as compared to mainly Chinese interests, would be difficult to prepare without extensive research (or some wishful thinking!). China presents a huge problem as well as huge opportunities for India, as it does to most other countries. On the basis of a clinical examination, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that, in the not too distant future, the “opportunities” will come under the shadow of the “challenges”. Any one of the explosive ingredients mentioned above could be the cause of serious friction, a breakdown of diplomacy, over-reactions, miscalculations or misjudgements on one side or the other and a violent clash, with unpredictable longer term repercussions.

The India-China war of five decades ago continues to cast a long shadow over Indian thinking about anything to do with China, except possibly Chinese food. It would greatly help if India is able to come face to face with certain truths: that with better political management of tensions that arose in the late ’fifties, a conflict could have been avoided, or at least deferred, hopefully with a better outcome from India’s point of view; that India under Jawaharlal Nehru could and should have avoided costly misjudgements about China’s intentions and miscalculations about its own military capabilities and state of preparedness.

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

STRATEGIC COMPETITION

The logic of an “Asian Century” built on the foundations of a relationship of peaceful cooperation between the two billion plus peoples of India and China has a strong win-win appeal for both countries But even when these are acknowledged, the disturbing reality that is seeping into the national consciousness fifty years after that war is that for China, it was probably not a stand-alone conflict provoked by India’s territorial claims in a disputed area, but a necessary action, both in the context of Chinese perspectives of its place in history as well as contemporary challenges posed to its self-image by Nehru’s India. In regard to the latter, it was necessary for China to put India in its place for Nehru’s leadership pretensions in the region, in the non-aligned movement and generally, in the post-colonial-order third world. As for the former, Mao invoked historical memory going far back into the past and extracted a PLA consensus that a partially successful attempt to crush an Indian challenge of long ago needed to be completed now; moreover, a border which was a legacy of British colonial history could hardly be accepted as sacrosanct. (Of course, according to that border Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim were also a part of China. Mao had said way back in 1950, after China had moved into Tibet: “Tibet is the palm and Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal are its fingers. Now that the palm is with us, we must have the fingers.”) The fact that the Dalai Lama had fled the Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950 and had sought and obtained, refuge in Nehru’s India on humanitarian grounds was obviously also an important factor in ending the “Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai” phase of bilateral ties through an emphatic military message. It is significant that, despite a steady expansion of trade, political, cultural and other forms of cooperation between India and China in the past fifty years, China has steadfastly refused to come to an agreement on the border dispute. Clearly, it feels that it has a pressure mechanism in its hands which can

be activated at will to pressurise India and therefore should not be given up, despite the obvious advantages for both countries to settle this long festering problem.

Civilisational ethos The differing civilisational ethos of the two countries is also something which needs to be discussed and understood. India’s defining world view is best expressed in the several-thousand year statement of our sages – Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam – “the world is one family”. For Mao, as for most Chinese policy makers even today, China is supposedly first a civilisation and then a nation state. The civilisational entity takes a much longer term view, backwards and into the future, than does the state. Hence the capacity of China to adjust the different culture and polity of Hong Kong the totally different culture and polity of the mainland. Irrespective of changes in leadership, the Chinese nation state will remain anchored to the civilisational commitment to be the superior centre, the Middle Kingdom. Since many centuries ago, other nationalities are considered to be barbarians, who would sooner or later consider it a privilege to pay tribute to China, accept its suzerainty and be transformed into accepting the Chinese world view. Until they do, China’s state policies can be quite flexible according to expediency. They can be assertive to the point of being aggressive. Or pragmatic. Or even submissive. In the case of the 1962 conflict, certain historical shortcomings in China’s past attempts to establish its superiority over India had to be corrected and India offered the right opportunity, which China exploited with surgical precision.

China’s priorities and challenges would seem to favour a reasonably even expansion and diversification of cooperation with India, given its focus on sustaining its own economic growth, rather than on fuelling India’s sense of insecurity through a test of nerves or muscle flexing on the border or in India’s backyard or on the igh seas China’s continuing consolidate its hold

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

failure to on Tibet,

combined with the unresolved border with India which is the basis for claiming long established parts of India such as the state of Arunachal Pradesh, remains a potentially explosive ingredient of the bilateral relationship. In addition to the vastly superior infrastructure China has built on its side of the Line of Actual Control, there are all kinds of indications of the Ch i n e s e improving their intelli g e n c e and rapid military bui l d - u p facilities in Tibet, including for reinforcement of its already heavy offensive airstrike and military capabilities from there. The military infrastructure in Tibet, including plans to extend the existing rail links to Shigatse and on to Kathmandu, tens of thousands of kilometres of excellent road networks, several modern air bases, missile sites and ammunition depots pose a direct security challenge to India’s defence planning. The Indian Army has often asserted its confidence in ensuring that there will be no repeat of 1962 in dealing with a concrete Chinese threat at the disputed border, but the morale of the civilian populace in Border States cannot be said to be high. The poor quality of governance, lack of confidence in political leaders from all parties, the self-inflicted dents in the Indian Army’s professional image, should be cause for serious concern in India, just as they must be a source of great encouragement and satisfaction to military planners on the Chinese side.

Another potential source for serious friction arises from the fact that China has the capacity to disrupt the flow of major Indian rivers. Its construction of mega-dams, its water management projects and its dismissive attitude to suggestions for water-sharing cooperation arrangements Competition for energy resources in the Middle East and Africa will inevitably translate into increasing competition in political, economic, defence and security ties with supplier nations and competition for control over the sea lanes. There continues to be much discussion, without much agreement, about the so-called “String of Pearls” policy of maritime encirclement of

India through China’s expanded presence and activities in the Indian Ocean. One distinguished former Indian diplomat has suggested that India could take these in its stride and the security implications are probably exaggerated: “a string of pearls is hardly the best murder weapon.” Others strongly disagee. They feel that Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh and Chinese investment in Myanmar, have obvious strategic implications that go beyond simply supporting mercantile cargo destined for China: India’s geographical advantage in the Indian Ocean region will be sought to be systematically eroded within a finite time frame.

Chinese scholars do argue that no particular national interest would be served for China to invite a major distraction and expend precious energy and resources, through confrontational policies with India. In fact, the yearning to be a “different kind of super power by 2020, one that is responsible, trustworthy, attractive” is being increasingly articulated. In response, Indian scholars can also be heard voicing (cautious) optimism regarding the future relationship between Asia’s giants India’s only option is to nip the Chinese threat in the bud, through systematic modernisation, intensification and expansion of its own military capabilities and projections, strategic tie-ups with friendly nations and, as necessary, substantive information sharing and coordination arrangements with the US. In other words, while it is true that India will be able to deal with any maritime threat from China in the Indian Ocean in the immediate future, there is no room for complacency. Every Chinese action or pronouncement here should be seen in the context of ground realities and trends elsewhere in India’s neighbourhood, all of which undoubtedly support the thesis that China is testing the waters (pun unintended) regarding India’s resolve to maintain its leverages in its backyard, while also testing

the capacity and will of India’s neighbours to strengthen their anti-India activities traditionally fuelled by anti-India sentiments – which are a fact of life, given the legacy of history combined with asymmetries dictated by geography. India has absolutely no problem with its neighbours having the best possible relationship with China. But it has difficulties if the spirit of China’s South Asia policy is hexiaogongda: “uniting with the small”– Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Burma and Sri Lanka – “to counter the big” – India. Today it is Nepal which is falling into China’s deadly trap, as China feeds the far Left as well as ultra Rightist forces with anti-India venom to vent their political frustrations; sooner rather than later, it will cross the lakshman rekha, by building infrastructures which will neutralise its disadvantages because of the intervening Himalayan heights, securing the same special treatment as accorded to India under the 1950 Treaty, by capturing strategic heights of the Nepal economy, by directly challenging India even in the Tarai, which is substantially populated by supposedly pro-India Madheshis. Will India wait until it is too late? Or will it act to pre-empt the Chinese challenge? India’s continuing diplomatic task is to manage the psyche of its smaller neighbours so that they realise that it is India and not China who will always be their true friend and well-wisher; while discouraging China from indulging in provocations and also giving it a sense of security about a strong relationship between India and its neighbours not being employed in any way against legitimate Chinese interests. Needless to say, when India tries (however tentatively) to improve relations with China’s neighbours, without meaning to return the compliment with a String of Pearls of its own around China – through agreements for offshore oil exploration with Vietnam, or naval exercises with South East Asian countries, the Chinese reaction is strongly negative. “Double Standards” is culturally legitimatised in the Chinese lexicon; moreover, China does not recognise any activity that it undertakes in

the pursuit of its interests, even if aimed against a third country as “aggressive”; any protest or countervailing action from the latter is therefore unwarranted and would merit strong countermeasures. In the new Asian Jungle Book that is being written and might take a decade or two to be completed, the key actors are the uncaged elephant, an increasingly strong and assertive dragon which is held in awe and some fear and a bunch of tigers who do not much like the dragon, even if they don’t quite get along among themselves. India’s Look East policy has found fertile jungle soil in this environment, despite China’s reservations and occasionally, opposition, the caution of and divisions between its prospective “tiger” partners and its own lethargy and inconsistencies. India’s economic, political and security ties with Mongolia, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia and Australia have grown steadily. At the same time, India has wisely resisted attempts to be roped into a regional “containment” strategy directed against China. This will only increase the dragon’s sense of insecurity and make it into a more unpredictable and hostile beast. Instead, the attempt is to forge potential balancing arrangements which should influence China to increasingly opt for the route of pragmatism and moderation and play according to internationally accepted rules in every sphere – political, economic, security, social, human rights etc. Is this an unrealistic hope? In terms of population, these prospective partners of India are half of China’s strength; in terms of GDP, however, they outclass China collectively two to one. Their collective military strength is also not insignificant. The problem of course is that many of them are not on particularly good terms with each other. In recent weeks, South Korea’s anger against Japan for its wartime treatment of Korean women and insensitivity to South Korean territorial and maritime claims has been as bitter as the China-Japan slanging match on their respective island claims. In fact,

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

announcement

STRATEGIC COMPETITION

the map of the North East and South East Asian region is clogged with criss-crossing red lines of claims to islands, Exclusive Economic Zones and islands. ASEAN itself, once touted as a role model for SAARC and other regional groupings, is in danger of unravelling because of one single factor: lack of agreement on how to deal with the increasingly assertive stance of China on its claims in the South China Sea. Countries like South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines would like a strong collective posture against the Chinese; China prefers to deal with each bilateral issue with the country concerned and has, through proxies like Cambodia and Laos (and possibly Myanmar) prevented an ASEAN consensus from emerging. Prospects of ASEAN becoming an EU-like free trade area by 2015 (the target date) are extremely dim. Advantage China.

The self-inflicted dents in the Indian Army’s professional image, should be cause for serious concern in India, just as they must be a source of great encouragement and satisfaction to military planners on the Chinese side All the more reason for India to consciously step up its defence-related arrangements individually with key ASEAN countries. The free-trade agreements it has with Singapore, South Korea, Malaysia, Japan and the ASEAN and its participation in multilateral forums should be constantly focused on reinforcing strategic ties with the region keeping China in mind. The name of the game is to refuse to endorse the idea of constraining or balancing China through such arrangements, but work with clarity, consistency and a sense of urgency precisely towards that objective.

Indo-US bulwark The US-India partnership is also emerging as an important component of India’s strategy to balance China’s power. India seeks US economic and technological assistance. Fortunately for India, two geopolitical adversaries – China and Pakistan – also now happen to be on the United States’ long-term and

immediate strategic radar as well. It is a great pity that the momentum and enthusiasm on both sides which was generated by the Indo-US nuclear deal and the flurry of high level interactions on cooperation in defence, high-tech transfers, nuclear, space, maritime spheres has dissipated under the Obama and UPA-II administrations. Advantage China again.

In addition to the vastly superior infrastructure China has built on its side of the Line of Actual Control, there are all kinds of indications of the Chinese improving their intelligence and rapid military build-up facilities in Tibet, including for reinforcement of its already heavy offensive airstrike and military capabilities from there On balance, despite recurring exhortations from diplomats and politicians on both sides to build a relationship between India and China of “strategic mutual trust”, “strategic maturity”, “strategic stability”, it is reasonably clear that the coming decades will witness intensifying “strategic competition”. Whether this can degenerate into a confrontation at some point in time, or worse, a conflict which neither country can afford, will largely depend on the extent to which China gives up the Middle Kingdom mentality and accepts its responsibilities as an equal member of the comity of nations, even if it is more powerful than most. The problem, of course, is that by the time it is clear what China’s intentions really are, say in a decade or so, it might be too late for India to salvage its interests. This is the principal reason why India must prepare now for a possible conflict which it does not want, but cannot afford to lose. At home, several steps can be taken, beginning with a serious attempt to forge a cross party consensus despite the poor political environment. The Prime Minister could call a two day closed door briefing of senior party leaders with the participation of serving and retired Indian diplomats, military and intelligence officials, business and media leaders and scholars as a first step towards better

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understanding of key challenges and the hard decisions that will have to be made. MEA should perhaps have a Secretary to deal exclusively with China, reporting directly to the Prime Minister, chairing inter-Ministerial meetings and also regularly briefing politicians, media, business and other leaders. Discussions with the US, EU and like minded Asian countries, on institutionalised linkages – not only at the government level but between think tanks, retired military personnel and diplomats, media and business leaders, civil society groups – to enable a deep understanding of common concerns about China and develop mechanisms for cooperation on a long-term basis would be another important task for the Secretary. In today’s situation, China is so far ahead in economic and military terms that India will remain a distant second in the Asian power structure for the foreseeable future. Yet in many ways it compares favourably with China, commands greater respect and affection globally for its democratic values and is often cited as the role model for emerging powers. It would therefore seem to be prudent for India to anticipate that China will look for a pretext to repeat a 1962 exercise in some form, to expose India as a weak and soft state – on the land or high seas, at the border or through a neighbour like Nepal with which India has always enjoyed a special relationship. From the viewpoint of Beijing, it might even be advantageous to have such a test of strengths sooner rather than later, even if its normal priorities would be to “settle” its superior status in its immediate neighbourhood before venturing farther afield. India has weakened itself through serious shortcomings in governance, its economy is not in great shape, its border infrastructure plans are still mostly unimplemented, its relations with most SAARC neighbours are strained, the strategic tie-up with the US is struggling to live up to its potential, the EU is in a mess, so is the ASEAN with intra-state conflicts and divergences and there is total asymmetry in terms of military defensive and offensive capabilities.

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1962 and now

TRANSFORMATION

A Jayadeva Ranade

The writer is a former Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India and is a security and intelligence expert. He is a seasoned China analyst with almost 30 years’ experience in the field. He has also dealt with matters relating to Terrorism and Pakistan. He has been directly involved in formulation of policy at the highest levels in the Government of India. He was conferred the Organisation’s two highest awards, both out of turn. He is presently a Distinguished Fellow with the Centre for Air Power Studies. He writes on strategic and security issues relating to China, Tibet and East Asia, his chosen fields of specialisation.

Those tipped as the new PLAAF and PLAN Commanders have operational credentials. The presence of two senior PLAAF officers in the CMC guarantees that the PLAAF will receive adequate funds to pursue its modernisation programme. It is assessed that ten per cent of the defence budget will be spent on aircraft procurement and R&D. PLAN representation in the CMC will ensure continued allocation of a larger percentage of the defence budget for PLAN and the Navy’s modernisation programme will proceed apace. PLAN and PLAAF are both anticipated to assume a more operationally assertive posture. China’s current policy of pushing the limits to regain sovereignty and ‘recover’ its ‘lost’ territories, as being witnessed in the South China Sea, can be expected to receive impetus

major overhaul of China’s military leadership is underway. The changes in the CMC will have implications for India and China’s other neighbours as the new appointees will redefine China’s military doctrine, strategy and the PLA’s role in safeguarding national and territorial interests. The induction of additional representatives from the PLAAF and PLAN into the CMC will mean greater emphasis on coordinated planning and conduct of Joint Integrated Operations (JIO). In the running for the post of PLA CGS to replace General Chen Bingde is Commander of the Shenyang Military Region, General Zhang Youxia (born: 1950), a ‘princeling’ who was promoted full General in July 2011. He is one of the few Generals with battle experience having participated in the Sino-Vietnam War.

major overhaul of China’s military leadership is underway with China additionally set to change virtually the entire top echelons of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) command at the upcoming 18th Party Congress scheduled to be held in Beijing this October. These occur at a time when the PLA’s composition is changing as it advances towards ‘professionalisation’ and becoming a technology-based armed force. Once reconstituted, China’s apex military body, the Central Military Commission (CMC), will reflect the doctrinal and operational changes in strategy that are taking place in the PLA. The apex military body, namely the Central Military Commission (CMC), will see two of its three Vice Chairmen stepping down on reaching the mandatory retirement age. Both are uniformed officers while the third, who is ranked first and is tipped to take over as Chairman when Hu Jintao steps down, is China’s Vice President Xi Jinping. The two uniformed members namely, General Xu Caihou and General Guo Boxiong, will retire on reaching the age of 70 and 71 years respectively. The five others who will retire are members of the CMC. They include the Chief of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) who is formally designated as the Director of the PLA’s General Staff Department (GSD), 1941-born General Chen Bingde and the Commanders of the PLA Navy (PLAN) and China’s strategic force, the Second Artillery. The Directors of the PLA’s other three principle departments namely the General Political Department (GPD), General Armaments Department (GAD) and General Logistics Department (GLD) will also all have new incumbents.

Transformation The changeover comes at a delicate time for

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China and the PLA, when there is ferment and resentment against corruption and pro-Mao nostalgia is spreading in the country. At least two PLA Generals of impeccable, prestigious ‘Revolutionary’ lineage have spoken out strongly against corruption namely, Mao Xinyu, Mao Zedong’s grandson who is a Major General in a PLA think tank and General Liu Yuan, former Chinese President Liu Shaoqi’s son. The PLA has itself been buffeted by the recent political upheaval caused by the Bo Xilai incident and by July 2012, at least five central task force teams had conducted investigations in the jurisdiction of the 13th and 14th Group Armies associated with Bo Xilai. Further, since the past three years successive year-long political education campaigns have been conducted throughout the PLA. Their emphasis has been that the ‘Party commands the gun’ and that the PLA owes ‘absolute loyalty’ and ‘absolute obedience’ to the Party. The following listing by the Jamestown Foundation of some articles published this year, together with some additional instances of public demonstrations of loyalty to Hu Jintao are illustrative. People’s Daily (June 25) carried an article by the Jinan Military Region Political Commissar exhorting military cadres to more aggressively challenge mistaken ideas about the PLA’s political role in the face of growing pluralism in Chinese society. Liberation Army Daily (LAD-June 17) urged military officers to be steadfast in their loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The implication was that many officers were insufficiently committed to the Party’s continued rule. On May 23, the Beijing Military Area Command held its 10th Party Congress,

CHINA’S NEW MILITARY LEADERSHIP

during which Hu Jintao demanded that military officers remain ‘absolutely obedient’ and loyal to the Party. Senior PLA officers attended, including the CMC Vice Chairman Guo Boxiong, who cancelled a five-day visit to Japan and South Korea in order to attend.

An LAD (April 6) editorial asserted the need for the PLA to be firmly aligned with the Party to ensure political stability, because historical experience demonstrated that ideological competition intensified whenever the CCP faced a crucial moment of reform.

The changes in the CMC will have implications for India and China’s other neighbours as the new appointees will redefine China’s military doctrine, strategy and the PLA’s role in safeguarding national and territorial interests. The induction of additional representatives from the PLAAF and PLAN into the CMC will mean greater emphasis on coordinated planning and conduct of Joint Integrated Operations (JIO)

On April 6 high-ranking PLA officers publicly expressed loyalty to President Hu Jintao.

An LAD editorial (May 15) encouraged soldiers to recognise the ‘conspiracy’ behind efforts to separate the army from the Party and need to adhere to the fundamental political system that places the CCP above the army.

LAD (March 19) published an article declaring that the PLA must resist the “three mistaken ideas” about China’s military development. It said it is necessary to “always put ideological and political construction first” because this is essential for strengthening the PLA. Xinhua (March 13) publicised China’s President Hu Jintao’s speech. It quoted him as saying that “every soldier in the military must be aware that development while maintaining stability is the priority. Hu stressed that the PLA and armed police must focus on national defence and

army building and adhere to the fundamental requirement of making progress while maintaining stability.” Significantly, the Liberation Army Daily (LAD) article published on June 17, 2012, for the first time implied there were ‘sub-loyalties’ in the PLA. Indirectly underscoring the sensitivity of the current period it said ‘that the problem of loyalty is of special importance in the year of the 18th Congress, when “enemy forces” are spreading rumours …’. Warning readers about “fake loyalty” the article urged personnel to be ‘aware of people just pretending to be loyal, who feign loyalty, but do not really mean it’. Clearly indicating the leadership’s concern, a few months earlier at the NPC session in March 2012, Premier Wen Jiabao had, for the first time, pointedly declared “we will run the armed forces with strict discipline”.

New equations An official campaign was simultaneously launched from March

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1962 and now

TRANSFORMATION

this year against “depoliticising of the military, separating the Chinese Communist Party from the military and nationalising the military.” These were related directly to suggestions, initially voiced by the foreign media, that the PLA should be an army of the State and not the CCP. The thought has been picked up by some Chinese intellectuals like outspoken Chinese economist, Han Zhiguo, who has a following of over three and a half million on Sina Weibo. At a gathering in Beijing on January 18, 2012, he declared that ‘reform had come to a dead end’ and advocated ‘universal suffrage’, an ‘independent judiciary’ and ‘nationalisation of the PLA’. Senior Party and PLA leaders are concerned that such sentiments could influence the better educated, younger officers now joining the PLA. The linkages established by the PLA with a hundred universities to upgrade the quality of officer-recruits and personnel has introduced an additional area of vulnerability. That the topic is sensitive became evident with the summary dismissal on June 3, of the Editor of the Chinese newspaper Southern Metropolitan, Yu Chen, for allowing a comment on the paper’s official micro-blog mocking the CCP’s insistence on retaining control over the PLA.

Political reliability will be the pre-eminent requirement. The appointments will impact on the PLA’s doctrine, policies and future direction. There could be some lack of continuity consequent to the changes Separately, a ‘study campaign’ was launched throughout the PLA, affiliated military establishments and Party-run institutes, in late July this year to disseminate CMC Chairman Hu Jintao’s ‘important’ speech of July 23. Study sessions were held in establishments like the National Defence University (NDU) and the Xian Politics Institute. The speech was delivered at an unprecedented national seminar, convened in Beijing for principal leading Party and military cadres at the provincial and ministerial level, in the run up to the upcoming 18th Party Congress. These themes were stressed again on the occasion of the PLA’s

85th anniversary on August 1 this year. Lengthy articles eulogising the PLA’s history and role in building the country ‘under the leadership’ of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), were front-paged by the Liberation Army Daily, official news agency Xinhua and other official Chinese media. Each of them emphasised that the PLA is the Party’s army and owes it ‘absolute loyalty’ and obedience. They warned that ‘hostile foreign forces’ were spreading propaganda intended to weaken this relationship and that this needs to be combated. Other articles pointed to the inextricable close links between the Party and PLA and mentioned that over the years the CCP had strengthened its bonds with the PLA by establishing Party cells in each PLA company. It is against this backdrop that the CCP Central Committee (CC) will, at the upcoming 18th Party Congress, approve new appointments to China’s all-powerful Central Military Commission (CMC). Political reliability will be the pre-eminent requirement. The appointments will impact on the PLA’s doctrine, policies and future direction. There could be some lack of continuity consequent to the changes, especially since they take place when the PLA is advancing towards ‘professionalisation’ and becoming a technology-based armed force. This will, however, be compensated to an extent by the presence of Xi Jinping as either CMC Vice Chairman, or Chairman in case Hu Jintao does hand over the Chairmanship to him and presence in the CMC of General Chang Wanquan, present Director GAD, who is expected to be elevated to the position of Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC). General Chang Wanquan, presently Director of the General Armaments Department (GAD), is a strong candidate for the position of CMC Vice Chairman given the importance attached to defence R&D and weapons indigenisation. Of the current Commanders of the PLA Navy (PLAN) and PLA Air Force (PLAAF), at least one will be elevated as CMC Vice Chairman. PLA Navy Commander Wu Shengli, who is the senior of the two and reputedly favoured by Hu Jintao, is expected

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to be promoted as Vice Chairman of the CMC. He is, however, already 63 years old and is just short of the mandated retirement age. In case he is promoted, then he continues till 70 years, or till the next Congress. Next in line for elevation as Vice Chairman CMC is PLA Air Force Commander, Xu Qiliang, who was born in 1950. It is possible that his elevation might be deferred in case Hu Jintao continues as CMC Chairman for another year and there is resistance to increasing the posts of Vice Chairmen of CMC. In the event of his promotion, though, it will be for the first time that the PLAN and PLAAF will be represented at the level of Vice Chairman of CMC and, more significantly, that the era of only the PLA ground forces being represented in the CMC at that level would have ended. It will additionally mean that the PLAN and PLAAF, will for the first time have two representatives each in the CMC. Vice Chairmen of the CMC, incidentally, retire at 70 years while Military Region Commanders, with whom PLAAF and PLAN Commanders and heads of principal PLA departments are equated, retire at 65 years. There is reliable indication that General Chen Bingde, who is due to retire as PLA CGS, has recommended that a symbolic generational changeover be affected in the PLA. He has proposed that only those born in 1949 or after, in other words those born after ‘liberation’ and in the People’s Republic of China, be inducted into the CMC. In case this is accepted, then PLAN Commander Wu Shengli will retire in 2015. Air Force General Ma Xiaotian, who was born in 1949, is assessed a front-runner for the job of PLAAF Commander. There is another suggestion, though, that Ma Xiaotian, presently a PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff (DCGS), a ‘princeling’ closely connected to Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping and with a high-profile record of service, will be appointed Defence Minister and made Vice Chairman of the CMC. If this materialises it will mean that the number of Vice Chairmen in the CMC will have been enhanced and Ma Xiaotian would have benefited from a double promotion. It would

be the first time also that a PLAAF officer will officially interact on behalf of the PLA with foreign militaries and, more importantly, influence formulation of defence budgets. A consequence of this would be that PLAAF Commander Xu Qiliang will then be elevated as Vice Chairman of the CMC and the PLAAF will have an unprecedented three representatives in the CMC. This is unless Xu Qiliang is elevated as CMC Vice Chairman, but continues as PLAAF Commander. The 1952 born Vice Admiral Sun Jianguo, Deputy CGS and former ‘mishu’ to General Chen Bingde and Chief of Staff of PLAN (2004-2006), is a leading candidate for the post of PLAN Commander. He is a nuclear submariner.

A major overhaul of China’s military leadership is underway with China additionally set to change virtually the entire top echelons of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) command at the upcoming 18th Party Congress scheduled to be held in Beijing this October. These occur at a time when the PLA’s composition is changing as it advances towards ‘professionalisation’ and becoming a technology-based armed force There are a number of others considered as likely candidates for the posts of Director of the GSD, GPD, GAD and GLD – all of which are on the CMC. In the running for the post of PLA CGS to replace General Chen Bingde is Commander of the Shenyang Military Region, General Zhang Youxia (born: 1950), a ‘princeling’ who was promoted full General in July 2011. He is one of the few Generals with battle experience having participated in the Sino-Vietnam War. Another is General Fang Fenghui, who was born in 1951 and when appointed Commander of the sensitive Beijing Military Region was the youngest Commander of a Military Region. He is reputedly close to Hu Jintao. General Li Shiming, born in 1948 and Commander of the Chengdu Military Region exercising operational jurisdiction over Tibet and the areas across the border with India, is also in the reckoning. In contention for the post of Director of the powerful GPD are:

1951-born General Liu Yuan, son of China’s former President Liu Shaoqi, Vice Admiral Liu Xiaojiang, PLAN Political Commissar and former ‘mishu’ to Admiral Liu Huaqing and General Zhang Haiyang, presently Political Commissar of Second Artillery and also a ‘princeling’. The promotion of 60 year old Liu Yazhou, also a ‘princeling’, as General on July 31, suggests that General Zhang Haiyang might be overlooked. All contenders are members of the 17th CCP CC. Distinguishing the new CMC will be the increased representation of the PLAAF and possibly even PLAN, in the CMC. Once the new PLAAF and PLAN Commanders are appointed, they will automatically assume their positions in the CMC. It was CMC Chairman Hu Jintao who, for the first time in 2004, appointed the PLAAF and PLAN Commanders as members of the CMC. Their predecessors, if still in service as in the case of the PLAAF Commander, would have been elevated as Vice Chairmen of the CMC. This will give renewed impetus to the emphasis on ‘Joint Integrated Operations’ (JIO), a concept that Hu Jintao has focused on. It was to implement this that he first introduced changes in the structure of the GSD to include officers from the PLAAF and PLAN at senior levels. These changes will, however, not mean a reduction in the primacy of the PLA ground forces, or PLAA, as they are designated in China’s Defence White Paper, 2010. Of 57 senior General Officers in the PLA, for example, 37 are from the PLAA. In the Military Regions (MR) also, it is the Military Region Commander who heads the command and the head of the PLAAF Military Region Air Force, for example, is designated a Deputy MR Commander. The PLAA which has considerably larger manpower also receives a larger proportion of the budget in real terms. Representation in the CCP Central Committee (CC) is also likely to remain unchanged and this is suggested by the 251 delegates selected by the PLA to the 18th Party Congress. Presently the PLA has 69 per cent representation in the 17th CCP CC. The changes in the CMC will

have implications for India and China’s other neighbours as the new appointees will redefine China’s military doctrine, strategy and the PLA’s role in safeguarding national and territorial interests. The induction of additional representatives from the PLAAF and PLAN into the CMC will mean greater emphasis on coordinated planning and conduct of Joint Integrated Operations (JIO). This will be reinforced by the composition of the CMC which will, for the first time, be weighed heavily in favour of unquestionably politically reliable yet professional officers with operational backgrounds. Those tipped as the new PLAAF and PLAN Commanders have operational credentials. The South China Sea Fleet is being equipped for a large operational role spanning the South China Sea, the Malacca Strait and the Indian Ocean. The first China-built aircraft carrier will be incorporated in this fleet. The presence of two senior PLAAF officers in the CMC guarantees that the PLAAF will receive adequate funds to pursue its modernisation programme. It is assessed that ten per cent of the defence budget will be spent on aircraft procurement and R&D. PLAN representation in the CMC will ensure continued allocation of a larger percentage of the defence budget for PLAN and the Navy’s modernisation programme will proceed apace. PLAN and PLAAF are both anticipated to assume a more operationally assertive posture. Meanwhile, the new PLA Chief of General Staff (CGS) will certainly have an operational background which would imply increased attention at high levels to the Sino-Indian border and China’s other unsettled frontiers. China’s current policy of pushing the limits to regain sovereignty and ‘recover’ its ‘lost’ territories, as being witnessed in the South China Sea, can be expected to receive impetus. Overall, the PLA’s political clout and representation in the CCP Central Committee (CC) is likely to remain unchanged with two seats in the PB while in the CC they will probably continue to have 65 full and alternate members. This is suggested by the 251 delegates selected by the PLA to the 18th Party Congress.

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1962 and now

OPTIONS FOR INDIA

A Amb Arundhati Ghose The writer joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1963. Served in various capacities in MEA and in Missions abroad in Austria, the Netherlands, Bangladesh and Permanenet Mission of India in New York. Was in charge of economic relations as AS(ER) when economic reforms were launched in 1991. Served in the Branch Secretariat of the Ministry to liaise with the Bangaldesh Government in exile in Calcutta. Served as Ambassador in Egypt, South Korea, as Permanent Representative to UNESCO and to the UN Offices in Geneva. Was also Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament. Was Member and Chairman of UN Secretary General’s Disarmament Advisory Board from 1998 to 2001. Currently on Global India Forum Kolkata as Vice President and Member of its Executive Council and Adjunct Fellow at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore. Was member of Task Force set up in 2007, by MEA on non-proliferation and Disarmament.

China’s first nuclear weapons test caused the concern to escalate into consternation as both the opposition parties and politicians within the Congress Party increased domestic pressure on the government to build a nuclear arsenal. The Defence Minister, however, claimed that the Chinese nuclear test would not have a significant impact on China’s military strength since the short term threat to India remained China’s conventional forces

ccording to Reed and Stillman, “with the coming of Deng (Xiaoping) regime (to power) earlier in the decade, the proliferation of nuclear technology into the Third World (from China) had become state policy. During … 1982 to 1983, the Chinese handed over design details for the CHIC-4 nuclear device to Pakistan.” ‘Cold’ tests (in the laboratory) of implosion systems began in 1983. This would have enabled A Q Khan to have claimed to journalist Kuldip Nayar in 1987, that Pakistan had the bomb at that time: “You don’t have to test in the ground any more” he said, “You can test in the lab. Let me assure you, we have tested. We have it and we have enriched uranium. Weaponised the thing. Put it all together.” This assistance continued through the 80s and 90s and included the testing by China of Pakistan’s first A-bomb on May 26 1990. These events of 1982 are as, if not more, significant than the 1962 War in India-China relations.

nternational reaction to India’s successful Agni V missile in April 2012 was understandably perhaps, very different from the reactions to India’s 1998 Pokhran tests; most foreign commentators at least implicitly, now accept India’s need for a strategic deterrent against the threat from the north. In 1998, India’s claim that her weaponisation was a response primarily to the threat from China was summarily dismissed by the West and a majority of countries. While this pair of dates reflects changing geopolitical realities and perceptions, another pair may be said to be equally significant in terms of determining bilateral Sino–Indian relations. If 1962 is today remembered, by India, at least, as a crucial turning point in these relations, 1982 brings into focus the nuclear factor in them. To illustrate the significance of 1982, a brief recap of the how and why of the nuclear factor – which was not present in the only war India has fought with China, is necessary. This factor has, over the decades, evolved to become a crucial, yet little discussed, issue in Sino–Indian relations.

The genesis

The nuclear narratives of both countries could not be more different, both in their origins and evolution. If there were any contact on nuclear issues in the early days, they were purely commercial in nature, despite their seeming closeness at the political and rhetorical levels. During the cold war, China’s programme was fundamentally assisted by the Soviet Union, India’s by the US and other Western countries. The cooperation lasted, for the Chinese, till 1960, when the Sino–Soviet nuclear relationship was snapped and for India, till 1974, when she carried out her first nuclear test. China was recognised by the NPT as a Nuclear Weapon State; India, which did not sign the NPT, was sanctioned. Both continued their research and development indigenously – China, to build an arsenal, India, initially at least, to build power reactors – though India faced greater obstacles to the acquisition of equipment and technology because of the sanctions. The late 50s saw a souring of China’s bilateral relations with both India and the Soviet Union and China’s close nuclear cooperation with the Soviet Union was abruptly stopped when the latter failed to supply China with a prototype of a nuclear weapon. China then announced its intention to produce nuclear weapons in 1958, causing concern in the Indian Parliament. Dr Bhabha assured Parliament that India, too, could produce nuclear weapons. Post the 1962 war, the opposition formally demanded in Parliament that India reverse its stated policy in order to produce nuclear weapons. This demand was reiterated by the Jana Sangh in 1963; Nehru‘s response was that there was little justification for the ‘minor psychological advantages that nuclear weapons would confer’. China’s first nuclear weapons test caused the concern to escalate into consternation as both the opposition parties and politicians within the Congress Party increased domestic pressure on the government to build a nuclear arsenal. The Defence Minister, however, claimed that the Chinese nuclear test would not have a significant impact on China’s military strength since the short term threat to India remained China’s conventional forces. India’s reaction was to take the issue to the United Nations, where the discussions on the dangers of nuclear proliferation led to negotiations of the NPT. India had sought security assurances from the UN from nuclear threat or blackmail by China and some restrictions on China’s programme. That she failed in obtaining both objectives is well known, particularly as China was ‘recognised’ by the NPT as a Nuclear Weapon State. This led India to opt out of the NPT on the grounds of

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The Nuclear Factor in the Evolution of Relations “enlightened self-interest and considerations of national security”. It was not till 1974, post the adoption of the NPT and the 1971 war, when the US sought to pressure India in the war with Pakistan, by sailing the nuclear armed USS Enterprise off India’s shores, that a hesitant step was taken by the government to respond to significant political opinion within the country to develop her nuclear military technology. It is clear that India’s threat perceptions and subsequent policies found their source in a perceived threat from China. It was in 1982, however, that a significant development took place in Chinese nuclear policy that made the issue even more complex.

Sino–Pak nexus Recently (in 2009), two Americans, Thomas C Reed and Danny B Stillman published “The Nuclear Express”, which they sub–titled ‘A Political History of the Bomb and its Proliferation’. Thomas Reed is a former nuclear weapons designer at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and a former Secretary of the US Air Force under Presidents Ford and Carter. Stillman, was (in 2009) a Los Alamos physicist who directed the Los Alamos Technical Intelligence Division and who had been invited by the Chinese to spend considerable time in China in the 1990s, visiting various institutions and sites within the Chinese nuclear establishment and meeting with Chinese nuclear scientists. According to Reed and Stillman, “with the coming of Deng (Xiaoping) regime (to power) earlier in the decade, the proliferation of nuclear technology into the Third World (from China) had become state policy.” Most of the proliferation was to countries such as Algeria, North Korea and Pakistan. But, according to the authors, the assistance to these countries “pale in comparison to the

help China gave General Zia’s Pakistan … in 1982, China began to assist Pakistani scientists with nuclear weapon design, materials production and the construction of nuclear infrastructure.” The relationship was developing on the lines of the earlier Sino–Soviet nuclear relationship. “During … 1982 to 1983, the Chinese handed over design details for the CHIC–4 nuclear device.” ‘Cold’ tests (in the laboratory) of implosion systems began in 1983. This would have enabled A Q Khan to have claimed to journalist Kuldip Nayar in 1987, that Pakistan had the bomb at that time: “You don’t have to test in the ground any more” he said, “You can test in the lab. Let me assure you, we have tested. We have it and we have enriched uranium. Weaponised the thing. Put it all together.”

According to Reed and Stillman, “with the coming of Deng (Xiaoping) regime (to power) earlier in the decade, the proliferation of nuclear technology into the Third World (from China) had become state policy.” Most of the proliferation was to countries such as Algeria, North Korea and Pakistan. But, according to the authors, the assistance to these countries “pale in comparison to the help China gave General Zia’s Pakistan … in 1982, China began to assist Pakistani scientists with nuclear weapon design, materials production and the construction of nuclear infrastructure” This assistance continued through the 80s and 90s and included the testing by China of Pakistan’s first A-bomb on May 26 1990. The authors cite at least seven reasons for arriving at the conclusion that such an event did in fact take place. These reasons include briefings by Chinese of US nationals including Stillman,”regarding the May 26, 1990

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event (no. 35) (which) confirm(ed) the detonation of an imploded, solid-core, enriched but unboosted uranium bomb that most likely gave ten kilotons of yield, matching the performance of both the CHIC–4 shot and the subsequent May 28 test within Pakistan.” Further, the authors cite “the speed and confidence with which the Pakistanis responded to the Indian nuclear tests of 1998.” Had the weapon not already been tested, it was bound to have taken considerably longer to respond. Finally, the authors claim that in their discussions with members of the Chinese nuclear weapon community, they implicitly accepted having conducted a test for the Pakistanis.

International reaction to India’s successful AgniV missile in April 2012 was understandably perhaps, very different from the reactions to India’s 1998 Pokhran tests; most foreign commentators at least implicitly, now accept India’s need for a strategic deterrent against the threat from the north. In 1998, India’s claim that her weaponisation was a response primarily to the threat from China was summarily dismissed by the West and a majority of countries Much of the information on Sino-Pakistan nuclear cooperation is widely available in the public domain, including revelations from A Q Khan himself. The Reed–Stillman book carries more than usual credibility since the latter had access to first hand sources in China. Today, it is a given that such cooperation exists, though the Chinese insist that they have ceased weapons related transfers in 2002. For India, 1982 was, in terms of its current security perceptions, almost as crucial vis-à-vis China as 1962. The basic point is that the foundation of Sino-Pakistani cooperation rests on the adversarial relations both countries have with India. What is perhaps more important is the ‘balance’ within the relationship; it certainly is not one between equals. China’s nuclear programme developed with the objective of attaining equality with the US and the Soviet Union, in terms of technology and modernisation. Today, China’s economic and military power has the US as its

1962 and now

OPTIONS FOR INDIA focus, though Russia continues to have apprehensions about the rising profile of its neighbour. The Indian nuclear weapons programme is seen by China as more of an irritation than an actual threat, given the time lag between India’s programme and that of China and the arrogance of China’s power. This throws some light on the contours of the Sino-Pakistan relationship; it was not just that both shared a common enemy, but that the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme was and continues to be, an extension of China’s strategic policy towards India. China could continue its focus on the US while the Pakistani arm of its strategy would take care of the potentially troublesome India. This does not imply that China has physical control on Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal but a coordination of policies and strategy vis-à-vis India; the latter’s dependence on China in this field enables China to use the Pakistanis for their political and deterrent purposes. The inherent danger of such a strategy does not seem to have deterred China; the instability in that country – political and economic, its unpredictability and the possibility of the nuclear arsenal being put to use – whether by the military that has control of it or by other forces currently challenging the “professionalism” of the army, seem to worry it as little as that of its other protégé, North Korea. Its external diplomacy has been breathtaking in its audacity. Its projection of itself as a ‘responsible’ nuclear weapon state within the NPT (it only signed the NPT in 1992) complacent in the status this apparently conferred on it, even while it was a member of the Permanent-5 of the UN Security Council with veto powers, allowed it to shield its ongoing nuclear cooperation with Pakistan without the international community and the West running too much interference. It joined the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group in 2004 and objected, during that Group’s consideration of a waiver in favour of India, to a non–NPT country being extended such an exemption. It proposed instead the development of criteria which could, in future, also cover Pakistan. This was not merely a gesture to its friend nor pique at the growing relationships between India

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and the US, but essential to its strategic purposes if Pakistan was to continue to be the extension of its objectives in the subcontinent. It has given China the freedom to work with India on multilateral issues such as climate change and in the framework of BRICS and to permit bilateral commercial relations to flourish in its favour. Simultaneously, it has ‘responsibly’ advised India and Pakistan to solve their bilateral problems, while refusing to discuss Sino-Indian nuclear issues, perceptions and apprehensions, with India. It appears quite willing to discuss global disarmament and disarmament issues with India, but no bilateral arms control measures.

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NON-ALIGNMENT 2.0: A POLICY PRESCRIPTION FOR PLACATING CHINA?

It has, however, signalled to India, after the Agni V test in April 2012, the true challenge that India faces – six days after that test, Pakistan tested a Shaheen 1A missile, one built on the technology of a Chinese M9 missile. India therefore faces not two separate nuclear armed countries but a single challenge from the north and the west.

Conclusion What are the options for India? At a level, she needs to buy time to build-up the nuclear triad to deter any adventurism, overt or covert. There are bound to be efforts to degrade the power of her deterrent, requiring our core policy to remain focused. At another level, the bilateral relations need to be managed – and it would appear that this appears to be the current effort. At yet another level we need to pursue efforts to engage China in a dialogue on bilateral nuclear and arms control issues. It would appear that the insouciance of Mao towards casualties from nuclear conflict may have been tempered over the years and the growth of its economy may have made it more vulnerable to “unacceptable” damage. The situation within the Af–Pak region would also make China more amenable to revisiting earlier assumptions. In any case, it needs to be noted that China has never actually threatened India with its nuclear weapons; the messages have been in the signals. Today, the time is ripe for initiating such a bilateral discussion – opportunities are available and need to be taken.

he Indian Security establishment recently released an important study entitled “Non-alignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the 21st century” (January 2012). This paper is a virtual policy prescription for placating an assertive China. At its very roots is an attempt to mollify China by assuring it that we are Non-aligned in any contest between the USA and China. This very anchor premise is flawed and needs debate. Instead of a Multipolar world order with India as one of the Poles, it presupposes a new Bipolar world order with USA and China as the two new super powers and a bit part role of a self-preserving neutrality for India. Non-alignment is elevated to the status of dogma. The paper advocates that it is in India’s interest to self-deter itself from any thought of matching proportionate responses to serious provocations by its adversaries. This is a seriously flawed narrative and cannot be permitted to slip into the policy domain without being challenged and subjected to wide-ranging debate and analysis. Based upon this the government has stalled the raising of a strike corps for the Himalayas so as not to annoy China. This return to Nehruvian sentimentality has dangerous overtones of Déjà vu. We don’t really seem to have learnt any lessons from the 1962 debacle. The prime anchor premise of that war was that China would not initiate any serious military action. It turned out to be seriously and tragically flawed. It would be even more tragic if we were to revert to that ridiculous anchor premise for a second time in just 50 years.

Maj Gen (Dr) G D Bakshi SM, VSM (retd) The writer is a combat veteran of many skirmishes on the Line of Control and counter-terrorist operations in Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab. He subsequently commanded the reputed Romeo Force during intensive counter-terrorist operations in the Rajouri-Poonch districts. He has served two tenures at the DGMO. He is a prolific writer on matters military and non-military and has published 24 books and over 100 papers in many prestigious research journals. He is Editor-in-Chief of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) magazine.

China impinges directly on India’s geopolitical space. It is not a distant super power. It has already attacked us once, has built-up Pakistan into a local counterweight and is seriously engaged in trying to encircle India by projecting power into its immediate periphery. Can India afford to remain non-aligned in such a skewed scenario? The basic Balance of Power Theory entails the need to bandwagon with other powers who are equally threatened with China’s rise

Today the global scenario is inching towards multipolarity. In the new poly-centric world order, the BRICS nations – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are emerging as regional powers of consequence, who could aspire later to a wider global influence. We must not forget that both before World War I and World War II, the global order was multipolar. It was characterised by rapid alignments and realignments as the multiple poles of power sought to balance out one another

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edia reports indicate that the Indian government has stalled the army’s proposal for raising a strike corps for the Himalayas which could enable a riposte into Tibet in the face of a Chinese attack. The ostensible reason is not to provoke China! At the basis of this new found timidity and pusillanimity in the Indian approach is a semial paper provided recently by the Indian National Security Establishment which recommends an unabashed policy prescription for kowtowing to China and keeping Beijing in good humour. To placate China it seeks to signal that India will be non-aligned in any new great game between the USA and China in which, it assumes that India will be a bit part player whose sole concern will be its safety and survival. The National Defence College (NDC) and the Centre for Policy Research (CPR) recently sponsored a study entitled “Non-alignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the 21st century” (January 2012). It was jointly authored by a set of analysts and policy makers known for their proximity to the present National Security establishment. These included Sunil Khilnani, Rajiv Kumar, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Lt Gen (retd) Prakash Menon, (now a Military Advisor with the NSA), Nandan Nilekani, Srinath Raghavan, Shyam Saran (former Foreign Secretary) and Siddharth Varadarajan. Since the authors are so close to the current National Security establishment, their views need to be studied closely for discerning policy implications. The surprising and somewhat disquieting fact however is the Chapter on Hard Power at a very considerable variance with the views of the armed forces in general and the Indian Army in particular and seems to parade personal views as policy. It has already taken its toll by delaying the raising of the army’s new strike corps. This chapter contains some sweeping recommendations about India’s military strategy against China and Pakistan that are somewhat astonishing in content and implications. Before these insidiously become part of our national security policies by default, there is a need to challenge these constructs and debate them extensively. Some of their implications are positively

disconcerting and merited discussion and in-house consensus within the armed forces community before they are prematurely paraded as the official viewpoint of the establishment. At its very roots is an attempt to mollify and placate China by assuring it that we are Non-aligned in any contest between the USA and China. This very anchor premise is flawed and needs debate. Non-alignment: The paper claims it is an attempt to identify the basic principles that should guide India’s foreign and strategic policy over the next decade. It seeks to define the broad perspective approach that India should adopt as it works to enhance its strategic autonomy in global circumstances that for some time to come, are likely to remain volatile and uncertain. The title page suggests its attempt to present the Non-alignment of the 1960s as entirely relevant and adequate for the 21st century. This is a rather surprising formulation that is dressed up in the comfortable jargon of autarky. The report says: “Strategic Autonomy has been the defining value and continuous goal and India’s International Policy ever since the inception of the Republic. Defined initially in the terminology of Non-alignment that value we believe, continues to remain the core of India’s global engagement even today – in a world that has changed drastically since the mid-20th century.” The authors thereby equate Non-alignment to a core value that will remain relevant for all times to come, regardless of the radical changes in the global and regional security scenarios. Elevating Non-alignment to the status of dogma is a strange mindset that remains so deeply wedded to the past that it glaringly ignores the current realities and future possibilities. It seeks comfort in a foreign policy past where India had been able, for a time, to wield undue influence not commensurate with its hard power credentials. Critique: Non-alignment was relevant in a bipolar era when the world was sharply polarised into two sharply opposing camps or blocks. India was then militarily weak and glaringly deficient of hard power. It

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tried to punch much above its actual weight by elevating neutrality to the level of a principle. It crafted a national narrative of exceptionalism that stated that India was an exceptional state based not on hard power but on soft power of Ahimsa, Satyagraha and Non-violence. Thereby it had arrogated to itself the role of the peacemaker of the planet. For a time, this neutrality approach succeeded admirably. The world was sick of war and conflict, after the most destructive war of human history. India had a field day, playing peacemaker in Korea and Indo-China and wherever it could insert itself in this high personal profile peacemaking role. Non-alignment worked brilliantly in a bipolar era and practically the entire third world lined up behind India, Egypt and Yugoslavia, to become Non-aligned and get the best of both the worlds through neutrality.

The decision to embark on war will therefore be weighed by the degree of risk that the political decision-maker is willing to take and will depend on the issues at stake. The author thereby implies / suggests that the Indian political leadership’s tolerance for risk or ambiguity is zero. That it will not fight under almost any circumstances and would prefer to kowtow or surrender when challenged. This learned group has therefore gone ahead and waved the White Flag to placate China via its Non-alignment 2.0 policy prescription of surrender Given the bipolar setting then – globally it was a highly successful policy for weak and poverty stricken states which lacked any semblance of hard power. Nonalignment however floundered at the regional level. China was incensed with what it saw as Pandit Nehru’s global pretentions. It decided to teach a sharp and painful (la dang da tang) military lesson to India. None of India’s non-aligned friends came to her rescue as India learnt a humiliating lesson in realpolitik. Pandit Nehru, the architect of non-alignment did not survive this great debacle. India, the world’s peacemaker, was then involved in two major wars within a decade. In 1965, Pakistan saw its weakened conditions and attacked it to seize Jammu and Kashmir by

force. In 1971, Pakistan precipitated the second war by its brutal genocide in East Pakistan, which pushed 10 million refugees into India. Nehru’s successors however, had learnt the bitter lesson of realpolitik. Though lip service continued to be paid to Non-alignment to retain the membership of this Third World country club, India for all purposes aligned itself with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union made India a credible hard power state by subsidising its military build-up in a very significant fashion. Not only did it want India to over-match Pakistan, but act as a counterweight to China in Asia. During the war, Nixon sent the Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal to coerce India and show its support for Pakistan. In the late 1980s, India did make attempts to correct its pronounced pro-Soviet tilt of the 1970s and take advantage of Deng Xiaoping’s Quest for a peaceful periphery to complete China’s economic and military modernisation, to buy temporary peace for itself also on the India-China border. Events moved very fast thereafter. The Soviet Union collapsed in 1990 and overnight the world order changed dramatically to a unique unipolar situation. Frankly non-alignment became absolutely irrelevant from that date onwards. Today the global scenario is inching towards multipolarity. In the new poly-centric world order, the BRICS nations – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are emerging as regional powers of consequence, who could aspire later to a wider global influence. We must not forget that both before World War I and World War II, the global order was multipolar. It was characterised by rapid alignments and realignments as the multiple poles of power sought to balance out one another. The world order now could perhaps be termed as asymmetric unipolar, with America having no single global peer competitor but a whole range of regional competitors, who wield significant clout in their immediate backyards. China is emerging as a global power of consequence. However, as the study concedes, China impinges directly on India’s geopolitical space. It is not a distant super power. It has already attacked us once, has built-up Pakistan into a

local counterweight and is seriously engaged in trying to encircle India by projecting power into its immediate periphery. Can India afford to remain non-aligned in such a skewed scenario? The basic Balance of Power Theory entails the need to bandwagon with other powers who are equally threatened with China’s rise. These include Japan, Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia and Australia. America remains the primary extra-regional balancer whose considerable power projection capabilities simply cannot be ignored. America is trying to rebalance its forces, reduce its commitments in the Middle East, Iraq and Afghanistan and is preparing to face a rising and increasingly assertive China. Non-alignment in such a transformed context makes no sense whatsoever.

The General is obviously concerned about the nuclear backdrop and feels that it would reduce all conventional warfare to a few nibbles / shallow bites across the LC / IB. Anything more would unleash a nuclear exchange. This is an absurdly low threshold set for nuclear release in South Asia and the basis for pegging it so low is not clear. It may be recalled that in Korea, the Chinese had launched a million troops against a nuclear armed USA It implies that India anticipates not a multipolar world order but another bipolar situation and would like to remain neutral. The main problem is

India abuts China. China will never be a distant super power; it is the primary challenge and main military threat. What this policy prescription suggests is a meek surrender and kowtowing to the rising power in the pious hope that it will leave us alone and fight only with America. Chinese military strategy in all its wars is to identify the weak enemy formations (like South Korean divisions in the Korean War) and target them for attack and annihilation. Of the line-up of powers that could contend China’s rise, India is the weakest. Unless it tries to balance the power of a rising China, it is heading for serious trouble. Not one non-aligned friend had come to our support in 1962. We do not have to be pushed into a conflict with China by other powers keen to weaken both rising centres of economic and military power in Asia. However, India needs to be able to defend itself from any aggression from a rising China, which is its primary threat. Non-alignment against our primary threat sounds a bit like an oxymoron. Autarky and autonomy certainly do not imply that we fight alone and in splendid isolation. It means the autonomy to make and remake regional alliances in tune with the threat and emerging scenarios. It also means the capacity to wage war when we choose to defend our primary national interests. China has aligned itself with Pakistan to put us in a two-front situation. We cannot,

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in the name of non-alignment, curtail all our options to balance China’s rising power. We need to do so by tie-ups with the states that are equally threatened by China’s rise. We certainly cannot be non-aligned with Vietnam, Japan, Philippines, Indonesia and Australia. We need to safeguard our national interests in a fast changing world. We cannot fixate ourselves in a past that is no longer of any relevance. Turning non-alignment into a rigid dogma can be most counterproductive. It sends the wrong signals to our strategic partners and smacks of pusillanimity and an unwillingness to face our threats and challenges squarely. This evades the responsibility and dangerously ignores the emerging realities.

Non-alignment was relevant in a bipolar era when the world was sharply polarised into two sharply opposing camps or blocks. India was then militarily weak and glaringly deficient of hard power. It tried to punch much above its actual weight by elevating neutrality to the level of a principle

Hard power aspects The Chinese had virtually demanded that India remain Non-aligned in the US-China tussle. Possibly its hardening of stance over Jammu and Kashmir and intrusions into Baltistan were specifically designed to ratchet up its hostility in the face of India’s perceived swing towards the US. India has now complied by dutifully trotting out Non-alignment 2.0 as the policy prescription for a virtual surrender even before the hostilities began. India’s Look East policy was premised primarily upon economic reasons. It was also tacitly based upon a tit for tat approach that was designed to make China realise that it was hurting our core national interests by its nuclear and conventional military support to Pakistan and encouraging it to wage asymmetric warfare against India by becoming the main security guarantor of the primary regional destabiliser of South Asia. Not only that, by its forays into Gilgit-Baltistan and by its String of Pearls Strategy, China was acting in a markedly hostile fashion. We timorously tried

a tit for tat approach by reaching out to the South East Asian states. In response, China’s rhetoric has been shrill and adequate for New Delhi to beat a hasty and undignified strategic retreat by waving the white flag of Non-alignment to a country which quite simply constitutes our primary security threat. The sheer intellectual cowardice and pusillanimity of the approach suggested by this document is appalling. There is however another school of thought that given the massive delays in India’s arms acquisition process, what other alternatives does the Indian government have today? But that begs the question why has the government so delayed the arms acquisitions in the first place so that it is forced to retreat from a strong defence of the national interest in the face of provocations by an adversary. What is worse however are the Non-alignment 2.0 document’s policy prescriptions in the field of Hard Power. The document asserts inter alia “Our strategy should be to hold the line in the North on the Sino-Indian land frontier but maintain and if possible, enlarge India’s current edge in the Maritime South”. The author of this Chapter possibly implies thereby a tripwire defence along the Himalayas and a grand strategic counter offensive by the Indian Navy on the Chinese SLOCs. Attractive in theory, a maritime riposte to a major land offensive in the Himalayas could raise costs for the aggressor but will contribute absolutely nothing to the outcome of the land battle in the mountains. To say that the land battle is of no consequence whatsoever is a rather preposterous suggestion. The author of this approach dismisses the Indian Army’s felt need for a Strike Corps for a land riposte in the Mountains that could make the Chinese recoil from any attack across the Himalayas. In recent years, the Indian Army’s inordinate focus so far has been on the Eastern theatre with China. This was understandable so far in the context of China’s strident assertions on Tawang and Arunachal Pradesh. However, In the context of a two front war and China’s recent forays into Gilgit-Baltistan, the next major Chinese offensive

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is far more likely to materialise in Jammu and Kashmir where it can be done in tandem with Pakistani attacks across the LC. India, therefore, urgently needs to field a Second Mountain Strike Corps for Jammu and Kashmir with adequate Light / Medium Armour for a meaningful riposte capability into Tibet that could make the Chinese recoil. However, the authors of this document cavil against even one Mountain Strike Corps to be raised (instead of the two that we genuinely need). What is now cause for genuine alarm is, that nudged by this highly subjective exercise, the government of India has actually stalled the raising of even one strike corps for the mountains. The study has already caused serious damage by retarding a long felt military requirement. Unfortunately General Menon’s prescription for defending the long land frontiers against China borders somewhat on the bizarre. The General is obviously concerned about the nuclear backdrop and feels that it would reduce all conventional warfare to a few nibbles / shallow bites across the LC / IB. Anything more would unleash a nuclear exchange. This is an absurdly low threshold set for nuclear release in South Asia and the basis for pegging it so low is not clear. It may be recalled that in Korea, the Chinese had launched a million troops against a nuclear armed USA. Even though Vietnam had a treaty relationship with a nuclear armed USSR, China did not hesitate to launch 2,50,000 troops in a major offensive against Vietnam in 1979. The author of the Hard Power chapter rightly feels that, “Nuclear weapons constrict the traditional utility of military force and call for a redefinition of our notions of victory. The challenge for the military establishment, he says, is to shape our hard power capabilities in tandem with India’s political objectives while remaining within the ambit of the political and strategic logic imposed by nuclear weapons”. Political objectives have never really been spelt out by the Political elite to the Armed Forces. The author now seemingly interpolates his personal views on the alleged political objectives as a virtual fait accompli

that rules out any sizeable use of military force in response to provocations by China or Pakistan. He seems to imply thereby that nuclear weapons have ruled out even Limited War as a response option. This is not a plausible deduction. It is well known that Limited or Local Wars under conditions of informatisation are the type of wars China expects and is fully prepared for. The War Zone Concept and the focusing of Trans-regional capabilities on to a given theatre, suggests that the Chinese are not talking of nibbling or small bites of territory here and there. Korea was such a Local or Limited War and the Chinese had thrown in one million troops against a nuclear armed adversary. It is disconcerting that the personal views of the General have prevailed over the official views of the army headquarters.

The National Defence College (NDC) and the Centre for Policy Research (CPR) recently sponsored a study entitled “Non-alignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the 21st century” (January 2012). It was jointly authored by a set of analysts and policy makers known for their proximity to the present National Security establishment. These included Sunil Khilnani, Rajiv Kumar, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Lt Gen (retd) Prakash Menon (now a Military Advisor with the NSA), Nandan Nilekani, Srinath Raghavan, Shyam Saran (former Foreign Secretary) and Siddharth Varadarajan. Since the authors are so close to the current National Security establishment, their views need to be studied closely for discerning policy implications. The surprising and somewhat disquieting fact however is the Chapter on Hard Power at a very considerable variance with the views of the Armed Forces in general and the Indian Army in particular and seems to parade personal views as policy “Escalation” the author says, “is structurally intrinsic to war and is unpredictable as it involves an action-reaction chain between two independent wills. The decision to embark on war will therefore be weighed by the degree of risk that the political decision-maker is willing to take and will depend on the issues at

stake.” The author thereby implies /suggests that the Indian political leaderships’ tolerance for risk or ambiguity is zero. That it will not fight under almost any circumstances and would prefer to kowtow or surrender when challenged. This learned group has therefore gone ahead and waved the White Flag to placate China via its Non-alignment 2.0 policy prescription of surrender. What if China attacks nevertheless? The paper has a preposterous suggestion on how to deter it. The author seems to anticipate primarily bite sized operations (attributing to the Chinese the same level of pusillanimity / loss of military nerve that the Indians have exhibited). Nevertheless, he subsequently in the paper concedes that “We cannot dismiss the possibility of a major military offensive in Arunachal Pradesh or Ladakh”. He says in the same breath – that, “in the event of a major offensive by China, we cannot resort to a strategy of proportionate response (why pray is not answered). I suppose the author feels that any significant military retaliation will draw an assured nuclear response from China and Pakistan – (as if India has no nuclear deterrence of its own and can be nuked without any qualms or inhibition). Rather we should, he says, look to leverage our asymmetric capabilities to convince the Chinese to back down. He amplifies that first we must be “able to immediately trigger an insurgency in areas occupied by Chinese Forces. This would need careful preparation in advance. We need to induct locals into paramilitary forces and train them to switch to guerilla mode”. We are back therefore to 1962, when Mr B N Malik , the then Director IB had trained Bodos and other tribes of Assam to bravely wage a guerilla war once the Indian Army had fled the scene. The authors of the Non-alignment Document seem to feel that this guerilla war will so terrify the Chinese that they will be deterred from even launching an attack. A bit of history would be in order. From 1956-1961 the PLA had ruthlessly crushed the Khampa rebellion in Tibet and then proceeded to teach a humiliating lesson to the Indian Army. So asymmetric warfare doesn’t really terrify China. The

author is on much firmer ground however when he advocates that, “we must concurrently acquire the capabilities to interdict the Chinese logistical and military infrastructure in Tibet”. Air power and asymmetric capabilities can achieve that. Just one reality check – the much larger Chinese PLAFF and their asymmetric assets will repay the compliment and we should be prepared for it. The underlying theme of this policy prescription for paralysis seems to be a highly exaggerated fear of the prospect of nuclear escalation. The Chinese or Pakistanis, it appears can launch massive military attacks on India at will without any fear of nuclear escalation but any attempts by India to give a proportionate military response would trigger nuclear strikes by China and Pakistan. This logic is contradictory and confusing. The prime restraint in the Limited Wars of the past has been non-use of nuclear weapons. How this deterrence logic will work purely as a one way street of escalation in South Asia is not understood. The policy implications of such an attitude are – “don’t fight, just surrender tamely or else we will get incinerated in a nuclear holocaust.” How is it that the threat of the same nuclear escalation will not serve to deter our adversaries from initiating major conventional attacks or asymmetric provocations? The paper therefore advocates that it is in India’s interest to self-deter itself from any thought of matching proportionate responses to serious provocations by its adversaries. This is a seriously flawed narrative and cannot be permitted to slip into the policy domain without being challenged and subjected to wide ranging debate and analysis. It was hoped that the one General on the team would have injected a note of military realism but he has largely gone with the anti-war sentiments of his civilian colleagues. Such sentiments are laudable but we now need to graduate to realism and realpolitik, the return to Nehruvian sentimentality has dangerous overtones of Déjà vu. We don’t really seem to have learnt any lessons from the 1962 debacle. The prime anchor premise of that war was that China would not initiate any serious military action. It turned out to be seriously and tragically flawed. It would be even more tragic if we were to revert to that ridiculous anchor premise for a second time in just 50 years.

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1962 and now

CALAMITOUS INCOMPETENCE?

The Ghosts of Henderson Brooks and Bhagat Double, Double Toil and Trouble 1

Vice Adm Vijay Shankar PVSM, AVSM, ADC (retd) The writer holds an MSc in Defence Studies and is a graduate of the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, USA. He is the former Commander-in-Chief of the Andaman and Nicobar Command, C-in-C of the Strategic Forces Command and Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet. His Command and operational experience are comprehensive and include Command of INS Viraat the aircraft carrier. He is a member of the adjunct faculty of the National Institute of Advanced Studies and he currently tenants the Admiral Katari Chair of Excellence at the United Services Institute.

The government of the day faced harsh criticism despite enjoying an overwhelming majority. The primary condemnation was the woeful neglect of defence preparedness, an unreal approach to international relations, particularly with China and the dangerous inadequacies of higher defence management (significantly the intrusive, extemporised and incompetent manner in which civil military relations had evolved)

India has faced many traumatic events since 1962 that have had critical impact on security of the nation including three wars, bloody insurgencies, gory terrorist acts, periodic crumbling of the law and order mechanism, incompetent governance, authoritarian rule, a crippling lack of strategic vision, a sycophantic establishment and an inexplicable abhorrence to change

n incisive analysis of the reasons behind our debacle in the 1962 India-China War. The Admiral writes – “India had blinded itself to every principle that governed national strategy making; from the absence of an understanding of the nature of war that was to be fought, to calamitous incompetence of leadership at the highest political and military levels. The fact of courtiership’s pervading control, disintegrating logistics and the sheer fantasies that replaced political and strategic orientation were the consequences of institutional ineptitude. One of the abiding puzzles of the entire episode which could have had a critical impact on the outcome was, why combat air power was not brought to bear on the operational situation.”

un-Tzu, exhorting the virtues of a skilful Commander, advocates the attainment of a position from which he cannot be defeated and misses no opportunity to master his enemy. Thus, he declares, “A victorious army wins its victories before seeking battle, an army destined to defeat, fights in the hope of winning.”2 This pithy avowal so aptly describes the strategic essence and outcome of the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962. India had blinded itself to every principle that governed national strategy making; from the absence of an understanding of the nature of war that was to be fought, to calamitous incompetence of leadership at the highest political and military levels. The fact of courtiership pervading control, disintegrating logistics and the sheer fantasies that replaced political and strategic orientation were the consequences of institutional ineptitude. So it hardly astounded the detached observer when on 17 November 1962, Prime Minister Nehru faced Parliament and as the American news magazine, Time, reported, “his agony was apparent, as he rose in Parliament, three days before the Chinese cease-fire announcement, to report that the Indian army had been decisively defeated at Se La Pass and Walong.”3

The abstract and contradictory legacy of the Sino-Indian border The Sino-Indian (un-demarcated) border runs along the Himalayas for a distance of about 3,225 km starting with the Aksai Chin in the West, broken into three segments by Nepal and Bhutan. The Western segment of the border was derived in 1846 when sovereignty of Ladakh passed on to the British after the defeat of the Sikhs. However the ‘Great Game,’ played out in Central Asia between imperial Russia and Britain, saw a state of cartographic jugglery in the region; the British had delineated 11 different boundary lines in the region to exploit opportunities provided by the changing political fortunes of Russia, China and Britain.4 Significant to the boundary situation are the Johnson Line of 1865 which placed the Aksai Chin in Kashmir; and the McCartney-MacDonald Line of 1899 which showed Aksai Chin as Chinese (China was not a signatory to either of these border delineations). However, by the second decade of the 20th century as both China and Russia 1 Shakespeare, William. Macbeth Act 4 Scene 1. The three witches from the play await the coming of Macbeth, the man who they said would be king. The witches with their incantations are piling up toil and trouble till they yield twice the toil and double the trouble for Macbeth. 2 SunTzu.The Art of War, translated by Griffith, Samuel B, Oxford University Press, New York 1963, Chapter IV, Paragraphs 13-14, p 87. 3 Time Magazine, Cover feature, India: Never Again the Same. Friday, 30 November 1962. 4 Hopkirk, Peter, The Great Game, Oxford University Press 1990. Survey and delineation of the Northern borders of British India as a part of the “shadowy struggle” between Czarist Russia and Britain is a continuous refrain in the text.

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lapsed into turmoil the British sensed a closure to the Great Game and once again the border was redrawn as the original Johnson Line.5 At the time of India’s independence in 1947, the Johnson Line was an inheritance of the partition award.6 The eastern segment was defined by the McMahon Line as a part of the Simla Agreement of 1914, an accord entered into between Tibet and Britain. China, though represented in the talks, never ratified it. The Line spans 890 km from Bhutan in the west, north of Bum La, journeys along the crest of the Himalayas passing through Tunga La, Yonggyap La and Tsang Kang La, before joining the Burmese border north of Diphu Pass. China however, continues to reject the legality of the Simla Accord on grounds that they were neither a party to it nor was Tibet sovereign at the time of endorsing the agreement.7 By the closing years of the 1940s, the world was witness to the British Empire in its death throes. South Asia which hastened this collapse was partitioned into India and Pakistan and by 1949 the region also saw the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

At that time there were no apparent conflicting territorial claims; whether on account of an inward looking orientation or a preoccupation with nation building, is not entirely clear. But the Battle of Chamdo in October 1950 which led to the annexation of Tibet and the consequent moves aimed at strategic consolidation of the Aksai Chin to conform to the McCartney-MacDonald Line, presaged the coming clash. All this went either unheeded by Indian leadership or was explained away as the natural articulation of an emerging giant.

The Group of Ministers also recommended the integration of service headquarters into the Ministry of Defence. This while given lip service has not happened. Service headquarters continue to be treated as attached offices to service the MoD as hitherto. Responsibility and accountability for operational matters remain with the military while controlling authority and higher defence decision-making resides in the MoD In 1959, as an upshot of the failed Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule, the 14th Dalai Lama, sought asylum

and was accommodated by the Indian government. This was the trigger that set into motion a series of border incidents and a growing bellicosity, bringing into sharp focus the distinct divergence in the orientation of the border and territorial contiguity. By 1960 not only had border clashes intensified but so had the cartographic-conflict. Politically exasperated by the uncompromising and intrusive patrolling by China along the McMahon and the McCartney-MacDonald Lines, India initiated a “Forward Policy” with the aim of creating offensive posts behind Chinese patrol lines to threaten and beat back their thrusts. While the concept may have had notional appeal, the awkward irony was that neither the Indian Army had materially trained and prepared for such confrontational operations nor was there an appreciation that the solution, given the balance of forces, largely lay in politics and diplomacy. After all, as recent as 1960, Zhou Enlai had ‘unofficially’ offered a quid pro quo in Aksai Chin and the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA), that India accept the McCartney Line while China would abandon its claims across the McMahon Line. Negotiations on this critical issue were never

5 Maxwell, Neville, India’s China War, New York, Random House 2000. General reference for the Sino-Indian border. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid.

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CALAMITOUS INCOMPETENCE?

considered with any seriousness by the Indian government, reportedly on account of a 1954 statement made by the PM that the borders of India as defined by the Johnson and McMahon Lines were inviolate and non-negotiable.8 The context of this assertion is remarkable, for it came at a time when the ink on the Sino-Indian Panchsheel Agreement9 was barely dry and there remained major unresolved cartographic disparities in the alignment of borders which could well have been addressed within the Panchsheel framework. This did not happen.

The solution, given the balance of forces, largely lay in politics and diplomacy. After all, as recent as 1960, Zhou Enlai had ‘unofficially’ offered a quid pro quo in Aksai Chin and the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA), that India accept the McCartney Line while China would abandon its claims across the McMahon Line. Negotiations on this critical issue were never considered with any seriousness by the Indian government In the event, India in pursuance of the ill-advised Forward Policy went on to establish 60 new border outposts, 43 of them north of the McMahon Line, under circumstances that were militarily untenable both materially and logistically. These resulted in periodic skirmishes through the summer of 1962 which intensified by the autumn. While analysts have offered many theories for the reasons that China went to war, ranging from the opportunity presented by the Cuban crisis to a belief that China was in fact defending her territory, clearly the implementation of the Forward Policy was the tipping point.

Brief narrative War broke out on 20 October 1962

when China launched two assaults. In the Aksai Chin sector the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) sought to expel the Indian forces from the Chip Chap Valley. In the NEFA the McMahon Line was breached and fighting broke out at Walong and along the Tawang-Bombdi La-Se La axis. By 24 October, Chinese forces had moved nearly 16 km south of the line controlled by India prior to 20 October. In the Aksai Chin the Chip Chap Valley had been vacated and Chinese forces had moved to Pangong So. Four days of fighting was followed by a lull of three weeks during which Zhou Enlai once again offered the 1959 quid pro quo. The offer was rejected and fighting resumed in both sectors on 14 November. In the Aksai Chin, Indian forces put up stiff resistance at Rezang La and the Chinese advance was stalled. A unilateral ceasefire was declared on 21 November. In the east, Chinese forces had penetrated to the outskirts of Tezpur, a distance of almost 60 km south of the Indian line of control by this time. The Chinese also undertook to withdraw 20 km behind the line of actual control that existed on 07 November 1959.10 One of the abiding puzzles of the entire episode which could have had a critical impact on the outcome was, why combat air power was not brought to bear on the operational situation. Particularly in the light of the PM’s declaration of the inviolate nature of India’s borders in 1954 and the events of 1959 which ought to have stimulated preparedness. The Indian Air Force of that day certainly had in its inventory a combination of modern fighter aircraft (Hawker Hunters and Dassault Mysteres) and bombers (English Electric Canberras) that were quite capable of operating in both sectors. What is even more mystifying is the reported request by Prime Minister Nehru for air power support from the USA.

The immediate aftermath The government of the day faced harsh criticism despite enjoying an overwhelming majority. The primary condemnation was the woeful neglect of defence preparedness, an unreal approach to international relations, particularly with China and the dangerous inadequacies of higher defence management (significantly the intrusive, extemporised and incompetent manner in which civil military relations had evolved). President Radhakrishnan went on to censure the Nehru government declaring that they had been “crude and negligent about preparations.” Lack of preparedness of the military was blamed on the Defence Minister who had to demit office. Nehru assured the Rajya Sabha on 09 November 1962 (during the three week lull in fighting) “People have been shocked, all of us have been shocked, by the events that occurred from 20 October onwards, especially of the first few days and the reverses we suffered. So I hope there will be an inquiry so as to find out what mistakes or errors were committed and who were responsible for them.11 The Inquiry took the form of an ‘Operations Review’ ordered by the new Chief of Army Staff Lt Gen J N Chaudhuri assigning the task of investigation to Lt Gen Henderson Brooks and Brig P S Bhagat. Terms of reference set for the inquiry were: Adequacy and potential of training for high altitude warfare Material and appropriateness

equipment

System of command Physical fitness of troops Capacity

commanders

8 Graver, John W, “China’s Decision to go to War with India in 1962” in New Directions in the Study of China’s Foreign Policy, Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S Ross Eds., Stanford University Press, 2006, pp 86-130. The Sino-Indian Boundary Question, full text of the Letter from Premier Zhou Enlai to Prime Minister Nehru, proposing the quid pro quo dated 07 November 1959 available at www.marxists.org/subject/ india/sino-india-boundary-question/ch04.htm Source: Sino Indian Border Question, Foreign Language Press, Peking 1962, p 47-50. 9 The Panchsheel Agreement signed between India and China on 29 April 1954 were a set of principles to govern relations between the two states. The 5 principles include: mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-agression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and peaceful co-existence. Full text is in United Nations Treaty Series, Volume 229, pp 57-81. 10 Sinha and Athale, The Official History of the Conflict with China (1962), History Division of the Ministry of Defence: 1992, www.bharatrakshak. com 11 Noorani, A G, Publish the 1962 War Report Now, The Hindu, e-paper, 12 July 2012, Opinion.

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influence the command

men

under

their

Going by the scope of an ‘Operations Review’ and the terms of reference handed down, would clearly suggest that the aim of the convening authority was to deliberately limit and strait-jacket the investigators to the operational level of the conflict. Conventional wisdom and military analytical tradition will, however, advocate the need to start a scrutiny of this nature with an understanding of the political direction, strategic posture and preparation and higher military decision-making in the run-up to war and its prosecution. Leaving the Inquiry divorced from the functioning and decision-making at service headquarters, Ministry of Defence and indeed by the Cabinet of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister (where decisions on strategic orientation and the political direction of the war were made), was not only to castrate the Inquiry, but was also to insinuate that all was well in the realm of higher defence management and decision-making. Facts had made it pretty apparent that it was here that an inquiry was most needed. The Supreme Commander’s terse censure of the Prime Minister and his government had underscored where the fault lines ran.

In 1959, as an upshot of the failed Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule, the 14th Dalai Lama, sought asylum and was accommodated by the Indian government. This was the trigger that set into motion a series of border incidents and a growing bellicosity, bringing into sharp focus the distinct divergence in the orientation of the border and territorial contiguity. By 1960 not only had border clashes intensified but so had the cartographic-conflict

The report The Henderson Brooks and Bhagat Report was presented to the new Defence Minister Mr Y B Chavan on 02 July 1963. Earlier in April, in reply to a question in Parliament, he affirmed that Army Headquarters had already

instituted measures to implement the lessons to be learned based on the terms of reference of the report. These included quality of planning, air-land cooperation, training for high altitude warfare, depth of officer man relationship, focused intelligence service and the creation of a chain of strategic airfields.12 What was conspicuous in its omission was a statement on the blemishes in higher defence management, the failings in the political direction of the war and ‘courtiership’ being promoted in the military. He also mentioned that the contents of the Report in its entirety were not being disclosed for considerations of security. On 02 September 1963, an intriguing statement was made by the Defence Minister in Parliament, he disclosed that the Inquiry Committee had not confined its investigations to operations alone but had also examined the “developments and events prior to hostilities as also the plans, posture and the strength of the Army at the outbreak of hostility.” Further, that a detailed review of the actual operations had been carried out “with reference to terrain, strategy, tactics and deployment of troops.” He also summarised the main recommendations of the report sticking to the terms of reference (which by now was well known) and later (on 09 September) in a statement on defence preparedness, he confirmed

that changes were underway which encompassed expansion, reorganisation, modernisation, development of comprehensive infrastructure and enhancing operational efficiency. The value and effectiveness of these sweeping changes were soon to be confirmed during the wars of 1965 and 1971 against Pakistan.13 What remained disturbingly unanswered was the out-of-mandate areas that the report addressed with regard to “developments and events prior to hostilities, strategic posture and plans, which must be taken to have included civil military relations, higher defence management, decision-making and the political direction of war.” In 1963 to divulge these may well have compromised national security, but to persist through time is to invite long shadows to loom over the military establishment.

The question In 2008 India’s Defence Minister Mr A K Antony told Parliament that the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report could not be declassified because its contents ”are not only extremely sensitive but also of current operational value.”14 Fifty years on it is challenging to comprehend what the Report could contain that would warrant such sarcophagal silence. As far as “operational value” is concerned it is an uncomfortable

12 Arpi Claude, The War of 1962: Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report, Indian Defence Review Vol 26.1 Jan-Mar 2011. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid.

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CALAMITOUS INCOMPETENCE? Sikorsky S-70B helicopter

contradiction that there exists a document in the public domain titled “The Official History of the Conflict with China (1962)” by Sinha and Athale, published by the History Division of the Ministry of Defence in 1992, that has, in 475 pages, given a detailed and critical operational account of the war including the run-up. The Introduction Section on page XXII sets the tone of the document, when alluding to the transformation in the defence establishment that Krishna Menon was experimenting with, “such basic changes required first of all a committed, or at least pliant, band of army officers in key positions. So mediocre Thapar was selected instead of the doughty Thorat as the Army Chief and Bijji Kaul was made the CGS.”

India had blinded itself to every principle that governed national strategy making; from the absence of an understanding of the nature of war that was to be fought, to calamitous incompetence of leadership at the highest political and military levels There are also a host of analytical books written on the subject in addition to Neville Maxwell’s “India’s China War” which claims access to the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report. It is also an awkward truth that the Woodrow Wilson Centre in the USA has obtained a large collection of Chinese archival documents featuring Beijing’s foreign policy before and during the 1962 conflict which would undoubtedly throw light on only the Chinese perspective.15 For scholars and students of history, without an alternate point of view the first becomes the gospel. Under these circumstances the belief that there exists continued operational value in keeping the Report classified must be viewed with considerable circumspection. The question that then begs to be asked is, what is it in the contents of the Report that makes it sensitive enough to cling on to the ‘Top Secret’ classification, even after half a century? If the answer to the question is, as mentioned earlier,

“developments and events prior to hostilities, strategic posture and plans which must be taken to have included civil military relation, higher defence management, decision-making and the political direction of war” (if this hypothesis is true) then it is the accountability of offices and the ‘Teflon’ authority that they wield and not individuals (since all primary protagonists are long gone) that is being safeguarded. This is the key scepticism that must be removed if credibility is to be restored in the military establishment.

The long shadow of ghosts Even after the passage of fifty years we note that the fixing of liability at the heights of higher defence decision-making for the 1962 debacle remains unfulfilled despite the four thousand plus casualties (killed, wounded, missing), the humiliation and indeed the credibility amongst the comity of nations. The perpetuation of this causeless inability may be directly linked to some of the more recent happenings in the military establishment, which can be considered to have been cast in the same mould of politico-bureaucratic opacity: The curious sacking of the Chief of Naval Staff on 30 December 1998 based on a hastily compiled imbalanced booklet by an Additional Secretary that had pretensions of being a ‘White Paper’ (it was distributed to all MPs) which invoked Article 310 of the Constitution that officers serve at the pleasure of the President. Primary reason apparently was the officer’s refusal to brook bureaucratic interference and high handedness in service matters.16 The Group of Ministers that reviewed the national security system in the wake of the Kargil conflict 1999 recommended the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) so that the military perspective would be reflected at the strategic level of warfare and would be taken note of when defining political direction and attaining strategic postures. While successive Service Chiefs have themselves to blame for not having

followed up with the necessary vigour for petty reasons of turf protection and internal incoherence, the office most affected would have been the Defence Secretary who currently perpetuates and plays at being the de-facto CDS with no liability to that office. The Group of Ministers also recommended the integration of service headquarters into the Ministry of Defence. This while given lip service has not happened. Service headquarters continue to be treated as attached offices to service the MoD as hitherto. Responsibility and accountability for operational matters remain with the military while controlling authority and higher defence decision-making resides in the MoD. The recent General V K Singh age fiasco could well have been resolved discreetly without compromising integrity of the army. This was not done and there is reason to believe that behind the scenes military bureaucratic tensions ensured that the matter, by design was allowed to rupture in public. India has faced many traumatic events since 1962 that have had critical impact on security of the nation including three wars, bloody insurgencies, gory terrorist acts, periodic crumbling of the law and order mechanism, incompetent governance, authoritarian rule, a crippling lack of strategic vision, a sycophantic establishment and an inexplicable abhorrence to change. In this contra rotating vortex two institutions stand out: firstly, the civilian-military bureaucracy who’s ‘duck-back’ all-weather-non specialist virtue makes it impervious to the demands of accountability; the second institution is the Military who have stood steadfast in every adversity, unfortunately, without the savvy to either rid courtiership when it manifests or to view the entire spectrum of force application as a unity. The spectres of Brooks and Bhagat will continue to consume us unless they are exposed to the light of day.

15 See Woodrow Wilson Centre project on Cold War Archives at www.wilsoncentre.org/digitalarchive Collection on Sino-Indian geography. 16 Bhagwat, Vishnu, Betrayal of the Defence Forces: A Soldier’s Diary. Manas Publication 2001. The fact of bureaucratic officiousness is a recurrent theme.

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1962 and now

CONCOMITANT ADVANCES

ith India’s recent successful test launch of the Agni-V ballistic missile, the Sino-Indian deterrence relationship entered a new era. India took a major step towards ensuring that China’s power centres of Beijing and Shanghai were within range. Yet, while Chinese coverage of India’s newest aerospace achievement is marked, it is far from new and even farther from simply isolated to India’s offensive capabilities. Defensive systems, like ballistic missile defence, are coming into China’s perceptual range.

Dr Lora Saalman

The writer is an associate in the Nuclear Policy Programme at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, based at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing. She completed her PhD entirely in Chinese at Tsinghua University in Beijing, where she was the first American to earn a doctorate from its Department of International Relations.

In the near term an arms race is unlikely. However, if current trends of hype over reality continue, the trajectory of Sino-Indian relations promises to change. Strategic stability to be gained vis-à-vis China from eventual deployment of India’s Agni-V would likely be eroded by India’s concomitant advances in ballistic missile defence and anti-satellite systems. Even if these systems never come to fruition, the effectiveness of BMD and ASAT is driven more by perception than reality, particularly if the Chinese strategic community dominates the discourse. Therein lies a future Sino-Indian security dilemma. To strengthen strategic stability between China and India, their exchanges need to be grounded first in technical understanding, altering the current trajectory from strategic rhetoric back to scientific reality

Overall, whether offensive or defensive, India’s aerospace developments have received a good deal of attention in China for a number of years.1 Much of this discussion has focused on ballistic missile and satellite capabilities, originating within China’s scientific circles.2 Yet, this focus has begun to spread to ballistic missile defences, captivating the strategic community within China. This is a trend only likely to be strengthened by the Agni-V test.3 Prior to these nascent shifts, Chinese assessments of Indian military developments were more prosaic and technology-based. Instead of analysing the geostrategic and security implications, Chinese technical analysts have heretofore been much more preoccupied with pro-forma lists of Indian capabilities and tests. That is, until now. Coverage of India’s aerospace developments is spreading from scientists to strategists, both within and outside of the Chinese military. This is a trend that should give pause. For while the United States continues to dominate Chinese threat perceptions, this prism is increasingly multi-faceted, with experts from a variety of groups, including the Second Artillery taking notice of India.4 Beyond such circles with a direct line into China’s strategic military modernisation, any number of strategic journals and analysts are also training their sights on their neighbour. This fact has both stabilising and destabilising implications.

Chinese Tracking of India and Aerospace

n American Scholar working in China analyses the impact of the recent Agni V test in the Chinese media. Initial Chinese assessments of Indian military developments, she feels, were more prosaic and technology-based. The shift of attention towards India’s aerospace advances from the scientific to the strategic community, combined with the increasing range of India’s aerospace advances, suggests that Chinese evaluations and nationalism are likely only to harden. The strategic community will be applying “what may be” to worst-case scenarios, potentially responding in kind. This is how security dilemmas and arms racing start. This article seeks to address how to end the race before it even begins. A very informative article on Chinese perceptions of India’s Missile and BMD programme.

As a positive outcome, if Chinese analysts are more aware of India’s military advances vis-à-vis China, they are less likely to miscalculate Indian intentions and actions. However, whether official or unofficial, these voices can be less measured than those of a scientific community that calculates mathematical probabilities based on evidence of “what is.” The strategic community will be applying “what may be” to worst-case scenarios, potentially responding in kind. This is how security dilemmas and arms racing start. This article seeks to address how to end the race before it even begins.

“What is” Indian ballistic missile defences are an unusual focus of Chinese preoccupation, in part, because these defences remain largely trained on Pakistan.5 In fact, graph 1 shows that while the United States and Russia continue to dominate Chinese analyses, India and Japan are not far behind. India places third, with over 37 per cent of Chinese articles surveyed highlighting it in the title.6 This suggests that Chinese analysts are looking to China’s west, not simply to its east.

The flow and ebb of Chinese discourse parallels a number of advances in India’s BMD pursuits. As visible in graph 2, an incipient rise in interest occurred in 2000, when Delhi’s programme was relatively new. Chinese interest in India’s BMD pursuits grew a few years later with reports on Israel’s supply of the Green Pine radar system, as well as Barak and Arrow-2 missile defence systems to India.8

Graph 1: Chinese mention of countries pursuing missile defence Sources: 786 articles downloaded from the Tsinghua University Electronic Database using the term fandao (missile defence) from such periodicals as Zhongguo Guofang Bao (China Defence News), Guofang keji gongye (Defence Science and Technology Industry), Xiandai Junshi (Modern Military), Guofang Shibao (Defence Times), Shi Jie bao (World News), Zhongguo Hangtian Bao (China Aerospace News), Feihang Daodan (Cruise Missiles), Guofang Keji (Defence Technology), Jian Zai wu qi (Shipboard Weapons), Shijie zhishi (World Knowledge), Zhongguo hangtian (China Aerospace), Kexue juice (Scientific Decision-making), Xiandai guoji guanxi (Modern International Relations) etc.7

A Changing Trajectory:

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The potential for US integration of India into its larger aerospace network casts a wide net impacting China. While India’s traditional aerospace suppliers receive mention, it is India’s future that receives greater attention. The potential for the United States to use India to balance against China remains a common theme Not surprisingly, early analyses continued to place an emphasis on the Indo-Pakistan dynamic.9 Yet, they also paid notable attention to the US role in green-lighting such sales. While noting initial US opposition, Chinese analysts were struck by the contrast between its approach towards Chinese and Indian attempts to procure Israeli aerospace-related items. Even though the Indian Space and Research Organisation remained on the US Entity List, US arguments against Israeli transfers to India began to fall by the wayside.10 Beyond giving way to Israeli sales, in the years that followed, the United States also sought to become a supplier to India. Among these efforts have been enticements to engage India on the Patriot missile defence system, coinciding with former President George W Bush’s visit to Delhi in 2005.11 In fact, the Patriot system actually featured in

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1962 and now

CONCOMITANT ADVANCES

32 per cent of Chinese articles mentioning India and its BMD programme. This is in spite of the fact that no apparent US-Indian BMD cooperation has occurred. While to a degree this can be explained by the appearance of Indian claims that its systems are comparable to the US Patriot system, there is more than meets the eye.12 These same articles feature the implications of India’s advances for China and Pakistan. Aerospace cooperation with India has become emblematic of the double standards of the international community, particularly when it comes to US treatment of China and India. The former continues to face US sanctions and the EU Arms Ban legacy, while the latter has largely cast off such external constraints.

Beyond India’s domestic layers to defend against ballistic missile attack, Chinese rhetoric is concentrating on another kind of web or network, namely that of the United States. In China, US pursuit of ballistic missile defence is often referred to as more about weaponisation of space than interception of missiles.18 In applying this logic to India and New Delhi’s own official statements about ASAT pursuits, Chinese interest in India’s BMD advances takes on a whole new meaning.19 When paired with the analysis above, graph 3 indicates that, even more than space weaponisation, the potential for US integration of India into its larger aerospace network casts a wide net impacting China. While India’s traditional aerospace suppliers receive mention, it is India’s future that receives greater attention.20 The potential for the United States to use India to balance against China remains a common theme. Overall, ballistic missile defence is a stepping-stone to greater US-Indian strategic integration. And, in many of these articles, encirclement of China receives prominent mention.21 US cooperation with allies Japan and South Korea has largely been a foregone conclusion on this front. India remains a wild card that China does not want to see played.

Graph 2: Chinese mention of India’s BMD programme

Sources: See graph 1

Nonetheless, Indian cooperation with the United States and other western powers is often seen in China to be an albatross around India’s neck.13 By making itself overly dependent on external suppliers and cooperation, India has placed itself at the mercy of western supply and future sanctions. In perpetuating this reliance, India is viewed as having demonstrated its weakness in research and development. The advantage of India’s potential ability to leapfrog on others’ technological advances, however, is not entirely lost on China. Graph 2 illustrates that Chinese dismissiveness should not be taken at face value. By 2010, US courting of India came full circle and reached an all-time high. In December of that year, US President Barack Obama announced that the United States would remove the Indian Space and Research Organisation (ISRO), Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) from the US Entity List. These firms play an integral role in India’s aerospace and BMD-related developments.

If Chinese analysts are more aware of India’s military advances vis-à-vis China, they are less likely to miscalculate Indian intentions and actions Thus, it is not surprising that in the lead up to and the wake of Obama’s announcement, Chinese strategic and technical attention to India’s BMD programme rose. Since the removal of ISRO, BDL and DRDO came at the end of 2010, however, another rationale for increased Chinese attention has also come to the forefront. In the same year, DRDO chief Saraswat emphasised India’s ability to achieve an intercept range of 5,000 kilometers.14 So rather than India’s actual BMD advances, in other words “what is,” driving Chinese interests, instead it is illusory BMD aspirations, in other words “what may be” that are taking the lead.

“What may be” Following India’s first successful test in 2006, its BMD advances have had several effects that are relevant for China. First, they demonstrate that India is integrating and mastering capabilities, whether imported or domestic. Second, Chinese analysts are diverting interest from what India purchases to what it is capable of achieving domestically. Third, faced with Indian early warning systems, increased intercept range and “China threat” rhetoric, Chinese analysts perceive India’s military systems as a long-term source of interest, particularly if they become part of the US missile defence web.15 And this is exactly the terminology used by Chinese strategists to describe India’s pursuit of multi-layered BMD, referred to in analyses as a fandao wang (missile defence network) and lan jie wang (intercept network).16 Heightened interest appeared in 2009 and 2010, coinciding with India’s Prithvi Air Defence and Advanced Air Defence tests, conducted with the assistance of its Swordfish radar.17 Official mention of intent to expand intercept range to 5,000 km, from DRDO Director General V K Saraswat, not only conveyed the potential to intercept Chinese missiles, it also captured China’s interest.

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Graph 3: Chinese attention paid to Indian BMD cooperation

Sources: See graph 1

This could, in part, explain why Chinese analysts are often adamant in stressing India’s non-aligned posture. Chinese delegations of experts to India from such organisations as the Chinese Institute for Contemporary International Relations are on the rise and emphasise the importance of Delhi not becoming too aligned with Washington.22 They seek to remind India of its incentive and rationale for not becoming part of US regional pivoting.

Indian cooperation with the United States and other western powers is often seen in China to be an albatross around India’s neck. By making itself overly dependent on external suppliers and cooperation, India has placed itself at the mercy of western supply and future sanctions. In perpetuating this reliance, India is viewed as having demonstrated its weakness in research and development While an independent stance is largely what India has chosen, concerns persist in China. US-Indian space cooperation remains part of the High-Technology Working Group agenda. And even without US assistance, India is proving increasingly adept at integration and indigenisation when it comes to aerospace.23 The belief that such systems are advancing is more than enough to draw the Chinese strategists’ gaze.

From statements to strategy Given the prominence accorded to such officials as DRDO Director General V K Saraswat and taken in the context of statements from figures like former Indian National Security Advisor, Brajesh Mishra, Chinese coverage of India’s BMD programme is entering a new phase. Such Indian statements are marked by hyperbole, but they nonetheless represent the thinking among some of India’s elite. Successes whether in ballistic missile tests or ballistic missile defence tests add fuel to the fire as seen from China. In some cases, these statements are no more than comparison of capabilities, such as Saraswat’s claims that India had exceeded China in its BMD developments.24 In others, linkage of India’s BMD advances to another system, namely anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons draws a new line of concern.25 In light of India’s achievement in terms of ballistic missile range with the Agni-V, the addition of enhanced accuracy and targeting suggests that Indian assertions and their implications for China cannot be and, more importantly, are not being dismissed. In the face of such pronouncements, there are two possible responses. The Chinese scientific community, which has long kept its eye on such advances, responds with an evaluation of the validity of such claims. The Chinese strategic community, which is increasingly part of the discussion, works these claims into its calculations of threat and response.

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1962 and now

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Chinese discussions have naturally begun to question how Indian systems like BMD might impact China. Some articles even compare and contrast India’s and China’s BMD programmes.26 Not only are these analytical shifts in China striking, another pillar of traditional Chinese interest in India has also been shaken. There has been a move from referring to India’s BMD programme largely as a function of Pakistan, to addressing it in the context of China. From 2009 onward, mention of China actually exceeded that of Pakistan in Chinese articles on Indian BMD and its implications, with the former occupying 78 per cent of the articles surveyed and Pakistan appearing in 61 per cent. These figures could be partially explained through Chinese interest in India’s pursuit of multilayered BMD, combined with Indian official claims of working to increase its intercept range to one with implications for China.

With India’s recent successful test launch of the Agni-V ballistic missile, the Sino-Indian deterrence relationship entered a new era. India took a major step towards ensuring that China’s power centres of Beijing and Shanghai were within range. Yet, while Chinese coverage of India’s newest aerospace achievement is marked, it is far from new and even farther from simply isolated to India’s offensive capabilities. Defensive systems, like ballistic missile defence, are coming into China’s perceptual range Yet, China’s obsession with US regional involvement also informs the focus. While China outpaces India in any number of arenas, its analysts spend a significant amount of time covering India’s early warning systems. Of the articles surveyed, 45 per cent detail India’s evolution from imports to indigenous early warning, discussing Israel’s Green Pine phased array radar system, Indian Doppler Radar (INDRA) series and Swordfish Long Range Tracking Radar, as visible in graph 4. This is not simply due to India’s receipt of external assistance, but also concerns over deficiencies in China’s own capabilities. So while there remains a tendency in China to refer to India’s reliance on external assistance to show that India remains behind, with every test launch and hint of external cooperation this habit recedes.27 India’s aerospace programme is among the few arenas in which India is perceived as being able to surpass China. And this is not simply due to boasts from such figures as DRDO’s chief Saraswat. Ballistic missile defence is a system that is sometimes as much about perceptions as actual capabilities. Questions remain regarding the effectiveness of the BMD programmes of any number of countries, including those of the Graph 4: Chinese attention paid to BMD-related capabilities Sources: See graph 1 United States.28 Yet, countries like China are basing their own strategic planning on just such contingencies and future potential. Thus, while India ranks at a much lower level on China’s strategic threat radar than the United States, the Chinese strategic community is driven by anticipating what will happen in the decades to come. Whether India molds this future on its own or with the assistance of the United States, its progress remains part of the Chinese scientific and now strategic discourse. Within this framework, whether exaggerated or not, statements on the part of Indian leadership and technical community are scrutinised within China. In the past, Chinese scientists would have been likely to take a circumspect view of Indian claims, basing their assessments to a much greater extent on empirical evidence. However, the shifting trajectory of analysis on Indian aerospace programmes towards the Chinese strategic community suggests that Indian statements drawing China into perceptual range are likely to gain a greater audience. When combined with the successful Agni-V test launch bringing China into actual range and expanding India’s reach in both BMD and ASAT, the strategic audience in China is only likely to grow. The shift of attention towards India’s aerospace advances from the scientific to strategic community, combined with the increasing range of India’s aerospace advances, suggests that Chinese evaluations and nationalism are likely only to harden. Tracking the intersection of these developments in perception and reality is essential to anticipating whether arms racing or security dilemmas will occur. In the near term an arms race is unlikely. However, if current trends of hype over reality continue, the trajectory of Sino-Indian relations promises to change. Strategic stability to be gained vis-à-vis China from eventual deployment of India’s Agni-V would likely be eroded by India’s concomitant advances in ballistic missile defence and anti-satellite

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systems. Even if these systems never come to fruition, the effectiveness of BMD and ASAT is driven more by perception than reality, particularly if the Chinese strategic community dominates the discourse. Therein lies a future Sino-Indian security dilemma. To thwart such an outcome, it is essential that the two sides make a conscious effort to reclaim the discourse and to highlight assessments by their scientific communities. Direct technical exchange or study into the growing aerospace capabilities of each side would allow for much of the hyperbole to be defused by fact. Recognising limitations in transparency on both sides, these exchanges must not be written-off before they even start. Ballistic missile defence is a system that operates off of “what may be,” rather than “what is.” Therefore, to strengthen strategic stability between China and India, their exchanges need to be grounded first in technical understanding, altering the current trajectory from strategic rhetoric back to scientific reality.

Footnotes:

1. As detailed in the author’s talks at the Observer Research Foundation and the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (Three Dimensionality in Chinese Views on India and Space, www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yhep9pD8ziQ) in January and February 2011, as well as a journal article “Divergence, Similarity and Symmetry in Sino-Indian Threat Perceptions,” Vol. 64, No. 2, Sino-Indian Relations Issue, Journal of International Affairs, Columbia University Press, Spring/Summer 2011, pp. 169-194. The author’s research revealed that the Chinese scientific and technical community has been the primary group interested in India’s aerospace developments. 2. Among these scientific journals, the most compelling is the periodical Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles). Yet, it is not alone. The scientific journal Hangtian dianzi duikang (Aerospace Electronic Countermeasures) among others does not ignore India’s developments. The fact that these journals pay limited, if any, attention to other powers makes their focus on India all the more significant. Ma Junsheng, “Yindu ‘liehuo’ dandaodaodan tufang jishu xingneng fenxi” (An Analysis of India’s ‘Agni’ Ballistic Missile’s Penetration Technology Capabilities”), Hangtian dianzi duikang (Aerospace Electronic Countermeasures), Issue 6, 2008, pp. 1-4; “Yindu jinyibu tuidong dandaodaodan fangyu xitong jihua” (“India’s Plan to Further Promote Ballistic Missile Defense System”), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 2, 2009, p. 11; “Yindu lujun zhengshi liezhuang luji xing bulamosi xunhang daodan” (“Indian Army Officially Fields Land-Based BrahMos Cruise Missile”), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 4, 2007, pages unavailable; Dong Sichun and Gong Gao, “Yindu jinxing diwen fadongji shiche” (“India Conducts a Cryogenic Engine Test”), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 4, 2007, pages unavailable; Liao Shaoxu, “Yindu diwen huojian fadongji dianhuo shiyan beipo zhongduan” (“Interruption of Indian Cryogenic Rocket Engine Test Firing”), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 1, 2007, pages unavailable; Sun Weiping, “Yindu jiang yanfa zaizhong 10 t de huojian” (“India is Developing a Rocket with a Load Capcity of 10 Tons”), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 2, 2007, pages unavailable; “Yindu zhengfu pizhun 7450 wan meiyuan de dengyue jihua” (“India’s Government Approves a 74.5 Million Dollar Moon Landing Plan”), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 4, 2003, p. 44; “Yindu chenggong jinxing bulamosi xunhang daodan di san ci feishe” (“India Succeeds in Conducting the Third Test Launch of the Brahmos Cruise Missile”), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 1, 2003, p. 39; “Yindu jiang shengchan shecheng geng yuan de daodan” (“India Will Produce Missiles with Greater Range”), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 2, 2003, p. 24; Yu Tian, “Yindu chenggong fashe shiyan tongxin weixing” (“India Succeeds in Launching an Experimental Communication Satellite”), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 3, 2001, p. 61; Xi Yin, “Yindu de hangtian yusuan zengchang 6.4%” (“India's Space Budget Grows 6.4%”), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 3, 2001, p. 62; “Yindu jiang ba huojian jianzao he weixing fashe deng huodong yijiao siying qiye” (“India Will Transfer Rocket Manufacture, Satellite Launch Among Other Activities to the Private Sector”), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 3, 2000, p. 10; “Yindu kaishi yueqiu tance renwu de yanjiu” (“India Begins Research into Moon Exploration Missions”), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 3, 2000, p. 10; “Yindu jiang shiyan jiada shecheng de liehuo shi daodan” (“India Will Conduct Tests to Expand the Range of the Agni Missile”), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 3, 2000, pp. 61-62; “Yindu jigui weixing yunzai huojian fashe chenggong” (“Successful Launch of India's Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle”), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 1, 1995, p. 75; “Yindu yi jianzao di 2 ge fashe tai” (“India Intends to Build Two Launch Pads”), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 4, 1995, 54; “Yindu jiasu yanzhi tongbu weixing yunzai huojian” (“India is Accelerating the Development of a Synchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle”), Daodan yu hangtian yunzai jishu (Missiles and Space Vehicles), Issue 5, 1995, p. 76. 3. A survey of databases, ranging as far back as 1981, reveals Chinese analysts working on aerospace have been looking at India since 1982. By the early 1990s, more in-depth analyses of India’s aerospace-related programs already began to emerge, proving to be a sustained phenomenon. Attention paid towards aerospace largely derives from two particular subsets, namely the Chinese technical and strategic communities. Of which, the technical community possess the most in-depth and far-ranging overview of India and aerospace. This trend is far different from other arenas in which Chinese focus on India beyond the occasional reference has been relatively recent. This overall attention within China towards India’s military modernization launched itself to a substantive degree in the mid-1990s, markedly accelerating in 2000 and 2005. Cai Hongkui and Shu Leiming, “Yindu – zhengzai qiaoran jueqi de hangtian daguo” (“India – A Quietly Rising Aerospace Great Power”), Zhongguo hangtian (Aerospace China), Issue 8, 1993, pp. 11-13; Liang Fushen, Cai Li and Gao Peng, “Yindu hangtian jihua de jinzhan” (“Advances in India’s Aerospace Program”), Zhongguo hangtian (Aerospace China), Issue 12, 1992, pp. 6-10; “Yindu di er dai yaogan weixing IRS-1C” (“India’s Second Generation Remote Sensing Satellite IRS-1C”), Zhongguo Hangtian (Aerospace China), Issue 2, 1993, pp. 26-29; Ye Minglan, “Yindu di di daodan he hewuqi fazhan fenxi” (“Analysis of India’s Development of Surface-to-Surface Missiles and Nuclear Weapons”), Zhongguo hangtian (Aerospace China), Issue 6, 1996, pp. 43-45; Yu Hua, “Xiao hua qian duo ban shi de yindu hangtian” (“Spending Less, But Doing More in Indian Aerospace”), Zhongguo hangtian (Aerospace China), Issue 12, 1996, pp. 7-11. This observation is substantiated by the author’s exchanges with at least two members of China’s second artillery, who have a pronounced interest in India and statements coming out from its leadership and military vis-à-vis China. Chart coverage is limited to 1999-2011. While India’s interest in and pursuit of BMD was mentioned before 1999, the author chose to limit the scope to the official inception of India’s BMD program. For reportage since 2011, while these analyses will be referred to in the body of this article, since full 2012 statistics are not yet available, they have been removed from the chart. 4. This observation is substantiated by the author’s exchanges with at least two members of China’s second artillery, who have a pronounced

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interest in India and statements coming out from its leadership and military vis-à-vis China. 5. Chart coverage is limited to 1999-2011. While India’s interest in and pursuit of BMD was mentioned before 1999, the author chose to limit the scope to the official inception of India’s BMD program. For reportage since 2011, while these analyses will be referred to in the body of this article, since full 2012 statistics are not yet available, they have been removed from the chart. 6. Cai Jinman, “Yindu jiakuai xiang shijie junshi qiangguo wanjin de bufa” (India to Accelerate the Pace of Becoming a World Class Military Power), Guofang keji daobao (Defense Technology Industry), pp. 54-57; Peng Xiaolong, Wu Wenjun, Wang Jianfei, “Yindu ye yao gao daodan fangyu xitong” (India is Also Pursuing Ballistic Missile Defense), Xiandai junshi (Modern Military), October 2004, pp. 52-54. 7. Given that missile defense could refer to systems targeting both ballistic and non-ballistic missiles, this research cast the net wider than it might otherwise. The overall statistics may be higher than if “dandao daodan fangyu xitong” (ballistic missile defense system) had been used. However, in the interest of not excluding articles using the more popular and frequently used term “fandao” (missile defense), the author erred on the side of inclusion, rather than exclusion. Regardless, the same set of total articles was used to determine the country coverage. 8. Liang Jiahua “Dongpin xicou zhu tiandun – Poxi yindu haijun jianzai fan daodan xitong” (Patching Together a Space Shield – Analysis of India’s Carrier-based Anti-missile System), Jianzai wuqi (Shipborne Weapons), August 2003, pp. 42-45. 9. Wan Xuying, “Yin, ba fandao de fei junheng fazhan” (Imbalanced Development of India’s and Pakistan’s Missile Defense), Xiandai bingqi (Modern Weaponry), March 2000, pp. 9-12. 10. Lora Saalman, “White Elephants to Weapons Systems: The Role of Arrow Missile Defense in Israeli-Turkish-U.S. Military Cooperation,” Monterey Institute of International Studies, May 2004, http://www.miis.edu/docs/GSIPS-Arrow-Paper-Final-5-12-WR-2.pdf. 11. “US team in Delhi to sell Patriot, Falcon,” The Economic Times, September 2005, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/200509-10/news/27487788_1_anti-missile-system-multi-role-combat-aircraft-defence. 12. Liu Yibo, “2012: Yin fandao jiang ‘zhangang’: Ni lanjie zhongguo he bajisitan zhongcheng dandao daodan” (2014: India ABM ‘Guard’: Intended to Intercept Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles in China and Pakistan,” Zhongguo guofang bao (China Defense News), September 2011, p. 4; Du Zhaoping, “Quanmian fandao bushu: Yin neng lvxian wancheng ma?” (Comprehensive anti-missile deployment: Can India be the First to Complete It?), Zhongguo guofang bao (China Defense News), December 2007, p. 2. 13. “Zhang Kanli, “Yindu fandao jishu mei name xianjin” (Yindu fandao jishu mei name xianjin), Guofang shibao (Defense News), August 2010, p. 3. 14. Zhang Chao, “Yindu: Shuangceng fandao shiyan pinpin wei na ban? – Dui yindu dazao wanquan gongchanhua shuangceng fandao xitong de zhuizong guancha” (India: What are the Repeated Missile Defense Tests For? – Following Complete Indigenization of a Missile Defense System), Zhongguo hangtian bao (China’s Aerospace News), July 2010, p. 4. 15. Wei Dongxu, “Meiguo tiaoqi quanqiu fandao jingsai” (The United States is Provoking Global Missile Defense Race), Guofang shibao (Defence Times), March 2011, p. 1) 16. Kong Xiangwu, “ 2012 nian: Yin goucheng fandao lanjie wang?” (2012: Is India Building a Missile Defense Interception Network?), Zhongguo guofang bao (China Defense News), October 2012, p. 13; Qian Feng, “Yindu ye bian fandao wang” (India is Also Compiling a Missile Defense Network), Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), Date Unavailable; Liu Yibo, “2012: Yin fandao jiang ‘zhangang’: Ni lanjie zhongguo he bajisitan zhongcheng dandao daodan” (2014: India ABM ‘Guard’: Intended to Intercept Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles in China and Pakistan,” Zhongguo guofang bao (China Defense News), September 2011, p. 4; Du Zhaoping, “Quanmian fandao bushu: Yin neng lvxian wancheng ma?” (Comprehensive anti-missile deployment: Can India be the First to Complete It?), Zhongguo guofang bao (China Defense News), December 2007, p. 2. 17. The Swordfish radar system is a spin-off of Israel’s Green Pine radar system, suggesting another way in which India is integrating and making its own improvements to externally supplied systems. 18. Based on frequent interactions in China, in particular with a retired Senior Colonel of China’s PLA at the 12th PIIC Beijing Seminar on International Security: Building A World of Sustainable Peace and Stability, Beijing, China, September 5-9, 2010. 19. Song Lifang and Zheng Caiming, “Yindu fanweixing jihua zheshe kongtian yinyou: Fang zhongguo hangtian kegong jituan gongsi keji weiguwen, zhongguo gongchengyuan zhongshan yuanshi” (India's Anti-satellite Program Reflects Space Concerns: Interview with the Advisor to the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation and Chinese Academy of Engineering Academician Zhong Shan), Zhongguo hangtian bao (China Aerospace Daily), January 2010, p. 4. 20. “Feiyue haishi fudan? Cong yindu jinkou S-300V toushi e junshi dianzi gongye” (Leap or Burden? From India’s Import of the S-300V Examining Russian Electronic Industry), Guoji guancha (World Outlook), July 2003, pp. 49-53. 21. Chen Guangwen “Yindu, ‘wanmei zhangwo’ fandao jishu?” (Will India “Completely Master” Missile Defense Technology), Shijie bao (World News), March 2011, p. 15. 22. Based on series of interviews conducted at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses in Delhi, India on June 21, 2012. 23. Zhang Chao, “Yindu: Shuangceng fandao shiyan pinpin wei na ban? – Dui yindu dazao wanquan gongchanhua shuangceng fandao xitong de zhuizong guancha” (India: What are the Repeated Missile Defense Tests For? – Following Complete Indigenization of a Missile Defense System), Zhongguo hangtian bao (China’s Aerospace News), July 2010, p. 4. 24. “‘India senior to China in missile programme’,” Press Trust of India, February 11, 2010. 25. Sagar Kulkarni Thiruvananthapuram, “India readying weapon to destroy enemy satellites: Saraswat,” Press Trust of India, January 3, 2010; Bharath Gopalaswamy and Harsh Pant, “Does India need anti-satellite capability?” Rediff News, February 9, 2010. 26. Guo Xuan, “Zhongguo fandao jinzhui meiguo” (China’s ABM hot pursuit of the United States), Shijie bao (World News), May 2011, Page 1; Yu Feifan, “Yindu fandao chaoyue zhongguo you yidian nan” (It Would Be a Bit Difficult for India’s Missile Defense to Surpass China’s), Shijie bao (World News), March 2010, pp. 15-16. 27. Li Rui, Li Xuwu, and Liu Xiaojian, “Yindu fandao lanjie shiyan jinzhan” (Progress in India’s Missile Defense Intercept Tests), Feihang daodan (Cruise Missiles), Pages Unavailable, Year Unavailable. 28. George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, “A Flawed and Dangerous U.S. Missile Defense Plan,” Arms Control Today, May 2010, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_05/Lewis-Postol.

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INDIA-CHINA EQUATION Maj Gen Afsir Karim AVSM (retd) The writer is a well known retired Indian Army General and a military scholar who has authored several books on strategic affairs and military studies. He is a graduate of the Defense Services Staff College, Wellington and the National Defence College.

he writer takes a reflective look back at 1962 and the current state of the India-China balance. Commenting on our readiness for a two-front war he says – the current Indian military profile suggests that India is rapidly building a military capability to alter the military equation on both the fronts. The Indian military infrastructure on the Indo-China border is being built-up rapidly and the IAF has begun to develop forward bases. India has enhanced the troop level both in the eastern and western sectors and has deployed new formations which are well equipped and trained for war in the high Himalayas. The army is planning to deploy a strike corps in the Eastern Sector and IAF has developed new airfields here all along the Sino-Indian border. Evidently India is building a military capability to contain China. With an increasing naval capability and longer reach in the Indian Ocean region India has the potential to dominate crucial sea lanes and threaten the Chinese lines of communication and vital supply routes.

Evidently India is building a military capability to contain China. India’s collaboration with several western countries and the US in procuring strategic weapon systems and developing a robust economy has substantially added to its capability to counter China at the strategic level. With an increasing naval capability and longer reach in the Indian Ocean region India has the potential to dominate crucial sea lanes and threaten the Chinese lines of communication and vital supply routes. India as a growing regional military power has developed the military capability of stopping Chinese forces in their tracks in a border war; and a 1962 like military thrust by the Chinese forces is out of the question today

n 1962 India-China war, preparedness for war and morale of the two adversaries, the kind of tactics employed by the Chinese Army, comparative technologies, weapons systems and terrain played a big role in the outcome of operations. However, incompetence of the field commanders affecting the morale of the troops and lack of preparedness for war at the national level led to the debacle of 1962. The war preparedness of a nation cannot

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be assessed merely by counting and comparing weapon systems of the two armies, wars have been lost by the best equipped forces with all the tactical advantages because of poor quality of civil and military leadership. In 1962 professional honesty and competence was lacking in the commanders responsible for conduct of operations and this seemed to be the main cause of the ignominious defeat of the Indian troops in the Eastern Sector.

The observations of a former Army Chief, suggesting that India has developed a capability of conducting operations simultaneously both against Pakistan and China could be taken with a pinch of salt, but the present situation and the current Indian military profile suggests that India is rapidly building a military capability to alter the military equation on both the fronts. The Indian military infrastructure on the Indo-China border is being built-up rapidly and the IAF has begun to develop forward bases. India has enhanced the troop level both in the eastern and western sectors and has deployed new formations which are well equipped and trained for war in the high Himalayas. The army is planning to deploy a strike corps in the Eastern Sector and IAF has developed new airfields here all along the Sino-Indian border My personal recollection and impressions as a young officer of 1962 era, regarding the quality of leadership, morale and preparedness of the troops for war reflect the conditions prevailing on the eve of 1962 war. As young officers we had a fairly good idea of the quality of our senior officers. All of us without exception were proud of General Thimayya, General Thorat and General Manekshaw, uneasy about the likes of General Kaul and General Thapar. Although, traditionally senior officers were never discussed but we kept on hearing murmurs about the political clout of Gen Kaul and the meekness of Gen Thapar and other senior officers. We were also aware of many self-seeking officers lining up behind the Kaul group to seek out-of-turn promotions and plum postings. At the regimental and unit level everyone was aware of the fact that we did not possess the equipment and weapons needed for war in the mountains. However, morale of all ranks at the unit level was high and everyone was sure that we will give a very good account of ourselves whenever war came. Some of our JCOs, who were veterans of the Second World War showed great surprise when the news of our reverses against Chinese became public, they had a very poor opinion of the fighting qualities of the Chinese soldiers and could not believe that they defeated us in battle. News of failure of our army to stand up against the Chinese and chaotic retreat of our forces in several sectors came as a great shock to all of us and I do not remember such feelings of shock and despair prevailing so widely in the army ever after in war or peace. In 1962 we lacked the wherewithal for war, professional incompetence and lack of moral courage among many of our field commanders was glaring. In these circumstances even if the Indian Army had been better equipped for war

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in 1962 the results may not have been much different.

The current situation

State of preparedness prior to 1962 war

General K S Thimayya, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) until 1961, wrote in Seminar Magazine that, “I cannot even, as a soldier, envisage India taking on China in an open conflict on its own; we could never hope to match China in the foreseeable future. It must be left to the politicians and diplomats to ensure our security.”

The main area of concern that may adversely affect India’s military capability is, however, not shortfall of weapon or equipment but a question mark on its military leadership In 1959-1960, Lt General S P P Thorat, GOC-in-C Eastern Command, had carried out an appreciation of the Chinese threat to our borders in the Eastern theatre and had made detailed recommendations about the immediate requirements of the army to counter this threat. But the government did not pay much attention to the threat perception in Gen Thorat’s appreciation and it was not considered important enough to bring any radical changes in the training or equipment of the army. As the events proved subsequently, Indian Army was not ready for war in the mountains in 1962, very few units were trained for mountain warfare, troops were armed with obsolete weapons and their equipment was unsuitable for operations in high altitudes. The army did not even have proper winter clothing and snow shoes. Our lines of communication were tenuous and there was no suitable road network for reinforcement of positions or replenishment of ammunition and other vital supplies. Our knowledge about the Chinese Army facing us was poor and we had no clear idea of the Chinese strength, tactical doctrines and infrastructure in various sectors.

India’s defence preparedness, on the other hand, is still hampered by long procedural delays in procurement of weapons and equipment and its capability of manufacturing sophisticated weaponry is extremely limited. Production of simple weapon systems drags on for years and the finished products have not always been found satisfactory. The bureaucratic delays and an inefficient procurement system, despite our ambitious arms purchase programmes, are likely to keep us far behind China for many years unless there is dynamic change in our policies The Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Reports though still classified are believed to have pointed out that an ill-equipped and unprepared Indian Army was committed to battle against superior Chinese forces who were well prepared for war in the mountains. The Indian Air Force (IAF) was not used in offensive role. This decision was unfortunate as IAF could have prevented the build-up of the Chinese forces for offensive action in some vital areas.

In 1959-1960, Lt General S P P Thorat, GOC-in-C Eastern Command, had carried out an appreciation of the Chinese threat to our borders in the Eastern theatre and had made detailed recommendations about the immediate requirements of the army to counter this threat. But the government did not pay much attention to the threat perception in Gen Thorat’s appreciation and it was not considered important enough to bring any radical changes in the training or equipment of the army Evidently India is building a military capability to contain China. India’s collaboration with several western countries and the US in procuring strategic weapon systems and developing a robust economy has substantially added to its capability to counter China at the strategic level. With an increasing naval capability and longer reach in the Indian Ocean region India has the potential to dominate crucial sea lanes and threaten the Chinese lines of communication and vital supply routes. China has a global military reach but India as a growing regional military power has developed the military capability of stopping Chinese forces in their tracks in a border war; and a 1962 like military thrust by the Chinese forces is out of the question today. Although, it is not possible to predict the course of India-China border war with any accuracy but it is certain that a war between the two countries will not lead to any decisive gains for China.

Wars have been lost by the best equipped forces with all the tactical advantages because of poor quality of civil and military leadership. In 1962 professional honesty and competence was lacking in the commanders responsible for conduct of operations and this seemed to be the main cause of the ignominious defeat of the Indian troops in the Eastern Sector

Occupation and holding on of any key areas is unlikely by China in a short war given the current military balance between the two armies. In the present circumstances any move by China to grab Indian territory will entail heavy costs and may lead to Indian counter thrusts across the borders. China has a reputation of making realistic assessments while formulating war strategies or tackling the border problems, in the present conditions China is likely to be extremely cautious and rule out any military intervention in the border areas.

Concluding remarks China’s enhanced military spending, (11 per cent this year and 12.7 per cent last year) has increased the pace of modernisation of the People’s Liberation Army. China is also rapidly improving its offensive capability by acquiring and producing sophisticated weaponry; it has recently introduced a new indigenous stealth jet and built an aircraft carrier.

In 1962 India-China war, preparedness for war and morale of the two adversaries, the kind of tactics employed by the Chinese Army, comparative technologies, weapons systems and terrain played a big role in the outcome of operations. However, incompetence of the field commanders affecting the morale of the troops and lack of preparedness for war at the national level led to the debacle of 1962 India’s defence preparedness, on the other hand, is still hampered by long procedural delays in procurement of weapons and equipment and its capability of manufacturing sophisticated weaponry is extremely limited. Production of simple weapon systems drags on for years and the finished products have not always been found satisfactory. The bureaucratic delays and an inefficient procurement system, despite our ambitious arms purchase programmes, are likely to keep us far behind China for many years unless there is dynamic change in our policies. In a global or regional context India still cannot match China’s military capability but China will now face massive resistance and challenges from the Indian armed forces, this will prove a major deterrent for any major confrontation between the two countries. The main area of concern that may adversely affect India’s military capability is, however, not shortfall of weapons or equipment but a question mark on its military leadership. Lately signs of dissension between senior officers, serious charges of corruption involving higher ranks have surfaced with alarming regularity. The institution of the Chief of Army Staff itself has been under attack. These problems may severely limit army’s fighting potential against China in a short border war.

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ASCENDING STAKES

T Dr Harsh V Pant The writer is Reader in International Relations at King's College London and an affiliate with the King's India Institute.

Many in India argue that given the high stakes that China and India have in each other’s economies, conflict between the two is highly unlikely. But as tensions in South China Sea exemplify, economic interdependence has never really been an antidote to conflict. New Delhi should watch China’s behaviour closely and learn due lessons in dealing with the rising dragon in its vicinity. Against this backdrop of China’s rise and relative US decline, it is imperative that India contribute to the Asian security dynamic to bring greater stability to the region. The US has encouraged a greater role for India in East and Southeast Asia. Exhorting India to lead and look beyond its immediate neighbourhood, the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, during her visit to India earlier this year asked India “not just to look east, but to engage east and act east as well ”

he US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, was in Asia in July and used her last visit to Asia as the US chief diplomat to signal unequivocally that the US is unwilling to accept China’s push for regional hegemony. She visited Mongolia, Vietnam and Myanmar making new friends and reinforcing old partnerships. She then went to attend the ASEAN summit meeting in Cambodia where the ASEAN member states failed to agree on a legally binding code of conduct for managing disputes in the South China Sea. Tensions are rising in East Asia as China remains embroiled in a number of disputes with many of its neighbours raising questions about the future stability of the entire region. The uninhabited and long-contested Senkaku Islands, controlled by Japan but claimed by China, have again turned into a flashpoint amid Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda’s recent proposal to buy the territory from a private Japanese landowner. China sent three ships to the area recently as an apparent response, prompting Japan to temporarily recall its Ambassador from Beijing.

America’s new playground? Clinton’s visit comes at a time when the US has initiated its foreign policy pivot towards Asia. As the US Secretary of State has already underlined, “the future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq and the United States will be right at the centre of the action.” At a time when talk of American decline and retrenchment from global commitments has become de riguer, the signals coming from Washington are that it has no intention of leaving the Asian strategic landscape. Nor will regional states allow America to lower its profile. After all, the elephant in the room (region) is China’s faster than expected ascent in global inter-state hierarchy. The new defence strategy outlined by Washington is explicitly geared towards tackling the emerging threat from China’s massive and rapid military build-up. It takes forward the already underway process of reorienting the American military might from the Atlantic to the Pacific. With his visit to Asia last November and with a new military strategy that focuses on the region, the Obama Administration is underscoring America’s commitment to regional stability at a time when the US is wrapping up two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The new strategy is unambiguous in underlining the challenge in the Asia-Pacific and turning America’s gaze to this geo-strategically pivotal region and to China’s growing prowess. “As I made clear in Australia, we’ll be strengthening our presence in the Asia-Pacific and budget reductions will not come at the expense of this critical region,”

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

Obama remarked at the Pentagon while releasing the new strategy. It remains to be seen how successful this strategy will be in meeting the challenges of the future but it should give some respite to regional states, including India, who are confronted with a rapidly rising China and all its attendant consequences. As America’s economic constraints force it to go back to an “offshore balancing” posture, it needs new arrangements in Asia if it wants to prevent China from dominating the regional strategic landscape. The US will increasingly rely on its regional allies and regional arrangements to carry more of the security burden much as it did via its hub-and-spokes alliance system in Europe since the end of the Second World War. China, of course, remains very sensitive to this more pro-active approach in Asia and has suggested that a “cold war mentality” is not the way forward but the regional states have their own plans. Concerns remain while the US is ostensibly shifting its strategic focus on Asia, it is decreasing its military strength in the region, leading to an inevitable power vacuum in East Asia and the Pacific, which China may be determined to fill.

The China-US-India Dynamic:

Geopolitical Jostling Begins M

any in India argue that given the high stakes that China and India have in each other’s economies, conflict between the two is highly unlikely. But as tensions in South China Sea exemplify, economic interdependence has never really been an antidote to conflict. New Delhi should watch China’s behaviour closely and learn due lessons in dealing with the rising dragon in its vicinity. Against this backdrop of China’s rise and relative US decline, it is imperative that India contribute to the Asian security dynamic to bring greater stability to the region especially as Sino-Indian relations become turbulent with each passing day.

Assertive China This new assertiveness vis-à-vis Beijing has been widely welcomed in the region. The remaining members of the ASEAN strongly endorsed Clinton’s call for multilateral commitment to a code of conduct for the South China Sea rather than China’s preferred bilateral approach. For China, the issue was all about its sovereign rights and claims to the sea whereas for the rest of the region it was all about freedom of navigation, rights of passage and customary international law. It is under the American provision of public goods for the last several decades that China has emerged as the economic powerhouse it is today. Now it wants a new system in place but a system that only works for Beijing and does not deal with the provision of public goods and common resources will not work. China’s haphazard diplomatic approach and unnecessary bluster on South China Sea has exposed all the myth surrounding Chinese soft power in the region. As was expected there was no movement on the contentious South China Sea dispute at the ASEAN summit held in Phnom Penh in July this year. But what was striking was the fact that the looming shadow of China prevented the meeting from even issuing a joint statement for the first time in the organisation’s 45-year history. China succeeded in playing divide and rule politics, thereby ensuring that the dispute remains a bilateral matter between Beijing

and individual rival claimants. As a consequence, the waters of the South China Sea will not be calm any time soon.

Beijing’s rapidly rising defence expenditure, its expansive maritime sovereignty claims; its aggressive behaviour pursuing them; its support for states such as North Korea and Pakistan; and its non-transparent military build-up all raise questions about its willingness to act as a responsible stakeholder in the region At a time of domestic political transition, China is embroiled in a

range of disputes with its neighbours. Conflict in the region has the potential to disrupt global trade flows. The South China Sea waterways carry around half of the world’s total trade and are claimed in whole or part by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei. Proven and undiscovered oil resources in the South China Sea are estimated to be as high as 213 billion barrels. Fears have been rising in Asia that China is seeking to use its growing maritime might to dominate not only the hydrocarbon-rich waters of the South China Sea but also its crucial shipping lanes, the lifeline of regional economies.

The Philippines and Vietnam, in particular, have been raising concerns about China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. The Philippine President Benigni Aquino III has even suggested that he may ask the US to deploy spy planes over the South China Sea to help monitor disputed waters in the region. The impasse between China and the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal, which started when Philippine naval vessels discovered Chinese fishing boats in a lagoon of the Shoal, shows no signs of abating with China refusing to remove its fishing boats from the Shoal.

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

ASCENDING STAKES

Just weeks back, the state-owned China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) opened nine blocks for exploration in waters also claimed by Vietnam and PLAN has been conducting combat-ready patrols in the area. The state-run Chinese media has been very vocal about states like the Philippines and Vietnam asking Beijing to “teach them an unforgettable lesson when it is time to hit back.”

Japan has also asked China to clarify its maritime claims. Though Japan may not have a direct stake in the dispute, it has increasingly taken a proactive role in the dispute. Tokyo remains worried about the implications of China’s assertiveness in South China Sea for its own dispute with China in East China Sea. The manner in which South China Sea issue gets resolved will have significant implications for maritime conflicts in the region and beyond. China blocked efforts to resolve long-running tensions over claims in the disputed South China Sea, warning participants at the ASEAN summit that it is “crucial” they leave the issue out of their discussions. The US had been hoping that ASEAN member states would work on developing a code of conduct for activities in the sea to ensure future disagreements are resolved amicably and has been pushing the ASEAN nations to unify around a legally binding code of conduct based in international maritime law as a means of managing disputes and cultivating ASEAN

Despite agreeing to draft a code of conduct almost a decade back, there has been little movement towards completion primarily because of China’s position that disagreements should be settled on a bilateral rather than a multilateral basis. China has refused to discuss the South China Sea dispute with the ASEAN as a group because they want to negotiate on a one-to-one basis where they are much bigger than any individual Southeast Asian country and they can bully their interlocutors seriatim. But there is a clear need to stress the importance of principles such as the freedom of navigation, respect for international law and unimpeded lawful commerce in the South China Sea. By putting up for global bidding a Vietnamese petroleum block under exploration by an Indian oil company China has forced India into a diplomatic logjam. Not surprisingly, India was very vocal about its concerns at the AEAN Regional Forum meeting in Cambodia demanding “access to resources in accordance with principles of international law.” New Delhi, which so often likes to sit on margins, can no longer afford the luxury of inaction if it wants to preserve its credibility as a significant actor in East and Southeast Asia. China’s assertiveness is not good news for the region but it should be particularly troubling for India.

Challenges facing India Beijing’s rapidly rising defence expenditure, its expansive maritime sovereignty claims; its aggressive behaviour pursuing them; its support for states such as North Korea and Pakistan; and its non-transparent military build-up all raise questions about its willingness to act as a responsible stakeholder in the region. How to manage China’s rise and mould its behaviour will be one of the biggest diplomatic challenges facing New Delhi in the coming years. Many in India argue that given the high stakes that China and India have in each other’s economies, conflict between the two is highly unlikely. But as tensions in South China Sea exemplify, economic interdependence

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

has never really been an antidote to conflict. New Delhi should watch China’s behaviour closely and learn due lessons in dealing with the rising dragon in its vicinity.

The new defence strategy outlined by Washington is explicitly geared towards tackling the emerging threat from China’s massive and rapid military build-up. It takes forward the already underway process of reorienting the American military might from the Atlantic to the Pacific Against this backdrop of China’s rise and relative US decline, it is imperative that India contribute to the Asian security dynamic to bring greater stability to the region especially as Sino-Indian relations become turbulent with each passing day. The emerging security environment in the Asia-Pacific is likely to revolve around China and the US and each of these powers will have a military with significant offensive capability and unknowable intentions. The US has encouraged a greater role for India in East and Southeast Asia. Exhorting India to lead and look beyond its immediate neighbourhood, the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, during her visit to India earlier this year asked India “not just to look east, but to engage east and act east as well.” India has responded with a renewed focus on its Look East Policy which has evolved from economic and trade linkages with various regional countries to a gradual strengthening of security ties. India’s ties with Japan, in particular, have been gaining momentum with both New Delhi and Tokyo making an effort in recent years to put Indo-Japanese ties into high gear. India’s role in East and Southeast Asia is only likely to grow in the future as China’s faster than expected economic and military rise forces New Delhi to reorder its strategic priorities. Indian policy makers should remember that India of today is not the India of 1962 and this should be conveyed unequivocally to China as well. This is important if a repeat of the 1962 humiliation is to be avoided.

In Full Partnership with the Centre for Asia Studies

1/25 Stryker Brigade Combat Team

Official US Navy Imagery

The National Guard

At a time of domestic political transition, China is embroiled in a range of disputes with its neighbours. Conflict in the region has the potential to disrupt global trade flows. The South China Sea waterways carry around half of the world’s total trade and are claimed in whole or part by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei. Proven and undiscovered oil resources in the South China Sea are estimated to be as high as 213 billion barrels. Fears have been rising in Asia that China is seeking to use its growing maritime might to dominate not only the hydrocarbon-rich waters of the South China Sea but also its crucial shipping lanes, the lifeline of regional economies

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1962 and now

POWER ASYMMETRY

Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee AVSM (retd) The Writer has served in all operational theatres and the wars of the Indian Army. Commissioned into the 1st Gorkha Rifles in December 1960 he has been an instructor at the Indian Military Academy, the College of Combat and twice at the Defence Services Staff College (once as Chief Instructor Army). He attended the Staff College at Camberley, UK and the National Defence College, New Delhi. For the last 23 years he has held Director level positions at leading think tanks in India and the region specialising in international security and strategy.

Finally, are deterrence measures to balance the military posture across the border. There should be no illusion that the border problem will be resolved or that it will somehow go away any time soon. Hence maintaining a comprehensive and all-round deterrence capability is an urgent necessity. 1962 demonstrated that valour is no substitute for effective plans, sound organisational structures, good communication infrastructure and careful military preparation based on sufficient military hardware

There is enough space in Asia and the world for both India and China to grow together. Let us promise to the nation that never again will we compromise our national security through unpreparedness and inattention

ifty years along the path of history it is time to take stock. Instead of learning from our past we hide our mistakes from posterity lest it hurt the reputation of leaders we have adored. Let us today critically reflect only on the current India-China balance; geo-politically, strategically and in military capability. At one stage only a few years ago, the world thought that India will outstrip China in GDP growth by the mid 2030’s. That perception of rising capability led others to portray India as a potential ‘swing power’. The fulfilment of that prediction will have to wait. This translates into an enormous asymmetry in comprehensive power. The strategic challenge confronting India is to negate the two front scenario that faces it today. A strategy to undermine this may lie in developing alternate alliances ourselves as well as to exploit the vulnerabilities that China has to contend with in its periphery.

uns boomed across the Himalayas fifty years ago waking us up from slumber and leaving us to confront the world in all its stark reality. It taught us that national policies must be based on hard analyses based on the worst that our enemies will do unto us. That even though we chose the more difficult option of keeping away from global power politics by remaining non-aligned, we could not escape its harsh consequences. Even as our leaders believed that war was no longer an option and that armies were redundant, that others would have a different view. That Nehru’s dynamic global influence could not gloss over the reality of India’s many infirmities.

that does not recognise its heroes. But, let us today critically reflect only on the current India-China balance; geo-politically, strategically and in military capability.

True balance

Fifty years ago we were ignorant of global geo-strategic developments. We did not know of the deep fissures, indeed hostility in Sino-Soviet relations. We also relied too heavily on the ‘Warsaw connect’ through which the US fed us its views on China and based on which it guided us even on strategic issues. Such as the unlikelihood of a Chinese attack and later against the use of our Air Force, which was one area where we then enjoyed a major advantage.

Fifty years along the path of history it is time to take stock. It is a pity that in spite of a rich and glorious past, the Indo-Gangetic civilisation today believes more in mythology than history. Instead of learning from our past we hide our mistakes from posterity lest it hurt the reputation of leaders we have adored. Not accepting that the great too are fallible and the best of them are admired as much for their mistakes as their achievements. We are thus unaware of the details that led to the debacle of 1962 and hence are almost pre-determined to make those very same mistakes in the future. Henderson Brookes Report for example cannot be declassified even in fifty years precisely for these reasons, for small minds cannot accept that in the end truth alone prevails. Remembering 1962 fifty years later, others will and must reflect on the valour of our soldiers. How among others, Charlie Company 13 Kumaon defended the nation’s honour at Rezang La with bare hands till the last breath of the last soldier, long after the last bullet had been fired. Let us pay a silent tribute to them. No nation can aspire to greatness

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

In the globalised world of today this “balance” is not restricted to the Himalayan frontiers, where troops confront each other now in a less offensive manner than before. True “balance” would lie in shaping the global agenda to ensure the nation’s comprehensive security and further its strategic interests in a lasting and enduring manner. This will involve careful analyses of the global security environment and its strategic imperatives.

The scene has changed dramatically since then. The last fifty years have seen a global power transformation that has shifted the geo-strategic centre of the world to Asia. Its axis now lies astride the Seoul-Tokyo-Beijing-Shanghai-Singapore and includes the Indo-Pacific Ocean and its trade routes. The world’s growth areas, source of future prosperity as well as possible conflicts may well occur and be shaped by developments in this region. It is also where India will need to concentrate its maximum efforts, while not neglecting the rest of the world. China’s acceptance of this geo-strategic

Geo-strategic Balance reality has led to its foray into the ‘second island chain’ and to the Indo-Pacific Ocean. In the process reaffirming the “nine dotted lines” in the South China Sea as its area of ‘core interest’, establishing bases around the Indian Ocean as a ‘string of pearls’ and steadily developing an anti-access strategy to secure the region.

A strategy to undermine this may lie in developing alternate alliances ourselves as well as to exploit the vulnerabilities that China has to contend with in its periphery. In a purely military sense the strategic deterrence option if carefully calibrated, can provide a significant option This is attempted to be countered by America’s “rebalancing towards Asia”, both in its force deployment and in foreign policy initiatives. This

will consist of ‘returning’ to the region and building new alliances, among others with Vietnam and Philippines. It will also mean strengthening existing defence arrangements with Japan, Republic of Korea and Australia.

of India, measured respectively in per capita or overall terms. This translates into an enormous asymmetry in comprehensive power, no matter how we choose to measure it. Our policies must reflect and be based on this reality.

Asymmetry

At one stage only a few years ago, the world thought that India will outstrip China in GDP growth by the mid 2030’s. That perception of rising capability led others to portray India as a potential ‘swing power’. The fulfilment of that prediction will have to wait. Today we need to accept that while China’s GDP has grown at over ten per cent a year for thirty years and more, India’s GDP since 1991 has grown at an average below seven per cent. This gap over such a long period has led to China’s GDP being between four to five times that

There is thus an asymmetry in relative power that must feature

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

POWER ASYMMETRY

NAVAL BALANCE

of its nuclear arsenal have a Chinese or North Korean imprint.

high in our strategic planning, while we simultaneously deal with future uncertainties. But, China too has to encounter its ‘democracy bump’ perhaps sooner than later. The critical challenge in both countries lies in their respective politics. China has to deliver on democratisation and India on governance.

It taught us that national policies must be based on hard analyses based on the worst that our enemies will do unto us. That even though we chose the more difficult option of keeping away from global power politics by remaining non-aligned, we could not escape its harsh consequences. Even as our leaders believed that war was no longer an option and that armies were redundant, that others would have a different view. That Nehru’s dynamic global influence could not gloss over the reality of India’s many infirmities A lesson that we need to remember from 1962 is that in spite of our strong support for independence from colonialism for the developing world and our founding of the Non-aligned Movement; when it came to the crunch no one supported us. Every other country preferred to remain “non-aligned’ between the aggressor and the victim of this aggression. A question that we need to ask is that if a similar situation were to emerge, who can we consider to remain positively engaged in our support? The strategic challenge confronting India is to negate the two front scenario that faces it today. No matter how Islamabad would like to describe it, in reality there is no military alliance between China and Pakistan. At this stage of China’s evolution Beijing is not likely to

fight another nation’s wars or align itself too closely with a country that in overall terms can but only be a liability. But, it is equally unlikely that Beijing will fail to exploit opportunities if they present themselves. Pakistan realistically presents many opportunities.

Strategic deterrence A strategy to undermine this may lie in developing alternate alliances ourselves as well as to exploit the vulnerabilities that China has to contend with in its periphery. There are several possibilities of working with both traditional allies in the Asian mainland as well as with the Pacific Rim countries. But, the challenge is major. In a purely military sense the strategic deterrence option if carefully calibrated, can provide a significant option. A critical component of Sino-Pakistan partnership lies in the area of arms supply and support that Beijing provides to Islamabad over the years. It is this much more than the US support that has enabled the Pakistan Army to maintain its equipment profile at a low cost. Today a major complex to produce 300-350 JF-17 fighter aircraft is in progress at the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex and another 30 J-10 multi-role combat aircraft are currently under production. China has more or less assured Pakistan to maintain an effective deterrence if not parity with India in combat military hardware. This may include advanced combat ships of all types as well as army weaponry and advanced missile systems. Most important has been Pakistan’s dependence on China in nuclear hardware. Pakistani indigenous capability has been limited to A Q Khan’s Uranium enrichment. Almost all other aspects

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

A major issue is China’s relations with other countries of South Asia and its effort at ‘containing’ India through this. Only a stronger and economically more powerful India, with its own financial assistance programmes matching Beijing’s, will enable it to reduce the importance of these linkages and maintain balance. It will require both a strong Indian economy as well as a forward engagement policy. This alone will ensure that no advantage can be drawn from it by external powers. Finally, are deterrence measures to balance the military posture across the border. There should be no illusion that the border problem will be resolved or that it will somehow go away any time soon. Hence maintaining a comprehensive and all-round deterrence capability is an urgent necessity. 1962 demonstrated that valour is no substitute for effective plans, sound organisational structures, good communication infrastructure and careful military preparation based on sufficient military hardware.

True “balance” would lie in shaping the global agenda to ensure the nation’s comprehensive security and further its strategic interests in a lasting and enduring manner India does not wish a resumption of conflict and will never initiate one, as demonstrated repeatedly in our recent history. The Indian Prime Minister has said that we consider there is enough space in Asia and the world for both India and China to grow together. That there is no room or cause for conflict and bilateral issues are addressed through effective negotiation and agreements. The border can be resolved peacefully and till then arrangements exist to keep it tranquil.

New Great Game in the Indo-Pacific Ocean Region

perceptive article on the unfolding “New Great Game” in not just the IOR but what the writer calls the “Indo-Pacific Ocean Region”. The meteoric rise in China’s GDP is fuelling the impressive rise of the PLA-Navy and its increasingly assertive stance in the South China and the Yellow Sea. The writer critically examines the naval balance between India and China and the consequences thereof. With the announcement of an American pivot plan in the East by President Obama and Defence Secretary Leon Panetta’s recent visit to India, the great game is revving up in earnest. Can India choose to be non-aligned in the context of a balance of power game which involves its primary security threat? Can we afford to sit on the fence? China has Pakistan as its key regional balancer for India and is engaging India in the Chinese game of surround called Weiqi (Go). We need to bandwagon with those countries that feel equally threatened by China’s menacing rise. Its too late perhaps to sit on the fence.

Cmde Ranjit Bhawnani Rai (retd) The writer is a former Director Naval Intelligence and Director Naval Operations. Presently he is Vice President of Indian Maritime Foundation, New Delhi.

China looks to secure its strategy with China's policy of "strategic encirclement" of India, inspired by the game of surround called Weiqi (GO) that the Chinese play and have designed China’s String Of Pearls centered around Gwadar and Hambantota and soon in Myanmar and Bangladesh with Operational Turn Around (OTA) facilities in Seychelles. The Chinese strategy has an element of cheque book diplomacy with its US$ 1 trillion reserves, it can afford of first building ports with loans and grants and then setting up bases with a close linkage. The magazine Economist states India may be losing the game in the Maldives. India cannot afford to lose any game in the Indian Ocean and has to put on its thinking cap

As the bugle sounds the last post over the mountains across the Himalayas, laying to rest memories of a War long ago, let us promise to the nation that never again will we compromise our national security through unpreparedness and inattention.

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

NAVAL BALANCE

"I do not think we need to be particularly alarmed as far as the China border is concerned. They (Chinese) have a definitive established mechanism as far as the differing perceptions of the borders is concerned. Apart from that, we are taking adequate measure." — Minister of State for Defence, Shri Pallam Raju 2011

hilst the Indian border with China has seen many years of peace and tranquillity the border remains unresolved despite sixteen border meetings between the two countries’ representatives which in recent times has included National Security Advisers Brajesh Mishra, M K Narayanan and Shivshankar Menon from India and China’s long serving Special Envoy for boundary talks, Dai Bingguo, who retires this year. Claims by China over Arunachal, Tawang and Aksai Chin surface and create diplomatic tensions over visas and create ripples. Also, intrusions do take place by patrols into each others territories across the line of occupation as per each patrol’s perception of where the border lies. This is likely to continue as China recognises Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) as part of Pakistan till resolved and has a settled international border with Pakistan. This for China includes a part of Kashmir’s Shaksgam Valley ceded by Pakistan. This muddies all border discussions and exchange of maps in the Western Sector. China’s claims in the East are also worrisome and maps have only been exchanged for the central sector.

China seeks international prestige and a power projection capacity in the Pacific and Indian Ocean Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) by deploying its ships and, in due course aircraft carriers with fighters and submarines To safeguard Indian interests the government has decided to beef up defences along the border areas, build-up the road network, station Su-30MKIs at Tezpur and two Divisions and two batteries of BrahMos missiles in the north-east.

Advance landing grounds (ALGs) have been upgraded. But the situation in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and Indo-Pacific for influence and for safety of sea lanes for transportation of trade and vital energy supplies is turning into a new great game between China and USA with President Barack Obama announcing America’s ‘pivot plan’ in the East. Defence Secretary Leon Panetta declared that 60 per cent of USA’s military assets mainly naval will be moved east and US military has taken up facilities at Subic Bay which USA had vacated in 1992. Soon after Panetta’s announcement he made a visit to India to canvass for support and co-operation on security issues, push sales of US equipment to bring about interoperability and explored basing, on the lines that USA has stationed Marines in Northern region of Australia. India has decided to sit on the fence with an Independent stance. The PLA (Navy) is rapidly expanding thanks to its rising economy. China wishes to have a say in the security architecture of the Indian Ocean but India and USA do not want that, as China is not transparent nor is it a democracy to be trusted. Hence China will muscle its way into the IOR with a navy which is on the ascendancy. China this year passed a defence budget of US$ 106 billion which China’s National Peoples Congress (NPC) approved in keeping with its number 2 position as the second largest GNP in the world. India cannot match China in economic terms as it has left India far behind in the economic race. Indian economy has faltered after a healthy rise. India is no longer shining or rising as fast as it was expected but the Indian Navy is on course with 42 ships on order and INS Vikramaditya (Ex Gorshkov) due to join early next year in 2013 and be fully operational with 12 MiG-29Ks and Ka-31 AEW helicopters. The three Shivalik Type 17 class frigates are operational, the two new BrahMos fitted Krivacks from Yantar in Kallinngrad with INS Teg are already with the fleet and Tarkash is due to commission this year and INS Trikand early next year. Two new tankers INS Shakti and Deepak from Fincantieri have joined the fleet train and can sustain a task force at sea for 60 days.

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

INS Chakra an Akula SSN with Klub missiles on lease from Russia has been working up from its base at the Ship Building Centre (SBC) off Visakhapatnam and will be an asset for any task force with its speed, stealth and patrol capabilities and Klub missiles fired from under water. INS Kolkata Type 15A improved Delhi class is due for sea trials later this year. The powerful 44,000 ton INS Vikramaditya with MiG-29Ks which have completed 10 successful arrestor hook landings and weaponry will join early 2013 fully worked up. The sleek flat top as it is on sea trials in the White Sea in Russia. The first of eight P8i Boeing maritime reconnaissance platform which was shown by Boeing to Indian journalists who were invited to USA as part of the post Farnborough airshow will be with the fleet in 2013 and join the aging TU-142 and the IL-38s and Dornier-228s and Ka-31 AEW helicopters to give aerial fillip and the balance of power in the Indian Ocean will tilt for India as a carrier task force can cover 5,000 square miles of sea space for action. Maritime assets in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands which can form a defensive chain in India’s Look East policy have also been beefed up and Naval Air Station INS Baaz commissioned at Campbell Bay. This calls for look at the PLA (N) strategy and assets as its plans are kept under wraps.

China aspires to be blue water navy that can operate globally befitting a global power with aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and a long line of frigates and destroyers and support ships, augmented by long range air power. Concurrently China has built-up a nuclear deterrent from the sea with long range ICBMs and a large shipbuilding base, which is now able to turn out five large warships and submarines annually

The PLA (Navy) strategy China’s PLA (Navy) has been expanding and the build-up is driven by a very robust growth in its economy and its defence budget is likely to rise to four times that of India in 2012-13 (Table on

page 49) and China has a three pronged naval strategy, modified since the earlier directions given by the Chairman Deng Xioaping in the 1980s as “First and Second line Chains of Naval Defence’, which has changed to an anti-access and sea denial strategy.

Selected defence budget projections 2012 / 13: India and China The defence budget projections for 2012 and 2013 (depending on budget cycle) indicate the change and direction (up, down or the same) from previous levels.

Country

2012 Budget (Billion US$)

2013 Budget (Billion US$)

Change Amount (US$)

Change (%)

Budget Direction

Singapore

(June 2012)

9.1

9.5

(+) 380 Million

4.3

Australia

(May 2012)

26.9

25.9

(-) 971 Million

3.8

Down

China

(May 2012)

167.4

187.6

(+) 20.2 Billion

11.2

Norway

(April 2012)

6.44

6.56

(+) 12 Billion

India

(March 2012)

33.6

40.4

(+) 6.8 Billion

Russia

(March 2012)

63.3

79.7

(+) 16.4 Billion

Germany

(February 2012)

41.6

41.1

(-) 2 Billion

0.5

Down

Indonesia

(February 2012)

5.4

7.9

(+) 2.5 Billion

544.2

525.3

(-) 18.9 Billion

3.5

Down

United States (February 2012)

First, China seeks to deny access to the US Navy and other naval powers including the Indian Navy into the Yellow and South China Seas, so that it can dominate the natural resources and claim the disputed island chains such as the Spratly, Parcels and Senkaku and build-up capacity to reunify Taiwan with the mainland without US interference. China’s broad claim to the South China Sea remains contentious. Beginning in the 1930s and 1940s, the Republic of China began publishing regional maps with a dotted line around the perimeter of South China Sea and has been pressing the claim in recent times and wishes to mutually settle its sea borders and EEZ with nations like Vietnam and Philippines as provided in UNCLOS 1982, while ASEAN wishes to do it jointly under a code of conduct. Second, China seeks international prestige and a power projection capacity in the Pacific and Indian Ocean Sea Lines of Communications (SLOCs) by deploying its ships and, in due course aircraft carriers with fighters and submarines. The Chinese economy is dependent on imported resources and oil and gas from Africa and the Middle East to feed and assuage the aspirations of its 1.3 billion plus population and desires the ability to protect its interests in the Indian Ocean and Straits of Malacca. China is unlikely to delegate this to other powers like India or USA. This feature is evident as the PLA (N) task force of three anti-piracy warships operating in the Horn of Africa has been self-sustaining since 2008 and looks to developing expeditionary capabilities. Third, China aspires to be a blue water navy that can operate globally befitting a global power with aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and a long line of frigates and destroyers and support ships, augmented by long range air power. Concurrently China has built-up a nuclear deterrent from the sea with long range ICBMs and a large shipbuilding base, which is now able to turn out five large warships and submarines annually. The PLA (N) has taken up exercises abroad and has deployed hospital ships in the South China Sea where it has habited islands like Woody with structures and sent warships to the region. China’s ambitious naval modernisation remains a great source of pride for the Chinese public and leadership and the Kuznetsov aircraft carrier Li Shang (ex Varyag) acquired from the Soviets has been refitted and has completed sea trials and the Indian maritime community awaits to see which aircraft like the J-10 or any other modified for flight deck operations the PLA (N) will fly off the platform. When the Chinese succeed in this endeavour there will be a sea change in the maritime capabilities of the PLA (N) and will have caught up with other carrier operating navies. China has a big carrier building plan and this aspiration is in keeping with its third strategy goal cited above. The PLA (N) has 4 powerful 8,000 ton Sovremenny destroyers with Sunburn missiles from Russia, 5 Luzhou and 5 Luyang / Luhu class destroyers and over 30 Luda / Jianghu class frigates. Among the new buildings are over 8 Jiangwei

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

Type 53/54 C-802 missile fitted frigates with organic helicopters and HQ-7 AA systems and the nomenclature is not easy to comprehend. The Type 054 has now been superseded by the Jiangkai II Type 054A frigate, which is in series production. The 054A features a number of important improvements. The main air defence armament has been upgraded to a 32-cell VLS HQ-16 medium-range SAM system, giving area air defence capability for the first time in PLA (N) frigates. In addition, the four AK630 CIWS have been replaced by two autonomous Type 730 CIWS. The PLA (N) has commissioned 4 LPDs and a large train of missile boats and even experimented with foreign Swath design missile boats for high speed action. The PLA (N) prides itself as a submarine navy with extensive submarine building facilities built-up at Holudua Shipyard near Dalian and Wuhan with a conventional force of over 40 boats and some 12 nuclear propelled submarines. The conventional force includes the older and upgraded 15 Romeo (Wuhan and Ming), 12 Kilos similar to India’s 10 Kilos, 5 Song 039 which can fire the C-801 missiles and 15 Mings / improved Yuan and a Golf which it is claimed can fire nuclear missiles. The nuclear submarine force conssits of 1 large 8,500 ton Xia 093 experimental boat which can fire the JL-1 ICBM it is claimed, 3 Type 093, 6,000 ton SSNs, 4 Han class 4,500 ton boats, Shangs and the new Jin 094 classes in service with JL-2 missiles. China continues its efforts to deploy a sea-based nuclear deterrent. Although the PLA Navy has received the Jin-class SSBN, it has faced repeated challenges with the JL-2 weapons system. The system did not reach an initial operational capability (IOC) by 2010 as DoD had anticipated. Once China overcomes remaining technical hurdles, the PLA Navy will match other nuclear nations with sea based deterrents. India has some way to go with INS Arihant before it has nuclear deterrent capabilities with the K-15 nuclear capable missiles. PLA (N) has deployed its most modern ships to engage in naval diplomacy and counter-piracy in the Horn of Africa though according to Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo, the

1962 and now

NAVAL BALANCE Gulf of Aden mission has shown the PLA (Navy) equipment is not particularly suited to blue water operations. Many in China see naval power as a prerequisite for great power status. The PLA (N) has refitted the aircraft carrier Li Shang (ex Varyag) which has completed sea trials and the world waits to see it operate fighters. Chinese scholar Wang Haiyun, a Major General and one-time diplomat, thinks China’s navy needs three to five carrier task forces to realise Beijing’s maritime strategic ambitions. Writing in Globe Magazine, a subsidiary of Xinhua, Wang maintains that only such a force can police the three million square kilometers of water China claims as its own and break out of US-led containment and avoid being checkmated.

Indian Ocean became the scene of a struggle for control of the sea, the future of India has been determined not on the land frontiers, but on the oceanic expanse”. He was echoing what Alfred Mahan had predicted in the 19th century, “Whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia. The ocean is the key to seven seas. In the 21st century, the destiny of the world will be decided on its waters.”

In recent years, some of China’s neighbours have questioned Beijing’s long-term commitment to peacefully and cooperatively resolve the remainder of its disputes. PLA Navy assets have repeatedly circumnavigated the South China Sea since 2005 and civilian enforcement ships, sometimes supported by the PLA Navy, have occasionally harassed foreign vessels.

The above message is gaining importance as the world’s economy and power is shifting eastwards with a rising China and a resurgent India as the two leading nations India and China are beefing up their navies. Both nations are concerned about unhindered passage in the sea lanes of communications (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean and influence for resources to feed a population of almost one third of the world between them and to attend to their rising economy and aspirations of their peoples and maintain stability for growth.

India’s options In the situation portrayed above India has to follow a dissuasive strategy and Shri Pallam Raju’s statement on India’s borders is on those lines and the rise of China deserves a critical analysis from the Geo-military point of view as Pakistan is its client state and Pakistan recently announced a Strategic Command for the navy which could mean acquiring a nuclear submarine from China. In the North the high Himalayan mountains are a difficult terrain to wage a war and the increased forces will offer deterrence. And in the South, the Indian sub-continent juts into the strategically important Indian Ocean. Therefore one needs to heed the seas. India’s Oxford educated historian and Ambassador to China (1948 to 1952), late Sardar K M Panikkar, who wrote, “Ever since the sixteenth century from which time the

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

SINO-PAK COLLUSION

The Two-Front Threat

and Warning Intelligence Dr Prem Mahadevan The writer is Senior Researcher for Intelligence, Sub-state Conflict and Organised Crime at the Center for Security Studies in Zurich, Switzerland. Between 2002 and 2009, he completed an undergraduate degree in War Studies and postgraduate and doctoral degrees in Intelligence Studies from King’s College, London. He has written extensively on Indian and Pakistani intelligence agencies and his articles on Indian counter-terrorism have been made recommended reading for military officers in North America and Western Europe.

China seeks to deny access to the US Navy and other naval powers including the Indian Navy into the Yellow and South China Seas, so that it can dominate the natural resources and claim the disputed island chains such as the Spratly, Parcels and Senkaku and build-up capacity to reunify Taiwan with the mainland without US interference

China looks to secure its strategy with China’s policy of “strategic encirclement“ of India, inspired by the game of surround called Weiqi (GO) that the Chinese play and have designed China’s String Of Pearls centered around Gwadar and Hambantota and soon in Myanmar and Bangladesh with Operational Turn Around (OTA) facilities in Seychelles. The Chinese strategy has an element of cheque book diplomacy which with its US$ 1 trillion reserves, it can afford of first building ports with loans and grants and then setting up bases with a close linkage. China dubs Pakistan its all weather friend, higher than the mountains and deeper than the seas. The magazine Economist states India may be losing the game in the Maldives. India cannot afford to lose any game in the Indian Ocean and has to put on its thinking cap.

very interesting article which looks at the Intelligence aspects of a two-front war with China and Pakistan. Whichever country attacks India first, will pose the greater threat. This is because it will be involved in a general war, in which the second front will only be complementary action by its ally. Even so, events on the second front will ultimately determine the war’s result. As it prepares to fight two opponents at once, the Indian Army needs to develop the capacity to act promptly on local intelligence warnings. Most importantly, it requires drawing up counteroffensive plans to strike the second aggressor while he is still off-balance and yet to consolidate his position.

nformation about a China-Pakistan nexus first became available in June 1959, shortly after the two countries secretly held exploratory talks about forming an anti-India alignment. During the summer of 1962, new reports came in about a possible combined offensive. The expected attack from Pakistan did not materialise, perhaps because of American dissuasion. Even so, the trend was becoming clear: in the event of India-China hostilities, Pakistan would seek to exploit Indian military difficulties to its own advantage. Its only constraint would be Western advice. For its part, China threatened to intervene whenever India gained a battlefield advantage over Pakistan. During the 1971 war, it was poised to attack, but backed down when Moscow mobilised 47 divisions along the Sino-Soviet border, in support of New Delhi.

Information about a Sino-Pak nexus first became available in June 1959, shortly after the two countries secretly held exploratory talks about forming an anti-India alignment. During the summer of 1962, new reports came in about a possible combined offensive. The expected attack from Pakistan did not materialise, perhaps because of American dissuasion. In the event of India-China hostilities, Pakistan would seek to exploit Indian military difficulties to its own advantage. Its only constraint would be Western advice. For its part, China threatened to intervene whenever India gained a battlefield advantage over Pakistan. During the 1971 war, it was poised to attack, but backed down when Moscow mobilised 47 divisions along the Sino-Soviet border, in support of New Delhi. With Sino-Pakistani ties growing increasingly close, a wildcard action by establishment-backed jihadists is possible. China has increased the risk of such a scenario through its public assurances of support to Pakistan, in the event of Indian retaliation to terrorist raids

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

SINO-PAK COLLUSION

Today, as India tries to deal with a relentless proxy war being waged by Pakistan, relations with China are once again sliding downward. The cause, according to some analysts, is Beijing’s desire to deflect domestic tensions outward by goading India into a clash. Meanwhile, through its cost-free support to militant Islamists, the Pakistani strategic elite has discovered the limits of Anglo-American influence in South Asia. Its confidence in forceful power projection has grown commensurately. With the Soviet shield long gone, New Delhi faces the real probability of a two-front war, should either China or Pakistan engineer a bilateral crisis. Information on their operational plans is therefore vital as never before.

From mysteries to secrets Intelligence agencies distinguish between hypothetical scenarios (‘mysteries’) and knowable facts (‘secrets’). No one can steal a battle plan that does not yet exist, or deduce the enemy’s course of action before he himself has decided on one. However, through fusing strategic and tactical analysis, it is possible to identify when a mystery becomes a secret. Once the enemy has consciously made a strategic decision, most if not all subsidiary decisions that flow from it are made as per a situation-specific concept of operations. That concept, which is based partly on established military doctrine and partly on contextual particularities, can be discerned through an aggressive intelligence collection effort and imaginative analysis. It remains a mystery when another war will break out and whether China or Pakistan will be the first aggressor. However, the present-day thoughts of the Chinese and Pakistani military leadership on opportunistic intervention lie within the realm of secrets; they can be intuited with a high degree of certainty once enough hard facts are available. The job of intelligence agencies will be to recognise the point in time at which enemy planning for a second front moves from the hypothetical to the practical. Basically, as soon as either China or Pakistan is sure of the other partner’s commitment to a coordinated offensive, New Delhi must also be sure of it. Thereafter, the emphasis would shift from the strategic to the tactical: where and when will the second front be created, on what pretext and in what manner?

Combining adventurism with indignation A look at Chinese and Pakistani military doctrine suggests a striking similarity: both emphasise the need for politico-diplomatic rearguard action following a first strike. The idea is to launch a sneak attack with limited objectives and then, before anyone can ascertain what transpired, preemptively accuse the opponent of aggression. Every India-Pakistan war, except for 1971, has conformed to this pattern. Taking advantage of fluctuating bilateral tensions, Pakistan infiltrated troops into Jammu and Kashmir and tasked them to carry out sabotage and guerrilla action whilst in mufti. The aim was not just to retain plausible deniability, but also to portray the Indian security response as aggression against local Kashmiri civilians. Likewise, China portrayed its 1962 offensive in Aksai Chin as a reaction

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

to India’s ‘Forward Policy’, while omitting to mention that it had pursued an identical policy prior to hostilities. Even the invasion of Vietnam in 1979 was termed a ‘self-defence counterattack’, because to Beijing, Vietnamese refusal to obey Chinese diktats constituted an act of aggression. Sudden non-linear manoeuvres on the ground, combined with a media strategy that focuses on the opponent’s subsequent ‘aggressiveness’, are the defining qualities of Chinese and Pakistani military behaviour. The limited scope of these manoeuvres poses a major intelligence challenge, allowing them to be executed without a significant logistical build-up. As the Kargil crisis has shown, it is unrealistic to expect Indian intelligence agencies to provide specific warning of localised offensives. What these agencies can do is track forward-deployed capabilities of both China and Pakistan, with a view to ascertaining their campaign objectives. Once these are identified, the priority must be on denying them to the enemy.

The second front will be decisive Irrespective of how fighting begins, it seems that the Indian defence will hinge primarily around the fate of the second aggressor. If he is stopped promptly, the first attacker will suffer a heavy blow, knowing he is isolated from further support and can now expect a vertical escalation from India. This might make him more susceptible to an early ceasefire, which New Delhi could accept or reject depending on the specific terms. If the second front is not contained however, India will be forced into a horizontal escalation, probably in defiance of international advice to hastily conclude an unfavourable ceasefire.

One location might be Sikkim, which sits on top of the Chicken’s Neck to north-eastern India. Having long been ambiguous about whether Sikkim is in fact a part of India, China might choose this theatre to up the ante. Alternatively, a move into western Arunachal Pradesh via Myanmar is conceivable. The People’s Liberation Army’s success in 1962 was partly due to its violation of Myanmar’s sovereignty, which allowed it to deploy troops on India’s neutral flank in the then Lohit Frontier Division The intelligence community must therefore, concentrate on assessing the aims of the second aggressor. Since it is unclear at this point who the attacker would be – China or Pakistan – analysts would have to formulate a model that allows for this ‘imponderable’. For instance, China could come to Pakistan’s assistance if India militarily retaliates to a cross-border terrorist attack. Conversely Pakistan could ingress into Jammu and Kashmir while Indian troops face off the Chinese in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. What seems unlikely is that Pakistan, if it were the second aggressor, would initiate hostilities much further south, since such a move will almost certainly trigger an all-out counterattack against the exposed Pakistani mainland. In the absence of prior hostilities with Pakistan, India’s window of vulnerability along the western border will thus be smaller than on the eastern border. China has certain spatial and topographical advantages which Pakistan lacks and would therefore be more inclined to activate the entire length of its border with India, should war occur.

Scenario A: China as second aggressor An analytical paradigm where China is the second aggressor throws up a disturbing inference: that elements within the Pakistan Army might support a major terrorist attack on India, in the hope of provoking a war and forcing Beijing’s hand. So far, China has yet to provide a conventional military cover to Pakistani territorial ambitions (it has indirectly provided nuclear cover, via technology transfer). With Sino-Pakistani ties growing increasingly close, a wildcard action by establishment-backed jihadists is possible. China has increased the risk of such a scenario through its public assurances of support to Pakistan, in the event of Indian retaliation to terrorist raids. However, given its own desire to develop internally and peg its international status to a strategic rivalry with the US rather than a relative lightweight like India, China would eventually not risk much for its junior partner. Intelligence collection for a China-dominated warning paradigm would first need to focus on communication between the Chinese and Pakistani Army high commands. Does the Central Military Commission currently have a policy on China’s posture during an India-Pakistan war? Has it accurately communicated this policy, with all its nuances, to General Headquarters Rawalpindi? If the answer to both questions is ‘yes’, then there is no mystery anymore; there are only secrets which need to be obtained by intelligence sources in Beijing and Rawalpindi, as well as Xinjiang, Tibet, Aksai Chin and Gilgit-Baltistan. Where would China focus the bulk of its interventionist thrust, assuming there will be one? One location might be Sikkim, which sits on top of the Chicken’s Neck to north-eastern India. Having long been ambiguous about whether Sikkim is in fact a part of India, China might choose this theatre to up the ante. Alternatively, a move into western Arunachal Pradesh via Myanmar is conceivable. The People’s Liberation Army’s success in 1962 was partly due to its violation of Myanmar’s sovereignty, which allowed it to deploy troops on India’s neutral flank in the then Lohit Frontier Division. Should it now intervene in an India-Pakistan war, it would similarly use strategic manoeuvre to shock New Delhi into submission within a matter of days if not hours and thus avoid slogging it out over several months. The exact location of its attack would probably not be finalised until very shortly before D-Day, but numerous possibilities would have been considered and wargamed by subordinate commanders. Intelligence agencies would need to develop a capacity for tracking these deliberations.

Scenario B: Pakistan as second aggressor The more orthodox view of the two-front threat – that Pakistan could launch an overt attack during ongoing India-China hostilities, might need to be updated. Pakistan would need to be very sure of its military strength before it enters into a massive Yom Kippur-style scheme to attack India. In doing so, it would risk international condemnation (which it

can safely ignore) and American, European and Russian material support to its opponent (which in the long term, it cannot). Only the prospect of a joint offensive with China, in the same theatre, would make the tradeoff appear respectable and offer a believable chance of seizing Kashmir. It is probably with a mind to creating this eventuality that GHQ Rawalpindi has permitted Chinese troops to enter Gilgit-Baltistan. The idea would be to turn India’s northern flank with Chinese support and cut-off Ladakh, so as to complement a PLA attack launched from Aksai Chin. Meanwhile, parts of the India-Pakistan border elsewhere could be activated through hit-and-run raids by troops in mufti, who could conveniently be labelled ‘non-state actors’. In this manner, Pakistan could tie down India’s dual-use mountain divisions and prevent them from being redeployed against China. For it to take the plunge however, India-China tensions would need to boil over into armed skirmishes at the very least, otherwise Pakistan would be vulnerable to retaliatory strikes by India in all the affected areas. The main intelligence questions, if Pakistan is assumed to be second aggressor, would focus on the Gilgit-Baltistan region. What fighting equipment have the PLA units brought with them? Have there been frequent meetings between the staff of Pakistan’s 10th Corps and the Xinjiang Military District? What about their respective subordinate formations? If GHQ Rawalpindi has already decided to intervene in an India-China war, it would have developed suitably tailored battle plans up to at least division level. Given past Pakistani behaviour, these would probably unfold behind a veil of attacks by irregular forces. Accordingly, intelligence agencies would also have to look at indicators (both positive and negative) in Mirpur, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Pakistani Punjab. Do multiple sources suggest a major build-up of jihadist militants near border-crossing launch pads? Has there recently been a lull in reporting on Pakistani Special Forces units? Affirmative answers to these questions should lead to covert reconnaissance by the Indian Army, to determine if, as in 1999, regular Pakistani soldiers are being ‘sheep-dipped’ preparatory to entering Indian territory disguised as ‘freelance’ fighters.

Commanders’ responsiveness to intelligence Whichever country attacks India first, will pose the greater threat. This is because it will be involved in a general war, in which the second front will only be complementary action by its ally. Even so, events on the second front will ultimately determine the war’s result. As it prepares to fight two opponents at once, the Indian Army needs to develop the capacity to act promptly on local intelligence warnings. Besides logistical upgrades and equipment modernisation, this requires sensitising sector commanders of the crucial role played by intelligence. Most importantly, it requires drawing up counteroffensive plans to strike the second aggressor while he is still off-balance and yet to consolidate his position.

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

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unrestRicted warfare

Empirical glimpse: The Global Theatres of Jihad

The columnist is an Intelligence and Terrorism Analyst, Clinical Psychologist and Clinical Hypnotherapist based in SouthEast Asia. She has also received training in specialised areas including counter-terrorism, intelligence and tactical operations. She specialises in cognitive learning processes and neural pathway response and how these factors apply to specialised trainings. She is an expert in the field of non-verbal micro and macro expression for deception and detection and also using non-verbal assets for psychological self-assessment in conjunction with Emotional Intelligence to enhance the human mind, personality, image and spirit. She is a member of ICPA (International Corrections and Prisons Association), IACSP (International Association for Counter-Terrorism and Security Professionals) and a member of APA (American Psychological Association), APP (Association of Professional Psychologists), UK Certified Hypnotherapist and General Hypnotherapy Register.

Dr Rupali Jeswal

federal and democratic society is where freedom and the rule of law ensure the purposeful and successful life of the community. Core of federalism and democracy is in the security of the nation and its people and if personal security and freedom is curtailed and attacked by violence and terrorism, it is the very foundations of democracy, which is at stake. Security is like the air we breathe. Once we realise it is decreasing, it just might be too late to take preventive measures.

ounter terrorism is a broad issue so its operational efficacy relies on a 360 degrees view. History of Muslim empire’s dominance and the minority status of the Muslims today is an important correlate to the eruption of global theatres of Jihad.

necessarily violent by nature, nevertheless they generate important security risks and also one does not have to be a follower of Islam to become a jihadist.

21st century’s fast growing western interests in Islamic regions, international conflicts and globalisation have changed the influence of Islam on the world. Many movements and groups have radical Islamic views, although related may harbour different aims, this means that various kinds of threats can emanate from radical Islam, one of which is terrorism. Radical Islam and its many definitions have one focus-a shift from 4GW or asymmetrical warfare to 5GW or unrestricted warfare.

History conveys that the meaning of Jihad is the obligation of each Muslim, within his abilities, to spread Islam in the world. Generally the obligation of Jihad was understood as a peaceful method of setting a personal and social example of moral and caring behaviour so others will join Islam.

This Unrestricted Warfare utilises the tools of pen and the sword; which must be neutralised in a manner appropriate to the characteristics of these tools.

Terrorism inflicted areas of today are like an echo originating from the then confident, rich tapestry of Muslim empires. Terrorism is the ultimate consequence of a development starting with radicalization processes. These processes may manifest themselves in various ways and involve also, other than terrorist threats (for example, interethnic tensions). The Da’wa-oriented forms of radical Islam are not

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

Various interpretations of jihad

But what does Jihad mean? Jihad has various interpretations, from spiritual jihad to Jihad bil Saif (warfare). Al-Khatib al-Baghdadi, an 11th century Islamic scholar has referenced a statement in his book, The History of Baghdad, by way of Yahya ibn al ‘Ala’ from the hadith in which Prophet Muhammad speaks of greater jihad (al-jihād al-akbar) and lesser jihad (al-jihād al-asghar), but some Islamic scholars dispute the authenticity of this reference and consider themeaning of jihad as a holy war to be of more importance. (The fourteenth century Hanbali scholar Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziya rejected the doctrine of the “greater jihad” and called the hadith on which it is based a “fabrication”. Then in Ahmadiyya Islam (founded in 1889 by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad), pacifism is a strong current and jihad is one’s personal inner struggle and should not be used violently for political motives. Violence is the last option only to be used to protect religion and one’s own life in extreme situations of persecution. Jihad primarily meant struggle but this definition has itself undergone transmutation. Shaeed Sayyid Al Qtub was an

author, educator, poet and member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the incompatibility between Islamism of the Brotherhood and of Free Officers Movement headed by Gamal Abdel Nasser, made Qtub verbalised jihad as a primary tool of advancing the revolution as an offensive struggle. His martyrdom became an example through which a human becomes part of the revolutionary movement aimed at changing the world with a new ethical code based on freedom, brotherhood and justice for all. (Excerpt from his book Milestones, Chapter 4: The Jihaad of Islam is to secure complete freedom for every man throughout the world by releasing him from servitude to other human beings so that he may serve his God, Who IS One and Who has no associates. This is in itself a sufficient reason for Jihad.)

Not all the wars where Muslims are fighting

Global Jihad has a great influence already – on the global economy, the human rights and democracy. As Paz noted in his article “The Islamic Debate over Democracy”, 2006; Egyptian Islamist Dr Hani al-Siba`i, posted on the Jihadi forum “Al-Hesbah” a list of names of 102 Islamic clerics, who severely opposed any participation in parliamentary elections in the Muslim world. The list was meant to influence the Palestinian Hamas not to take part in the elections. An Islamic state is an ideological state, ideologies are beliefs and belief system incorporates meanings and emotions. Terrorist minds have showcased their efficient use of pen, through propaganda using media and information technology and the sword through weapons and homicide bombers.

non-Muslims are part of the global jihad; Unrestricted warfare contextual risk factors such as poverty, minority, unemployment and stressful life events may exacerbate a sympathiser’s view leading them through stages of radicalization.

Success in silencing the global theatres of jihad needs insight on importance of prevention through analysis, information, intelligence and tactics which need to disperse globally via active cooperation and information exchange. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon; over the years it has changed from being primarily a national topic to a global issue. To combat this unrestricted warfare with diffusion

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

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unrestRicted warfare

of powers, countries need correct interpretations of today’s security scenario keeping in view, aspects of culture, geography, soft and hard targets. We are not only confronting terrorism but effects of their relationship with organised transnational crime rings. Terrorism has had many definitions, for many it no longer describes a tactic but implies moral censure. Terrorism is an activity

committed by the people against the people. It is still a tactic whether employed and deployed by a government, a revolutionary group or an individual.

Terrorist

acts

are consciously chosen and carried out for purposes that go beyond violence, these are a mixture of political goals and emotional needs and a need for recognition of these emotional needs. Maritime and Aviation Threats: The extraterritoriality of the high seas and inconsistent security measures that apply in coastal areas and facilities in many parts of the world can make maritime environment attractive to terrorist (Maritime Terrorism, Risk and Liabilities, Rand Corporation.) In many parts of the world, maritime attacks have the potential to inflict significant harms on persons and property. Risk of Aviation terrorism has increased with the rise of aviation as a popular mode of transportation. The first registered incident of aviation terrorism goes back to 1930, when Peruvian insurgents seized an airplane to scatter propaganda leaflets. The starting date of modern aviation terrorism, as we see it now, is 22 July 1968, when three gunmen from the Popular Front for the Liberation of

Palestine (PFLP) hijacked passenger airliner of the Israeli airline El Al on a flight from Rome to Tel-Aviv and demanded to exchange hostages for their comrades-in-arms who were imprisoned in Israel. Although this case being the 12th in the civilian aircraft seizure in 1969, this case was different in its aim. This was the first time an aircraft had been hijacked for specific political goal and to use the incident as a propaganda tactic. Maritime and Aviation categories have some commonalities, such as they are both perceived high in vulnerability, they are the link of the global economy, past historical cases provide patterning. Acts of terrorism using these two categories generate an economic warfare, can be used as deliberate move by terrorist to create situation of crisis, due to the vastness of the area (high seas) vigilance is low, technical sophistication may override the gaps in our system, such attacks have a symbolic value plus high seas and aviation provide a multinational arena.

Suicide terrorism Osama bin Laden honoured Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the 9/11 mastermind, with the title ‘mukhtar’, meaning ‘the brain’. It may be argued that the most powerful weapon of bio terrorism in the terrorist’s armory is not any microbial agent but the human brain itself. It is known that some terrorists have followed this line of philosophical thought. In the words of one Palestinian: ‘if you want to compare it to the life of Paradise, you will find that all of this life is like a small moment. You know, in mathematics, any number compared with infinity is zero’. “A long view of history reveals that suicide terrorism existed as early as the 11th century. The Assassins (Ismailis-Nizari), Muslim fighters, adopted suicide terrorism as a strategy to advance the cause of Islam. These perpetrators perceived their deaths as acts of martyrdom for the glory of God.” Example: The Ishtish Hadiyat (January 2002 representing Al-Aqsa).

Suicide readily

bombers available,

are

require

little training, leave no trace

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

behind and strike fear into the general population. Element of surprise and accessibility to targeted areas of population are the only two criteria for their success. Since the 1980s, killing oneself deliberately has become the most popular method of attacking and killing one’s enemies. It was a real-life Shi’i fanatic, a thirteen-year-old boy called Hossein Fahmideh, who set things moving in 1981 when he died with a grenade in his hand, throwing himself under a tank during the Iran-Iraq war. He was followed by thousands of young Iranians carrying “keys to paradise,” who, walked and ran across minefields, ripping their bodies apart for God and the Islamic regime. Ideal type is the fighter who engages in an action called inghimas, throwing himself recklessly at the enemy, even if he should be one man against a thousand. Doing this was seen as legitimate because the mujahid was seeking martyrdom and did not need permission from the leader of his army or unit. Suicide bombers believe, God sends them on their missions and by the time they’re ready to be strapped with explosives they have reached a hypnotic state (tunnel-vision) to fulfill their role. Concept driven motivation presumably has a certain role here. The figure of the martyr as a holy warrior (mujahid) who dies in battle and goes on to reap a heavenly reward above that of ordinary mortals is of central importance in the earliest period of Islam. The psychological impact of suicide terrorism is potent and crippling to the society. A state of intense fear creates the definition of terror, when induced in societies; it becomes a weapon in itself for stagnation and demoralisation, creating state of unrest leading to an effective terrorism tactic. Examples set by the LTTE, who became the world’s foremost suicide bombers and proved the tactic to be so unnerving and effective, that their

methods and killing innovations have been studied and copied by most terrorist organisations.

Threats from communication warfare Definitions: Electronic warfare: Techno Terrorism, which is to disrupt communication (jamming, HERF guns, EMP bombs) and cause damage to vital hardware. Hacker warfare: Cyber Terrorism, which is damage to control system of information (Chipping / Backdoors). Psych warfare: Propaganda / Hactivism (direct broadcast). Information warfare: Attack or threats to disrupt civilian infrastructure.

Cyber attacks like suicide bombers are effective tools employed by terrorists because these cause fear and uncertainty within a given population influencing the government or population for their own political, social or ideological agenda. Cyber terrorists prefer using the cyber attack methods because of its many advantages: It is relatively cheaper than traditional methods, action is very difficult to be tracked, they can hide their identities and location, there are no physical barriers or checkpoints to cross, the act can be remotely controlled from anywhere in the world, big targets can be aimed at collectively, they can affect a large number of people. Jihad relies on global communication and through Internet they receive the same advantages as common public, which is – speed, security and linkage. They are geographically dispersed groups of non-hierarchical standing; work as a team through a non-visible leadership. Unrestricted warfare has a faceless and stateless enemy systematically spreading and unifying ideas and motives under a virtual caliphate. Non-state actors means, they are free of facing direct retaliation. Global jihad movement places a high value on propaganda and agitation, operating according to low-intensity, long term and transnational strategy based on leaderless jihad, terrorist networks and franchises and cyber-warfare. The Internet provides many different ways of anonymously meeting with ‘like minded’ individuals in a (comparatively) safe way. Furthermore, a successful cyber terrorism event could require no more prerequisite than knowledge – something that is essentially free to the owner once acquired and an asset that can be used over and over again. Thus, it would be possible that such an environment could facilitate the creation of entirely new terrorist groups – no monies would be required for actions and members could organise themselves quickly and easily in the anonymity of cyberspace.

In Jihad Website Monitoring Group, a periodical review of Institute of Counter-Terrorism, Israel in October 2010 published by Israel’s institute of counter-terrorism, it is mentioned how one of the surfers on the “Shumukh Al-Islam” Jihadi forum provides explanation along with instructional steps and illustration on how to make a car bomb, further on in the forum the surfer provides a very detailed explanation on turning gas tanks into bombs and information on the preparation of a timer. The end of the 20th century may have seen a decline in the number of incidents of ‘traditional’ terrorism such as hijackings and kidnappings but the lethality of the terrorist potential has risen to a frightening degree with the advent of cyber terrorism and its links to computer technology. The target of Internet terrorism is twofold: a) Attack / distort the moral values of the masses and b) Change mental frames of the Muslims around the world through persuasion. Change in mental frames is effective to take the potential recruit through the radicalization phase. Jihad messages appeal to the emotion-significant limbic system establishing long-term memory tags. Bio-terrorism: Few known cases showcase the menacing nature of bio-terrorism, a major challenge of the 21st century, even though biological warfare is as old as the human race. For example in the Middle Ages, the bodies of plague victims would be thrown over city walls to discourage advancing enemy armies. Statistics show that between 1960 and 1999 more than 200 incidents involving biological agents were reported in different parts of the world. Before 2001, the Aum Shinrikyo sect in Japan experimented with Ebola, Botulinum Toxin and Anthrax and tried to spray in Tokyo. And then in 2001 an editor of a US tabloid died due to inhalation of a white powder hidden in an envelope, which he had opened. Some cases reported after were hoaxes but seeds of fear and panic were sown intimidating the civilian populations. Bio-terrorism is low on probability and potentially high consequence event. French Sociologist, Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) has argued in his book Division of Labour in Society, that traditional primitive societies, based around a clan, family or a tribe unite members through common consciousness and religion plays an important role in unifying its members. This also reflects the work of the Islamic scholar, Ibn Khaldun (1332-1395 CE), on Asbyiah (group feelings) Ibn Khaldun expects the sense of solidarity to be based originally and normally on kinship. A sense of solidarity can be powerfully supported by religion and conversely no religion can make an impact unless its members have a strong sense of solidarity. If we keep the above mentioned theories in mind then the modern era of today and intermingling of cultures and ideas through media and Internet may give rise to cultural insecurities in various societies leading to mental and emotional unrest. Addressing the root cause of modern terrorism is; taking a longer view and facilitating multifaceted strategies and implementations, multilayered dialogue is vital for successful counter-terrorism.

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

homeland security

unrestRicted warfare

Transformation in counter-terrorism designs should be endless; it is needed to anticipate

Indulgence in co-operative

the next step. This transformation is achieved through swarming – which involves flexibility,

federalism is needed, which

synchronisation, communicating, deciphering the unit autonomies and coordinating every

means – that the two levels

available asset to its action-advantage. A centralised body of collection of research is needed,

of government are essentially

that provides information and analysis to support monitoring, acquisition and neutralising of

partners.

a threat and is comprised of various levels of intelligence and management packages. Terrorists

To assist management what can be proposed as starters?

employ these methods and imitation can be the sincerest form of counter-terrorism. We need 4 key Pillars to combat terrorism: Analysis, Protection, Response and Resiliency Standards must be created for Operational Security to thwart or neutralise attacks using human and technological means, which stands on good intelligence plus the synchronicity between manpower, technology and measures.

Inter-government and intra-country bodies collaborate to select the most cost-effective, pro-active and / or reactive options and/or eliminate a target crime(s) and / or terrorist individuals or terrorist groups. Constant improvement in areas of security systems, professionals, security patterns through technology, upgraded trainings, red teaming, modernisation of weapons and tactics, protective gears, creating open intra-group communication channels and decisionmaking responsibilities. Re-evaluation of methods of use of technology to reduce and further eliminate information warfare / cyber terrorism. Vulnerabilities of jihadist online are behavioural and not-technical which can assist in countermeasures through intercepting jihad forums and monitoring the pattern of language of propaganda.

Success and changes need insight on importance of prevention through analysis, information, intelligence and tactics, which need to disperse globally via active cooperation and information exchange in all channels. (Government, Political leaders, Law Enforcement Agents, Security Experts in Academia and Community) Very few of us would answer in the affirmative if we were to be asked: Are we more secured today as compared to 20 years ago? A federal and democratic society is where freedom and the rule of law ensure the purposeful and successful life of the community. Core of federalism and democracy is in the security of the nation and its people and if personal security and freedom is curtailed and attacked by violence and terrorism, it is the very foundations of democracy, which is at stake. What is the importance of prevention? Security is like the air we breathe. Once we realise it is decreasing, it just might be too late to take preventive measures. To enhance and promote growth, of roots of federalism, the installation, effectiveness and long-term credibility of state governments, central government, private and non-profit sectors must be strengthened, as we are all collective contributors, in constructing the multilayered security parameters.

Homeland security should be a collective concern and countering terrorism – a collective approach – “A whole Nation approach”.

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

Greater emphasis should be on psychological and information operations, web-based operations and counter propaganda.

Conclusion Unrestricted warfare displays how terrorists are able to operate as loosely organised, self-financed networks. Religiously oriented, ideologically motivated terrorist organisations have eclipsed the earlier ethno-national terrorists. Cross-pollination of ideas among terrorists via use of technology makes their network widespread more so than among various counter-terrorism agencies. New breed of recruits are highly educated and with advance training in science, engineering and biochemistry, which increases their appetite to obtain WMDs or crude nuclear weapons. Terrorist organisations and counter-terrorism units are competing for the same audience with same levels

of skills and knowledge.

Quaker Publications.

Optimal advantage of effective counter-terrorism will be seen when all levels of details are arranged in a way that most effectively executes an action and signals the weakness through re-evaluation of the existing structure. Developing a stronger operational and tactical intelligence structure should be constructed along with partner countries to assist in planning, preparedness and disaster management with control and speed. Construction of a lattice framework of all counter-terrorism analysis centres to share and analyse risk, predict acts of terrorism and their modus operandi for various scenarios. The design phase includes when we start to create assets, advantage and culling methods to counter acts of terrorism. To prepare target packets, using collaborated effort of knowledge of 3 kinds – specific, non-specific and expert. Thus, setting priorities requires modelling and simulating attack and response and “red teaming” to test the effectiveness of proposed solutions and also incorporating social sciences to reach the core of the ideologies of terrorists.

Crone, P (2005) Medieval Islamic Political Thought, Edinburgh University Press.

Further reading on this article: Paz. R, (2006) ‘The Islamic Debate over Democracy: Jihadi-Salafi Responses to Hamas’ Victory in the Palestinian Elections, Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, THE PROJECT FOR THE RESEARCH OF ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS (PRISM) OCCASIONAL PAPERS, Volume 4 (2006). Cartwright, N (1989) Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Center on Law and Security, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 30:1-14. Ciovacco, C J. (2008) “The Erosion of Noncombatant Immunity within Al-Qaeda”, Small Wars Journal, June issue, Vol. 4 and 5. Council for European Affairs (2007), “Counter-Terrorism A Critical Assessment of European Union Responses.” QCEA, Brussels,

Cruickshank P (2007) “Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda”. Cullison, A (2004) “Inside al Qaeda’s Hard Drive,” The Atlantic Monthly, September issue. Hall, R (2005) “Assessment Guidelines for Counter-Terrorism” (Under FEMA Grant EMW-2004GR-0112) July 2, 2005 Report #05-017 DRAFT, Available at Hoffman, B (2006) Inside Terrorism, New York: Columbia University Press. Hoffman, B (2010) “Al-Qaeda has a new strategy, Obama needs one too”, Washington Post, “OUTLOOK and OPINION” section, January. Jones, J (2009) Muslim-Jewish Relations in Australia: Challenges and Threats, (No. 45). Levins, R (2006). “Strategies of Abstraction”. Biology and Philosophy 21: 741-755. Mahdi, M (2006) Ibn Khaldun’s Philosophy of History: A Study in the Philosophic Foundation of the Science of Culture. ISBN: 9789839541526 Oliver, R (2004) The search for New Ummah. Oliver, A M, Steinberg P. The Road to Martyr’s Square. Oxford University Press, 2005, 214 pp. Howard, T (2010) The Spread of Terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 33 Issue 11. Streusand, D E (1997) “What Does Jihad Mean?” Middle East Quarterly, Vol 4, no. 3, pp. 9-17. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT official government edition, Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Venzke, B N, and Ibrahim, A (2002) Al-Qaeda Tactic / Target Brief Intel Center / Tempest Publishing.

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

homeland security

HIGH-TECH – A SINE QUA NON

India’s Internal Security Challenges are Significant

s India’s counter-terror effort is yet far removed from the global sophistication levels, it has been estimated that by 2020, a significant 6 per cent of the global procurement in homeland security (HLS) will be from India. That is huge. Technology has to and will, play an increasing role in the entire gamut of security components – counter-terrorism, border security, immigration, entry and exit point monitoring. In India, the central government and state governments have primarily been involved in providing security whereas the private sector’s role has been minimal. Keeping in mind the huge financial and infrastructure requirements, there is a large potential for corporates to play a role in the internal security sector. They can develop critical technologies for the country’s unique challenges, supply sophisticated equipment and ensure timely implementation of a variety of security solutions.

hile India’s internal security concerns may seem similar to those of other nations, India’s geography – 7,000 km of coast and 15,000 km land border – large population, social and political exigencies, dated security and scrutiny technological tools pose peculiar challenges.

A federal system with multi and regional party system also throws open the challenge of centre and state co-ordination. Given the constraints, successive governments face a formidable task in identifying and containing security threats. India has for long been a victim of terrorist activity.

The columnist is President and Chief Executive Officer, New Ventures, Reliance Industries Limited and Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation. Earlier he was Vice President and Country Head, Boeing Defence Space and Security and had also served as Managing Director of Boeing Commercial Airplanes in India. Prior to Boeing he worked for Raytheon and with NASA Ames Research Center in various multidisciplinary engineering fields. He has his PhD in Aerospace Engineering from Wichita State University in Kansas and his MBA from City University in Washington. He served as Chairman of the Defence Committee of the Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM). He also served as the Chairman, Defence Equipment Committee, AMCHAM and is on the panel of the FICCI Defence Task Force. He had the distinct honour of representing 2,500 companies as Regional President of the Indo-American Chamber of Commerce, the only US-India bilateral chamber. In April 2012, he has been appointed as Chairman of the Indo-US Strategic Dialogue by the Indo-American Chamber of Commerce. The columnist has recently been appointed Co-Chair of the FICCI Homeland Security Committee along with Sh Gopal Pillai, Former Home Secretary, Government of India.

Dr Vivek Lall

Post Kargil, several measures were put in place to enhance border security. The events of 26/11 Mumbai attack in 2008 forced the security agencies to look deeper into what is needed to secure the nation from internal and external threats. Three years later, the security situation in Indian cities has evolved but remains challenging. We will need fast deployment of manpower and technologies not just to secure cities but also to ensure that India’s growth rate continues at over 8 per cent per annum.

As India’s counter–terror effort is yet far removed from the global sophistication levels, it has been estimated that by 2020, a significant 6 per cent of the global procurement in homeland security (HLS) will be from India. That is huge Many terrorist incidents in the last few years all over the world point to the ever increasing possibility of use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) materials by non state actors. Although the setting up of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) will provide the institutional and coordination mechanism at the national, state, district and local levels for disaster response and mitigation, India’s preparedness for such an attack remains at a nascent stage. Terrorists across the globe have stepped up the use of IEDs, the sophistication of which continues to baffle investigation authorities. Ammonium nitrate, a chemical which is primarily used in fertilisers, is also used as a main component in powerful IEDs for attacks, including in the Mumbai attacks. The need to secure the supply–chain of ammonium nitrate is urgent, requiring concerted efforts on the part of government, organisations and people.

Terrorists across the globe have stepped up the use of IEDs, the sophistication of which continues to baffle investigation authorities. Ammonium nitrate, a chemical which is primarily used in fertilisers, is also used as a main component in powerful IEDs for attacks, including in the Mumbai attacks. The need to secure the supply-chain of ammonium nitrate is urgent, requiring concerted efforts on the part of government, organisations and people India is being repeatedly subjected to terror and cyber attacks and hostile groups have also established front organisations in cities. As India’s counter-terror effort is yet far removed from the global sophistication levels, it has been estimated that by 2020, a significant 6 per cent of the global procurement in homeland security (HLS) will be from India. That is huge. Terrorism in 2012 has assumed different dimensions and is significantly different from its form a decade back. Terrorists are faceless, sometimes using sophisticated weapons and technologies which are supposed to be the domain of security forces. The metamorphosis of a petty criminal into a terrorist using sophisticated technology and weapons – as seen in 26/11 terror attack convict Kasab’s case – is an indicator of their formidable training capacity. These new dimensions of the threats India faces require very agile security governance. Our state responses are gearing up to match the speed with which things are changing.

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

homeland security

HIGH-TECH – A SINE QUA NON

There are no accounting procedures in place to account for ammonium nitrate produced in the country. Domestic purchasers must validate legitimate use and suppliers must retain records and report theft or loss of ammonium nitrate to authorities. Terrorists are adept at choosing new and different styles of terror attacks as illustrated by the use of a magnetic bomb employed to target an Israel embassy car in a high security area in New Delhi, injuring four people. The National Security Guard (NSG) Chief has admitted that sticky bombs have become a more serious matter of concern for the security forces than IEDs. These easy–to–use devices are fast becoming a preferred choice for many terror groups in other countries as well. The cyber domain – the fourth security dimension after air, land and sea – offers its own unique set of challenges. According to an answer given in the Parliament by the government, 117 websites were hacked between January and June in 2011. In 2010, according to reports from Canada and US, several Ministry of Defence websites and that of India’s leading think tank, the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) were also hacked. The Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT–In) carried out an analysis on the web server logs of the hacked websites and suggested specific steps and countermeasures to patch the existing vulnerabilities and strengthen the security of these websites. As suggested by these statistics, government websites getting hacked is becoming quite a regular occurrence indicating the fact that the infrastructure which powers important websites was very fragile. On the other hand, cyber threat actors are much more sophisticated and organised than they are given credit for. In many cases apparently, hacking is part of the games played by spying and sabotage agencies from other countries.

The genesis of many terrorist movements has been internal, with motivations ranging from Marxism to ethnicity. The Ministry of Home Affairs has banned 35 organisations around the country under The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. Over the last few decades, the rise of terrorist groups in our neighbouring countries has increasingly become a source of threat to our internal security India needs to move from reactive to preventive strategy which would entail significant IT and management effort. Technology has to and will, play an increasing role in the entire gamut of security components – counter-terrorism, border security, immigration, entry and exit point monitoring. More than 40 countries have already adopted biometrics while 12 to 13 countries require biometrics for granting visa. India has disparate technologies and procedures that do not necessarily interoperate optimally. That is a big weakness. There are also plenty of cases reportedly indicating that foreigners from neighbouring countries are easily able to get some kind of identity cards which instantly and illegally, turn them into Indian citizens. The MHA’s NATGRID initiative, the formation of an intelligence database designed to consolidate and make searchable data gathered by existing security and law enforcement agencies, will prove to be a vital link in India’s intelligence infrastructure. In fact the robustness of the databases to be integrated would need to be shored up. The CCTNS initiative of the MHA, to facilitate storage, transfer and sharing of data and information between police stations, their state headquarters and the Central Police Organisations will see large benefits accruing as its usage goes up. But data inputs have to be verified in two to three layers before acceptance is accorded. It has to be kept in mind that whatever system is accepted, rightly or wrongly, will be there for a long time. It may be noted that in India, the central government and state governments have primarily been involved in providing security whereas the private sector’s role has been minimal. To assist the resources at the government’s disposal though, the proactive involvement of private citizens and organisations in mitigating such threats is finding ever increasing support. Keeping in mind the huge financial and infrastructure requirements, there is a large potential for corporates to play a role in the internal security sector. They can develop critical technologies for the country’s unique challenges, supply sophisticated equipment and ensure timely implementation of a variety of security solutions.

homeland security

CYBER ONSLAUGHT

Cyberspace management

getting critical in India I

ndia has for the first time experienced a concerted offensive of cyber-terrorism from Pakistan that was picked up and fanned by elements hostile to the state to generate hatred between communities and large scale ethnic / communal violence. One part that originated from Pakistan was the injection of morphed images of the Tibetan earthquake and flood victims in Thailand in the web to pass off for victims of the Assam violence and persecution of Rohingyas in Myanmar. These were designed to whip up anger and hatred in the minority community. The second part of this cyber offensive was new. It saw a niche segment, targeted attack against the people of the north-east living in major metropolitan cities. The medium was mass SMSs circulated individually to the people of the north-east. Being individually targeted messages, these proved most potent in generating fear and panic and triggering mass flight of the targeted community. This entailed local supporters of the ISI misusing the data bases of the commercial service providers to get the list of the individuals of the north-east and engineer the targeted attack on this niche segment. This takes cyber warfare to a new cellular dimension that has proved to be highly effective – even more so than the net-based social media because the attacks / threats became so individuated and personalised and thereby generate a high degree of panic that effects behaviour ( flight). The service providers need to ensure that their customer data bases are safeguarded from such dangerous elements and privacy is respected.

Subimal Bhattacharjee The writer is currently Country Head for India of General Dynamics, one of the top five US defence corporations. He is a well known strategic thinker and columnist on issues of cyberspace and security. The views expressed are personal.

Many of the images and postings were being propagated from Pakistan based networks. These images in many cases were morphed from photos of the earthquake deaths in Tibet and floods in Thailand and were totally unrelated to the violence in Assam. These were specifically designed to enrage the minority community and very specifically terrorise the people of the north-east. They were very strongly designed to generate fear and passions across the country and instigate chaos and large-scale violence

Such attacks were attempted by perpetrators from within the country as well as abroad taking advantage of the absence of geographical constraints and anonymity. While cyber attacks on critical infrastructure and defence installations would have to be dealt with, readiness both in terms of policy approach and technical response, the current situation has shown that vested interests have already started working to foment trouble in the country using the advantage of freedom of content in cyberspace that India offers

Ultimately, in the arena of internal security, the race will be won by who makes effective use of the latest technology the terrorist or the government.

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

homeland security

CYBER ONSLAUGHT

iolence in Assam that started in end July 2012 has cast a spell not only in the state and country but also in cyberspace. Lives have been lost and nearly five lakh people are still in relief camps. Violence is still not completely subsided. But some groups with vested interests found the prolonged incidents to be a great tool to incite passions in cyberspace. So in mid August, with continuing violence and incitement in spurts, smses, mmses, voice messages, emails and social media postings became rampant with threat messages to people from the north-east region living in major Indian cities like Bangalore, Hyderabad, Mumbai, Chennai and Pune. These targeted hate messages forced many of them to go rushing back home fearing attacks. All these cities with their booming service industry that also, to a great extent, owed its prosperity to cyberspace, suddenly became the medium for instigating fear and panic for techies and support services staffs alike.

Nefarious cyber designs With such a mass exodus having serious implications for the unity and integrity of the country, the government was forced to act – for the first time monitoring and selectively blocking malicious cyberspace content. While traffic on smses, mmses and social media were being proliferated mostly in the domestic networks, on investigation by government agencies, it was found that many of the images and postings were being propagated from Pakistan based networks. These images in many cases were morphed from photos of the earthquake deaths in Tibet and floods in Thailand and were totally unrelated to the violence in Assam. These were specifically designed to enrage the minority community and very specifically terrorise the people of the north-east. They were very strongly designed to generate fear and passions across the country and instigate chaos and large-scale violence. With conclusive evidence in the kitty, India’s new home minister Sushil Kumar Shinde on 19th August 2012, spoke to his Pakistani counterpart Rehman Malik

and expressed his concern over the issue of social media-networking websites being misused by elements based in Pakistan to circulate false pictures and stories and thus fan communal passions in India. He requested for Pakistan’s full cooperation to control such activities in that country. While Pakistan has to act and respond positively, considering their shoddy response and support to India for the 26/11 Mumbai attack investigations, it can well be guessed what support will actually come from that direction. However the government is clearly left with the situation that cyberspace will henceforth be a concomitant medium for the problems in the physical world and in many occasions not only domestic but foreign designs will be propagated through cyberspace. The pertinent point is the readiness of the government to deal with the emerging scenario.

Many nations have been progressing their cyber warfare strategies that also included using cyberspace as a potential force multiplier for future conflicts and also engaging cyber surrogates. Our immediate neighbours China and Pakistan have been reported by various sources to be moving in that direction

Cyber security architecture In May 2012, the National Security Adviser announced that the government was giving finishing touches to a ‘Whole-of-government cyber security architecture’ for the country that would comprehensively define the strategy to address all issues of cyberspace management. This came much after a draft national cyber security policy was put up for public comments in March 2011 and despite a lot of relevant responses from various stakeholders, the final policy was never announced. While the Information Technology Act of 2000 was amended by Parliament in December 2008, to include a lot of new provisions like the monitoring, intercepting and blocking of content and also revised the provisions relevant to the role of intermediaries, nothing really happened in terms of building the institutional capacity around the law enforcement agencies

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

and relevant cyber infrastructure. The actual trigger for a fresh look happened in December 2010 when the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) website was hacked by some Pakistan based elements. The decision was taken to have the Deputy National Security Adviser as the coordination point for all the government agencies involved in cyber security including the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-IN), the intelligence agencies and the defence forces. Also the role of the NTRO was more clearly defined as for the cyber mandate. While the move was a timely one as most of the agencies were on their own developing islands of capabilities, a national picture was not emerging and isolated incidents and response mechanisms had become the order of the day. The need for better coordinated readiness was being felt not only for optimal performance but for the clear emerging needs of national security considerations. Cyber attacks were being targeted and planned on critical infrastructures and terrorists were finding this medium as the new front to propagate and launch attacks. Such attacks were attempted by perpetrators from within the country as well as abroad taking advantage of the absence of geographical constraints and anonymity. While cyber attacks on critical infrastructure and defence installations would have to be dealt with, readiness both in terms of policy approach and technical response, the current situation has shown that vested interests have already started working to foment trouble in the country using the advantage of freedom of content in cyberspace that India offers. So the wide proliferation of morphed and unrelated content with full potential to incite racial and social violence was witnessed and the resulting exodus created an unprecedented situation in India. Thus comes the issue of how to deal with such content. Sections 69 and 69A of the IT Act 2008 dealt with provisions of Internet monitoring and interception and blocking respectively. However these provisions could be implemented only on the basis of defined rules and these were notified in October 2009. A very well laid out

procedure which factored in checks and balances were defined. These rules were followed by another set of rules in April 2011 which referred to the content and communications via the intermediaries’ networks that also included the social networking websites. Much opposition was raised against these Rules, but these rules gave a footing to the government to deal with content which had impact on national security, sovereignty of the state, friendly relations with foreign nations and also maintenance of public order. So the government had the laws in place to deal with the emerging possibilities but these issues were very sensitive in nature and a proper balance needed to be drawn between freedom of speech and security concerns for each and every case.

The government had the laws in place to deal with the emerging possibilities but these issues were very sensitive in nature and a proper balance needed to be drawn between freedom of speech and security concerns for each and every case

Global cooperation But this legal readiness only could work in India and the efforts to have a global arrangement for cyberspace issues have not yet taken shape. At the same time many nations have been progressing their cyber warfare strategies that also included using cyberspace as a potential force multiplier for future conflicts and also engaging cyber surrogates. Our immediate neighbours China and Pakistan have been reported by various sources to be moving in that direction. On many occasions, cyber attacks and cyber espionage attempts have been traced back to these countries but with attributes being still very difficult to convincingly point to, not much progress has happened to diplomatically take up the matter with these countries. At the same time, proximity not being an issue, enemies on cyberspace are clearly many and also include non-state actors. While India has established cyber security cooperation dialogues with many nations like the US, UK, Japan, South Korea and Australia, such

moves with China and Pakistan seem to be difficult at this stage. The multiple efforts of the UN is also not leading to some working model: despite the UN General Assembly resolutions 55/63(2000), 56/121(2002),57/239(2002), 58/199(2004), 64/211(2009), they have only flagged the issues concerned as so also did the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). These remained short of fostering an effective institutional mechanism. The Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), now in the third edition after the earlier efforts in 2004 and 2009 made very little progress. The ITU is waiting on the door to control Internet infrastructure but it will be just trying to move to a space that is currently being efficiently handled by ICANN. So currently all global efforts on cyberspace management seem to be missing the mark. Interestingly at the 66th session of the UN General Assembly in October 2011, India proposed for a United Nations Committee for Internet-Related Policies (CIRP) comprising of 50 member states which would be funded by the UN and staffed from the UN’s Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and report directly to the UN General Assembly. This multilateral body would manage cyberspace that would

encourage a multilateral, democratic participative and transparent global policy making mechanism to enable coherent and integrated global policy making on all aspects of global Internet governance. The Indian position at the UN General Assembly was consistent with the resolution of the India Brazil South Africa (IBSA) Multi-stakeholder meeting on Global Internet Governance held in September 2011 in Brazil. A multi-pronged approach is required for dealing with these issues and the efforts of the government have been in that direction. However, with the pace and sophistication of the emerging cyber-terror attacks and most recently the hate and fear inciting contents, the pace of work of the government has to increase manifold. On the institutional front it needs a proper cyber security structure that can command and also build-up a network of resource pool that would work in tandem with the law enforcement agencies and private sector community. At the same time, global diplomacy efforts have also continued with vigour. Much before the wake up call has been sounded, the current spate of violence and cyber threats just indicate that the time is ripe for the government and the stakeholders to act.

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

COMMAND FAILURE

T Maj Gen V K Singh (retd) The writer served in the Army for 35 years, his last appointment being Chief Signal Officer of the Western Army. In November 2000 he joined the Cabinet Secretariat, (R&AW), where he served up to June 2004, when he retired from government service. He has authored five books including India's External Intelligence – Secrets of the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in 2007.

The answers will probably be known fully only after the Henderson Brooks Report is made public. However, most military historians agree that the divisional commander, Maj Gen Pathania, must share the major portion of the blame, for painting a false picture of the situation at Se La and ordering the withdrawal even before he had received orders to this effect from corps HQ. The conduct of GOC IV Corps, Lt Gen B M Kaul, was in keeping with his personality. He tried to give the appearance of a bold and decisive commander, but his orders were rarely clear and to the point. Overall, Se La was classic example of military incompetence at all levels, which was not commensurate with the reputation and past in keeping with the performance of the concerned commanders, most of whom were veterans of World War II and the 1947-48 operation in Jammu and Kashmir

he Sino-Indian War of 1962 was one of the most shameful episodes in India’s post Independence history. Even after half a century, memories of the ignominious defeat at the hands of the Chinese still rankle in the mind of every Indian soldier, especially those who were in uniform at that time. However the large majority of citizens know nothing about the war of 1962, except that India lost and China won. The primary reason for this lack for awareness is the refusal of successive governments to declassify the Henderson Brooks Report and the war records of the conflict. While it is generally known that mistakes were committed by the political as well as the military leaders, the debacle at Se La was a classic example of military incompetence, for which the military alone must accept responsibility. The Chinese invasion commenced on 10 October 1962, when they attacked and overran the Indian post at Tsenge Jong, on the north bank of the Namka Chu River. Ten days later they launched a massive attack in the Namka Chu sector, virtually destroying 7 Infantry Brigade. Continuing their onslaught, on 25 October they occupied Tawang, which had been vacated by Indian troops. The Chinese did not advance further and stopped their push north of Tawang Chu. This ended the first phase of the Chinese advance, which was followed by a lull that lasted a little over three weeks. The second phase commenced on 16 November and ended on 21 November, when the Chinese announced a ceasefire, having reached the foothills after capturing Se La, Dirang Dzong and Bomdila in quick succession. The three-week lull in operations was utilised by both sides to prepare for the next phase. There were changes in the deployment of Indian troops, along with those of commanders. The responsibility for defence of Se La was assigned to 62 Infantry Brigade, Bomdila to 65 Infantry Brigade and Dirang Dzong, where the divisional HQ was also located, to 4 Artillery Brigade. Brigadier G S Gill replaced Brigadier Kalyan Singh as Commander 4 Artillery Brigade; Brigadier Hoshiar Singh replaced Brigadier N K Lal as Commander 62 Infantry Brigade and Brigadier A S Cheema succeeded Brigadier G M Sayeed as Commander 65 Infantry Brigade. The new divisional commander was Major General A S Pathania. Of the 10 battalions that were then available to 4 Infantry Division, five were deployed at Se La, two at Dirang Dzong under 48 Brigade and three at Bomdila.

The saga before the withdrawal Out of the three brigade defended sectors, Se La was the strongest, being a natural fortress which was difficult to storm even by a stronger attacking force. The new commander, Brigadier Hoshiar Singh, took over on 29 October 1962, being moved post-haste from Khadakwasla near Pune, where he was the Deputy Commandant of the National Defence Academy. He was a highly decorated soldier, having been awarded the IOM, IDSM and the Croix de Guerre, during World War II. (The writer was then a cadet at the NDA and still recalls Brigadier Hoshiar’s forceful speech when he left. He was pleasantly surprised when unknown to the NDA brass, the cadets lined up on both sides of the road at night to

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

cheer him when he drove to Pune, from where an Air Force aircraft flew him to Tezpur). By mid-November, all the five battalions earmarked for the defence of Se La had occupied their defences. A few anti-personnel mines had been laid around the covering defensive positions of the battalions and the brigade HQ. The brigade was being maintained almost completely by air. It had about two first line scales of small arms ammunition and ten days rations stocked with the units. However, only one and a half scale of first line artillery ammunition was held. The battalions allotted to the brigade were 4 Garhwal Rifles, 2 Sikh Light Infantry, 4 Sikh Light Infantry, 1 Sikh and 13 Dogra. Of these, 4 Garhwal Rifles was deployed as covering troops between Nuranang and Jang. For fire support, the brigade had a field regiment, a mountain battery and a troop of heavy mortars. It also had a platoon plus a section of medium machine guns. Engineer support was to be provided by 19 Field Company. Reports of the Chinese infiltration on both flanks of the defences had reached HQ 62 Infantry Brigade. Troops of 4 Sikh Light Infantry positioned in Two-Lake area had reported on 16 November the movement of more than 1,000 Chinese troops along Bhutan border towards south-east. A strong patrol under the second-in - command of 2 Sikh Light Infantry had been attacked on the morning of 16 November which clearly confirmed the concentration of Chinese troops in the Luguthang area, on the right flank of the brigade defences. On 17 November, the enemy had secured a foothold on the main road axis by hammering the covering position occupied by 4 Garhwal, which was ordered to fall back to the main defences at Se La. There was a possibility that the brigade defended sector would soon be attacked from three sides and that the line of communication of the brigade might be cut. In spite of this, the brigade commander stuck to his decision to stay put and fight the Chinese at Se La. He ordered D Company of 4 Sikh Light Infantry to take up a screen position in the

THE DEBACLE AT SE LA: A CLASSIC EXAMPLE OF MILITARY INCOMPETENCE

dismal historical narrative of the command failure at Se La. The degree of demoralisation after the initial battles of Namka Chu was such that no cohesive defence of Se La was even attempted. It makes a depressing litany of one of India’s worst military humiliations.

area forward of Nuranang to cover the withdrawal of 4 Garhwal and ‘A’ and ‘C’ Companies of its own battalion from Two-Lake area. Commencing their withdrawal at 9.30 pm on 17 November, both A and C Companies of 4 Sikh Light Infantry reached Se La at 4.50 am. 4 Garhwal had arrived at Se La earlier, at 3 am. The Chinese had reportedly pushed more than a division through Kye La and Poshing La axis and were using the numerous tracks to bypass the defended localities on the main road axis. On 15 November they captured Poshing La, overwhelming the two Assam Rifles platoons and the platoon of 5 Guards that had been sent to reinforce them. Orders were immediately issued to 48 Infantry Brigade to send a battalion to Thembang to stop the Chinese and if possible recapture

Poshing La. 5 Guards left Bomdila on 16 November and reached Thembang the same evening. Meanwhile, the company at Lagam was attacked by the Chinese and the company second-in-command killed. On 17 November the Chinese attacked Thembang and overwhelmed 5 Guards, which retreated in disorder, some elements being able to reach Bomdila, with the rest breaking up into small parties that headed for the plains. By the evening of 17 November, the Chinese had cut the road Bomdila-Dirang. The divisional commander, Major General Pathania talked on telephone to Commander 62 Brigade, Brigadier Hoshiar Singh who felt that he would be able to hold out for 5 to 6 days. Pathania told Hoshiar Singh to formulate his plans for withdrawal to Bomdila on night of 18/19 November,

but not to communicate it below the level of battalion commander. During the conversation, Hoshiar informed Pathania about his earlier orders to 4 Garhwal and two companies of 4 Sikh Light Infantry deployed in Two-Lake area to withdraw to the main defences at Se La. Pathania gave his approval to those moves. He also authorised Hoshiar to demolish Bridges 2 and 1 in the event of withdrawal from Se La.

The brigade was being maintained almost completely by air. It had about two first line scales of small arms ammunition and ten days rations stocked with the units. However, only one and a half scale of first line artillery ammunition was held At 6.30 pm on 17 November, soon after the telephone conversation with

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

COMMAND FAILURE

the GOC, Hoshiar held a conference, at which a plan for withdrawal on the night of 18/19 November was chalked out and conveyed to those who could not attend. He made it clear that the information was for them personally and that he would brief them in detail the next morning. The plan of withdrawal was as follows: 4 Garhwal Rifles was to withdraw from Nuranang and occupy a delaying position at Senge and cover withdrawal of the brigade. 13 Dogra Regiment less two companies with 4 Garhwal Rifles was to cover the withdrawal of the rest of the Brigade from Se La. 2 Sikh LI would abandon Kye La at 4.30 pm on 18 November and take up delaying position at Nyukmadong to cover the withdrawal of rest of the brigade. 4 Sikh Light Infantry would abandon its defences at 9 pm and concentrate at Bridge 1. 1 Sikh to abandon its defences at 11 pm on 18 November. The brigade HQ would move in two parts. The non-essentials would leave at 9.30 pm with 4 Sikh Light Infantry and the rest would withdraw at 11 pm with 1 Sikh LI.

The responsibility for defence of Se La was assigned to 62 Infantry Brigade, Bomdila to 65 Infantry Brigade and Dirang Dzong, where the divisional HQ was also located, to 4 Artillery Brigade. Brigadier G S Gill replaced Brigadier Kalyan Singh as Commander 4 Artillery Brigade; Brigadier Hoshiar Singh replaced Brigadier N K Lal as Commander 62 Infantry Brigade and Brigadier A S Cheema succeeded Brigadier G M Sayeed as Commander 65 Infantry Brigade. The new divisional commander was Major General A S Pathania. Of the 10 battalions that were then available to 4 Infantry Division, five were deployed at Se La, two at Dirang Dzong under 48 Brigade and three at Bomdila One must now switch to HQ 4 Corps at Tezpur, where the

real drama was to be enacted, with entire top brass of the Indian Army in attendance. At about 4.30 pm, Pathania rang up the Corps HQ and said he wanted to speak urgently to the corps commander. Lt Gen B M Kaul was not present, since he was visiting Walong. Pathania was then put through to the BGS, Brigadier K K Singh. Pathania pleaded that his position was precarious, due to road blocks placed by the Chinese and requested permission to withdraw. K K refused to give permission for withdrawal and advised Pathania to stay put. Shortly afterwards, the COAS, General Thapar, the Army Commander, Lt Gen L P Sen and the DMO, Brigadier D K Palit arrived in Tezpur and were briefed by the BGS, as Kaul had still not returned. Thereafter, Thapar and Sen also spoke to Pathania, who reiterated his request for permission to withdraw. He was told to await the arrival of the corps commander. Shortly afterwards, Kaul arrived and was apprised of Pathania’s request. He spoke to Pathania at about 7 pm and told him to stick it out that night and he would issue final orders next morning i.e. on 18 November. Significantly, Brigadier Hoshiar Singh had already held his conference at 6.30 pm, after being told by Pathania to plan his withdrawal next day. Shortly after denying permission for withdrawal, Kaul gave a message to the CSO (Chief Signal Officer), Brigadier P S Gill, which read ‘withdraw to Bomdila’, and asked him to clear it to HQ 4 Division. Since the message was to be enciphered, the BGS spoke on telephone to Brigadier Gurbax Singh, Commander 48 Infantry Brigade and asked him to pass the message to Pathania on telephone. Within 20 minutes, the message was enciphered and began to be transmitted. Halfway through the transmission, Kaul walked up to the CSO and told him to stop the transmission. The BGS spoke again to Gurbax and told him not the pass the message about withdrawal to Pathania. Gurbax told him that the line to Dirang Dzong being down, he had not been able to speak to Pathania. About 20 minutes after cancellation of the above message, after consultations with Thapar and

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

Sen, Kaul handed over another message to the BGS, to be cleared to HQ 4 Division. The gist of the message was that Pathania was to hold on to the present position to best of his ability. However, if any position became untenable, he could withdraw to any alternate position he could hold. This message was cleared to HQ 4 Division at about 2.30 am on 18 November. At about 5.30 am, Pathania spoke to Kaul and told him that Hoshiar’s brigade had started pulling out from Se La on 17 November night, as it was attacked by the enemy from both flanks.

Se La abandoned Brigadier Hoshiar Singh had already briefed his battalion commanders at 6.30 pm on 17 November about the withdrawal from Se La on 18 November. At about 10 pm, he advanced the abandoning of Kye La by 2 Sikh LI from 4.30 pm on 18 November to 10.30 pm on 17 November. The battalion less one company was asked to take up covering position at Nyukmadong, with one company being left to cover Nuranang road. Hoshiar informed the GOC and the battalion commanders about this change on telephone. Though there was no change in the withdrawal timings of 1 Sikh, its CO, Lt Col B N Mehta, ordered his battalion to pull out on night of 17 November itself, a day earlier than planned. This decision was taken by the CO on his own, i.e. without any orders from the brigade commander. It is likely that information about the withdrawal of 2 Sikh LI having been advanced was probably not passed on to the troops of 1 Sikh. Consequently, when the troops of 2 Sikh LI were passing through 1 Sikh defences at night, the latter got jittery and began leaving their posts. This triggered a panic and led to the premature abandonment of Se La. At about 4 am on 18 November, when Hoshiar went to Se La to watch the progress of the withdrawal, he saw that troops of 2 Sikh LI and 1 Sikh had got mixed up and were completely disorganised. All communications from brigade HQ to the battalions had broken down or were cut off. Rearward communications on line and wireless was disrupted after

5 am and progress of the withdrawal could not be communicated to divisional HQ. Realising that the right side of Se La was completely devoid of troops, at about 5.45 am Hoshiar ordered that all troops should withdraw immediately and concentrate at Senge. These orders could not be communicated to 4 Sikh LI, there being no communication and the route to the battalion being blocked by the Chinese. Hoshiar left Se La and reached at the location of 13 Dogra at Senge at about 6.30 am. At 8 am, the BM of 62 Brigade informed the GSO 1 of IV Corps from Shukla Camp that the brigade was on its way to Dirang. He also informed the BM of 48 Brigade that they expected to reach Bomdila on 19 November after clearing the enemy on Dirang-Bomdila road.

Debacle at Se La was a classic example of military incompetence, for which the military alone must accept responsibility When the withdrawing troops reached Senge, Hoshiar divided them into three columns. The vehicle column was asked to move immediately to Dirang Dzong. Of the two marching columns, one consisting of two companies of 4 Garhwal was ordered to reach Dirang Dzong by the old mule track Nyukmadong-Dirang along the heights and not by the main road, with a view to protect the left flank of the brigade column, which consisted of all the other troops, i.e. the brigade HQ, 2 Sikh LI, 1 Sikh and the remaining two companies of 4 Garhwal Rifles. 4 Sikh Light Infantry and section of 7 Mahar (MMG) were still at Se La as they had not been conveyed the withdrawal orders. The Chinese began occupying the defences of Se La even as they were being vacated. Soon afterwards, 4 Sikh Light Infantry positions came under fire from localities held earlier by 2 Sikh LI. After repeated attacks on their positions, including the battalion HQ, the CO, Lt Col R B Nanda, ordered his troops to withdraw. The troops divided themselves into small parties and started marching south of Se La. These parties were repeatedly ambushed by the enemy and a large number were killed or wounded, the

others escaping to Bhutan. Among the six officers killed were the Lt Col Nanda and the second-in-command, Major S R Tandon. The section of 7 Mahar Regiment that had been left in Se La continued to occupy its location until it was attacked, suffering heavy casualties before being overwhelmed. The vehicle column of 62 Brigade left Senge at 8.30 am on 18 November for Dirang. At about 10.30 am, when it was 2 km short of Bridge 1, it was ambushed by the enemy. More than 30 all ranks were killed and many were made prisoners. Only a few could escape. The 4 Garhwal column under the CO cleared an enemy delaying position of about one platoon strength in the area of Nyukmadong and a series of enemy stops, suffering many casualties. Just after midnight on 18/19 November when it reached Dirang Dzong, the column ran into an ambush, most of them being killed or captured. The CO Lt Col Bhattacharjea and Lt S N Tandon were captured in the early hours on 19 November. The brigade column came under fire when they were a little ahead of Bridge 2. The leading battalion, 2 Sikh LI tried to clear the enemy located on high features on both sides but failed. In the meantime, 13 Dogra, which was in the rear, was attacked twice and could not be brought forward to assist 2 Sikh LI or 4 Garhwal. The lack of wireless communication between brigade HQ and the units led to a loss of command and control and the column was disorganised. The column was pinned down with enemy medium machine guns sweeping the road. When darkness fell, command and control broke down completely and men began dispersing in ones and twos. Some of these parties were again ambushed that night while trying to escape. Hoshiar’s party was reportedly ambushed near Phu Dung on 27 November 1962 and he was killed, four days after the ceasefire announced by the Chinese government with effect from 23 November. Some idea of the confusion and disorder that prevailed can be gauged from the fact that on 1 December 1962, i.e. after 14 days

of withdrawal, 2,291 personnel of 62 Infantry Brigade were still missing. This included two officers, one JCO and 54 OR of the Signal Section.

The aftermath Se La was a very strong position. The brigade commander, Brigadier Hoshiar Singh had indicated several times that he could hold on for several days. Yet, the position was abandoned. How did this happen? Who was responsible for the debacle? Was it Kaul, Pathania, Hoshiar, or Mehta, the CO of 1 Sikh, who abandoned his position without orders? What about Thapar and Sen? Why did they remain mute spectators when the drama was being played out, in front of their eyes? The answers will probably be known fully only after the Henderson Brooks Report is made public. However, most military historians agree that the divisional commander, Maj Gen Pathania, must share the major portion of the blame, for painting a false picture of the situation at Se La and ordering the withdrawal even before he had received orders to this effect from corps HQ. The conduct of GOC IV Corps, Lt Gen B M Kaul, was in keeping with his personality. He tried to give the appearance of a bold and decisive commander, but his orders were rarely clear and to the point. Overall, Se La was classic example of military incompetence at all levels, which was not commensurate with the reputation and past in keeping with the performance of the concerned commanders, most of whom were veterans of World War II and the 1947-48 operation in Jammu and Kashmir. (The above account is based mainly on the History of the 1962 Conflict with China, produced by the History Division of the Ministry of Defence, which is available on the website www.bharat-rakshak.com. As mentioned in the Preface of the book written by the Chief Editor, Mr S N Prasad, they were given access to the Henderson Brooks Report. Footnotes giving references to original sources and particular files were deleted on instructions of the Ministry of Defence, but they are available in the ‘Master Copy’ kept in the History Division. In the book, these have been referred to euphemistically as ‘official records’.)

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1962 and now

SEA POWER

A Rear Adm (Dr) S Kulshrestha (retd) The writer has held the post of Director General Naval Armament Inspection at the NHQ prior to his superannuation. He is an ardent exponent of indigenisation and selfreliance in the field of military weapons.

Initiatives by China in the Indian Ocean region in the past decade would point to a rather imbalanced tilt in favour of China because of its forays into port projects in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Chinese anxiety is rooted in its insecurities arising from SLOCs, which are currently dominated by the US and its endeavour to protect its economy from over dependence on Malacca in future

The rapid expansion of PLAN into a formidable blue water force outgunning the Indian Navy, is a given by 2025

most interesting comparison of India and China’s sea power. The writer cites Nathaniel Barber to the effect that “China would be unlikely to attack India before being quite prepared; at such a time when China was prepared, its foothold in the Indian Ocean region would be so strong that armed conflict would be unnecessary. In the next 10 years or so, if India wishes to maintain its influence with its closest neighbours, it would have to compete with China’s direct investment in its neighbours’ infrastructure”. The Indian Navy has graduated to one of the finest navies in the region both quantitatively and qualitatively and has the experience of operating aircraft carriers for over four decades. However even though it has a wide reach, it still does not have the numbers required for sea control along its coastline or sea denial in areas of its choosing. The Indian Navy will have a very significant role to play, even when it may not be able to match the PLAN in years to come, it has to transform itself into a major regional navy and possibly align with the US and its allies in East and South East Asia, such that the cooperative strength of the arrangements far outweighs the Chinese naval power in the region.

“Only when China and India develop well, can one claim that the century of Asia has come. If China and India strengthen cooperation, Asian unity, stability and prosperity will be very hopeful; the world will be in peace and make more progress.” —Deng Xiaoping

nitiatives by China in the Indian Ocean region in the past decade would point to a rather imbalanced tilt in favour of China because of its forays into port projects in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Chinese anxiety is rooted in its insecurities arising from SLOCs, which are currently dominated by the US and its endeavour to protect its economy from over dependence on Malacca in future. It is also a fact that PLAN in the current state, is unable to project itself as a formidable navy, far into the Indian Ocean and counter blockage of SLOCs should such a situation arise. Further China has increased its influence in African countries by carrying out developmental and infrastructure projects, thereby gaining a toehold in their resources as well as their support in international bodies. India on the other hand has tried to strengthen its relationships with Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, Japan and Australia, to extend its reach in Southern Indian Ocean and South China Sea. It is also evident that India’s role in the IOR has tacit approval of the United States of America, much to the discomfort of China. It is noteworthy, as far as SLOCs are concerened that, while China has some costlier options with respect to bypassing Malacca, India has no viable alternatives to its SLOCs as they begin and end in the IOR. The China-India economic excursions / largesse have been beneficial to the recipient nations, who in turn have in their own way tried to balance a perceived hegemony by either of the Asian giants. The projection of power in the IOR is thus becoming an economic chessboard between China and India, with none in a position yet to breach the status quo. Meanwhile the bilateral trade between the two is likely to touch US$ 100 billion by 2015, creating its own shield against direct confrontation. With the above background it can be seen that the driving force behind increasing influence in the IOR by both China and India are the insecurities regarding ‘energetics’, which is literally fuelling the rising economies.

Interestingly Mahan, in his book The Influence of Sea power Upon History 1660-1783 has interconnected manufactured items / export of raw materials to commerce (transaction of goods) and overseas bases as providing security to trade as well mediums in transacting it. The activities carried out by a nation within its boundaries has been outreached across the oceans, making safe transportation of goods across the seas, a vital link in the economic development and well-being of a nation with sea borders. Thus free flow of trade becomes a national interest which needs to be safeguarded by a naval force, making it subservient to trade and commerce. Sea trade flourishes not because of a strong navy but importance of sea trade to a nation’s overall economic well-being

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

India China: NAVAL BALANCE

gives rise to a strong navy. To quote Mahan

“... production, with the necessity of exchanging products; shipping, whereby the exchange is carried on; and colonies, which facilitate and enlarge the operations of shipping and tend to protect it by multiplying the points of safety – is to be found the key to much of the history, as well as of the policy, of nations bordering upon the sea.” Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea power Upon History 1660-1783. In the case of China and India, currently, it is securing the import of oil and gas from Gulf as well as the African coast, rather than the export of goods and raw material which is guiding the build-up of diplomatic effort as also the naval strengths of the Asian giants. With the backdrop of SLOCs and economically driven power projection in the IOR it has become imperative for the Chinese to shift the focus from maintaining a coastal defence navy to developing a progressive blue water force. China has not explicitly articulated its aspirations for a blue water navy but strengthening of its submarine fleet and credible plans of operating a carrier battle group in near future give indications of PLAN’s transcendence from an offshore to an oceanic navy. China clearly understands that for it to field a substantial blue water force, its navy should have the ability to exercise control over seas near its shoreline, protect its island territories and deny access on sea routes of its interest to navies of its adversaries. The current abilities of PLAN already enable it to carry out asymmetric warfare and pose an effective nuclear deterrent. The strength of PLAN is approximately twice the size of Indian Navy in terms of major warships.

The Indian Navy has graduated to one of the finest navies in the region both quantitatively and qualitatively and has the experience of operating aircraft carriers for over four decades. However even though it has a wide reach, it still does not have the numbers required for sea control along its coastline or sea denial in areas of its choosing. Indian Navy’s acquisition plans are aimed at long range operations and extra regional power projection, accordingly its modernisation and replacement plans are ambitious but hampered by time and cost overruns. In case of a face-off in South China Sea, the Indian Navy may not match up to the PLAN, the same will hold true for PLAN if the face-off takes place in IOR. A China India Naval Balance does exist as of today in the region, with the underlying fact that none of the two countries are even thinking about confrontation at sea in the near future. A comparison of naval force attribute in purely layman’s terms is tabulated alongside. Two important factors that are likely to change the India China naval balance in next decades in favour of China are the economic crucible and the emergence of the land based anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) the Dong-Feng 21D.

Economics The following graph from SIPRI gives country wise, the increase in military spending during 2000-2011. It can be observed that whereas China’s military expenditure increased a whopping 286 per cent, Indian military spending increased by only 71 per cent.

ATTRIBUTE

CHINA

INDIA

A/C carrier

~End 2012

Yes

SSBNs

Yes

Not yet

SSNs

Yes

ASBMs

Yes

Amphibious capability

Yes

Naval aviation

Yes

Major combatants

Yes

Extended reach

Not Yet

Yes

Aggressiveness

Benign as of now

Benign

Capability build-up

Rapid

Slow

Int’l Joint operations

Limited experience

Adequate experience

As far as the economics goes it is seen that PLAN receives *Layman’s comparison of naval force attributes ~24 per cent of the Chinese defence budget of US$ 106 billion, whereas Indian Navy gets ~14 per cent of the Indian

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

SEA POWER

defence budget of ~US$ 36 billion. The Chinese defence budget is estimated to go up to ~US$ 238 billion by 2015, more than double in next three years, with corresponding increase in the PLAN’s share. No country in the IOR can even come anywhere near those figures in the next three to four decades. The rapid expansion of PLAN into a formidable blue water force outgunning the Indian Navy, is a given by 2025. An interesting study carried out by Nathaniel Barber et al1 has predicted that: a) For an ‘expansionist China’ China would be unlikely to attack India before being quite prepared; at such a time when China was prepared, its foothold in the Indian Ocean region would be so strong that armed conflict would be unnecessary. In the next 10 years or so, if India wishes to maintain its influence with its closest neighbours, it would have to compete with China’s direct investment in its neighbours’ infrastructure. In 10 years and beyond, India would likely see China exploit the countries’ widening trade gap. India would lose investment opportunities and face being cut-off from key port facilities in the Indian Ocean region where it can no longer afford investment competition with China. b) For a ‘non-expansionist China’ China’s actions relating to India would not be directed at India; rather they simply would be strategic steps taken in a region that is important to Chinese shipping. Also, the presence of the Chinese military would not be explicitly aggressive or expansionist per se: it would be in line with the norms of all superpowers to retain bases throughout the globe to be utilised for a variety of reasons.

In the next 10 years or so, if India wishes to maintain its influence with its closest neighbours, it would have to compete with China’s direct investment in its neighbours’ infrastructure

ASBM Dong-Feng 21D The emergence of ASBM Dong-Feng 21D is being hailed as a game changer in naval warfare, though it has not yet been proven in combat, it has still caused serious anxiety as far as CBG operations are concerned. It is inevitable that China will position these missiles with its associated C4ISR systems within the next couple of years. As far as Indian Navy is concerned, it will have to develop a doctrine to operate its carriers under the omnipresent threat of Dong-Feng 21D’s as they have a strike range of over 3,000 km and would therefore deter any opportunistic adventures which may irritate the Chinese. It is unlikely that an indigenous counter to the Chinese ASBM will be available for deployment by even 2020. Admiral Nirmal Verma stated that: “As far as a weapon like ASBM is concerned, if it is operationally fielded, certainly it is a matter of concern,” ... “The areas in which it (ASBM) will be deployed in our area of operation is something we need to look at. And certainly we need to have something in place with respect to ASBM-type of weapon and we will put it in place.” — Admiral Nirmal Verma, 02 December 2010. It is understood that while the US is working out a startegy to effectively counter the ASBM threat it is also trying to reduce conflict with China by enhancing startegic dialogue and taking steps to avoid miscommunication. Admiral Willard has stated that “ … I think this raises the importance of a continuous military-to-military dialogue …” 1. Nathaniel Barber, Kieran Coe, Victoria Steffes, Jennifer Winter, China in the Indian Ocean: Impacts, Prospects, Opportunities. Prepared for US government’s Office of South Asia Policy, Workshop in International Public Affairs, Spring 2011 University of Wisconsin–Madison.

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

The future of India-China naval balance Two major issues discussed above clearly indicate towards a powerful and transformed PLAN in the next two decades, which would be notches above the Indian capability, this dampner by no means implies a subservient role for the Indian Navy, it only underpins the relevance of continued dialogue and cooperative strategy in the IOR and South China Sea between the United States and the other aspiring regional naval powers to maintain a status quo which would be extremely beneficial to the nations in the region. This brings us to the issue of India China naval balance in the next two decades. Walter C Ladwig III2 has rightly argued that given the current preponderance of American power in the region and the gap between the relative power of Japan, China and India, it is unlikely that Asia will see the emergence of multiple poles of approximately equal power in the medium term. As a result, the most likely configuration in Asia appears to be a continuation of the present, which is a hierarchical order with American preponderance especially with the Pivot to Asia, wherein by 2020 sixty per cent of the American fleet would be positioned in Range rings for Chinese ASBM and other conventional anti-access capabilities the Asia pacific region. Source: http://www.chinasignpost.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Range-rings-map2.jpg The Indian Navy will have a very significant role to play, even when it may not be able to match the PLAN in years to come, it has to transform itself into a major regional navy and possibly align with the US and its allies in East and South East Asia, such that the cooperative strength of the arrangements far outweighs the Chinese naval power in the region. This would then prevent shifting of power from the US to China, which otherwise could lead to destabilising the region. In the words of Lora Saalman3 “India should continue a strategy of cooperative engagement with China and enhance bilateral trade on one hand and on the other hand try to locate synergies and confront differences for making long-term sustainable progress in a pre-crisis rather than post-crisis setting.”

2. Walter C. Ladwig III, Delhi’s Pacific Ambition: Naval Power, “Look East,” and India’s Emerging Influence in the Asia-Pacific, in Asian Security, Vol.5, No. 2 (June 2009) 3. Lora Saalman, Divergence, Similarity and Symmetry in Sino-Indian Threat Perceptions. Journal of International Affairs, Spring/Summer 2011, Vol. 64, No. 2.

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

AIR POWER BALANCE

SINO-INDIAN DISPUTE

T Air Vice Marshal A K Tiwary VSM (retd) The writer commanded a MiG-29 Squadron in late 80s. His various command and staff appointments like Chief Operations Officer at a major Wing, operational planning at Command level, Director Concept Studies at Air HQ, Command of a major flying base, Head of the Training Team (Air) at Defence Services Staff College and Senior Directing Staff (Air) at National Defence College have conferred a rich practical experience. The air staff course at DSSC Wellington (TN), Command and Air War Course at the Air University, Maxwell Airbase, Montgomery (USA), all inducted and accelerated his interest in air war studies.

The targets on Chinese side, destruction of which could cause pain, are located far away from the border. The heartland of China, East and South East China starts at an average distance of 1,000-1,500 km from our airfields. The heartland is around 2,500-3,000 km. They are far too distant for air power to destroy as it exists today in the IAF

This means that in order to defend everywhere we need dedicated troops in each area. To attempt this on a border extending over 4,000 km will need phenomenal number of troops – a near impossibility

AND OUR PREPAREDNESS

he writer carries out an appreciation of the air power balance between India and China. He concludes that the PLAAF will have modern aircraft for both air defence and long range strike and army support making use of their GPS called BeiDou-2 consisting of 35 satellites. It will have around 9 AWACS / AEW&C, Air Refuellers, Surveillance and Electronic warfare aircraft in support. Space imagery will present good intelligence on our target systems. The fighters will have modern air to air missiles including beyond visual range active missiles. Strike aircraft will have PGMs. H-6 will carry air launched cruise missile of 1,400 km plus range. The high altitude of TAR will reduce bomb load to around one third that of sea level. However today’s PGMs have reduced the required bomb load for target destruction significantly. Air refuelling and high performance of Su-27, Su-30, and J-10 will offset altitude disadvantage to quite an extent. TBMs and GLCMs will not be affected much.

0 years back India’s tryst with destiny was rudely jolted by the betrayal of our trust by the newly created republic of China. The saving grace was unanimous withdrawal announced and implemented by the Chinese to status quo existing on May 1960. Our policy of forward defence pending settlement of border dispute with China lay in utter ruins. Non-aligned countries, formed under our influence and leadership were nowhere seen for our help. We sought security against further Chinese attacks from the Western block – from whom we had distanced ourselves in our policies especially the defence matters. 50 years on from that ignominious defeat we need to revisit the scene to judge for ourselves as to how have we prepared for a similar threat in future – for the dispute remains as alive today and China with its economic super-might emerges as the new super power of the world. This article examines what role the Chinese military is likely to play in the unfortunate event of another Sino-Indian conflict. Both China and India are continental size nations. This geographical reality, the past non-aggressive history of both and the contemporary views on wars to occupy other’s territory rule out war for additional territorial conquest. This rules out the possibility of a total unlimited war, so characteristic of WW I and WW II.

again. It is a cycle of acclimatise, de-acclimatise and again acclimatise. It is a slow process requiring weeks. This severally restricts freedom to move troops quickly from one area to another. Napoleonic movements are out of question. This means that in order to defend everywhere we need dedicated troops in each area. To attempt this on a border extending over 4,000 km will need phenomenal number of troops – a near impossibility.

The terrain adjoining border areas in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) is at an average elevation of about 14-15,000 feet above mean sea level. It is a cold desert devoid of major habitation and any industries. It is not a target rich area for air strikes. The road-rail network is far more extensive in Tibet compared to Indian side. Generally Chinese military posts look down at Indian posts located at lower altitudes. The Indian side is marked by steep climb towards the border and prone to frequent landslides. The logistics build-up and / or troop’s relocation from one area to another is highly time consuming and seasonal due to climatic compulsions. The border is 4,000 km plus. Nepal and Bhutan situated as buffer states over nearly 1,500 km border results in problem in surveillance and detection should Chinese decide to invade from these areas as attack avenues.

IAF on the other hand has dwindled to a force of 32 combat squadrons comprising of only 435 modern aircraft against an estimated requirement of 45 squadrons in an appreciation done post 62 war. Remember that the appreciation was post 62 war and most probably did not cater for a two front simultaneous war. Post Kargil war, in it’s appreciation for Kargil review committee IAF had felt the need of 65 modern combat squadrons

High altitude acclimatisation, a necessity for both sides, is easier for Chinese because the TAR itself is on a high plateau. On Indian side post acclimatisation, troops are restricted to that area only. Movement to another area entails coming down, moving laterally and climbing up

The targets on Chinese side, destruction of which could cause pain, are located far away from the

Geographical reality

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border. The heartland of China, East and South East China starts at an average distance of 1,000-1,500 km from our airfields. The heartland is around 2,500-3,000 km. They are far too distant for air power to destroy as it exists today in the IAF. Conventional warfare requires 3:1 numerical superiority for the attacker in plains. Highly contested, obstacle ridden plains require a ratio of around 5:1. In mountains this ratio shoots up to 10:1. If required China can bring in 30 Divisions (15,000 troops in each) in TAR. They can relocate additional troops from adjoining areas of Sinkiang and Chunking. In the battlefield they can concentrate troops much faster at places of attack or facing adverse situation in defence. This is possible because of better rail / road network created by the Chinese on their side. Also their battlefield defences and logistics are better than ours. Our defence minister admitted that India was way behind the needed preparation in this regard. If India decides to go on a land offensive, imagine the forces and logistics requirement in this difficult terrain.

Appreciating the compulsion of topographical disadvantage, the then Army Commander in 1960, Lt Gen Thorat had suggested an unconventional strategy. His pragmatic plan proposed purposeful escalation of war wherein Chinese would advance down the mountains into Assam plains. These plains would then be used as killing grounds by our forces after interdicting Chinese supply.

Preparedness How have we prepared since the unfortunate year of 1962? We did increase the size of our Army, Air Force and the Navy. But a new and more potent threat reared its head in 1965 and 1971 as Pakistan resorted to open hostilities. Of course Pakistan was dealt a fitting reply in both wars and the military preparation post 62 fiasco helped in this. But our national requirement to defend against two fronts, in worse case simultaneously, has placed a phenomenal demand. This we have not been able to cater to sufficiently. Pakistan realising futility of conventional war against India adopted a twofold different strategy.

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AIR POWER BALANCE

First it commenced a sub-conventional warfare by introducing terrorism in substantial scale in Jammu and Kashmir and at other places far apart like Mumbai etc. Second it was helped by the Chinese in it’s quest for nuclearisation. So since late 80s it threatened India with nuclear capability. Our response to these threats has overlooked the Chinese threats to quite an extent.

The then Army Commander in 1960, Lt Gen Thorat had suggested an unconventional strategy. His pragmatic plan proposed purposeful escalation of war wherein Chinese would advance down the mountains into Assam plains. These plains would then be used as killing grounds by our forces after interdicting Chinese supply Our planned infrastructure along Chinese border lagged in the implementation part and has remained increasingly behind the Chinese efforts. Though the army strength has been increased, often these new raisings have been over engaged in countering the terrorism threat. It was with great effort that army was able to stabilise situation in the valley by 2005. In Kargil war 1999 again army had to redeploy troops often without rest and sufficient acclimatisation. It was the massing of our artillery hastily pulled out form other locations and the relentless air attacks that turned the table on Pakistani ambitions. But for some time there were vulnerable places which army would have found hard to defend in case of an attack there. As per press reports there are plans to raise a new mountain corps to cater to the Chinese threats. Given the adverse terrain and massive capacity of Chinese, no matter how many troops we raise, they will never be sufficient to counter Chinese threats on land which is already 3:1. This is a stark reality we need to keep in mind. On the naval front both India and China are building navies with increasing blue water capabilities. But in this race too, we are way behind in offensive role against China. Our naval air expertise of operating from aircraft carriers is definitely ahead of Chinese. How long we can sustain this in both quality and quantity is an open question demanding more resources. In submarine department we are way behind in quantitative terms. PLAAF is replacing its obsolete combat aircraft fleet and weaponry with current 4th generation fighters and modern weaponry. In Tibet area its airfields lie within 300 to 1,000 km from IAF bases. Most of the airfields are at high elevation between 3,500 to 4,300 meters above sea level. The table below gives details of these airfields.

Airfield

Elevation

Hoping

3,900 m

300 km

Gonga Dz

3,375 m

300 km

Pangta

4,200 m

360 km

Donshon

4,300 m

450 km

Hotan

1,380 m

600 km

Kashgar

1,200 m

800 km

Shiquanhe

4,240 m

300 km

Golmud

4,500 m

1,000 km +

Bangda

4,240 m

200 km

Dequen

3,300 m

1,000 km

Kunming

1,900 m

800 km

Nachu

3,200 m

600 km

Jey Kundo

1,600 m

1,000 km

600 m

800 km

Chengdu

Distance to IAF bases

There are a total of 14 airfields of concern. However increasing air refuelling capability in future will increase their numbers. PLAAF can deploy around 16 squadrons in these airfields. They would deploy the best units here, unless our diplomacy can ensure simultaneous threats to China at other fronts.

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Air power balance Out of 1,600 plus combat aircraft, around 400 aircraft are 4th generation. Its old bomber carrying long range cruise missiles will be still effective. Ground launched cruise missiles (GLCM) and TBMs will add to the strike power. The table below gives details.

Aircraft / Missiles

Quantity

Role

Remarks

Su-30 MK

100

AD / GA

Su-27 / J 11

171

AD / GA

200 more to come

J-10

AD / GA

Production rate to go up. Indigenous.

JH-7A

Indigenous

J-8 II

180

Indigenous

J-7

471

Indigenous

H-6

Bomber

ALCM armed

Cruise Missiles

In thousands

Ground launched

TBMs

In thousands

Conventional warhead

Thus it is evident that PLAAF will have modern aircraft for both air defence and long range strike and army support making use of their GPS called BeiDou-2 consisting of 35 satellites. It will have around 9 AWACS / AEW&C, Air Refuellers, Surveillance and Electronic warfare aircraft in support. Space imagery will present good intelligence on our target systems. The fighters will have modern air to air missiles including beyond visual range active missiles. Strike aircraft will have PGMs. H-6 will carry air launched cruise missile of 1,400 km plus range. The high altitude of TAR will reduce bomb load to around one third that of sea level. But today’s PGMs have reduced the required bomb load for target destruction significantly. Air refuelling and high performance of Su-27, Su-30, and J-10 will offset altitude disadvantage to quite an extent. TBMs and GLCMs will not be affected much.

If required China can bring in 30 Divisions (15,000 troops in each) in TAR. They can relocate additional troops from adjoining areas of Sinkiang and Chunking. In the battlefield they can concentrate troops much faster at places of attack Chinese airfields and other logistics related areas will have plethora of manual and automatic anti-aircraft artillery. In addition there will be MANPADs, close and medium range SAMs. Radar cover will be extensive at medium and high altitude. IAF on the other hand has dwindled to a force of 32 combat squadrons comprising of only 435 modern aircraft against an estimated requirement of 45 squadrons in an appreciation done post 62 war. Remember that the appreciation was post 62 war and most probably did not cater for a two front simultaneous war. Post Kargil war, in it’s appreciation for Kargil review committee IAF had felt the need of 65 modern combat squadrons. Since then the Chinese build-up of it’s military aviation is really staggering. J-20 stealth is the potent proof for the skeptics. J-10s are already doing live exercises in TAR. In this light IAF needs another review to contain Chinese threats. We need to remember that while army faces tremendous adversities against Chinese, it is the nature of air power which alone can help us redeem this situation. Because air power does not suffer from the problems of terrain, logistics build-up etc. it’s mobility, reach, speed and multi-role capability gives it the unique ability to counter Chinese and if required overwhelm them. Naturally for this we need to build-up our air power in quality and quantity. So we really need the most potent Air Force to not only defeat PLAAF but also inflict mortal wounds on PLA and PLAN. That alone will be the required defence against China. Air power being highly mobile and with it’s reach of thousands of kilometer, the same IAF will also fulfill the adverse situations arising far away at different fronts also unlike the army or navy.

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1962 and now

Chinese higher defence decision-making in this conflict was characterised by its deliberate and methodical planning and a very high degree of coordination between the political leadership and the military commanders, staff and logisticians. All those likely to be involved in the planning and execution were kept in the loop. The CMC took the basic political decisions and the CMC staff devised operational plans. The Chinese political leadership had extensive military experience and from the early stages involved the MR Commanders of Tibet and Xinjiang (who executed the operations) in the decision-making/planning process. The Indian decision-making in contrast, was chaotic and highly compartmentalised

A key consideration in the Chinese operational planning was the need to bring to battle and destroy significant Indian formations (in a meat grinder war). Thus Mao had the option of launching the main operations in Aksai Chin or in the East. After a careful analysis of the state of roads and logistics and the relative thinness of Indian deployment, Mao had selected the Eastern sector as the main point of effort. The Chinese objective of inflicting a big and painful defeat on India that would cause it to sober up implied that a big battle was required. Thus a powerful offensive that met only thin Indian Forces would not fulfill the political objective. The Chinese concluded that in the Eastern sector India could more readily rush in large reinforcements and therefore this better served the Chinese objectives

STRATEGIC CULTURE

DSA Research Team

literature survey of Chinese open sources indicates the following works that provide very useful insights into the Chinese perceptions of that conflict.

The Official History of the 1962 War: The first and foremost primary source document of this war is “Zhang Yi Bian Jiang Ziwei Fangfa Zuozhanshi”, 1994, Junshi Kexue Chubanshe (History of the Sino-Indian Border Self Defensive War). This exhaustive 567 pages document provides copious details of the Conflict (as viewed from the Chinese perspective). Rich in operational and tactical level details, its coverage of higher level decision-making however, is scanty and entails only four pages out of its over 567 pages. The second important source is a book by Xu Yan, one of the foremost Military Historians of the Chinese National Defence University. His book “Zhong Yin Bianjie Zhi Zhan Zhanlishi Zhenxiaang”(True History of the Sino-Indian Border War), was published by Cosmo Books, Hong Kong in 1993. It is deemed the most important Chinese work on the 1962 War. This seminal work deals at great length with the actual decision-making process. Xu Yan apparently had access to primary source documents (though these are not cited / listed in his book). (ISBN No-13.9789622576827) The third is Wang Hong is’ “Zhang Yu Beanjiewenti de lishi Beijing Yu 1962 nian Zhong Yin bianjie Zhang Zheng” (Historical Background of the Sino-Indian Border Problem and the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War), Ya Tai Ziliao, Asia Pacific materials No. 1, March 1989. Zhao Wei Wen is another noted Chinese scholar and authoritative India hand. From 1950 till mid 1990s, she worked for China’s Institute of Contemporary International Studies (and organisational predecessors of that body). This is an analytical organ of the Chinese Ministry of State Security. Her authoritative book is entitled “Yin Zhang Guangxi Feng Yun Lu (1949-1999)” (Record of the Vicissitudes of India-China Relations: 1949-1994), Beijing, Shishi Chubanshe. This was published in 2000 and is useful for its insights into the Chinese perceptions about Indian decision-making. The next notable work is Yang Gangsu’s “Xin Zhongguoduiwei Zhongee”

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

(New China’s Foreign Policies). Zhong was Foreign Affairs Assistant to PLA in Tibet in the 1950s. He later became China’s Ambassador to Nepal. His work is not available but has been extensively cited by Zhao Wei Wen in her book (Record of Vicissitudes …). His work is notable for its direct accusation that the Indian Consul General in Lhasa drafted the Tibetan Declaration of Independence in 1959. Another seminal primary document would be Lei Ying Fu as told to Chen Xianyi Zai Zuigao Songs huaibudang Sanmo – Lei Yingfujiangjunhuiyilu (Serving on the Staff of the Higher Command: Memoir of Gen Lei Yingfu), Nanchang, Jiangxi province, Baihuazhou Wenyi, Chubanshe, 1997. Gen Lei Yingfu was Head of PLA’s War fighting Department and one of the most critical players in the higher decision-making process (Equivalent roughly to the DGMO of the Indian Army). Another primary source is the authoritative “Zangguo Renmin Jiefangjun Liushuian Dashiji (1927-1987)” (Record of 60 years of Major Events of the PLA), Beijing, Haijun Shi Kexue Chubanshe, 1988.

THE 1962 INDIA-CHINA WAR A CASE STUDY OF CHINESE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

LESSONS FOR FUTURE CONFLICTS T

he 1962 War has generated a fairly sizeable volume of literature in China. It is surprising that these open sources are so little known and studied by Indian scholars and military historians. A study of the Chinese literature provides some very interesting insights into the Chinese motivations and planning for this conflict. It constitutes an excellent case study on the Chinese higher defence decision-making process for war that holds very important and useful lessons for the future. An understanding of the Chinese model for the higher direction of war (as it specifically relates to the Case Study of the 1962 Conflict), would be a highly instructive and very essential exercise in understanding the working of the Chinese National Security system and how it is likely to respond in future conflicts. It would provide very useful insights into the Strategic Culture of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a facet that is vital for us to study and understand.

Lastly, there is Shibo’s (editor) “Zhang Yinda ZhangJishi” (Record of Events in the Big China-India War), Beijing, Dadi Chubanshe, 1993. The aim of this article is to carry out a case study of the Chinese Higher Defence Decision-making process that resulted in the India-China War of 1962 to draw lessons / insights relevant to the Chinese decision-making process in a possible future conflict scenario with India. American analysis of China’s decisions for war with India: 1962 John W Graver, a well known US scholar on China, has carried out a very incisive analysis of Chinese Source materials on the 1962 War. In his Monograph entitled “China’s Decision for War with India in 1962” (http://www.peoplefas.harvard.edu/ Jhonston/graver.pdf) he has carried out a cogent analysis of two major aspects: Seizing Tibet: China’s fundamental error of attribution. The Chinese perception was that the root cause of the 1962 War was an Indian attempt to undermine Chinese rule and seize Tibet. In 1964, Mao had told a

visiting delegation from Nepal, “The problem between India and China was not the McMahon Line, but the Tibet Question.” After an indepth analysis of Chinese and US sources, Graver concludes that this Chinese perception was erroneous. Graver feels that Nehru’s policies derived not from a desire to seize Tibet, but to uphold Tibet’s autonomy under Chinese sovereignty, as part of a grand accommodation between India and China. The two leading Asian powers could then create a new axis in world politics. Nehru hoped that

in return for India’s acceptance of Chinese ownership and military control of Tibet, China would repay Indian friendship by consolidating the Sino-Indian partnership and by granting Tibet a significant degree of autonomy. Thus the central Chinese perception that India wanted to seize Tibet appears to be a fundamental error of attribution. Graver postulates that it was a case of the militaristic Chinese projecting aggressive motives on to Nehru to explain the Tibetan resistance to Chinese rule to foreign machinations / instigation.

In their self-image they felt that their communist rule had liberated the Tibetans from serfdom and they were at a loss to explain as to why the Tibetans should rebel. CIA’s Tibet involvement: The CIA had started an operation to provide covert support to Tibetan rebels in Kham region in late 1950s and early 1960s. John Knaus of the CIA was incharge of this operation. Actual assistance was limited (totalling 250 tons of Arms / Ammunition between 1957-61). Graver opines

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STRATEGIC CULTURE

(after interacting with former CIA officials) that Nehru and Malik possibly knew the general parameters of this operation and to an extent, tacitly condoned the US covert operations in Tibet (in view of the harsh Chinese repression in that Autonomous Region). However, this by itself indicated no desire to seize Tibet. China’s response to India’s forward policy: The second causative aspect of the 1962 War between India and China is said to be India’s Forward Policy. Like Neville Maxwell, Graver seems to suggest that this Indian policy provided the final provocation for the Chinese to escalate the situation and go to war. In itself there was nothing wrong with any Indian desire to secure its territory to the extent possible by establishing token posts. That precisely was what China had been doing for a long time in those frozen wastes. This Forward Policy however, was based on a seriously flawed premise that China would not react militarily to India’s moves to assert its claims on the disputed territory by establishing token posts. These posts were tactically unsound and lacked proper logistical support. Yet these incensed the Chinese who felt that India was not taking them seriously. They deliberately decided to teach a lesson to India through “a large and punishing blow (not just “little blows” – Xiaoda). Mao said, “if we want to strike, we must strike in a big fashion and wage a war of extermination” (la dang da tang). Mao said, “If China fought successfully in an awe inspiring manner (Wei Feng), it will guarantee at least 30 years of peace”. Western scholars make much of India’s Forward Policy as a provocation to the Chinese. The simple fact is that India was only trying to establish token claims to what it sincerely felt was its own territory. The Criticality of Aksai Chin Highway: It emerges clearly in Graver and Dr Francis Watson’s Analysis (The Frontiers of China) that one of the major Chinese criticalities was the perceived threat of Indian “Forward Policy” to the Security of the Aksai Chin Highway that linked Tibet to Xinjiang. The Chinese deemed it a significant strategic artery and were not prepared to countenance

any threat to its security. In fact, so vital was this road to the Chinese that in April 1960, Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Prime Minister offered to drop claims to Eastern Sector (Arunachal Pradesh) if India gave up claims to Aksai Chin. Apparently, the Indians failed to perceive the Chinese sensitivity for the security of this highway. They turned down the swap offer. In retrospect, the Chinese were incensed by what they felt was a refusal to respond to a reasonable swap offer that ensured the security of their key strategic highway. India’s failure to read the degree of importance / significance that the Chinese attached to the highway was perhaps one of the key precipitating factors for this war. Salient chronology of 1962: Evolution of the Chinese decision for military conflict Chinese invasion of Tibet (1949-50): Graver highlights that India had inherited certain privileges from the British Empire in Tibet. These included Trading Missions, Representative Officials, Telecom Facilities and small military contingents to guard these facilities in several Tibetan towns. When the Tibetan government sought help in 1949, India had supplied a small quantity of small arms and lodged diplomatic protests to try to prevent PLA from invading Tibet. The Chinese invaded nevertheless in 1950. The top Chinese Commander actually went to Lhasa via Kolkata. India’s first Director IB, Mr B N Malik wanted India to take some action to oppose the Chinese invasion. Even Sardar Patel had highlighted the strategic perils of the Chinese occupation of Tibet. However, Gen K M Cariappa pleaded inability as the freshly partitioned Indian Army had its hands full in Jammu and Kashmir, Hyderabad and quelling communal riots. India frankly had no military capability or force levels to intervene in Tibet. The Chinese for their part abrogated the unequal treaties and did away with the colonial privileges India had inherited. Since, India had no military response options to the Chinese invasion of Tibet, it made a virtue out of necessity and actually assisted

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China in consolidating its hold over Tibet. CIA intervention: In 1957, CIA began its covert assistance programme to Tibetan Rebels in South Eastern Kham province. 1958: In late 1958, China demanded that India expel key leaders of Tibetan resistance who were based in India / Sikkim. Nehru sought the middle ground and tried to restrict the activities of Tibetan leaders but refused to expel them. China accused India of granting asylum to the Dalai Lama, having official contacts with him and permitting foreign leaders / representatives to meet him. It also accused India of granting asylum to 10,000 Tibetan refugees and not suppressing anti-Chinese activities in their camps. 25 March 1959: The CCP dissolved the local Tibetan Government (10 March 1959). On 25 March 1959, the Central Committee met in Shanghai. It decided that though India was fomenting unrest in Tibet it would as yet not name / condemn India. Three weeks later, thousands of Tibetan refugees fled to India. 09 April 1959: In a carefully calibrated move, Mao authorised Chinese Media (Xinhua) to issue a commentary blaming unnamed Indian expansionists for the troubles in Tibet. 23 April 1959: Mao ordered the People’s Daily (Renmin Jibao) to now criticise Nehru by name. The Chinese information offensive was thus carefully calibrated by the highest Political authority. Politbureau study committee: On 25 April 1959 Mao convened a Polit Bureau Study Committee, which concluded that Nehru was fomenting rebellion in Tibet, so that he could force Beijing to solicit Indian support to deal with the crisis. India’s forward policy and China’s decision to go to war with India In November 61, India began to implement its Forward Policy. The policy was based on the premise that a wide corridor of empty area separated the Chinese and Indian

outposts. Indian outposts were pushed forward to show token possession of the area. It was the complete absence of Indian presence in the border areas, it was felt, that was inviting Chinese encroachments. The central premise on which this policy was based was that China would not use military force against Indian outposts which only served to show token ownership. This was a seriously flawed anchor premise that led to the establishment of tactically unviable posts that resulted subsequently in a military humiliation. CMC meeting: To consider the implications of India’s Foreign Policy, Mao ordered Tibet and Xinjiang MRs to put forward proposals. However, post the Longju incident (1958), he retained tight central control and insisted that the first shots would be fired only on his express authorisation (instructions to Gen Luo Ruiqing, Chief of the PLA). Meanwhile the Chinese resumed patrolling and accelerated the construction of roads to the border. 26 February 1962: Mao met Lin Biao (Vice Chairman CMC and Minister of Defence) along with Zhou Enlai and Luo Ruiqing, Chief of PLA. They decided on a policy of counter encirclement of posts with no firing – an armed coexistence. Propaganda broadcasts were now beamed towards Indian troops. April 1962: India accelerated implementation of the Forward Policy in the East. Objections were raised by Lt Gen Umrao Singh (GOC 33 Corps), who felt that India should not provoke China without first carrying out adequate military and logistical preparation. This was overruled by Krishna Menon and Lt Gen Kaul. The Chinese felt India’s Forward Policy was growing more aggressive. June 1962: India’s Foreign Office claimed that Indian Troops had brought under control over 2,000 sq miles of China claimed territory. Tension mounted in the border areas. July 1962: Indian Army HQ gave discretion for opening fire to all posts, if threatened. Even at this stage, there was a virtual consensus between

Indian leaders that China would not respond / use force, or if it did so, any military response would be extremely limited. Critical factor: Indications of non-intervention by USA. At this stage, China received indications that any war with India would not draw external powers. Beijing got indications that the US would not support a KMT attack on mainland China. Warsaw was China’s main listening post. In May 1962, Zhou recalled China’s Ambassador Wang Bingham from vacation and sent him to Warsaw to assess US intentions regarding any KMT Invasion. The Chinese were expecting an attack via Laos. On 23 June 1962, the Chinese received Wang’s reply that the US did not want war with China and under present circumstances, would not support a KMT attack on China. This, Graver feels, was a critical ‘tipping point’ for a Chinese decision to go to war with India. In fact, Graver rates this as the single most important factor in the Chinese decision-making to go to war. 23 July 1962: Laos was partitioned and declared neutral in the Geneva Conference. This greatly reduced the chances of US support for a KMT Attack via Laos. Meeting of Chen Yi and Krishna Menon: Chen Yi met Krishna Menon to discuss the boundary question. Chen Yi reported back to Zhou Enlai that Menon was adamant. Zhou Enlai is then reported to have said, “It seems as though Nehru wants war with us (Dao langwonen da jiang). In July 1962 itself, Mao issued a 20 character directive in response to India’s Forward Policy. 21 July 1962: A major clash occurred on 21 July 1962. In a scathing article, Renmin Ribao warned of Chinese advance south of the McMahon Line. Nehru, it claimed, hoped to attack China’s prestige in the third world and win US support. August 1962: There was a review of the situation by Gen Li Ying Fu (head of PLA’s War Fighting Department). He pleaded with Mao that without firing the Chinese troops could no longer

prevent the Indians from advancing. Dhola Incident: In June 1962, the Indians had established a post at Dhola. In retaliation, the Chinese forces occupied the Thagla Ridge. In September 1962, China warned India that it was “playing with fire”. 08 September 1962: Some 800 Chinese troops descended from Thagla and surrounded the Dhola Post. This led to public clamour in India to throw the Chinese off Thagla Ridge. In fact on 18 September 1962, Indian Spokesman announced the government’s decision to evict the Chinese from the Thagla Ridge. This resulted in clashes from 20-24 September 1962.

The 1962 War has generated a fairly sizeable volume of literature in China. It is surprising that these open sources are so little known and studied by Indian scholars and military historians. A study of the Chinese literature provides some very interesting insights into the Chinese motivations and planning for this conflict. It constitutes an excellent case study on the Chinese higher defence decision-making process for war that holds very important and useful lessons for the future. An understanding of the Chinese model for the higher direction of war (as it specifically relates to the Case Study of the 1962 Conflict), would be a highly instructive and very essential exercise in understanding the working of the Chinese National Security system and how it is likely to respond in future conflicts The Chinese decision to go to war: These clashes apparently precipitated the Chinese decision to go to war. Mao now considered administering a large and powerful military rebuff to Indian Forces. “A large and punishing blow was necessary” (not just little blows – Xiao Da). “If we strike we must strike in a big fashion, wage a war of extermination; resolutely hit the wolf and make it hurt (la dang da tang). Moreover, we can guarantee that for a long time to come the aggressor will not dare to come again to commit aggression against China.”

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STRATEGIC CULTURE

Central Military Commission (CMC): Preliminary meeting: The CMC had a preliminary meeting on 06 October 1962. Deputy Chairman CMC, Marshal Lin Biao gave a briefing on the situation and read out reports from the Xinjiang and Tibet MRs. Chinese Intelligence Reports indicated that Indian Troops might attack on Thagla on 10 October 1962. Mao stated that, “Nehru wants war; we must reciprocate.” Zhou Enlai said, “We have strained our best to avoid war. Nehru has closed all roads.” Enlarged meeting of the military leadership: After the consensus amongst the top leaders (Mao, Zhou and Lin Biao), a larger meeting of the Military leaders was held at Xishan (Western Hills) of Beijing. The meeting was attended by: ── Mao Zedong (Chairman) ── Zhou Enlai (Foreign Minister) ── Chen Yi (Vice Foreign Minister) ── Lin Biao (Defence Minister and Dy Chairman CMC) ── Marshals Liu Bocheng

Jianying

and

── China’s Chief of Staff, Senior Gen Luo Ruiqing ── Vice Chief Yang Chengwen

Staff,

Gen

── Head of PLA’s Political Department, Gen Zhou Hua ── Head of PLA’s Logistics Department, Gen Qui Hu Zuo ── Commander of Tibet MR, Lt Gen Zhang Guohua and Cdr of Xinjiang MR, Maj Gen He Jiachan. Mao opened the discussion with, “Nehru insistently demands a fight. If we fight, what should war look like? He asked everyone to contribute their thoughts. Historical analysis and personality study of opposing commander: Mao had intensively studied the history of Sino-Indian relations in the interim. He was struck by the friendly and beneficial interaction between India and China from the 7th-9th centuries.

However, he recounted one and a half wars fought between China and India. The first by the Tang dynasty in 648 AD and the second was the invasion by Taimoor Lang of Mongolia, who captured Delhi in 1398 AD. Mao then asked Marshal Yi Jian Yin to tell the gathering his impression of Lt Gen Kaul. Yi had met Kaul in 1957 during his visit to India. Marshal Jian Yin’s assessment was remarkable for its insight. “Even though Kaul had served in Burma during the World War-II”, he said, “he lacked actual combat experience.” Kaul he felt was a rigid and impressive looking soldier and regarded as India’s best! (most influential) “Fine”, remarked Mao wryly, “He will have another opportunity to shine.” Mao then pointed out that China would be isolated internationally, but it did not matter. “If China fought successfully and in awe inspiring manner, (Wei Feng) it will guarantee at least 30 years of peace.” Mao and the enlarged CMC thereupon decided upon a large scale attack to seriously punish India. PLA COS Gen Luo Ruiqing received a directive from the CCP centre and Chairman Mao authorising a fierce and painful (la dang da tang) attack on Indian Forces. The 06 October directive laid down the broad direction of the projected offensive. It designated the main offensive in the Eastern Sector with the Chinese Forces in the West coordinating their actions with the Eastern offensive. Detailed planning by CMC staff: CMC staff was directed to draw up detailed operational plans for a campaign to expel Indian troops from area north of traditional customary boundary. It was in this staff work that the PLA Logistics department highlighted the practical difficulties of a campaign near winter. The Chinese staff now developed the idea of terminating the war by a unilateral Chinese halt and ceasefire. In view of the practical difficulties associated with China’s domestic situation the operational plans developed by the CMC staff proposed that after achieving military objectives, Chinese forces would quickly disengage and end the fighting (on their own terms). Thus was the Teach a Lesson style Chinese campaign finalised. China was taking no chances. Mao repeatedly warned his commanders

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

not to underestimate the Indian Army and make thorough preparations. 08 October 1962: The CMC now ordered several additional divisions from the Chengdu and Lanzhou MRs to prepare to move out to Tibet. All these forces were veteran, high quality units, who had previously participated in anti-rebel operations in Tibet and were acclimatised and experienced in fighting in high altitude areas. As per the practice the Chinese carried out a careful quantitative analysis of the Indian military strength and quality and concluded that the Indian Army was just one-sixth the size of the Chinese Army and judged inferior in war fighting capability. However uncertainty about Indian military strength led the Chinese to over insure by concentrating larger forces than might otherwise have been needed. Meat grinder war: A key consideration in the Chinese operational planning was the need to bring to battle and destroy significant Indian formations (in a meat grinder war). Thus Mao had the option of launching the main operations in Aksai Chin or in the East. After a careful analysis of the state of roads and logistics and the relative thinness of Indian deployment, Mao had selected the Eastern sector as the main point of effort. The Chinese objective of inflicting a big and painful defeat on India that would cause it to sober up implied that a big battle was required. Thus a powerful offensive that met only thin Indian Forces would not fulfill the political objective. The Chinese concluded that in the Eastern sector India could more readily rush in large reinforcements and therefore this better served the Chinese objectives. Strategic planning group: Having evolved the concept of operations, a small group headed by Marshal Liu Bocheng was set up in the CMC Staff. Liu Bocheng was considered one of China’s foremost proponents of mobile warfare. (He had commanded a division in the Anti-Japan War and a Field Army in the post 1945 Civil War). Lin Biao stressed the need for concentration of local superiority to achieve swift war and swift decision (Jig Hang zhubu you shibinglesuhansujuan). The PLA must not disperse its forces he stressed. It was essential to

deploy crack troops, he insisted. The upcoming fight was not against India’s Border Police, but against India’s best regular forces that had participated in the World War II. PLA could not be arrogant. The PLA should not rely so much on the tactics of infiltration, isolation and encirclement but annihilate the enemy. This meant killing, wounding or capturing the enemy. Commencement of battle: The Indian troops crossed the river and established a post overlooking the Chinese and reportedly opened fire. A PLA battalion now launched an all out assault and routed the Indian Company. It lost 11 killed and 22 wounded. However, despite this initial setback, the Indian media continued to talk of evicting the enemy. Analysis of enemy intentions / motivations: Zhou Enlai now ordered Gens Lee Jinju and Luo Ruiqing to research and report on the reasons for India’s offensive against China. India’s belief that China was bluffing “China barks but does not bite”. On 16 October 1962, the CMC formally decided to annihilate the Indian Forces that had intruded in the East. In the meantime, on 08 October 1962, China had received indications that because of the approaching crisis in Cuba, the USSR wanted Chinese support against the US. The Chinese anticipation of a US-Russia crisis in November led them to subsequently expand their offensive on 18 November 1962. Discussion on postponement of operations: July-September is the post-Monsoon campaign season in the Himalayas. The Tibet MR warned that snowfall would pose great difficulties. The attack therefore must be launched soon or postponed to the next year (1963). However, it was argued that the PLA then had the military balance heavily in its favour (in terms of troop strength and artillery). Indian troops were short of winter clothing and even food. If the attack was postponed by six months, the Indians would be much better prepared. 17 October 1962: The CMC meeting comprising Mao, Zhou, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Luo Ruiqing, Marshal Liu Bocheng, Ha Long and Xu Xiangqianmet and ordered the

Tibet MR to exterminate the Indian aggressor forces in a “Self-defence Counter Attack” (Yi Chang Zhi Wu Fang Zhao Zhang). This decision for war was approved the next day (18 October 1962) by an expanded Polit Bureau Meeting, attended by Mao, Zhou, Liu Shaoqi, Marshals Zhu Dao, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yi, Ho Lung and Gens Luo Ruiqing and Yang Shanglam. Also present were the Tibet MR Commander Lt Gen Zhang Guohua and Gen Wang Shang Zhey (Head of Operations Department PLA). The diplomats Zhang Han Fei and Quiao and Gen Lu Ying Fu. Mao once again warned of the need to not underestimate the Indian Forces. The Tibet MR Commander Lt Gen Zhang Guohua assured Mao that his forces would prevail. The PLA War plan was thereupon approved and the date of attack set for 20 October 1960. By 24th October, the Chinese had destroyed 7 InfBde of the Indian Army at Nymka Chu and moved up to capture Tawang. Operations in the Western sector continued till 27 October 1962. There was then a Chinese logistical and operational pause of almost three weeks. The Chinese used it to feverishly construct a road till Tawang. On 18 November 1962, they commenced the second phase of their offensive against Se La. This was a largely uncontested battle and the demoralised Indian formations disintegrated due to confusion and orders / counter orders mostly stemming from the fact that Kaul, though hospitalised in Delhi, continued to meddle with operations from his sick bed. Gen Harbaksh had meanwhile stabilised the situation by creating strong defences at Se La. Kaul however was keen on holding the Bomdila line and as soon as he returned to resume command, he let it be known how upset he was about the Se La Defence Line. The moment the Se La defences were bypassed the GOC 4 Infantry Division tried to ingratiate himself with the revived boss by giving the disastrous withdrawal order from Se La. Kaul did nothing to stop this disastrous decision and the uncalled for retreat turned into a shameful rout. A vaunted formation melted away without firing a shot or even the

semblance of any serious resistance. It was the nadir of the Indian Army. The retreat became an unorganised rout and the Chinese pursued our forces till the foothills. There was complete panic on the Indian side.

India had inherited certain privileges from the British Empire in Tibet. These included Trading Missions, Representative Officials, Telecom Facilities and small military contingents to guard these facilities in several Tibetan towns. When the Tibetan government sought help in 1949, India had supplied a small quantity of small arms and lodged diplomatic protests to try to prevent PLA from invading Tibet Analysis: Chinese higher defence decision-making in this conflict was characterised by its deliberate and methodical planning and a very high degree of coordination between the political leadership and the military commanders, staff and logisticians. All those likely to be involved in the planning and execution were kept in the loop. The CMC took the basic political decisions and the CMC staff devised operational plans. The Chinese political leadership had extensive military experience and from the early stages involved the MR Commanders of Tibet and Xinjiang (who executed the operations) in the decision-making / planning process. The Indian decision-making in contrast, was chaotic and highly compartmentalised. The political leadership of that period had very little grasp of military realities. They were convinced that China would not go to war over their Forward Policy. It was a monumental error of judgment. Seasoned Combat Commanders (like Gen Umrao Singh) who warned of the need to prepare thoroughly before undertaking offensive moves were overruled and sidelined. The military planning process was dominated by Lt Gen Kaul, whose painful lack of combat experience soon became evident. There were serious personality dissonances on the Indian side and much confusion and ambiguity. Maj Gen Harbaksh Singh could have stabilised the situation but was overruled by the return of Kaul (after his hospitalisation for Pulmonary Odema). The Indian and Chinese higher direction processes in 1962 therefore present studies in contrast.

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

raising the antE?

Brig Gurmeet Kanwal (retd) The writer is a Delhi-based defence analyst.

China fears that the growing US-India strategic partnership is actually a loose alliance and that the two countries are ganging up against China. It should be clear that India is unlikely to ever form a military alliance with the US – unlike Pakistan, which is a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) of the US and is also China’s “all weather ” friend. India realises that its growing relations with its new strategic partners are causing some concern in China. China has viewed with some suspicion India’s willingness to join Australia, Japan and the US in a “quadrilateral” engagement to promote shared common interests in South East Asia. China also wishes to reduce what it perceives as the steadily increasing influence of the US over New Delhi

n the Indian perception, there are several major areas of concern that are limiting the growth of the bilateral relationship. The foremost among these is the “all-weather” friendship between China and Pakistan that is, in Chinese President Hu Jintao’s words, “higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans”. The Indian government and most Indian analysts are convinced that China has given nuclear warhead designs, fissile material and missile technology as well as fully assembled, crated M-9 and M-11 missiles to Pakistan. China and Pakistan are also known to have a joint weapons and equipment development programme that includes Al Khalid tanks, F-22 frigates and FC-1 / JF-17 fighter aircraft. China’s military aid has considerably strengthened Pakistan’s war waging potential and enabled it to launch and sustain a proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir and in other parts of India. By implication, therefore, it is also China’s proxy war.

elations between India and China have been fairly stable at the strategic level. Economic relations are much better now than these have been in the past. Mutual economic dependence is growing rapidly even though the balance of trade is skewed in China’s favour. The two countries have been cooperating in international fora like WTO talks and climate change negotiations. There has even been some cooperation in energy security. However, at the tactical level, China has been exhibiting a markedly assertive political, diplomatic and military attitude. Instability in the security relationship, in particular, has the potential to act as a spoiler; and, it is this relationship that will ultimately determine whether the two Asian giants will clash or cooperate for mutual gains. The major cause for instability in the China-India relationship is the half-century old territorial and boundary dispute over which the two countries fought a border war in 1962.

Strategic relationship On April 11, 2005, China and India announced a new “strategic and cooperative partnership” after a summit-level meeting between Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Wen Jiabao. International analysts were quick to note that the prospects of a more cooperative relationship between these two growing economies had significant global implications. A meaningful strategic partnership will lead to mutually beneficial synergies between Chinese and Indian economies. India is rapidly emerging as a leader in software development. Its knowledge-based industries are attracting the interest of major information technology (IT) enterprises from all over the world. China is now a leading base for the manufacture of IT hardware. Synergising India’s software capability and China’s hardware strength will produce an unbeatable combination.

The rapidly growing appetite of both the countries for energy and their high dependence on oil and gas imports is forcing both to secure oil equity abroad. Chinese and Indian oil and gas companies have often been in competition with each other to invest in overseas fields and have driven up prices by outbidding each other. A strategy based on cooperation rather than competition will help both the countries to secure better terms and will enable them to share their risks. They could follow a consortium or joint venture approach for bidding and invest in sharing infrastructure costs such as building joint pipelines. So far, cooperation in this field has been extremely limited. China and India’s coordinated approach in international negotiations is proving to be mutually beneficial to both. When two countries that represent more than a third of the global population speak in unison, as has been seen in their coordinated approach in the Doha round of WTO negotiations and on environmental issues, particularly in the 2009 World Climate Summit at Copenhagen, the world has no option but to sit up and take note. China and India played a calming role in the 2008-09 global financial meltdown that has now begun to peter out. They are likely to work together towards the long-pending reform of the international financial architecture. As both the countries hold substantial foreign exchange reserves, they will increasingly play a greater role in decision-making in the existing Bretton Woods organisations.

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

India-China Relations: Strategic Stability, Tactical Aggressiveness make the 21st century truly Asia’s century. Counter-terrorism is another area in which China and India can cooperate for mutual benefit as both countries are victims of pan-Islamist fundamentalist terrorism emanating from across their borders. In this context, Exercise Hand-in-Hand series of joint military exercises, conducted at Kunming in 2007 and at Belgaum in 2008, were steps in the right direction. Both also need to work together to counter the menace of narcotics trafficking from the Golden Crescent on one side and the Golden Triangle on the other.

In the Indian perception, there are several major areas of concern that are limiting the growth of the bilateral relationship. The foremost among these is the “all-weather” friendship between China and Pakistan that is, in Chinese President Hu Jintao’s words, “higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans”. The Indian government and most Indian analysts are convinced that China has given nuclear warhead designs, fissile material and missile technology as well as fully assembled, crated M-9 and M-11 missiles to Pakistan

Areas of concern

Reform of the UN Security Council (UNSC) is yet another area for cooperation. Just as India had played a very positive role in China’s membership of the UN and its subsequent inclusion in the UNSC, India expects China to support its aspiration for a seat in an expanded UNSC. This will quite naturally increase Asia’s clout in world affairs. However, so far such explicit support has not been forthcoming. In Asia, China and India should work together for peace and stability and broader regional economic integration to

missiles to Pakistan, as has been widely reported in the international media. China and Pakistan are also known to have a joint weapons and equipment development programme that includes Al Khalid tanks, F-22 frigates and FC-1 / JF-17 fighter aircraft. China’s military aid has considerably strengthened Pakistan’s war waging potential and enabled it to launch and sustain a proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir and in other parts of India. By implication, therefore, it is also China’s proxy war. Other contentious issues include China’s continuing opposition to India’s nuclear weapons programme; its deep inroads into Myanmar and support to its military regime; its covert assistance to the now almost defunct LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) in Sri Lanka; its increasing activities in the Bay of Bengal; its attempts to isolate India in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) while keeping India out of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation; and, its relentless efforts to increase its influence in Nepal and Bangladesh. China’s efforts to develop port facilities in Myanmar (Hangyi), Bangladesh (Chittagong), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Maldives

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

1962 and now

raising the antE?

and at Gwadar in Pakistan are seen by many Indian analysts as forming part of a “string of pearls” strategy to contain India and develop the capacity to dominate the northern Indian Ocean region around 2015-20. Though at present the Indian Navy dominates the northern Indian Ocean, a maritime clash is possible in future as the PLA Navy begins operating in the Indian Ocean – ostensibly to safeguard its sea lanes and protect its merchant ship traffic. Hence, China’s moves are seen by Indian analysts to be part of a carefully orchestrated plan aimed at the strategic encirclement of India in the long-term to counter-balance India’s growing power and influence in Asia, even as China engages India on the political and economic fronts in the short-term.

Counter-terrorism is another area in which China and India can cooperate for mutual benefit as both countries are victims of pan-Islamist fundamentalist terrorism emanating from across their borders As both China and India are nuclear-armed states, it is in the interest of both to ensure that strategic stability is maintained and that the risk of accidental or unauthorised nuclear exchanges is minimised. This would be possible only if negotiators from both the sides sit down together and discuss nuclear confidence building measures (CBMs) and nuclear risk reduction measures (NRRMs). However, China’s insistence that it cannot discuss nuclear CBMs and NRRMs with India as India is not a nuclear weapons state recognised by the NPT is proving to be a stumbling block. China’s official position is that India should cap, roll back and eliminate its nuclear weapons in terms of UNSC Resolution No 1172. That is unlikely to happen. India has been recognised as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology and has been given a backdoor entry into the NPT through the NSG waiver and the IAEA safeguards agreement. India has also signed civil nuclear cooperation agreements with France, Russia and the United States. It would be in the interest of both the countries to discuss nuclear CBMs and NRRMs so as to enhance strategic stability in Southern Asia. It is also in China’s interest to enter into a nuclear trade agreement with India as India is rapidly emerging as a large market for nuclear fuel and nuclear technology. India realises that its growing relations with its new strategic partners are causing some concern in China. China has viewed with some suspicion India’s willingness to join Australia, Japan and the US in a “quadrilateral” engagement to promote shared common interests in South East Asia. China also wishes to reduce what it perceives as the steadily increasing influence of the US over New Delhi. China knows that the US is several years ahead of Beijing in recognising India’s potential as a military and economic power and has greatly increased its cooperation with India in both spheres. China fears that the growing US-India strategic partnership is actually a loose alliance and that the two countries are ganging up against China. It should be clear that India is unlikely to ever form a military alliance with the US – unlike Pakistan, which is a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) of the US and is also China’s “all weather” friend. India’s new found strategic relationship with the US need not come in the way of India-China relations, which have their own significance for India.

September 2012 Defence AND security alert

China is concerned about the situation that might develop when the Dalai Lama passes away. Despite all the raving and ranting against him, the Chinese government is acutely conscious of the fact that the present Dalai Lama’s is a voice of moderation and accommodation. They know that there will be a major uprising in Tibet when he passes away as the Tibetan youth will no longer feel constrained to respect his cherished desire for peace and harmony and are likely to resort to violent attacks against the Han Chinese people and officials and state property. Despite India’s remarkable restraint over 50 years, the Chinese are not sure of how India will react to a post-Dalai Lama rebellion in Tibet. In fact, the Chinese harbour a fair deal of ill will against India for providing the Dalai Lama with a sanctuary – even though India has forbidden him from any anti-China political activities from Indian soil and the Dalai Lama has honoured the restraints imposed on him by his hosts.

Unresolved territorial dispute Of all the areas of concern that have dampened relations between the two countries, it is the long-standing territorial and boundary dispute that is the most disconcerting. The genesis of the territorial dispute is well known. Since well before the 1962 border war, China has continued to be in occupation of large areas of Indian territory. In Aksai Chin in Ladakh, China is in physical possession of approximately 38,000 sq km of Indian territory since the mid-1950s. In India’s north-eastern region, China continues to stake its claim to about 96,000 sq km of Indian territory that includes the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh even though the territory is physically under Indian control. In terms of physical area, Arunachal Pradesh is over three times the size of Taiwan. Despite prolonged negotiations at the political level to resolve the long-standing territorial and boundary dispute between the two countries, there has been little progress on this sensitive issue. Also, in recent years, China appears to have raised the ante by way of its shrill political rhetoric, frequent transgressions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and unprecedented cyber attacks on Indian networks. The security relationship has the potential to act as a spoiler in the larger relationship and will ultimately determine whether the two Asian giants will clash or cooperate for mutual gains. Finally, as two large countries with a shared border and a long history of peaceful co-existence, the governments of China and India have a responsibility to discharge towards their own people and the people of Asia: Both can and must work together in the interest of peace, stability and the future prosperity of Asia. Healthy competition for markets can have positive spin-offs as long as it is conducted in a spirit of cooperative security. China must not hold resolution of the territorial dispute hostage to its successful integration of Tibet with the national mainstream. Once the long-standing territorial dispute is resolved, there is no reason why the dragon and the elephant cannot dance together.

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