DSA September 2013 by Defence and Security Alert

THEIR CRITICAL ROLE

IN HOMELAND SECURITY

ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SECURITY

The power of a King lies in his mighty arms â&#x20AC;Ś Security of the citizens at peace time is very important because State is the only saviour of the men and women who get affected only because of the negligence of the State.

â&#x20AC;&#x201D; Chanakya

editor-in-chief

DSA is as much yours, as it is ours!

arring the occasional hiccups on the Line of Control or Chinese intrusions on the Line of Actual Control, the country is far more focused on its internal security problems. The issues with terrorism and Naxalism are a constant source of news within the country. The recent arrest of Tunda the bomb maker for Pakistan based jihadi groups is a case in point. He occupies more news space in the papers than any other national security related subject. It is safe, therefore, to say that the biggest challenge facing India currently is that of internal security. The external environment may not exactly be the most benign, internal security is a bigger challenge than the external, by a mile at least. The twin challenges of terrorism and naxalism demand far greater attention than the country has actually devoted to them thus far. Granted there is greater news space but that is fleeting attention. The attention that is demanded is that which produces solutions and antidotes. Newspaper space is alright as a source of information and its dissemination. It is not policy formulation, which remains the greatest requirement currently as far as internal security is concerned. It is the policy formulation on terrorism and its counters, as well as Naxalism and its solutions, that the country needs urgently. What goes as policy is uncoordinated and unsteady. There is an urgent need to analyse what it is that the country needs to confront the twin threats of terrorism and Naxalism. The usual suspects will of course come up – intelligence sharing and coordination, centre-state cooperation et al. The one that invariably comes up last is quality of manpower. Modernisation of weaponry comes much higher but not the manpower that is to handle the weapon. And in the current and future scheme of things the manpower that is most important is that of the Central Police Organisations. Granted the state police is the first force to confront the internal challenges. For, after all, they are on the scene all the time and have to be the first response. But as is the case most often they are unable to handle the situation let alone contain it. And the country is compelled to deploy its CPOs. Over a period of time Jammu and Kashmir Police has risen to the challenge and is now at the forefront of counter-terrorist operations in the state. But its manpower is limited in comparison to the threat of terrorism and insurgency in the state. It therefore needs back up, which comes in the form of the Army for hard operations and the CPOs for crowd control and other counter-terror operations. Similarly the various states confronting the spectre of Naxalism need the deployment of CPOs since their police personnel lack the numbers and the firepower to deal with the left-wing insurgents. So now most times instead of the state police being the primary responder it is the CPO which has become the principal response of the Union of India. From being a back-up it is now the front arm of state. Which behoves that the state treat it a primary arm and upgrade it as such. The issue of modernisation of the CPOs has been hanging fire for far too long. Whatever that has been done has been sketchy and without a larger design. There are various facets that come under the gambit of modernisation and each is as important as the other. They complement the other, each other, to a significant degree. The first that naturally comes to mind is the issue of weapons. It became clear from the moment the Central Reserve Police Force lost an entire company in Dantewada that its quality of firepower was inadequate. It isn’t only a question of the small arm that is being carried, but the supporting arms that is as important. Adequate attention has to be paid to that. Just as it is vital that intelligence available to the CPO in operations is current and actionable. For that human and technical intelligence are equally important. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles therefore become vital in this regard. All of these are dependent on better coordination with the local state police and administration. The massacre of Congress leaders is a case in point where a CRPF camp was within striking distance of the ambush site but there was no information with them that the convoy would pass the particularly risky route. The most important though is that of leadership and which remains the critically unaddressed aspect of CPO management. The current model is unsustainable but the solutions that come must be scientific and long-term not stop-gap and short-term.

Manvendra Singh September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

announcement

publisher's view

Sentinels Of Homeland Security

very state’s most important role is to attain peace, happiness and prosperity for its people in all manner and for that it is the ﬁrst responsibility of the government to arrange the best ways to achieve this. Police and security forces are the most important instruments responsible for the maintenance of the law and order and take care of the safety and security of the people.

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Volume 4 Issue 12 September 2013 Chairman Shyam Sunder Publisher and CEO Pawan Agrawal Editor-in-chief Manvendra Singh Director Shishir Bhushan Corporate consultant KJ Singh Art consultant Divya Gupta Central Saint Martins College Of Art & Design, University Of Arts, London Business development Shaifali Sachdeva PR and communications Mamta Jain Creative Prem Singh Giri Representative (USA) Steve Melito Representative (J and K) Salil Sharma Correspondent (Europe) Dominika Cosic Administration Devendra Pillani

It has become ever so important that our CPOs are capable of swift action to snuff out trouble in all its aspects be it communal tension, ethnic conﬂicts or parochialism and natural disasters. The CPO personnel are expected to be more effective and are trained for the purpose of imposing control and resorting to dissuasive action. Their exposure to complex situations is of a much higher degree than the state police and their equipment including ﬁrearms, crowd control gear and their general orientation is different from that of the provincial police. Currently we have some eight CPOs with a manpower strength of around one million personnel spread throughout the country manning all our international borders and guarding all our airports and important establishments. The special forces are committed to provide the best support to the Indian society. Some are always ready to reach anywhere in the country at the shortest notice to handle any riot, terrorist strike or natural calamity.

Announces October 2013 4th Anniversary Issue as

AIR FORCE SPECIAL GLOBAL

AIR POWER TRENDS

The dedication and the commitment of our CPOs is of the highest level and the leaders of these men are some of the best experienced professionals. Under their guidance each force is always ready to give its 100 per cent for the cause of peace, happiness and prosperity for each Indian. Their morale is always high in all situations. Even if they face many adverse situations such as post trauma stress disorder (PTSD) and other psychological ailments, they are ready to accept new challenges. Each of our CPOs personnel is a one man army and we have seen many instances in the past and recent times when they have actually proved their mettle.

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We have the state police forces to handle any situation in their jurisdiction and we have the Central Police Organisations (CPOs) which are deployed at the request of the state to contain riots and mass unrest in conjunction with the state police forces. The role of the CPOs is critical in the current situation because India is confronted by foreign instigated terrorism, the Naxal / Maoist movement and several separatist groups operating on its periphery especially in the north-east. The threats come from sources both external and internal.

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The importance and the role of our CPOs have increased multifold in the last one decade but unfortunately the Ministry of Home Affairs has not done enough for the well-being of the personnel which is a matter of great concern. If they are not looked after well then how will they be able to maintain their high performance level to save and secure peace, happiness and prosperity for the Indian society in the current situation. We are carrying candid interviews of the Director Generals of two very important Central Police Organisations – Border Security Force and the National Disaster Response Force – in this issue as token of our appreciation of their critical role in the service of the nation. This issue also highlights the importance of intelligence gathering in the present scenario. Our distinguished contributors have analysed the requirement of manpower and materials for internal security and the pursuit of peace and prosperity of our people at large. We have seen in the many attacks that have taken place over the years that it was the lack of good actionable intelligence that has hampered the working and operational efﬁciency of the CPOs as well as the state police forces. This has allowed the Naxals, Maoists and other anti-national elements to commit heinous crimes against the security forces and kill innocent people.

NOVEMBER 2013: INDO-UK STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

In the month of August two terrorists Tunda and Bhatkal have been nabbed by our intelligence and police forces. A job well done deserving all appreciation. I am sure if our intelligence network is further improved and strengthened then our CPOs and other state police forces will perform more efﬁciently and give better results. I on behalf of team DSA salute and wish all the best to our CPOs, state police forces and intelligence services. Jai Hind!

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Pawan Agrawal

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Contents

CPOS And Their Critical Role In Homeland Security

Role Of Intelligence In Internal And External Security

An ISO 9001:2008 Certified Magazine

Volume 4 Issue 12 SEPTEMBER 2013

A R T I C L E S 2014: A Defining Year Just Ahead Lt Gen Kamal Davar PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

CPOs And Their Critical Role Cecil Victor

Poor Functioning Of The State Armed Police Battalions Sankar Sen IPS (Retd)

Role Of Technology In Intelligence Gathering Prof Arvind Kumar

The Role Of Intelligence In Countering Terrorism In Iraq Ilias Papadopoulos

Role Of Intelligence In A Democracy: Paradoxes And Solutions V Balachandran IPS (Retd)

Role Of CPOs And Intelligence In Combating Terrorism And Insurgency VK Deuskar IPS (Retd)

National Security: Role Of Intelligence Agencies PM Heblikar

Getting The Intelligence And Policy Balance Right Dr Harsh V Pant

Intelligence And National Security Kalyan K Mitra IPS (Retd)

Causality: External Forces, Internal Threats Damien Martin

Indian Coast Guard: Growth Trajectory Post 26/11 Vice Admiral Arun Kumar Singh (Retd)

Helicopters for VVIPs: A Highly Convulated Deal Maj Gen (Dr) Mrinal Suman AVSM, VSM (Retd)

Role Of Intelligence In Brain Force Wars And Fourth Generation Warfare Of 21st Century Col Rajinder Singh (Retd)

Impediments To Tackle Terrorism In India Dr Ahmad Reza Taheri

Mindware: Psychological Strengthening For Tactical Operations Dr Rupali Jeswal

Effectiveness Of State Police And CAPFS In Internal Security Lt Gen Mukesh Sabharwal PVSM, AVSM**, VSM (Retd)

The Role Of DRI In Providing Intelligence Inputs For Internal And External Security BV Kumar IRS (Retd)

Role Of Intelligence In Security Lt Gen PC Katoch PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SC (Retd)

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September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

F E A T U R E S

Border Security Force A Unique Force Of Praharies! DG, BSF INTERVIEW

National Disaster Response Force 16 Rescue And Relief Operations DG, NDRF INTERVIEW

Safe And Secure Habitations Team DSA

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For online edition log on to: www.dsalert.org September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

homeland security

DG, BSF INTERVIEW

BORDER SECURITY FORCE

A UNIQUE FORCE OF PRAHARIES! Perfect Policemen during peacetime Professional Soldiers during wartime

efore taking over the charge of the Director General, BSF Mr Joshi has served as Director General, NSG; Special Director General, CRPF and DGP, Uttarakhand. Mr Joshi has been decorated with Police Medal for Meritorious Service in 1994 and President Police Medal for Distinguished Service in 2000. He was also awarded “Samman Patra” by the UP government in 1991.

Mr K F Rustamji. How do you see the evolution of the force since then and the signiﬁcant role it has come to play in national security?

Defence and Security Alert: To effectively counter the

BSF has always played an important role in the nation’s security matrix. The gallant role played by BSF during the Indo-Pak War of 1971, militancy in Punjab,

armed aggressions by Pakistan, BSF was operationalised on 1st December 1965 under the leadership of

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Director General, BSF: Border Security Force was raised on 1st December 1965 with 25 Battalions. BSF today is the largest border guarding force in the world with 173 Battalions including four specialised Disaster Management Battalions, its own Air and Water Wings, Artillery Regiments and excellent Training Institutions.

Jammu and Kashmir and north-east and recently in the areas affected by Left Wing Extremism not only reﬂects its glorious past but also instills a great sense of pride among all of us and encourages us to achieve more in the future. More so effective border domination is key to National Security and BSF had effective domination of our borders due to which peace is prevailing in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir now.

DSA: Over the years in addition to its mandated function of securing the national borders, preventing inﬁltration and smuggling etc BSF has also been called upon to assist in the counter-insurgency and other homeland security objectives.

Has this overstretched the sinews of the force and diluted its effectiveness ? DG, BSF: As and when, BSF receives tasks, our endeavour is to carry out in a people friendly way. Yes, most of the times, we have to withdraw from our basic border duties from International Boundary to perform the tasks related to Internal Security. However, diversiﬁed roles have augmented our professional competency and has made the force more effective to deal with security related issues. Our achievements in bringing normalcy in Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, north-eastern states and recently in countering anti-national activities speaks about the yeoman contribution made by this great force.

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homeland security

DG, BSF INTERVIEW relations with Bangladesh. Our border domination is indeed strengthened with the introduction of border fencing and ﬂood lighting.

DSA: As the country is afﬂicted with militancy

and terrorism, inﬁltration and insurgency, smuggling of arms and fake currency and various shades of Left Wing Extremism BSF is charged with an onerous responsibility. How well prepared is BSF under your command to face and surmount these challenges?

DG, BSF: As I told you earlier, that our diversified roles apart from border management has helped us immensely in gaining rich experience to counter the problems of militancy, terrorism and insurgency, infiltration, smuggling of arms, ammunitions and fake currency and tribulations of Left Wing Extremism. Apart from Left Wing Extremism, all these problems are prevalent in Western and Eastern borders, ie, in Indo-Pak and Indo-Bangla borders. BSF since 2010, is deployed in the anti-Naxal front. Presently there are 14 Battalions deployed in Naxal infested states of Chhattisgarh and Odisha. In the ongoing phase of its growth, BSF is moving towards some critical crossroads. In the western theatre of our deployment, the ceasefire continues by and large on the International Borders, while there have been significant efforts to violate it by unprovoked firing across the borders by the militants and other anti-national elements. The regular attempts to infiltrate Fake Indian Currency, Drugs and Weapons also remain a constant threat to our country. BSF is well aware about these threats and is ready to thwart all nefarious attempts which threaten our national security. Equipped with latest technology, advance training and motivated troops, BSF is fully prepared to take on any challenge.

The Director General of Border Security Force Mr Subhash Joshi, IPS in conversation with Mr Pawan Agrawal, Publisher and CEO of Defence and Security Alert at BSF headquarters, New Delhi sharing his views and vision for the elite paramilitary force with DSA readers around the world.

Our endeavour should be not to rest on the maintains its effectiveness in every sphere past glory but to assess the future challenges of security. and keep this elite force ever ready to thwart all DSA: After the introduction of border fencing, nefarious designs which pose serious threats ﬂood lighting etc in large parts of western to our national security. We should relentlessly and eastern borders, it was believed that task of securing the borders and preventing strive for excellence through advance training, anti-national activities will become much more dedication and modernisation. I assure all my efﬁcient, but the ground realities tell a different countrymen that BSF is ever vigil wherever they story. Your comments. are deployed and ready to thwart all threats DG, BSF: This is not true. BSF mans 4096.7 km of inimical to our country Indo-Bangla border out of which, MHA has Special focus is given for continuous updation and training and we also ensure that Force always

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

sanctioned 3436.590 km of borders for fencing. This border has a riverine stretch of 1116.2 km, which cannot be fenced. Out of 3436.590 km sanctioned by MHA, 2542.336 km of fencing has been completed.

DSA:

Border Security Fence has helped the nation immensely in curbing the trans-border crimes. Due to BSF’s effective border domination our Western Borders are completely safe and secure. We know that in the past the problem of illegal migration, smuggling and other trans-border crimes were widespread and this has come down considerably with the erection of fencing. The manning of Eastern Borders is quite complex but due to BSF’s proactive approach today we have best of the

By virtue of the sub-continental size of the country and being surrounded by hostile neighbours BSF has to work in concert with other paramilitary forces as well as the defence forces specially the Army. How seamless is intelligence and resource sharing among the forces and how well-coordinated are joint operations? DG, BSF: In the Nation’s security canvas, BSF plays a key role and is an important member. It is true that anti-national elements are taking constant help from the groups having vested interests present in the neighbouring countries and are always on a lookout to pose a threat to the nation’s security. BSF which has its

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

homeland security

DG, BSF INTERVIEW Training Institutions / Centres to enhance the professional competency and capabilities of commanders at all levels. Planning and conduction of continuous training in a progressive manner in a most imaginative, innovative and realistic manner, at different levels takes place throughout the year in the BSF. Basic Training in BSF teaches ethos and the culture of the force and prepares the new inductees for the envisaged task. Basic training / syllabus is prepared in view of the magnitude of threat perception on border / LoC and security environment in the country. Task oriented training is conducted with stress on analytical thinking, sharp shooting, physical and mental robustness and motivation.

BSF women recruits have been given training in weapon handling, intelligence gathering, border management, sports, unarmed combat, frisking at check posts, immigration points and trade routes and presently also taking part at the retreat ceremony at the Atari-Wagah border in Amritsar

In order to maintain a high level of physical ﬁtness and to mould all ranks of BSF into a professionally organised, proactive and motivated ﬁghting machines capable at defending the international border in peace and hot war situation is constantly taking place.

DG, BSF admiring a special edition of DSA own intelligence network regularly collects, collates and disseminates information to our ﬁeld formations and also to other agencies. Sharing of intelligence not only takes place at national level but it is also seamlessly taking place in the ﬁeld formations.

DSA: Recently BSF has inducted women into the force

to guard highly volatile Indo-Pak and Indo-Bangladesh borders and other sensitive assignments. How effective have they been in search and combat operations in the inhospitable terrains? DG, BSF: Initially, BSF was sanctioned nearly 700 posts for recruiting women constables for guarding International Borders. Presently 1,684 women constables and 18 Sub Inspectors (General Duty) are serving in the force. BSF plans to recruit 5,000 women constables in the coming three years. 25th July 2009, was a historic day for the Border Security Force, when the ﬁrst batch of 178 women recruits after training at Kharka Camp in Punjab were inducted into this largest border guarding force of the world. After 26 week long hard training, these BSF women recruits undergo specialised training on

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

advance combat for two weeks before they take up their assignment along the India-Pakistan and Indo-Bangla border. BSF women recruits have been given training in weapon handling, intelligence gathering, border management, sports, unarmed combat, frisking at check posts, immigration points and trade routes and presently also taking part at the retreat ceremony at the Atari-Wagah border in Amritsar.

DSA: BSF personnel are mandated for a unique

dual role as Praharies – perfect Policemen during peacetime and professional Soldiers during wartime. This requires exceptional qualities of physical endurance and mental toughness and resilience. What kind of training regimen your Praharies have to undergo to successfully perform this demanding and challenging dual role ?

DG, BSF: Three types of trainings are imparted in BSF. Basic training, in-service skill upgradation and various refresher courses are regularly run as our training requirements. BSF has three major Training Institutions, 11 Subsidiary Training Centres and nine other Specialised Training Centres. About 105 different types of in-services courses are conducted at various BSF

With the available infrastructures, BSF Training Institutions / Centres are also imparting skill based training to the personnel of other CPMFs / state police forces. Five BSF training institutions are declared as Centres of Excellence.

DSA: Enemies of India both across the borders

and within the country have graduated to using high-tech gadgets and equipment, satellite communication and digital deception devices for anti-national and disruptive activities. What measures are you taking to ensure that BSF personnel are smarter and more lethal than the enemy? DG, BSF: To meet the challenges of internal and external security, the government has emphasised on modernisation of the force and capacity building for discharging assigned duties effectively. The force has acquired state-of-the-art weaponry, special equipment, surveillance devices, all terrain vehicles, water crafts, bomb detection and disposal equipment, communication and information technology related gadgets and computers. BSF men are given specialised training to handle their modern equipment. BSF is also maintaining pace with the latest technology which makes our men smarter and effective on border. The current Modernisation Plan-II (2011-16), has proposed an outlay of Rs 5,667.40 crore, which is divided into six broad heads, ie, Arms and Amn, Motor

Transport, Clothing, Tentage and Stores, Machinery and Equipment, Administration and Logistics and Solar Energy. This will further enhance our efficiency and operational capability. Following the erection of the Border Security Fencing System, the infiltration has been reduced considerably. Our surveillance systems are very effective. The Border Security Force is guarding the International Borders under extreme hostile and difficult conditions with an intelligent assimilation of technology in the overall scheme of border management.

DSA: Border Security Force is the largest Border Guarding Force in the world with 173 Battalions and its own Air and Marine Wings as well as Artillery Regiments and Training Institutes. As Director General of this elite force, what is your vision and mission in the light of prevailing security environment in the country specially in the border areas? DG, BSF: Our endeavour should be not to rest on the past glory but to assess the future challenges and keep this elite force ever ready to thwart all nefarious designs which pose serious threats to our national security. We should relentlessly strive for excellence through advance training, dedication and modernisation. I assure all my countrymen that BSF is ever vigil wherever they are deployed and ready to thwart all threats inimical to our country.

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homeland security

MIND OVER MATTER

MIND WARE Self-science is becoming aware of and recognising patterns of responses to various situations and is one of the prerequisites to having some control over reactions and increasing self-direction. Constant need should be there to upgrade the training methods to seek the mental edge for performance factor and to mitigate clinical manifestations that are acquired by the professionalswhile working in high-stress-critical domains. With this structure installed we can “think” the brain and override natural “ﬁght or ﬂee” response and utilise stress as a drive through stress structuring and perception reframing.

sychological strengthening for Tactical Operations is gaining momentum abroad. To understand the stress response system and enhance the overall functioning of the human design, for professionals in high-pressure-high-stress jobs is through sustainment-resiliency reformative designs installed in standard trainings. A prerequisite for those in mission-critical domains (Law Enforcement, Military, Aviation, Border Security, Fire Fighting, Crisis Managers and Negotiators and other high-stress jobs) is to have a ﬂuid mind that can operate in full capacity regardless of the negative variables in their operational environment. Where stakes are high, physical danger is omnipresent, information is always incomplete leading to poor situational awareness, high emotional stress and time is of essence, requiring the human mind to process cues at high speeds for critical decision-making and transforming it to action. This environment is a non-equilibrium one (Chaotic and Volatile). This medium demands a faster process of cognition, decision and behaviour. Perception can be inﬂuenced by fear, panic, anger and attention problems due to overall stress in a non-equilibrium situation.

Self-science Design

Self-science is the process of being aware of and recognising patterns of responses to various situations and is one of the fundamentals to having some control over one’s own reactions and increasing self-direction.

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRENGTHENING

FOR TACTICAL OPERATIONS

DR RUPALI JESWAL

As we learn to answer “self-questions” thoughtfully, we come to recognise the relationship between our feelings, thoughts and actions (Emotion-action behaviour). Concept of emotions – one of the most salient characteristics of emotion is the extraordinary heterogeneity of how different individuals respond to the same emotionally provocative challenge. Such differences in patterns of emotional reactivity play a crucial role in shaping variations in individual well-being. There is a constant need to upgrade the training methods in seeking the mental edge for performance factors and to mitigate clinical manifestations that are acquired by the professionals while working in high-stress-critical domains. The ultimate objective of these trainings is that the individual not only performs with excellence but the “emotional memory” remains functioning despite the negative stimulus in the environment. This can be due to the threat and stress-response factor to ensure the individual is not marked by mental and physiological ailments, which in turn render him / her disabled and incapacitated. Jimmy Smits: It's less about the physical training, in the end, than it is about the mental preparation: boxing is a chess game. You have to be skilled enough and have trained hard enough to know how many different ways you can counterattack in any situation, at any moment.

High performance in “critical–domain” requires that the individual is equipped with psychological skill set, in recent years focus has been given to brain-behaviour and emotion-reaction aspects of performance for professionals in high-stress-high-pressure jobs. New research in neuroscience, emotion and behaviour has opened up a whole new dimension on how to look at performance and the human factor High Performance in “critical-domain” requires that the individual is equipped with a psychological skill set. In recent years focus has been given to brain-behaviour and emotion-reaction aspects of performance for professionals in high-stress-high-pressure jobs. New research in neuroscience, emotion and behaviour has opened up a whole new dimension on how to look at performance and the human factor. Human beings may be a physiological entity, but fundamentally we are psychological phenomena. By integrating the components of these various scientiﬁc ﬁelds we are able to understand, predict,

The writer is an Intelligence and Terrorism Analyst, Operational Psychologist and Clinical Hypnotherapist based in South-East Asia. She has also received training in specialised areas including counter-terrorism, intelligence and tactical operations. She specialises in cognitive learning processes and neural pathway response and how these factors apply to specialised trainings. She is an expert in the ﬁeld of non-verbal micro and macro expression for deception and detection and also using non-verbal assets for psychological self-assessment in conjunction with Emotional Intelligence to enhance the human mind, personality, image and spirit. She is a senior fellow at IACSP-CSS and a member of ICPA (International Corrections and Prisons Association), IACSP (International Association for CounterTerrorism and Security Professionals), APA (American Psychological Association), APP (Association of Professional Psychologists), FPRI (Foreign Policy Research Institute) and UK Certiﬁed Hypnotherapist and General Hypnotherapy Register.

regulate, down-regulate and utilise internal mechanics of the human cognitive-emotive and response system, to not only enhance performance but also minimise the affect of the nature of the job. Reducing critical incident stress reaction, aids in self-care of the ofﬁcer preventing Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), depressive disorders, sleep deprivation and other various physiological and psychological indispositions. Neuro-psychological performance enhancement trainings (nPSYPEt) are a design and application of this combination. These methods strengthen the mind, initiating execution of apt action through the utilisation of internal force multipliers. It will induce smoother adaptation mechanism in a non-equilibrium environment and will be an asset for decision-making skills, using abductive reasoning, enhancing self-conﬁdence, self and team belief, self-leadership intelligence and navigation quality of the individual and the whole unit. With this structure installed we can “think” the brain and override natural “Fight, Flight or Freeze” response and utilise stress as we drive through stress structuring and perception reframing. With primordial soup came high human arousal when faced with danger; it is adaptive mechanics to sustain life by making life-saving decisions when exposed to danger.

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MIND OVER MATTER

Heightened emotional arousal, high-stress environment and the need for making decisions do come with latent failures as high emotional arousal dampens cognition. Latent failures such as:

brings resiliency and toughens the mind for performance. From the brain’s viewpoint, everything can be perceived as stress. Crossing the street to a school exam, to meeting deadlines, it all depends on the intensity of stimulation and the level of the perceived threat during that stimulation. A great step toward a healthy attitude in regards to stress is to realise our ownership over our brain and learn to engage our brain intentionally to manage the consequences of the Acute Stress response (Fight-Flight-Freeze).

 Autovigilance  Task disorientation  Loss of situational awareness  Poor attention capacity (freeze-frame)  Increased adrenalin and hydrocortisone (a typical survival stress response)  Peripheral vision is compromised due to increase in central vision  Parasympathetic recoil  Personal health risk issues (anxiety and depressive disorders, PTSD, coronary heart disease, high blood pressure, insomnia etc) Allocation of resources during critical stress to gross motor skills, like running or fighting affects the fine motor skills, such as hand / eye coordination. Increased cortisol due to adrenalin surge in critical stress decreases the hippocampus function (affecting memory), the focus of brain shifts to amygdala to speed-up the survival response. The thinking brain starts to shut down. Therefore psychologically inclined trainings will assist the individual in these critical-stress situations to overcome the natural stress response and keep the “thinking brain” functioning. Mental preparation for training and competition is equally important as physical conditioning. Mental preparation develops resiliency, develops intense concentration, self-confidence to perform and have self-belief towards achieving a goal and also helps in coping with anxiety, thereby enhancing performance. Sustainment, resiliency and reformative trainings with focus on stress structuring, re-structuring during critical incidents and stress utilisation have many positive performance affects when incorporated in operational trainings. Excellence in performance is achieved by training and by making it a regular practice. Athletes to military professionals to musicians have acknowledged the importance of mental preparation. Some famous quotes: Yogi Berra, American baseball player and coach said, “Baseball is 90% mental and the other half is physical.” Thomas Edison: “The first requisite for success is to develop the ability to focus and apply your mental and physical energies to the problem at hand – without growing weary. Because such thinking is often difficult, there seems to be no limit to which some people will go to avoid the effort and labour that is associated with it.” Carl von Clausewitz: “Two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that, even in the darkest hour, retains some glimmerings of the inner light which leads to truth; and second, the courage to follow this faint light wherever it may lead.” William Shakespeare: "All things are ready, if our minds be so." This strategic fabric requires that the organisation is weaved through leadership intelligence, where the assets (employees) of that organisation are transformed through a mind-set

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

that “every officer is a leader”. Great leadership skills and strategy triggers mirroring, which in turn strengthens the entire organisation, enhances performance while minimising latent failures of a various nature – physical, mental, emotional. High definition design uses cognitive and emotional behaviour markers as competencies to improve individual and team performance by empowering individuals to use critical thinking learning systems understanding their own operational capabilities to perform with confidence, improve attention to levels of details, regulate and down-regulate emotional responses during critical stress. Critical stress demands along with the ability to operate, a sense of clarity regarding immediate actions and long-term results, thus producing an individual who is asset based, operating with optimum effectiveness through premeditated mind. Mental conditioning is often overlooked in standard trainings in many countries. But the 21st century and the environment laden with VUCA (volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity) demands we change our way. Using various techniques and strategies through mind preparation in positive belief will expedite the learning and execution process in critical incidents. Positive attitude works on multiple levels and alters the brain chemistry. Positive emotion, fear management, situational awareness and stress utilisation are critical features to be instilled in every officer to increase their personal resilience meter. In addition, the adaptation to the operating environment and with accurate processing of cues, internal and external for prompt decision-making and execution of apt action is required.

Stress And Security

Stress is a biological response controlled by the brain as a reaction to a challenging stimulation of a physical or emotional nature. Edgar Mitchell, the sixth man to walk on the moon, said: “Reliance on the intuitive response was the most important part of an astronaut’s training.” Psychological trainings enhance our intuitive response,

Stress is something all security forces throughout the world are exposed to daily. Embracing it and using it for success is key. A positive mind-set and a warrior ethos along with a serious focus on psychological trainings should be an ongoing process of skills reﬁnement. From “how” to use stress, shape and reshape combat stress and application of it develops a sense of self-awareness and overall situational awareness, minimises task disorientation and develops “mental-models” to think and act with speed and accuracy. This sort of response has to do more with “how we think” our “situational awareness” and “perceptual past memory” than just what eyes and ears are experiencing in the present.

and emotional interior climate conducive to top levels of performance. It is different from our ordinary daily reality and quite different from the relaxation state. It is a state of flow, where the performer enjoys an effortless, focused, relaxed, automatic, confident existence. There is little anxiety, energy seems to be abundant, there is an optimistic outlook, mental focus is sharp and intense, the individual feels in control, physical relaxation is evident and there is a feeling of calm and quiet inside the performer. This flow state was, coined by the psychologist Czikszentmihalyi and his techniques are applied in every field of performance.

Conclusion

A personality is made up of the following: Temperament – which is of biological and physiological nature. Character trait – which represents a continual form of behaviour. Mood – which is the state of mind. Disposition – a person’s tendency to behave in a certain manner. Habit – a sort of a conditioned response. Attitude – a person’s point of view that represents a general set of values towards matters.

 Self-discovery  Self-conﬁdence  Self-management  Self-effectiveness  Self-balance

Personality to some extent is determined by the individual’s genetic and cultural make-up also. Human behaviour does change as the individual develops and through the environment which the individual encounters and the kind of interactions an individual has with peers, family, friends and in general the society. Beliefs are the preset, organised ﬁlters to our perceptions of the world (external and internal). Beliefs are like ‘Internal commands’ to the brain as to how to represent what is happening, when we congruently believe something to be true. In the absence of beliefs or inability to tap into them, people feel disempowered. As an individual learns to cope with challenges in an adaptive way, a positive spiral develops: More effective coping leads to a smoother psychobiological stress response and healthy self-belief in his or her own capabilities leading to being more adaptive and less disruptive due to our natural stress-response system. To have a strong mind is to be resilient not resistant and to cope adaptively in adverse situations and become better at responding to crisis and managing it. Strong minds will prevent stress related disorders, they will have the advantage of “metacognition” and “reﬂection.”

Mismanagement of stress can lead to:

Metacognition is:

Components of a stress situation:

 It’s objective  It’s your perception of it  It’s your emotional response towards it This is innate human mechanics, that employs our past experience, evaluation and judgement of a similar situation and our behavioural response for action. It uses our physiological and psychological response and ultimately determines the consequences.

The components of stress utilisation will lead to:

 Reduced awareness of environmental cues (loss of task awareness and situational awareness)  Increased awareness to signs of anxiety  Decreased tolerance for pain and frustration  Decreased efficiency in mental processing Concentrating on components of stress is vital for arousal level and control. Optimal Arousal Level (OAL) is associated with peak performance in many arenas, such as athletics, combat and performing arts. Ability to use flexibility of thought and perception will modulate the psychophysiological arousal level appropriate to the situation and task at hand. Psychological survival training prepares you to anticipate danger, seize the initiative, react quickly and purposefully, adapt quickly and efficiently and respond with peak physical and mental power to survive and overcome a life-threatening critical incident. The peak performer is able to gain entry to a special mental

 Awareness: Where an individual is in their personal and professional development process.  Evaluation: Evaluating their own capacities, limitations, thinking and feeling styles.  Regulation: When an individual can draw upon their own knowledge and skills and direct their internal force multipliers for planning, self-correcting and setting the goals.

Reﬂection is:

 Looking back for reference, comparison and evaluation of the present experience.  Pulling apart ideas for deeper understanding and methods of contribution.  Addressing omission and ambiguities.  Considering alternative perspectives and making connections.  Drawing conclusions and unravelling questions. “You will never do anything in this world without courage. It is the greatest quality of the mind next to honour.” – Aristotle

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DG, NDRF INTERVIEW personnel each. Do you think for a large country with vast swathes of disaster prone areas a force of just 11,490 personnel is adequate to manage natural and man-made disasters and calamities? Do you have plans to increase the force size? DG, NDRF: NDRF presently comprises 10 Battalions and two more battalions are in the process of being raised. Each state has to raise its own SDRF on the lines of NDRF. Once these SDRF units become operational, the disaster response facility in the country would have sizeable strength. DSA: NDRF functions at central and states level under National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA). What is the mandate of NDRF and how independently it can function during disaster and crises when instant decisions have to be taken to save lives and property?

DG, NDRF: NDRF is equipped to provide specialist response in disasters. The Force has well trained and multiskilled personnel to carry out the duties. We need to update ourselves continuously, both in terms of technique and equipage. We also need dedicated air evacuation facilities to provide quick response. DSA: In disaster management immediate and efﬁcient response is of critical importance. On many occasions according to the media reports NDRF response has been tardy and not very effective. What kind of “Training Regime for Quick Disaster Response” do you propose? DG, NDRF: NDRF personnel are well trained as far as their skill is concerned. There is no doubt about the efﬁciency of the Force. However, our battalions are presently located only at ten places in the whole country. We are now in the process of locating

NATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE FORCE

World-class Rescue and Relief Operations

enior IPS Ofﬁcer Mr Krishna Chaudhary has recently taken over as Director General, National Disaster Response Force. In a long and distinguished policing career he has been Range DIG, Zonal IG and Zonal ADGP. He has also been Special Secretary in Bihar Home department and Director of Bihar Police Academy. He has attended several training courses in premier institutions including IIM Ahmedabad, ASCII Hyderabad, TISS Mumbai etc and has been honoured with Police Medal for Meritorious Service in 1997 and Police Medal for Distinguished Service in 2006. In addition to NDRF, the DG ofﬁce is also looking after the Civil defence, Home Guards and Fire Services for the entire country.

Defence and Security Alert: Congratulations on taking over the reins of National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) at this critical juncture of its evolution when the force warrants a new thrust and a new direction. How do you envision NDRF in the service of the nation? DG, NDRF: The National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) is a multi-skilled multi-disciplinary force raised to provide specialist response to disaster or disaster like situations. The single largest force of its kind in the world, it has responded in several disasters including Kosi ﬂoods, Bellary building collapse, Leh cloudburst, ﬂoods in north-eastern states, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, Mayapuri radioactive incident and

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the recent Uttarakhand disaster. The Force performed extremely well in these disasters. NDRF is equipped with modern state-of-the-art equipment, which is continuously upgraded. The Force needs to have dedicated air evacuation system and better field communication equipment. We are trying to get classified as per International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) guidelines in order to play a role in the international arena. DSA: The recent Himalayan Tsunami has been a monstrous tragedy causing enormous losses of life and property. NDRF played a significant role in rescue, relief and evacuation operations. Please share with our readers your assessment of the effectiveness of the force and the lessons learnt. DG, NDRF: NDRF was deployed on 17th June, 2013 in the Uttarakhand disaster. 14 teams of NDRF were deployed in the Kedarnath axis, which was the worst affected area. They rescued nearly 10 thousand people and also retrieved numerous dead bodies, besides assisting state authorities in distribution of relief materials. Since the disaster was of humongous proportions, several agencies were working in tandem to carry out relief and rescue operations. We faced initial problems in communication, but these were sorted out when satellite phones were provided. DSA: NDRF has a strength of 10 Battalions of 1,149

The Director General, NDRF Mr Krishna Chaudhary, IPS in conversation with Mr Pawan Agrawal, Publisher and CEO of Defence and Security Alert (DSA) at NDRF headquarters in New Delhi expounding his views and sharing his vision with our readers around the world.

DG, NDRF: NDRF has been created by government of India in accordance with the provisions of the Disaster Management Act, 2005, which clearly deﬁnes the role and function of NDRF. The Force functions under the direction and control of the Ministry of Home Affairs and the National Disaster Management Authority. DSA: The vision of NDRF is to build a safer and disaster resilient India by developing a holistic, proactive, multi-disaster and technology driven strategy for disaster management. In your opinion how well prepared is NDRF to deliver on this vision?

sub-units at several more locations so as to chisel our response time. DSA: The kind of work NDRF personnel have to do requires exceptional qualities of physical endurance and mental toughness and resilience. What kind of training regimen they have to undergo to perform optimally in demanding and challenging situations? DG, NDRF: NDRF personnel are well trained in Medical First Response, Collapse Structure Search and Rescue, Deep Diving, Biological, Chemical, Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies

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DG, NDRF INTERVIEW

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SAFE HABITATIONS

INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON BEST PRACTICES IN BUILDING RESILIENT CITIES BANGALORE (AUGUST 5-7, 2013) Team DSA

Commissioners, Deputy Commissioners of Districts, Additional District Commissioners, Zonal Inspectors General of Police, District Superintendents of Police, Senior Medical and Health Ofﬁcers in the ﬁeld and in state capital, several IAS probationers, members of the media, representatives of local self-governments, academia and few think tanks.

I as well as Urban Search and Rescue Emergencies. Our personnel are trained in these skills in premier institutes of the country as well as abroad. DSA: Like other paramilitary forces do you also have your own training institutes / centres or do you use the services and facilities of other national and international organisations? What are your plans to make each NDRF ofﬁcer and jawan the best in their specialisation? DG, NDRF: In addition to the continuous process of training which goes on in our own battalions, we get our personnel trained in BIDR Tekanpur (BSF), CTC Coimbatore (CRPF), NISA Hyderabad (CISF) and NITSRDR Chandigarh (ITBP). Our personnel are also trained in renowned institutes of disaster management abroad. A National Institute of Disaster Management is also being raised at Nagpur. DSA: NDRF teams have to work very closely with the State Disaster Response Forces (SDRFs). What kind of operational mechanism do you have to ensure optimal resource sharing and complete co-ordination in disaster management? DG, NDRF: While some states have already raised their SDRFs, others are in the process. We assist State Disaster Management Authorities in raising their SDRFs by providing training to their personnel and also by advising them in respect of operationalisation and equipage. DSA: CBRN disasters are looming in the horizon. What kind of wherewithal does NDRF have to counter this threat? Do we have enough specially trained personnel for this kind of disaster?

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

DG, NDRF: Four of our battalions are presently identiﬁed to provide emergency response in CBRN threats. These are located at Pune, Kolkata, Arakkonam (Chennai) and Ghaziabad. Our personnel are trained in CBRN response at premier institutions like DRDE and CME Pune. Some of our personnel are also trained abroad. DSA: What is your message for the NDRF personnel, other stakeholders and the people of India? DG, NDRF: In realisation of our motto “आपदा सेवा सदैव ”,we have already done commendable work and earned laurels over the seven years of our existence. But we have a long way to go. NDRF personnel must at all times be aware that they are members of a truly multi-skilled high-tech force which is mandated to render the most pious of services, that of saving lives in disasters and disaster like situations. We have to work hand in hand with all other stakeholders towards our objective to make India a disaster resilient country. We have to ensure that the common man is aware of our capabilities and conﬁdent of our intent. We must constantly strive to improve our professional skills and equipage as well as our soft skills so as to acquire the image of a capable, dedicated and compassionate force.

n a major policy pronouncement, while inaugurating the “International Workshop on Best Practices in Building Resilient Cities” in Bangalore on August 5, the Karnataka Chief Minister, Mr Siddaramaiah, signalled his government’s determination to provide the necessary support and infrastructure to make Bangalore and five other cities of the state into safe and secure habitations. The three day workshop was organised by the Department of Disaster Management, Karnataka in coordination with a local think tank, The Synergia Foundation (www.thesynergiafoundation.com). The presence of the Karnataka Home Minister, the Revenue Minister and the Transport Minister at the opening session underlined the importance Mr Siddaramaiah’s government attached to the event and to the subject. Mr Sashidhar, MLA and Vice Chairman, National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), Government of India, who delivered the keynote address, made several policy announcements and reiterated the keenness of his agency to push the programme forward. The aim of the workshop was to bring together practitioners, policy makers, first responders and other stakeholders onto a platform for a deeper exchange of current practices and identify gaps in order to build resilient operating procedures. It focused on current global practices in proactive security and strategic thinking with the overall objective to take steps to mitigate disasters in India and identify possible gaps or vulnerabilities, if any. There were five main topics discussed (a) response to mass casualty, with a table top simulation of a mass casualty incident (b) role of media and journalistic confidentiality in national security (c) role of intelligence – dissemination and action (d) Tactical medicine and (e) Proactive security – entering the mind of the enemy. The participants were drawn from among the Regional

The workshop heard a detailed report on the Mumbai incident (26/11) by Mr V Balachandran, former Special Secretary, Government of India and co-author of the report submitted to the Maharashtra government. This was followed by a talk by noted journalist, Praveen Swami and followed by a detailed report on the Uttarakhand disaster by Mr Sandeep Rathore, IG, NDRF. Several senior police ofﬁcers gave an assessment of the security environment in the state. There were two important sessions, the ﬁrst one was on nuclear and biological threats by an eminent panel of civil and military experts and the second was by three international specialists who covered diverse subjects such as (i) Genesis of urban terror and its manifestations in the future (ii) Incident Command System and Continuity of Operational Planning (iii) Tactical Medicine, Exercise and planning and table top simulation of a mass casualty incident. The workshop was treated to a detailed picture of the Karnataka State Disaster Management Agency and the formulation of plans by the Karnataka Administrative Institute, Mysore to meet exigencies – natural and man-made. The steps taken by the government to strengthen the disaster management infrastructure in the state were explained in full including the raising of the state’s own disaster relief force and

also to host the national disaster management force in the state and other details gave satisfaction that the subject was receiving attention at the highest echelons of the government and there was actual progress on the ground. The workshop was ﬁrst of its kind in Karnataka, it was also the ﬁrst public-private venture on a matter of substantial interest in the state. It met its objectives. The scene is now set for more such interaction at regional level in the state and involvement of more stakeholders.

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SUB-OPTIMAL POLICING top priority. However, the administration of police stations is perhaps the most neglected. Despite the recommendations of successive police reform committees, sufficient attention has not been paid in this regard. The police being a public service are responsible to the people and the courts of law and according to the Constitution are expected to act independently. Unfortunately, they are treated not as public servants but are supposedly meant to serve only the government. As a result, the police force no longer enjoys the confidence of the society it is meant to serve. According to Mr GP Joshi, a former police officer, who has carried out extensive research on police reforms, the establishment of statutory institutional arrangements would ensure that the power of superintendence of the state government over the police force is limited to guarantee that the police function to establish rule of law and not the rule of politics, by insulating them from outside illegitimate control. Once the police are given functional independence, they must be held accountable for the wrongs they do.

Some Notable Successes

It must be made clear that policing within the country needs to be reﬁned at every level, be it for controlling law and order or for countering insurgency. That said, it is rather unfortunate to ﬁnd that every other discussion, debate or study unabashedly derides both the state police forces and the CAPFs. This is rather unfair because they have achieved a fair degree of success in the states of Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Tripura and to some extent in Jammu and Kashmir as well.

EFFECTIVENESS OF STATE POLICE AND CAPFS

IN INTERNAL SECURITY It must be made clear that policing within the country needs to be refined at every level, be it for controlling law and order or for countering insurgency. Law enforcement is mostly the responsibility of the state governments to be discharged by their own police forces. At the outbreak of internal armed conflict, the state police finds itself in acute disorder as it lacks the manpower, organisation, weapons and training to deal with the threat. Hence, most state governments prefer to depend on the central police assistance. Ultimately this leads to a massive expansion of CAPFs mostly haphazardly without conforming to a perspective plan sans consolidation.

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

“The conventional bureaucratic device of financial allocations can no longer suffice, nor can the shuffling about of available forces between security flashpoints serve any enduring purpose.”– Dr Ajai Sahni “The power of superintendence of the state government over the police force is limited to guarantee that the police function to establish rule of law and not the rule of politics, by insulating them from outside illegitimate control.” – Mr GP Joshi

roviding security to the citizens of the country and addressing the law and order situation is solely dependent on a police force that is efﬁcient, honest and thoroughly professional. According to various commissions, reports by the media and the experiences of common people, there is obviously a lot that needs to be achieved by both the state police forces and the central armed police forces (CAPFs), especially in their role in internal security. As is commonly known, improving the functioning of the local police at the station level should receive

Between 1979 and 1981, the National Police Commission (NPC) made some recommendations regarding the problem of insulating the police from illegitimate political and bureaucratic interference; setting up a Security Commission in each state; selection procedure for appointing competent ofﬁcers; and instituting a new Police Act. As expected, implementation of these is just too tardy and the government’s response has not been disclosed. In addition to the NPC, a series of reform committees have been set up over the years: Ribeiro Committee (1998-99); Padmanabhaiah Committee (2000); Soli Sorabjee Committee (2005); but have proved to be of no consequence. The Supreme Court took upon itself to intervene in 2006 and followed up again in 2009 to kick-start the reform process. Fruit of their labour is yet to be delivered.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MUKESH SABHARWAL PVSM, AVSM**, VSM (RETD)

The writer is the former Adjutant General of the Indian Army and erstwhile Corps Commander of the sensitive 15 Corps in Srinagar, Jammu and Kashmir. A professional to the core, he is passionate about writing on defence issues.

Bureaucratic Security Planning

It is essential that the Home Ministry undertakes a time bound programme to strengthen, train and equip our police forces In Punjab, under the dynamic leadership of Mr KPS Gill, the to effectively manage both the current and future challenges. situation turned around dramatically. Slow to start with, but Every adverse situation evokes a flurry of utterances indicating the strengthening of police stations, instilling of confidence raising of additional forces, extra budgetary provisions for in the police force and investing in intelligence secured weapons and protective equipment to handle emerging initial success. Gill’s slogan of “we must own the night” situations. However, these do not result in concrete physical spurred his police forces that eventually had the terrorists acquisitions in sufficient quantity to be effective. National on the run. Another hallmark was the close cooperation security objectives, strategies and tactics must be reconciled and interaction with the army and other security forces. The with the resource configurations available or those that can be generated. According to Andhra Pradesh story of Dr Ajay Sahni, the renowned success in the counter Naxal internal security expert and operations is much spoken In Punjab, under the dynamic leadership the Director of the Institute of of, wherein the role of the of Mr KPS Gill, the situation turned around Conflict Management, “the Greyhound special police teams bureaucratic was most exemplary. Once dramatically. Slow to start with, but the conventional device of financial allocations again, the basis of the operation strengthening of police stations, instilling of can no longer suffice, nor lay in the strengthening confidence in the police force and investing can the shuffling about of of the police stations and in intelligence secured initial success. Gill’s available forces between consolidating the grid network. Intelligence acquisition was slogan of “we must own the night” spurred security flashpoints serve any purpose. A gradual more productive and resulted his police forces that eventually had the enduring and systematic reconstruction in efficient special operations. terrorists on the run of capacities to secure national Thanks largely to a strong goals must be worked into administration and innovative the process of governance employment of various police forces; a semblance of normalcy has also been and these cannot be bound by electoral cycles and partisan political interests”. achieved in Tripura. CAPFs have also made significant contributions in their respective spheres of activity but these have been few and far between and therefore they have not been adequately noticed and recognised. There is a strong reason for that too. Consolidation is lacking and successes achieved have not been exploited imaginatively. Hundreds of lessons have been learnt, both positive and negative but application is conspicuous by its absence.

Law enforcement is mostly the responsibility of the state governments to be discharged by their own police forces. At the outbreak of internal armed conflict, the state police finds itself in acute disorder as it lacks the manpower, organisation, weapons and training to deal with the threat. Its members are easily identifiable and feel vulnerable. Hence, most state governments prefer to depend on the central paramilitary assistance. The central government has no option in many cases but to play

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

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SUB-OPTIMAL POLICING

The CAPFs have been handling counter-insurgency in several parts of the country over the years. External studies and internal introspection have revealed that training, operational logistics and leadership need to be further improved. On the job training is necessary for troops but not learning from experience of earlier operations can prove to be perilous. Let us take operations. The ambush on the convoy of the political party members in Chhattisgarh in May 2013 was certainly not the ﬁrst of its kind. The methodology, technology used and tactics were reminiscent of innumerable ambushes and IED attacks on vehicle convoys employed by insurgents over decades in different regions and forces within the country. So obviously, no one is paying attention to the lessons learnt. Any number of inquiries will not indicate fresh or earthshaking new revelations. Standard operating procedures are explicit and lay down actions to be taken in various contingencies but no one seems to have the time to read and follow them. The root cause is so stark – lack of implementation! One may suggest that training is the answer. No doubt training will impart knowledge and skills to the participants, as the standard of training is not inferior or sub-standard by any means. The larger question is whether these trained personnel are really in-charge of the operations being launched or a vital part of them. Invariably they are not. Also of critical interest is to note whether these trained individuals are part of an integral, cohesive unit or sub-unit. In all probability this is not the case. Alas that has been the bane and indications of it improving do not appear to be bright, unless serious structural changes are incorporated to address operationally oriented tasks. At least the results do not point towards that direction.

CAPFs Terrorist Ratio

Another area that needs looking into is the deployment of

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

CAPFs are expected to perform three distinct roles ie the maintenance of law and order and public order; border guarding; and the security and protection of vital installations. However, the CAPFs ﬁnd themselves doing ad hoc tasks due to so called exigencies, time and availability constraints. Once inducted, relief by forces actually suited for the job is often delayed and even resisted. This obviously affects the effectiveness of any CAPFs so employed.

297mm Trim

Lieutenant General Rostum Nanavatty in his book Internal Armed Conﬂict in India, states that the decision to nominate the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) to progressively take over the counter-insurgency role nation-wide may appear logical but it is likely to prove extremely difﬁcult to implement.

An important lesson gained from countering insurgencies is that the responsibilities of disturbed states do not ﬁnish just with the posting of CAPFs to assist the state. It is incumbent on the state administrative machinery to pay explicit attention to deal with the main causes that were responsible for the area or region to be declared as disturbed. Once the security situation has been relatively restored, the state in conjunction with the centre’s assistance must provide effective governance. Unfortunately this continues to remain an area of concern.

307mm Bleed

CRPF: Counter-insurgency Hub

252mm Live

forces to counter armed conflict and insurgency. Whereas the Army, Rashtriya Rifles and the Assam Rifles adhere to a well established counter-insurgency grid in their operations in Jammu and Kashmir and the north-east, the CAPFs and the state police do not follow this model strictly in Naxal affected areas of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha and neighbouring states. One cannot blame them totally for this because the numbers allocated do not quite match up with the requirement. The density of troops deployed in the thickly forested and Operation Green Hunt stronghold of the Maoists like Bastar and Dantewada an active role in maintaining law and order, something that was abysmally adverse even during the so called was not envisaged by the Constitution for them, except in coordinated “Operation Green Hunt”. Weak sub-units spread emergencies. Ultimately this leads to a massive expansion of in penny packets without adequate defence potential and CAPFs mostly haphazardly without conforming to a perspective desperately lacking any offensive design is bound to fail plan sans consolidation. In fact each central government has against a motivated adversary in his backyard. It is not only the been criticised for providing the lion’s share to the CAPFs and police to population ratios that need to be enhanced; it has to the other central police organisations (CPOs) under the garb be supplemented by comparable weapons and equipment, an of tackling internal security. astute leadership with a will to win.

Past experience has also shown that a violent agitation arising from a sensitive demand is dealt with merely as a law and order problem. Mr NN Vohra, Governor, Jammu and Kashmir and former Home Secretary opines that in many such cases, the agitating elements are supported and incited by adversary external agencies. When this happens, we see the beginning of much larger problems that ipso facto take greater time, effort and resources to resolve. According to the Annual Report of the Ministry of Home Affairs of 2012, a Modernisation Plan II is on the anvil to upgrade the CAPFs, which will address the modernisation of the fighting jawan and hone his combat skills in contrast to the first plan that concentrated on modernisation of weaponry and equipment. The central government spent over Rs 22,000 crore in the last financial year for the CAPFs alone. 17 of the 21 Counter Insurgency and Anti-Terrorism (CIAT) schools have become operational in various states. Over 13,000 police personnel have been trained in 2012. If the efficacy of the first modernisation plan is anything to go by, the second may only remain an endeavour in futility. Ultimately the quality of training, not numbers will determine the effectiveness of police forces in handling internal security.

The CH-47F Chinook is the most versatile, mission-capable heavy-lift helicopter in the world. More powerful than ever with advanced flight controls and avionics, the CH-47F is in a class by itself, whether it’s transporting troops and equipment, on deep combat assault, performing search and rescue, or delivering disaster relief. Extraordinary performance—it’s what you expect from Chinook.

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TERRORISM AND BLACK MONEY

THE ROLE OF DRI IN PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE INPUTS

FOR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SECURITY

After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the International Monetary Fund intensiﬁed its Anti-Money Laundering (AML) activities and extended them to include Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT). In 2009, the IMF launched a donor-supported trust fund to ﬁnance technical assistance in AML / CFT. The ULFA has stashed away around Rs 800 to 1,000 crore in tax havens in numbered accounts in Panama, Liechtenstein, Channel and Cayman Islands. Intelligence agencies have revised their estimates subsequent to a fresh assessment of seized documents. The funds have been reportedly used for purchasing arms through Bangkok Banks and ferried to southern-most tip of Bangladesh from where it goes to Myanmar and then to Assam and Bhutan.

he Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) is recognised today by its peers not only in India but other agencies such as the National Criminal Intelligence Service, the National Crime Agency, the Serious Fraud Squad of the United Kingdom, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police of Canada as one of the ﬁnest Intelligence and investigation agencies manned by highly trained personnel.

cross-border crime, drug trafﬁcking, money laundering and other forms of serious economic crime. In addition, the DRI not only gathers actionable intelligence but also investigates against multinational corporations involved in fraudulent transfer pricing resulting in evasion of Customs Duties, Income Tax and other taxes leviable on their transactions. Investigation is also taken up against companies operating in India involved in ﬁnancial frauds, evasion of Customs and Excise Duties and consequently other taxes leviable on their operations.

Transformation

Till 1985, the DRI functioned basically as a source to collect, collate and disseminate Intelligence to the ﬁeld organisations, viz the maritime Commissionerates of Central Excise and Customs. However, since 1985 it took upon itself the task of acting on actionable intelligence and it became a formidable striking force including undertaking detailed investigation within India and if

Over the years, from a small unit which was set up in September 1953 as the Central Revenue Intelligence Bureau under the direct supervision of the Central Board of Revenue, today it has a strength of over 750 personnel spread across the country for gathering intelligence against organised criminal groups involved in

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

necessary in the source countries from where the crime originated. For this purpose, the assistance of host country’s investigation agencies was being taken either under the multilateral treaties for Mutual Administrative Assistance in Criminal Investigations or bilateral treaties specifically entered into with each country. With the enactment of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and its subsequent amendments and the setting up of the Narcotics Control Bureau, DRI has been responsible for effecting some of the largest seizures of heroin, hashish, mandrax and other psychotropic substances. Close liaison and coordination is maintained with other organisations such as the Intelligence Bureau, the Research and Analysis Wing of the Cabinet Secretariat, the Central Bureau of Investigation, the Directorate of Foreign Exchange Enforcement and with other Revenue Departments such as the Income Tax, the Central Excise Commissionerates, the Directorate General of Central Excise Intelligence etc. Liaison is also maintained with the World Customs Organisation, the Interpol and agencies of other countries so as to seek help in cases having international ramifications and where the offenders move from one jurisdiction to another. The DRI has been recognised as a super Intelligence and counter-Intelligence organisation to combat serious financial crime. Over the years and due to the complexities in the security scenario, the DRI has modernised its Intelligence apparatus to cope up with new forms of crime including money laundering and serious financial crimes. The DRI is fully equipped and has trained officers to investigate the most complicated financial crimes.

Intelligence And Secret Money

In a world torn with conflicts and power struggles, geopolitical ambitions of super powers and regional powers, despots and dictators, mega-deals and corrupt politicians, terrorist outfits and the games the Intelligence agencies play, there is always a demand for secret money and this demand creates its own supply. The demand for secret money varies from country to country in intensity and complexion and can broadly be categorised as follows:  Capital flight (fright capital), triggered by perceived adverse, economic, political or social unrest;  Funds generated in bribery and corruption and placed abroad for secrecy and security. Slush funds maintained abroad to meet the demand for paying bribes;  Tax evasion;  Smuggling and related activities;  Fraud, including banking frauds and securities law violations;  Money laundering associated with smuggling, gambling, extortion or protection rackets, drug trafficking and financing terrorism;  Demand for supporting undercover activities of terrorists from intelligence agencies of other countries who are inimical. In this context one should understand how ‘dirty’ money gets laundered, moves on to tax havens, how the tax havens function and what are the secrecy laws that protect them from the investigators. The unholy alliance of the organised criminal enterprises, syndicates

involved in organised economic crime, drug trafﬁcking and terrorist groups, all of them well serviced by money laundering organisations and ﬁnancial institutions mostly operating overtly in national jurisdictions are a serious threat to any government, more so to the governments of the developing countries. If this unholy nexus has to be combated with determination, a series of policy measures are required to be undertaken. Known variables that breed and help the growth of terrorism may increase in the near future. Money laundering is a term used to describe the process whereby cash from illegal activities is converted to an alternate form in a manner that conceals its origin, ownership or other potentially embarrassing factors. While laundering schemes can be of varying degrees of sophistication, all are designed to accomplish the same purpose – to obscure and if possible to obliterate the audit trail.

BV KUMAR IRS (RETD)

The writer was Director General (Revenue Intelligence) and Director General, Narcotics Control Bureau. During the Interpol Conference held at Nice in November 1987, he was elected as President of the Drugs Committee which is one of the most important Committees of Interpol. Visiting Lecturer at National Defence College, New Delhi and National Police Academy, Hyderabad. Co-authored a book “The Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Laws of India” and authored “The Preventive Detention Laws of India”.

The characteristic preference for the underworld is for shrouding illegal activities in extraordinary levels of secrecy. This is accomplished by multiplying the number of ﬁnancial transactions so that it becomes difﬁcult for investigators to reconstruct facts surrounding

In a world torn with conflicts and power struggles, geopolitical ambitions of super powers and regional powers, despots and dictators, mega-deals and corrupt politicians, terrorist outfits and the games the Intelligence agencies play, there is always a demand for secret money and this demand creates its own supply each laundering transaction and to move from that point towards the allegedly illegal origin of the funds in question. This is essentially the rationale for using complicated banking and, especially, offshore and foreign banking arrangements to conceal both the origin and ownership of assets. The primary goal of individuals or entities involved in the financing of terrorism is, therefore, not necessarily to conceal the sources of the money but to conceal both the financing and the nature of the financed activity.

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

homeland security

TERRORISM AND BLACK MONEY

Drug trafﬁcking, organised crime, fraud and other illegal activities generate enormous amounts of cash. In countries where foreign exchange restrictions prevent currency transfers to other countries, the trafﬁckers or the criminal syndicates deposit money with the underground banking system for being transferred through ‘hawala’, which has taken deep roots in the Indian subcontinent.

There is hardly any record keeping under this system leaving no audit trail to follow. Once the money reaches the selected tax haven the second part of the laundering process starts. The money is deposited generally in a shell corporation and repatriated in such a way that it appears to be from legitimate sources. The real ownership of the foreign ‘investor’ is clouded by secrecy laws or the use of nominee owners.

Black Money And Terror

After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the International Monetary Fund intensified its Anti-Money Laundering (AML) activities and extended them to include Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CFT). In 2009, the IMF launched a donor-supported trust fund to finance technical assistance in AML / CFT. In 2011, the IMF’s Executive Board reviewed the effectiveness of the programme and gave strategic guidance for the work ahead. The fight against money laundering and terrorist financing has been given a priority. The IMF is especially concerned about the possible consequences of money laundering, terrorist financing and related governance issues have on the stability not only of the financial institutions and the economy but on the integrity of a nation itself. In an increasingly interconnected world, the negative effects of these activities are global and their impact on the integrity and stability of the countries is widely recognised. Money launderers exploit both the complexity inherent in the global financial system as well

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

as differences between national anti-money laundering laws and systems and they are especially attracted to jurisdictions with weak or ineffective controls where they can move their funds more easily without detection. Some of the major cases where terrorism was financed with laundered funds are illustrated below:  The US government has not been able to determine the origin of the money used for the 9/11 attacks. Investigation reveals that an amount of US$ 400,000 and US$ 500,000 was provided by Al-Qaeda. Out of this 85 to 95 per cent of the funds was provided by Osama bin Laden from his personal wealth and the remainder came from Al-Qaeda’s funds. The money was sent by wire transfers and the hijackers after their arrival in the US received approximately US$ 130,000 from overseas facilitators from a financial centre in Dubai. Some amount was carried physically in cash and traveller’s cheques. Overseas accounts in Saudi British Bank in Saudi Arabia and Citibank in UAE were accessed by the hijackers through ATM cards. Extensive use was made of international banks such as Bank of America, SunTrust, Hudson United Bank and Dime Savings Bank in New Jersey.  According to FATF, charities and NGOs have been used for financing terrorism and it is a weak point in the global struggle to stop such funding at source. Some charities are founded with the express purpose of financing terror and other existing entities are infiltrated by terrorist operatives and supporters and co-opted from within. Global Relief Foundation (GRF) having its ties with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban was organised exclusively for charitable religious education and scientific purposes. Another Al-Qaeda linked NGO is Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, a Saudi based NGO also had a website that encouraged donations.  Terrorists are increasingly using internet for financing terrorism during the last decade to raise and transfer funds since funds can be transferred electronically either from a computer or through a mobile phone. Online gambling sites and similar entities have also made it easier to launder money on internet, which the terrorist groups have taken advantage of in the recent years.  Hamas has been accused by the Fatah of using imports into Gaza from Egypt to conceal money laundering and importing millions of counterfeit US dollars from Iran which have been used to pay government employees.  According to the Indian Express, the ULFA has stashed

away around Rs 800 to 1,000 crore in tax havens Cyberspace extends limitless opportunities for in numbered accounts in Panama, Liechtenstein, digital subversion, exacerbating the problem Channel and Cayman Islands. Intelligence agencies greatly. Using cyber technology, even a have revised their estimates subsequent to a fresh non-state actor enemy can become a source of assessment of seized documents by the United Command which is in-charge of anti-insurgency damage and he can do so while cloaking himself operations in Assam. Most of the money may in deniability. It is time for India and particularly, have been garnered through extortion and tax on Intelligence agencies such as the DRI, to think businessmen and companies operating in Assam. Bulk of the money is reportedly channelled through doctrinally about and prepare for, a new age of Kolkata based hawala operators. Money is also cyber terror and cyber warfare being laundered through Bangladesh where rupee is converted into dollars, again through the hawala route. The funds have been reportedly used for such groups to finance and promote their activities so that purchasing arms through Bangkok Banks and ferried to they can achieve the political agenda of the country concerned, southern-most tip of Bangladesh from where these go to by proxy. A stage would reach, when the terrorist organisation Myanmar and then to Assam and Bhutan. Another channel concerned, is no longer interested in the ideology or the objective for which they initially started the conflict. is through the Mymensingh District of Bangladesh. Most of the terrorist organisations / insurgent groups are supported, financed and armed more often than not, by external intelligence agencies, including setting up training camps and providing sanctuaries. Such external intelligence agencies also help in the recruitment of personnel and selecting leaders, amongst the frustrated, though ambitious local leaders, aspiring to come to power, who otherwise cannot achieve their dreams through the democratic process. The object of the external state sponsored terrorism and insurgency is to weaken the Central / Federal government or to achieve regional hegemony, keeping in mind the geopolitical equations. The insurgent groups thereby equip themselves with the required training, equipment, experience and the determination to exploit the weaknesses of the governments in power, beset by economic crisis, political instability and social unrest.

Foreign Spy-ring Support

While international terrorist outﬁts operating within a country’s borders receive support and sustenance from terrorism sponsoring states, the danger that has to be guarded against is the creation of a ‘grid’ between such groups and those involved in internal terrorism. For example, in spite of wide ideological differences among various terrorist organisations operating in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, the north-eastern states and the Maoists, it should not surprise anyone, much less the intelligence agencies, if they are found trading with one another in arms and ammunition or drugs or are just carrying out certain tasks on contractual terms. It has also been noticed that some terrorist groups operating in these states have been contacted by ‘Maoist’ groups operating in Jharkhand, Bihar, Paschimbanga, Chhattisgarh etc for procuring arms and ammunition from terrorism sponsoring states or other contractual parties. Such violent non-state actors are covertly aided and assisted by a few neighbouring states whose main objective appears to be to bleed and weaken India politically and economically so that its economic development is inhibited and its growth as an economic super power in the region is obstructed. It is a well-documented fact that terrorist organisations establish a network with other terrorist organisations nationally and internationally and undertake franchised operations for a price. It is at that stage that contacts are established by intelligence agencies of other countries with

Terrorism and insurgency are used to describe two forms of systematic low level political violence committed by militant and sub-national groups. Their attributes can be clearly distinguished. However, the distinction is slowly getting blurred and insurgency is only a form of transmutation and metamorphosis of terrorism. It goes through a process of evolution. What is required to be guarded against is such non-state actors do not grow into ‘super-terrorists’, when they gain access to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and do not hesitate to use such weapons. The most dangerous terrorists will be motivated by a fierce ethnic and religious hatred. Their immediate goal may not be political control, but the utter destruction of their avowed enemies by the use of weapons of mass destruction. Terrorism may improve and increase its tools and targets, serve a wider range of causes and become more sophisticated. Anticipating such a development, it will be necessary to prepare a long range perspective plan involving a multi-disciplinary approach. For carrying out any activity either for development or for terrorism apart from finding sympathisers and volunteers for the cause, funds are required for acquiring weapons, training, travel and other needs of the terrorist outfit, including maintaining sleeper cells. Such funds come after being laundered to the recipients. If the source of such funds is choked, the outfit will not have the wherewithal either to strike or survive. That is where AML to CTF assumes importance. This is where the role of the DRI or the Foreign Exchange Enforcement Directorate assumes importance. Cyberspace extends limitless opportunities for digital subversion, exacerbating the problem greatly. Using cyber technology, even a non-state actor enemy can become a source of damage and he can do so while cloaking himself in deniability. It is time for India and particularly, Intelligence agencies such as the DRI, to think doctrinally about and prepare for, a new age of cyber terror and cyber warfare. Since cyber-attacks take place through cyberspace from India or into India, crossing virtual borders, the DRI’s responsibility widens and it has to equip itself to intercept any communications or data passing through cyberspace. This is one area which is vulnerable and requires the attention not only of DRI but other security agencies.

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PRIMACY OF HUMINT

a pati l Intell s ig o

ce en

ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN SECURITY

build-up in Nepal; two attempted coups in Bangladesh and the like. More recently, it was shameful that we came to know of the presence of 11,000 Chinese in PoK and Pakistan through a news report in New York Times. Deposing of the President of Maldives too came as a surprise. We have little intelligence about PLA and Chinese Special Forces disguised in development projects abroad. We are not only virtually blind in our areas of strategic interests; we have little intelligence of our immediate neighbourhood as well. To cap this, we suddenly discovered a 19 km deep Chinese intrusion in Ladakh and we still don’t know whether they came down from Karakoram Pass or from elsewhere. The situation at the home front is no better. We have little information about even the Maoists, whom the Prime Minister has been describing as the biggest internal security threat for the past six-seven years. Maoists have vast areas under their control that security forces do not venture into. Total lack of intelligence facilitates strikes by Maoists with impunity. Same can be said of other terrorist organisations pan-India.

Misuse Of Intelligence Cells

India has been suffering glaring intelligence voids on the external front in the past and continues to suffer so even now. The situation at the home front is no better. We have little information about even the Maoists, whom the Prime Minister has been describing as the biggest internal security threat for the past six-seven years. Maoists have vast areas under their control that security forces do not venture into. The much publicised telephone intercept of Musharraf’s conversation during the Kargil intrusions linking him with the inﬁltrators was not indigenous but was through a foreign agency, but once we did the stupidity of publicising the catch, that source too dried up. We need to reinstate primacy of Humint in relation to Techint, the former costing less, requiring less time and being more responsive in relation to the latter. Without this, we will continue to make decisions in a vacuum and without holistic intelligence.

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

he security, economic progress and well-being of the citizens of a country is closely interlinked with what intelligence gathering capability the country’s establishment has. Intelligence plays a prominent role in the decision-making process of any organisation including the security agencies. Considering the threats that India faces, both external and internal, the need for intelligence was never more. Another significant issue is the importance of synergised intelligence with advent of asymmetric wars and irregular forces that recognise no boundaries. Within intelligence, we need to consider Geospatial Intelligence, which is vital to the C4I2 System as forces transit from platform-centric to net-centric capabilities to fight in the digitised battlefield.

Intelligence Voids

India has been suffering glaring intelligence voids on the external front in the past and continues to suffer so even now. When the Chinese built a highway cutting across Aksai Chin, India came to know 11 months after its commencement and one month before completion. We had no inkling prior to 3,500 Indian families ousted from Fiji and replaced by Chinese in equal numbers. For years we had no idea what Chinese were doing in Coco Island. We heard about the Bhutanese Consulate in Hong Kong after it was established. We had no prior inkling of Kargil intrusions in such a massive scale. Similarly, we knew little about the trouble in our immediate neighbourhood: Royal massacre and Maoist

MK Dhar, former Joint Director IB wrote in his book Open Secrets – India’s Intelligence Unveiled that irrespective of which government is in power in India, the entire intelligence effort of the country is geared towards doing down the Opposition. More and more evidence of this we see now on daily basis. Then the other major issue is on what basis does the government task intelligence agencies when we have not deﬁned a National Security Strategy and outlined our National Security Objectives? Obviously, a muddled approach is followed. For external intelligence we are depending primarily on Technical Intelligence (Techint) in which we have limited prowess. The much publicised telephone intercept of Musharraf’s conversation during the Kargil intrusions linking him with the inﬁltrators was not indigenous but was through a foreign agency, but once we did the stupidity of publicising the catch, that source too dried up. We have discarded the most important factor of Human Intelligence (Humint) both externally and internally. It is because of sole reliance on Techint that fooled the US regarding Pokhran II and that is why their Special Forces have been covertly inducted into Iran. We have disparate intelligence agencies without much effort towards synergising all source intelligence and requisite dissemination in real time / near real time is also lacking. Internally, the focus

The situation at the home front is no better. We have little information about even the Maoists, whom the Prime Minister has been describing as the biggest internal security threat for the past six-seven years. Maoists have vast areas under their control that security forces do not venture into. Total lack of intelligence facilitates strikes by Maoists with impunity. Same can be said of other terrorist organisations pan-India

is on nailing terrorists ‘after’ the incident has taken place rather than ‘preventing’ the incident. More importantly, the latter is because of political patronage both at the low and higher levels for vote-bank politics, two examples being: Kerala headquartered Popular Front of India (PFI) has been certiﬁed by both R&AW and IB of having conﬁrmed links with LeT and Al-Qaeda. PFI picked up weapons against India four years back and their cadres have been caught in Kupwara (north Kashmir) trying to cross over to PoK. Yet, PFI is not in the MHA banned list of terrorist organisations; Force One of Maharashtra Police was raised in aftermath of 26/11. It has well motivated local manpower but they are not permitted to generate their own intelligence. Intelligence collection is to be done by the local police who venture into the well-known ‘grey’ and ‘black’ areas only when the politician wants them to, which is seldom. Additionally, we have just about started taking baby steps in cyber intelligence and geospatial intelligence has yet to take off in the country.

LT GEN PC KATOCH PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SC (RETD)

The writer is a third generation Army ofﬁcer who retired as DG Info Systems in 2009 after 40 years service. He participated in the 1971 Indo-Pak War, commanded a Special Forces Battalion in Sri Lanka, a Brigade on Siachen Glacier during Kargil Conﬂict, a Division in Ladakh and a Strike Corps in Semi Deserts. He is former Colonel of The Parachute Regiment. A leading defence expert, he is a visiting fellow in foreign Think Tanks and contributes regularly for Indian and foreign publications.

Human Intelligence

Though former Prime Minister IK Gujral banned development of trans-border Humint sources, successive governments have not really reversed the decision, which is out of synch with 21st century requirements. Former R&AW officials confirm Humint has been moribund in India ever since. Not only does Humint enhance asymmetric advantage of our adversaries it is actually stupid for us not to do so. Even the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), which has a mandate to operate trans-border human sources is denied permission to do so and directed to rely solely on Techint. More significantly, India has not deployed its Special Forces on covert and continuous surveillance of areas of strategic interest, as most armies including China and Pakistan are doing. Chinese PLA, Special Forces included, are deployed as civilians in all her development projects abroad including in PoK / Pakistan, Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Maldives etc. India does not understand the value of human intelligence, especially in achieving asymmetric advantage in the face of non-traditional threats and there are no signs of an effort to make amends. We are unwisely spending crores on Techint while spending relatively nothing on Humint. This is the root cause for our inability to strategise and cope with irregular and asymmetric threats, both national and transnational. This has not only affected covert intelligence gathering but also counter-intelligence. We do not even exploit Open Source Intelligence (Osint) including capitalising on the considerable Indian diasporas abroad. While our media encourages the citizen journalist concept, the establishment has no such concept

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homeland security

PRIMACY OF HUMINT

Internally, the focus is on nailing terrorists ‘after’ the incident has taken place rather than ‘preventing’ the incident. More importantly, the latter is because of political patronage both at the low and higher levels for vote-bank politics, two examples being: Kerala headquartered Popular Front of India (PFI) has been certified by both R&AW and IB of having confirmed links with LeT and Al-Qaeda. PFI picked up weapons against India four years back and their cadres have been caught in Kupwara (north Kashmir) trying to cross over to PoK. Yet, PFI is not in the MHA banned list of terrorist organisations; Force One of Maharashtra Police was raised in aftermath of 26/11. It has well motivated local manpower but they are not permitted to generate their own intelligence – the feasibility of 'billion eyes on the ground' has never been explored. Hence, inadequate intelligence even in the case of the Maoist insurgency where our security forces do not venture into large tracts of Maoists territory but fail to capitalise on the lakhs of individuals from these interior areas working in Delhi / NCR who go home periodically. We need to acknowledge advantages of Humint at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, that even signal intelligence (Sigint) and Osint are linked to Humint and Humint will continue to play signiﬁcant role in both

defensive protection and offensive penetration of cyberspace. We need to reinstate primacy of Humint in relation to Techint, the former costing less, requiring less time and being more responsive in relation to the latter. Without this, we will continue to make decisions in vacuum and without holistic intelligence. Suitable application of Humint duly integrated with modern surveillance technology and processing capacity, will greatly enhance situational awareness, assist in the decision support system and lead to better decision-making.

The technological revolution in the ﬁeld of IT and 21st century challenges to security including terrorism have forced governments world over to restructure organisations. Geographic data base is vast; no more restricted to areas adjoining international boundaries and also includes own territory. Therefore, the amount of information that needs to be processed to ﬁlter meaningful intelligence is colossal. This makes exploitation of technology essential in order to facilitate real time intelligence. The aim of any such system should therefore be to fuse data from multiple and sometimes even unrelated sources to be able to produce a comprehensive intelligence picture dealing with all aspects of information. In case of Maoists, security forces do not venture into large tracts of territory, but fail to capitalise on the lakhs of individuals from these interior areas working in Delhi / NCR who go home periodically.

The NCTC Debate

A number of Chief Ministers and political parties have raised strong objections against its establishment. The main objections are the fear that the government will use

the NCTC to target non-Congress politicians and non-Congress supporters, NCTC will be an The bottom line is that as a nation we not only infringement on the rights of the states and that require the NCTC, we must have data links and the issue was not discussed with the Opposition standardised protocols with and amongst all and states. There is no doubt that this will require thorough discussion and consensus, which is intelligence agencies for real time passage unlikely unless the government in power can of information. More significantly, State convince everyone that adequate measures have Counter Terrorism Centres (SCTCs) must be been instituted to ensure that the intelligence effort of the country is not utilised to target the established to ensure regular flow of ground Opposition – a very difficult proposition in the level intelligence upwards and dissemination current dispensation considering the reluctance of collated and analysed intelligence flowing displayed in bringing even the CBI under the Lokpal or at least a wholly autonomous body. both ways. SCTCs should be linked with the However, the bottom line is that as a nation NCTC through the National Intelligence Grid we not only require the NCTC, we must have data links and standardised protocols with and (Natgrid) and established in all states, not amongst all intelligence agencies for real time like UHQ (Unified HQ) in selected few as is passage of information. More significantly, the current practice State Counter Terrorism Centres (SCTCs) must be established to ensure regular flow of ground level intelligence upwards and dissemination of collated and analysed intelligence flowing both ways. aspects pertaining to creation of metadata of available SCTCs should be linked with the NCTC through the geospatial data and does not cater for inputs from National Intelligence Grid (Natgrid) and established in intelligence community or for that matter the Defence all States, not like UHQ (Unified HQ) in selected few as is Services. While the DIA and NTRO have been established the current practice, for the simple reason that the threat but such steps by themselves are still not sufficient to of terrorism is omnipresent that can occur any place deal with aspects pertaining to Geospatial Intelligence. without warning. It is also reiterated that Humint is the The DIA is the central repository for all intelligence most important in internal security. inputs pertaining to the three Services including Imagery Geospatial Intelligence Intelligence and Electronic Intelligence (Elint) however, Geospatial intelligence is vital for our security forces we are yet to integrate the aspects of topography in present day conflict situations, both external and with the DIA. Within the existing setup, adequate internal. Establishment of the National Spatial Data resources in terms of remote sensing, Elint payloads Infrastructure (NSDI) has been a good initiative but its and cartography are not available to produce high networking with concerned government quality fused data. Similarly, much more is required agencies relevant to geospatial data base at the national level in terms of integration of various and updates is still catching up. More government agencies. While certain isolated linkages importantly, NSDI deals with only some between certain government agencies are already in place, this connectivity has to be extended to all necessary arms of the government over a national security information grid for optimal exploitation of various multilayered data sets. Disparate information held by different agencies has to be fused to form an intelligent picture before operations can be planned to produce maximum results whether against Maoists, terrorists, arsonists or the like.

Need Of The Hour

What India needs may be summarised as: Comprehensive intelligence collection plan based on our national security objectives; plan and deploy adequate resources both externally and internally including Humint and Techint integrating Special Forces, sons of the soil, Indian diasporas abroad and implementing the ‘billion eyes on the ground’ internally; a synergised intelligence set up integrating all source intelligence with both way free ﬂow of intelligence, dissemination of real time / near real time common operational picture to all concerned supported by a decision support system that can facilitate short, medium and long-term assessments. We are way behind in putting all this in place. We need national will. Get going!

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

homeland security

REDEFINING INTELLIGENCE

ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN A DEMOCRACY

PARADOXES AND SOLUTIONS

In the US an elaborate bipartisan protocol was drawn up through several laws, popularly known as Patriot Act to improve intelligence collection, coordination, interpretation, dissemination, ground action and assessment on their efﬁcacy through statutory accountability and review by setting up new institutions like the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), NCTC, Fusion Centres and Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). To some extent the Ishrat Jahan case has created the same type of controversy on the role of our Intelligence Bureau (IB) when demands are made for redeﬁning its role. Yet it could be argued that a reverse tidal wave of public opinion might press for a more effective role of intelligence agencies if unfortunately the country is faced with a repeat of 9/11 or 26/11 types of terrorist attacks.

t a time when intelligence agencies in all democracies are being battered by civil and human rights organisations for “excesses” and privacy breaches it will be relevant to examine what role they play in a democracy. It was not too long ago that the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who was once Chairman of the US Senate Intelligence Committee, had introduced bills (1991 and 1995) in the Congress to abolish the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) since it was not doing what it should have done. It was ironic that he was earlier awarded the CIA’s “Agency Seal Medallion” for “demonstrating that effective oversight of intelligence can be realised without risk to the intelligence priorities”.

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Moynihan wanted CIA’s functions to be transferred to the State Department.

Overarching Law

That was a time when US had no worthwhile domestic intelligence agency. It also had no equivalent to our Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA). The US National 9/11 Commission found that the terrible attack on US mainland in September 2001 was indirectly facilitated due to lack of effective coordination in domestic and foreign intelligence collection and interpretation. Hence an elaborate bipartisan protocol was drawn up through several laws, popularly known as Patriot Act to improve intelligence collection, coordination, interpretation, dissemination,

ground action and assessment on their efﬁcacy through statutory accountability and review by setting up new institutions like the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), NCTC, Fusion Centres and Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). The structure of the new overwhelming security bureaucracy was accepted by the US public who were nervous about another attack. However this bipartisan consensus did not last. Very recently the so called excesses of the US National Security Agency (NSA) caught public attention as is evident from the worldwide interest in the Snowden case. To some extent the Ishrat Jahan case has created the same type of controversy on the role of our Intelligence Bureau (IB) when demands are made for redeﬁning its role. Yet it could be argued that a reverse tidal wave of public opinion might press for a more effective role of intelligence agencies if unfortunately the country is faced with a repeat of 9/11 or 26/11 types of terrorist attacks. This is evident in India even while recognising the repeated Chinese “incursions”.

mistakenly or through ulterior designs? This, again, can be laid down by law where the secret methods have to be approved and supervised by the higher echelons in the organisation who will be held accountable in case of any miscarriage of justice. All such procedures are considered secret, but to be reported and supervised by higher authorities who would keep secret records which could be examined by legally competent bodies. In some countries courts perform this role. Once this is done, the requirements of public security and individual liberties are satisﬁed.

V BALACHANDRAN IPS (RETD)

The writer is a former Special Secretary of the Cabinet Secretariat. He was also a part of the high level committee appointed by the Maharashtra government to enquire into Mumbai 26/11 terror attacks. He is a proliﬁc writer on intelligence, terrorism and insurgency issues and has also given lectures on these subjects at several institutions in India and abroad.

It is for this reason that all modern democracies have passed laws governing the activities of How then do we define the limits of intelligence their intelligence agencies. USA gathering in a democratic world which even while was the first to codify such laws warding off all dangers to the society, would be less governing their intelligence intrusive, respecting individual privacy, civil liberties organisations. In 1947 they passed and undertaking all their activities by means prescribed the National Security Act setting by law? For this we need to codify laws governing the up their National Security Council functioning of all intelligence bodies, prescribing their and CIA, their civilian intelligence agency. In 1949 they charter of duties and at the same time giving them passed the CIA Act which permitted their core activities legal protection from prosecution in the discharge of hidden from public scrutiny so that essential security their duties. At the same time every democracy has to operations could be conducted in secrecy. In later years acknowledge that intelligence agencies are not like police the Congressional Intelligence Committees added a organisations which conduct investigations openly with number of rules and regulations to ensure that the CIA every step prescribed by law being in the knowledge of did not conflict with individual liberties. They also the courts and to some extent by the media. Intelligence wrested the power of controlling intelligence budgets agencies, on the other hand, are supposed to collect from the Executive Branch. These regulations laid down security intelligence secretly without the suspects coming elaborate oversight as well as checks and balances so that to know of their activities. This is called “clandestine” the CIA could carry on their secret activities unhindered activities. Surveillance of a suspect and his network who by exposure, while ensuring that they did not breach might be terrorists masquerading as innocent citizens or individual liberties. Similarly the Armed Forces Security suspected spies can be detected by intelligence agencies Agency (AFSA) formed in 1949 became National Security only by employing secret or clandestine methods where Agency (NSA) in 1952 for communications and cyber the targets would not be aware of such surveillance. intelligence. Its legal framework was through the National Security Agency Act of 1959. Section 12 clearly defined Curbing Rogue Activity Congressional control over its budget. They monitor How will we ensure that intelligence agencies do not worldwide communications for preventive security but subject an innocent citizen to such surveillance either have to take orders from the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for such surveillance within How then do we define the limits of intelligence the US homeland.

gathering in a democratic world which even while warding off all dangers to the society, would be less intrusive, respecting individual privacy, civil liberties and undertaking all their activities by means prescribed by law? For this we need to codify laws governing the functioning of all intelligence bodies, prescribing their charter of duties and at the same time giving them legal protection from prosecution in the discharge of their duties

Evolution Of Codes

United Kingdom was late in passing law on their intelligence agencies. It was only in 1989 and 1994 that they could pass Security Service Act 1989 and Intelligence Service Act respectively codifying oversight on MI-5 (Internal), MI-6 (Foreign) and GCHQ (Technical). These acts put them under parliamentary control. Further, their “Interception of Communications Commissioner” performs a statutory role under the Regulation of Investigative Powers Act 2000 in auditing all interceptions done by police and intelligence agencies. His annual report is sent to the Parliament. Canada passed their law

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homeland security

REDEFINING INTELLIGENCE

PROBLEMS GALORE

ROLE OF CPOS AND

INTELLIGENCE

IN COMBATING TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY

26/11

9/11

It is a shame that India has not even thought of codifying the role and activities of our intelligence agencies. Unfortunately successive leadership of our security bureaucracy had shied away from this attempt for fear that outside scrutiny would “expose” their so called “operations”. Our political leadership is also ignorant on the utility of such a measure. Otherwise they would not have allowed an excellent draft private bill languish in Lok Sabha since 2011. This was introduced by Mr Manish Tiwari, then Congress spokesperson and MP, now Minister for Information and Broadcasting (The Intelligence Services – Powers and Regulation – Bill 2011) in 1985 when they set up their civilian intelligence agency (Canadian Security Intelligence Service) after removing national intelligence functions from the RCMP, their national police. South Africa passed their Intelligence Services Act in 1994 when they set up new intelligence services after the end of the Apartheid regime. Australia, which created their ASIS through an executive order in 1952, chose to give it a legal basis in 2001 by Intelligence Services Act 2001.

Indian Experience

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and Regulation – Bill 2011). Had IB’s activities been codiﬁed earlier the present situation of some of them getting entangled in Ishrat Jahan case could have been avoided. Absence of legal backing to intelligence agencies also deprives them of special legal protection, outside the Criminal Procedure Code, while doing their legitimate duties.

However it has to be acknowledged that in a democracy there would be discordant voices against intelligence agencies even after codification of their functions and oversight of their operations. Debate and dissent are the essence of democracies. The recent defection of Edward Snowden has cast the NSA in the role of an Orwellian “Big Brother” keeping all US citizens under watch. Recently an amendment to NSA Act restricting its role in internal snooping was narrowly defeated (217-205) in the US lower house (House of Representatives). The controversy was on collecting “Metadata” which effectively means collecting call records of “who called whom” (not full transcripts) from selected numbers under court orders as stipulated by S.215 of the Patriot Act. In other words the public are not satisfied even with court orders since they are secret. They fail to understand that a warrant request in an open court against a terror suspect will be self-defeating. Fierce debates are still going on. European Union is also agitated against NSA which has “code sharing” with UK’s GCHQ. Michael Mukasey, former US Attorney General, has described in Wall Street Journal the need for collecting metadata: "Because intelligence does not arrive in orderly chronological ranks and getting useful data is an incremental process that often requires matching information gathered in the past with more current data, storing the information is essential." But this reasoning is not going to satisfy privacy advocates. Two law suits are pending in New York and California Federal Courts by American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and an NGO named “Electronic Frontier Foundation” in San Francisco. John le Carre, famous British spy novelist and former intelligence officer has joined the debates saying that secret courts “will be a stain on our society”. But this should not delay codifying the activities of our intelligence organisations and giving them legal protection.

Bihar

Andhra Pradesh

This article draws attention to the ones who have got inside and have grown roots within our security perimeter. Do we have any information about the inﬁltrators who have crossed over into India and are settling down in safe houses? They may even have got hold of Aadhaar Cards for all we know! We do not have any counter-intelligence setup to weed out such persons. This aspect of intelligence work has to be given top priority. In the terror camp we have only our western neighbour who is interested in truncating Kashmir from India to avenge the formation of Bangladesh. In the north we have China which is laying claims to large chunks of Indian territory. They keep blowing hot and cold in the same breath all the time. Bangladesh which owes its birth to us is permitting and encouraging percolation of its population into India. Myanmar is also reported to be looking the other way when insurgents take shelter there. Therefore the scenario is bleak and it appears that we are friendless and should have to bear the burden of security alone.

f we draw up a balance sheet of the gains and losses in our ﬁght against insurgents, terrorists and Maoists spread across the country we will ﬁnd that our liabilities column far outweighs the assets column. I need not give any facts and statistics of our gains and losses in terms of manpower, weapons and equipment and self-esteem. We all know it. Where have we gained? Kashmir? No. Eastern states and the Naxal area from Bihar to Andhra Pradesh? Again a big No.

The cross-border terrorism in Kashmir remains the same. The terrorists kill our police personnel whenever and wherever they feel like. Yet we continue to claim that the last year or two has been free of attacks because of better security measures. The fact is that it suited the terrorists and they chose to remain quiet in this period. So we should stop deluding ourselves and not indulge in self back patting. Our media goes to town whenever a couple of inﬁltrators are killed while trying to cross the border into India along with ten others. They choose to ignore the remaining ten inﬁltrators who may have been

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PROBLEMS GALORE Protect The People

are trying to create a scare that India will have to face serious problems. If proper measures are taken, nothing can happen. There may be a few strikes and demonstrations and that is about all that we can expect. On the contrary the Kashmir problem may get resolved just by this action.

Bangladeshi Deluge

It is only the vested interests that are trying to create a scare that India will have to face serious problems. If proper measures are taken, nothing can happen. There may be a few strikes and demonstrations and that is about all that we can expect. On the contrary the Kashmir problem may get resolved just by this action successful in crossing over. Do we have any information about the infiltrators who have crossed over into India and are settling down in safe houses? They may even have got hold of Aadhaar Cards for all we know! Just a handful of Pakistani infiltrators have been caught and some weapons, ammunition and explosives have been recovered from them or from some of their hideouts. This, I presume, forms only 5 per cent of the unlucky infiltrators who are caught. Where are the remaining 95 per cent who have managed to sneak in? Are we to believe that these 5 per cent are the only fellows who came in and there are no other infiltrators, no other arms and ammunition and explosives hidden in India? Let us not be ostriches please!

Is Article 370 Sacrosanct?

Kashmir is a serious problem and serious problems require drastic measures to solve them. The ﬁrst question that comes up is why should Kashmir be given a special status. Is it not a part of India like any other state? What is so sacrosanct about Article 370? What happened when Goa was liberated from foreign rule? What happened when Hyderabad was liberated from the Nizam’s rule and the Razakars who were a bunch of criminals? What happened when The Golden Temple was attacked to remove the terrorists and Bhindranwale was killed? Just sweet nothing! And nothing will happen if Article 370 is abrogated. It is only the vested interests that

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The Bangladeshi inﬁltrators have entered into the country in thousands or may be lakhs. Many have been given voter ID cards. In a two kilometer radius around my own house there must be a hundred such Bangladeshis and they all claim to have come from Calcutta when asked, although they speak Bengali with a Dhaka accent. They are working in factories, shops and some have even found work as temporary daily wage workers in government departments or started small businesses. We have a very large number of men in the CPOs who are trained to do sentry duties, bandobast duties and if need be, resort to lathi charges or ﬁring. But where do they stand when it comes to dealing with highly trained terrorists and Naxals in the jungle areas? There they become cannon fodder. They require specialised training in how to avoid ambushes and booby traps, specially while travelling by vehicles. Most of our casualties have been with troops travelling in vehicles.

The Intelligence Loophole

The Police forces like the CPOs are blind and deaf without good intelligence, as well as counter-intelligence to prevent leakage of police information. The Naxals get pinpoint information of the movements and plans of the police forces in detail as they have a far better intelligence network. They have inﬁltrated into the police and intelligence departments, into colleges and students hostels and God knows how many other government agencies. We do not have any counter-intelligence setup to weed out such persons. This aspect of intelligence work has to be given top priority. Most of the intelligence work done in our country is to keep spying on the political leaders of the opposition and their activities. I do not make any claims to personal knowledge or information about how much information our intelligence departments have about the terrorists and insurgent activities. Being a retired man I am not entitled to it. But I can read between the lines. I somehow have a feeling that our intelligence setup has lost its professionalism. Most of the Intelligence work today is restricted to electronic surveillance and interception of communications. Although this is an important part of intelligence work, but there is no substitute to the old fashioned system of spies or agents or moles or whatever you call them. A machine, however sophisticated it may be, cannot replace a human brain. The sooner we accept this fact the better it will be for our intelligence network.

Most of the Intelligence work today is restricted to electronic surveillance and interception of communications. Although this is an important part of intelligence work, but there is no substitute to the old fashioned system of spies or agents or moles or whatever you call them. A machine, however sophisticated it may be, cannot replace a human brain. The sooner we accept this fact the better it will be for our intelligence network This process is dangerous and may cost human lives, it is pains taking, it requires endless patience, it is highly stressful and it is expensive. But at the same time it is absolutely essential and it is the only solution. No amount of gadgetry or devices can deliver the kind of intelligence that is required for the security of the country. It can be done only by human beings. Another thing which needs attention is that vital information leaks out from the police itself. We Indians have a great weakness with a tendency to brag about being in possession of “inside knowledge”. Policemen are notorious for divulging the innermost secrets about sources, police movements and plans to complete strangers. During my service I have come across cases where the identity of informers has been disclosed by careless and ignorant policemen resulting in untold misery and suffering for the informer. Not only policemen, even ordinary citizens travelling in a train will disclose the innermost family secrets to perfect strangers travelling with them. It is almost like a national disease. This tendency has to be curbed in the Police personnel. In my article written for the DSA, November 2009 edition, on the issue of terrorism, I have given 18 suggestions for a multi-pronged solution. I do not know how many of these suggestions, if any, are being put into practice. If not, then I would think we are expecting a miracle to take place and terrorism will disappear by itself!

Internal security is a very wide term which encompasses a thousand things. Everything in the country is vulnerable, every life is precious. Therefore security means security of everything. With a wide canvas like this it is difficult VK DEUSKAR IPS to decide where to begin. (RETD) Therefore we start with the The writer is former DGP, security of life of the Indian Andhra Pradesh. He population as most terrorist conducted research for activities that we have National Police Academy experienced target human on organised crime and lives. Subsequently we will impact of Evaluation of have to take up the threats IPS Training. He also to the country’s economy, land served as Principal of CISF Training College. and vital installations etc. What and where are our major security Before joining IPS, he was with Gorkha Regiment threats. In the terror camp we have for 5 years. only our western neighbour who is interested in truncating Kashmir from India to avenge the formation of Bangladesh. They will not hesitate to adopt any means to achieve their aim and even if some elements in Pakistan are willing to bury the hatchet, the fundamentalists among them will not permit it. It has now conclusively been proved that they have orchestrated all the terrorist attacks on our country. All their claims to innocence have been blown wide open for the world to see. A very dangerous prognosis which can be seen is based on the following facts:  Continuous infiltration by Pakistani terrorists into India and their disappearance by merging into the population.  The circulation of counterfeit Indian currency notes in large quantities. Continued terror strikes in Kashmir and other parts  of the country at selected intervals. Infiltration into our security forces and intelligence  network by terrorists or their abettors and sympathisers. We need to make an independent and an in-depth enquiry into the issues raised above to ascertain what possible actions need to be taken to counter their effects. In the north we have China which is laying claims to large chunks of Indian territory. They keep blowing hot and cold in the same breath all the time. Bangladesh which owes its birth to us is permitting and encouraging percolation of its population into India. Myanmar is also reported to be looking the other way when insurgents take shelter there. Therefore the scenario is bleak and it appears that we are friendless and should have to bear the burden of security alone. There is also no dearth of treacherous people in the country which should not be lost sight of. India is a vast country with a huge population and resources and a powerful defence capability. There is no dearth of courage, knowledge or brains in our people. If we do our jobs honestly, sincerely and with patriotism there is no reason why we cannot meet the security requirements of our country.

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homeland security

FUTURISTIC ARTICULATION security management. Of the ﬁve reviews, one involved China, one was terrorism related and the rest Pakistan centric. It is important to note that since 1947 there has never been a comprehensive and pro-active review of national security management that has been totally futuristic and all-encompassing and not a panic reaction. It also underlines the fact that India’s national interest and objectives have not been fully articulated in ofﬁcial terms.

NATIONAL SECURITY ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES Since 1947, India has seen 4 in-house reviews and 1 inter-ministerial review on certain aspects of national security management. It is important to note that since 1947 there has never been a comprehensive and pro-active review of national security management that has been totally futuristic and all-encompassing and not a panic reaction. Our major political parties at the national level and regional ones too have to articulate their policy on several subjects of importance. This is important especially in the era of coalition dharma, when competing political compulsions often dictate different approach or create piquant situations. The past few years are replete with examples when states have created issues running counter to the central government’s policies.

he December 2008 lecture delivered by the then Home Minister, P Chidambaram at the 22nd Intelligence Bureau Endowment Lecture is the ﬁrst major policy pronouncement on national security by a senior ruling party representative in recent years. It is visionary as also unprecedented in its character especially as it was set in the backdrop of the Mumbai incident few weeks earlier. Chidambaram spelt out an ambitious road map for the future. Since then

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several eminent persons, both in the government and outside, have articulated views on this subject, prominent among them being the current National Security Adviser (NSA), Shivshankar Menon, former Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran and former head of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), Naresh Chandra. A collation of their public discourse gives an insight into the thinking at the highest echelons on several aspects of national security and its expanded term. This is important since India does not yet have a formal national security doctrine

or policy. It is hoped that the Naresh Chandra report of May 2012 to the government will coalesce into a policy document for adoption by the government of the day. For observers of India’s national security environment, Finance Minister Chidambaram’s address at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), in March 2013 is a must-read document. It is important since it forms the thought process of a person expected to play a major role in national and international politics in years to come.

Undeﬁned Policy Framework

Since 1947, India has seen 4 in-house reviews and 1 inter-ministerial review on certain aspects of national

Mrs Indira Gandhi is the first major political leader, in post-Independence period, who established India’s first ever national security architecture. In September 1968 she created the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) and made it responsible for all aspects of India’s external security. This was one of the several initiatives that came in the wake of her desire to lead India into a more secure and stable environment for entering the nuclear age

PM HEBLIKAR

The writer is Managing Trustee, Institute of Contemporary Studies Bangalore (ICSB). He is a Visiting Professor at the Department of International Relations and Strategic Studies, Manipal University, Manipal (Karnataka). He is an Adjunct Faculty at National Institute of Advance Studies (NIAS) Bangalore. He retired as Special Secretary to Government of India in September 2010. He was twice decorated by the Government for Meritorious and Distinguished service besides other commendations. He specialised in insurgency and counter-insurgency developments in India’s north-east region and its external ramiﬁcations. His areas of interest included developments in South Asia, South East Asia, Africa and India’s national security.

It is common knowledge that awareness of India’s national security interests and objectives does not occupy the highest priority among the country’s political class and law makers. It is also true that only a small number of law makers at the central, provincial or local levels participate in debates on this subject more out of personal or academic interests. In rest of the cases, the desired contribution is nearly absent and hence informed decisions are usually not available. Our major political parties at the national level and regional ones too have to articulate their policy on several subjects of importance. This is important especially in the era of coalition dharma, when competing political compulsions often dictate different approach or create piquant situations. The past few years are replete with examples when states have created issues running counter to the central government’s policies. This begs the question whether national security issues can be held hostage by party mandates? Is there a way forward? Do existing constitutional provisions provide solutions or is there is way forward on evolving a common minimum programme? Political parties at each level would need to reﬂect seriously on internal education of their senior ofﬁce bearers and others.

Indira Gandhi’s Foresight

Mrs Indira Gandhi is the first major political leader, in post-Independence period, who established India’s first ever national security architecture. In September 1968 she created the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) and made it responsible for all aspects of India’s external security. This was one of the several initiatives that came in the wake of her desire to lead India into a more secure and stable environment for entering the nuclear age. Creation of the R&AW was not the first step; she also took the extraordinary step to create a separate cadre and service

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FUTURISTIC ARTICULATION

It is imperative to establish a central agency to impart instruction in various aspects of national security, analysis, threats and challenges, processing of technical intelligence, building capacity for the state government agencies without going into the tradecraft of intelligence acquisition. A National Intelligence Academy, under the National Security Council, is recommended to be set up at Bangalore for the purpose to meet professional requirements of the R&AW. On the other hand, she strengthened the Intelligence Bureau (IB) for safeguarding internal security and ensured both remained at the forefront of her national security calculations. This arrangement was of the same character as in the UK and other western democracies where the bifurcation of responsibilities was clear and unambiguous. With strong political direction and guidance both organisations delivered excellent results and grew professionally.

subsequently Atal Bihari Vajpayee. While considerable institutional and governmental support was forthcoming to make the intelligence agencies strong and effective, there was also the grooming of several young political aides of Rajiv Gandhi in important issues of national security. This included familiarisation by selected senior members of the two organisations so as to give them a sense and appreciation of larger issues, threats, challenges and possible solutions. This paid rich dividends.

The same patronage was evident under the leadership of late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and

Fits And Starts

Unfortunately, however, such initiatives happened in spells and

intervening periods saw decline in their activities for a variety of reasons. The enormous advantage enjoyed by India in its immediate neighbourhood, thanks to its external agency, was lost on account of differing perceptions and other factors in our national leadership. It is also unfortunate that the functional autonomy of the two major intelligence acquisition services were not allowed to develop assiduously and no efforts made to restore them to their former glory. Several observers and former members of the agencies point out to the alleged growing trend of political interference in their activities. Some of them recall the decision to wind down India’s options to retaliate against those involved in exporting terrorism or creating violence from sanctuaries across the borders as poor political judgment or lack of vision. The Kargil Review Committee was intended to address issues of mismanagement of India’s security establishment. It created additional layers and reorganised the assets of leading institutions without building capacity to handle challenges and most of its important

recommendations are yet to ﬁnd meaningful expression. India’s security apparatus is vast and large covering a range of subjects and each having its own reporting channel. While the R&AW reports to the Prime Minister where the NSA has a major role to play, the IB is responsible to the Home Minister with the Home Secretary as its interlocutor. These are the major players. There are others too playing a vital role in the jurisdiction of the Defence, Finance and Commerce ministry respectively. The armed forces have their designated intelligence acquisition bodies under the Defence Ministry. Likewise, there are other organisations under the Ministry of Defence Production, Science and Technology, Space, Information Technology and Communications and others. Added to this are specialist agencies like NTRO, NATGRID, CERT-IN and Cyberspace related agencies under the National Security Council Secretariat. India has a plethora of agencies that constitute its national security base. The Home Ministry supervises several central police organisations and investigative agencies, which have evolved their own systems. It is imperative to establish a central agency to impart instruction in various aspects of national security, analysis, threats and challenges, processing of technical intelligence, building capacity for the state government agencies without going into the tradecraft of intelligence acquisition. A National Intelligence Academy, under the National Security Council, is recommended to be set up at Bangalore for the purpose. It has multiple advantages and builds synergy and better cross-movement of human resources and ideas.

Absence Of Talent Reservoir

Recruitment and training of intelligence professionals is a major area of concern. It must be pointed out that there is a great absence of talent reservoir in the country that could ﬁll the ranks of our intelligence agencies at cutting edge levels. One of the reasons is that the study of national security, Constitution of India and contemporary history of India is not part of our educational system both at scholastic and collegiate education. Further very few universities, both private and

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The internal and external security landscape of India is rapidly changing. Our existing systems operating in their subject specific sectors will face major challenges in the prosecution of their strategic responsibilities. Unless they quickly evolve and are able to collaborate and deliver multi-disciplinary and multi-sectoral responses, the tasks ahead will be more complicated public, devote major attention towards comprehensive study of all national security related issues. Our higher institutes of education namely the Institutes of Technology, Business Management or even prestigious Law Schools too are yet to focus on this aspect. India needs a great body of educated professionals in near future to complement its growing stature as not only a multi-trillion dollar economy but as an important economic power. Presently there is an immense problem of supply to meet the growing demand for professionals and knowledge. The existing talent pool is inadequate.

Back To ‘Kao-boys’ Days

One of the issues that have often attracted concern is recruitment into the agency (R&AW) and the service (IB). The Naresh Chandra Task Force has made several recommendations on this aspect. At the level of the Group “A” officers, the current experience is not satisfactory and has not worked well. The RN Kao scheme, which addressed several issues, was not permitted to develop due to vested interests and entrenched views. It was given short shrift and buried in indecent haste and because of this myopic decision, after effects will be felt severely by the nation in the coming 5-7 years. A return to the RN Kao scheme is the best solution to restore the agency to its former efficiency. The first one was a success by any standard. It created professionalism, specialisation and a body of foreign language enabled officers, which is a prerequisite for any intelligence agency.

Experts In The Lay Of The Land

It must be mentioned herein that when the covert Special Service Bureau (SSB), predecessor of the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB), was created in the early sixties for deployment on the India-Tibet

border, its founding fathers gave considerable attention to its human resource requirements. It included in its ranks a large number of officers of the Indian Forest Service (IFoS) and also from states lying on the Indo-Himalayan region. IFoS officers rendered yeoman service by their professional knowledge of not only flora and fauna but also about inhabitants of forests etc. Our security managers need to go back to basics especially when dealing with ethnic insurgency or counter-insurgency operations in jungles etc. Input from IFoS officers make for considerable value, deputation of such willing officials is essential into our COIN strategy, which must also seek services of those volunteers from other walks of civil service. The internal and external security landscape of India is rapidly changing. Our existing systems operating in their subject specific sectors will face major challenges in the prosecution of their strategic responsibilities. Unless they quickly evolve and are able to collaborate and deliver multi-disciplinary and multi-sectoral responses, the tasks ahead will be more complicated. The term national security as we presently understand is based on narrow military terms, this notion is undergoing rapid changes and has come to include future threats and challenges as also cross-cutting issues. Health, water, climate, international-terrorism, food, transport, communications, transportation, maritime, space and cyber are some of the issues that define the new landscape. India has developed a technological base to suit its needs and has to recalibrate it to meet next generation challenges. In this direction a comprehensive national security policy that binds all national stakeholders is the need of the day.

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SKEWED PRIORITIES

Intelligence in India has long ceased to be a profession and a craft but has turned into a tool to be used for partisan gain by the political dispensation of the day. A nation’s intelligence community is expected to be a source of unbiased and objective information; if it were considered no more objective than other sources it could not fulﬁll this role. In India, the skewed priorities of the policy makers have meant that ensuring the independence and objectivity of the nation’s intelligence organisations was never a prime objective. And the result is for all to see.

n recent days, a theatre of the absurd has been played out in front of our eyes. India’s two premier security agencies are at loggerheads and the battle is being waged through the media. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) seems set to chargesheet senior intelligence officer Rajendra Kumar and three of his juniors in connection with the Ishrat Jahan "fake encounter" case. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) chief Asif Ibrahim has written to the Home Ministry complaining against the ‘witch-hunt’ against its officers. It was reported in the media that in a strongly worded letter to former Home Secretary RK Singh, Ibrahim registered his disapproval of the CBI’s investigation against its officers and said it was “disastrous for the morale of IB officers.” The CBI director Ranjit Sinha responded by suggesting that it was up to the IB to appeal to the right quarters if it wants immunity from prosecution. He went on to say that “a bogey is being created that thanks to the Ishrat Jahan case the entire IB will stop functioning and national security will be in jeopardy.”

Government Prevarication

The government, meanwhile, is busy doing what it does best – fudging the issue while trying to reap as much political mileage out of this unfortunate spectacle as it possibly can. Commenting on the CBI’s submission to the Court, Home Minister Sushilkumar Shinde said those guilty of carrying out the alleged fake encounter should be punished. “Facts are facts. Guilty should be punished,” was his profound response. His junior minister, RPN Singh was more nuanced when he suggested that “when they [the CBI] ask us for sanction, they will have to come up with reasons and proof” while bemoaning the fact that “over the past few years, we have been dismantling our own organisations, be it the IB or R&AW.”

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intelligence community. This issue is complicated when policy recommendations incorporate covert intelligence which is to be kept secret as this can result in the formulation of policy options which, due to their sensitive nature, limit their exposure to independent assessment and criticism.

This raises the question of who is responsible for dismantling these organisations. And the answer is very clear: the nation’s policy makers. Intelligence in India has long ceased to be a profession and a craft but has turned into a tool to be used for partisan gain by the political dispensation of the day. Successive governments have systematically misused the IB as a result of which the agency’s officers are much better at doing domestic political intelligence than they are at targeting internal security threats. A nation’s intelligence community is expected to be a source of unbiased and objective information; if it were considered no more objective than other sources it could not fulfil this role. Stated another way, the role and goal is to inform decisions, not to promote any particular outcome. A balance has to be struck between policy maker and analyst: relationships have to be close enough to ensure relevance of the intelligence product whilst maintaining sufficient distance to ensure independence and objectivity are not compromised, but not so distant that the value of the product decreases. Managing this tension successfully requires awareness of its existence on both sides of the relationship. In India, the skewed priorities of the policy makers have meant that ensuring the independence and objectivity of the nation’s intelligence organisations was never a prime objective. And the result is for all to see. Sherman Kent, widely regarded as the spiritual father of the US intelligence analytical community, has written: “Intelligence is not the formulator of objectives … drafter of policy … maker of plans … carrier out of operations. Intelligence is ancillary to these; … it performs a service function. Its job is to see that doers are generally well informed … to stand behind them with the book open at the right page, to call their attention to the stubborn fact they may be neglecting and – at their request – to analyse alternative courses without indicating choice.”

This passage illuminates clearly the central logic behind the separation of intelligence and policy making: intelligence exists to understand and convey objectively information and knowledge of the context within which decisions must be made. A problem in the nexus between analyst and policy maker is the demand for facts. This can lead to black and white assessments which ignore the probabilistic nature of intelligence assessments and the necessary subjective elements that make them useful to policy makers. Conversely, there are those who believe in the myth that the analytic process is an exact and methodical science, capable of providing an answer.

DR HARSH V PANT

The writer is reader in International Relations at King’s College, London and an afﬁliate with the King’s India Institute.

To address this, organisations should be structured so that the intelligence provider is not simply part of the policy making process and systems and processes should be designed to incorporate checks and balances to make it unlikely that one person’s political viewpoint can sway the analysis. At the same time, the analyst should be attuned to the customer's concerns and then focus on gathering and presenting information to address those concerns in a balanced way. This need for a balanced perspective applies equally to the policy maker, who should be conscious to avoid creating an atmosphere that is not conducive to critical analysis and in which judgements erode subtleties and nuances. This balance between the intelligence practitioner and the policy maker has come unstuck in India. And unless rectiﬁed soon, will have damaging consequences not only for India’s ability to practice the art of intelligence effectively but also for wider national security.

In its simplest form, intelligence can be described as processed information. Raw information passes through a process of analysis and interpretation to provide meaning and the roots of intelligence are biological. Every animal must instinctively have a mechanism to perceive stimuli and to judge whether they are good or bad. Armies throughout history have used intelligence, but not all to the same extent. Sun Tzu stated ‘Now the reason a brilliant sovereign and a Tailor-made Intelligence wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their The question is how achievements surpass those to shield intelligence of ordinary men, is their The question is how to shield intelligence foreknowledge of the enemy reporting from policy bias or from having reporting from policy bias or from having situation.’ However, as political pressure exerted has developed, political pressure exerted to make it technology to make it conform to so has the emphasis on preconceived policy. In conform to preconceived policy. In intelligence, which has addressing this, policy of vital importance addressing this, policy makers face the become makers face the challenge to commanders in the challenge of providing effective direction current and contemporary of providing effective direction to the intelligence to the intelligence community under their operating environment. It community under their is disturbing to see Indian control whilst exercising self-restraint to policy makers unable control whilst exercising self-restraint to avoid to comprehend the avoid distorting the product they receive distorting the product they signiﬁcance of proper receive. Additionally, there intelligence in national is the question of how to avoid internal politicisation security decision-making. The cost unfortunately is and policy advocacy on the part of those within the borne by the nation at large.

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

homeland security

INNOVATIVE INTEL

INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Non-state Actors

National security is no longer defined solely in terms of a nation’s territorial integrity. Without doubt the primary threat to the security of a nation comes from other states. But there is a new security paradigm in the 21st century. The traditional state centric military threats are often overshadowed by new asymmetric threats from non-state actors who engage in acts of terrorism against innocent citizens of sovereign states. Since the last decade of the 20th century, terrorist acts have taken a huge toll of life and property in various parts of the world including our own. There is pressing need to reprioritise our security objectives and reorient the charter of various agencies and institutions involved in the management of national security. The defining mission of intelligences agencies today is to anticipate and prevent catastrophic attacks on life and property of citizens by organised groups many of whom receive support from outside the country. Indeed, all our major threats to internal security – jihadi terrorism, insurgency, separatist movement and left wing extremism – have external dimensions. These non-state actors have blurred the traditional distinction between domestic and external intelligence. The definition of national security outlined above, I must add as a caveat, takes into account security in its narrow, usually understood sense. National security has come to acquire a much wider connotation comprising a nation’s economic well-being, technological capability, food, energy security and human development. But in the succeeding paragraphs, this article will confine itself to the concept of security in its narrow sense relating to safety of life and property of citizens.

Two Foremost Threats

The traditional state centric military threats are often overshadowed by new asymmetric threats from non-state actors. These non-state actors have blurred the traditional distinction between domestic and external intelligence. National security has come to acquire a much wider connotation comprising a nation’s economic well-being, technological capability, food, energy security and human development. The UN Security Council’s Resolution 1373 has prompted many liberal, democratic western countries to adopt tough terrorism speciﬁc laws. But the ruling political class in our country is ever reluctant to follow suit because they fear that a tough law would be unpopular in some quarters.

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

fter every major terrorist attack intelligence agencies invariably face criticism and undergo public scrutiny. Quite often the agencies are made the scapegoat. People talk about revamping intelligence, committees are formed and a case is made out for greater allocation of resources and restructuring the intelligence apparatus. But once the storm passes over, the policy makers, the media and the public forget the matter. Worse still, they seem to resent a really effective, meaningful role for the intelligence. As a result, intelligence operates on the fringe of government, often unable to upgrade collection assets and recruit good quality, talented people. Structural reforms in the shape of new institutions do take place occasionally, but systemic or fundamental change hardly ever takes place. For systemic change to take place, we need to reassess our national security objectives and determine what kind of intelligence needs to be collected in the context of the complex security scenario today. It is important to remember that we have not been able to formulate a viable national security doctrine because there is no consensus on core issues and objectives.

The intelligence gathering capability of the concerned state governments as well as the training, weaponry, equipment and intelligence collection mechanism of central paramilitary forces like the CRPF must be revisited in order to neutralise armed guerrillas operating from secret hideouts in dense forests.

KALYAN K MITRA IPS

The repeated terrorist strikes (RETD) in urban city centres across the country have underscored the The writer served in R&AW in cabinet secretariat. grim truth that the government has He was Director, failed to win the war against Jihadi Aviation Research terrorism sponsored and funded by Centre and retired as the ISI of Pakistan. The new breed Principal Director, of homegrown terrorists are often DG Security. He writes educated and technology savvy on security related issues. youth motivated by perceived grievances against the Indian state. The radicalisation of a small segment of the minority community have grave implications for internal security. There is urgent need for comprehensive counter-terror policy based on national consensus cutting across the political spectrum. Such a policy must incorporate measures to identify and isolate the terrorist fringe from the rest of the community most of whom are peace loving law-abiding citizens. Unfortunately enough, the counter-terror response of the government has been politicised. It is time that logic of overriding national interest prevailed over short-sighted vote bank politics.

The result is there for all to see. The UN Security Council’s Resolution 1373 prompted many liberal, Interdiction and neutralisation of the has democratic western countries terrorist prior to his attack has to be the to adopt tough terrorism key element in government response. speciﬁc laws. But the ruling class in our country The terrorist core group is not easy to political is ever reluctant to follow suit penetrate, but their support apparatus because they fear that a tough is usually much easier to get into. The law would be unpopular in cornerstone of comprehensive response some quarters.

The Naxal menace and jihadi terrorism occupy the centrestage in the discourse on internal security today. Let us brieﬂy examine the problem of Naxal terror ﬁrst. Political and bureaucratic ambivalence continue to plague the government’s anti-Naxal strategy. The to national security imperatives has to be Counter-intelligence reign of terror unleashed effective counter by heavily armed Maoists the establishment of an apex body like the An has spread to more than a much discussed National Counter Terrorism terrorism strategy to contain and neutralise the threats dozen states. It has taken Centre which can coordinate the activities from all kinds of terrorist a heavy toll of innocent of intelligence, counter-intelligence and law groups must be integrated lives and caused wanton with counter-intelligence destruction of property. The enforcement agencies operations designed to propensity to downplay destroy activities of hostile the gravity of left wing extremism while looking for the so-called intelligence agencies and trans-border terrorist networks. “root cause” has been the primary reason for government’s In the interest of national security, we have to deal with failure to tackle heavily armed groups of ruthless killers marginal elements within the society, people who would who are waging war against the Indian state to capture betray their fellow citizens for personal gain, money, political power. They have developed linkage with terrorist religious or ideological belief. Discovering the in-country organisations within and outside the country. The Naxal modules and degrading them ought to be the main terrorists forcibly collect funds, extort money and oppress focus of counter-terror operations. This cannot be done the very same poor people whose cause they profess to unless there is cooperation between counter-intelligence, champion. They resist development efforts because the law-enforcement and administrative organisations. These movement draws sustenance from lack of development. disciplines should be mutually supportive.

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

homeland security

INNOVATIVE INTEL

Both the IB and the R&AW will need top of the line specialists, engineers, scientists, linguists and crypt-analysts more than ever before. Finding talented, qualified people will pose a big challenge for leaders of the intelligence community. The intelligence culture has to change so that managers of intelligence could borrow a leaf out of the corporate leader’s handbook for sharpening human resource management skills

Interdiction and neutralisation of the terrorist prior to his attack has to be the key element in government response. To protect all possible terrorist targets in a country of India’s size and diversity is of course an unrealistic goal because there is no dearth of soft targets and the terrorist has the added advantage of surprise because he chooses the time and place of attack. The terrorist core group is not easy to penetrate, but their support apparatus is usually much easier to get into. Counter-terror intelligence operation should discover and identify hostile groups and their leaders, identify people who are vulnerable to entrapment or recruitment and ﬁnd out extent to which such groups have developed their network within a given area. The cornerstone of comprehensive response to national security imperatives has to be the establishment of an apex body like the much discussed National Counter Terrorism Centre which can coordinate the activities of intelligence, counter-intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

Intelligence And Policy Makers

Intelligence is of very little consequence unless the policy makers accept it and act upon it as and when required.

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

The relationship between the policy maker and the intelligence community is full of pitfalls. Many things can go wrong and they often do. Since it is the “silent service”, intelligence is often made to accept blame even when the fault lies elsewhere. The relationship ought to be based on perfect honesty on the part of the concerned agency and clear understanding on the part of its political master about limits to intelligence and what it cannot accomplish. More often than not, the crisis

of intelligence is rooted in disappointment resulting from unrealistic expectations. While it is true that intelligence cannot function in a vacuum and must necessarily have knowledge about government’s policy in order to focus its collection efforts, the importance of unbiased intelligence and its neutral role in policy making cannot be over emphasised. Empirical evidence across the globe including our own country has shown time and again the perils of too close cooperation between intelligence chiefs and policy maker. Human nature being what it is, intelligence cannot escape from falling in line with the policy of the ruling political elite and processing the type of intelligence sought by them. The desk analysts are often unable to do imaginative out-of-the-box analysis and anticipate worst case scenario that might appear low in probability but high in consequence because there is reluctance on the part of consumers of intelligence to accept information that challenges conventional beliefs and past experience. The decision-makers, to make matters worse, often preempt the role of intelligence and exert pressure to shape their

products to support policies already decided upon. In the ﬁnal analysis, much depends on the integrity and strength of the key players, namely, the chiefs of intelligence and their political masters.

UN Security Council’s Resolution 1373

Change In Intelligence Culture

There is growing realisation that obsession with secrecy has prevented the agencies from interacting with outside world where a good deal of knowledge and expertise is available. With rapid advances in technology and information revolution, there is need to understand and interpret vast amount of complex data collected from a variety of sources – clandestine as well as open. This calls for multi-disciplinary, futuristic approach to analysis of data. Both the IB and the R&AW will need top of the line specialists, engineers, scientists, linguists and crypt-analysts more than ever before. Finding talented, qualified people One of the biggest shortcomings of our intelligence will pose a big challenge for leaders of the apparatus is lack of inter-agency collaboration intelligence community. The intelligence culture at centre, between the centre and the states and has to change so that managers of intelligence could borrow a leaf out of the corporate leader’s among the state agencies themselves. Information handbook for sharpening human resource is still readily shared vertically up the chain of management skills. If intelligence organisation command but not horizontally with other agencies runs like just another government department, then it will retain dead wood with sheltered people and demotivate the talented ones. At the end of the day, the effectiveness of our national (DNI) in the US has described as “Stovepiping” of intelligence effort will be directly proportional to the intelligence which hampers information sharing, ability of the agencies to recruit and retain talented men collaboration and integration (Foreign Affairs, and women who fit the bill. A few specific suggestions July-August 2007). In the USA, these shortcomings were sought to be rectified by creating the post of are mentioned below: DNI through ‘Intelligence Reform and Terrorism  There should be greater flexibility in hiring and Prevention’ Act, 2004. We have not yet been able to forge a collaborative approach to intelligence firing employees.  Recruitment should take place at various levels, with right balance between ‘centralised direction including lateral induction at middle and top levels on and decentralised execution’. The proposed and much debated National Counter Terrorism Centre the basis of carefully devised guidelines.  Contract employment should be considered as and with powers to monitor, coordinate and share terrorism-related information with state agencies has when necessary.  The career development of intelligence officers after not been able to take off yet and there seems little basic training should be a continuous process in order chance of NCTC becoming a reality. The NATGRID, to determine aptitude for type of intelligence work another new institution for networking database has yet to become operational. such as analysis, operations and so on.  Promotions should be based on performance and Overhauling intelligence culture referred to earlier, not seniority.  The unsuitable and the non-performer must be may not happen any time soon because bureaucracy and government institutions resist change. However, squeezed out. eventually the vital questions like the accountability Lack Of Cooperation of intelligence agencies and the need for legislative One of the biggest shortcomings of our intelligence oversight of their operations will have to come apparatus is lack of inter-agency collaboration at centre, out in the public domain for debate. Intelligence between the centre and the states and among the state organisations in several western countries are subject to agencies themselves. Information is still readily shared such oversight. As a part of the process of intelligence vertically up the chain of command but not horizontally reform, our agencies will have to be made accountable with other agencies. As a result, we have what without compromising the need for operational Mike McConnell, the Director of National Intelligence flexibility and secrecy.

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

neighbourhood watch

DANCE OF CIVILISATIONS

CAUSALITY

EXTERNAL FORCES, INTERNAL THREATS If the past is measured with the same parameters as the present, then nowadays, India is relatively stable in comparison. With a population of 1.24 billion, industry ﬁring on all cylinders, the threat of occupation from invading neighbours is unimaginable. Modern times may not be a Gupta Dynasty “Golden Age”, however it isn’t in the throes of a Hephthalite invasion either. India’s security model is not a simple internal / external dichotomy, instead its a kaleidoscope of possibilities, each element reﬂected by and obscured from the next. Seven countries interlinked by proximity, history and goals. So how does India gain and maintain trust with its own people and neighbours? Risk taking may be the answer.

o grasp the external and internal security topography that threatens India, we need to understand its relationship to causality. Exogenous forces may or may not stream into endogenous threats and paradoxically internal threats may or may not cascade externally. In other words, the cause of forces acting on either side may have an inimical ripple effect. When contemplating the security challenges India has confronted over the centuries compared with the present day it is easy to comprehend the difference. If the past is measured with the same parameters as the present, then nowadays, India is relatively stable in comparison. To juxtapose the last 66 years with the preceding 6666 years might be imposing a slight bias in terms of time, however India is now an independent nation. With a population of 1.24 billion, industry ﬁring on all cylinders, the threat of occupation from invading neighbours is unimaginable. Modern times may not be a Gupta Dynasty “Golden Age”, however it isn’t in the throes of a Hephthalite invasion either.

New Nationalism

The Indian subcontinent has a long history, however the nation that is Bharat Ganrajya (Republic of India) today is still in its infancy. That's not a negative statement but a positive one. India has the people power, a comparatively strong democratic base and one of the largest English speaking populations. For millennia it has been the victim of countless invasions, civil uproars, divisions of north and south and territorial partitions based on religious context to eventually an amalgamated socio-economic world player. A landscape of spectacular kingdoms, rich in language and vibrant culture one could say historically

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

“ To secure against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself. ” – Sun Tzu Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka Amicable agreement or irreconcilable antagonism, political and religious leaders rarely see eye to eye. Taking religion out of the equation to establish neutral ground

China

Pakistan

Nepal

Bangladesh Myanmar

it is represented by the Hindu deity – Kali, into a new form of modern state forged as one nation, represented by the goddess – Durga. India’s security model is not a simple internal / external dichotomy, instead its a kaleidoscope of possibilities, each element reflected by and obscured from the next. Seven countries interlinked by proximity, history and goals. So how does India gain and maintain trust with its own people and neighbours? Risk taking may be the answer. Those risks need to be calculated and respective plans drawn up and decisive action taken. Hot on India’s heels is China. These two aspiring super powers are going head to head in a race to the top. The main difference between the two is China`s precision planning mechanisms. The Five Year Plan and the Science 50 year plan enacted by China are proving the bedrock for its success. Each country is fighting border disputes with each other and with other countries as well as aligning partners. China borders approximately 15 countries, India 7 and when we look at this strategically it is easy to see China is busier than India in the protective domain. This battle to be in the super power club is like the United States and Russia or the United States and Japan of yester year. In many ways this is healthy competition and there are many beneficiaries.

Bhutan

Sri Lanka

would encourage amicable agreement. Invoking a mental modus vivendi (agree to disagree) to bring forth a solution could be a method of handling any heated dispute or perceived difference. Stripping away the many adjectives in a debate leaves little to argue with at the end of the day. Adjectives bring about clarity but in that process distort basic truths. “You are my brother” has a benign meaning, if compared to Big Brother or Younger Brother. “Believer” in a higher power or supernatural beings dissolves labels like Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu or Christian. Holding a

plain view of the word Muslim versus Shia or Sunni can have a positive resonating effect at the negotiating table for all concerned. We cannot make stereotypical assumptions and expound thousands of “what if” scenarios. Just for argument’s sake, we could assume that Pakistan, an Islamic DAMIEN MARTIN republic is harbouring terrorists. The writer is an IT and Does that mean that Bangladesh Security professional, is doing the same because Counterterrorism and 89 per cent of the population is Combatives expert based Muslim? On the contrary, all in Japan for the last 10 years. He specialises countries, like people, must be in cyber threats, social viewed by their efforts not their religious persuasion. Within engineering and corporate security and a regular the religions of Christianity keynote presenter for and Buddhism there have been ASIS and OSAC. Currently conflicting views over time he is the Director for resulting in factionalised groups. the IACSP Japan and an Catholics and Evangelists may Associate Professional worship the same God yet their with the OPSEC Society dogma dictates a different focus. and a Certified Master Anti-terrorism Specialist. The depiction and practices of He is the only PDR Japanese Buddhists compared to (Personal Defence Buddhists of Thailand, China or Readiness India are a far cry from being the – Tony Blauer’s SPEAR same. In the Islamic world where system) coach in North Shia battle against Sunni over East Asia. inherency and interpretations of scripture, intolerance exists amongst brethren. Bangladesh and Pakistan share a religious affinity but deeper than that is a heritage outside of religious barriers linked back to India. The stability of a country is imperative to the security of a neighbouring country as cross-border vulnerabilities create susceptibility that cascade into a dangerous butterfly effect. Bangladesh is a guiding star for other Islamic based governments. Bangladesh has female leadership, a vision for education, training and skills development in conjunction with the digital age which together embodies hope. The Islamic Golden Age between 800 AD and 1100 AD was influenced by the Qur'anic injunctions and hadith such as "The ink of a scholar is more holy than the blood of a martyr" that stressed the value of knowledge. Since the times of the Abbasids rarely has innovation and modernisation been promoted so vigorously. Bangladesh’s fight against terrorism and improved internal security in

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

neighbourhood watch

DANCE OF CIVILISATIONS enemy is my friend, does create animosity and suspicion. As Pakistan`s powers wane, China is multi-tasking and engaging heavily in the promotion of Chinese language and culture in other places namely, Nepal. With resistance to Maoist rebellions at the forefront of the Nepalese government, the last thing Nepal needs is more indoctrination. The Chinese government is also worried about Tibetans living in Nepal adding atmospheric pressure to the current Sino-Indian air of distrust. Nepal, a relative peace-promoting nation is heating up from constant pressure and confusion.

addition to cultivating relations with India recently have been impressive. Shonar Bangla 2021 of building a digital Bangladesh will deﬁnitely change the industrial landscape. The Sheikh Hasina government is desperate to demonstrate strong leadership to the outside world. India’s attention should be focused on Bangladesh and assisting where it can.

India-China-Pakistan Scenario

Sino-Indian tension is best explained as healthy competition however the Pakistan-China alliance is an odd one. China’s aim is to solidify its borders along the Himalayas, which also happens to be India’s focus. But does the occasional sabre-rattling instill fear by aligning with volatile nation states like in the case of China and Pakistan? Using that old war maxim that the enemy of my enemy is my friend, does create animosity and suspicion. As Pakistan’s powers wane, China is multi-tasking and engaging heavily in the promotion of Chinese language and culture in other places

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

In Myanmar, there is a different type of stage being set. Economic opportunities are increasing through successful strategic planning from China and India rarely has a part to play. The recently completed Sino-Myanmar pipeline only cements China’s relationship with Myanmar and illustrates the ongoing trust between the two. The India-Bangladesh-Myanmar pipeline proposal on the other hand shows evidence of strain. The twist to this sordid affair is that India and Bangladesh felt the repercussions of the anti-Islamic demonstrations involving Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, whereas China did not. What happens next door tends to impinge on India's stability or at the very least raise alarms. One of the reasons for China`s success in Myanmar is undoubtedly the participation as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, something India has yet to consider.

Sri Lanka-China Entente Cordiale

Although not a physical land border, Sri Lanka too is making headway with China. Late last month, Sri Lanka signed an agreement with the Chinese to upgrade the relations between the two countries to a “strategic cooperative partnership.” Closer ties between the two will not help India’s cause and possibly escalate the need to lay down proper foreign relationship building at the next roundtable meet. The bottom line is that political and religious issues in South Asia emphatically dog peace, safety and economic prosperity for this region. It does not appear to be any particular religion against another per se. What is interesting however is that most of these countries share an historical cultural connectivity. China doesn't share the same cross-cultural bond as India with countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and to an extent Myanmar, however China is attaining results faster and more efﬁciently than India. Is it because they can negotiate better at an International level, put religion aside as it holds none of its own or that the other team is failing, therefore winning by attrition? Is the lack of internal unity amongst the India’s leaders reverberating to the outside? Could a discussion involving all the prominent Indian subcontinent leaders promote thematic coherence in one sitting? The possibility is just as unlikely as the probability; therein lies the problem.

A Rainforest

Trees, in their quest for light create darkness to a world below.

On the surface, it appears that personal agendas of political parties weigh more than national interest. There must be a “one nation, one goal”. A similar example in Australia that questions the management of the country by the Labour Party: The majority of people voted for Labour leader, Kevin Rudd and he was successfully elected as the Prime Minister of Australia in 2007. During his term fellow Labor Party representative Julia Gillard overturned his position as leader. Then in the 2010 election, Gillard was elected and before her term ended Kevin Rudd returned in kind with an ousting of his own. When these types of egocentric acts occur one wonders who is running the country? The voting process is now impotent – a meaningless act, a mere facade to make voters think they have control. Make no mistake politics is more about self-proclamation than endearing a nation. It should not be for outsiders to criticise Indian leadership skills, but more about a peer level critique. A consensus needs to be reached to ensure the future is secure. Although a play on words, the Indian security paradigm resembles the “Orlova Syndrome” (named after the MV Lyubov Orlova). The News is “all over” (Orlova) it but little is being done. All parties involved are claiming immunity of responsibility for this rat infested ghost ship as it drifts aimlessly. If nothing is done there are few possibilities for the vessel: It will collide with another object, sink or an agreement between several parties will pool together to rectify the course of action. The same would apply for success of the subcontinent.

External Forces: Cross-border Threats Geographically close to the flames of the encroaching Global War On Terror (GWOT) it does battle potential fires of animosity from neighbours: Categorising India’s neighbours by types of fires is a anecdotal way of expressing security volatility. Pakistan: Potential Bush Fire It’s close proximity to Iran and Afghanistan. Economic ties are strengthening between India and Pakistan but there is continuing internal political instability. Athough there is willingness to strengthen ties where possible, this region could change at any moment because of either internal or external pressure. Bangladesh: Controlled Fire Bangladesh is focused on reducing terrorism and stabilising the economy. It is making efforts to reengage India and improve its economic status. Myanmar: Ember India still has a lot to be done to win Myanmar’s trust but the possibilities are real. There is also a smouldering ember for Islamic uprising. China: Gas Tanker Speeding Down A Highway The driver is alert but at high speeds things get dangerous. China has Maoist supporters, a large army and air force, nuclear potential, direct competition in labour costs and industry building and the population size very similar to India at 1.3 billion.

Although a play on words, the Indian security paradigm resembles the “Orlova Syndrome” (named after the MV Lyubov Orlova). The News is “all over” (Orlova) it but little is being done. All parties involved are claiming immunity of responsibility for this rat infested ghost ship as it drifts aimlessly. If nothing is done there are few possibilities for the vessel: It will collide with another object, sink or an agreement between several parties will pool together to rectify the course of action. The same would apply for success of the subcontinent Nepal: Arson Nepal’s survival is circled around hydropower and tourism versus political instability and Maoists. If this ﬁre is lit it won’t be by natural means. Propaganda and poverty will ignite this one. Bhutan: Kitchen Stove Warm and friendly towards India and cool to China. India can sit down to a comfortable setting with Bhutan. “You see, there is only one constant, one universal, it is the only real truth: causality. Action / reaction. Cause and effect” The Merovingian (Matrix II reloaded) India’s future is bright provided a proactive approach to education and relationship building increases. Consolidating security at a federal level, opening up closed communication channels with neighbors and ﬁnding common ground internally and externally will reengage India’s turbo booster of regional leadership. Rather than blindly sail through threatening waters, it is bettertoclimbthelookoutpostandnavigatewithprecision. Without security there is no safety just as there is no agreement without understanding.

References

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-22365488 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/apr/23/ nepal-china-tibet-india-araniko-highway http://www.thedailystar.net/beta2/news/myanmarbangladesh-india-gas-pipeline/ http://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2013/01/08/ why-have-the-islamic-countries-failed-to-developeven-with-resources-like-oil-while-countries-with-noresources-like-switzerland-have-ﬂourished/ http://www.business-standard.com/article/newsians/there-will-be-element-of-continuity-in-bhutanindia-ties-113071400605_1.html

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

coastal security

RISING TO THE CHALLENGE

INDIAN COAST GUARD GROWTH TRAJECTORY POST 26/11

India has a 7,500 km long coastline, 1,197 islands and islets (most of them uninhabited) and can be used as staging posts by terrorists, smugglers, pirates, poachers or gun runners for ne farious activities, numerous oil rigs off both the coasts and numerous oil refineries, oil storage facilities and nuclear power stations along both the coasts (all of them vulnerable to terrorist attacks) and 13 major ports along with dozens of minor ports, which (like airports) need to be protected from terror attacks. Adding to the problem are over 3,00,000 fishing boats (over 98 per cent of these are vintage boats with no wireless or navigation system) manned by over two million fishermen with no identity cards, operating with little control or knowledge of the state administration.

designated coastal authorities by special internationally recognised systems, regular patrolling by aerial and seaborne platforms and timely interception of these seaborne terrorists and criminals by maritime agencies like the Navy, Coast Guard and Marine Police etc. India still has some way to go to ensure total coastal security. The numerous landing points for fishing vessels in ports like Mumbai need to have police posts, while the Port Control (like Air Traffic Control in Airports) needs radar, wireless and cameras to be constantly aware of the location and movement of every vessel (including fishing boats and dhows) – indeed nothing should move without permission and knowledge of the Port Control, which should keep the Maritime Security Agencies informed in real time, using fibre optic data links.

UNCLOS Legacy

As navies are expensive, some nations like USA, Japan, South Korea, China and India have created cheaper maritime forces like Coast Guard for coastal policing tasks. The Indian Coast Guard (ICG) is still not equipped sufﬁciently to fulﬁll its originally mandated tasks. It was basically founded with the intention of creating a

"transferred" to the newly formed service. The ICG was formally created by an Act of Parliament on 19 August 1978. The first few Chetak helicopters were inducted in 1982, followed by a few fixed wing Fokker F27 aircraft. This fledgling force was initially tasked with numerous responsibilities which included enforcement of maritime laws in the EEZ, safety of life and property at sea, collection of scientific data, protection of fishermen, assistance to fishermen in distress at sea, protection and preservation of marine environment, prevention and control of marine pollution, assistance to customs and other authorities in anti-smuggling operations, safety and protection of artificial islands and offshore terminals. In addition the ICG forms part of the navy during wartime.

Inadequate Facilities

VICE ADMIRAL ARUN KUMAR SINGH (RETD)

The writer retired as Flag Ofﬁcer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval Command, Visakhapatnam. His key appointments included Director General of the Indian Coast Guard (during the Tsunami of 26 December 2004) and Commander-in-Chief of the Tri-Service Andaman and Nicobar Command. He is also a proliﬁc writer on maritime, strategic and nuclear issues.

Despite the Mumbai bomb blasts of 1993 (Dawood Ibrahim's gang brought the explosives by sea from Pakistan), the ICG did not get the assets it needed to carry out its tasks. In 2005, the force levels comprised 50 odd ageing vessels, six hovercraft and 44 aviation units (helicopters and aircraft), 22 odd shore stations, manned by a paltry 6,500 sailors and 700 ofﬁcers. The same year, with an improving economy, the government sanctioned the additional indigenous procurement of 35 vessels (mostly small patrol boats). Other important issues like coastal radar stations and 87 coastal Indian Marine Police (IMP) stations with about 200 small patrol boats were still pending approval. The IMP was a new concept in keeping with the Indian practice of creating a new force after every new incident. Unfortunately, it resulted in every coastal state ﬁrst creating a post of a two star police Inspector General with no force levels or coastal police stations under him, till the 26/11 terror attacks on Mumbai once again exposed gaping loopholes in our coastal security system.

fter 26/11 some ad hoc attempts have been made to remedy this sorry state of affairs, but much more needs to be done – the majority of these tiny vintage fishing boats need to be replaced by about 10,000 modern deep sea trawlers, which will be fitted with modern equipment. After all, the fishermen need to act as the "eyes and ears" of the nation at sea and should be in a position to immediately report any suspicious terrorist or contraband activity at sea to the Indian Maritime Security agencies like the Indian Navy, Indian Coast Guard etc.

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Adding to this chaos are hundreds of international merchant ships and numerous coastal merchant ships which ply the sea routes close to peninsular India. These chaotic conditions permit marine terrorists, gun runners, poachers, smugglers and pirates to operate freely. The only anti-dote is real time MDA (Maritime Domain Awareness) based on coastal radar stations, coastal and waterfront patrolling, international co-operation, ships and ﬁshing vessels equipped with electronic automatic identiﬁcation systems, distress warning systems and reporting their positions regularly and automatically to

low cost seagoing paramilitary force, to police the vast 2.01 million sq km of the Indian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which came into force vide the Maritime Zones of India Act of 1976. This EEZ was created after the 1972 United Nations Convention on Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) awarded EEZs to all coastal states. The Interim ICG was founded on 01 February 1977, when two small frigates, ﬁve small patrol boats and a few hundred Indian Navy ofﬁcers and sailors were

Clearly our coastal security system had huge gaps which were exploited by the Pakistani terrorists who attacked Mumbai on 26 November 2008. To put things in perspective Japan and South Korea, respectively have over 500 and 260 vessels and over 100 aircraft cum helicopters in their coast guards, while the US Coast Guard has about 2,000 vessels. India needs an ICG with over 300 vessels and over 160 aircraft cum helicopters, along with a coastal radar chain, over 200 coastal Marine Police stations and over 700 small Marine Police boats for patrolling close to coast and inside harbours. Fortunately, the ICG personnel (ofﬁcers and sailors) undergo training with the Indian Navy and the ICG ships and aircraft have been exercising regularly with the Indian Navy and also with the Coast Guards of USA, Japan, South Korea, Maldives and other nations. This has ensured that the

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

coastal security

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RISING TO THE CHALLENGE

INCREDIBLE TRANSGRESSION

ships and arrest of 121 Somali pirates within 400 miles off India's south-west coast and near India's L&M Islands. However, it must be clarified, that detecting, capturing and destroying pirate vessels in comparatively open waters (about 400 miles from land) is less difficult than detecting maritime terrorists mingling with thousands of Indian fishing boats close to the coast, as was demonstrated by the perpetrators of 26/11, who used a captured Indian trawler to reach Mumbai.

Growth Curve

The ICG has been growing rapidly, with about 150 ships and 12 hovercraft on order, in Indian ICG maintains a very high level shipyards. Presently the ICG of professionalism, which meets The ICG has been growing has about 80 vessels and international standards. 60 aircraft-cum-helicopters. rapidly, with about 150 ships and New regional headquarters Post 26/11 terror attacks on 12 hovercraft on order, in havebeensetupinGandhinagar Mumbai, the government in Indian shipyards. Presently the and Kolkata, along with February 2009 made the 20 ICG coastal stations in the ICG has about 80 vessels and last four years. By 2020 the Indian Navy incharge of coastal 60 aircraft-cum-helicopters. New ICG should have 20,000 men, security, with the ICG responsible to the navy for security within regional headquarters have been 160 vessels, 40 very small the 12 nm (nautical miles) patrol boats and set up in Gandhinagar and Kolkata, harbour territorial water limits and also 100 aircraft-cum-helicopters, along with 20 ICG coastal stations in despite most of the ageing for coordination with other stakeholders like Marine Police, the last four years. By 2020 the ICG, vessels being decommissioned. Customs, Ports, fishermen, coastal ICG should have 20,000 men, 160 vessels, Additional ONGC etc. Intensive coastal stations and ICG airfields 40 very small harbour patrol boats would also be set up. A Coast patrolling by ships and aircraft, was made more effective by and 100 aircraft-cum-helicopters, Guard Academy is being co-ordinating the efforts of all up at Azikal (Kannur despite most of the ageing vessels set seagoing services and also by district of Kerala, at about being decommissioned. Additional 20 km from the existing Naval involving the fishermen to report anything suspicious. Every coastal ICG stations and ICG airfields Academy, located at Ezimala) fisherman needs to be provided to train personnel, including would also be set up with a special identity card and Marine Police personnel on every fishing boat with a wireless specialised ICG subjects. set and a distress beacon (to be activated in case of an emergency of terror attack) needs to be plugged. Here also, some work The Indian Marine Police (IMP) experiment has has been done, but much more remains. not succeeded, with most of the patrol boats lying non-operational due to shortage of trained personnel and The coastal radar chain phase 1, comprising radar and lack of funds for maintenance etc. In any case this IMP has optronic sensors (36 on the mainland, six in Lakshadweep created an additional need for co-ordination and it may and Minicoy Islands in the west and four in Andaman and be worthwhile to consider transferring all the patrol boats Nicobar Islands in the east) were to be ready by March to the ICG, while the IMP operates small rubber Gemini 2013. Also about 85 odd Marine Police stations (having over type boats for harbour patrols only, does coastal patrolling 200 small boats), linked by communications to ICG coastal on jeeps and also mans the coastal IMP stations. stations have been set up. Phase 2 of the coastal radar system will have an additional 38 radars and integration of phases 1 Thus by 2020, the ICG should be in a position to double and 2 is planned so that continuous real time data is available. its present 12 nm territorial waters patrolling zone to the 24 nm contagious zone. The next aim would be to reach a force All these coastal security forces are linked to joint maritime level of over 300 vessels and 200 aircraft-cum-helicopters operations rooms, under the navy at Mumbai, Kochi, by 2030, with a manpower of about 30,000 personnel, Visakhapatnam and Port Blair. This coordinated response so that it can take over complete counter-terror and mechanism proved effective as seen by the joint navy and counter-piracy operations in the existing 200 nm EEZ and ICG operations which resulted in the 2011 destruction of four leave the navy free to carry out bluewater and distant Somali pirate mother ships, capture of two pirate mother counter-piracy roles.

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

HELICOPTERS FOR VVIPS

A HIGHLY CONVULATED DEAL

The unbridled audacity displayed by the decision-makers is simply unbelievable. The magnitude of the transgression can be gauged by a close examination of the various aspects of the procurement process. The altitude ceiling was inventively ﬁxed to facilitate the entry of AgustaWestland as EH-101 (AW-101) which could ﬂy only up to 4,572 meters. Although Air HQ cautioned that making cabin height of 1.8 meter a mandatory SQR would lead to a single vendor situation as only EH-101 (AW-101) possessed it, the objection was disregarded. Whereas the stated purpose of issuing fresh RFP with revised parameters was to generate more competition, MoD reduced the number of invited vendors from the earlier 11 to 6. Consequently, instead of increasing competition, new RFP reduced it. And deletion of active Missile Approach Warning System (MAWS) would have left the Prime Minister of the nation vulnerable to a missile attack, his helicopter unable to respond to the threat by deploying decoys and taking evasive action.

he contract for the procurement of helicopters for VVIPs has been in the news since the arrest of the head of the Italian defence group Finmeccanica, the owners of AgustaWestland, for alleged payment of bribes to clinch the deal. In addition to handing over the case to the Central Bureau of Investigation, Ministry of Defence (MoD) issued a detailed fact sheet on 14 February containing a chronology of the important procedural milestones of the deal.

from the framing of Services Qualitative Requirements (SQR) to the conclusion of contract to have deviated from the laid down procedure. Exposing inﬁrmities in every stage of the procurement process, CAG has sought accountability and raised serious questions about the lack of transparency.

The much awaited report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) was tabled in the Parliament on 13 August. It has found the entire process of acquisition right

The Backdrop

This article endeavours to carry out an appraisal of the whole deal, relying primarily on the report tabled by CAG, fact sheet issued by MoD and the information available in the public domain. Mi-8 helicopters of the Communication Squadron of the Indian Air Force (IAF) have been meeting heli-lift requirements of

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CAG’s report has revealed that the helicopter offered by AgustaWestland was still in the developmental phase and not ready for trials. Perhaps, it was the reason for its reluctance for FET in India. Undoubtedly, Air HQ was aware of it and decided to bail it out by obtaining sanction for FET abroad VVIPs since 1988. As Mi-8 helicopter could fly only up to 2,000 meters altitude and that too during daylight conditions and good weather, a need was felt to replace the complete fleet with modern helicopters possessing better capability in terms of avionics, high altitude operations and passenger comfort. After evolving SQR in consultation with the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), a Request for Proposals (RFP) was issued to 11 manufacturers in March 2002. Importantly, it was mandated that the helicopters should be able to operate at an altitude of 6,000 meters. Although four vendors responded, the Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) found three proposals (Mi-172, EC-225 and EH-101) to be compliant and recommended that they be called for trial evaluation. Only two helicopters were trial evaluated as EH-101 (later renamed as AW-101) was certified to fly up to an altitude of 4,572 meters only. Flight Evaluation Trials (FET) were conducted in end-2002 and the report submitted to MoD in May 2003 for acceptance. EC-225 (Eurocopter Super Puma) was recommended for procurement.

Single Vendor Bogey

PMO objected to the emergence of a single vendor and directed that SQR be reformulated to generate competition. Further, the Air Headquarters (Air HQ) was directed to co-opt the Home Ministry and the Special Protection Group (SPG) in framing parameters to ensure that all operational, security and convenience requirements are duly satisﬁed. Consequently, in a meeting convened by PMO in November 2003, it was proposed to reduce ceiling requirement to 4,500 meters and have a desirable SQR of minimum cabin height of 1.8 meters. As a desirable SQR (since done away with) was simply an expression of wish, it was not a limiting factor and no equipment could be eliminated for its non-compliance. The Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) mandates that in the event of a single vendor emerging successful, the case should be aborted and a fresh RFP issued with revised parameters. Hence, the steps taken were in order. However, in early-2005, powerful decision-makers appear to have decided to procure helicopters from AgustaWestland. Thereafter, the whole procurement exercise was reduced to a sham and every single provision of DPP was tweaked to forestall challenges to AgustaWestland. The unbridled audacity displayed by the decision-makers is simply unbelievable. The magnitude of the transgression can be gauged by a close examination of the various aspects of the procurement process.

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Service Ceiling

As a follow-up of the instructions issued by the National Security Advisor (NSA) in March 2005, fresh SQR were evolved in consultation with PMO and SPG. Air HQ had been insisting since 1988 that requirement of service ceiling of 6,000 meters was an inescapable operational necessity to access many border areas. The same was also reiterated to the Defence Secretary in January 2004. However, in a meeting convened by the Defence Secretary in May 2005, it was decided to lower the altitude requirement to 4,500 meters. Thus, the altitude ceiling was inventively ﬁxed to facilitate the entry of AgustaWestland as EH-101 (AW-101) which could ﬂy only up to 4,572 meters.

Cabin Height

Air HQ considered cabin height of 1.45 meters to be acceptable in view of the fact that ﬂights undertaken by VVIPs are generally of short duration. Strangely, on the insistence of PMO / SPG, minimum cabin height of 1.8 meters was converted from a desirable to a mandatory SQR. It implied that no helicopter with lesser cabin height could be considered for procurement. Although Air HQ cautioned that making cabin height of 1.8 meter a mandatory SQR would lead to a single vendor situation as only EH-101 (AW-101) possessed it, the objection was disregarded. It made the entire exercise of generating competition a farce as the process was skillfully contrived at the very outset to clear the path for the selection of AgustaWestland as a single vendor. Despite the fact that the earlier proposal had been aborted for resulting in a single vendor situation, the fresh proposal was deliberately perverted at the parameter formulation stage itself. Expectedly, the process led to the emergence of AW-101 as the sole compliant helicopter.

Reduced CompetitionThrough Limited Tendering

Whereas the stated purpose of issuing fresh RFP with revised parameters was to generate more competition, MoD reduced the number of invited vendors from the earlier 11 to 6. Consequently, instead of increasing competition, new RFP reduced it. When queried by CAG for this anomaly, MoD replied that limited tendering was resorted to due to security considerations and that the vendors had to be vetted from the intelligence angle. It defies logic. MoD did not clarify as to what fresh inputs it had received regarding their becoming security threats since the issuance of the first RFP. Additionally, MoD justified the exclusion of five vendors on the ground that they had failed to comply with SQR in the earlier RFP. Again, it was an absurd logic. How could a vendor who was non-compliant in 2002 be considered unfit in 2006 as well? It was for the vendors to state whether they had been able to develop machines in the interim period to meet Indian requirements. Some feel that the competition was intentionally kept restricted to reduce threats to AgustaWestland.

Field Evaluation Trials

Only three vendors responded to the new RFP. The

proposal of Rosoboronexport (Mi-172) was rejected for non-deposition of the earnest money and refusal to sign the pre-contract Integrity Pact. Accordingly, Sikorsky (S-92) and AgustaWestland (AW-101) were shortlisted for FET. FET is by far the most critical aspect of the entire procurement process as it aims to validate performance claims made by the vendors in their technical proposals. Attention needs to be drawn to two grave misdemeanours during FET. First, DPP mandates that FET must be carried out in all conditions where the equipment is likely to be deployed. Even the new RFP had categorically stated that FET would be carried out in India in varying climatic, altitude and terrain conditions on ‘No Cost No Commitment’ basis. In their responses, both vendors had agreed to it. Undoubtedly, all vendors prefer to have FET at their own locations as it saves considerable costs and helps them in channelising trials in the manner that suits them the best. However, MoD never allows it. Most surprisingly, Air HQ accepted the request of both the vendors to hold trials at their respective sites. CAG has highlighted the extent of the pressure put by the then Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) on the Defence Secretary and the Defence Procurement Board. It is not understood as to why CAS was so insistent on carrying out FET abroad. It was a gratuitous demand. On being repeatedly coerced by CAS, the Defence Minister granted permission with great reluctance in December 2007. However, he cautioned that the trial process should be credible, technically competent and above board. He directed that the trial directive should give equal opportunity to both the bidders. CAG’s report has revealed that the helicopter offered by AgustaWestland was still in the developmental phase and not ready for trials. Perhaps, it was the reason for its reluctance for FET in India. Undoubtedly, Air HQ was aware of it and decided to bail it out by obtaining sanction for FET abroad. Secondly, FET is required to be carried out on the equipment being considered for procurement and not a substitute. DPP allows no deviations whatsoever. It is considered a sacrosanct necessity and DPP allows no dilution of this requirement.

methodologies were employed for the trial evaluation of S-92 and AW-101. Whereas FET in respect of Sikorsky was conducted in the USA on the same S-92 helicopter as mentioned in their technical offer, trials in respect of AgustaWestland were carried out in the UK on representative helicopters (Civ-01 and Merlin Mk-3A) for different parameters and a mock-up of the passenger cabin. Most shockingly, AW-101 helicopter was declared fully SQR-compliant. CAG has rightly questioned the methodology of evaluating different aspects of equipment on separate platforms and hoping that the conﬁgured machine would satisfy all SQR. In other words, AW-101 was selected without subjecting it to real FET. Can there be a bigger travesty of the procedure?

Additional Requirement

MAJOR GENERAL (DR) MRINAL SUMAN AVSM, VSM (RETD) The writer heads Defence Technical Assessment and Advisory Service (DTAAS) of Confederation of Indian Industry (CII). He did MSc in Defence Studies and Doctorate in Public Administration. He commanded an Engineer Regiment in the most hostile battleﬁeld in the world ie, the Siachen Glacier. He was awarded a gold medal for being 'the most outstanding engineer of the year'. He was the ﬁrst Technical Manager [Land Systems] when the newly created Acquisition Wing was established in the Ministry of Defence in 2001. He has been closely associated with the evolution and promulgation of the new defence procurement mechanism.

One of the most intriguing aspects of the deal is an increase in the requirement of helicopters from 8 to 12. CAG has found no justification for the same. The Communication Squadron had been managing with a fleet of eight Mi-8 helicopters since 1988 and had never complained of shortage. More importantly, even the first proposal initiated in 1999 sought eight helicopters (five in VIP configuration and three in non-VIP configuration). Accordingly, the first RFP issued in March 2002 was for 8 helicopters only.

However, in October 2005, SPG insisted that the requirement be increased to 12 (eight in VIP conﬁguration and four in non-VIP conﬁguration). MoD accorded sanction for the increased number in January 2006.

CAG has found the procurement of additional helicopter to be unjustiﬁed that resulted in a totally avoidable excess expenditure of Rs 1,240 crore. In total contravention of the directions issued by the It has opined that the increased requirement was Defence Minister and the provisions of DPP, different not commensurate with the low utilisation levels (29 per cent) in the past. It appears that The reasoning questions the sanctity of SQR. DPP defines the requirement was increased only after it was reasonably ensured that the order SQR as minimum inescapable performance characteristics would go to AgustaWestland through the that are considered essential for the performance of tailor-making of SQR.

equipment for the designated operational tasks. Any SQR that can be dispensed with or can be ‘overcome operationally’ should not have been included in the RFP in the first place. It is evident that special dispensation was accorded to AgustaWestland

Two interesting points emerge. One, whereas it should be for the Air HQ to determine the requirement as it is its responsibility to make adequate helicopters available for the transportation of VVIPs, NSG was allowed to usurp

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this right. Two, PMO / NSG had been co-opted with the proposal since 1999. They never projected additional requirement till October 2005.

Faulty Staff Evaluation

Staff evaluation is the last stage of technical evaluation. It conﬁrms full compliance of equipment with SQR. DPP speciﬁcally debars grant of waiver or amendment to SQR after the issuance of RFP in ‘Buy’ cases. CAG observed that both the vendors (Sikorsky and AgustaWestland) were not found fully compliant with SQR. However, the Staff Evaluation Report recommended the induction of AW-101.

Estimated cost in the proposal submitted by the Air HQ was Rs 793 crore which was duly approved by MoD in January 2006. In September 2008 (in less than three years), CNC benchmarked the reasonable cost at Rs 4,877.5 crore more than six times the estimated cost. Cost quoted by the vendor AgustaWestland was Rs 3,966 crore. Thus, the benchmarked cost was higher by 22.80 per cent

When queried by CAG, MoD admitted that the non-VIP version offered by AgustaWestland was partially compliant with respect to two SQR. MoD claimed that the infirmity could be operationally overcome. The above reasoning questions the sanctity of SQR. DPP defines SQR as minimum inescapable performance characteristics that are considered essential for the performance of equipment for the designated operational tasks. Any SQR that can be dispensed with or can be ‘overcome operationally’ should not have been included in the RFP in the first place. It is evident that special dispensation was accorded to AgustaWestland.

Frequent Deviations

To cater for unforeseen contingencies, DPP has empowered the Defence Minister to approve deviations on the recommendations of the Defence Procurement Board. It is an enabling provision that should be invoked in rare and exceptional circumstances.

In this case, CAG has observed numerous instances of deviation from the provisions of the DPP. Even the Ministry of Finance pointed out that the approval of the Defence Minister had been sought for eight deviations, including seeking additional commercial quotation from both vendors; non-compliance of two SQR by AW-101 helicopter; extension of delivery period from 36 to 39 months; reducing the validity period of the option clause from 5 to 3 years; incorporation of rear air-stairs in the four non-VIP helicopters; requirement of additional items; and deletion of active Missile Approach Warning System (MAWS). As per RFP, vendors were required to provide a warranty of 3 years or 900 hours ‘whichever is later’. On the request of the vendors, MoD changed it to ‘whichever is earlier’, thereby diluting the warranty clause to its disadvantage. Similarly, MoD granted deviation to the vendor by reducing the validity of the option clause from 5 to 3 years. It gave undue beneﬁt to the vendor. An

option clause carries a cost penalty as the vendor has to keep his manufacturing facilities functional.

Commercial Negotiations

Perhaps, the most shocking aspect of the whole deal was the slapdash manner in which commercial negotiations were carried out with AgustaWestland. CAG has been scathing in its observations. Every procurement proposal contains estimated cost of the whole deal. In order to arrive at a realistic cost, DPP mandates that the concerned Service Headquarters must obtain inputs from major vendors through the issuance of Request for Information (RFI). Such a requirement becomes inescapable in respect of systems that are unique in their configuration. Air HQ floated no such RFI. Consequently, their estimate of the likely cost was devoid of any logical foundation. It was a contrived and unrealistic estimate. The lapse is indefensible. In single vendor cases, Contract Negotiation Committee (CNC) is required to establish a benchmark of reasonableness of price prior to the opening of the commercial offer. If the quoted price falls within the benchmark, price negotiations are dispensed with. CAG has observed that CNC carried out benchmarking of price in an unrealistic manner at 67.4 million dollars per helicopter (without passenger cabin modifications). Resultantly, the following absurdity emerged:  Estimated cost in the proposal submitted by the Air HQ was Rs 793 crore which was duly approved by MoD in January 2006.  In September 2008 (in less than three years), CNC

Mi-172 Helicopter

benchmarked the reasonable cost at Rs 4,877.5 crore – more than six times the estimated cost.  Cost quoted by the vendor AgustaWestland was Rs 3,966 crore. Thus, the benchmarked cost was higher by 22.80 per cent.  Even the Ministry of Finance had pointed out that the difference between the final negotiated price and the estimated cost to be abnormally high. Offsets As regards the fulfilment of offset obligations, CAG has observed major infirmities. Offsets were allowed to AgustaWestland which were not compliant with the DPP provisions, eg creation of infrastructure. Further, there was ambiguity in the offset contract regarding the type of services and export orders to be executed by IDS Infotech (Indian Offset Partner). Surprisingly, work completed prior to the award of the helicopter contract was allowed to be included in the offset contract – AgustaWestland gave year-wise break-up of work for the offset programme from 2011 to 2014 even though the work had already been completed by IDS Infotech well before 2010. It was totally in contravention to the offset policy directions. Many IOP selected for the discharge of offset obligations were not even eligible. Worse, many programmes which were based on uncertain expectations were also included. These could never have been completed in the planned time frame. CAG noticed that offset obligations had remained unfulfilled upto August 2012. In short, the complete offset contract was handled in a slipshod, inefficient and subjective manner. Almost all critical provisions of the offset policy were flouted.

Finally

As has been seen above, every act of omission or commission was carried out to tweak the process. One can summarise by saying that the said deal is a fit case study – it provides a road map for swinging a deal in favour of a chosen vendor:  Service ceiling was reduced to 4,500 meters as AW-101 could fly only up to 4,572 meters.  Cabin height was fixed at 1.8 meters. It effectively made it a single vendor case as no other helicopter possessed that facility. Moreover, fewer vendors were invited to limit competition.  Major deviations were granted to favour the vendor – all to the disadvantage of the buyer.  Trials were held abroad on substitutes and mock-ups as the helicopter on offer was still under development. Thus AW-101 was declared acceptable without testing it. There cannot be a greater mockery of trials.  Whereas the Air HQ had projected the likely cost to be Rs 793 crore in January 2006, CNC benchmarked it at Rs 4,877.5 crore in September 2008. Something is terribly amiss.

AgustaWestland EH-101 (AW-101) Sikorsky (S-92) EC-225 (Eurocopter Super Puma)

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Unfortunately, CAG report reveals only a tip of the iceberg. The whole deal is mired in irregularities and inﬁrmities. One will not be surprised if the ongoing investigations reveal it to be a murkier affair than the much maligned Bofors.

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homeland security

WAR BY OTHER MEANS

ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN BRAIN FORCE WARS AND FOURTH GENERATION WARFARE OF 21st CENTURY

Terrorists and insurgent movements are sponsored to bleed the adversary politically, socially, economically and militarily. This also goes by the name of WOM (War By Other Means).

Proxy War

Focus is on sponsoring or ‘outsourcing war’ to ‘internal enemy’ of one’s adversary. In the South Asian context,

Advent of WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction) and nuclear battleﬁeld have forced nations to adopt other means of waging war so as to attain same political objectives. The main objective of “information war” is not only to build public opinion against the adversary but also weaken his political will to resist. The role of “irregular soldiers” or “mujahideen”, in such a war, attains signiﬁcance. In Indian context, they also go by the synonym of insurgents, Naxalites, Maoists, militants, fundamentalists or even terrorists. No wonder, some of India’s adversaries might see them as “strategic assets”.

echnology advancement and sheer lethality of modern weapon systems have necessitated the need to wage war in diverse ways. It could vary from ‘economic war’ through ‘war of attrition’ to ‘information and cyber war’. Accurate information and realistic intelligence are needed to successfully conduct these modern wars. Frankly speaking, as Alvin Tofﬂer and Heidi Tofﬂer explain in their book, War and Anti-war, the shift has taken place from “brute force war” to “brain force war”. Some military scholars refer to them as ‘niche wars’ or even “designer wars”. In some other context, these wars are also called “WOM” (War By Other Means) or even ‘fourth generation warf are’.

War By Other Means

Advent of WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction) and nuclear battleﬁeld have forced nations to adopt other means of waging war so as to attain same political objectives as was the purpose enunciated by Sun Tzu, some centuries back. These other means relate to low cost options to cause maximum damage with minimum effort. While era of direct and absolute wars might not be over yet we see the emphasis shifting to indirect approach to war. Even tailor made ‘designer wars’ seek to weaken and attrite the adversary before giving the knockout punch. In all these cases, whether “brain force wars” or fourth generation warfare, intelligence and information play a signiﬁcant role. There are three components of a “designer war”. First component is “information war”, which is launched to discredit the adversary and build international opinion against the adversary. Second is “war of attrition”, which aims at bleeding and weakening the adversary through

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“WOM” (war by other means) or exploiting frustration of discontented people. The third component is the “surgical operation” in the form of direct aggression. It follows the “war of attrition”, when the adversary is incapacitated fully to resist direct military offensive. The main objective of “information war” is not only to build public opinion against the adversary but also weaken his political will to resist. This would demoralise adversary’s armed forces and break their will to fight. Once the “war of attrition” is launched by exploiting adversary’s internal vulnerabilities, there might be collapse of the adversary even before “surgical operation”. The distortion and misuse of intelligence is the key feature of ‘information component’ of the “brain force war”. Alvin Toffler calls them “wrenches, which twist the mind”, “atrocity accusation” is one such distorted version of information which is used to wrench the mind. He cites example of the daughter of a Kuwaiti ambassador in Washington, who made a testimony to US Congress, on Iraqi atrocities in Kuwait, prior to the first Gulf War. She was presented as a victim of rape, while her real identity, as the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador, was kept a closely guarded secret. Her appearance was stage-managed. Further, it is now emerging that the primary cause of second Gulf War, which accused late Saddam Hussein of possessing ‘WMDs’ (Weapons of Mass Destruction), was an orchestrated lie to hide the real motive of initiating war. Such an orchestration of intelligence by spin doctors is often accompanied by demonisation of opponent. The 'war of attrition' component of 'designer war' translates itself into exploiting internal vulnerabilities of the adversary. It is also called 'fourth generation warfare'.

this would be so in the next three to four decades or even more. Border skirmishes cannot be ruled out but they would not be allowed to escalate beyond the border. Kargil-99 authenticates this belief. Therefore, India must pay attention to this “outsourced war” on her by northern and western adversaries. The role of “irregular soldiers” or “mujahideen”, in such a war, attains signiﬁcance. In Indian context, they also go by the synonym of insurgents, Naxalites, Maoists, militants, fundamentalists or even terrorists. No wonder, some of India’s adversaries might see them as “strategic assets”. More clever term in fashion dismisses them as “non-state actors” to avoid accusation of fermenting trouble in India. But the attack on Indian Parliament in 2001 and Mumbai 26/11 episode belittle such assertions and nail the indefensible lies.

tactics designed to combat them.

Human Rights

In a world infested by terrorist organisations, there are a host of overground organisations ﬂoated to provide psychological, legal and moral support to these terrorist outﬁts. These overground organisations justify their existence as exponents of ‘human rights’ or function as PUCL (People’s Union for Civil Liberties). The primary function of these organisations is to spread misinformation about security forces to demoralise them and impose caution on them.

COL RAJINDER SINGH (RETD)

The writer is an alumnus of National Defence Academy and commissioned into 3 Bihar battalion in June 1971. He is a graduate of Defence Services Staff College, Wellington and Army War College, Mhow. He has vast experience of handling militancy, terrorism and insurgency intimately for over 20 years in Nagaland, Assam, Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir.

Thus, one ﬁnds fabricated cases of rape, abduction and killing against members of security forces. Individuals are targeted. Most of these human rights organisations are funded as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) by foreign governments. Some of them are prominent lawyers or eminent personalities, whose words carry weight. These NGOs are the conduits for carrying out “atrocity accusation / exaggeration” campaign against the security forces to mislead the public. India is replete with such organisations and individuals.

One must understand as to how terrorism was tackled in Punjab and Assam in the 90s of the last century. Mission oriented squads operated, based on accurate information from ‘moles’ or ‘insiders’ and thus militant leaders became unsafe. Once they went on the run, it was easy to spot them and neutralise them.

These operations were often referred to by this writer as “searching for a needle in the haystack” without disturbing the haystack. Such operations discount the use of mass scale operations and general population is not antagonised. These mission-oriented teams gave birth to “Operation Wolf Packs”, during Operation Rhino in Assam, which All the same, they are the ‘new soldiers’ of the new form later came to be known as “Cat Squads” in Punjab during of war, who have obliterated the ‘rear’ and ‘front’ of the 92-93 counter-terrorism operations. They were all based on erstwhile battlefield. “irregular pinpointed information from an soldier” is the “faceless enemy” “insider”, compromised, captured The distortion and misuse of fighting you. He does not roam or bought over. Therefore, the role intelligence is the key feature with headbands. He does not of information and intelligence, operate across, hitherto known in the ‘fourth generation warfare’ of ‘information component’ battlefield boundaries. To identify cannot be overemphasised. Here, of the “brain force war”. and recognise him is the biggest it is pertinent to understand the Alvin Toffler calls them challenge of security forces, nuances of this kind of warfare. engaged in fighting such an enemy. “wrenches, which twist the mind”, It is akin to searching for a ‘needle During initial stages of ‘Operation “atrocity accusation” is one such in the haystack”. “Electronic and Bajrang’ against ULFA militancy in distorted version of information human” intelligence in such a Assam, in the year 1990-91, vital set-up, therefore, becomes the informational gaps and a lack which is used to wrench the mind primary feature of any strategy or of proper evaluation of special

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homeland security

WAR BY OTHER MEANS

LACROSSE satellites

Drone War

The 'war of attrition' component of 'designer war' translates itself into exploiting internal vulnerabilities of the adversary. It is also called 'fourth generation warfare'. Terrorists and insurgent movements are sponsored to bleed the adversary politically, socially, economically and militarily. This also goes by the name of WOM (War By Other Means) characteristics of ULFA militancy, had compelled the army, to adopt a ‘universal and an automated approach’ against ULFA, which resulted in large scale operations. During ‘Operation Blue Star’ this lack of intelligence made army pay a heavy price and it fell into the trap of militants, whereby use of armoured vehicles and heavy guns in the Golden Temple enraged the Sikh community.

Technology Plus Humint

Even operations against Maoist insurgency are handicapped by ‘actionable intelligence’. ‘Maoists’ excel in this game. Their ambushes against CRPF in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand have been well planned on accurate information. It won’t be a surprise if they have inside information coming to them from their own “moles”. Modern technology has extended the range of ‘eyes and ears’ to obtain information on your enemy. During the First Gulf War, USA ﬁrst time made use of KH-11 satellites for taking extremely ﬁne-grained photos from space. Magnum satellites were put to use to listen to adversary’s telephone conversations. Recent disclosures by Edward Snowden, an ex-CIA agent on the run, explains as to how USA snoops on other nations by making use of latest technology. Google earth maps have exact information on the territory where security forces would operate. USA made use of LACROSSE satellites for this purpose during the First Gulf War. It is on records that USA and allies made use of some 60 satellites during this war to obtain all kind of information on Saddam Hussain’s large “dumb army”, which fell like nine pins before this “smart army”. It is no gainsaying the fact that even in Fourth Generation Warfare technology would play a crucial role. Inaccessible areas can be kept under surveillance with eyes and ears in the space. What is needed is to create an effective

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PROLIFERATING THREATS

“space machine”. Take the case of “Drone War”conducted by USA in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas, over the last decade or so. ‘Smart soldiers’ operate these drones sitting thousands of miles away from the battlefronts and they deliver the knockout blows to Taliban. Pilotless vehicles can be guided and controlled by smart soldiers as Remote soldiers they control NASA flights to celestial bodies, like Mars, Venus and Saturn. Loaded with adequate weapons, containing accurate description of the target, they would create havoc in hiding areas of terrorists / Maoists / Naxalites. There would be no place for them to hide as it happened to Taliban and Al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s tribal areas. Drone weapon system and satellite-guided target acquisition system have enabled “remote soldiers” to conduct ‘counter-terrorism’ from thousands of miles away. It might seem science fiction but one must know that drones that kill Taliban are operated and controlled from Nevada in USA, some thousands of miles away from the battlefield, in the combat zone in Iraq and Afghanistan. Most of these operators are females. Their one hand is on the throttle controlling the drone's engine. The other hand is operating the drone. The joystick contains all the buttons she needs to control and operate the drone. She never removes her hand from the throttle till she gets a kill in the real time. The use of drones has made life miserable for Taliban. And many Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders have lost their lives, thus, weakening them, though not totally breaking them. These ‘rear echelon’ cyber soldiers are the real heroes of modern war. The use of drones explains the shape of things to come in the war against terrorism. Their utilisation is subject to pinpointed information. The elimination of Baitullah Mehsud, boss of TTP (Tehrik-e-Taliban of Pakistan) was because of accurate information. This information can be acquired by electronic means or human employed, as target designators or as spies or even as ‘moles’. Even the elimination of Osama bin Laden was done based on accurate information and intelligence. Use of Human Intelligence played an important part in identifying and pinpointing residence of Osama bin Laden. Electronic intelligence enabled CIA to find out his approximate location. Even flushing out of Saddam Hussain of Iraq was done based on Human Intelligence. Therefore, while modern gadgets, such as satellites and radars, can be eyes and ears in the space but they cannot confirm the target. Technology might assist detection but Human Intelligence leads to confirmation. Whateveristhe‘war-form’,accurateandauthenticinformation on the adversary acts as a force multiplier. In conclusion, I would quote Alfred Marshal, renowned economist, who, once said, “When you are not sure of the aim, you invariably double your effort”. Same is directly applicable to national security apparatus and intelligence. If you lack information / intelligence on potential enemy, internal or external, you tend to go for over-insurance and over-kill, thus, using force and weapons that are more than required; which would invariably prove to be counterproductive.

IMPEDIMENTS TO TACKLE TERRORISM IN INDIA

Terrorism in India has emerged both from internal and external sources. Internal sources are the homegrown terrorists and external sources are the foreign elements involved against Indian security. Without intelligence role in the political system terrorism cannot be tackled. Today, communalism is being fanned by fundamentalism as well as by foreign agencies who are deliberately exploiting this weakness in Indian society.

ne of the major threatening challenges which our world has to cope with is terrorism. Despite the fact that terrorism poses signiﬁcant threat to the security of the states and societies no country so far has been able to tackle it effectively. India, the theme of this article, is no exception. The Republic of India has been experiencing terrorism since its independence. Accounts indicate that since 1947 the number of terrorist cells in India has increased remarkably. A 2008 report claims that, "there are as many as eight hundred terrorist cells operating in India." India's major concern

perhaps is religious terrorism mainly with ideological and political roots.

Internal And External Links

Terrorism in India has emerged both from internal and external sources. Internal sources are the homegrown terrorists and external sources are the foreign elements involved against Indian security. As far as the external terrorism is concerned, the Indian mentality mainly holds Pakistan responsible. The reason is that much of external terrorism in India either has been

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PROLIFERATING THREATS Bangalore, home to many foreign students and employees which hitherto have been known as India's safest places, are turning up as easy targets for the terrorists. Yet, taking into account the big geographical set up of India, the complex ethno-religious structure, multilingual and social groups, overpopulation and poverty, unfriendly neighbourhood with Pakistan and deficiency of Indian democracy, one can still claim that India's overall strategy to fight homegrown terrorism has been satisfactory. But, its strategy to fight external terrorism has not been effective. This is mainly because unlike the internal terrorism which can be dealt with through social, cultural, economic and political development policies, external terrorism is partly out of Indian reach to be dealt with. This form of terrorism threatens India's security more than ever before. With the ongoing religious fundamentalism and sectarian violence in the Indian neighbourhood (Afghanistan and Pakistan) terrorism can become more complex and dangerous in India.

9/11 hijackers supported by the Pakistan's ISI or has been carried out by the Pakistani terrorist cells. In India, the main targets for both internal and external terrorists have been Jammu and Kashmir, Central India, north-east-states, and ﬁnancial or IT capitals. A report shows that from 2000 to 2006, around eighteen major terrorist attacks took place across India. According to another source, since the 1990s there has been an increase in the frequency of attacks in Mumbai and Delhi. Of recent years, Pune and

However, though the aforementioned developments imply that India's approach to fight terrorism has been satisfactory, nonetheless it has not been considered effective. It is because there are some major impediments to fight terrorism efficiently. Apart from common problems such as poverty and unemployment which can pave the way for terrorism, there are some other key preventative factors in combating terrorism. These factors, more or less, are common in other developing countries in general and are usual to India in particular. These are discussed in the following way. The first seven obstacles are indirect and structural but the last two obstacles seem rather direct but superficial.

Problem In Indian Democracy

India has an uneasy and disturbed neighbourhood. The developments there make an impact on India's internal security. These neighbours more or less have promoted, propagated and exported fundamentalist tendencies and terrorism. Peace process between India and Pakistan is less likely to happen. China, for that matter, views India as a regional threat; it cannot tolerate the growth and influence of India in the region

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Apart from positive aspects of Indian democracy, the deﬁciencies of this democracy should not be overlooked. Of course, the debate on democracy and terrorism is lengthy, complex and disputable which requires space beyond this article. Yet, what I try to put in this context is that "rich democracy" should be differentiated from "poor democracy". Terrorism is more common in nations with poor and formal democracies such as some of the third world and developing countries in the East and South and it is less common in the rich and effective democracies such as the Western Europe and the North America. India, for that matter, is a developing country with various socio-political, ethno-religious and multilingual communities coming from different backgrounds. While its political system is secular, majority of the society is religious. While many of its politicians lack standard academic education, many with standard academic education do not participate in politics. Besides, contrary to its neighbours such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, China and Myanmar, where intelligence and military do play strong role in the overall

mechanism of these countries, Indian intelligence and army is relatively passive in the state's overall mechanism. This is a weak point on the Indian part. Although the police and intelligence interference in power politics and society can undermine the principles of democracy, without intelligence role in the political system terrorism cannot be tackled. Of course, there is no need for constant police interference in rich democracies. A rich democracy like Switzerland, for example, does not need a strong police or intelligence role to fight terrorism. But, a democracy with some elements of religious fundamentalism and national authoritarianism like India needs effective police control to tackle terrorism, otherwise terrorism would continue to threaten the Indian national security. This theory even can work in democracies like the United States of America. American government never fought terrorism with soft methods alone. The CIA and the FBI have defused many terrorist plans against the US. In doing so, no doubt, rights and liberties of many American citizens have been restricted. Today, many Americans are of the opinion that by bugging and checking on people's conversations and internet activities, US intelligence agencies are violating the basic principles of democracy. A recent (2013) disclosure by Edward J Snowden (former technical contractor for the United States NSA and a former employee of the CIA who leaked details of top-secret US mass surveillance programmes to the press) is indicative of the fact that even rich democracies have to employ non-democratic measures to fight terrorism. Thus, the implementation of undemocratic measures, at times, may be worth the restriction on rights and liberties. Back to the point, however, Indian Intelligence is not that much powerful as the US Intelligence is in fighting terrorism. It is partly because of the nature of democracy in India; problem is Indian democracy. To cite one more example, one of the problems with Indian democracy is its unregulated freedom of press. On 26 November 2008, for instance, while police and security forces were engaged with the terrorists at Taj Mahal Hotel in Mumbai, the entire scene was broadcast on TV in India and worldwide continuously till the end of the scene. This act itself provided an opportunity to the mastermind terrorists to watch their own acts live on TV and to study the Indian police tactics. Put differently, perhaps it was expediential not to allow the media to highlight the incident that much live on TV.

Religious Fundamentalism

No doubt, all religions condemn terrorism, yet religious extremists preach false doctrines that claim divine sanction for terrorism and promise redemption through martyrdom. There are religious schools in India where government does not have full control over their teaching syllabuses. Among other religions perhaps Islam can be referred to as a prime example. At many religious schools and mosques Islamic teachings and concepts are fanatically presented. Although some Muslim scholars preach peaceful Islam some others preach radical Islam, as there are different ways of interpretations. This ultimately may result in what we witness today – suicide attacks and bomb blasts – in the name of Islam. The pity is that apart from the ordinary Muslims, there are considerable numbers of the educated Muslims who favour radical Islam. The leading 9/11 hijackers in the US, for example, all had secular educational backgrounds.

The number of such likeminded people is remarkable in India. Besides, the secret role of neighbouring intelligence networks and terrorist cells in spreading the virus of Islamic fundamentalism into India where Muslims constitute around 13 per cent of the population must not be underestimated. Put simply, religious fundamentalism is a challenge to the security of India because it is anti-democratic and anti-secular.

Communalism

DR AHMAD REZA TAHERI

The writer is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Azad University Science and Research Branch of Sistan va Balochestan, Iran. He is also a Research Guide as well as a Researcher at the Institute for Iranian Studies in Paris and the Founder and Director of Taheri Entrepreneurship Company of Daneshyaran of Humanities. He has served as a Research Fellow and Research Associate at Yashwantaro Chavan National Centre of International Security and Defence Analysis afﬁliated with University of Pune and a visiting faculty at different universities in Iran.

Communalism is about the conﬂicts between extremist religious communities. Political parties are generally considered to play an important role in stimulating, supporting and / or suppressing communalism. Communalism is different from terrorism, but like terrorism it creates violence and terror. Indian social scientists consider communalism a threat to the national security of India. Today, communalism is being fanned by fundamentalism as well as by foreign agencies who are deliberately exploiting this weakness in Indian society. There are a large number of Indian teachers and leaders who have no concept of nationhood, geopolitics, geoeconomics or national interest. The worse is that many political leaders follow such groups. Two examples of recent incidents of communal violence in India are the 2010 Deganga riots and the 2012 Assam violence, between Bodo Hindus and Bengali Muslim settlers.

India's Neighbourhood

India has an uneasy and disturbed neighbourhood. The developments in Nepal, Bhutan, Tibet, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, China, Pakistan and Afghanistan certainly make an impact on India's internal security. These neighbours more or less have promoted, propagated and exported fundamentalist tendencies and terrorism. Although there have been positive relations with these neighbours, this will not guarantee a peaceful neighbourhood. In relations with Pakistan, for example, peace process between India and Pakistan is less likely to happen. China, for that matter, views India as a regional threat; it cannot tolerate the growth and inﬂuence of India in the region. Therefore, in such neighbourhood, India has to cope with the threats of terrorism.

Drugs And Illegal Arms

Drug trafficking and flow of arms and light weapons in the hands of terrorists is a cause of concern. India is situated between Golden Triangle in the East and Golden Crescent in the West, both known for export of heroin. In 2005, seizure of heroin in India increased by 270 per cent. Drug traffic in India not only spoils the youth but also generates black money in the country. Black money rarely can be used for legal and

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PROLIFERATING THREATS

The first seven factors are fundamental problems which require efficient planning and long-term policies. A genuine and well-functioning democracy, good governance, responsiveness to public grievances, effective policing and economic development and effective diplomacy with the neighbours can help in dealing with these factors effectively constructive purposes. Well, the UNDP has estimated that there is US$ 2.5 billion worth drug money in Pakistan, most of this money is being laundered by the ISI to fund jihadists and illegal arms purchase. On the other hand, the terrorists and militants need arms and explosives to carry out their sabotage plans. So, arms such as rifles, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and even shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles are available on sale or for gratis supply in Indian neighbourhood. The ISI has had 3 million AK rifles in grease-pack condition for supply to favoured militant groups. The point to note is that India is badly exposed to such an unfavourable environment particularly when there are millions of beggars, vagrants and slum dwellers with extremely poor living conditions in India. These dysfunctional sections of the society are potential targets for the gangsters and terrorists against the Indian security; they can be picked up by the terrorists.

Bribery

Unfortunately like other developing countries, bribery is a major problem in India. In 2008, Transparency International had reported that around 40 per cent of Indians had experience of paying bribes or using a contact to get a job done in public offices. In 2012, India ranked 94th out of 176 countries in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index. Different sources claim that both government employees and police benefit from bribery and financial corruptions. This problem is clearly felt in the entire system of police or security hierarchy right from the ordinary watchmen to the high-ranking personnel. For example, a 2004-05 study has found that the driver-licensing procedure has been a distorted bureaucratic process which has allowed the applicants to be licensed without attending the driving test. Another similar study shows that among the surveyed individuals, approximately 60 per cent of the license holders did not take the licensing exam. Today, bribing traffic police officers to avoid the police bureaucracy of imposing fines over the violation of traffic rules is a common phenomenon in India. A private independent survey (2004-11) on Foreigner Registration Office (FRO) Pune Branch shows that close to 60 per cent of the foreigners have bribed some FRO officers to register themselves with the office to avoid the slow and painful process of bureaucracy. It has also been claimed that the Indian Armed Forces have witnessed corruption involving senior officers from the Army, Navy and Air Force which has damaged the military's reputation. Although there might not be reliable data available on how many terrorists succeeded in bribing the government servants / officers and authorities to reach their targets, nevertheless it cannot be ruled out to claim that in such environment terrorists may easily proceed with their plans through bribery. No doubt, the police-criminal links can embolden the

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WAKE-UP CALL

criminal and terrorist elements in India.

Weakness Of Education

Along with the family institution it is also the responsibility of the state institution to educate the children. In the Western developed nations, it is the responsibility of the states to see the education of the kids done appropriately. In most of the developing eastern / southern nations, states do not effectively preserve this responsibility, as if family alone has to take this responsibility. In India there are many poor families who have no idea of how to invest on the future of their children. In other words, education has failed to play its due role in many poor families with fanatically religious and traditional backgrounds. Unfortunately, when it comes to higher educational centres, we see that a large segment of the academics and intelligentsia are engaged only in academic discussions over terrorism without sorting out the problem. Social science professors and academicians organise national and international seminars and conferences on terrorism; they collect and compile data, publish them and ﬁnally place them in the archives and libraries to gather dust. Not to be forgotten that in many societies, social and cultural revolutions have been started from the educational institutions. Educational centres including universities can establish direct links with intelligence and military agencies. They can share with each other the theories and practices of combating terrorism and contribute to eradicate it.

The coming months and importantly 2014 portend to re-deﬁne and thus reshape a coming world order which may not range from the desired relative peace and growth of vital economic ties between nation states but is likely to witness the other end of the spectrum, namely, recourse to local and low-intensity clashes to settle inter-state conﬂicts with escalation to more serious exchanges always looming.

Police Investigations

No counter-terrorism strategy can be successful without the effective involvement of consistent police investigations. Although after each terrorist attack in India police would immediately take measures to deal with the problems, such measures usually would be temporary. It is because in the process of time police would lose its consistency in the investigations. This is particularly true with the low intensity terrorist attacks. Usually after each terrorist attack as security forces try to maximise their efforts in finding the culprits, to the same extent, culprits try their best to conceal themselves. This makes the job of police investigation pretty difficult. In the long term, however, as Indian police would slowly lose its consistency, likewise, culprits would gradually find courage to re-emerge with new attacking plans.

Inappropriate Security Checks

Improper and unprofessional security checks at big shopping malls, Western restaurants, theatres, cinemas, international hotels, religious celebrations and even at the airports, is a real threat to the security of the citizens in India. Although apparently the presence of security guards is noticeable at the aforementioned places, physical checks are not carried out professionally. Attacks on Mumbai railway and Taj Mahal hotel are just few references. To conclude, as pointed earlier, the ﬁrst seven factors are fundamental problems which require efﬁcient planning and long-term policies. A genuine and well-functioning democracy, good governance, responsiveness to public grievances, effective policing and economic development and effective diplomacy with the neighbours can help in dealing with these factors effectively. But, the last two factors appear to be less challenging yet vital. In this respect, intelligence and police forces require better training to overcome these problems.

he global security order and the new geographical construct, Indo-Paciﬁc Asia and crucially, our immediate South Asian neighbourhood, regrettably, showcases increasingly an acrimonious and untrusting environment among the nations which inhabit these regions. It is almost a cliché now that the centre of gravity of strategic security and global wealth has shifted to Asia with the reckonable surfacing of leading global players like China and India and many other emerging economies

in Asia. However, this paradigm shift in global power equations appears to transform the Asian landscape more towards competition and confrontation rather than cooperation and collaboration between its nations. By any reckoning, the coming months and importantly 2014 portend to re-deﬁne and thus reshape a coming world order which may not range from the desired relative peace and growth of vital economic ties between nation states but is likely to witness the other end of the spectrum, namely, recourse to local and low-intensity clashes to settle inter-state conﬂicts

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WAKE-UP CALL In India, the currently passing election year is fraught with more bad news than good. With the Indian economy under siege from gross inflation and a falling rupee, political rivalries within India’s polity at its peak, political niceties have been consigned to the winds by some political parties in total disregard of national interests. In addition, most of India’s regional satraps are clamouring for more national resources and influence beyond their geographical confines and eyeing a future role in central governance for themselves without the responsibilities which go with it. Is India and more significantly, are its institutions prepared to take on the myriad formidable challenges, both external and internal, which are already on the horizon. With all opinion polls in India currently forecasting no political formations emerging as clear winners in the next general elections (mercifully they be wrong) – the India Story is set to take a beating unless the Gods or the wisdom of the Indian voter decides otherwise and a single party or one political alliance assumes power at the centre.

INS Sindhurakshak

more serious exchanges always looming. That internal political and economic stability are serious issues in a large number of countries across the globe will perhaps be overstating the obvious. In Asia, the emergence of a new regime in an increasingly assertive China, the impending inglorious draw down of battle weary and financially fatigued US and international troops from a still unstable Afghanistan in 2014, the consistent myopic anti-India stance of Pakistan despite a democratic change in regime and regardless of its own monumental financial and internal security problems, the impending general elections in Bangladesh in December 2013, political instability still ruling Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Nepal in the neighbourhood and with India’s own general elections not far away – 2014 will surely be more than a defining year for Asia and India by any reckoning. How clear-cut and determined in its strategies will the US be, as it now rebalances its policy towards Asia and in the Indo-Pacific will be another major factor at play in the foreseeable future.

UPA 2, beleaguered more by Opposition parties than events or even external factors, has its hands full to fulﬁll its promises to the nation in the last lap of its governance. As it races through introducing some Bills including the much heralded Food Security Bill, the external dimensions to India’s security challenges especially in the neighbourhood requires a hard-headed determined approach.

The government must give an urgent fillip to all major pending arms and weapon acquisitions which have otherwise gone through the entire time consuming process from identification, exhaustive trials and finally approval of the government The emergence of a new regime in an increasingly assertive like the 126 strong Rafale combat China, the impending inglorious draw down of battle weary aircraft purchase, acquisition of sorely 155 mm artillery, submarines and financially fatigued US and international troops from needed for the Navy, multi-role helicopters for a still unstable Afghanistan in 2014, the consistent myopic the three Services and the paramilitary anti-India stance of Pakistan despite a democratic change in and many other force multipliers which are urgently required by the Indian regime and regardless of its own monumental financial and Armed Forces. Acceptable levels of internal security problems, the impending general elections General Staff Reserves, War wastage ammunition scales must be in Bangladesh in December 2013, political instability still reserve ensured and their safety, maintenance ruling Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Nepal in the neighbourhood and overall handling improved.

and with India’s own general elections not far away – 2014 will surely be more than a defining year for Asia and India by any reckoning

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Any wrongdoings in equipment evaluations or purchases must be dealt with in an exemplary manner but the acquisitions of critically

needed equipment must not be delayed – for the Armed Forces are falling way behind their required combat capabilities. The Armed Forces themselves must carry out honest and stringent security audits and in-house reviews of their SOPs to ensure that all their strategic and irreplaceable assets are safe and ever-ready for battle. It must never be forgotten by the guardians of the nation’s security that the agencies of those countries who do not wish to see India rise are waiting in the wings to inﬂict as much destruction as they can during peacetime. Somewhere our security and vigil is lacking and senior commanders at all levels of command and responsibility must over-ensure the required security and vigilance preparedness. Hard lessons from the unfortunate sinking of INS Sindhurakshak need to be learnt by all. It appears that some serious discussions at various levels of engagement between India and China are in progress after the recent Chinese DBO and Chumar intrusions. Nevertheless, the Chinese psyche only respects strength and India will do well to now speedily raise the Mountain Strike Corps, speedily improve infrastructure along the Indo-China border and till a boundary agreement is formalised with China, prevent any further Chinese intrusions by deterring them with our own troops carrying out aggressive patrolling till the Line of Actual Control. Even if a few live exchanges result between local troops of the two nations, we should take it in our stride. Local ﬁeld commanders must be accorded the initiative they deserve to preserve the integrity of our borders. To most security analysts, Pakistan’s ever persistent belligerence towards India, has not been the least surprising. Notwithstanding the ‘sweet-talk’ indulged by newly elected Pak PM Nawaz Sharif prior to his election and occasionally later, Pakistan’s actions on the ground and its continuing tirades against India do not portend well for any improvement in India-Pakistan relations. Pakistan’s sinister spy agency, the ISI’s masterminding of the bombing attempt of the Indian Consulate at Jalalabad in Afghanistan, the redoubling of its efforts

Somewhere our security and vigil is lacking and senior commanders at all levels of command and responsibility must over-ensure the required security and vigilance preparedness. Hard lessons from the unfortunate sinking of INS Sindhurakshak need to be learnt by all to infiltrate terrorists across the Line of Control along with the intensification of the many ceasefire violations, its endeavours to foment law and order and communal troubles in Jammu and Kashmir, the passage of an anti-India resolution on Jammu and Kashmir, by the Pak National Assembly and the Pak Punjab Provincial Assembly and its refusal to grant India the MFN status are all clear-cut symptoms of Pakistan’s unchanging mindset. Thus the Indian government needs to factor in Pakistan’s continuing perfidy and give it a befitting reply whenever required. Till Pakistan does not radically alter its anti-India

stance, while ensuring utmost vigil, India should follow a policy of ‘benign neglect’ and just keep minimum diplomatic contact with Pakistan which needs to heal itself. India must continue with its humanitarian, developmental assistance to friendly Afghanistan unmindful of Pakistan’s machinations towards both the nations developing closer ties. India, may also, not only increase its commitments to train the Afghan National Security Forces but also provide some military aid, both lethal and non-lethal, as requested by Afghan President Karzai during his visit to India in May 2013. In any case, India will have to take measures to guard its assets in Afghanistan and also ensure the safety and security of the infrastructure it has developed in Afghanistan which the ISI and its agents would want to destroy.

LT GEN KAMAL DAVAR PVSM, AVSM (RETD)

The writer is a distinguished soldier having served in all theatres of operations in his 41 years of service. A veteran of the 65 and 71 operations, he was wounded in action in the 1965 ops. Was the first armoured corps officer to be specially selected to be GOC Ladakh where he implemented many operational and logistical innovations. Has been Chief of Staff of a Corps HQ in Jammu and Kashmir and then as GOC 11 Corps responsible for the defence of Punjab. He was especially selected by the government of India to raise the Defence Intelligence Agency after the Kargil War. After retirement the General writes and lectures on security issues. He is widely known to passionately espouse the cause of jointness in the Indian Armed Forces. As the first DG, DIA, many intelligence initiatives including abroad were taken by him.

For too long since Independence, India looked towards its West as its strategic front but to no avail. As it takes suitable measures to secure its western and north western flanks from likely collusive threats, it must realise that newer strategic opportunities await it from its East. India’s much heralded ‘Look East Policy’ can only be a success if we get Bangladesh on board for this nation can be the “bridge” for us to foster economic, political and military linkages with the vital emerging economies of SE Asia and the nations of Indo-Pacific Asia. The present Sheikh Hasina government in Bangladesh – otherwise a predominantly Islamic country – is courageously combating fundamentalist forces within and thus requires unqualified support from India on the various contentious issues it has with it. India has to be both pragmatic and magnanimous in its dealings with Bangladesh as regards the Teesta water sharing issues, exchange of enclaves, reduction of trade deficits and tariff barriers while Bangladesh addresses our concerns about illegal human immigration and our connectivity problem from West Bengal to our NE states. Bangladesh PM Sheikh Hasina has largely addressed our concerns about Bangladeshi soil being used by anti-India insurgents in our north east. To take its rightful seat on the global high table, India must be prepared to pay the price which should come after a hard but judicious consideration of its supreme national interests. 2014 – the year of reckoning is just around and the India Story has to be concretised.

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ESCALATING THREATS

into its constituent states by an American coterie allegedly headed by former US Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick as part of a cold war stratagem to do pro-Communist regimes in the eye, a position she later denied. Part of that legacy was apparent when the US supported the Khalistan separatist Sikh movement by giving Jagjit Singh Chauhan a visa to visit and drum up support from the Sikhs in the US.

Foreign Hand

Long derided by the Opposition parties as being a ﬁgment of imagination of the ruling Congress party attempts by nation states to undermine India by using ‘non-state actors’ is now an accepted reality.

With the Northern Command of the he plethora of “Central Police Organisations” and “paramilitary Indian Army in Jammu and Kashmir in forces” underscores the multiplicity almost constant engagement in a proxy of threats that confront the Union of India. It is a truism that war along the Line of Control; nearly counter-insurgency ten lakh of paramilitary deployed on and dealing counter-terrorism, with a proxy war conducted by a one-border one-force concept; and a neighbour who does not want to suffer the seven Central Armed Police Forces consequences of a full-blown conventional war is a manpower intensive operation. How intensive is acquiring more manpower by the day a product of empirical experience. That we are in there are still large gaps caused by the throes of enlarging our security apparatus both insufficient security forces along more for defence against the external threat as well as for managing the internal dimension proves the point. than 14,000 km of active borders with seven neighbours with varying degrees Game Plan: Balkanise India India has retained its monolithic character in of hostility / indifference towards India That spite of the multiple threats that at various times and the need to protect vital installations ranged from outright Balkanisation of the kind that within the country. To counter the visited Yugoslavia; to a nibbling at the periphery to weaken the federal structure is a measure of its escalating homeland security threats resilience and an innate ability to deal with and most of the Central Armed Police withstand the pangs of separatism externally Forces are embarking on massive inspired. Difficult it may appear to believe that at one time Britain was set to implement what was known modernisation drives and are being as the “Coupland Plan” to dissect India into several expanded with addition of personnel components. It finally settled for the bifurcation of and Kashmir on the basis of the two-nation and upgradation of training facilities. Jammu theory that underlined the fallacious concept that Recent events have shown up glaring Muslims were a monolithic nation unto themselves. faults in the management of security It is a concept inherited by Pakistan which is still to secure some semblance of legitimacy for both external and internal. Chief of Army trying its existence by trying to wrest the Muslim-majority Staff General Bikram Singh’s ire at the portion of the Kashmir Valley even while the people way the Pakistanis have been allowed to there are none too keen to join it. get away without condign punishment is Even more difficult to believe in this day and age that India was set to be Balkanised (dismantled) shared by every Indian.

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disposal cannot be spared from their primary role in defending the nation against the external threat now growing into what is being seen as a two-front war scenario for which more mountain strike formations have only just been sanctioned. Belatedly, it must be stated, given what has been happening in the sector opposite Ladakh in Jammu and Kashmir and the Uttarakhand / Himachal Pradesh segment of the Line of Actual Control.

The Kashmir Front

CECIL VICTOR

The writer has covered all wars with Pakistan as War Correspondent and reported from the conﬂict zones in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in South East Asia as well as from Afghanistan. He is author of India: The Security Dilemma.

The Central Reserve Police Force is In many respects, given the dual internal / external threat, operating as a second line of defence in Jammu and Kashmir there has been a great deal of truth in the Indian claim that manning sentry posts and managing the internal security there is a foreign hand in the attempt to destabilise the nation situation while the army patrols the Line of Control. Recent state through the encouragement of fissiparous and seperatist intrusions in which the Pakistan Army beheaded an Indian tendencies. In the north-east China has been a prime suspect soldier in the Kupwara sector and the more recent one in which five Indian soldiers and there is an element of were killed by intruders admission of guilt when who had moved more than Beijing says that it has “stopped Recent intrusions in which the 500 meters through the supporting” insurgent groups Pakistan Army beheaded an Indian barbed wire fence and a in the north-east which has to minefield of anti-personnel be taken with a pinch of salt soldier in the Kupwara sector and explosives indicates the given that there is evidence the one in August in which five Indian working of the ‘complacency to prove that the United soldiers were killed by intruders who syndrome’ induced by static Liberation Front of Asom defences. These events show (ULFA) has stacked crores of had moved more than 500 meters that there is no way by which dollars in bank accounts in through the barbed-wire fence Indian troops are made aware China and draws regularly and a minefield of anti-personnel of an attempted intrusion. from them to pay for arms explosives indicates the working of There is no ‘burglar alarm’ that and ammunition. would indicate somebody is the ‘complacency syndrome’ induced interfering with / cutting the In the west, Pakistan’s role in by static defences barbed wire fence; there is no trying to instigate separatism way that an Indian patrol can first in Punjab and from 1990s tell that an enemy is already in Jammu and Kashmir is continuing apace and is well documented. The Pakistan Army inside our periphery till the intruders start shooting. From has time and again been caught out trying to masquerade then on our actions are just reactions and inadequate at that. variously as Sikh and Kashmiri “freedom fighters” and, more Over the years the Indian Army and other security recently it has even dropped that camouflage in its threat that the jihadi terrorists from the Lashkar-e-Taiba would, once free forces have been reminded time and again that the from fighting the US-led International Security Assistance management of the assets at their disposal is inadequate. Force in Afghanistan, would be turned to “liberating” the Ever since the intrusion of terrorists into a military barracks in Jammu and Kashmir down to the latest. It is not just a Muslim-dominated Kashmir Valley. matter of manpower management. The Indian Army’s own That all these conspiracies failed was largely due to an studies have underscored the superior seeing and smelling unjingoistically portrayed desire of Indians to remain in one capabilities of dogs trained in a wide range of capabilities piece and fight they did to stay that way. The Khalistani from guard dogs to explosives, sniffers to infantry patrol dogs. movement dissipated in the face of a determined phalanx Team DSA has on several specific occasions drawn attention forged by the Indian Army, the paramilitary Border Security to these inadequacies and the less than optimal usage of these Force and the Punjab Police. The lessons learned in Punjab force multipliers. The Indian Army as well as the Border need to be replicated in Jammu and Kashmir, the north-east Security Force which have been in the business of training dogs within their establishments produce specialist dogs in too and the Maoist / Naxal heartland in central India. small numbers for the requirement of patrolling 14,000 km of The dilemma appears to be that the armed forces – Army, periphery. The static defences of barbed fences are beginning Air Force in particular – with the best weaponry at their to take their toll through the ‘complacency syndrome’.

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ESCALATING THREATS Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA)

The Central Reserve Police Force has only just started a dog breeding centre and while one does see more dogs in the state police forces their deployment in internal security duties against Maoists / Naxalites also is inadequate.

The Chinese Dimension

The deployment of dogs against the external enemy has evolved in methodology. Against Pakistan, irrespective of claims by the Indian Army, there is no way of knowing how many terrorists do manage to successfully inﬁltrate into the Indian hinterland. There have been umpteen cases when terrorists have managed to successfully disengage from a cordon-and-search operation and escape, the most infamous being the Charar-e-Sharif disaster. The Chinese brought in military dogs into the Ladakh standoff recently. Just as it has not been able to handle the human intrusions the Indian Army and the other security forces – Indo-Tibetan Border Police which patrols the Ladakh sector – have suffered the humiliation of having the cameras they had set up being broken and handed back by the

Indo-Tibetan Border Police Central Industrial Security Force

Border Security Force

Indian Coast Guard

What India needs is attack dogs all along the border with China and Pakistan in particular. What is needed is free-roaming batches and groups of dogs in “wolf-pack formations” taking command from a single trainer in both daytime and nighttime patrol scenarios. One immediate benefit from such a deployment would be that there can be no ambush of the kind that happened in Poonch or the beheading that also happened in this sector Chinese. The ITBP needs to be able to deal with both the PLA manpower as well as the dogs they are bringing into the battle zone. The dogs that the Chinese have brought in are not for decorative purposes. They are anti-personnel attack dogs and are intended not to allow human body contact as happened so disastrously for the Chinese at Nathu La in Sikkim in 1987.

Maximising The Dog Asset

What India needs is attack dogs all along the border with China and Pakistan in particular. What we have at the moment are dogs trained on a one-to-one basis of trainer and dog. What is needed is free-roaming batches and groups of dogs in “wolf-pack formations” taking command from a single trainer in both

The smallest though perhaps the most sought after Central Armed Police Force is the National Security Guards which is highly trained counter-terror group. One component of it is the Special Protection Group that looks after VVIP security.

Central Reserve Police Force

Railway Protection Force

daytime and nighttime patrol scenarios (Additional trainers with empathy with the dogs should be held in readiness for change in shifts). The trainer should have night vision goggles so that he can see his dogs and respond to their signals / pointers to the presence of human beings close to or inside the barbed wire fence. One immediate beneﬁt from such a deployment would be that there can be no ambush of the kind that happened in Poonch and no beheading that also happened along the LoC earlier. The second valuable advantage would be that the dogs if ordered by the trainer to attack through the use of whistles and other

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

Special Frontier Force

pre-determined signals would do so silently and swiftly giving little chance for the intruders to use their guns. The Indian patrol can back up the dogs with gunﬁre. Any intruder trying to disengage and escape into the darkness would be followed and chewed up and prevented from escaping.

Internal Dimension

This tactic applies equally to forces under the Ministry of Home Affairs deployed for internal security. The largest security force of its kind in the world – the Central Reserve Police Force with a strength that is being raised to 3,00,000 personnel has a designated internal security component in the Rapid Action Force, a commando force for anti-Maoist / Naxalite operations in the Commandos for Resolute Action (CoBRA) and a Mahila (Women’s) Force to deal with female agitators. The Border Security Force which guards the 2,912 km border with Pakistan, the 4,053 km border with Bangladesh and the most recent assignment on the 1,463 km border with Myanmar (Burma) for which its strength has been raised to 2.75 lakh personnel as part of the one-border one-force rule. In

Sashastra Seema Bal

National Security Guard

relation to all these countries the BSF is the first line of defence and acts as scout for reconnaissance and controller of prisoners of war during hostilities apart from preserving the sanctity of the lines of communications close to and within the battle zone. Nothing epitomises most starkly the perception of threat to internal security than the explosive growth of the Central Industrial Security Force. Created in March 1969 with a strength of 2,800 in 1983 it was converted into an armed police force with a strength of 1,65,000. Within a year or so its strength will grow to 2,00,000 to handle an expanded mandate to protect more than 300 vital installations ranging from airports, seaports, all the facilities of the Defence Research and Development Organisation, oilfields and refineries, dams and thermal power stations in a list that has to be truncated because of its immense length. The Delhi Metro is in its safekeeping. Many industrial and business houses have also requisitioned its services. The Indo-Tibetan Border Police as the name suggests patrols portions of the Line of

that is confronted day in and day out by the threats posed to the internal security of the nation. The recent attack by Naxals on a train underscores this threat which is made more complex by the other dimension of transportation of weapons and explosives and other contraband. The protection of every trainload of passengers is an activity that becomes noticed when dacoities take place or thefts of luggage.

Rapid Action Force

Actual Control. The nearly one lakh strong force is in the eye of the storm over the repeated intrusions by the Chinese in the Depsang Valley segment of the Daulat Beg Oldi sector of north Jammu and Kashmir. The army has asked that it be converted into a full-ﬂedged paramilitary force by being brought within army jurisdiction. Irrespective of under what command the force is, if it cannot show presence when the Chinese arrive (how else were the cameras broken) it may as well be non-existent. The ITBP has been used in internal security duties even in Delhi which is something that needs to be reviewed and redressed. One other, little known force, that is deployed along the border with Nepal and Bhutan is the Sashastra Seema Bal. Given the nature of the terrain and the kind of threats posed to India from Nepal through the smuggling of explosives, narcotics and fake currency, this 82,000 strong force is in dire need of an expansion and re-orientation of its dog squad, adding to their force-multiplication qualities. The Railway Protection Force is one Central Armed Police Force

Apart from the seven CAPFs are three paramilitary forces so described because they are commanded by army and navy officers. These are the venerable 50,000-strong Assam Rifles that is so old that it has participated in World War I. Its primary role is counter-insurgency and border security and is a second line of defence during hostilities. It is led by army officers on deputation but is under the command of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The rapidly expanding Indian Coast Guard is commanded by naval officers and particularly after the attack on Mumbai has acquired a central role in the defence of the inner line of maritime jurisdiction. Officered by the Indian Navy, the third paramilitary force is the Indian Coast Guard entrusted with the job of patrolling and controlling the passage of arms and ammunition as happened in Mumbai in 2008, smuggling of drugs and other contraband and preventing poaching. Additionally it is required to ensure that ships do no sully Indian beaches by washing out the oil from their holds and polluting the sea. Almost every month a new inshore patrol vessel joins the ICG fleet to help it to eventually patrol the 7,000 km coastline and the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone and allow the Indian Navy to look for and deal with dangers along the vastness of the Indian Ocean littoral region. Never heard about is the miniscule Special Frontier Force composed mainly of Tibetan refugees. They too are led by army officers and their job is Intelligence gathering along the Line of Actual Control with China.

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LAW ENFORCEMENT dispassionate evaluation of the working of the armed police battalions will show that though they have rendered yeoman service on different occasions and served the country with distinction in inhospitable climes and terrains under daunting conditions, there has been a steady deterioration in the working of these battalions. The standard of discipline, efﬁciency and job performance has steadily declined. Immediate steps are called for to reverse this alarming trend.

Poor Leadership

POOR FUNCTIONING OF THE STATE ARMED POLICE BATTALIONS After the Chinese aggression in 1962, there was rapid increase of armed police battalions all over the country. The standard of discipline, efﬁciency and job performance has steadily declined. Immediate steps are called for to reverse this alarming trend. The National Police Commission has recommended, in its Sixth Report, while dealing with the IPS, that there should be a central IPS cadre for paramilitary organisations like BSF, CRPF and ITBP. Selected ofﬁcers from this cadre should be sent to states as Commandants of the Armed Police Battalions.

he problem of law enforcement and order maintenance in the country is today compounded by the poor state of health of the State Armed Police battalions. Armed Police battalions are the strong arm of the district administration and they come to the need of district police when the latter finds it difficult to cope with widespread disturbance and continuing lawlessness. Now, in our country, in each district, there is an armed reserve police kept trained and equipped for intervening in law and order situations. The Indian Police Commission, 1902-03 (Fraser Commission) observed that, “It is the function of an efficient police not only to prevent and detect crime, but also to secure the peace and tranquillity of the country.” In addition to the district armed reserve, states have their armed police battalions, more or less organised on the infantry pattern. Among the states which had armed police battalions long before Independence were Bihar, Bengal, Assam and Madras. The importance of district armed reserve and armed police battalions was appreciated even after independence. It was considered not desirable to use the army frequently for dealing with law and order situations and for containing such situations, the police should have their own armed units.

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Sardar Patel’s Advice

Addressing the conference of the State Inspectors General of Police, Sardar Patel said, “It is even more necessary for State Governments to avoid in the day-to-day administration of law and order, resort to military force. It is from this point of view, and also in full knowledge of the commitments of our army, that I cautioned the provincial governments in 1947 about the need for self-sufﬁciency of their police forces. I am glad to say that provincial governments have generally been very quick in achieving this self-sufﬁciency and the occasions for calling military in aid of the civil power have been few and far between.” After the Chinese aggression in 1962, there was rapid increase of armed police battalions all over the country. Their strength has now risen to 426. This overwhelming increase in the number of the armed police in preference to the civil police has often been criticised. It has been argued that armed police battalions have consumed valuable public funds which could have been better spent for improvement and strengthening of the civil police service to the community. But against the background of mounting danger to internal security emanating from various quarters increase in the number of armed police battalions was an inescapable necessity. However, a

One of the main causes of malfunctioning of the armed police units in the states is the poor quality of leadership. It is a fact that many officers, particularly of Indian Police Service, who have not been able to prove their mettle in the district, are dumped in armed police battalions. They dislike it and explore various ways and means of wriggling out of the so-called inconvenient and unglamorous postings. In consequence, discipline, morale of the force suffer. For toning up the discipline and efficiency of the armed police battalions, the first and foremost need is to improve the quality of officering. The National Police Commission has recommended, in its Sixth Report, while dealing with the IPS, that there should be a central IPS cadre for paramilitary organisations like BSF, CRPF and ITBP. Selected officers from this cadre should be sent to states as Commandants of the Armed Police Battalions. This will make available to the state governments a number of police officers, with the experience of commanding armed police battalions in the government of India. The state governments can gainfully put them in command of State Armed Police battalions.

police battalions are detailed for prolonged law and order duties to the detriment of training. They are deployed in “ones” and “twos” on routine police duties like night rounds, controlling crowd before cinema halls, escorting under-trials in the courts etc. As a result, training of the men suffers. Its deleterious effect surfaces in critical SANKAR SEN IPS law and order situations when at (RETD) times the armed police personnel The writer is Senior fail to display proper restraint and Fellow, Institute for Social go berserk. While posted as DIG Sciences. He served Orissa I was dismayed beyond as Additional DG BSF, measure to find armed police units Director National Police in hilly mining areas posted for Academy (NPA) and DG long periods because of continuing (Investigation) NHRC. labour tension in the area. Men were He brought innovative changes in the training staying in tents for long spells of time programmes for NPA without proper supervision and officers, and sensitised acquiring indiscipline of unionised the personnel of Indian industrial workers. It is absolutely police and paramilitary necessary that deployment of forces on human rights armed police personnel should be at NHRC. He is also a for a fixed period of time only and recipient of President's the force should be pulled back to Police Medal for his the battalion headquarters as early distinguished services. as possible. This in practice has become difficult because the District Superintendents of Police invariably try to play safe and requisition more men than are needed and the superior officers feel hesitant to prune the inflated demands.

The poor quality of leadership is not confined to the level of Commandants alone. The malaise has spread down the Curbing excessive deployment of force is a major line. I have seen that Assistant Commandants of armed challenge for the Central Police Forces also. Exaggerated police battalions are afraid of pulling up the defaulting demands of the state governments cannot always sepoys and boldly enforcing discipline. In some states, an be resisted by the central government as hardly any officer of the rank of Deputy Inspector General of Police remains in overall charge of a number of battalions. The National Police Commission recommends that Another reason for the poor functioning of the for effective control and supervision, a Deputy State Armed Police battalions is neglect of Inspector General of Police should be provided training of the officers and the men. This has for five to six battalions (and not fifteen to twenty, happened because of gross mismanagement as the Commission had found in some states), so that they would be able to visit battalions, know and misuse of trained manpower of the first-hand the grievances of the men and adopt battalions over the years. As a result, training of necessary corrective measures. In many states now, the men suffers. Its deleterious effect surfaces there are DGs incharge of armed police battalions and there are IGs supervising the work of two or in critical law and order situations when at times three DIGs of armed police battalions. It is doubtful the armed police personnel fail to display proper if this expansion of the hierarchy has improved restraint and go berserk the functioning of the battalions. Further, IGs and DGs of armed police battalions should be vested with sufficient powers; very often they are without financial and disciplinary powers which put them in a very professional evaluation is undertaken relating to the task to be accomplished. There should be also close scrutiny disadvantageous position. of the demand and it should always correspond to Neglect Of Training written prior plans submitted by the states. Immediate Another reason for the poor functioning of the State deployment without a previously furnished plan should Armed Police battalions is neglect of training of the be discouraged. officers and the men. This has happened because of gross mismanagement and misuse of trained manpower Poor leadership, prolonged deployment outside of the battalions over the years. Very often, armed without adequate supervision for various odd duties,

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LAW ENFORCEMENT useful information and valuable intelligence concerning criminal groups, insurgents and terrorists. But the actionable intelligence gathered during such operations is very often not shared by the concerned authorities. This is an area in which ofﬁcers supervising the functioning of the armed police battalions and the central paramilitary forces must pay adequate attention. At present there is only one way trafﬁc and very few armed police forces are collecting and disseminating useful information.

lack of training and neglect of genuine grievances are breeding indiscipline in armed police battalions. The truth of the matter is that many of the armed police battalions in different states all over the country are slowly deteriorating with over-use, no training, no rest and no appreciation of their difficulties. In 1978-79 when police unrest spread like a tidal wave in many states the armed police units in the states remained in the vanguard of the agitation. Ring leaders of the agitation were mainly from the armed police battalions. For improving the standard of discipline and efficiency of the armed police battalions, the National Police Commission recommended a central enactment prescribing uniformity in their composition, officering patterns and disciplinary rules etc. Armed police units very often feel diffident

only. The courage and conﬁdence of the state police including the armed police battalions can be restored only by liberating it from external pressures and inﬂuence.

Operational Autonomy

The ofﬁcers incharge of armed police battalions should be given adequate operational autonomy. Tasks may be prescribed for the units and sub-units by the state authorities; but the manpower to be used, the tactics and logistics should be left to the discretion of the force leaders. Reﬁnement of the training patterns and efforts is also of paramount importance. Training of armed police has often remained mired in obsolescence. There is utmost need for upgradation of resources and quality of personnel imparting training. The imperative need to make the training

Curbing excessive deployment of force is a major challenge for the Central Police Forces also. Exaggerated demands of the state governments cannot always be resisted by the central government as hardly any professional evaluation is undertaken relating to the task to be accomplished. There should be also close scrutiny of the demand and it should always correspond to written prior plans submitted by the states. Immediate deployment without a previously furnished plan should be discouraged and fail to act as ﬁrmly as per law because of the fear of offending the local political bosses. Even a small unit of the army is more effective because it is not limited by such fears. The central police forces are also far more effective because they enjoy certain protection under the law and remain accountable to the central government

institutions for armed police personnel centres of excellence has unfortunately not been appreciated by the powers-that-be and many of the institutions remain denuded of resources and competent training staff. It is seen that during ﬁeld operations the armed police battalions gather

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Attention must also to be paid to the human rights sensitisation of the armed police personnel. There have been in the past allegations of serious communal bias and caste prejudices displayed by the personnel of the armed police battalions. Officers and men afflicted with caste and communal biases have to be weeded out and there must be constant exhortation to officers and men to inculcate respect for human rights of the citizens for whose protection they have been deployed. With the difficult and deteriorating law and order situation in the country there is constant demand for armed police battalion and the central police forces. They have to remain well-trained and well-equipped so that the need to call the army in aid of civil authorities is reduced to the minimum. This is a matter of utmost importance. During the first two decades after independence serious law and order situations could be tackled by the state police and the central police forces. Heads of state police forces considered it a matter of professional honour to tackle internal security problems without seeking army’s help. In the seventies Naxalite agitation at its peak was tackled by the West Bengal Police with the help of CRPF. Army was not called. Later on over-exposure and over-deployment began to tell on the armed police battalions in the state and in the centre and the army had to be frequently summoned to perform law and order duties. But summoning the army frequently for combating internal disturbances is bad for the army and also for the country.

SPYWARE

ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY

IN INTELLIGENCE GATHERING There is a deep co-relation between the interrelated nature of technical intelligence systems and national security. India faces multiple and complex threats and challenges to its security from land, sea and air. India’s most immediate threat comes from Pakistan. Simultaneously, the Chinese intentions and behaviour across Indian borders have not been very friendly. Against this backdrop, providing information across the Sino-Indian borders through the help of surveillance and intelligence technologies becomes an urgent necessity. When Kargil happened the Pakistan Chief of Army Staff was in Beijing and was in constant touch with Director General of the Pakistan Army Inter-Services Intelligence. India intercepted their conversations and was able to convince the world of the nexus between terrorism and the Pakistan military establishment.

he collection of information about other countries has historically been of great importance. The methods of collecting intelligence information have changed signiﬁcantly over the years. It is no more limited to the use of human intelligence. The expanse of intelligence gathering methods has by and large been seen in the use of technology. These technological capabilities ranged from an early – and not particularly successful – use of camera – carrying weather balloons snapping pictures at random, to those current collection practices (eg photo-reconnaissance satellites), known technically as National Technical Means (NTM) of veriﬁcation in the

United States’ parlance. The NTM has been in practice for decades in gathering intelligence. There has always been a quest to ﬁnd out the enemy’s plans and moves well in advance in order to develop one’s own operations effectively since the early days of warfare. In other words, domination of the high ground was sought which gave a commander knowledge of the enemy’s strength and disposition. This has become very complex in the existing environment where sophisticated technologies have been invented. These issues provided an impetus to produce the radar. Undoubtedly, radar has the effect of forcing air operations down to lower

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homeland security

SPYWARE The concept and techniques of surveillance and reconnaissance, which have evolved primarily around technological advances in the areas of sensors and platforms, are of a great signiﬁcance from the point of view of any country’s national security. It must again be emphasised that there has been certainly a revolution in the area of computers, information technology, processing and networking and such revolution has impacted the way the information is now being collected, collated, disseminated and used to achieve the rapid and precise responses in the battleﬁeld during the war.

levels to stay below the radar horizon and thus helps in evading detection. The advances made in the ﬁeld of science and technology have warranted a number of nation states including India to prioritise the use of various technologies for intelligence gathering.

The intensification of cross border terrorism in the recent years has thrown up new challenges for the intelligence communities. The dynamic nature of the problems concerning management of borders demands various surveillance and intelligence technologies in place for protecting India’s national interests

There is a deep co-relation between the interrelated nature of technical intelligence systems and national security. The dynamic international security environment warrants India to build a network-centric mechanism, which would collect reliable, accurate and if necessary continuous information on the situation. The reliability and the analysis of the information collected through the help of technology is the key for any decision-maker during a time of crisis. It must be pointed out that the effort to put emphasis on the technologies for intelligence gathering in Indian context has been a very positive and signiﬁcant development. India faces multiple and complex threats and challenges to its security from land, sea and air. India’s most immediate threat comes from Pakistan. The intensiﬁcation of cross-border terrorism in the recent years has thrown up new challenges for the intelligence communities. The dynamic nature of theproblemsconcerningmanagementofbordersdemandsvarious surveillance and intelligence technologies in place for protecting India’s national interests. It is generally believed that the Sino-Indian relation is not on a high pitch. India has a long-standing border dispute with China and all of it is in mountainous regions. China has occupied a large chunk of India’s territory and has also an outstanding claim in Arunachal Pradesh. It seems that China has been attaining its objective of creating internal disturbances in India through Pakistan and Nepal. The Chinese intentions and behaviour across Indian borders have not been very friendly. Against this backdrop, providing information across the Sino-Indian borders through the help of surveillance and intelligence technologies becomes an urgent necessity. The adversarial relations with

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China and Pakistan have always been unstable and it requires comprehensive intelligence on the motivations and intentions of China and Pakistan in order to discern their plans and actions across the borders.

Information And Data Fusion

The emergence of network-centric world has made the nation states highly vulnerable. New information technologies arrive at lightning speed, allowing us to share information across towns, across the country or around the world faster than ever before. It must be emphasised here that information assurance and information dominance is the key in the current international security environment. The other important area has been relating to the data fusion – the combination of data from various sources into intelligence information needed for decision-making. It must be stressed that India requires achieving mastery in data fusion. Fusion is the process through which one brings together multiple data on a single issue collected from persistent surveillance and reconnaissance and then combines and transforms multi-source data into intelligence necessary for decision-making. The core concept is the combination and transformation of multi-source data into an integrated information product, that is, the creation of a single, integrated, analysed “intelligence picture” from data supplied by various sensors and other sources.

Advances In The Field

It must be pointed out here that lots of advances have been made in the ﬁeld of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capability. The ISR capability of any nation requires adequate sensors and reporting technologies associated with intelligence collection, surveillance and reconnaissance. The surveillance and the reconnaissance of the adversary both during war and peace time are important aspects of the military preparedness and form essential part of the strategic and tactical planning.

The information is also being received from different sensors working in different domains / platforms / frequencies and collated manually, the technological advances would now permit fusion of imagery and data from several different kinds of sensors such as radar, infrared and other electronic intelligence sensors, in space, aircraft (eg AWACS), UAVs, ships and in ground facilities (eg ground battery radar / ASTOR) and supplemented by other wider array of sensors scattered on the terrain providing a comprehensive picture of the battleﬁeld to the commanders and decision-makers.

Sensors For National Security

The trends in the advances in science and technology suggest that over the next 20 years the various data streams produced by the sensors would be networked, merged and intelligently fused so as to be able to receive much information faster and in greater detail. The potential of integrating the various elements of intelligence gathering systems, information processing systems and the weapon systems exists in a number of countries and it may be required to streamline in India’s context. Surveillance sensors operating over wide spectrum of frequencies form the front end of the integrated surveillance system. It is the key to intelligence gathering. The developments in the field of following sensors have changed the strategic discourse among the members of international community as far as the intelligence gathering is concerned:  Image Intelligence Sensors (IMINT)  Signature Intelligence Sensors  Measurement and Signature Intelligence Sensors  Aerial Photography – Optical, Infrared, Stereoscopic, Multispectral  Electro-optical Devices (Electronic Still Camera, Radar, SAR, LiDAR) The developments taking place in the field of sensors worldwide have posed challenge to a number of countries including India. There will certainly be need and relevance of these sensors for Indian requirements in the field of intelligence gathering. The role of signal intelligence in gathering intelligence in particular is gaining momentum. The information is collected through the interception of radio waves. These are very crucial during both peace and crisis time. There is no doubt in saying that a wide variety of sensors are available in the international market that can provide high resolution images from different platforms operating in ground, air and space. Electro-optic sensors operating in visual and infrared wavelengths have always been synonymous

with the term IMINT sensors. Many of these sensors are used in surveillance platforms such as manned aircraft and UAVs provide real-time situational awareness information, which becomes crucial part of the decision-making during the case of any eventuality. The development in the ﬁeld of Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) has made the things easier for intelligence gathering. So far, it is the only all weather sensor that can provide surveillance and intelligence information during day or night. These radars are also capable of providing high-resolution images at long ranges.

PROF ARVIND KUMAR

The writer is Professor and Head of Department of Geopolitics and International Relations at Manipal University, Manipal, India.

Image Analysis Capability

The image analysis has become the key in terms of getting to know about the adversary’s capability. The imaging methods have received the widest attention in terms of intelligence gathering. Intelligence acquisition through imageries has been one of the non-intrusive means of gathering information. It must be pointed out here that the technological advances made in the image analysis capability have helped many countries in assessing their adversary’s intentions and behaviour across the border. The satellite imagery and the gradual improvement in their resolution have changed the landscape of the analytical capability of the researcher working in this ﬁeld.

What Next?

India in the current context requires strengthening its sensors capability by pursuing defence research and development. It is generally believed among the members of strategic community that the imported technologies and systems for India would be highly vulnerable. India must strengthen its R&D labs working on a number of sensitive areas including sensors technology. The participation of private industry in strategic sectors and the creation of public-private interface should be promoted at all the levels of defence research and development. India shall learn the lessons from the United States’ private enterprise and how they have been a great source of augmenting research and development in strategic sectors. The time has come for India now to promote the related basic sciences required for intelligence gathering. The following areas need a greater focus in the current international milieu:  Cryptoanalysis; Cryptography;  TECHINT Interpretation and Analysis;  Biometric and Biotech Mapping;  Sciences relating to the detection, defusion of explosive substances and devices India will require to drive and augment its capability in the research and development and then it would really be able to harness the potential of various technologies for intelligence gathering.

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homeland security

IRAQ CASE STUDY This violence was perpetrated by a multitude of indigenous and foreign groups that were active in Iraq soon after the fall of the Ba’ath regime. These can be categorised in two ways, the first is their ethnic / religious composition and the second is the goals they sought to achieve. For the first part we can identify: i) Kurds, ii) Sunni Arabs, iii) Shi’a Arabs, iv) Foreigners. For the second part we can identify the following goals: a) political power in the post-Saddamera, b) religious reasons in the context of fighting a jihad, c) separation from Iraq.

THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

IN COUNTERING TERRORISM IN IRAQ In this article the writer studies the role of intelligence in combating terrorism, with Iraq as a case study. He argues that the pursuit of the counter-terrorism agenda, solely based in the use of military force, doesn’t produce positive results. On the other hand, results can be achieved by relying on the counter-terrorism model in the use of intelligence and the application of military force only when other avenues of action have been spent.

efore proceeding any further, there is need to define the term ‘intelligence’. For that, we will use a definition first published by M Werner which says: “Intelligence is secret, state activity, to understand or influence foreign entities”.

Intelligence work is divided into five levels, all of which institute the “intelligence cycle” which in turn is the mechanic by which an intelligence agency works. These levels of the “intelligence cycle” are: “Planning and Direction”, “Information Collection” (The means of intelligence collection can be technical (Techint), via the use of informants (Humint), or via the use of open sources (Osint), “Information Processing”, “Analysis” and finally “Dissemination” of the intelligence product to the proper officials and policy makers. Each level of the cycle must effectively cooperate with the others for the intelligence product to be of value.

Deﬁning Terrorism

Having described how intelligence agencies work, now we will see what terrorism is and how its role has increased in modern warfare. Terrorism by itself should be considered a tactic which is employed either by itself, or in the context of a broader campaign. For an attack to qualify as “terrorism” it must comply with four criteria. These criteria are i) the action must use or threaten to use violence; ii) the incentives for that action must be political

September 2013 DEFENCE AND SECURITY ALERT

in the broader sense (political, religious, philosophical etc); iii) the action must have far reaching psychological repercussions in the target (that might be the demoralisation of a society and / or of the armed forces); iv) be conducted by a non-state actor. The phenomenon, albeit not new at all has an increased impact in modern affairs mainly for two reasons. The ﬁrst is the contemporary Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). This is the development of technology to a level that a small group of people could cause disproportionate damage with relatively cheap materials. The second reason is that RMA allows in even a small group of highly motivated people to press for their agenda by forcible means. While in the past a vast conscription pool was required for war to be conducted, a pool that only states could possess, this is not the case for today. Only one man with an explosive vest, could cause mass casualties and with only low cost materials. This new reality allows non-state actors to conduct war-like operations.

The Iraq Context

While operations from this ‘new kind of war’ cannot defeat conventional forces in the ﬁeld of battle, they can engage them in an asymmetric way that regular forces could not retaliate against the terrorists. This was the nature of the Iraqi campaign after the Coalition overthrew Saddam Hussein. Small armed groups set Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) causing casualties in both the civilian population and Coalition forces. Other practices included attacks with RPGs and small arms, as well as abductions of civilians that subsequently were tortured and killed publicly.

Soon after the invasion, many armed groups appeared with different ethnic composition, different goals and different methods. With the exception of Kurdish Pash Merga that kept a distance from the sectarian violence, all other groups turned one against the other and all of them, turned against Coalition forces. With Saddam gone, sectarian violence began to emerge all over the country, dragging Iraq into a de facto civil war. But besides the civil war, these groups also turned against Coalition forces which they saw as an illegitimate occupation force, or in the case of Islamist extremists as “crusaders”. In these circumstances Coalition forces and particularly Americans who bore the main brunt of the attacks were unprepared. Their forces were trained and equipped to achieve a fast conventional victory, but not to engage in operations of the “new kind of war”. The last similar experience for the US Army was Vietnam and since then, little had been done to ﬁght such wars with success.

The Disastrous Bremmer Model

After the occupation, the position of administrator of the provisional authority in Iraq went on to Ambassador Paul Bremmer III. His choice to demobilise Iraqi military exacerbated terrorism in the country, since the decision opened a large conscription pool for the illegitimate armed groups of the country. The Sunni element of the country was particularly affected, since they constituted the main body of ofﬁcers in the pre-war army. Thus it was only logical for them to try to expel the Americans from the country and regain part of their former power. This notion became even clearer when all government ofﬁcials of the Ba’ath government were expelled from the administration. Besides political mistakes, the Americans also lacked the appropriate number of troops on the ground to ensure order in the country. This allowed the terrorists greater freedom of

The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is the development of technology to a level that a small group of people could cause disproportionate damage with relatively cheap materials. The second reason is that RMA allows even a small group of highly motivated people to press for their agenda by forcible means. This new reality allows non-state actors to conduct war-like operations

movement and eventually the ability to control large areas in the country. But the greatest shortcoming in the counter-terrorism strategy was the counter-terrorism model itself. Ambassador Bremmer soon after he assumed command of the country decided that he would pursue his goal via the “war model”. This meant that areas that were ‘suspect’ of harbouring terrorists would be searched by the military in a forceful manner. This practically led to people being dragged from their beds in the middle of the night and their homes searched for weapons and explosives. This strategy particularly targeted Sunni elements of the society, causing further enmity from their part.

ILIAS PAPADOPOULOS

The writer holds a Master’s degree in International Relations and Strategy, with a specialisation in intelligence. His main research interests are intelligence and counterterrorism / counterinsurgency. He has served in the Greek Special Forces and in Greek NATO base and also participated in a series of seminars and lectures concerning political violence and international affairs.

In that model, intelligence played a secondary role. The administration believed that these agencies were better suited to vet ex-Ba’ath personnel than to run intelligence networks and identify the terrorists in the country. That meant that ﬂaws were in the very beginning of the cycle, in the ‘planning and direction’ level. Furthermore this model deterred Iraqis from cooperating with the intelligence communities practically severing the ‘collection’ level. President Bush for example informs us that intelligence tips in the country were only 12,500 per month, while when the counter-terrorism model changed this number doubled. The cycle of violence kept mounting until in 2007 when the Bush administration lost the mid-term elections and politically was forced to do something in Iraq. What was decided was a troop increase of 28,500 troops. The commander that would implement this “Surge”, as this came to be called, was General David H Petraeus who took command of the Multi-National Force I (MNF-I) on February 10, 2007.

The Petraeus Tactic

The new strategy that the General quickly implemented was twofold. Firstly he invested in the safety of the local population and secondly he decreased the use of force against them, preferring to make use of the diplomatic route. Violence came to be Coalition forces’ last resort and only when all other methods of approach had failed. This strategy brought intelligence agencies back to the frontline against terrorism. The legitimisation of the new administration in the eyes of most Iraqis, meant that they believed coalition forces could better protect them than the terrorist cells did in the past. This in turn allowed the intelligence tips to increase and the intelligence agencies to sufﬁciently pursue the various terrorist organisations on the country. This resulted in a steep fall of terror attacks, both against civilian and military targets.

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The new strategy that General Petraeus quickly implemented was twofold. Firstly he invested in the safety of the local population and secondly he decreased the use of force against them, preferring to make use of the diplomatic route. Violence came to be Coalition forces’ last resort and only when all other methods of approach had failed. This strategy brought intelligence agencies back to the frontline against terrorism What changed in intelligence thinking was primarily the ‘planning and direction’ level. While in the past intelligence worked on background checks for the ex-Ba’ath ofﬁcials, from 2007 they started trying to identify terrorist cells in the country. Their work was eased by the legitimisation of the new doctrine in the eyes of Iraqi society. As was mentioned earlier the established counter-terrorism model of the previous era, deterred Iraqi civilians from cooperating with the administration. The new doctrine allowed that to change. With the society convinced that it was in their interest to work with the new government of their country, they started supplying intelligences services with information. This in turn greatly improved the ‘collection’ level of intelligence agencies and resultantly the ﬁnal intelligence product.

Petraeus Tactic Beyond Iraq

By late 2008 Gen Petraeus was transferred in US CENTCOM, bringing with him the wisdom acquired during his tours in Iraq. In his new position, he was now responsible besides Iraq, also for Afghanistan

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as well as the politically sensitive case of Pakistan, trying to make political compromises and to limit the use of force. Besides use by the US forces in their various engagements around the globe, this doctrine is a road map on how to limit insurgent action, by maximising societal legitimisation and minimising collateral damage that in turn serves as a rallying banner for further violence. To that end countries that have suffered by asymmetrical strikes, such as India, can take valuable lessons and gradually escalate force application, instead basing their response in the use of intelligence and subsequently law enforcement, small scale military units and only as a last resort large scale military operations and such indiscriminate actions. Conclusively the role intelligence plays in counter-terrorism work is directly connected with the counter-terrorism model in effect. It shows that when the model employed is particularly heavy-handed, the role of intelligence is low and the results poor. Subsequently when the model shifted, the role of intelligence became a major factor in counter-terrorism work. Thus it is imperative that the intelligence agencies responsible for counter-terorism, must win the hearts and minds of the local population. What we see in Iraq is that when this principle was not adhered terrorism flourished. When intelligence was allowed to play its role in identifying terrorist cells and persecute them in a socially, not necessarily legal but legitimised context, the results were far better. Of course we cannot claim that intelligence by itself can win the fight against terror. But intelligence is the first and most delicate line of defence against the phenomenon and not to make the most out of its capabilities would be a waste that states can ill afford to make in their struggle for security.

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