LOSAT Launch Tube
line-of-sight anti-tank General Dynamics Armament and Technical Products manufactures the launch tube for the Line-ofSight Anti-Tank missile. LOSAT is designed for use by early-entry forces against hard-armor and actively protected targets. The system uses hit-to-kill technology, directing kinetic energy to defeat armor and other targets. The tube’s design includes a filament-wound composite launch tube with outer diameter build ups to accommodate mounting and handling features. The internal diameter incorporates a helical rail system for use in launch of the missile. Since initial production, GDATP has developed and produced over 1,300,000 launch tubes for U.S. Military ground- and ship-launched missile systems. Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control is the prime contractor for the LOSAT system.
Key Capabilities • Lightweight composite construction • Corrosion resistance • Integral mounting and handling features • EMI and lightning-strike compliance • Helical internal rail system • ISO9001 registration • Performance specifications manufacturing • Precision machining capability
Four LakePointe Plaza, 2118 Water Ridge Parkway, Charlotte, NC 28217 Tel 704 714 8000 n Fax 704 714 8232 n E-mail GDBusDev@gdatp.com
n
www.gdatp.com Copyright 2005 General Dynamics
Approved for Public Release 08/2005 (Lockheed Martin)
n
Printed in U.S.A. (A073035)
US Army LOSAT ATGM Units v.1.0 August 3, 2003 Roger Houston, Jim Milne, & Ravi Rikhye The LOSAT Missile The Line-Of-Sight Anti-Tank missile is a new ATGM produced by Lockheed Martin designed to defeat any existing or foreseeable armor. It will be used by deploying light forces, giving them a capability to protect themselves till heavy armor arrives, or even in heavy armor’s absence. Its characteristics are: • •
•
• •
•
•
•
Type o Kinetic Energy Long Rod Penetrator, Direct fire Dimensions o 174 pounds weight o 6.4 inch diameter o 114 inch length [9 ½ feet] Performance o Range: more than 4000 meters o Speed: 5000 feet per second o Acceleration: reaches top speed within 4 seconds Warhead o Energy delivered on target: 40 Megajoule [compare to M-1 tank’s M829 sabot round which delivers 7-10 MJ] Launcher o M-1114 Heavy Humvee chassis [armored Humvee] o Protects against 7.62mm AP round, 12-lb AT mines, and 155mm round airburst o Four rounds in two packs o 2-man crew o Can operate autonomously or networked with other systems o Reloads carried in trailer towed by separate Humvee Fire Control System o Acquires and auto-tracks up to 3 targets simultaneously o After launch consent, FCS automatically initializes and sequentially guides missiles to target, sending timed updates to missiles o Second-generation FLIR/video acquisition sensor o CO2 laser: determines range to the target and provides updates to the missile. “In its simplest sense, the fire unit transmits target location information through a series of laser pulses. The pulses are received through the aft looking receiver at the rear [of the missile”] [Reference: AUSA article, below] o All-weather, night/day, all cloud/haze conditions Program Status o Approximately 50 developmental firings have taken place o Engineering Development Flight 1 [EDF-1] fired on June 11, 2003 o Number of EDFs planned: Unknown o Production Qualification Testing: follows EDFs, 10 months, 18 rounds fired o Low Rate Initial Production 1 decision: during Fiscal Year 2004 Development Challenge o Said to be not the missile, but the tracking/guidance system
•
Future Development o Lightweight missile at half the size and weight of current LOSAT
References o http://www.spacedaily.com/news/missiles-03e.html o www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/missile/losat.htm o http://www.ausa.org/www/armymag.nsf/(soldier)/20026?OpenDocument o http://www.paraglideonline.net/archive/2003/4-17-03/index_4-17antitank.shtml LOSAT Battalions The first LOSAT unit is Company A, 511th Parachute Infantry Unit and is participating in the EDF and subsequent phases of the program. It will have 12 fire units, for which an initial contract of 144 missiles exists. Five LOSAT battalions are planned, each with 36 fire units: o 82nd Airborne Division [regular battalion] o 10th Mountain [Light Infantry] Division [National Guard battalion] o 25th Infantry Division [Light] [National Guard battalion] o 29th Infantry Division [Light] [National Guard] [National Guard battalion] o 101st Air Assault Division We have the following details: 82nd Airborne Division o o
First to equip, initial operating capability: Summer 2003; full capability: 2006 Presumably three companies of 511th PIR including Company A
29th Infantry Division o o o
2-115th Infantry, Maryland National Guard, currently assigned 3rd Brigade of the division. To become Companies C, E, G, 115th Infantry Replaced by 1-182nd Infantry, Massachusetts National Guard [Needs confirmation]
Unknown Infantry Division o
2-293rd Infantry, Indiana National Guard, to break up into three AT companies
10th Mountain Division o
One battalion from deactivating 27th Infantry Brigade [Light] [Separate] to break up into three AT companies
Originally, the plan was for 36 companies: o o
12 companies in four battalions [1 battalion each 82nd, 10th, 25th, 29th Divisions] 1 [or more?] company/companies 172nd Infantry Brigade [Separate]
o
Rest as Company D for several light infantry battalions of 10th, 25th, 29th Divisions
We do not at this time know what became of the plans to also equip light battalions with LOSAT. [Reference: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/acrc/98103.doc] Comment Roger Houston has previously chronicled the short-lived creation of anti-tank battalions equipped with the TOW to support early deploying light units. We include the article for the reader’s convenience. With LOSAT, the US Army has again taken a complete about turn. The difference this time is that if the LOSAT fire-unit sees a tank platoon before it is spotted, the tank platoon is dead. LOSAT is a devastating weapon, straight out of science fiction. We have seen from photographs of Gulf One what an M-1 round can do to a T-series tank: when rounds hit with such force that a turret is ripped off and flung several feet or even meters from the tank, the crew has no chance of survival. The LOSAT round will hit with five times more kinetic energy. Is this the end of the tank as we know it? Rumors of the tank’s demise have proved great exaggerated, as Gulf One and Two – and even urban fighting in Baghdad – have proved. Nonetheless, it is difficult to see what countermeasures will work against LOSAT, which has been described as rocket engine wrapped around a longrod penetrator. At 174 pounds and almost ten feet in length, this is a monster of a missile with phenomenal acceleration. Some future system will perhaps have the capability to defeat LOSAT. The problem for the tank is that LOSAT is almost ready for deployment and no future anti-LOSAT system is in prospect. LOSAT should maintain its edge till at least 2015. It is difficult to imagine that adversary tank units will want to even risk operating over ground where LOSAT units may be present. Given the big difference in size, the odds are that even with comparable detection systems, the tank is going to be found and fixed before the Humvee. All in all, LOSAT is going to give the heavy battalions a lot to think about. The TOW Light Anti Tank Battalion 1980-1993 - A Short History v.1.0 June 3, 2001 Roger W. Houston In the late 1970’s, the Army was coming out of its "hollow" period after the Vietnam debacle. Many new innovations were beginning to come of age and the great thinkers of the Army such as Bill Dupuy, Bernard Rogers, Jack Mackmull, and others were coming out with ideas that would revolutionize warfighting doctrine, organization, and training. Many of these ideas are easily recognized, such as the
development of the National Training Center, the push for the "Big Five" weapons systems, and the evolvement of light and motorized divisions in the force structure. Two other big issues were formulated in this period. First was the widespread utilization and integration of the TOW missile system in the battlefield and also the initiation of the Total Force concept where reserve component units were to be compatible with the active components. These two widely separated concepts were merged into one solution in the early ‘80s when 4 infantry battalions were formed in the national guard to become the TOW LIGHT INFANTRY BATTALIONS (TLAT). These units were the following: 2-128th INFANTRY (TLAT) WISCONSIN ARNG 1-249th INFANTRY (TLAT) OREGON ARNG 2-180th INFANTRY (TLAT) OKLAHOMA ARNG 1-122nd INFANTRY (TLAT) GEORGIA ARNG These units were formed to provide additional anti tank support to the corps commander and would be broken up into platoon subunits to provide TOW support for units not well endowed with anti tank weapons. These units could also provide rear security for the corps support areas. These units were organized with an HHC and 5 line companies each with 12 TOW launchers first mounted on M-151 series jeeps and later upgrading to the "turtleback" HUMVEE a total of 60 launchers per battalion. As events transpired in the early ‘80s, U.S. defense policy evolved on the rapid movement of light forces to the Middle East as well defending western Europe in place. The light forces available could be moved to a theater rather rapidly, however they lacked any staying power against an armored or mechanized OPFOR. The TLAT were then teamed up to specifically support active component light units destined for deployment to the USAREUR or CENTCOM battlefield. The 2-128 INF was teamed with the 10th Mountain Division, the 1-249 INF was teamed with 7th Infantry Division, 2-180th INF teamed with III Corps and the 101st Air Assault Division, and 1-122 INF with the 82nd Airborne Division. In 1990 the teaming idea was put to the test and failed under the bias of the Regular Army towards the National Guard. The 1-122 had just been through a rigorous, but extremely successful, annual training period in July 1990 at Ft Stewart Ga . They had trained with the 24th Mechanized Division, which was a sister unit with the 82nd in the XVIII Corps .The unit had surpassed all readiness and combat efficiency tests presented by their active component trainers. Nearly 80% of the unit was jump qualified and almost all the senior NCO’s were Ranger qualified. The unit was filled out with highly motivated people to say the least. When the 82nd was ordered to deploy to Saudi Arabia, the National Guard Bureau Operations Center notified DA that the 1-122 was ready to activate and deploy to Saudi with the 82nd. DA ignored the notification. Its companion units in the 48th Infantry Brigade (which was its peacetime parent headquarters) were activated and federalized a couple of months later, but the 1-122 was never given a second look. Had Saddam Hussein rolled his heavy Republican Guards divisions over the Saudi border in August 1990, the 82nd would have had 50 Sheridan tanks and about 70 TOW’S to stop them. An additional
60 TOW launchers would have been a necessity for the "Speed bump" 82nd, if it were to face those T-72â&#x20AC;&#x2122;s without being routed. Luckily, that was not to come about. In 1993, as part of the overall downsizing and realignment of the Army, the four TLAT battalions were deactivated because the army no longer had a mission for them. 1-122 was deactivated that year and consolidated into one company that would become H\121 Infantry. This unit is the long range recon company assigned now to the 525th MI BDE, XVIII Corps. Extracts from LOSAT Discussion on Strategypage.com Bulletin Board http://www.strategypage.com/messageboards/messages/2-788.asp LTC Tom Kratman to Jerry Pournelle January 30, 2003 A number folks up-thread doubt the qualitative difference between LOSAT and existing AT-Missiles. I'll try and clear it up. The differences between LOSAT and, say, a top attack version of the TOW missile is several fold. The first one is obvious. LOSAT is faster. It moves as fast as APFSDS shells out to extended battle ranges (2.5km-4.5km). This limits the time for maneuver, electronic or tactical countermeasures, and active defenses have to react. It also allows the use of tank-like "keyhole" positions that launchers slower missiles like TOW, HOT or Sagger can't take advantage of. Second is its lethality. No amount of passive protection can stop LOSAT. A clean hit is a kill, period. And probably a catastrophic kill at that. Third is the rate of engagement. An Abrams tank with a well-trained crew can fire eight rounds a minute at up to eight targets. TOW class missile will fire 1-2 two rounds a minute. Realistically, in a defensive engagement scenario, this means that the Abrams will conduct a 15-20 second engagement; destroying 2-3 enemy tanks, and relocate to a new position. A TOW missile launcher will fire one missile and relocate; getting a killing hit half the time. The LOSAT launcher third generation thermal sight can track several targets simultaneously and time-share its laser guidance beam among several missiles in flight, each attacking a different target. This means it can empty all four missiles on the launcher at four different targets in less than an a 15-20 seconds. This is a better than MBT rate of engagement, at greater than MBT ranges, with greater lethality. A platoon of LOSAT launchers can kill an MBT company in a single volley at ranges that the MBT cannot reply. There is a shock effect here that cannot be underestimated. The only real drawback to the LOSAT is that it leaves a long "please shoot me" smoke trail when it is fired. So whether it fires a single missile or four, it will have to relocate >FAST<. This is also the primary reason that I rate the Hummer-LOSAT as having a much lower exchange ratio than a LAV-LOSAT. It is too vulnerable too area effect high explosive fragmentation such a smoke trail will attract. From Trent J. Telenko to Jerry Pournelle
The original LOSAT launch platform was a stretched (seven vice six road wheels) Bradley fighting vehicle that carried four LOSAT ready to fire and 16 more missiles in an automatically reloaded magazine. Average reload time for four missiles was 15-20 seconds. The Bradley-LOSAT was to be part of a mech-infantry battalion's "Echo" or anti-tank Company with the extended range (10-15 km), top attack, FOG-M. There were to be 12-16 launchers proportioned 2/3 LOSAT and 1/3 FOG-M. When the Cold War ended. Bradley production was cancelled and the LOSAT was moved to the XM8 Buford light tank chassis. The Buford-LOSAT carried eight ready to fire missiles in two pods of four missiles. It had no reload magazine. Then Buford was cancelled to pay for Bosnia, at which point LOSAT nearly died. The LOSAT program was re-scoped yet again and placed in a Hummer, which carried four ready to fire missiles and had four more in a trailer for reloads. It was intended to provide the 82nd Airborne Div. with a heavy punch anti-tank company of 12 launchers and 144 missiles (IOC 2003). I've run into this "Hummers die from artillery, so LOSAT is no threat," argument before. The Hummer is after all a soft target. Against a M1A2 class tank opponent with full combined arms support, the exchange ratio of a Hummer-LOSAT to MBT will probably be 2-to-1 in the MBT's favor. WHAT MAKES LOSAT CRITICS THINK IT WILL BE LIMITED TO HUMMERS? Shinseki's Medium brigades won't be armed with a Hummer-LOSAT. They will have something like a USMC LAV. Proponents of the LOSAT have stated in old MARINE CORPS GAZETTE articles that an LAV could carry four LOSAT ready to fire and another four in an auto-loaded magazine. The exchange ratio between such vehicles and Abrams class tanks will be better than four-to-one in the LAV-LOSAT's favor. That is all she wrote, when it comes to heavy armor, because all our likely enemies that require us to ship large numbers of Abrams will be able to afford a battalion or two of the missiles. Sweden is working on a LOSAT equivalent missile. It is dead certain China and Russia are working on missile in that class and will sell them everywhere it is hurtful of US interests within 10 years. Our current fast sealift can deliver a brigade of US Army heavy armor anywhere in the world in a week to ten days and a US Army heavy division in six weeks (given strategic warning and the political will to act on it). One or two battalions of LAVLOSAT class launchers in the hands of a Third World military will rip the heart out of those heavy units. And this is assuming that the ports for those ships, and airfields our troops land at, are not blown to Hades by GPS guided Scud derivatives first. If we cannot project power with near invulnerable armor, and we know that light infantry cannot cut it in the face of Third World armor, then we are left with airpower and light armor with lots of ECM.