Malet Law Review

MALET LAW REVIEW

EU & UK BOTTLENECKS SPECIAL ISSUE APRIL 2015

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THE UK AND EU BOTTLENECKS EU GROUP PROJECT 2015

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Table of CONTENTS

NOTE FROM THE EDITORS…………………………………………………… 3 Group Members and Student Numbers………………………………….. 5 EU Immigration Spectre Haunts the UK………………………………… 7

By Nyambura Wainaina

Article 34 against Application of National Regulation Complying with free Movement of Goods ……………………… 19

By Siegmar Mischke

EU Law Supremacy Unhinges Member States ………………………. 30

By Caroline M. Muchechetere

Doctrine of Indirect Effect: A Kneejerk Reaction? …………………..37

By Uchechi Opara

LGBT Discrimination ………………………………………………………….. 44 Is European Football at Variance with Article 45 TFEU?.......... 52

By Felix Ebiwarebo

Bibliography

58

How we Team-worked

63

SPECIAL CONTRIBUTORS

online

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FROM THE EDITORIAL SUITE That momentous event in 1957, when the founding fathers of what we know today as the European Union- Germany’s Konrad Adenauer, Luxembourg’s Joseph Bech, Dutch politician Johan Willem Beyen, UK’s Winston Churchill, Alcide De Gasperi of Italy, Walter Hallstein, Sicco Mansholt, Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Paul-Henri Spaak, and Altiero Spinelli- signed the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC), or ‘Common Market’, remains the watershed moment that metamorphosed in the gigantic supranational body called the EU; and it has never looked back. This means that from the humble beginnings of the vision of a common market, we now have on our hands, a gigantic supranational entity playing defining roles in the shaping of global politics, diplomacy, energy and environment, human rights, immigration, asylum and international humanitarian policies, and above all, economy. Contemporaneously, it has added a crucial module to the body of knowledge and the field of law in all Member States universities, creating several journals, and which has necessitated this project.

Thus established as a new norm, and having gotten used to the routine university life of lectures and seminars, the call to form working groups for a European Union law group project initially posed a challenge because it required generating fresh ideas that are aimed at contributing to the jurisprudence of EU law; fortunately, however, a like-minded team of individuals, having managed to band together in pursuit of presenting this work, emerged into an unchartered territory needing fresh intellect, an open mind-set, patience and perseverance.

Yet unfortunately, even as we managed to team up as a group with similar mentality, we still found that we fell short; and that is where the unwavering support of our seminar leaders and lectures, without whose resolute we could not have managed to pull this through, came in boundlessly. This support, which we were fortunate to be endowed with, could not have borne fruit if it were not for the professional manner of the academic staff, our persistence in the form of asking what seemed like silly questions in seminars, accosting a lecturer in the corridors and hallways for clarification in specific areas of EU law, or indeed by way of an email. And the responses we received did get embedded somewhere in our brains and came in handy in the course of finalising the project.

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For this reason, we are indebted to all the staff in the European law department for their patience and perseverance, especially that some of them have been doing this for weeks, months and years with different students; and yet they still treated each one with the merited decency, politeness and kindness.

We are also fortunate in that some of us bonded with fellow students, who were also available to clarify what may at first not have seemed clear. Perhaps this is the advantage of studying at Birkbeck, a school reputed for its unique comradeship owing to the maturity of most of the students; thus they are more than willing to be of assistance to each other in a way that makes everyone feel special. The bottom-line is that engaging in an EU law project has taught us many things; least of all we have discovered ourselves and learnt to put our egos aside, because what matters is the team. We remain grateful for this wonderful opportunity Birkbeck School of Law has offered us; we hope, with this project, we have succeeded in contributing to the everburgeoning jurisprudence of European Union law.

NYAMBURA WAINAINA SIEGMAR MISCHKE

CAROLINE M. MUCHECHETERE UCHECHI OPARA

FELIX EBIWAREBO

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THE GROUP

Group Members

&

Student Number

Felix EBIWAREBO, 12712051

Research, Proof Reading and Writing

Siegmar MISCHKE

12807249

Research, Design and Writing

Caroline M. MUCHECHETERE 12619419

Research, Writing and Content Control

Uchechi OPARA

12523511

Research, Writing and Editing

Nyambura WAINAINA Research, Writing and Group Coordination

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EU IMMIGRATION

The movement of people in search of better economic conditions and a more secure environment is as old as human history. Such movements not only profoundly affect the lives of the migrants, but also lead to significant economic and social transformations in migrants' countries of origin and destination.

Migration is fundamentally the story of the human race from its origins to the present. Migration is an integral aspect of life on this planet. People move to survive. They move in search of food. They move away from danger and death.

They move towards opportunities for life. Migration is tied to the human spirit, which seeks adventure, pursues dreams, and finds reasons to hope even in the most adverse circumstances. Such movement affects the communities migrants leave and the communities that receive these migrants. This movement also impacts communities along the route of transit.

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FREE MOVEMENT AND EU MIGRATION: UK THROWS DOWN THE GAUNTLET NYAMBURA WAINAINA A PROLOGUE In a speech at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), London on October 20, 2014, the former European Commission President, Jose Manuel Barroso alluded to the early beginnings of the EU and stated that “just as nearly 70 years ago peace could not be built by one country alone, today even the largest, proudest European nation cannot hope to shape globalization – or even retain marginal relevance - by itself. It is only together that we have the weight to influence the big picture”. This was a message targeted at the UK whose Conservative-led government has capitulated to the demand for a referendum to determine its continued membership of the EU. As Barroso stressed, that attempt presents an existential debate between the UK and the EU. In asking where the UK and its existentialist European debate fit into the structure and achievements of the EU, he was quick to reel out such achievements by stating that the European Union “has reformed fundamentally over the past ten years, and will need to continue on that path. Making Europe stronger – institutionally, politically and economically – is a process of constant improvement”. Therefore, he suggested constant reform, not revolution and certainly not counterrevolution in the process of achieving the dream of the founding fathers of the EU. Yet, David Cameron defiantly fired a riposte to Barroso by claiming that “what we need in Britain is a renegotiation of our relationship with the EU and then a referendum where the British people decide whether we stay in this reformed organisation or whether we leave it.

That is what I will pursue, that is what I will deliver, and at the heart of that renegotiation we need to address people’s concerns about immigration. I’m very clear about who the boss is, about who I answer to and it’s the British people. They want this issue fixed, they are not being unreasonable about it, and I will fix it.” This apparent grandstanding not only has the potential to isolate the UK in Europe; it also places the United Kingdom at a crossroads.

Therefore, it appears that it is not the spectre of the founding fathers of the European Union that is bound to make UK have sleepless nights; rather, this discourse argues that it is David Cameron’s feeble and unsuccessful attempt to thwart Jean-Claude Juncker's ascension to the presidency of the European Commission, which failure has in turn been implicitly construed as formulating an imminent exit strategy of the UK from the European Union. The genesis of UK’s resentment for the EU dates a long way back in history, and thus has multiple old wounds; MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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however, new abrasions owe their appearance to the chasm in policies and resistance to immigration from within the EU, principally from the A2 accession states. The A2 represents the treaty signed by Member States for the purpose of admitting Bulgaria and Romania in Luxembourg on the 25th of April 2005. Like the Tsunami, the anxiety over immigration is not Cameron’s alone; it has gripped masses of residents and citizens of the UK, as they are egged on by a melodramatic and often erroneous right wing press which relentlessly reports about EU citizens’ capacity to access benefits and public services.

Also, deep-seated Euro-scepticism and the rise of right wing political parties across Europe, such as Nigel Farage’s UKIP, have also buoyed nationalistic views across borders. According to Eric Kaufmann in a seminal article in The Political Quarterly in September 2014, it is instructive that UKIP’s first place finish in the May 2014 European elections, with 27.9 per cent of the vote, represents an unprecedented political earthquake which has transformed political conversation in Britain, because as he observes, beneath the headlines, “deeper questions remain over immigration and the challenge it poses to the future of Britain’s main political parties”. Why, one may ask. Kaufmann wants us to believe that immigration and ethnic change are central to the rise of the populist right based on three factors: first, the rise of immigration, since 2001, to first or second spot among the electorate’s priorities; second, the emergence of the British National Party (BNP) in the period to 2009, shattering the complacent belief that Britain was immune to far right advances of the European variety; and third, since 2009, the rise of UKIP in a European Parliament with a record number of far right contenders.

Be that as it may, campaigning for UK’s exit from the EU as a way out of the imagined, socalled EU quagmire only smacks of self-deceit and misleading thinking.

It must be stressed that customary international law, or jus cogen, bestows the mandate on sovereign states to determine who enters, remains and exits their territory as well as matters pertaining to acquisition of nationality; these salient factors have conventionally been the symbol of Member States’ sovereignty, which Member States with Euro-sceptic mentality and fervour have passionately attempted to cling to and keep out of reach of the clutches of Brussels. Nevertheless, as the EU has metamorphosed into a more assimilating movement, with an integrated union citizenship, Member States have assumed the obligation to surrender the control of their borders to the EU. It is cardinal within the EU to create a unique identity for Union nationals; the implication of this became very significant from 1993 on account of the

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establishment of the status of Union citizenship by the Maastricht Treaty, via Article 20(1) TFEU which provides: Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not a replace national citizenship.

Critically, the second paragraph of Art 20 TFEU provides that Union citizens enjoy a number of specific citizenship rights, and are in addition, entitled to the rights provided for the Treaties. Consequently, the issue of who a Member State national and a Union citizen is has become vital because by virtue of possessing European Union citizenship, an individual has access to various rights, whose enjoyment do not depend on the exercise of an economic activity or proof of some other kind of contribution to the aims of the Union.

It therefore becomes important to investigate how UK’s membership of this influential supranational body affects it immigration policy. In order to appreciate how this nexus affects such policy, it is important to make a distinction between four characteristics of EU law and policy; first, the common market, which translates into reciprocal commitments- in this arena, not only products but also factors of production have to circulate freely. The movement of workers and other forms of exercising economic freedoms have now been included into the status of citizenship of the Union. Movement and residence in all Member States for Union nationals remains a defining feature of EU citizenship, so that UK nationals may in principle live anywhere they choose within the EU and vice versa.

Secondly, while the UK’s commitments on EU citizenship and the internal market are part and parcel of its EU membership, it has always maintained a divergent and distinctive position on the issues of border management and visas, as marked in its decision to opt-out of the Schengen visa system, which in itself, it must be admitted, has been legally contentious, even when it remains a significant feature of its EU relations.

The third factor concerns asylum: the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty marked a decisive shift because it enabled the EU for the first time, to adopt a binding EU law in this area with the aim of instituting a common European asylum system. The UK had a choice to participate in this procedural area, and therefore chose to opt in to the key EU asylum measures adopted between MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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1999 and 2004. However, in this sphere, since 2010, upon coming into power, the UK coalition government’s position appears to have shifted.

Finally, the EU via Directive 2004/38/EC has assumed the capability of adopting measures on the immigration of third country nationals (TCNS) into the EU. Here too, the UK has an opting in arrangement, but has tended to opt in only rarely to EU measures in the field. As will be discussed further below, while this grants the UK latitude to set its own labour migration policy, it may also end up at disadvantage in attracting highly skilled migrants.

The above brings us back to the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 which formally introduced Union citizenship as a fundamental status, while also building on previous rights to free movement, residence and non-discrimination for workers and service providers. Citizenship of the union provides rights of movement and residence as well; this is not only for the economically active citizens, but also for job seekers, students and retirees, within certain limits. It follows therefore that, David Cameron has been opposed to Juncker's appointment for two reasons: firs, he will find it difficult to lead in reshaping EU through its reforms process; and secondly, he firmly believes that the “Spitzenkandidaten” system has no legitimacy. The system, it must be noted, was conceived by European Parliament leaders who premise their power exercise on the Lisbon Treaty which stresses that EU leaders are required to take account of the 2013 European Parliamentary elections in nominating a candidate. However, unfortunately for David Cameron and the Euro-sceptics in his government, Juncker was the candidate of the centre-right European People’s Party, the largest group in the parliament.

The above being the case, exiting the EU on account of its failure to reform its immigration policy will be counterproductive. On the one hand, it will not help in resolving the intra-EU immigration ‘problem’; while on the other hand it will only resolve it only at a terrible cost.

Hence, we are left with two options. The first would be to preserve the advantages of free movement across the EU for UK nationals by acknowledging inward access from the whole EU on provisions which are analogous to those existing today, but at the same time, counting the cost of loss of influence that an exit entails. The second option would be to embrace a solitary position and put into operation national immigration controls on Union citizens and accept controls on UK citizens travelling to Europe. The consequence will, of course, be the loss of immeasurable business, educational and cultural opportunities as movement to and from Europe is bound to become more mired in visa application and border management MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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complications and probable greater-than-before encumbrances for UK citizens who may no longer have access to the erstwhile taken-for-granted advantaged access to Europe for employment, education, holidays, residence and other activities.

Perhaps “Euro-sceptics” who advocate a withdrawal from the EU envision that a looser freetrade arrangement akin to the Swiss or Norwegian representation is the ultimate solution.

However, it is worth stressing that the understanding with those countries replicates the free movement rights that are already in existence and which have hitherto proved very controversial in UK’s parlance. While restrictions are sometimes permitted, they are unlikely to meet concerns. Presumptively, the UK and EU could get past an agreement on different terms, but the EU may put up complete free movement a prerequisite for a free trade agreement and, as the weaker negotiator, the UK will not be well-placed to stand firm. Even if some dilution of free movement policies were negotiated, it is unfeasible to envisage the EU agreeing to an understanding that exhibits the Luhmann differentiation of policies amid the different EU Member States. Contemporaneously, to maintain the free entry of affluent German and French citizens, the UK would still have to permit the admission of the apparently ‘undesirable’ Bulgarians and Romanians; and most paramount, UK would have lost its ability to influence the overall direction of free movement laws. Perhaps therefore, advocates of an exit imagine that the UK could negotiate free movement agreements on an individual basis with member states. As Steve Peers puts it on the subject: [I]t is not clear that this would be possible under EU law and it is certainly an improbable scenario given the cumbersome nature of such an enterprise and member states’ likely reluctance to enable the UK to pursue such divisive tactics. if they did take place, negotiations would have to proceed on the basis of reciprocity to be politically acceptable and member states are bound by the EU’s immigration policy on visas and admissions which provides a floor of rights for third country nationals in certain situations; the minimal standards of the family reunification directive or the long term residents directive would therefore have to be incorporated into the UK's own laws, at least so far as these states are concerned.

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worse off states. As an EU member, the UK has been successful in keeping its opt-out from the EU’s immigration policy towards third country nationals. There is an incongruity in the prospect of the UK finding itself bound by such laws, at least in respect of some countries, as a result of the exit.

THE SCHENGEN ARRANGEMENT CONUNDRUM: A WORRISOME REALITY The Schengen arrangement has created a conundrum; when the UK became a member of the EEC in 1972, it in turn committed itself to the common market endeavour. The movement of people within the EU embraced further subtle issues with the internal market project of the 1980s, with some member states being of the view that internal free movement of persons needed the abolition of border controls. The treaty definition of the internal market provides that it comprises an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, capital and services stipulates that notwithstanding the internal market, the UK maintains its right to keep border controls on movement from within EU. The UK and Ireland were the only EU members that, before the 2004 enlargement, had not signed up to the Schengen agreement. The two countries maintain a common travel area with passport free travel for their citizens between them and the three British crown dependencies of Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man. The UK has never become a Schengen member, deciding instead on preserving sovereign border controls and visa policy, as it mulled over in the Schengen protocol. The Schengen system is now incorporated within the EU structure, even though the UK participates selectively. By and large, the UK takes part in the criminal law and law enforcement aspects, but not those related to border controls. The UK stance on Schengen agreement is formally justified as controls, which measure up to both geographical and traditional set ups of the country and have ensured high levels of personal freedom within the UK. Subsequent to the initial wave of EU legislation on asylum, UK’s method may be termed as tending to opt in to coercive measures, such as the Dublin system and those battling illegal migration to the EU, while opting out of those measures that governments have felt would involve ceding more power or intervention with UK practice. It has been argued that the decision not to opt in to EU measures on procedural rights and reception conditions have diminished asylum seekers rights; while another argument is that declining to take part in the EU’s external economic migration policies could place the UK at a disadvantage in the race MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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for new talent from third countries. There is certainly an intellectually and a politically unfailing argument for more harmonisation and collaboration in, and even teamwork of immigration and asylum guiding principle across Europe. There are numeral reasons for this.

Essentially, immigration is by definition a cross border matter which in the end necessitates cross border guidelines in one form or another.

The EU’s geographical location, adjacent to Africa to its south and Asia and Russia to its east, makes it highly exposed to arrivals of people from a customarily wide area, illegal immigration inclusive; occurrences of boats crossing the high seas carrying Northern African and Middle Eastern immigrants, illustrates this. Irrespective of whether one believes in more or less laissezfaire immigration strategies, there is a strong case for tackling this shared geographical, economic and political power at the EU level. On the other hand, it has to be perceived and tackled alongside the tremendously delicate characteristics of immigration and how directly this is connected to the social contract between government and citizens. Fundamental control over borders is still an essential part of a country’s entitlement to democratically administer itself; this is in addition to its authority over matters relating to taxes and the monopoly of force.

However, the UK’S pick and mix attitude to EU immigration and border strategy has rendered it incapable of partaking in some measures, even if it may have wanted to take part.

The UK on the other hand, has challenged the EC for this legal exclusion from three EU border measures with a security feature: first, the formation of Frontex; second, EU measures on biometric passports; and third, the decision allowing police services to gain access to data in the EU visa information system. To all intents and purposes, the ECJ has ruled that the UK cannot take part in border control and enforcement measures, which are structured as Schengen construction without embracing the underlying rules on border crossing first. In spite of this, as the UK’s participation in Frontex operations illustrates, it is able to work together virtually with other EU countries in this area without the legalities of being constrained by EU law. Even so, consecutive government's’ decision to take a pick and mix approach to EU cooperation on external migration and asylum policy illustrates a degree of cross-party harmony on the advantageous scale of EU participation in this field.

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THE STRUCTURE AND STATUS OF THE EU: SIGNS OF INDISTINCTNESS? Something does not sit well with the EU, especially when one looks at the approach made to the regional body in 2009 by a member of the European Parliament sympathetic to Italy over the country’s approach to EU migrants from the ethnic minority group, the Roma. When he asked the European Commission to make clear as to what action can be taken by Member States under directive 2004/38/EC to implement the removal of Union citizens who constitute a threat to public policy and security or who do not meet the conditions for residing in a Member State. The commission responded as follows: As to Directive 2004/38/EC, Member States may restrict the freedom of movement and residence of Union citizens and their family members, irrespective of nationality, on grounds of public policy, public security or public health. Restrictive measures may be taken only on a case-by-case basis where the personal conduct of an individual represents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of the society of the host member state. Measures taken on grounds of public policy or public security shall comply with the principle of proportionality and shall be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned.

This response may be construed either as ignoring the question about those who do not meet the conditions for residence, or as indicating that not meeting the conditions for residence is not grounds for removal. Before 2004, legislation on the free movement of persons established residence rights for precise classes of EU migrants, such as workers, the self-employed, pensioners, the self-sufficient and students. However, Directive 2004/38 created a comprehensive regime granting all EU citizens a right of entry into other member states. The pertinent case law of the European Court of Justice is in the same way indistinct, as reflected in the Oulane case which relates to a French citizen the Dutch authorities came across in a goods tunnel sealed off to the public inside a train station.

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CHALLENGES EU FREE MOVEMENT: A CASE FOR ADEQUATE RESPONSES The provisions of EU Treaties are that all nationals of Member States are also EU citizens and have the right of movement and residence within the territory of all Member States, dependent on the restrictions and conditions laid down in treaties.

These free movement rights provided under the auspices of EU citizenship provide rights of free movement not only for the economically active, but also for job seekers, students and pensioners. The crux of EU free movement legislation is the Free Movement Directive which however, makes clear that the right to move and reside freely within the EU in not absolute. In fact, Member State nationals and their families can reside for up to three months in another Member State, provided that they do not become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance system of the country they move to, after which they will have to prove that they have a job in that country or have sufficient resources to keep living there without becoming a burden. Additionally, following an EU national’s five year continuous legal residence in a Member State, they gain the right of permanent residence in that Member State.

What this means is that, Member States’ nationals cannot remain in another EU country for longer than three months, unless they have a job, are students, or they have sufficient economic power to prolong their stay without becoming a burden on the welfare system of the host member state. Then again, the directive provided that they do not become a reasonable burden on the social assistance system of the country moved to. However, the Directive provides for a series of exceptions restricting national governments’ ability to expel people who do not meet these requirements. This implies that, in practice, the Directive for the most part restricts national governments rights’ to refuse entry or expel citizens of other EU member states to reasons of public policy, public security or public health; although again, there are exceptions and conditions to be met before people can be expelled in these cases.

Interestingly, the EU’s Free Movement Directive also extends a number of rights to certain family members of EU nationals regardless of whether they are Member State nationals themselves. For instance, non-EU family members have the right to obtain entry visas to the EU, which are acquired through an accelerated procedure. Once they enter the territory of the host member state, they enjoy the same rights of residence as the person they are accompanying provided that they hold a valid passport.

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Thus the Free Movement Directive stretches the right to equal treatment including access of social assistance to non-EU family members who have the right of residence or permanent in the host member state. This has proved contentious, in that it has been cited as an incentive for sham marriages and manipulation of Member States’ welfare systems. Significantly, family members who have the right of residence in the host EU member state under the Directive are entitled to take up employment there, irrespective of nationality.

THE EPILOGUE What knowledge and understanding have we gained from the multifarious issues raised in this discourse? One, it is clear that while David Cameron may have failed to hamper Jean-Claude Juncker's ascension to the Presidency of the EU Commission, UK’s frosty immigration rancour is deep-rooted and transcends Juncker's presidency. Therefore, it is time the UK faced up to the reality and come to terms with the view that, while it is a valued member of the organisation, it needs the EU far more than the EU needs it; hence, pulling out would subject the country to a myriad of difficulties and frantic redrawing of decision-making at the policy level, the least being that, those entering the UK borders from the EU would have to meet the UK’s extremely restrictive immigration controls. This would in turn lead to the loss of highly skilled workers in various fields, as well as researchers. This is in addition to hardships to be faced by those who are intent on visiting the country for whatever purpose, who would be required to comply with immigration controls, probably visa requirements, and protracted passport control constraints alongside other non-EU citizens. Also, the expenditure and time concerned in engaging with the UK will inexorably rise and thus, diminishing the opportunities concerned with social, business and cultural interaction.

So, in going back to the question Barroso asks of the UK as the existential debate rages: what options are there for the UK? As the British Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) proffers, on the one hand, withdrawal from the EU or imposing any fundamental restrictions on free movement within the EU would be a hugely retrograde step for the UK; hence the 2015 general elections are bound to leave pro-European politicians in Britain and beyond with much more work to do to make the positive case for free movement. On the other hand, however, taking a cue from IPPR 2014 report, A Fair Deal on Migration to the UK, public concerns should be treated with the respect they deserve and the positive case should focus on how the system can be made fair for all so that everyone shares in the benefits of migration, rather that

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cling to the old approach of reiterating the facts about the net economic benefits of free movement and to dismiss popular concerns as ill-informed, or worse.

In summation, while the EU may not be a perfect organisation; conversely, the existing options are, on close scrutiny, far less pleasant and would undoubtedly not allow for the total uncoupling from the EU and its institutions, which the advocates of the breakaway seem to conjure. On the other hand, a different and much more damaging form of extrication is one likely consequence; should this happen, it is the spectre of Charles de Gaulle which will be peering, and feeling justified for having opposed the entry of the UK into this prestigious body in the first place.

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EU FREE MOVEMENT PART 1

Into Europe The system of 'imperial preference' in British trade which had been declared in the 1932 Import Duties Act continued after the Second World War. In the 1950s Britain still enjoyed strong trading connections with the Commonwealth countries, but there was much feeling that the nation's trading relationships should be more fully developed in Europe.

Treaty of Rome 1957 In 1957 the Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community which aimed to create a large European 'free trade area'. Initial British reluctance to seek membership of the Community was set aside by a decline in economic performance in the late 1950s, as compared with other European countries. In 1960 a British application to join the Community was rejected. A new application was made in 1967 and negotiations eventually began in October 1970.

The question of whether Britain should sign the Treaty of Accession was debated in the House of Commons in October 1971. Domestic opinion was strongly against membership and there was strong concern over whether the terms negotiated were good enough for Britain. Doubts over many issues affecting Britain's future were aired in a debate that lasted six days.

Britain Joins the European Economic Community The Treaty was signed by Edward Heath, the British Prime Minister, in Brussels on 22 January 1972. The European Communities Bill was then introduced in the House of Commons to give parliamentary assent to Britain's membership of the EEC. Although the bill itself consisted of only 12 clauses (accepting all previous EEC regulations, the Treaty of Rome, and the terms of entry), it was subject to some 300 hours of debate before becoming law.

Britain's membership of what was then primarily an economic union came into effect on 1 January 1973. Since then the Community has developed into a much broader entity, the European Union, which was formally created by the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992. The terms of Britain's agreement to the Treaty receiv ed parliamentary approval in the European Communities (Amendment) Act of 1993, and the Union came into force in November 1993.

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ARTICLE 34 AND FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS: A HOLISTIC INTERPRETATION SIEGMAR MISCHKE PRELIMINARY MATTERS The common market has come a long way in trying to develop a more cohesive and harmonised Europe in free trade, what has now metamorphosed into the market access principle. It was central to the formation of the European Union; now it has developed into a set of free movement principles, the principal of which is reflected in Article 34 TFEU: one of the core principles that initiated the movement of goods in trade amongst initial limited member states in 1952. Born out of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the cooperation among Member States reflected in the movement of goods like coal and steel, a major commodity in free trade among them. This removed unnecessary tariffs and trade barriers for imports and exports. An attempt to properly assess the importance of the principle of market access within the jurisprudence of goods, according to Tim Connor, necessitates a pertinent question: should the principle be employed as “first among equals� or should the ECJ have recourse to the principles of non-discrimination or mutual recognition in the context of the application of Article 34 TFEU? Or rather still, is the principle of market access to take a place as only one of a number of principles, the use of any of which may trigger the application of the Treaty free movement provision?

In this piece, it will be illustrated that the jurisprudence relating to the application of the principle of the free movement of goods the ECJ has set benchmarks of the legality of the national measure in relation to the requirements of European Union law. For example, in Commission v Italy Case C-110/05 [2009], the Court of Justice held as follows: It is apparent from settled case-law that Article 28 EC [Treaty Establishing the European Community; now Article 34 TFEU] reflects the obligation to respect the principles of nondiscrimination36 and of mutual recognition of products lawfully manufactured and marketed in other Member States as well as the principle of ensuring free access of community products to national markets.

Therefore, in this article I intend to investigate how the EU has been shaped in respect of free movement of gods, as well as the tariffs and barriers attached to them.

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I will do this by examining the functions of Treaty Article 34, and its legal application by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). However, I intent to examine mainly three central cases: Dassonvile, Cassis de Jong and Keck, all of which have helped to shape and achieve the common market vision of harmonisation and uniformity among members.

FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS: CONFLICTS WITH EU’S FOUNDING PRINCIPLES?

The founding principle of the EU was predicated on trade with one goal: to avoid conflicts and to promote greater cooperation; this was juxtaposed with the need to minimise the risk of conflicts. The Treaty establishing the EU has been credited with the recognition of ‘four core freedoms’ that underpin the social, economic and political goals to effectively the common market. These freedoms- free movement of goods, labour, business and capital are set out in Article 3(1) (c) EEC with the aim of the Community’s accomplishment of the abolition among Member States, obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital.

However, it is arguable that such conflicts among Member States, by their internal regulations were also a foresight that cultivated Europe’s modernisation of its Treaty articles to facilitate harmony, particularly Article 34 TFEU. That said, the yearning to avoid another World War has not been transmitted to the avoidance internal conflicts between Member States in the area of free movement of goods across borders; with several conflicts on how freely goods should move without internal trade barriers that the CJEU has had to intervene over, it is apparent that the application of Article 34 has not been issues and conflict-free.

Therefore Article 34, as it is intended to show in this piece, has become a highly polemic issue on fairness of the application of regulation across borders. It is also intended to reveal how the ECJ has constantly intervened to put it right. One question that is pertinent to ask therefore is: have the UK and EU reached a crossroads on the fundamental principle of trade in the single market? It is submitted here that the attainment of the vision of a market that is premised on free movement of goods could be tricky if Member State do not play by the rules. Conversely, however, the same rules that regulate free movements could also be seen as an impediment to a number of Member States, including the UK; hence the constant frosty relationship between the UK and EU, and which is why some have put forward the case for UK’s EU exit, despite the fact that as a Member State, the UK has benefited substantially from the internal market through its businesses and its citizens’ expanded capability to engage in and take advantage of opportunities the market offers to buy or sell their products without hassle or restrictions.

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But what price should be paid for being a player in the single market, where movements of goods should be free from constraints? In attempting to find answers to this question, it is acknowledged that the founding principles to prevent conflicts were some of the reasons the common market was created, a lot depends on free unrestricted access to goods for the ideology to function successfully. Such fundamental dependences are: business, goods, and jobs. The EU market makes it easier to buy and sell products within the 28 member states. With a potential access to over 450 million EU citizens, it provides jobs, stability and prosperity for its citizens. Thanks to the creation of the single European market in 1993, which tried to address most of the issues surrounding the restriction of free movement of goods with the creation of harmony amongst member states, the EU, it is admitted, has successfully set the framework for fairness. However, such a move has not quelled the complaints from citizens and businesses about the constant problems on trade barriers.

The above being the case, Tim Connor observes that ECJ recent case law has seen the adoption of the market access principle and approach within the jurisprudence relating to the free movement of goods. Particularly, in Commission v Italy Case C-110/05 [2009] the court held unlawful an Italian law which prohibited mopeds from towing trailers; and in Case C-142/05, Ă…klagaren v Mickelsson, [2009] E.C.R. I-4273 the court held unlawful Swedish laws which prohibited the use of personal watercraft on waters other than generally navigable waterways.

As Connor notes, the respective measures in the two cases were held to have prevented the access of the import to the respective national markets in those Member States. The use of the market access principle in relation to the assessment of the legality of the Italian and Swedish national measures is important not only for the jurisprudence relating to the free movement of goods, but also in the wider context of the jurisprudence for free movement in general.

OPERATIONALISING TREATY ARTICLE 34: FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS Despite Article 34 sounding like a mantra on free movement in the internal market, that movement provision, it has been noted not to be an absolute value, and may come within certain conditions. Human health and the environment are some of the areas that would justify internal regulations for the protection of its territory. While Article 34 deals with import, Article 35 regulates export. Under article 34, the prohibition of measures that have the effect of quantitative restriction on imports from member state are seen as illegal, and against the principle of the Treaty.

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This was put to test and operation in Dassonville, where the court held that “all trading rules enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-community trade are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions”.

To comprehend how the court reached its decision, there is a necessity on the part of the objective and average EU law reader to understand the facts and purpose of the Treaty.

Measures equivalent to quantitative restriction (MEQR) are deemed prohibitive and unreasonable. When Mr Dassonville from Belgium bought whisky in France and imported it to his country, he did not think he was doing anything wrong. As a trader with an astute understanding of cardinal trade rules, Mr Dassonville sought cheap products in order sell them back on the market a profit. However, he was faced with his own national law on the authenticity of designation of his products before it could be imported into the Belgian market for sale. The general importation practice was that of removing the certificate at the point of importation; yet Dassonville possessed none, a common practice and occurrence amongst traders. He was therefore in a quandary- that of not being able to sell his whisky. He argued in court that the Belgian policy was an MEQR. The issue the ECJ had to resolve was whether Dassonville was unlawfully prevented to exercise his rights under the founding principles of trade; as it appeared, the development of the single market, which should have protected him from the barrier he faced, should have made life easier for him. This did not happen. The court found that his rights were breached and agreed with him that the measure imposed my Belgium was MEQR. What is of essence following the Dassonville analysis is that the UK is not immune from MEQR and therefore, the ruling should be applied uniformly across Member States. However, commentators argue that some parts of the judgment lack clarity. The operation around “trading rules” and “hindering” intra-community trade may not be the intended aim of Member States.

On the one hand, it was suggested that the court focuses on “effects”, and not what the subject matter tried to achieve. On the other hand, it has been argued that the court looked broadly and refused to apply the de minimis test. Yet, since such a test was not in scrutiny in this case, some may argue that there is no de minimis test under article 34. Nevertheless, it was invoked van de Haar [1984] ECR 1797. Therefore, the Treaty provision was clear, precise and unconditional, and the court applied the regulation correctly.

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DASSONVILE: A LIMIT OR WIDENING EFFECT ON FREE MOVEMENT? The push to buy local goods could have been the effect of the restrictive judgment in Dassonville. Prior to the decision, certain conditions of goods were not protected. The court focused its attention mainly on trade and economics. By not providing facilities to promote imports, governments have used a certain type of approach to block imports, especially as the Mickelsson case illustrates. In this case the government set a condition for jet-skis. The condition was set in such a way that without such provision for jet-skis, no one could import them into the country. This was a clever way of manoeuvring around the principle of MEQR. Therefore, Mickelsson widened the scope of free movement from arbitrary limitations.

Another problem critics identify with Dassonville is its narrow application to imported goods.

This was the perception until the French case of Pistre [1997] ECR I-2343. Therefore, it is quite clear that CJEU has attempted to address market issues as they arose within the framework of free movement among Member States. This means that situations that may discriminate and affect EU citizens, which are not harmonised under Articles 34-35, can be relied on. However, Niels argues that the court in Dassonville, by providing a platform for the application of Articles 34 and 35, has demonstrated a dependence on the proportionality and justification tests, instead of the de minimis test. He argues that this portends the creation of legal uncertainty for Member States, with an associated possibility of overloading the courts with multiple cases on similar issues. Although such an argument is shared by many, yet as argued above, the court can always be relied upon to address EU-related issues. Neil’s seems to observe the ruling on selling arrangements in the case of Keck, which in his view, came very close to applying the de minimis test. But in applying a certain test, CJEU has demonstrated a willingness to rely on circumstances to developed case law as they arise; the offshoot of which is that the development of the law around free movement, sees the application Article 34 to be an ever-evolving one; Article 34 has not stood still.

EU LAW DEVELOPMENT ON FREE MOVEMENT POST-DASSONVILLE: CRITIQUE

Most well-governed states would like their citizens to be offered the best products in the market. Whether this is by the quality of the material used, or the standard with which they are produced, as it was in the case in Germany. But if this was a standard set in Germany before Dassonville, the application of Article 34 had not addressed issues of the production capacity of states’ inferior quality, if their economy was not as developed as Germany. This would be too expensive to tailor each product to meet some Member States’ criteria.

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For this reason, the application of Dassonville may pose a problem if the export was meant for the German market, and yet may not fit within certain local regulations; because no case law existed to deal with such circumstantial scenarios. The German specific product requirements mean that some member states may not be able to achieve such high quality goods in order to trade with them, and therefore, Dassonville would not apply given certain facts. However, if certain requirements were to hinder trade; either directly or indirectly, actually or potentially within intra-community, this would constitute MEQR. How would the court get round Germany’s specific local trade regulations on specific goods requirements?

The German requirement of alcohol for at least 25% in respect of fruit liqueurs was above that of alcohol contained in the blackcurrant produced by Cassis de Dijon. Therefore, it was refused to be imported into the German market. Cassis challenged the decision on the basis that in contravened its article 34 rights. The court found in their favour. It was held that such a specific requirement or rules that may be imposed by member states on other member states, “Constitutes” an obstacle to trade. Such founding principle of trade between communities is incompatible with Article 34. The court said that such general interest that may be a certain standard over the provision of free movement of goods, is a breach of foundation principles.

In her seminal article, Competence Review: the Internal Market, Catherine Barnard opines that, the Court’s approach in Cassis de Dijon, when read in conjunction with Dassonville, actually marked a shift away from a discrimination reading of Article 34 TFEU towards a reading based on market access. As noted above, the court’s position in Dassonville is to the effect that all trading rules enacted by Member States capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra‐Union trade must be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions. For Barnard, this market access approach, unlike the discrimination approach, does not look to see how domestic goods are. Rather, it looks at the national measure solely from the perspective of the out‐of‐state trader and asks: does this rule hinder, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra‐Union trade? If so, the measure is presumptively contrary to Article 34 TFEU unless the state can show that the rule can be justified and is proportionate. Therefore, for Barnard, the advantage to the EU of the Court adopting this approach was that it effectively presaged a bonfire of national regulation, much of which had been on the national statute books for decades, sometime centuries, and whose original purpose had long since disappeared.

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The disadvantage was that a supranational legal order was being used to challenge the existence of national rules adopted by democratically elected national governments.

In Cassis de Dijon however, the court sees the Community’s free movement that was created initially in 1952 as fundamental; as the court stated, “...the general interest and such as to take precedent over the requirements of free movement of goods, which constitutes one of the fundamental rules of the community”. Chalmers then seems to echo this sentiment in his assertion that Cassis de Dijon has been vital to EU law, one of the most important legal developments since the union’s foundation. These observations by both Chalmers and the court thus acknowledge the importance of free movement within the common market.

However, the controversy underlying UK’s relationship with the EU has seen a plethora of commentaries as to the effect of Cassis de Dijon on Member States. For some, Cassis de Dijon, and its application, reflects the court’s interference in national laws. This view is shared by Neil’s who argues that Member States “should be allowed to freely regulate their respective territories…” and that the “…Treaty for the proposition that Article 34 encourages a general deregulation of national economies.” However, the view taken here is that if that was the case, some Member States would have to adjust and tailor their goods to fit different legal requirements across borders. The question is where is the uniformity in this? Neil’s’ approach would be expensive, counterproductive, and goes against the principle of a democratic trade freedom for citizens across the EU, who may wish to purchase other competitive products that may suit their desire rather than IDENTIFYING THE BENEFICIAL EFFECTS OF ARTICLE 34 ON UNION CITIZENS

Two paradoxical set of events recently took place in the UK. First, the current Conservatives government promised the British people a referendum on EU “in or out” by 2017 should they win the next general election. On the other hand, as the promise was being made, a recent comprehensive report on the balance of competency on the freedom of goods was compiled in 2014. In chapter three of the report, which highlights the impact on EU competency on free movement of goods, and whether it is working in the UK’s best interest, politicians and stakeholders in British business including MEPs, Bureau of National Enterprises, Financial Services Bureau, among others, unanimously agreed that free movement is good for business.

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They also argued that a single set of rules is also good for business. The review highlights: The common set of rules removes many of the non-tariff barriers to trade, enabling exporters to reap the benefits of economies of scale, and is cheaper to administer than having to demonstrate compliance with multiple regulatory frameworks.

However, the report equally recognises the burden of regulation on some business within the UK. It further states: Evidence suggests that some businesses benefit from the single market in goods more than others. the FSB argued that ‘small and micro-businesses have more difficulty complying with regulation than big businesses and suffer more from the cumulative effect of legislation.’ the FSB further argued that the cumulative burden of regulation falls disproportionately on small and medium sized enterprises.

Overall the report found that consumers would benefit from selling arrangements due to free movement of goods. Such benefits highlighted in the review include: giving much greater consumer choice in products; making pricing more competitive; and allowing consumers to make more informed choices, for example, through energy efficiency labelling.

However, controversy dogs the CJEU’s interference in the arena of free movement of goods.

As the report noted, the ECJ can be seen as making law through the back door. If this is so, how then does the UK appear slightly silent on the benefits of such selling arrangements founded on the ruling in Keck? This piece argues that this is reveals a double standard, which is a ploy to play down the benefits derived in Keck; in doing so, the UK has instead emphasised the judgments the court finds to be incompatible with EU provisions. This same ruling on selling arrangements appears to have helped the UK in regulate Sunday trading, which was built on the principle of Keck. In Keck, it was held that the traders selling goods at a loss in other member states contravened their national laws. They argued that the restriction amounts to MEQR. To avoid opening the floodgate for many of these cases, the court recognised the need for internal rules, as long as they do not discriminate between internal products, and imported products. In other words, the law should apply across the board equally.

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This, it seems, is the court recognising Member States’ rights for their sovereign jurisdictions to regulate their markets. It would be pre-mature to suggest that the courts interference in free movement of goods restricts members’ ability to regulate internally. Therefore, the court should not be seen as taking away national power, but instead attempting to justify the market within the meaning of its founding principle to free trade.

Although Neil’s disagrees with Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon, he accepts the judgment in Keck by asserting that “the judgment in Keck, in our view, is based on the same logic: national measures must ensure “equality of chances” for domestic and imported goods. The UK government review also found the decision in Keck to be sensible; it was stated in the review that “in the joined case Keck and Mittouard, the court sought to limit the meaning of measures having equivalent effect by introducing a rigid distinction between product requirements and certain selling arrangements.” In this sense, it appears that the UK is not always at loggerheads on free movement of goods, neither are such bottlenecks to be seen as a hindrance to its path to sovereign control. It has only conveniently highlighted it to make its own argument, and not to see the balance the CJEU tried to achieve to retain national sovereignty.

SUBMISSIONS The common market trade was the fundamental principle that created the European community, and so it was right for the CJEU to apply provisions all members agreed to in treaty and its requirements to promote such principles. If the decision in Dassonvile had gone the other way, it would have been difficult for this free trade to flourish for the benefit of member states. A simple lack of product certification should not hinder on the successes of Europe. Therefore, the decision provides for industries to thrive, and for consumers to have the free will to choose. Not only would are consumers free to choose the best products, but are free to choose from some of the provided jobs the EU has to offer through free unrestricted trade.

The principle is the same in Cassis de Dijon. You cannot simply have member states setting local rules and expect everyone to abide by them. This is counterproductive, and makes trading far from free and simple. It goes against consumer laws and may create arbitrary protectionism from imports, which may place the importers at a disadvantage in the market.

However, the CJEU has become more dynamic in the interpretation of Article 34 in order to strengthen its force of application. According to Connor, in Commission v Italy, for example, the Court substituted reference to the “selling arrangement” by declaring unequivocally thus: MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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“Measures adopted by a Member State the object or effect of which is to treat products coming from other Member States less favourably are to be regarded as measures having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on imports”.

As Connors notes, such a statement arguably would appear to be an explicit acknowledgement by the Court that the principle of non-discrimination is an essential element in the application of Article 34 TFEU, going by the even more unequivocal judgment in the Case C-484/10 Asociación para la Calidad de los Forjados (Ascafor), Asociación de Importadores y Distribuidores de Acero para la Construcción (Asidac) v Administración del Estado, [2012] where it was held that “Article 34 TFEU reflects the obligation to comply with the principles of non-discrimination.” However, extended to jurisprudence relating to freedoms other than those applicable to goods, Alina Tryfonidou suggests that it is an anomaly in the sense that the Court, in the context of the other market freedoms, appears to be moving towards convergence through the adoption of a pure market access approach and has dispensed with the need of proving discrimination in law or in fact before a measure can be caught by the market freedoms.

So what do we take from the application of Article 34? It is submitted here that if every member state should do this, then what would be the point of having a common market with protectionist rules? Once the product is clearly labelled, then the customers would be in a position to make an informed choice. That is what the market should be. That is what the foundation principle of free market and trade is about. And that is what the court sought to achieve. The court was right to recognise that national states should have a say in their local laws. Therefore, as unanimously argued by others cited above, it sought to clarify the provision, and put in place sensibleness and common sense in keck. Therefore, the removal of certain restriction to ensure the free flow of goods cannot be seen to create any bottlenecks between the UK and the EU, by the CJEU’s application of the provision under Article 34.

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“THE structure of the United States of Europe, if well and truly built, will be such as to make the material strength of a single state less important. Small nations will count as much as large ones and gain their honour by their contribution to the common cause”.

“If we needed a referendum we would have one. But I think most people recognise that there is not a fundamental change taking place as a result of this amended treaty.”

We have to struggle against the conservatives from all sides, not only the right-wingers, but also the left-wing conservatives who don't want to change anything.

The UK is not going to leave the European Union. Of course not. We are inextricably wound up with Europe. In terms of culture, history and geography, we are a European nation.

Norwegian legislation is more in conformity with the rules of the European Union than most member states.

We all know the stories about the Human Rights Act... about the illegal immigrant who cannot be deported because, and I am not making this up, he had a pet cat.

As politicians we have to react to the fact that many people do not feel that they can relate to the EU.

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EU LAW SUPREMACY: A SEVERE CURTAILMENT OF MEMBER STATES LAWS CAROLINE M. MUCHECHETERE AT THE BEGINNING: THE BIRTH OF EU LEGAL SUPREMACY Two paradigmatically different narratives are vital for the understanding of the concept of the supremacy of EU which is the focus of this discourse. First, in a compelling introduction to their editorial in the 2014 edition of the European Constitutional Law Review entitled: For History’s Sake: on Costa v ENEL, Andre Donner and the Eternal Secret of the Court of Justice’s Deliberations, Jan-Herman Reestman and Monica Claes take us back to the origins of the supremacy of EU law, stating as follows: Fifty years ago, on 15 July 1964, the Court of Justice of what is now the European Union decided Costa v ENEL. The judgment is often mentioned in one breath with the no less famous judgment of 5 February 1963 in Van Gend & Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen. Rightly so: together the two judgments brought about the Big Bang of the EU legal universe, providing it at the same time with a matrix to expand into. Certainly, alternate histories generally are a form of fiction, but it is no fantasy to say that if the Court had not recognised the (possibility of) direct effect of EU law in the national legal orders in Van Gend & Loos and of the (internal) primacy of EU law over national law in Costa, the EU legal order would not have developed as it has.

From the above account, it is clear that as the major cataclysm for the establishment of the supremacy of EU law, from the time Van Gend en Loos was decided, prominence has been placed on EU law supremacy over national laws of Member States. The principle articulated in the case was predicated on the understanding that a restriction on national sovereign rights was, actually for the greater good for a new legal order which would bring about considerable benefit for those who gave up their sovereign rights. It was however, the ruling in Costa v Enel which elucidated the issue more clearly, when it was held that “the agreement of member states to the union in the first place signified an acceptance of limited sovereign rights, albeit in limited fields.”

The second narrative is made by Anthony Arnull in his 2010 European Law Review article entitled “The Law Lords and the European Union: Swimming with the Incoming Tide”. As he MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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narrates, “perhaps the most famous decision of an English court on EC law was delivered, not by the House of Lords, but by one of England's most remarkable judges sitting in the Court of Appeal”. HP Bulmer Ltd v J Bollinger SA [1974] Ch. 401 is notable chiefly for the judgment of Lord Denning at 418, in which he memorably said that the EEC Treaty “is like an incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries and up the rivers. It cannot be held back.” According to Arnull, Lord Denning’s judgment revealed certain ambivalence about the new legal order which Parliament, the courts and the legal profession would now have to assimilate. On the one hand, he appeared to welcome the intellectual challenge posed by EC law and the vindication it seemed to offer, in cases where it applied, of the purposive approach to interpretation he had for so long championed. On the other hand, the judgment betrayed anxiety about the Treaty's capacity to subvert the established order. For Lord Denning, not only was the Treaty “equal in force to any statute”, but on questions of Community law, “the European court is supreme. It is the ultimate authority. Even the House of Lords has to bow down to it.”

Thus, when one takes on board the fact that the UK does not have a written constitution, one could assume that UK should easily be compliant with the notion of EU law supremacy.

However, the UK’s legal and political affairs have also been predicated on the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty which espouses that the supreme body of law of the land is that which is enacted by parliament. This was bound to bring UK law into a collision course upon UK’s accession into the European Community in 1972. The dispute among the two comparable institutions of law arose at the onset of the European Communities Act 1972 which effectively provided that UK law shall be interpreted in conformity to Community law.

However, at the same time, this engages issues related to the UK’s constitutional history, and raises concerns about whether UK’s system of parliamentary sovereignty and EU law supremacy could co-exist. Section 2(1) of the ECA 1972 is vital in this instance in that it states that the UK is to take into consideration EU law on account that parliament itself says so. This reading implies that EU law is to take precedence over parliamentary sovereignty; it seems at the same time to be a suggestion that Parliament is still supreme but is gracious enough to allow EU law to assume supremacy. In contrast, the constitutional court of Estonia, a relatively new member of the EU, expressly put it that “the supreme body of EU law contained in the treaties, actually took precedence over its own constitution, as an amendment had been made to this effect”.

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While the UK and ESTONIA view their sovereignty in different terms, the application of the doctrine of direct effect on both countries is similar. The supremacy of EU law is not derived because the Treaties or the ECJ states so; rather, it is invoked because of the compliance and application of EU law by national constitution courts without which it cannot be supreme if the bodies responsible for putting it into operation fail to do so. Therefore, EU law only becomes supreme upon a Member State’ acknowledgement of its own constitution’s inferiority when juxtaposed with Community law. While UK courts have never stated out rightly that the UK constitution is inferior, the outcome of R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame (No2), appears to produce a similar conclusion. As Lord Bridge asserted, “….under the terms of the Act of 1972, it has always been clear that it was the duty of a United Kingdom court, when delivering final judgment, to override any rule of national law found to be in conflict with any directly enforceable rule of EU law.”

This absolute categorical assertion on the supremacy of EU law, draws attention to the fact that parliament in the UK is just as subordinate to EU law as its Estonian equivalent, except for the different method of recognising the sovereignty. Where a question of Community law needed to be resolved, the House of Lords (now Supreme Court) was required to make a reference to the Court of Justice, either when considering whether to grant permission to appeal18 or at a later stage in the proceedings; As the Court of Appeal put it in Chiron Corp v Murex Diagnostics Ltd [1995] All E.R. (EC) 8819, the possibility of asking the House for permission to appeal, constituted a “judicial remedy” for the purposes of the third paragraph of art.234 EC. The obligation to refer imposed by the Treaty on national courts of last resort was famously and controversially21 qualified in CILFIT v Ministero della Sanita (283/81) [1982] E.C.R. 3415 where the Court of Justice held that it did not apply where the correct application of Community law was so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt and laid down certain criteria that had to be met before that conclusion could be reached. For Arnull this is sometimes referred to as the “acte clair doctrine”. In Köbler v Austria (C-224/01) [2003] E.C.R. I-10239, the Court held that non-compliance by a top national court with its obligations under the third paragraph of Article 234 might render the competent state liable in damages to litigants who were thereby deprived of their rights under Community law.

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However, such liability arises “only in the exceptional case where the…national…court has manifestly infringed the applicable law”, a very high threshold Arnull argues had not been met in the circumstances of that case and successful claims are likely to be rare.

The above paints a clear picture of how Community law supersedes national laws of Member States; yet the UK has through successive governments upheld the absurd stance of the UK’s Parliamentary Sovereignty since its accession into the European Economic Community; and this trait has continued even in the coalition government. The somewhat ludicrous attitude became clear yet again at the time of the EU Act 2011 which was given royal ascent in July 2011, which contained a clause in s18 on UK parliamentary sovereignty.

SUPREMACY OF EU LAW AND UK: POLITICS AT PLAY As Arnull observes, between UK accession and the creation of the Supreme Court, the House of Lords made a total of 40 references to the European Court of Justice, with the three largest categories coming in the fields of social policy, value added tax (VAT), and jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. However, the entry of the Coalition government was heralded with mixed views. The Conservatives elements in the Coalition have made the pledge to give the nation an “in or out referendum” regarding the UK’s continued membership in the EU in 2017, apparently in apprehension of the momentum the UKIP was gathering as a result of being Eurosceptic. Thus David Cameron is considering measures to take in wresting power back from Brussels. A poll conducted by The Observer found that an astounding 56% of those surveyed responded that they would chose to exit the EU if a referendum was to be held.

Seeing that the UK joined the EU willingly, the reasons for wanting to opt out could be that the conditions which existed then in terms of remission, are largely at variance with what obtains at present; for this reason, directly or indirectly, this appears to be a focal topic in any argument with regard to the benefits or demerits of EU legal supremacy, not least, the subject of extension of competence, which continues to be an important point among member countries and the EU. Undeniably, it was as a matter of fact brought to the attention as a topic to be dealt with at the 2011 Treaty of Nice. There is a school of thought which holds that EU competences has in fact given power to Member States’ governments, chiefly the ones with devolved regions like the UK, in that the EU’s competences have usurped power from those particular regions, and not national governments; while another school has it that these competences are entirely MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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unwarranted supranational power, an untamed beast that has since become difficult to restrain.

Therefore in the UK situation, the forage of EU competences into domains which were encompassed by parliament before can may only be looked at as an on-going fragmentation of the thought of Parliament as a sovereign institution. Clearly there are a plethora of strands as to the merits and demerits of EU competences.

THE ECJ AS IMPLEMENTER OF EU LEGAL SUPREMACY In discussing the ECJ’s role the implementer of EU legal supremacy, it is important to dwell on two areas as a starting point: the use of defensive and offensive fundamental rights. While defensive deployment of fundamental rights is basically employed as a protection of supremacy of EU law over state law as expounded by Coppel and O’Neil, there may not be much controversy about the this variant of deployment. However, the second area, the offensive employment of fundamental rights, is not so clear as to stay off the fray of political discussion.

The offensive approach is in regard to the ECJ referring to fundamental rights not only to safeguard EU legal supremacy, but as well as expanding it to sectors which were before set aside for national courts.

There is also conceptual extension, such as was in Rutili in which the ECJ held that, “public policy considerations founded on Article 48(3) of the EC were not the exclusive preserve of member states, but were to be determined by Community law.” Thus, it referred to basic human rights as justification. Another instance of this finding is situated with the ruling in Wachauf v Federal Republic of Germany where the court examined for the first time, the real validity of a member nation’s law in the protection of fundamental rights. In contrast, in Ireland v Grogan, the ECJ did not seem to have taken into account fundamental human rights to extend its jurisdiction, it seemed to have overlooked a member state’s understanding of what in actual fact makes fundamental human rights, such as those of unborn children as provided in the Irish constitution, in order to extend its jurisdiction.

Interestingly, the ECJ conceded in Cindtheque v Fidration Nationale des Cinimasfranfais that it does not have the mandate to extend its jurisdiction into issues covered by national law, adding that it only had the power to make certain that fundamental rights were complied with in the context of community law. it seems therefore, the ECJ has on one hand, employed the offensive mode to expand the EU’s competences, leaving it all vague as to how much it has so in issues of state competencies by way of similar methods.

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While it is understated, it is a telling difference, given that the line of reasoning used by Eurosceptics is that the EU is emasculating the UK’s national sovereignty, by way of employing the human rights argument, which is just one of the major bones of contention.

Therefore, the image of the ECJ supremacy of the European Union law over every provision of law and indeed, national constitutions, has brought about the debate that the ECJ is overstepping its competencies. Crucially here, is that the ECJ is at the centre of interpreting European law and not questioning how the member states manage contradictions between national law and union law.

The supremacy of Community law and the obligations placed on national courts to make certain its workable efficiency is for this reason confirmed beyond doubt in consistent lines of case law. There are specific provisions of the EU Treaty which some may regard as fractional strong points of the supremacy principle. One such point is Article 307, which relieves member states of the requirement to guarantee the predominance of EU law in certain instances, or Article 297, which seems to inscribe out an area in which member states keep a level of sovereignty. However, these are stipulations of limited range, and the basic principle of supremacy articulated by the ECJ is a broad and general one. Then again, this makes up merely a portion of the supremacy feature. In the end, the recognition and application of the predominance of EU law are reliant on the adjustment and acceptance of the legal and constitutional arrangements of member countries.

CONCLUSION How has Community law fared in its process of exerting its supremacy over national law? The answer as Arnull notes can be predicated on the idea that it was not long after UK accession that the House of Lords made its first reference to the Court of Justice in a case which was a relatively specialised one turning on the interpretation of two fundamental provisions of the EEC Treaty, so was a natural candidate for transmission to Luxembourg. Therefore, acknowledging the fact that supremacy is very much part of Community law and originates as a consequence of the founding treaties is the easiest way to accept that EC law has sovereignty over national law. Until such a time when new treaties are drawn giving back powers to member states to determine their destinies, or until governments dissatisfied by the issue of EU law supremacy decide to pull out of the EU, they have no choice but to be compliant with whatever Brussels throws at them: and this includes former crusaders; and not even the “great” are exempted either.

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“Experience declares that man is the only animal which devours his own kind; for I can apply no milder term to the governments of Europe, and to the general p rey of the rich on the poor.” Thomas Jefferson

“There are two kinds of Europeans: The smart ones, and those who stayed behind.”

H. L Mencken

“Oh, London is a man's town, there's power in the air; And Paris is a woman's town, with flowers in her hair; and it's sweet to dream in Venice, and it's great to study Rome; but when it comes to living there is no place like home.”

Henry van Dyke

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THE INDIRECT EFFECT DOCTRINE: A NECESSARY OR KNEEJERK REACTION? UCHECHI OPARA

FIFTY YEARS ON: VAN GEND EN LOOS STILL LOOMS LARGE Before engaging in its case analysis, it is crucial to understand how EU law confers on individuals, directly enforceable rights and duties as Eric Engle observes, even against other individuals. This is because in Van Gend en Loos, it was stated thus: The Community constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals. Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon the Member States and upon the institutions of the Community.

On the basis of the above, European Union law, just like United Kingdom (UK) law, comes into being by various means which may mostly be classified as primary or secondary legislation. Primary legislation of EU law is treaties, and secondary legislation comprises of Regulations, Directives and decisions. Thus when the EU legislature makes laws, it desires that they will be effected in the national regions of Member States. The Commission has authority to bring proceedings against a Member State for non-compliance with EU commitments. It derives this mandate from Article 258 TFEU. Still, this is not enough in so far as ensuring the rights of individuals are concerned. A situation in point may be that a Union national of a concerned Member State may be disadvantaged because the concerned Member State failed to implement a Directive, or applied it the wrong way, thereby putting at disadvantage, the individual and depriving him of the rights the EU law meant to provide.

In an endeavour to bestow an efficient method of implementing of individual rights, the ECJ has come up with principles which connote that in some instances an individual can insist on their EU law rights in the member states’ own courts. These doctrines are direct effect, indirect MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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effect, and state liability. However, in this piece, the subject of discussion is the principle of indirect effect, although deliberation of this area corresponding to directives entails a cursory look at the doctrine of direct effect.

What is clear and which Sophie Robin-Olivier has pointed out is that the evolution that led to the recognition of horizontal or what the ECJ has coined as ‘indirect’ direct effect to Treaty provisions, and, in particular, free movement rules has for a long time gone, largely unnoticed.

One reason Robin-Olivier adduces for this is that the extension was only apparent in rare cases.

As a result, it did not seem to imply important changes at once. The story has been told many times. However, recent ECJ case law development has brushed away the obstacles to the horizontal direct effect of free movement rules, even if the Court of Justice continues to suggest that free trade provisions of the EU treaty were public law rules as it did in Case C-159/00 Sapod Audic, [2002] E.C.R. I-05031, where it was stated at 74 that “contractual provision cannot be regarded as a barrier to trade for the purposes of Article 30 of the Treaty since it was not imposed by a Member State but agreed between individuals.” Therefore, in looking at this, consideration will be taken as to whether it would be more prudent for courts to offer horizontal direct effect to directives as opposed to distorting ‘the meaning of national legislation’ by way of utilising the doctrine of indirect effect.

The TFEU does not categorically provide for the direct effect of EU law. In spite of this, it is clear that the ECJ, as a matter of efficacy, created this principle in Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, relative to Treaty articles. Consequent upon this case, it became feasible for an individual to directly enforce a right granted by EU law, as long as the right is provided by the Treaty. In spite of this, the ECJ has painstakingly restricted the range of direct effect to those specifications which were ‘sufficiently precise and unconditional’. And even though the direct effect of Treaty articles were somewhat clear, it was at first uncertain as to whether Directives would be matter of direct effect. This was owing to the fact that they were not explained as having the capability of being directly applicable were not concentrated at the world at large, but purely at member states.

Additionally, they are at all times conditional as they are dependent on the member state to give effect to them while at the same time, leaving some amount of options as to the method of carrying that out, to individual member states. Notwithstanding this, the direct effect of directives was instituted by the ECJ in Van Duyn v Home Office.

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This was a case involving a Dutch citizen, who wanted to enter the UK with the intention of working for the Church of Scientology, but was nonetheless, denied entry into the country by immigration on policy grounds. The claimant contested the decision on the grounds of the now Directive 2004/38/EC, claiming that it provided that public policy decisions based on the personal conduct of the individual, was directly effective. The ECJ found in her favour and held that the directive, was directly effective and she could rely upon it. The court was of the considered view that “the useful effect of a Directive would be weakened if individuals were prevented from relying on it before their national courts and if the latter were prevented from taking it into consideration as an element of Community law.” Consequently, direct effect is seen to be promoting the effet utile of EU law in the appearance of directives.

CLASSIFYING LAYERS OF DIRECT EFFECT Regardless of the finding of direct effect of Directives, the doctrine does not extend as far relative to Directives in the way it does to treaty articles and regulations. Specifically, a difference has been established between ‘Vertical’ and ‘Horizontal’ direct effect. While vertical direct effect entails the individual enforcing his right against the state and its emanations, horizontal direct effect, in contrast, has to do with matters between individuals in a similar position, that is, the enforcement of individual rights against another person, and private companies. Even as vertical direct effect of directives was determined in Van Duyn, there was no reference to horizontal direct effect.

It therefore almost immediately became obvious that directives were to be granted only horizontal direct effect. In Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority, the claimant was retired at the age of 60, in contrast to male employees were allowed to continue working until the age of 65. There was no law which prevented organisations from discriminating on gender justification in retirement-related issues. The claimant argued that the action was in contravention of an EU directive. It was held that the Directive could only be directly effective as against the state, and not against a private person, or for that matter, not such against a non-state employer.

The negative response of the ECJ to extending the direct effect of Directives to horizontal conditions signifies that even though the circumstances for direct effect are fulfilled, the individual will not be capable of relying on the Directive in procedures against another person.

Accordingly, rights can only be enforced where the other party is the State.

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This may point to situations in which people who find themselves in like circumstances, but the difference being that one may be employed by the state while another by a private company, may not derive a similar level of benefit from the enforceability of EU rights. This can scarcely be portrayed as adequate.

To facilitate the overcoming of the injustice drawn from the rejection of the ECJ to grant horizontal direct effect on Directives, the court has, as an alternative, worked out several approaches to lessen the impact of the rule. The first of these schemes has been to take on a broad interpretation of privatised state entities as ‘emanation of the state’. In this way, the ECJ has sought to enlarge the situations in which it will be likely to employ ‘vertical’ direct effect.

As a result, in Foster v British Gas, it was held that the Directive in question was enforceable against a nationalised utility firm, regardless of the fact that the firm was no longer a ‘state authority’; and because it provided a public service, was under state control and was given special powers to exercise its public service functions.

The second and possibly more significant approach the ECJ has adopted to restrict the outcome of the want for horizontal direct effect of Directives is to institute the doctrine of indirect effect.

This doctrine was first set out in the case of Von Colson, a case involving a female claimant who had been a victim of discrimination, in violation of the Framework Equal Treatment directive. The ECJ took cognisance of Article 4(3) TFEU which mandated Member States to take all appropriate measures to give effect to Community law. It was also held that national courts are an emanation of the state, and were thus obliged to interpret the wording of national law in according to the Directive in order to interpret national law in conformity to EU law as far as it was possible to do so.

Having given rise to the doctrine of indirect effect, which has need for the national courts to make certain that national law is attune with the directive at hand, the subsequent phase for the ECJ was to deduce whether this doctrine would be applicable even in horizontal instances between individuals. The response to this uncertainty was given in Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacionale de Alimentacion SA in a matter where a Spanish court was challenged over a national law which was at variance with a particular Directive which had not been applied in Spain.

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The finding here was that the interpretive requirement was applicable in horizontal cases; it mattered less whether the national law at issue was before or after the Directive was implemented. Then again, the interpretive requirement will only be applicable after the time restriction for putting into effect the directive has elapsed.

A different approach, linked to that above scenario, is to avail incidental horizontal effects.

This doctrine lets national law to be set aside where it is not in compliance with any feature of EU procedural law. Although this does not directly provide enforceable rights for individuals, it does have an effect on horizontal relationships in the manner the law is applied. In CIA Security International SA v Signalson SA and Securitel SPRL, it was contended that CIA had contravened the national technical standard for alarm systems. CIA asserted that the impertinence of the national standard was due to the failure of the state to bring it to the attention of the Commission as demanded by a Directive. The ECJ found this had been established and CIA was allowed to depend on the Directive so as to remove the national responsibility. This did not give rise to a duty on the other party by way of horizontal direct effects; nevertheless it did impact the other party because they lost the case as a consequence of the misapplication of national law.

Additionally, where a Directive sums up a general principle of Community law, that general principle may be horizontally directly effective, albeit the Directive itself would not be. This is so even where the time restriction for putting the directive into operation has not elapsed.

The initiation of this assortment of schemes to deter the likelihood of harsh consequences of a deficiency of horizontal direct effects of directives signify that the law is left in a somewhat disarray situation. A number of doctrines are appropriate; but then, they may all be assumed to be maturing in a period. Accordingly, a person cannot say with confidence whether or not a specific directive will be applicable. As a result, it is essential to reflect on whether the justifications for the want of horizontal direct effect for directives and if horizontal direct effect should be provided going forward.

Conceivably, the most pertinent reason for not availing horizontal direct effects to directives is that of legal certainty. this is a normative claim which provides that it would be a reversal of legal certainty for obligations to be placed on an individual as the individual would not be in a position to know whether to comply with existing national law or with the as yet to be implemented directive. Nonetheless, it is in any case, open to question that legal certainty MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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would be enhanced by means of the stipulation of horizontal direct effects of directives. For instance, if horizontal direct effects were given to directives, the individual would be obliged to come to a decision as to whether the requirements of the directive vary from national law and if they were adequately exact and unrestricted to have direct effect.

CONCLUSION Sophie Robin-Olivier in repositioning the profound effect of Van Gend en Loos argues that no account of the development of European Law misses the reference to the case. This is not because the facts are exciting, captivating, or memorable, neither is it because the case addressed a cause, a socially sensitive issue. Rather, the reason for all this attention is because the European Court of Justice (ECJ) named and shaped a “new legal order,” which can still be characterized by “the direct effect of a whole series of provisions which are applicable to their nationals and to the Member States themselves.” For that reason, the decision is considered a moment of “passage,” one of those turning points that marked the history of European legal and political integration. When combined with Costa v ENEL, and the principle of primacy, Van Gend en Loos has allowed a considerable expansion of EU law effects, in national courts, an evolution that was fostered by the dialogue between these courts and the ECJ, through the channel of preliminary ruling.

Finally therefore, it would as a matter of fact give rise to additional signification for the courts to proffer horizontal direct effects to Directives. the points of view in opposition to doing so do not carry much weight, moreover such an undertaking would make allowances for a better extent of legal certainty and the stipulation of ‘fair outcomes devoid of the requirement for resorting to complicated schemes intended to circumvent the end result of the principal in opposition to horizontal direct effects of directives, which does not give a good impression of this complicated legal outcome and rather, gives a negative opinion about the doctrine of indirect effect: one cannot help but conclude that it was founded as a kneejerk reaction.

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Candidates for top post of the European Commission once seated in power after the summer break are backing an EU-wide strategy to support the fundamental rights of gay people.

A defiant Conchita Wurst on Wednesday (8 October) challenged homophobic politicians and governments opposed to same-sex marriage to overcome their fears.

Slovakia will hold a referendum on marriage and gay rights this weekend, amid a debate so bitter the country's president has warned of "broken" social relations.

The EU is good at promoting LGBT (lesbian, gay, bi (sexual) and transgender people) rights beyond its borders, but it should pay more attention to what is happening in its member states.

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AN ADDENDUM LGBT DISCRIMINATION: HAVE WE CROSSED THE FRONTIER? THE GROUP CONTEXTUALISING THE STATUS OF THE LGBT IN THE EU The European Union has over the years, come up with an assortment of new directives to advance ‘equality’ and to combat ‘discrimination’. Be that as it may, the fact that these measures are founded on very extract concepts, leave extensive room for interpretation, thus rendering the real meaning and effect of the new laws strenuous to comprehend beforehand.

The real bearing of laws is for most of the time, better appreciated at the stage of being put into operation by the courts as opposed to the moment of their coming into being. thus on the whole, the same is true about the position for the EU Directives which have been put into operation to bring about ‘equality’ and ‘non-discrimination’, and the legislative methods adopted by member states to transpose and apply them. seeing that discrimination’ has become a main talking point for EU law makers lately, it would not be farfetched to conclude that ‘discrimination’ is still a momentous problem of current society; especially the type of discrimination associated with sexual preference, sexual inclination and sexuality generally.

Ever since Denmark established legal recognition for same sex relationships in 1989, more than half of EU Member States have put into operation homosexual non-marital partnerships, while some have gone on to extend rights of marriage to homosexual couples. Regardless of these progressions, same-sex marriage is still a subject burdened with controversy. While there is an obvious tendency toward acknowledgment in Western European countries, there is still a huge disparity in the levels of this recognition among member states. It is our intention here to discuss the disproportionate nature of dealing with homosexual relationships throughout the European Union and Council of Europe Member States, the grounds for such disparity and the response of European institutions to the discrimination that still goes on in relation to such relationships. It is our considered view that same-sex marriage is a fundamental human rights issue and that the European courts have not made a full recognition of this in their continued application of the ‘margin of appreciation’ principle, which lamentably, is just an apology to validate a failure to put into operation the right to marry to all EU citizens.

On the other hand, we appreciate that in the absence of consensus in European states, neither court can impose a responsibility on all states; this we are afraid, is as an outcome of the MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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arrangements in which the member states are entrenched by reason of various protocols which bind them. To claim that homosexuals have crossed the frontiers of equal rights in Europe would be being very economical with the truth. Legal responses to it are varied significantly with European states acting in response to the shifting surge of public opinion and the growing effect of human rights in various ways. Notwithstanding this, a familiar tendency of sluggish but progressive developments has been witnessed in many countries; regularly a direct consequence of likely membership of the European Union, given that potential member states have to fully agree to the acquis communautaire, or the council of Europe – which needs would be members to adhere to the human rights standards demanded by that institution.

Europe traces its major legislation in respect of same-sex relationships to the end of the 1980s following the enactment of the first legislation which provided legal acceptance of same-sex relationships and the European Court of Human Rights’ recognition of homosexuals as having the right to private life. Upon the first step toward legal recognition of same-sex relationships being taken by Denmark in 1989, other countries started to follow the trend- but it was still a further 15 years before the UK reached a similar status, while some European countries nevertheless, are still without legal recognition for same- sex couples. Now with the Same-sex Marriage Act 2014, same-sex marriage is legal in the UK, with the exception of Northern Ireland.

However, it must be stressed that the UK has outdone itself by going further by making marriage a devolved matter in parts of the country; the status of same-sex marriage being different in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, legislation allowing same-sex marriage in England and Wales was passed by the UK parliament in July 2013 and came into force on 13 march 2014, with the first same-sex marriages taking place on 29 march 2014.

Legislation allowing same-sex marriage in Scotland was passed by the Scottish parliament in February 2014, and received royal assent on 12 March 2014, which took effect on 16 December 2014. However, the greater than ever acknowledgment of homosexual rights must be understood in a wider perspective, given the shifting definition of marriage and the “family” in the twenty-first century. while most European member countries have endorsed partnership legislation that avails similar rights to those obtaining in marriage, it is not “marriage” in the view of the law or the public, no matter the similarities which may arise out of the situations.

This is also compounded by the fact that even in member states where same-sex partnerships

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are acknowledged and have rights; there is still opposition to suggestions of stretching “marriage” to homosexual couples.

As a result, heterosexual marriage still draws the most form of legal and social acknowledgment in most of Europe and commonwealth jurisdictions, to the exclusion of the few states where same-sex marriage has been established. Notwithstanding this discrepancy in legal appreciation of these relationships which is supposed to be very clear and precise, there is no doubt that traditional views of marriage and the family have gone through remarkable transformations in Europe. Yet still, the UK did not just arrive at conferring marital rights to gay couples, it was broken down slowly and in bits for it to get to where it is. The classic case is Wilkinson v Kitzinger, which upheld the definition of marriage stated by lord Penzance in Hyde v Hyde, “the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others”.

In Wilkinson, Sir Mark Potter, President of the family division, gave credence to this definition, to bolster his attempt to protect it as a solely heterosexual institution; also, in the case, a civil partnership was described as merely a “consolation prize” for marriage, by the petitioner in her submission. And yet a more realistic modern definition was given by Thorpe LJ in his dissenting Court of Appeal judgement in Bellinger v Bellinger, which concerned a transsexual marriage. He stated that an apt definition of marriage may be “a contract for which the parties elect but which is regulated by the state, both in its formation and in its termination by divorce, because it affects status upon which depend a variety of entitlements, benefits and obligations.”

It was however in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza, where Baroness Hale delivered a widely commended judgment that put in a nutshell the comparisons in the important fundamentals of any homosexual and heterosexual intimate relationship. As she stated, “homosexual couples can have exactly the same sort of inter-dependent couple relationship as heterosexuals can… many couples also come to want the stability and permanence which go with sharing a home and a life together…in this, people of homosexual orientation are no different from people of heterosexual orientation.” Unfortunately, such a progressive understanding of the family and what constitutes a relationship is not replicated in all European states, or by the European courts.

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THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS’ APPROACH The right to marry is provided for under Article 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights, applicable to all citizens of EU Member States, with the restrictions that parties are of marriageable age, and that they comply with the rules of domestic law. And ever since Schalk and Kopf v Austria, a case decided in 2010 by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in which it was clarified that the ECHR does not oblige Member States to legislate for or legally recognize same-sex marriages, there has still been no judgment from the ECtHR that has held that the right to marry is applicable to same-sex couples. Thus the relevance of Article 12 has been limited by the procedure of the margin of appreciate doctrine, in essence the court’s recognition of the signatory States’ right to self-legislate.

The margin of appreciation principle gives a degree of elasticity in application, with the purpose of providing some recognition of the diversity in political, social or legal positions within the signatory states to the convention. The doctrine of the margin of appreciation has had considerable impact on the case law in relation to same-sex marriage. There has been a reluctance on the part of the court to intervene in granting rights to homosexuals due to a “lack of consensus”- when widespread consensus exists the court is more willing to side with the majority - and undoubtedly, the politically sensitive nature of the subject. Thus a rigorous interpretation of Article 12 had been assumed in regarding homosexual and transsexual couples; nevertheless the court altered its position relative to transsexual marriage with the momentous judgement of Goodwin v UK. Before Goodwin, the court had held that transsexuals did not have the right to marry a person of the opposite sex to their “acquired gender.”

However, in Rees v UK, the court turned down the claim that there had been an infringement of the right to marry because it did not agree that the applicant; a transsexual had met the conditions of the right to marry seeing that the couple were not of opposite sexes. Four years soon after in Cossey, the court yet again decided that the UK did not impede the right for a transsexual to marry, since Mrs Cossey, a male to female transsexual, was legally entitled to marry a woman, just not a man. The court maintained that this kind of restriction on the right to marry was within the margin of appreciation.

Interestingly, in I v UK and Christine Goodwin v UK, the court, in a departure from the previous judgements of Rees and Cossey, held that transsexual men and women enjoy the right to marry a person of the opposite sex under the convention, in that a transsexual’s right to marry no longer fell within the margin of appreciation, but instead constituted a violation of Articles 8 MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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and 12. While this was a significant and positive transformation of fortunes for transsexuals, it still did not depart from the stand that partners had to be of opposite sexes for the right to marry to apply and therefore had no impact on homosexual marriage. Goodwin made allusions to the substantial transformations and social attitudes that had occurred all through Europe in recognising transsexuals in their changed gender and that most of the member states allowed post-operative transsexuals to marry. Thus the “continuing international trend in favour not only of increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals,” proved important, with the court considering not only the existence of a European accord but also the international perception. In view of the fact that Article 12 is limited in its operation to solely heterosexual marriage, European case law pertaining to the family rights of homosexuals has largely been brought under Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention.

Private and family life has proved a more wide and flexible concept than Article 12; it has been held to be relevant to matters such as succession to a tenancy by a homosexual partner, and yes indeed, to the relationship between an uncle and his nephew. The court has assumed a less guarded approach in Article 8 case law and has accepted the right to family and family life for homosexuals, initially holding that the criminalisation of homosexual activities was not justified by invoking the protection of public morals and in fact constituted a breach of Article 8. Since then the court has recognised discrimination under Article 8 where homosexuals are treated differently on the basis of their sexual orientation.

In Karner v Austria, the Austrian authorities wanted to validate their discrimination on the basis of the protection of the traditional family. Although the court accepted this as a possible reason for discriminatory treatment, it utilised the test of proportionality and established that “it must be shown that it was necessary in order to achieve that aim to exclude certain categories of people - in this instance persons living in a homosexual relationship - from the scope of the application … of the Rent Act. The court cannot see that the government has advanced any arguments that would allow such a conclusion.” To its credit, the ECtHR has stressed that the protection of family life under art 8 “is not exclusively restricted to marriage based relationships and may include other de facto family ties where parties live together outside of marriage”.

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However the case of E.B. v. France suggests a stricter approach being taken by the court in dealing with cases of sexual orientation discrimination under Articles 8 and 14. This is a case where E.B. had put in an application to the French authorities to adopt a child as a single person, adding in her documents that she was a homosexual in a relationship. Her application was denied on grounds that it would not be within the child’s best interest taking into account the lack of a paternal role model and E.B’s partner’s ambiguous approach towards the adoption.

In a succession of appeals, the French courts made constant allusion to E.B’s “lifestyle”. The ECtHR, even though by a tiny majority ruled that the French authorities’ refusal of the application was an infringement of Articles 8 and 14. Giving such substance to the “lack of a paternal reference” seemed to defeat the reason of single-person adoption.

In contrast to the UK, in France, a greater part of academics robustly opposed the introduction of same-sex marriage. The position was that “making marriage or marriage like institutions gender neutral would constitute such a departure from the unbroken tradition of upholding marriage as a union between a man and a woman that it will necessarily affect the legitimacy of the institution.”

THE ATTITUDE OF THE CHURCH TOWARD IN SHAPING THE LGBT The influence of the Catholic Church was an issue in the French attitude to the issue in spite of the civil, secular nature of the law of marriage. While we acknowledge that some EU Member States have crossed the frontier by giving their citizens the overdue deserved rights, whether they be registered partnerships or marriages, it is essential to draw attention to the fact that in some EU countries, such recognition does not exists. This state of affairs is predominantly widespread in Eastern European countries where, regardless of operation of anti-discrimination legislation, the States still come short in so far as provision of equal rights to the nationals is concerned: a case in point is Latvia, which in December 2005, “introduced no less than a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage.”

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CONCLUSION We submit here that in view of the lack of enthusiasm of the courts to proceed well over the “lowest common consensus” in its appreciation of same-sex relationships, it is improbable that recognition in this matter will come from European institutions. The ECtHR in Fretté v France alluded to its deficiency of political legitimacy in the nonexistence of a common European approach and employed this as a good reason for the application of a wide margin of appreciation. However, it is very probable that the increasing tolerance of homosexuality is a result of a greater awareness of rights and to an extent a backlash against the very idea of having EU institutions determining matters of individual choices; thus progressive member states have taken it upon themselves to implement same-sex marriage in their own way. The UK, Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Norway and Sweden have already introduced same-sex marriage and several more nations are now providing a kind of registered partnership system. The greater compromise that exists among Member States countries on this matter, the more feasible it is that the court will limit the margin of appreciation.

We appreciate that the causal aspects to effecting same-sex marriage or registered partnerships are complicated and not merely an issue of human rights recognition. We also submit that the reluctance by European institutions to advocate human rights founded method to same-sex relationship acknowledgment will forever lead to inequality in rights for non-heterosexuals across Europe - with UK same-sex couples able to marry and adopt and Latvian homosexual couples incapable of either. In arriving at this conclusion, we are very much alive to the legal, ethnic and political variations prevailing in Europe. However, if the EU institutions concerned with upholding human rights stand fast and depart from their dithering position, together we shall cross the frontier, whether we be lesbian, gay, bisexual, or indeed, transsexual.

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People who work together will win, whether it be against complex football defences, or the problems of modern society.

You can spend the money on new housing for poor people and the homeless, or you can spend it on a football stadium or a golf course.

Everybody wants you to do good things, but in a small town you pretty much graduate and get married. Mostly you marry, have children and go to their football games.

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IS EUROPEAN FOOTBALL AT VARIANCE WITH ARTICLE 45 TFEU? FELIX EBIWAREBO THE EU AND THE MAGIC, AND MIRAGE OF FOOTBALL There are very few leisure activities capable of drawing large crowds of people to an almost religious frenzy as football does. The sport is as unifying as it is divisive. at the core of this sport in Europe, is the union of European football associations (UEFA), an umbrella body encompassing 54 national alliances in charge of governing football in Europe, with the mandate of coming up with rules particular to the European Union. While UEFA has come up with sound policies, it has also arrived at questionable decisions, such as the barmy “home grown player rule”, which came into being at the beginning of the 2006/07 football season: it demands that each football club entering European club contests has to have eight ‘home grown’ players in their 25-man team, four of whom must be ‘club-trained’. The meaning of this terminology is that regardless of the age and nationality of the player concerned, as long as the said player has been on the books of the club for three football seasons or 36 months while between the ages of 15 and 21, he is to be considered home grown. The other four have to be ‘associationtrained’; these satisfy a similar requirement, save for the fact that it may be with another football club, but in the same national association. Failure to meet these quotas is sanctioned by the reduction of the number of players on the team’s list for competitions accordingly.

This brings us to the Spanish international Francesca Fabregas who joined arsenal at 16; this qualifies him as home grown. The establishment of the rule shapes part of a series of regulatory methods which include a club licensing system and ‘financial fair play’ policy implemented by UEFA in reaction to the apparent detrimental outcomes of the Bosman judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Bosman liberalised the European labour market in professional football by rendering unlawful two reputable rules. First, the CJEU held that rules restricting the right to take part in professional or semi-professional football matches to nationals of the state in question were prohibited by what is now Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Secondly, the court struck down a rule stating that a footballer who is a national of one Member State could not, on the expiry of his contract with a club be employed by a club of another member state unless the latter club paid a transfer, training or development fee to the former.

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UEFA are of the view that Bosman, along with the commercialisation of football brought about by growths in the European media industry, and has given rise to a number of unhelpful trends in European football. They maintain that there has been a decrease in ‘competitive balance’ across European football as the best players tend to want to move to the richest clubs, hence questioning the unpredictability of match and championship outcomes. This has been aggravated by the habit of clubs ‘hoarding players’, and has opened clubs to financial risk as they adopt business styles founded on recruitment by means of the transfer system and the rewarding of untenable player salary, as opposed to ploughing the money in the growth of young local talent. This does not only endanger output of playing talent, it also cuts the connection among clubs and their vicinities and deteriorates national teams by lessening the pool of talent offered to a national association to pick from.

It is hard to disagree with UEFA’s viewpoint. The rule, in unison with its club licensing scheme, which sets minimum youth training infrastructure principles and enticement youth training at clubs, must be agreed, operates to restore a degree of competitive balance at European club competition level and at domestic level where national associations implement the rule.

QUOTA SYSTEM: FOOTBALL TRUMPING EU LAW? Despite EUFA’s laudable policy, the quota system banned in Bosman makes the procedure of the rule to give rise to a possible clash with EU law on free movement of workers. In its 2007 Whitepaper on sport, the European Commission stated that the rule could be accepted as being compatible with treaty provisions on free movement of persons if it did not lead to any direct discrimination based on nationality and if possible indirect discriminatory effects could be justified as being proportionate to a legitimate objective pursued, such as to enhance and protect the training and development of talented young players.

Paul Downward, Richard Parrish, Geoff Pearson, and Anna Semens in their seminal article “An Assessment of the Compatibility of UEFA’s Home Grown Player Rule with Article 45 TFEU”, suggest that in assessing the compatibility of the rule with Article 45 TFEU, an orthodox approach needs to be adopted to the question of whether the rule is liable to impede or render less attractive the exercise of basic freedoms guaranteed by the treaty.

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This approach is based on the CJEU’s reasoning in Gebhard that in order to be compatible with EU free movement law, measures liable to restrict free movement must be, “applied in a nondiscriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.”

THE DISCERNIBLE CONSTRAINTS Article 45 TFEU disallows nationality discrimination that limits freedom of movement of workers across the EU borders of member state nationals in pursuit of economic activity, and in Bernard the CJEU affirmed that a professional footballer’s gainful employment fell within the scope of Article 45. The cross-border aspect required for Article 45 to be applicable is also satisfied as the rule is applicable to the make-up of club squads entering UEFA pan-European competitions, and cross-border movement of footballers could be encumbered if a club’s recruitment policy is informed by whether players satisfy the eligibility criteria.

Apparently, free movement rules can also be invoked against UEFA because Article 45 is both vertically and horizontally directly effective. Therefore, it is applicable to the actions of private bodies, the rules of which are aimed at collectively regulating gainful employment and services.

This relates not only to bodies engaged with quasi-state functions, but to purely private persons as well. UEFA is a private combined regulator in as far as its rules determine the terms on which professional sportsmen can engage in gainful employment and its geographical location in Switzerland is also not relevant as, “the rule on non-discrimination applies in judging all legal relationships in so far as these relationships, by reason either of the place where they are entered into or the place where they take effect, can be located within the territory of the EU.” In view of the above, it is vital to establish whether the rule amounts to a restriction under Article 45, and of what type. A football player may not abide by the rule on the basis that it is akin to a stipulation which prevent or daunts him from going out of his original country in pursuit of exercising his right of freedom of movement owing to the fact that a several positions in the squad are retained solely for ‘locally trained’ playing staff. This restriction, along with a method of sanctions put up into the regulations, is really prone to discourage clubs from securing a non-national if they cannot implement the home grown measures. This scheme remains unaffected by the reality that the rule does not set encumbrances on the recruitment of playing staff or on the make-up of the starting team of eleven players.

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The crucial aim of a football player’s pursuit is to be in a team so that he can play football and, as was held in Bosman, “a rule which restricts that participation obviously also restricts the chances of employment of the player concerned”. It may be concluded that the rule is inherently likely to restrict freedom of movement.

In spite of this, the restricted impression on workers does not seem to be obvious. There has been no consistent adjustment in numbers of foreign players in the "leading five" leagues from the time when rule was introduced. If it at all it has a harmful consequence on free movement, the expectation would certainly be a persistent fall in numbers of foreign players. As for the limits placed by Article 45, the CJEU makes a disparity between directly and indirectly discriminatory methods which limits free movement and other limitations that are nondiscriminatory in composition.

Direct discrimination is an obvious type of differential behaviour occurring where a migrant worker is treated less advantageously than a national worker, and is forbidden by Article 45 and connected secondary legislation. This prevention pertains not only to state of affairs in which migrant workers are entirely excluded from a particular activity but also to circumstances in which migrant workers proportions are implemented. The rule does not put such direct control on non-nationals; any non-national can meet the criteria as a home grown player as long as he meets the applicable criteria, which is that, he has been trained for three years by the club, or qualifies as ‘association-trained’ in the same country between the ages of 15 and 21. It is as a result not pertinent to deem the treaty derogations outlining the conditions in which direct nationality discrimination is suit Paradoxically, indirect discrimination is a less overt manner of differential treatment, and yet it is still prohibited by article 45 and secondary legislation to the degree that migrant workers are placed at a disadvantage relative to national workers, notwithstanding the challenged measure being vaguely applicable. The UEFA rule is in some way a discriminatory scheme for the reason that even if it is evidently on the fence in terms of nationality, national footballers are probably put in an advantageous position as opposed to their colleagues the migrant workers. It is clearly expected that nationals are more probable to attain the ‘locally trained’ standard as opposed to foreign workers purely as a result of their geographical position.

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As the Commission has accepted: Although it is difficult at the moment to state with any certainty that the ‘home-grown players’ rule will lead to indirect discrimination on the basis of nationality, the potential risk of this cannot be discounted, as young players attending a training centre at a club in a member state tend to be from that member state rather than from other EU countries.

In examining financial fair play rules, it is not easy to conclude whether they are in conformity with EU law or not because of the need to look at each case on its own merit. Undeniably, it is in the area of proportionality tests that the result of such examination includes some degree of vagueness, rendering it difficult to reach a certain conclusion in the matter. Nevertheless, the financial fair play rules are in harmony with EU law. Additionally, the financial fair play rules are not outlawed by Article 102 TFEU. Since they would meet the objective justification basis in regard to free movement of workers, they therefore would be in harmony with Article 45 TFEU on similar merits. Failing that, the likelihood of justification would be worn out and the financial fair play rule would be considered incompatible with Article 45 TFEU. CONCLUSION It appears the commercialisation of football has made the sport so influential that it is now in a position to circumvent, draw, and even command rules while shielding itself in its Zurich headquarters and at the same time, making itself, untouchable. This is not helped by the fact that there is not much mention about sport in the Union’s Treaties. However, not all is lost in that after Bosman, deliberations have since happened amid socio-cultural members on how to realise better safeguards from the appliance of EU law. Some alternatives for Treaty restructuring were suggested but before long, were overlooked as not viable. One alternative concerned sport being put to the catalogue of EU activities obtained in Article 3 of the treaty, which when read together with Article 308 would give the EU legal power to meddle in sports matters if it was deemed suitable for the realisation of one of the aims of the treaty.

Yet a further alternative concerned putting limitations on the freedom of movement for workers, that is, sportsmen and women, by revising Articles 39, 43 and 49. Additionally, part or all exemptions from the Treaty’s competition policy stipulations could be created by revising Articles 81 and 82.

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A final option related to defining sport in the circumstance of Article 86(2) of the Treaty which prospectively gives room for allowing for an exclusion from treaty principles if “undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly can demonstrate that the application of the competition rules would obstruct the performance of tasks assigned to it�. A couple of propositions have nevertheless remained grave options for the maximalist and moderate socio-cultural actors. In two previous intergovernmental conference discussions in the run-up to the Amsterdam and Nice treaties, some members of the socio-cultural coalition attempted and were unsuccessful in their quest to attain treaty status for sport, either by way of a separate article for sport or by the assumption of a sporting procedure. Still, the 1997 Amsterdam Declaration remains the only mention of sport within the treaty. Meanwhile, we can only hope that EU law will develop proper law to regulate the ever powerful sport, rather than leaving it to the meek Gebhard/Bosman jurisprudence.

On the basis of the above, it appears as it currently stands, it is submitted as follows, in aligning with the views canvassed by Paul Downward: that UEFA’s home grown player rule has resulted in improvements to competitive balance in European club competitions, but these improvements are very modest. And despite increases in the number of home grown players at EU clubs, there is little evidence to suggest that the Rule has improved the quality of youth development in European football. It is intrinsically liable to restrict the free movement of professional footballers and it is not possible, at this stage, to state that its benefits outweigh its restrictive effects. Therefore, the proportionality of the Rule cannot be categorically established until UEFA demonstrates that less restrictive alternative measures are ill equipped at securing its objectives. However, rather than adopting a negative position on the Rule, the European Commission should extend an invitation to UEFA to consult with key stakeholders on how alternative measures that do not carry discriminatory effects can deliver more substantial benefits for European football. Only when the outcome of these discussions and viability studies are known can it be established whether the proportionality of the Rule has been made out.

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Bibliography EU Immigration Spectre Haunts the UK  Applications—Who Decides? (19th Report, Session 2001–02, HL Paper 100);

Defining Refugee Status and those in need of International Protection (28th Report, Session 2001–02, HL Paper 156).  Article 3 of the Protocol on the Position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in

respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.  Directive 2001/55/EC on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the

event of a mass influx of displaced people and measures to promote a balance of effort between Member States.  Directive 2003/9/EC on minimum standards for the reception and support of

asylum seekers.  Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of

third country nationals as refugees or as persons otherwise in need of international protection.  Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards for granting and withdrawing refugee

status.  ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/future_prospects/negoti

ations/eu10_bulgaria_romania/treaty_2005  Enhanced scrutiny of EU legislation with a United Kingdom opt-in (2nd Report,

Session 2008–09, HL Paper 25).  europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/amsterdam_treaty/i

ndex_en.  European Union Committee’s Annual Report 2009 (23rd Report, Session 2008 –09,

HL Paper 167)  http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_maa

stricht_en.ht  Regulation 343/2003 determining the State responsible for examining an application

for asylum.  Regulation 407/2002 on the creation and operation of a database of fingerprints of

asylum seekers.  Standards in Asylum Procedures (11th Report, Session 2000–01, HL Paper 59);

Minimum Standards of Reception Conditions for Asylum Seekers (8th Report, Session 2001–02, HL Paper 49); Asylum  TEC Title IV, Article 63 (visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to the

free movement of persons).

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 The United Kingdom opt-in: problems with amendment and codification (7th

Report, Session 2008–09, HL Paper 55), paragraphs 1–5.  ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/highlights/2014-15/usherwoo

Article 34 Against Application of National Regulation Complying with free Movement of Goods Articles  Compiled by HM Government 2014, “Review of the Balance of Competences

between the United Kingdom and the European Union Single Market: Free Movement of Goods” (HM Revenue and Customs, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Intellectual Property Office.)  Directorate C, 2010, “Free movement of goods Guide to the application of Treaty

provisions governing the free movement of goods” (European Commission)  Professor Fenger, N., ‘To use or not use – that’s the question on Article 34 and

National rules restricting the use of lawfully marketed products’.

Books  Chalmers, D., Davies, G., & Monti, G, ‘European Union Law’ p 748 (2nd Edition

2010) Cambridge University Press.

Cases  Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649  Case c 142 05 Mickelsson and Roos 2009 ECR I-4273  Joined Cases 177/82 and 178/82 Van de Haar [1984] ECR 1797; Case 269/83

Commission v France [1985] ECR 837; Case 103/84 Commission v Italy [1986] ECR 1759  Keck and Mithouard (Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck and Mithouard

[1993] ECR I-6097)  Pistre [1997] ECR I-2343, ECJ  Procureur du Roi v Dassonville (Case 8/74) [1974] ECR 837

EU Law Supremacy Unhinges Member States  Article 207 TFEU  Article 297 TFEU  Article 307 TFEU  Article 48 (3) ECJ  Article 48 (3) of the ECC MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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 Cindtheque v Fidration Nationale des Cinimasfranfais EUR-Lex - 61984CJ0060 - EN

- EUR-Lex  Cinetheque SA v. Federation Nationale des Cinemas Francais (60- 61/84): [1985]

E.C.R. 2618, [1986] 1 C.M.L.R. 365  Costa v ENEL [1964] ECJ  EU Act 2011  European Communities Act 1972  R (Factortame Ltd) v SS for Transport [1990] 2 AC 85  Section2(1) of the ECA 1972  theguardian.com/.../observer-opinium-politics-polls+eu-referendu  Van Duyn -v- Home Office; ECJ 4-Dec-1974  Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1 (Case 26/62.)  Doctrine of Indirect Effect: A Kneejerk Reaction?  Article 258 TFEU  Article 4(3) TFEU  CIA Security International SA v Signalson SA and Securitel SPRL  ECJ in Van Duyn v Home Office  Foster v British Gas  Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacionale de Alimentacion SA  Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority  Van Duyn v Home Office  Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen  Von Colson  LGBT Discrimination Have we crossed the Frontier?  Boyle v. UK (1994) 19 EHRR 179.  Civil Partnership Act 2004.  Coester, M “Same-sex Relationships: A Comparative Assessment of Legal

Developments Across Europe” (2002) 14 Eur. J. L. Reform 585, 589-596, for distinction between models of legal regulation.  dca.gov.uk/constitution/transsex/policy.htm and the UK Gender Recognition Act

2004.  Diana Gittins: The Family in Question: Changing Households and Familiar

Ideologies (2nd ed. 1994) Chapter 4: ‘Why do people marry?’ p. 90 - 91.  Dudgeon v. UK (1982) 4 EHRR 149, Norris v. Ireland (1991) 13 EHRR 186, Smith and

Grady v. UK (2000) 29 EHRR 493.  Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, (No. 7525/76) (1981) 4 EHRR 149.

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 European Convention of Human Rights Art 12: “Men and women of marriageable

age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right”.  Goodwin (above n 47) at para. 101 and I v. UK (ibid. ) at para. 81.  Goodwin v. UK ( 2002) 35 EHRR 447 at 470-472.  Hamer v. UK 1979 Application N° 7114/75.  In particular see K. Waaldijk “Standard Sequences In The Legal Recognition of

Homosexuality” (1994) 4 Australasian Gay and Lesbian Law Journal 52.  Karner v. Austria (Application no. 40016/98) reported at: (2004) 38 E.H.R.R. 24 para.

41.  Karner v. Austria (Application no. 40016/98) reported at: (2004) 38 E.H.R.R. 24.  Michele Grigolo: “Sexualities and the ECHR: introducing the universal sexual legal

subject” (2003) 14(5) E.J.I.L. 1023 at 1027.  Registered Partnership legislation was first introduced in Denmark in 1989 and was

followed by Norway in 1993, Sweden 1995, Iceland 1996.

Is European Football at Variance with Article 45 TFEU?  Article 102 TFEU  Article 45 TFEU  C-519/04 P, Meca-Medina & Majcen v. Commission, Judgment of 18 July 2006  Case C-415/93, Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921 (“Bosman”)  EUR-Lex - 61993CJ0415 - EN - EUR-Lex  EUR-Lex - 61994CJ0055 - EN - EUR-Lex  four homegrown players in 25-man squad  uefa.com/news/newsid=943393.html UEFA Season 2006/07: minimum of  uefa.com/news/newsid=943393.html UEFA Season 2007/08: minimum of  six homegrown players in 25-man squad  uefa.com/news/newsid=943393.html UEFA Season 2008/09: minimum of eight

homegrown players in 25-man squad

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"Individual commitment to a group effort--that is what makes a team work, a company work, a society work, a civilization work."

“May your adventures bring you closer together, even as they take you far away from home.”

“Two heads are better than one because the more people that get involved, the easier it is to reach an agreement. This is why committees are so efficient.”

“The difference between successful and unsuccessful people is that successful ones know that the most unprofitable thing ever manufactured is an excuse.”

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HOW WE TEAM-WORKED FROM: MEL C MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK> DATE: TUE, OCT 28, 2014 AT 12:35 PM SUBJECT: MINUTES OF EU PROJECT MEETING HELD ON 20TH OCTOBER 2014 TO: "ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK" <ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK>, "NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM" <NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM>, MEL C MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK> MORNING ALL, PLEASE FIND ATTACHED MINUTES OF OUR MEETING HELD LAST MONDAY, 20TH OCTOBER (2PM - 4.20PM).

APOLOGIES FOR THE DELAY IN SENDING, I HAVE BEEN READJUSTING AT HOME, BUT PROMISE TO SEND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER EACH MEETING IN FUTURE. WE ARE MEETING THIS AFTERNOON AT 4.30PM FOR 1.5 HOURS. PLEASE THINK ABOUT THE OTHER TOPICS THAT WE CAN WRITE ON AND NYAMBURA PLEASE FIND OUT FROM YOUR NEPHEW HOW MUCH HE MIGHT CHARGE US, I WILL LOOK UP COSTS FOR VIDEO EDITING. BEST WISHES, CAROLINE -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------FROM: NYAMBURA WAINAINA <NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM> DATE: THU, OCT 30, 2014 AT 11:22 AM SUBJECT: RE: NO MEETING TODAY TO: MEL C MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK> HI CAROLINE, THE FEBRUARY READING WEEK START ON THE 9TH.

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PLS LINK ME WITH UCHIS EMAIL FOR HIM TO RECEIVE MESSAGES AT THE SAME TIME.

NYAMBURA ON TUE, OCT 28, 2014 AT 11:27 AM, MEL C MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK> WROTE: HI NYAMBURA, CAN WE MEET AT 4.30PM TODAY PLEASE? ________________________________________ DATE: MON, 27 OCT 2014 14:42:40 +0000 SUBJECT: RE: NO MEETING TODAY FROM: NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM TO: CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK OKAY CAROLINE WILL TELL HIM. ON MONDAY, OCTOBER 27, 2014, MEL C MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK> WROTE: HI NYAMBURA, I'M OUT OF TOWN AND WON'T ARRIVE BEFORE 2PM AND EVEN 4PM PLEASE CAN YOU TELL UCHE WE CAN'T MEET TODAY. I'M ON MY WAY BACK BUT WON'T MAKE ANY OF THESE TIMES. ANY CHANCE WE CAN MEET TOMORROW INSTEAD PLEASE. I'M REALLY SORRY. PLEASE CONFIRM YOU HAVE SEEN THIS. CAROLINE __________________________________________________________ _______________________________________ UK LONDON REGION MEPS 2009-2014.XWD ---------- FORWARDED MESSAGE ---------FROM: NYAMBARA <NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM> DATE: 2014-10-30 11:32 GMT+00:00 SUBJECT: UK LONDON REGION MEPS 2009-2014 TO: CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK CC: ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK __________________________________________________________ ____________________________________________________

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FROM:

NYAMBURA WAINAINA (NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM) THIS SENDER IS IN YOUR CONTACT LIST.

SENT: 12 FEBRUARY 2015 11:26:44 ---------- FORWARDED MESSAGE ---------FROM: SIEGMAR MISCHKE <SMISCH01@MAIL.BBK.AC.UK> DATE: MON, NOV 17, 2014 AT 10:55 PM SUBJECT: RE: MONDAY 1930 TO: MEL C MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK>, NYAMBURA WAINAINA <NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM>, ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK EU OFFICE LONDON HTTP://EC.EUROPA.EU/UNITEDKINGDOM/ABOUT_US/OFFICE_IN_LONDON/INDEX_EN.HT M

SIGGY FROM: MEL C MUCHECHETERE [MAILTO:CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK] SENT: 15 NOVEMBER 2014 23:35 TO: NYAMBURA WAINAINA; SIEGMAR MISCHKE; ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK SUBJECT: RE: MONDAY 1930 YES PLEASE. WE MEET ON THE 4TH FLOOR AS USUAL AND JUST FIND A ROOM? ________________________________________ DATE: SAT, 15 NOV 2014 07:48:16 +0000 SUBJECT: MONDAY 1930 FROM: NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM TO: CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK; SMISCH01@MAIL.BBK.AC.UK; ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK HI GUYS. HOPE YOU ARE WELL. UCHE SAYS THAT HE WILL SEND US SOMETHING ON SUNDAY. COULD WE MEET AT THE GEORGE MALET ST AND MAP OUT OUR NEXT MOVE WHATEVER HAPPENS. REGARDS NYAMBURA __________________________________________________________ ____________________ MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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NYAMBURA WAINAINA

11:27

FROM: UCHECHI OPARA <ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK> DATE: THU, NOV 20, 2014 AT 12:12 PM SUBJECT: RE: UPCOMING LGBT EVENTS TO: MEL C MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK>, SIEGMAR MISCHKE <SMISCH01@MAIL.BBK.AC.UK>, NYAMBURA WAINAINA <NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM>, YOU ARE ON THE RIGHT TRACK. I SUGGEST WE MAKE USE OF ANY AVAILABLE OPPORTUNITY. ON TUESDAY, 18 NOVEMBER 2014, 4:29, MEL C MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK> WROTE: HI , PLEASE FIND BELOW SOME MORE UPCOMING LGBT EVENTS: 29 NOVEMBER - NUT LGBT TEACHERS CONFERENCE HTTP://LONDON.GAYCITIES.COM/EVENTS/431241-NUT-LGBT-TEACHERS-CONFERENCE 13 DECEMBER - SINK THE PINK WINTER BALL HTTP://LONDON.GAYCITIES.COM/EVENTS/437403-SINK-THE-PINK-WINTER-BALL 28 NOVEMBER - THE POPSTARZ FAREWELL FUNFAIR - THE LAST PARTY HTTP://LONDON.GAYCITIES.COM/EVENTS/436328-THE-POPSTARZ-FAREWELL-FUNFAIRTHE-LAST-PARTY I HAVE ONE FRIEND WHO HAS AGREED TO BE INTERVIEWED, SHE IS A LESBIAN, HAS JUST RETURNED FROM MEXICO WHERE SHE SPOKE ABOUT THEIR RIGHTS AND IS ALWAYS GIVING ADVISE TO HER COMMUNITY. SHE IS IN A CIVIL PARTNERSHIP AND IS A CO-PARENT WITH A GUY WHO WAS ON BIG BROTHER, VERY ELOQUENT AND THERE IS ANOTHER CANDIDATE BUT SHE'S FROM THE SAME BACKGROUND SO MAY NOT BE GOOD, BUT SHE'S DONE EXTENSIVE WORK ON THIS TOPIC, SHE'S JUST DEFENDED HER VIVA AND IS A PSYCHOLOGIST, IN A RELATIONSHIP WITH ANOTHER LADY. THEY WILL HAPPILY DO IT FOR FREE OR A LUNCH FROM ME :).

WHEN YOU WAKE UP LET ME KNOW YOUR THOUGHTS PLEASE. REGARDS, CAROLINE ________________________________________ FROM: CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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TO: SMISCH01@MAIL.BBK.AC.UK; NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM; ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK; SUBJECT: UK LONDON REGION MEPS - EMAIL ADDRESSES DATE: TUE, 18 NOV 2014 04:13:36 +0000 HI ALL, HEREWITH THE EMAIL ADDRESSES AT THE READY, WHEN THE TEXT IS READY, THESE ARE THE PEOPLE WE WILL HOPEFULLY MEET WITH. • CHARLES TANNOCK - CHARLES@CHARLESTANNOCK.COM • CLAUDE MORAES - OFFICE@CLAUDEMORAES.COM • BARONESS SARAH LUDFORD - OFFICE@SARAHLUDFORDMEP.ORG.UK • DR SYED KAMALL - SYED.KAMALL@EUROPARL.EUROPA.EU • JEAN LAMBERT - JEANLAMBERT@GREENMEPS.ORG.UK • GERARD BATTEN - GERARD.BATTEN@EUROPARL.EUROPA.EU • MARY HONEYBALL - MARY@MARYHONEYBALL.NET • MARINA YANNAKOUDAKIS - MARINA.YANNAKOUDAKIS@EUROPARL.EUROPA.EU BEST WISHES, CAROLINE ________________________________________ FROM: CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK TO: SMISCH01@MAIL.BBK.AC.UK; NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM; ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK; SUBJECT: ACCOMMODATION DATE: TUE, 18 NOV 2014 04:04:28 +0000 ACCOMMODATION - IF WE GET TWIN ROOMS WILL BE QUITE REASONABLE, LOOKING AT PAYING £30 PER NIGHT SHOULD WE DECIDE TO VISIT BOTH CITIES. SEE BELOW, I'M JUST SENDING SO YOU KNOW THE COST IF WE GO FOR IT. HTTP://WWW.TRIVAGO.CO.UK/?IPATHID=35905&BDISPMOREFILTER=FALSE&ADATERAN GE%5BARR%5D=2015-02-24&ADATERANGE%5BDEP%5D=2015-0225&ACATEGORYRANGE=4&IROOMTYPE=7&SORDERBY=PRICE%20ASC&APARTNER=&AO VERALLLIKING=1%2C2%2C3%2C4%2C5&IGEODISTANCELIMIT=16093&IOFFSET=0&ILI MIT=25&IINCLUDEALL=0&BTOPDEALSONLY=FALSE&IVIEWTYPE=0&APRICERANGE%5B FROM%5D=0&APRICERANGE%5BTO%5D=0&IGEODISTANCEITEM=783076&AGEOCODE %5BLNG%5D=7.76881&AGEOCODE%5BLAT%5D=48.5975&BISSEOPAGE=FALSE&MGO= FALSE&BHOTELTESTCONTEXT=FALSE&TH=FALSE&AHOTELTESTCLASSIFIER=&BSHAREDR OOMS=FALSE&BISTOTALPRICE=FALSE&BISSITEMAP=FALSE&RP=&SSEMKEYWORDINFO=&

________________________________________ FROM: CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK TO: SMISCH01@MAIL.BBK.AC.UK; NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM; ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK; LEKBEL2001@YAHOO.COM SUBJECT: TRAVEL COSTS DATE: TUE, 18 NOV 2014 04:00:45 +0000 HI GUYS,

PLEASE PROVIDE THE NEW GUY'S EMAIL ADDRESS OR FORWARD ON.

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• EUROSTAR FROM LONDON TO BRUSSELS RETURNING THE SAME DAY COSTS £69.

DETAILS BELOW: 6:50 TUE 24 FEB 10:07 LONDON ST. PANCRAS INTERNATIONAL TO BRUXELLES-MIDI EUROSTAR 9110 £69.00 19:52 TUE 24 FEB 21:03 BRUXELLES-MIDI TO LONDON ST. PANCRAS INTERNATIONAL EUROSTAR 9161 • EUROSTAR FROM LONDON TO BRUSSELS (STOP OVER FOR 5 HOURS & 38 MINS) ON EUROSTAR & TVG, (5 HOURS, 15 MINS) - £84.50, IF WE LEAVE LONDON AT 08.04AM ON 17TH FEBRUARY WE WILL BE IN STRASBOURG AT 21.14HRS. HTTPS://LOCO2.COM/JOURNEY/LONDON-STRASBOURG-13A9XUY • FOR £101 WE CAN DO EUROSTAR, FROM LONDON AT 7.01, STOP-OVER IN STRASBOURG FOR 4 HOURS AND BE IN BRUSSELS AT 23.22, SLEEP, WAKE UP AND RECORD IN FRONT OF PARLIAMENT. •

FLIGHTS, DEPARTING ON 17TH FEBRUARY, ONE WAY LONDON TO BRUSSELS IS £29 DEPARTING AT 6.50AM FROM HEATHROW OR £41 DEPARTING FROM GATWICK AT 7AM; RETURNING ON THE SAME DAY AT 9PM IS £57.

•

IF WE FLY LONDON, BRUSSELS, STRASBOURG, LONDON IT COSTS - £29 (SINGLE - AS ABOVE) + £83 (BRUSSELS TO STRASBOURG) AND £231TO TRAVEL BACK TO LONDON.

________________________________________ FROM: SMISCH01@MAIL.BBK.AC.UK TO: CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK; NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM; ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK SUBJECT: RE: MONDAY 1930 DATE: MON, 17 NOV 2014 22:55:14 +0000 EU OFFICE LONDON HTTP://EC.EUROPA.EU/UNITEDKINGDOM/ABOUT_US/OFFICE_IN_LONDON/INDEX_EN.HT M

SIGGY FROM: MEL C MUCHECHETERE [MAILTO:CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK] SENT: 15 NOVEMBER 2014 23:35 TO: NYAMBURA WAINAINA; SIEGMAR MISCHKE; ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK SUBJECT: RE: MONDAY 1930 YES PLEASE. WE MEET ON THE 4TH FLOOR AS USUAL AND JUST FIND A ROOM? ________________________________________ DATE: SAT, 15 NOV 2014 07:48:16 +0000 SUBJECT: MONDAY 1930 FROM: NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM

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TO: CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK; SMISCH01@MAIL.BBK.AC.UK; ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK HI GUYS. HOPE YOU ARE WELL. UCHE SAYS THAT HE WILL SEND US SOMETHING ON SUNDAY. COULD WE MEET AT THE GEORGE MALET ST AND MAP OUT OUR NEXT MOVE. REGARDS NYAMBURA __________________________________________________________ _______________________________________ ---------- FORWARDED MESSAGE ---------FROM: MEL C MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK> DATE: FRI, NOV 21, 2014 AT 12:42 PM SUBJECT: RE: DATE OF NEXT MEETING - MONDAY, 24TH NOVEMBER TO: SIEGMAR MISCHKE <SMISCH01@MAIL.BBK.AC.UK>, "ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK" <ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK>, "FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM" <FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM>, "NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM" <NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM> THANK YOU SIGGY FOR YOUR CONTACT DETAILS. MINE ARE - 07749666731. SKYPE IS MEL MUCHECHETERE. PLEASE MAY WE HAVE EVERYONE'S DETAILS SO WE CAN COMPILE A CONTACT SHEET AND THE WHATSAPP GROUP THAT FELIX OFFERED TO CREATE. TAKE CARE. ________________________________________ FROM: SMISCH01@MAIL.BBK.AC.UK TO: CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK SUBJECT: RE: DATE OF NEXT MEETING - MONDAY, 24TH NOVEMBER DATE: FRI, 21 NOV 2014 11:26:46 +0000 CAROLINE MY EMAIL TO USE IS SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM FOR THE PLAN AS I WOULD LIKE TO REVIEW AS WELL PHONE NUMBER IS 07530807328 SKYPE IS EASY SIEGMAR.MISCHKE

WHATSAPP IS EASY IF YOU HAVE IT INSTALLED ON YOUR PHONE YOU WILL FIND ME AND VICE VERSA WE ALL NEED EACH OTHER’S PHONE NUMBERS PLEASE SENT ME THE STUFF I NEED MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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S FROM: MEL C MUCHECHETERE [MAILTO:CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK] SENT: 21 NOVEMBER 2014 00:00 TO: SIEGMAR MISCHKE; 'NYAMBURA WAINAINA'; ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK; FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM SUBJECT: DATE OF NEXT MEETING - MONDAY, 24TH NOVEMBER HI GUYS, CAN WE PLEASE MEET ON MONDAY AT 7.30PM ON THE 4TH FLOOR TO DISCUSS OUR PROJECT AND WAY FORWARD. EVERYONE SHOULD HAVE REVIEWED THE PLAN IN DETAIL AHEAD OF THIS MEETING. EVERYONE SHOULD HAVE DECIDED WHAT THEY WANT TO DO IN TERMS OF TRAVEL AND ACCOMMODATION, WHETHER WE GO TO BOTH FRANCE AND BELGIUM OR JUST TO BRUSSELS. EVERYONE TO RESEARCH ADDITIONAL LGBT EVENTS AND DATES AND BRING A SUMMARY SHEET AND THE DATES AND WE ALL AGREE ON A DATE OR DATES THAT WE CAN DO. EVERYONE TO RESEARCH COSTS OF HIRING VIDEOGRAPHY EQUIPMENT BECAUSE WE NEED THIS WHEN WE GO TO THE LGBT EVENTS. FELIX - YOU WERE GOING TO CREATE A WHATSAPP GROUP FOR US TO COMMUNICATE MORE EFFECTIVELY. ARE YOU STILL GOING TO DO THIS? PERHAPS SOME PEOPLE WILL THEN START RESPONDING TO MESSAGES. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT MY COLLEAGUES, WE ALL HAVE OTHER COMMITMENTS, PLEASE MAKE AN EFFORT TO DO YOUR BIT, WE DON'T WANT TO CARRY ANY DEAD WOOD, EVERYONE HAS TO DO THEIR BIT. ITS UNFAIR FOR EVERYONE ELSE TO DO RESEARCH AND EVERYONE ELSE TO JUST TURN UP AT MEETINGS AND NOT DO ANYTHING. WE AGREED FROM THE ONSET MOST OF THE WORK WAS TO BE DONE THIS SIDE OF XMAS SO NEXT YEAR WE CAN FOCUS ON EXAM REVISION. MOST PEOPLE ARE AWAY IN DECEMBER AND WE DON'T HAVE MANY SCHOOL DAYS LEFT. ONE OF THE LGBT EVENTS IS ON FRIDAY, ARE YOU GUYS PREPARED TO GO? ON MONDAY WE NEED TO ALLOCATE TASKS TO EACH PERSON THAT WE MINUTE AND DEADLINES FOR EACH TASKS AND ALSO WHO INTERVIEWS ON THE DAY SO PEOPLE ARE WELL READ IN ADVANCE.

REGARDS, CAROLINE ________________________________________ FROM: CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK TO: SMISCH01@MAIL.BBK.AC.UK; NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM; ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK; MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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SUBJECT: UK LONDON REGION MEPS - EMAIL ADDRESSES DATE: TUE, 18 NOV 2014 04:13:36 +0000 HI ALL, HEREWITH THE EMAIL ADDRESSES AT THE READY, WHEN THE TEXT IS READY, THESE ARE THE PEOPLE WE WILL HOPEFULLY MEET WITH. • CHARLES TANNOCK - CHARLES@CHARLESTANNOCK.COM • CLAUDE MORAES - OFFICE@CLAUDEMORAES.COM • BARONESS SARAH LUDFORD - OFFICE@SARAHLUDFORDMEP.ORG.UK • DR SYED KAMALL - SYED.KAMALL@EUROPARL.EUROPA.EU • JEAN LAMBERT - JEANLAMBERT@GREENMEPS.ORG.UK • GERARD BATTEN - GERARD.BATTEN@EUROPARL.EUROPA.EU • MARY HONEYBALL - MARY@MARYHONEYBALL.NET • MARINA YANNAKOUDAKIS - MARINA.YANNAKOUDAKIS@EUROPARL.EUROPA.EU BEST WISHES, CAROLINE ________________________________________ FROM: CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK TO: SMISCH01@MAIL.BBK.AC.UK; NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM; ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK; SUBJECT: ACCOMMODATION DATE: TUE, 18 NOV 2014 04:04:28 +0000 ACCOMMODATION - IF WE GET TWIN ROOMS WILL BE QUITE REASONABLE, LOOKING AT PAYING £30 PER NIGHT SHOULD WE DECIDE TO VISIT BOTH CITIES. SEE BELOW, I'M JUST SENDING SO YOU KNOW THE COST IF WE GO FOR IT. HTTP://WWW.TRIVAGO.CO.UK/?IPATHID=35905&BDISPMOREFILTER=FALSE&ADATERAN GE%5BARR%5D=2015-02-24&ADATERANGE%5BDEP%5D=2015-0225&ACATEGORYRANGE=4&IROOMTYPE=7&SORDERBY=PRICE%20ASC&APARTNER=&AO VERALLLIKING=1%2C2%2C3%2C4%2C5&IGEODISTANCELIMIT=16093&IOFFSET=0&ILI MIT=25&IINCLUDEALL=0&BTOPDEALSONLY=FALSE&IVIEWTYPE=0&APRICERANGE%5B FROM%5D=0&APRICERANGE%5BTO%5D=0&IGEODISTANCEITEM=783076&AGEOCODE %5BLNG%5D=7.76881&AGEOCODE%5BLAT%5D=48.5975&BISSEOPAGE=FALSE&MGO= FALSE&BHOTELTESTCONTEXT=FALSE&TH=FALSE&AHOTELTESTCLASSIFIER=&BSHAREDR OOMS=FALSE&BISTOTALPRICE=FALSE&BISSITEMAP=FALSE&RP=&SSEMKEYWORDINFO=&

________________________________________ FROM: CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK TO: SMISCH01@MAIL.BBK.AC.UK; NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM; ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK; SUBJECT: TRAVEL COSTS DATE: TUE, 18 NOV 2014 04:00:45 +0000 HI GUYS, PLEASE PROVIDE THE NEW GUY'S EMAIL ADDRESS OR FORWARD ON. • EUROSTAR FROM LONDON TO BRUSSELS RETURNING THE SAME DAY COSTS £69.

DETAILS BELOW: 6:50 MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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TUE 24 FEB 10:07 LONDON ST. PANCRAS INTERNATIONAL TO BRUXELLES-MIDI EUROSTAR 9110 £69.00 19:52 TUE 24 FEB 21:03 BRUXELLES-MIDI TO LONDON ST. PANCRAS INTERNATIONAL EUROSTAR 9161 • EUROSTAR FROM LONDON TO BRUSSELS (STOP OVER FOR 5 HOURS & 38 MINS) ON EUROSTAR & TVG, (5 HOURS, 15 MINS) - £84.50, IF WE LEAVE LONDON AT 08.04AM ON 17TH FEBRUARY WE WILL BE IN STRASBOURG AT 21.14HRS. HTTPS://LOCO2.COM/JOURNEY/LONDON-STRASBOURG-13A9XUY • FOR £101 WE CAN DO EUROSTAR, FROM LONDON AT 7.01, STOP-OVER IN STRASBOURG FOR 4 HOURS AND BE IN BRUSSELS AT 23.22, SLEEP, WAKE UP AND RECORD IN FRONT OF PARLIAMENT. •

FLIGHTS, DEPARTING ON 17TH FEBRUARY, ONE WAY LONDON TO BRUSSELS IS £29 DEPARTING AT 6.50AM FROM HEATHROW OR £41 DEPARTING FROM GATWICK AT 7AM; RETURNING ON THE SAME DAY AT 9PM IS £57.

•

IF WE FLY LONDON, BRUSSELS, STRASBOURG, LONDON IT COSTS - £29 (SINGLE - AS ABOVE) + £83 (BRUSSELS TO STRASBOURG) AND £231TO TRAVEL BACK TO LONDON.

________________________________________ FROM: SMISCH01@MAIL.BBK.AC.UK TO: CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK; NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM; ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK SUBJECT: RE: MONDAY 1930 DATE: MON, 17 NOV 2014 22:55:14 +0000 EU OFFICE LONDON HTTP://EC.EUROPA.EU/UNITEDKINGDOM/ABOUT_US/OFFICE_IN_LONDON/INDEX_EN.HT M

SIGGY FROM: MEL C MUCHECHETERE [MAILTO:CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK] SENT: 15 NOVEMBER 2014 23:35 TO: NYAMBURA WAINAINA; SIEGMAR MISCHKE; ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK SUBJECT: RE: MONDAY 1930 YES PLEASE. WE MEET ON THE 4TH FLOOR AS USUAL AND JUST FIND A ROOM? ________________________________________ DATE: SAT, 15 NOV 2014 07:48:16 +0000 SUBJECT: MONDAY 1930 FROM: NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM TO: CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK; SMISCH01@MAIL.BBK.AC.UK; ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK HI GUYS. MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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HOPE YOU ARE WELL. UCHE SAYS THAT HE WILL SEND US SOMETHING ON SUNDAY. COULD WE MEET AT THE GEORGE MALET ST AND MAP OUT OUR NEXT MOVE. REGARDS NYAMBURA __________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________ FROM: MEL C MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK> DATE: TUE, NOV 25, 2014 AT 2:47 AM SUBJECT: EU PROJECT_THE EU AT CROSSROADS? TO: "ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK" <ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK>, "FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM" <FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM>, "NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM" <NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM>, "SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM" <SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM> HI EVERYONE, AS AGREED AT THE MEETING, HERE IS A CLEAN EMAIL, WITH ALL CORRECT EMAIL ADDRESSES. PLEASE MAY WE USE THIS EMAIL, THE TRAIL WHICH WE WILL PRINT OFF AND INCLUDE IN OUR SUMMARY PACK. MINUTES OF THE MEETING WILL FOLLOW SHORTLY. BEST WISHES, CAROLINE __________________________________________________________ _______________________________________________________ FROM: MEL C MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK> DATE: SAT, NOV 29, 2014 AT 1:42 PM SUBJECT: RE: EU PROJECT_THE EU AT CROSSROADS?_MINUTES OF MEETING HELD ON 24TH NOVEMBER 2014 TO: SIEGMAR MISCHKE <SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM>, "FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM" <FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM>, NYAMBURA WAINAINA <NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM>, "ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK" <ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK> HI GUYS,

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I'M STILL POORLY AND APOLOGISE FOR NOT MAKING IT THIS AFTERNOON. DID ANYONE MAKE IT LAST NIGHT? REGARDS CAROLINE ________________________________________ FROM: SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM TO: CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK; FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM; NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM; ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK SUBJECT: RE: EU PROJECT_THE EU AT CROSSROADS?_MINUTES OF MEETING HELD ON 24TH NOVEMBER 2014 DATE: FRI, 28 NOV 2014 18:38:19 +0000 DEAR ALL, AS REQUESTED PLEASE FIND MY COMMENTS IN RED………..SIGGY AS DISCUSSED AT THE LAST MEETING HELD ON 26/11/2014. BELOW ARE QUESTIONS FOR OUR EU PROJECT TOPIC (THE EU AT CROSSROADS).

• IN RESPECT OF THE LGBT GROUP, HAVE WE ACHIEVED THE VISION OF THE EU I.E. CITIZENSHIP SHALL MAKE ALL CITIZENS EQUAL? • DOES THE EQUALITY OF CITIZENSHIP FOUND IN SCHOOLS AND WORK PLACES REALLY EXIST FOR THE LGBT COMMUNITY? ( TO SOME EXTEND THIS QUESTION CAN BE ANSWERED THROUGH CASE-LAW) • WHY IS THERE NO EU DIRECTIVE IN RESPECT OF THE LGBT GROUP, WITH THE EU COMMISSION STRESSING THAT IT CANNOT MANDATE MEMBER STATES TO PASS EQUALITY LAWS ON THE SUBJECT? ( CULTURE, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE PRINCIPAL OF PROPORTIONALITY) • DO YOU THINK THE LGBT GROUP IS FARING BETTER IN THE EU AS IT IS CURRENTLY STRUCTURED? • WHAT IS YOUR OPINION ON THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE ACTS RECENTLY PASSED IN THE UK AND FRANCE? ( OPEN QUESTION SHOULD BE CLOSED LIKE; “DO YOU SUPPORT THE CONCEPT OF MARRIAGE ? NEXT QUESTION DO YOU SUPPORT THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE ACT PASSED IN THE UK AND FRANCE? ) • WITH THE LAW IN PLACE IN THESE TWO LEADING EU MEMBER STATES, DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE RIGHTS THE LGBT GROUP NOW ENJOYS WILL CUT ACROSS THE EU AND APPLY TO COUNTRIES SUCH AS BULGARIA AND POLAND? ( THIS CAN REALLY ONLY BE ANSWERED BY THE PEOPLE OF BULGARIA AND POLAND SHOULD SUCH LEGISLATION BE APPLIED ACROSS THE EU IS MORE APPROPRIATE) MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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• IN REALITY, DO YOU EVEN THINK THE LAW HAS HAD DESIRED EFFECTS IN THE UK AND FRANCE? (WE NEED TO MENTION THE DESIRED EFFECT IN THE QUESTION FIRST AND ASK DO YOU THINK THE LAW HAS SO FAR ACHIEVED THIS..)

• WHY DO YOU THINK THE EU PARLIAMENT HAS SO FAR RESISTED THE OPPORTUNITY TO INTRODUCE A DIRECTIVE ON THE LGBT GROUP THAT WOULD HAVE RESOLVED THE CURRENT IMBALANCE IN THE EU CITIZENSHIP STRUCTURE? • WHAT DO YOU THINK AS THE WAY FORWARD IN THIS REGARD? PLEASE WE NEED EVERYONE'S OPINION ON THE ABOVE QUESTIONS. KIND REGARDS, FELIX. __________________________________________________________ _________________________________________ FROM: NYAMBURA WAINAINA <NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM> DATE: SUN, NOV 23, 2014 AT 11:09 AM SUBJECT: RE: UK LONDON REGION MEPS - EMAIL ADDRESSES TO: FELIX EBIWAREBO <FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM> CC: MEL C MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK>, SIEGMAR MISCHKE <SMISCH01@MAIL.BBK.AC.UK>, "ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK" <ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK> WILL TRY AND ATTEND THE DECEMBER 13TH EVENT NYAMBURA ON SUNDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 2014, NYAMBURA WAINAINA <NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM> WROTE: HI GUYS, MY GAY NEIGHBOR IS WILLING TO BE INTERVIEWED. NYAMBURA ON FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 2014, FELIX EBIWAREBO <FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM> WROTE: DEAR NYAMBURA, MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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MONDAY EVENING IS FINE BY ME. KIND REGARDS, FELIX.

SENT FROM MY IPHONE ON 21 NOV 2014, AT 00:01, MEL C MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK> WROTE: HOW ARE YOU GUYS COMMUNICATING - CAN WE JUST COMMUNICATE ON ONE EMAIL PLEASE THAT IS SENT TO EVERYONE INSTEAD OF EMAILS TO INDIVIDUALS? ________________________________________ DATE: THU, 20 NOV 2014 21:10:33 +0000 SUBJECT: RE: UK LONDON REGION MEPS - EMAIL ADDRESSES FROM: NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM TO: CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK CC: SMISCH01@MAIL.BBK.AC.UK; ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK CHANGE PLANS. SEEMS AVAILABILITY IS SCARCE TOMORROW SO WE PLEASE MEET MONDAY AFTER OPTION MODULES AT MALET ST. NYAMBURA ON TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 2014, MEL C MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK> WROTE: _____________________________________ FROM: MEL C MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK> DATE: TUE, NOV 25, 2014 AT 2:47 AM SUBJECT: EU PROJECT_THE EU AT CROSSROADS? TO: "ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK" <ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK>, "FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM" <FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM>, "NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM" <NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM>, "SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM" <SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM> HI EVERYONE, AS AGREED AT THE MEETING, HERE IS A CLEAN EMAIL, WITH ALL CORRECT EMAIL ADDRESSES. PLEASE MAY WE USE THIS EMAIL, THE TRAIL WHICH WE WILL PRINT OFF AND INCLUDE IN OUR SUMMARY PACK. MINUTES OF THE MEETING WILL FOLLOW SHORTLY. BEST WISHES,

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CAROLINE __________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________ FROM: SIEGMAR MISCHKE <SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM> DATE: SUN, NOV 30, 2014 AT 1:20 AM SUBJECT: EU TO: MEL C MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK>, FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM, NYAMBURA WAINAINA <NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM>,ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK AFTER SPENDING THE BEST PART OF SATURDAY SITTING IN THE CAR AND NOTHING MUCH TO DO……I REMINDED MYSELF OF THE TALK GIVEN BY OUR PROF. ABOUT THE EU PROJECT SO FOR ALL “SOCIAL OPINIONS” GIVEN BY THE EVERYDAY PEOPLE I FOUND SOME ACADEMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK AND THE EUROPEAN CENTRE OF HTTP://WWW.ILGA-EUROPE.ORG/ EQUALITY FOR LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, TRANS AND INTERSEX PEOPLE IN EUROPE SIGGI

__________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________ FROM: SIEGMAR MISCHKE <SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM> DATE: TUE, DEC 2, 2014 AT 12:05 PM SUBJECT: EU LAW TO: MEL C MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK>, FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM, NYAMBURA WAINAINA <NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM>,ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK SOMETHING TO READ OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL SHARPSTON HTTP://GOO.GL/346NHW LGBT ISSUE IN ASYLUM CASES THE SHORTER VERSION IS THE PRESS RELEASE ATTACHED

__________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________ FROM: MEL C MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK> DATE: SAT, DEC 13, 2014 AT 11:53 AM SUBJECT: RE: NEXT STEPS TO: "FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM" <FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM>, "ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK" <ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK>, "NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM" <NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM>, "SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM" <SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM> PLEASE CAN SOMEONE CONFIRM, I CAN'T ACCESS WHATSAPP MESSAGES ANYMORE AS MY BATTERY IS FLAT. ________________________________________ FROM: CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK

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TO: FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM; ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK; NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM; SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS DATE: SAT, 13 DEC 2014 11:37:02 +0000 HI GUYS, MY BATTERY IS FLAT AND I HAD LEFT THE CHARGER AT HOME. PLEASE CAN SOMEONE CONFIRM WHATS BEEN AGREED. IF SIGGY HAS RESPONDED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE I'M STILL IN A POSITION TO LEAVE NOW AND MAKE IT TO THE MEETING. PLEASE CONFIRM. BEST WISHES, CAROLINE __________________________________________________________ ___________________________________________________ FROM: FELIX POWEZ <FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM> DATE: WED, FEB 11, 2015 AT 5:11 PM SUBJECT: RE: RECAP OF MEETING HELD ON 2ND FEBRUARY 2015 TO: CAROLINE MELINDAH MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK> CC: NYAMBURA WAINAINA <NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM>, SIEGMAR MISCHKE <SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM>, UCHECHI OPARA <ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK> HI EVERYONE, AS DISCUSSED, ATTACHED IS THE FINAL DRAFT OF MY ESSAY. KIND REGARDS, FELIX.

ON WED, FEB 11, 2015 AT 11:07 AM, CAROLINE MELINDAH MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK> WROTE: SEE YOU ON MONDAY, 7.30? ________________________________________ DATE: TUE, 10 FEB 2015 15:27:29 +0000 SUBJECT: RE: RECAP OF MEETING HELD ON 2ND FEBRUARY 2015 FROM: NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM TO: CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK CC: SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM; FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM; ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK OUR SCHEDULED MEETING THAT WE MISSED OUT DUE TO READING WEEK SHOULD BE MOVED TO MONDAY AT THE SAME VENUE PLEASE. IF YOU CANNOT MAKE IT PLEASE ADVICE IN ADVANCE IN ORDER TO RESCHEDULE.

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ON MON, FEB 9, 2015 AT 12:54 PM, NYAMBURA WAINAINA <NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM> WROTE: I THINK GUYS SHOULD SEND WHATEVER THEY HAVE EVEN IF NOT COMPLETED. WE HAVE TO BE MINDFUL OF TIME BECAUSE AS WE AGREED WE SHOULD BE FINISHED BY END OF THE MONTH AND THEN WE CAN MOVE ON TO OTHER THINGS.

NYAMBURA ON MON, FEB 9, 2015 AT 12:51 PM, NYAMBURA WAINAINA <NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM> WROTE: HELLO CAROLINE, I HAVE JUST FINISHED READING YOUR ESSAY. SORRY TOOK TOO LONG BUT I DID NOT HAVE TIME. I THINK IT IS AWESOME. I HAVE MADE A FEW COMMENTS THAT I SHOULD THINK YOU SHOULD CHECK OUR BUT OTHERWISE FANTASTIC JOB AND WELL DONE! HAS ANYBODY ELSE MANAGED TO LOOK AT THE ESSAYS THAT HAVE COME THROUGH? IF SO CAN YOU PLEASE SEND YOUR COMMENTS. NYAMBURA ON SUN, FEB 8, 2015 AT 3:28 PM, NYAMBURA WAINAINA <NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM> WROTE: HA HA HA. VERY FUNNY ON SUN, FEB 8, 2015 AT 3:22 PM, CAROLINE MELINDAH MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK>WROTE: I WOULD VOTE IN FAVOUR OF PHOTOSHOP, ONLY BECAUSE MY NEW PASSPORT IS STILL TO BE DELIVERED. IF THE REST OF YOU AGREE TO GO THOUGH, PERHAPS YOU COULD PHOTOSHOP MY FACE IN :) ________________________________________ DATE: SUN, 8 FEB 2015 13:25:44 +0000 SUBJECT: RE: RECAP OF MEETING HELD ON 2ND FEBRUARY 2015 FROM: NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM TO: CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK CC: SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM; FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM;ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK I KNOW WE TALKED ABOUT IT IN OUR LAST MEETING, BUT I WAS STILL WONDERING WHETHER WE SHOULD GO TO BRUSSELS FOR OUR COVER OR WE SHOULD FOLLOW SIGGY'S SUGGESTION OF USING PHOTO SHOP. I HAVE ENCLOSED EVENTS TAKING PLACE IN BRUSSELS DURING THE MONTH OF MARCH THA WE MAY ATTEND IF WE WERE TO VISIT. NYAMBURA ON SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 2015, NYAMBURA WAINAINA <NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM> WROTE: MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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THANKS CAROLINE, I HOPE THAT THE OTHERS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO LOOK AT. I AM STILL AWAITING FEEDBACK BECAUSE I NEED TO MOVE ON TO OTHER WORK. I WAS HOPING THAT IT MAY BE OVER AND DONE WITH MY END OF FEBRUARY AS OUR INITIAL TARGET. NYAMBURA ON SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2015, CAROLINE MELINDAH MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK> WROTE: HI ALL, PLEASE DISREGARD MY EARLIER EMAIL I WAS LOOKING AT THE WRONG ATTACHMENT. NYAMBURA YOUR FIRST DRAFT IS ACTUALLY QUITE IMPRESSIVE, I NEED TO READ A BIT MORE AROUND THE AREA SO I CAN MAKE INFORMED EDITS/ UPDATES. I WILL SEND THIS IN DUE COURSE. ATTACHED IS ALSO MY FIRST DRAFT WHICH IS STILL VERY MUCH WORK IN PROGRESS, I APOLOGISE I HAVEN'T HAD A LOT OF TIME TO DEDICATE TO THIS DUE TO THE NEW JOB AND ADJUSTMENTS THAT WERE NECESSARY, HOWEVER I HAVE NOW SETTLED IN WORK SO LIFE GOES BACK TO NORMAL FOR ME. I WILL WORK ON THIS A BIT MORE DURING THIS WEEKEND, AND SHOULD SEND MY UPDATED ESSAY FOR REVIEW BY END OF DAY THIS COMING WEDNESDAY. ONCE AGAIN, I APPRECIATE YOUR PATIENCE WITH ME GUYS.

SIEGMAR, I WILL SEND YOU A SEPARATE EMAIL WITH IMAGES THAT I FOUND ONLINE WHICH ARE FOC WHICH I FELT MAY BE SUITABLE FOR DESIGN, I PROPOSE THAT WE HAVE 3 VERSIONS FOR REVIEW BY THE REST OF THE GROUP, WITH THE PROPOSED LAYOUT, THEN WE JUST ADD CONTENT AS AND WHEN IT GETS FINAL APPROVAL. IMAGES MAY ALSO NEED TO BE UPDATED TO REFLECT CONTENT AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, AT FINAL STAGE, BEFORE GOING TO THE PRINTERS. A SIMPLE EXAMPLE WOULD BE THIS HTTP://FC01.DEVIANTART.NET/FS71/I/2011/284/0/E/MAGAZINE_LAYOUT_SAMPLE_BY_ JANRICO-D4CKTOI.JPG C

________________________________________ DATE: FRI, 6 FEB 2015 14:52:02 +0000 SUBJECT: RE: RECAP OF MEETING HELD ON 2ND FEBRUARY 2015 FROM: NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM TO: CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK CC: SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM;FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM; ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK HI GUYS, FURTHER TO THE MEETING LAST NIGHT PLEASE FIND ATTACHED MY ESSAY FOR YOUR COMMENTS, EDITING AND APPROVAL.

I AM HOPING TO RECEIVE FROM EACH OF YOU THE SAME. KIND REGARDS MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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NYAMBURA ON FRI, FEB 6, 2015 AT 2:44 PM, NYAMBURA WAINAINA<NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM> WROTE: HELLO FRIENDS FOLLOWING THE MEETING WE HAD LAST NIGHT5TH FEBRUARY AT MALET STREET BIRBECK, I WISH TO RECAP WHAT WAS DISCUSSED. THE MEETING WAS INFORMED BY ALL THE FIVE MEMBERS WHO WERE PRESENT THAT THEY HAD ADVANCED IN THEIR ESSAYS. MOST OF THEM WERE OPTIMISTIC THAT THEY WOULD BE DONE BY WEEKEND. MEMBERS WERE OF THE VIEW THAT THE ESSAYS SHOULD BE CIRCULATED IN TIME TO ALL MEMBERS BEFORE PUBLICATION, SO AS TO ALLOW FOR THE ELIMINATION OF INADVERTENT ERRORS. SIEGMAR BRIEFED THE MEETING THAT HE HAD APPROACHED THREE PRINTERS FOR OUR PROPOSED PROJECT MAGAZINE, AND PRODUCED QUOTATIONS WHICH RANGED BETWEEN £380.00 AND £460.00. MEMBERS WERE PLEASED WITH HIS COVER DESIGN. MEMBERS WERE DIVIDED ON THE ISSUE OF PLACING PASSPORT SIZE IMAGES IN THE PUBLICATION. THIS WAS HOWEVER POSTPONED TO THE NEXT MEETING TO ALLOW FOR A CONSENSUS DECISION. THE MEETING FURTHER URGED MEMBERS TO BE ACTIVE AND BE INVOLVED IN ALL DECISION MAKING RATHER THAN REACTING TO ARISING SITUATIONS. IT WAS AGREED THAT AS THE FOLLOWING WEEK WOULD BE READING WEEK, THERE WOULD BE NO MEETING. THEREFORE, MEMBERS WERE ENCOURAGED TO COMMUNICATE VIA SOCIAL MEDIA. NYAMBURA WAINAINA ON THU, FEB 5, 2015 AT 5:18 PM, CAROLINE MELINDAH MUCHECHETERE<CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK> WROTE: WHAT IS THE DATE OF THE NEXT MEETING? ________________________________________ FROM:SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM TO:CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK;NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM;FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM;ROM EOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK SUBJECT: RE: RECAP OF MEETING HELD ON 2ND FEBRUARY 2015 DATE: THU, 5 FEB 2015 15:56:40 +0000 THANKS CAROLINE I SHOULD HAVE BEEN CLEARER ON WHAT I HAD IN MIND ABOUT THE PHOTOS, I WAS THINKING ABOUT A “ABOUT US” PAGE AS WELL AND THEREFORE AGREE WITH YOUR SUGGESTION. FOR THE PHOTO OP IN BRUSSELS NOT SURE EITHER WAY……NEXT MEETING PERHAPS WE COULD DISCUSS SOME PROS AND CONS ABOUT GOING..

FROM: CAROLINE MELINDAH MUCHECHETERE [MAILTO:CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK] MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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SENT: 04 FEBRUARY 2015 17:11 TO: SIEGMAR MISCHKE; 'NYAMBURA WAINAINA';FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM; 'UCHECHI OPARA' SUBJECT: RE: RECAP OF MEETING HELD ON 2ND FEBRUARY 2015 THATS A GREAT COVER SIEGMAR, ALONG THE LINES OF WHAT I WAS THINKING AS WELL. VERY NICE IMAGE, I TAKE IT WE SHALL NOT BE TRAVELLING TO BRUSSELS FOR A PHOTO OPP. :) IF I UNDERSTAND THE BELOW CORRECTLY YOU WANT TO INCORPORATE THE PICTURES ON THE COVER? I THINK IT MAY OVERCROWD THE NICE COVER, I'D KEEP THE COVER CLEAN WITH MININAL TEXT. HOW ABOUT HAVING A PHOTO AGAINST EACH PIECE OR AN 'ABOUT US' PAGE WHICH IS THE EQUIVALENT OF AN EDITORS NOTE? ________________________________________ FROM:SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM TO:NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM;CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK;FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM;ROM EOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK SUBJECT: RE: RECAP OF MEETING HELD ON 2ND FEBRUARY 2015 DATE: WED, 4 FEB 2015 13:52:16 +0000 HI ALL PASSPORT SIZE PHOTOS WOULD BE NICE ALREADY THINKING HOW I COULD INTEGRATE THIS INTO THE COVER I HAVE ATTACHED AN IDEA FOR A COVER I AM WORKING WITH BUT AS ALWAYS NOTHING IS FINAL. MY ESSAY WILL BE FOCUSING ON ARTICLE 34 TFEU THE EXACT TITLE OF WHICH I WILL HAVE READY BY THE WEEKEND. REGARDS SIEGMAR FROM: NYAMBURA WAINAINA [MAILTO:NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM] SENT: 04 FEBRUARY 2015 11:08 TO: CAROLINE MELINDAH MUCHECHETERE CC:ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK;FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM;SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.CO M SUBJECT: RE: RECAP OF MEETING HELD ON 2ND FEBRUARY 2015

UCHECHI OPARA 5:28 PM (17 HOURS AGO) TO ME, CAROLMUCH, FPOWEZ, SIEGMARMISCHKE

HELLO GUYS, HOPE YOU ALL ARE FINE. IN LINE WITH OUR AGREEMENT ON THE EU LAW PROJECT, I WANT TO INFORM YOU ALL THAT I WILL BE DOING AN ESSAY CENTERED THE INDIRECT EFFECT. I WILL BE OUTLINING THE

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BACKGROUND TO DIRECT EFFECT WHILE ALSO EXPLORING HOW INDIRECT EFFECT CAME TO BE... (MAYBE AN AFTERTHOUGHT? )

SENT FROM MY SAMSUNG DEVICE FELIX EBIWAREBO 7:35 PM (15 HOURS AGO) TO UCHECHI, ME, CAROLMUCH, SIEGMARMISCHKE

HI EVERYONE, AS DISCUSSED, MY ESSAY WILL BE FOCUSING ON ARTICLE 45 IN REGARD TO HOW IT AFFECTS FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS, IN PARTICULAR FOOTBALLERS IN LIGHT OF THE 'HOME GROWN' RULE. KIND REGARDS. FELIX. SENT FROM MY IPHONE CAROLINE MELINDAH MUCHECHETERE 9:08 AM (1 HOUR AGO) TO FELIX, UCHECHI, ME, SIEGMARMISCHKE

THAT SHOULD MAKE VERY INTERESTING READING....ALL THE BEST TO YOU BOTH.

HI GUYS, PLEASE KINDLY REFRAIN FROM OPENING OTHER DISCUSSION FORUMS LET US CONTINUE BUILDING ON THIS ONE. REGARDS NYAMBURA ON TUE, FEB 3, 2015 AT 6:07 PM, CAROLINE MELINDAH MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK> WROTE: GOOD IDEA NYAMBURA, I THINK PROFESSIONAL LOOKING B & W SHOULD HIT THE MARK, UNLESS IF ANYONE OBJECTS. MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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________________________________________ DATE: TUE, 3 FEB 2015 16:00:39 +0000 SUBJECT: RE: RECAP OF MEETING HELD ON 2ND FEBRUARY 2015 FROM:NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM TO:CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK CC:ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK;FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM;SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.CO M THANKS CAROLINE,

DOES ANYONE THINK WE THINK SOME PASSPORT SIZED PHOTOS IN OUR FINAL PROJECT. IF SO, COULD EVERYONE AVAIL ONE FOR THAT PURPOSE. NYAMBURA ON TUE, FEB 3, 2015 AT 3:56 PM, CAROLINE MELINDAH MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK> WROTE: HI GUYS AS ALWAYS, I WISH TO RECAP ON THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE MEETING WE HAD ON THE NIGHT OF 2ND FEBRUARY AT THE INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION, AT WHICH WE WERE ALL PRESENT. THE GROUP WAS INFORMED THAT ALL MEMBERS HAD STARTED THEIR ESSAY WRITING FOR THE MATERIAL THAT IS SCHEDULED FOR PUBLICATION IN A FORTNIGHT. IN ORDER TO AVOID A CLASH OF SUBJECTS, IT WAS AGREED THAT MEMBERS WERE GOING TO INFORM THE GROUP ON THE AREAS THEY WERE WORKING ON. VARIOUS MEMBERS WERE ALLOCATED TASKS. CAROL WAS GIVEN THE ROLE OF QUALITY CONTROL. THIS IS TO ENSURE THAT ONLY CONTENT WHICH IS SATISFACTORY MAKES IT FOR PUBLICATION. UCHECHI WAS TASKED WITH EDITING ALL MATERIAL TO ENSURE IT PASSES ACCEPTABLE STANDARDS, FELIX WAS TASKED WITH PROOF READING TO ELIMINATE INADVENTED ERRORS, NYAMBURA WAS ENCOURAGED TO CONTINUE IN HER ROLE AS GROUP COORDINATOR WHILE SIEGMAR, WAS GIVEN THE TASK OF LOOKING FOR QUOTATIONS AND A PRINTING SHOP FOR OUR FINAL PRODUCT, AS WELL AS THE DESIGN AND FORMAT OF THE SAME.

BEST WISHES, CAROLINE ________________________________________ DATE: TUE, 3 FEB 2015 13:18:33 +0000 SUBJECT: RE: FEEDBACK FROM:NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM TO:CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK CC:ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK;FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM;SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.CO M

HI GUYS, I WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT OUR PROJECT ESSAY IS ON IMMIGRATION FROM WITHIN THE EU, IN PARTICULAR THE A2 ACCESSION STATES: A2 REPRESENTS THE TREATY SIGNED BY THE EU MEMBER STATES FOR THE PURPOSE MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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OF ADMITTING BULGARIA AND ROMANIA IN LUXEMBOURG ON 25 APRIL 2005.

REGARDS NYAMBURA ON FRI, JAN 30, 2015 AT 8:59 AM, CAROLINE MELINDAH MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK> WROTE: GOOD MORNING UCHE, MY APOLOGIES FOR NOT SENDING FEEDBACK EARLIER. I HAVE TO LOOK AT YOUR EMAILS AND RESPOND ACCORDINGLY. RE. THE COVERS CIRCULATED BY NYAMBURA. THANK YOU NYAMBURA FOR ALL THE WORK THAT WENT INTO THAT. I HOWEVER FEEL WE CAN BE MORE CREATIVE. IF CONTENT IS GOOD BUT DESIGN IS 'SUB-STANDARD' IT WILL REFLECT NEGATIVELY ON THE FINAL PIECE OF WORK. PERHAPS I CAN WORK WITH A COUPLE OF YOU GUYS ON THIS. I WILL RESPOND TO THE OTHER EMAILS BY END OF DAY TODAY. BEST WISHES, CAROLINE ________________________________________ DATE: THU, 29 JAN 2015 21:32:00 +0000 FROM:ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK TO:CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK;NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM;FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM;SIEG MARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM SUBJECT: FEEDBACK

HI GUYS, I HAVE IN THE PAST FEW DAYS SENT OUT A COUPLE OF EMAILS TO THE GROUP FOR YOUR COMMENTS. I HAVE NOT HEARD FROM YOU APART FROM PROBABLY ONE PERSON. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE ALL GIVE FEEDBACK SO THAT WE PROGRESS AS TIME IS OF ESSENCE. REGARDS

FROM: SIEGMAR MISCHKE <SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM> DATE: SAT, JAN 24, 2015 AT 4:46 PM SUBJECT: RE: APPRAISAL OF MEETING TO: NYAMBURA WAINAINA <NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM> I CANNOT SEE THE COVER OR CAN MAKE MY CHOICE PLEASE HELP WITH COVER.

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REGARDS S FROM: NYAMBURA WAINAINA [MAILTO:NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM] SENT: 24 JANUARY 2015 16:16 TO: UCHECHI OPARA CC: CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK; FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM; SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM SUBJECT: RE: APPRAISAL OF MEETING CAN YOU GUYS CHOOSE THE BEST COVER FOR THE MAGAZINE PLEASE. AND SEND YOUR CHOICE. NYAMBURA ON FRI, JAN 23, 2015 AT 5:30 PM, NYAMBURA WAINAINA <NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM> WROTE: HELLO GUYS, THANKS VERY MUCH INDEED UCHE FOR THE UPDATES I PRESUME WE ARE MEETING ON MONDAY EVENING AS PLANNED. NYAMBURA ON FRI, JAN 23, 2015 AT 1:01 PM, UCHECHI OPARA <ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK> WROTE: DEAR FRIENDS, APPRAISAL ON GROUP PROJECT FOLLOWING A MEETING WE HAD AT THE EUSTON STATION COFFEE SHOP, WHICH WAS ATTENDED BY MYSELF, CAROL, NYAMBURA AND FELIX, I THOUGHT IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECAP ON WHAT WE DISCUSSED. WE AGREED THAT OUR PROJECT IS GOING TO BE IN THE FORM OF A MAGAZINE, WHICH WILL HAVE A MINIMUM OF FIVE ESSAYS AND A MAXIMUM OF SEVEN, ALL OF NOT LESS THAN TWO THOUSAND WORDS EACH, BUT NOT MORE THAN FIVE THOUSAND. SINCE TIME IS OF ESSENCE, WE AGREED THAT WE SHOULD TRY BY ALL MEANS TO HAVE THE ESSAYS PRESENTED TO THE GROUP BY 15TH FEBRUARY TO ALLOW ROOM FOR ANY CHANGES AS WE MUST GO TO PRESS BY THE END OF THE MONTH OF FEBRUARY.

PLEASE, ACKNOWLEDGE THIS EMAIL AND CONFIRM IT IS A TRUE REFLECTION OF WHAT TRANSPIRED. IF I HAVE LEFT OUT ANYTHING, I WILL BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY OF YOU TO FILL THE GAPS. KIND REGARDS UCHE. __________________________________________________________ __________________________________ MALET LAW REVIEW VOL.1 ISSUE 1

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FROM: CAROLINE MELINDAH MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK> DATE: WED, FEB 4, 2015 AT 9:08 AM SUBJECT: RE: PROJECT CONTRIBUTION TO: FELIX EBIWAREBO <FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM>, UCHECHI OPARA <ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK> CC: NYAMBURA WAINAINA <NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM>, SIEGMARMISCHKE <SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM> THAT SHOULD MAKE VERY INTERESTING READING....ALL THE BEST TO YOU BOTH. ________________________________________ SUBJECT: RE: PROJECT CONTRIBUTION FROM: FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM DATE: TUE, 3 FEB 2015 19:35:28 +0000 CC: NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM; CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK; SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM TO: ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK HI EVERYONE, AS DISCUSSED, MY ESSAY WILL BE FOCUSING ON ARTICLE 45 IN REGARD TO HOW IT AFFECTS FREE MOVEMENT OF WORKERS, IN PARTICULAR FOOTBALLERS IN LIGHT OF THE 'HOME GROWN' RULE. KIND REGARDS. FELIX. SENT FROM MY IPHONE ON 3 FEB 2015, AT 17:28, UCHECHI OPARA <ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK> WROTE: HELLO GUYS, HOPE YOU ALL ARE FINE. IN LINE WITH OUR AGREEMENT ON THE EU LAW PROJECT, I WANT TO INFORM YOU ALL THAT I WILL BE DOING AN ESSAY CENTERED THE INDIRECT EFFECT. I WILL BE OUTLINING THE BACKGROUND TO DIRECT EFFECT WHILE ALSO EXPLORING HOW INDIRECT EFFECT CAME TO BE... (MAYBE AN AFTERTHOUGHT? )

__________________________________________________________ _____________________________ FROM: NYAMBURA WAINAINA <NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM> DATE: TUE, FEB 3, 2015 AT 1:18 PM SUBJECT: RE: FEEDBACK TO: CAROLINE MELINDAH MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK>

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CC: UCHECHI OPARA <ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK>, "FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM" <FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM>, "SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM" <SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM> HI GUYS, I WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT OUR PROJECT ESSAY IS ON IMMIGRATION FROM WITHIN THE EU, IN PARTICULAR THE A2 ACCESSION STATES: A2 REPRESENTS THE TREATY SIGNED BY THE EU MEMBER STATES FOR THE PURPOSE OF ADMITTING BULGARIA AND ROMANIA IN LUXEMBOURG ON 25 APRIL 2005.

REGARDS NYAMBURA ON FRI, JAN 30, 2015 AT 8:59 AM, CAROLINE MELINDAH MUCHECHETERE <CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK> WROTE: GOOD MORNING UCHE, MY APOLOGIES FOR NOT SENDING FEEDBACK EARLIER. I HAVE TO LOOK AT YOUR EMAILS AND RESPOND ACCORDINGLY. RE. THE COVERS CIRCULATED BY NYAMBURA. THANK YOU NYAMBURA FOR ALL THE WORK THAT WENT INTO THAT. I HOWEVER FEEL WE CAN BE MORE CREATIVE. IF CONTENT IS GOOD BUT DESIGN IS 'SUB-STANDARD' IT WILL REFLECT NEGATIVELY ON THE FINAL PIECE OF WORK. PERHAPS I CAN WORK WITH A COUPLE OF YOU GUYS ON THIS. I WILL RESPOND TO THE OTHER EMAILS BY END OF DAY TODAY. BEST WISHES, CAROLINE ________________________________________ DATE: THU, 29 JAN 2015 21:32:00 +0000 FROM: ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK TO: CAROLMUCH@HOTMAIL.CO.UK; NWWAINAINA@GMAIL.COM; FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM;SIEGMARMISCHKE@GMAIL.COM SUBJECT: FEEDBACK

HI GUYS, I HAVE IN THE PAST FEW DAYS SENT OUT A COUPLE OF EMAILS TO THE GROUP FOR YOUR COMMENTS. I HAVE NOT HEARD FROM YOU APART FROM PROBABLY ONE PERSON. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE ALL GIVE FEEDBACK SO THAT WE PROGRESS AS TIME IS OF ESSENCE. REGARDS __________________________________________________________ ___________________________________

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FROM: UCHECHI OPARA <ROMEOREHOBOTH@YAHOO.CO.UK> DATE: 12/02/2015 11:27 (GMT+00:00) TO: FELIX POWEZ <FPOWEZ@GMAIL.COM> SUBJECT: RE: RECAP OF MEETING HELD ON 2ND FEBRUARY 2015 HELLO FRIENDS, ATTACHED HEREWITH IS THE FINAL DRAFT FOR MY ESSAY. I HAVE ALSO HAD TIME TO PERUSE THE WORKS DONE BY CAROLINE AND NYAMBURA. GREAT JOB I WOULD SAY AND I WILL PASS MY FINAL COMMENTS WHEN WE GATHER AT OUR NEXT MEETING. PLEASE DO FIND TIME AND GO THROUGH MY WORK. THANKS. __________________________________________________________ ___________________________________ • • • • •

© 2015 MICROSOFT TERMS PRIVACY & COOKIES DEVELOPERS ENGLISH (UNITED KINGDOM)

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THE MALET LAW REVIEW

THE MALET LAW REVIEW IS AN INDEPENDENT PUBLICATION MANAGED AND RUN BY STUDENTS FROM BIRKBECK SCHOOL OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON. WE PUBLISH THOUGHT-PROVOKING ARTICLES WRITTEN BY STUDENTS.

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