Maoist Butchers of Dantewada

Maoist Butchers of Dantewada April 6, 2010 will be saddest day in the history of our police force, CRPF to be more specific. 75 jawans laid down their precious lives in the forests of Dantewada in Chattisgarh fighting the dreaded Maoists. It was unprecedented and completely unexpected in spite of the fact that the forces were not very familiar with the terrain of the guerrilla warfare. I am sure there would be full enquiry into the incident and truth would come out regarding the details of the incident.

This is not the time for finger pointing and yet a rewinding of events would definitely be necessary for complete analysis for avoiding future casualty in the bitter battles that lay ahead. I am sure the central & state governments and top DG level officers would take the stock and take necessary measures to equip our forces adequately. Nevertheless, a common man like me, not any expert in war fares, would definitely reflect on the basics.

Strategic Review: There are three major questions which come to my mind for stock taking.

First is that why there is still no suo motu announcement of a comprehensive and pre­emptive package for tribal areas and the Maoist belts so that the basic issues get addressed for welfare of the tribes coupled with development of the areas. Offer for talks has been announced but there is no response from the Maoists.

Second question is about the political patronage extended to the Maoists by some parties which is encouraging them. There must be broad political consensus for unified approach to resolve this problem.

The third question is about rear guard actions and security of the formation itself while camping in the jungles. What about the intelligence inputs and connectivity with the command? What was the strategy for self defense if any?

One gets a feeling that there has been inadequacy in strategic planning, gathering & monitoring of intelligence inputs and operational quick footed rapid action preparedness in totally alien jungles. One does not have to be right or wrong in retrospect but some elementary questions need to be answered. We have shown restraint in using air force and other military wings as the war is with our own citizens and dissatisfied groups. While politically that is right, no doubt, nothing stopped us from picking the strategic brains of military planners who are well trained in warfare techniques.

Our police forces have shown in Punjab that, given the leadership and resources, they could root out terrorism and therefore one must hold them in high esteem for their competence. Similar approach, training and commitment to succeed are required to tackle the Maoists.

The Maoists have modernized themselves from the bow & arrows of early sixties to fairly modern equipment as is obvious from news reports coming out. Our police force is possibly not fully modernized to tackle modern day form of terrorism, be it internal or external. In what way the Maoists have been different in the end results than terrorists of Indian Mujahideens funded from overseas and manned by Indian personnel? Maoists have also been getting overseas support. So while political sensitivities of using military or air force has to be kept in mind, I think the Maoists have pushed too far for soft approach any more. While we may accuse them of “cowardice”, they may be thinking the same way about ability of our establishment to take action against them.

Redefining National Security: Our police forces are trained more in peace keeping, law & order operations and not in warfare except round the street corners. On 26/11, we had to fly in NSG commandos though police force held on bravely. In last ten years the words “national security” have been redefined completely. In future there may not be any conventional wars. “Internalizing” the external security threats to a nation is the name of the game. That is what Pakistan is doing to us. Supporters of Maoists are also in the same league. Let us change the gears please.

Pragmatic Approach: In what way the Maoists are any different than the terrorists entering Kashmir Valley except their nationality? Why the police force is not adequate in Kashmir to tackle the militants, needing army to be in command? It is obvious that certain skills and experience which is called for handling the job is not adequately available with the police force. That is the reason why army is deployed in Kashmir Valley.

It is time that we take pragmatic steps to enlist the behind­the­scene support of the army for strategic inputs and techniques. Don’t we induct army, navy & air force for rescue operations, air dropping food and airlifting people stuck on the roof tops when the rivers are flooded? Don’t our politicians go around in helicopters to survey the flooded areas? So why are we shy, Mr.Home Minister, to provide air cover to our police force? What if an aircraft will warn Maoists of presence of police force? Let them know that police force is after them. Let them run for life or the negotiating table.

We don’t have to use Bofors guns and stealth bombers against the Maoists but we can provide adequate strategic inputs, warfare training, safety and logistic support to the police force to bridge the gaps. Or else it may be the case of a bridge too far!

Vijay M. Deshpande Corporate Advisor, Strategic Management Initiative, Pune April 9, 2010 Scroll Down for my other blogs Or visit www.strami.com