Et homo(marriage)echr

In 2010, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) had ruled that a prohibition on same-sex marriage did not violate the European Convention on Human Rights. 此案應是 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria，是歐洲人權法院 (European Court of Human Rights , ECHR)於 2010 年所作出的判決之一。該判決闡述《歐洲人權公約》並未 賦予成員國有立法或合法承認同性婚姻的義務。

判詞原件： http://www.menschenrechte.ac.at/uploads/media/Schalk_und_Kopf_gg_OEsterreich_Urteil_01.pdf

維基百科項目(英)： http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schalk_and_Kopf_v._Austria

維基百科項目(中)： http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%B4%94%E5%85%8B%E8%88%87%E6%89%98%E5%A4%A B%E8%A8%B4%E5%A5%A7%E5%9C%B0%E5%88%A9%E6%A1%88

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崔克與托夫訴奧地利案 维基百科，自由的百科全书 跳转到： 导航, 搜索 崔克與托夫訴奧地利案（Schalk and Kopf vs. Austria，no. 30141/04）為歐洲人權法院於 2010 年所作出的 判決之一。該判決闡述《歐洲人權公約》並未賦予成員國有立法或合法承認同性婚姻的義務。

目錄 • •

• • •

1 案例事實 2 歐洲人權法院的判決 o 2.1 未違反公約第 12 條 o 2.2 未違反公約第 8 條和第 14 條 o 2.3 依據歐盟基本權利憲章所作成關於第 12 條範圍之旁論 o 2.4 不同意見 o 2.5 上訴 3 參見 4 參考文獻 5 外部連結

案例事實 原告為一對住在奧地利維也納的同性伴侶。2002 年 9 月 10 日，他們向戶政事務所（Standesamt）申請 正式成立婚姻關係。但是 2002 年 12 月 20 日，維也納市政府卻拒絕了原告的申請，理由是：根據《民 法》（Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch）第 44 條之規定，婚姻關係的締結限於不同性別的二人方得 為之。且根據該國一直以來的判決見解，同性別的兩個人無法締結有效的婚姻關係。而申請人為兩個 男性，因此欠缺締結婚姻關係的能力。原告二人於是向維也納州長（Landeshauptmann）提起訴願，但 遭到駁回。在 2003 年 4 月 11 日所作成的訴願決定中，州長肯認市政府的法律見解，他同時引用行政 法院的判決，而判決向來否認同性別的兩個人可以締結婚姻關係

[1]

。

原告於該國的最終救濟途徑是向憲法法院（Verfassungsgerichtshof）請求裁判。原告於起訴理由中表示， 法律使他們無法締結婚姻關係，乃侵害了他們基於憲法所保障私人及家庭生活的權利以及平等原則 （奧地利承認歐洲人權公約為該國憲法的一部分，因此原告所據以主張的法律部份，包含了公約的第 12、8 和 14 條）。原告主張，自從該國民法於 1812 年生效以後，關於婚姻的概念便是不斷的成長， 生育和教育小孩不再是婚姻關係中必不可缺的一部分。過去的見解認為，婚姻關係是一種包含所有生 活面向的永久結合體。客觀上，排除同性伴侶締結婚姻關係並不具有正當理由。更何況，歐洲人權法 2

院也已經表示，任何基於「性別」所為之差別待遇，必須要具備特別重大的理由方得為之。其他的歐 洲國家不是承認同性婚姻，不然便是修法賦予同性伴侶關係和婚姻關係平等的權利。 2003 年 12 月 12 日，憲法法院駁回原告之訴，其判決中較有意義的部份摘述如下：

「

不論是根據奧地利聯邦憲法，或是歐洲人權公約（該公約第 12 條係規定「男 女」可以證之）所設立的平等原則，婚姻的概念為具有成為父母關係之根本 可能性之人所構成，而此概念應該被擴張理解婚姻係不同性別所構成的關係。 （……） 事實上，同性伴侶關係雖然落入歐洲人權公約第 8 條所保障的私人及家庭生 活或相類似概念之保障中—第 14 條同時也禁止任何基於不客觀之條件所構 成的歧視—，但該條並沒有課予國家改變婚姻法的義務。 因此，在本案中，並無因未為同性伴侶關係成為婚姻關係提供特別規定而檢 視法律是否有無理歧視的必要。本院對此並無就憲法議題或法律政策對於立 法機關提出建議之必要。 是以，原告之訴應以無理由加以駁回。[2]

」

歐洲人權法院的判決 未違反公約第 12 條 原告主張，奧地利未合法承認同性婚姻，構成違反歐洲人權公約第 12 條，其主張如下：

「

已達適婚年齡的男女，均有權結婚並建立家庭，並得依法行使這項權利

」

法院一致性的駁回了這項主張：

「

本院認知到公約第 12 條賦予人們有權和「男人或女人」結婚，同時，第 12 條也賦予人們有建構家庭的權利。原告主張該條的文字並不必然意謂男人只 能和女人結婚，反之亦然。本院觀察到，若是將第 12 條的文字單獨觀察，可 能並不排除兩個男人或兩個女人結婚。然而相反地，公約其他所有的條文都 是以『任何人』為主體賦予權利或自由，或是以『沒有人』作為禁止施以某 種待遇的主體。由此可見，第 12 條的文字應該被認為是有意如此規定。另外， 從歷史的角度觀察，在 1950 本公約生效時，婚姻這個詞毫無疑問的被認為係 有兩個不同性別的人所構成的共同體[3]。

3

」

未違反公約第 8 條和第 14 條 作為附帶主張，原告也主張若依據公約的第 14 條併同第 8 條，未賦予他們有結婚的權利，對他們構 成以性傾向為基礎的歧視。 關於這點主張，歐洲人權法院指出：

「

就原告的主張看來，假如（同性）結婚的權利不包含於第 12 條中，也可以從 第 14 條結合第 8 條推導出來，本院對此不予苟同。本院重申，公約應該整體 觀察，其中的個別條文的解釋必須要與其他條文達成和諧（按：體系解釋）。 根據上述之結論，公約第 12 條並未課予成員國有准許同性伴侶構成婚姻關係 的義務，就此範圍內，第 14 條和第 8 條，也不能被解釋為課以成員國如此之 義務[4]。

」

原告同時也認為，奧地利在 2010 年以前欠缺對於同性伴侶關係合法承認，也是違反歐洲人權公約上 開所列舉的條文。 對此，法院表示：

「

本院不得不注意到，對於同性伴侶關係的合法承認已經成為歐洲國家的新共 識。 而且，這種趨勢在過去的 10 年內正快速的發展。然而，並非絕大多數 的國家都合法承認同性伴侶關係。 因此，本案的議題應該被認為是尚在發展 而未形成共識的權利之一。是以，國家在立法引進此權利前，應該享有一定 的判斷餘地（......）於 2010 年 1 月 1 日生效的奧地利同性民事伴侶關係法， 也反映了上述發展，同時也成為此一新共識的一部分。儘管不是先驅者，但 奧地利的立法者不能因為沒有引進承認民事結合的法律而遭到非難[5]

」

Rozakis、Spielmann 和 Tulkens 法官在這方面則提出不同意見，他們表示：

「

在確定這是個「非常相似的情況」（para. 99），並且強調「以性別為基礎的 差別待遇必須要有相當重大的理由作為其正當化基礎」（para. 97）的前提下， 法院應該認為這是一個違反公約第 14 條併合第 8 條的情況，因為被告政府並 沒有提出任何進行此種差別待遇的正當化基礎，而僅僅是主張她們有判斷餘 地。（para. 80）。然而，在被告政府未提出任何足以令人信服的理由去正當 化差別待遇的情況下，應該沒有適用判斷餘地的空間存在。所以，「締約國 間的法律是否存在或不存在共同點」（para. 98）並不重要，他只是在考量判 斷餘地時的附屬事項。 確實，國家於此時提出考慮是否存在共同的做法作為 [6] 擱置這件事比積極處理這件事為佳的理由，將可以令法院認同。

依據歐盟基本權利憲章所作成關於第 12 條範圍之旁論 4

」

法院所作成的另一個旁論，則與歐盟基本權利憲章有關：

有鑑於憲章第 9 條之規定，因此，本院不再認為第 12 條所規定的婚姻權必須 被限定在不同性別的兩個人才能結婚。是以，並不能認為，第 12 條不適用於 原告之訴求[7]

「

」

Malinverni 法官在他的協同意見書中，對此旁論表示反對：

第 12 條並不適用於同性別的兩個人。誠然，為了保障結婚的權利，歐盟基本 權利憲章第 9 條有意不以男人和女人來作為規範之文句。而僅規定：「結婚 權與組織家庭權應依國內法律規定此等權利行使之範圍而保障之。」然而， 依余之所見，並不能以此作為依據來解釋本公約的第 12 條。 就該憲章的評 論確實顯示，第 9 條的起草者希望其所指涉的範圍較其他國際公約的範圍為 廣。然而，不該忘記的是，憲章的第 9 條是「依國內法律規定此等權利行使 之範圍」而對於結婚權加以保障。

「

藉由此種交由民主立法機關決定的方式，憲章第 9 條僅是留給各國自行決定 是否提供同性伴侶結婚的權利。然而，就如同相關評論正確的指出：「婚姻 這個詞，並不是承認同性伴侶關係的阻礙。而是沒有任何規定表示，國內法 應該促進這種婚姻的成立。」就 我看來，憲章的第 9 條與公約的第 12 條是 否限於不同性別的人方有結婚的權利之解釋應該沒有關聯。[8]

」

不同意見 Rozakis、Jebens 以及 Spielmann 法官所共同提出的不同意見書中認為，奧地利於 2010 年以前欠缺對於 同性伴侶關係的合法承認，乃構成違反公約第 14 條和第 8 條。 Malinverni 和 Kovler 法官所共同提出的協同意見書認為，公約第 12 條在任何情況下，都可以被解釋為 包含同性伴侶。

上訴 關於本案上訴到歐洲人權法院大法庭之上訴請求，遭到該院之駁回確定。[9]

參見 LGBT 主題首頁 •

歐洲 LGBT 權益 5

•

奧地利 LGBT 權益

•

諾里斯訴愛爾蘭案

參考文獻 1.

^ para. 7-10 of the ECtHR judgment

2.

^ Verfassungsgerichtshof (VfGH), B777/03, 13.12.2003

3.

^ paras 54, 55 of the Judgment

4.

^ par. 101 of the Judgment

5.

^ par. 105-106 of the Judgment

6.

^ Para. 8 of the joint dissent of Judges Rozakis, Jebens and Tulkens

7.

^ para 61 of the Judgment

8.

^ para. 2 of the concurring opinion of Judge Malinverni

9.

^ ECtHR press release no. 906 29.11.2010

Schalk and Kopf v. Austria From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to: navigation, search Schalk and Kopf v. Austria (Application no. 30141/04) is a case decided in 2010 by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in which it was clarified that the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does not oblige member states to legislate for or legally recognize same-sex marriages.

Contents • • o o o o

o o • •

1 Facts of the case 2 The ECtHR Decision 2.1 No violation of Article 12 of the Convention 2.2 No violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention 2.3 Obiter dictum on homosexual relations to be considered a form of "family life" 2.4 Obiter dictum on the scope of Article 12 in light of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 2.5 Separate opinions 2.6 Request for referral to Grand Chamber 3 References 4 External links

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Facts of the case The applicants are a same-sex couple living in Vienna, Austria. On 10 September 2002 they requested the Office for matters of Personal Status (Standesamt) to proceed with the formalities to enable them to contract marriage. By decision of 20 December 2002 the Vienna Municipal Office (Magistrat) refused the applicants’ request. Referring to Article 44 of the Civil Code (Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), it held that marriage could only be contracted between two persons of opposite sex. According to constant case-law, a marriage concluded by two persons of the same sex was null and void. Since the applicants were two men, they lacked the capacity for contracting marriage. The applicants then lodged an appeal with the Vienna Regional Governor (Landeshauptmann), which was also dismissed. In his decision of 11 April 2003, the Governor confirmed the Municipal Office’s legal view. In addition he referred to the Administrative Court’s (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) case-law according to which it constituted an impediment to marriage if the two persons concerned were of the same sex. [1] The ultimate and final remedy for the applicants was a complaint to the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof). In this complaint the applicants alleged that the legal impossibility for them to get married constituted a violation of their constitutional right to respect for private and family life and of the principle of non-discrimination. (Austria treats the ECHR as part of its own constitutional law. The legal provisions referred to by the applicants were thus those set out in Articles 12, 8 and 14 of the Convention). They argued that the notion of marriage had evolved since the entry into force of the Civil Code in 1812. In particular, the procreation and education of children no longer formed an integral part of marriage. In present-day perception, marriage was rather a permanent union encompassing all aspects of life. There was no objective justification for excluding same-sex couples from concluding marriage, all the more so since the European Court of Human Rights had acknowledged that differences based on sexual orientation required particularly weighty reasons. Other European countries either allowed same-sex marriages or had otherwise amended their legislation in order to give equal status to same-sex partnerships.

On 12 December 2003 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicants’ complaint. The relevant parts of its judgment read as follows: “Neither the principle of equality set forth in the Austrian Federal

Constitution nor the European Convention on Human Rights (as evidenced by “men and women” in Article 12) require that the concept of marriage as being geared to the fundamental possibility of parenthood should be extended to relationships of a different kind. (...) The fact that same-sex relationships fall within the concept of private life and as such enjoy the protection of Article 8 of the ECHR – which also prohibits discrimination on non-objective grounds (Article 14 of the ECHR) – does not give rise to an obligation to change the law of marriage. It is unnecessary in the instant case to examine whether, and in which areas, the law unjustifiably discriminates against same-sex relationships by providing for special rules for married couples. Nor is it the task of this court to advise the legislature

7

on constitutional issues or even matters of legal policy. Instead, the complaint must be dismissed as ill-founded.”[2]

The ECtHR Decision No violation of Article 12 of the Convention The applicants claimed that Austria's failure to legally recognise same-sex marriages constituted a violation of Article 12 ECHR, which provides as follows: “Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.”

The Court unanimously dismissed this claim: "The Court notes that Article 12 grants the right to marry to “men and women”. The French version provides «l’homme et la femme ont le droit de se marier». Furthermore, Article 12 grants the right to found a family. The applicants argued that the wording did not necessarily imply that a man could only marry a woman and vice versa. The Court observes that, looked at in isolation, the wording of Article 12 might be interpreted so as not to exclude the marriage between two men or two women. However, in contrast, all other substantive Articles of the Convention grant rights and freedoms to “everyone” or state that “no one” is to be subjected to certain types of prohibited treatment. The choice of wording in Article 12 must thus be regarded as deliberate. Moreover, regard must be had to the historical context in which the Convention was adopted. In the 1950s marriage was clearly understood in the traditional sense [3] of being a union between partners of different sex."

No violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention As a subsidiary argument, the applicants complained under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention that they had been discriminated against on account of their sexual orientation, since they were denied the right to marry.

Addressing this part of the complaint, the ECtHR pointed out the following: "Insofar as the applicants appear to contend that, if not included in Article 12, the right to marry might be derived from Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8, the Court is unable to share their view. It reiterates that the Convention is to be read as a whole and its Articles should therefore be construed in harmony with one another. Having regard to the conclusion reached above, namely that Article 12 does not impose an obligation on Contracting States to grant same-sex couples access to marriage, Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8, a provision of more general purpose and scope, cannot be interpreted as imposing such an obligation either."[4] 8

The applicants also saw these articles as violated by lack of legal recognition of same-sex couples in Austria before 2010. The Court responded: The Court cannot but note that there is an emerging European consensus towards legal recognition of same-sex couples. Moreover, this tendency has developed rapidly over the past decade. Nevertheless, there is not yet a majority of States providing for legal recognition of same-sex couples. The area in question must therefore still be regarded as one of evolving rights with no established consensus, where States must also enjoy a margin of appreciation in the timing of the introduction of legislative changes (..)

The Austrian Registered Partnership Act, which entered into force on 1 January 2010, reflects the evolution described above and is thus part of the emerging European consensus. Though not in the vanguard, the Austrian legislator cannot be reproached for not having introduced the Registered Partnership Act any earlier[5] Judges Rozakis, Spielmann and Tulkens dissented in this respect, stating: Having identified a “relevantly similar situation” (para. 99), and emphasised that “differences based on sexual orientation require particularly serious reasons by way of justification” (para. 97), the Court should have found a violation of Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention because the respondent Government did not advance any argument to justify the difference of treatment, relying in this connection mainly on their margin of appreciation (para. 80). However, in the absence of any cogent reasons offered by the respondent Government to justify the difference of treatment, there should be no room to apply the margin of appreciation. Consequently, the “existence or non-existence of common ground between the laws of the Contracting States” (para. 98) is irrelevant as such considerations are only a subordinate basis for the application of the concept of the margin of appreciation. Indeed, it is only in the event that the national authorities offer grounds for justification that the Court can be satisfied, taking into account the presence or the absence of a common approach, that they are better placed than it [6] is to deal effectively with the matter

Obiter dictum on homosexual relations to be considered a form of "family life" The Court, for the first time, has accepted homosexual relationships as a form of "family life". The statement runs as follows: "...the Court’s case-law has only accepted that the emotional and sexual relationship of a same-sex couple constitutes “private life” but has not found that it constitutes “family life”, even where a longterm relationship of cohabiting partners was at stake. In coming to that conclusion, the Court observed that despite the growing tendency in a number of European States towards the legal and judicial recognition of stable de facto partnerships between homosexuals, given the existence of little common ground between the Contracting States, this was an area in which they still enjoyed a wide margin of appreciation. (...) The Court notes that (...) a rapid evolution of social attitudes towards same-sex couples has taken place in many member States. Since then a considerable number of member States have 9

afforded legal recognition to same-sex couples (see above, paragraphs 27-30). Certain provisions of EU law also reflect a growing tendency to include same-sex couples in the notion of “family”(...). In view of this evolution the Court considers it artificial to maintain the view that, in contrast to a different-sex couple, a same-sex couple cannot enjoy “family life” for the purposes of Article 8. Consequently the relationship of the applicants, a cohabiting same-sex couple living in a stable de facto partnership, falls within the notion of “family life”, just as the relationship of a different-sex couple in the same situation would."[7] It must be noted, however, that this constitutes a mere obiter dictum that had no impact on the outcome of the case.

Obiter dictum on the scope of Article 12 in light of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Another obiter dictum of the Court concerns Article 9 of the EU Fundamental Rights Charter: Regard being had to Article 9 of the Charter, therefore, the Court would no longer consider that the right to marry enshrined in Article 12 must in all circumstances be limited to marriage between two persons of the opposite sex. Consequently, it cannot be said that Article 12 is inapplicable to the applicants' complaint[8]

Judge Malinverni in his concurrence has objected to this obiter dictum: Article 12 is inapplicable to persons of the same sex. Admittedly, in guaranteeing the right to marry, Article 9 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union deliberately omitted any reference to men and women, since it provides that “the right to marry and to found a family shall be guaranteed in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of these rights”. In my opinion, however, no inferences can be drawn from this as regards the interpretation of Article 12 of our Convention. The commentary on the Charter does indeed confirm that the drafters of Article 9 intended it to be broader in scope than the corresponding articles in other international treaties. However, it should not be forgotten that Article 9 of the Charter guarantees the right to marry and to found a family “in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of these rights”. By referring in this way to the relevant domestic legislation, Article 9 of the Charter simply leaves it to States to decide whether they wish to afford homosexual couples the right to marry. However, as the commentary quite rightly points out, “there is no obstacle to recognize same-sex relationships in the context of marriage. There is, however, no explicit requirement that domestic laws should facilitate such marriages.” In my view, Article 9 of the Charter should therefore have no bearing on the interpretation of Article 12 of the Convention as conferring a [9] right to marry only on persons of different sexes

Separate opinions

10

Judges Rozakis, Jebens and Spielmann submitted a joint dissenting opinion, arguing that lack of legal recognition of same-sex couples in Austria before 2010 constituted violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8.

Judge Malinverni, joined by judge Kovler, submitted a concurring opinion, arguing that Article 12 could under no circumstances be construed as referring to same-sex couples.

Request for referral to Grand Chamber A request of the unsuccessful applicants to refer the case to a Grand Chamber was rejected by the Court.[10]

References 1.

^ para. 7-10 of the ECtHR judgment

2.

^ Verfassungsgerichtshof (VfGH), B777/03, 13.12.2003

3.

^ paras 54, 55 of the Judgment

4.

^ par. 101 of the Judgment

5.

^ par. 105-106 of the Judgment

6.

^ Para. 8 of the joint dissent of Judges Rozakis, Jebens and Tulkens

7.

^ paras 99-94 of the Judgment

8.

^ para 61 of the Judgment

9.

^ para. 2 of the concurring opinion of Judge Malinverni

10.

^ ECtHR press release no. 906 29.11.2010

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