LEARNING NOTE 3 Participating in Consultative Bodies to Support Policy Co-Implementation
LEARNING NOTE 3: PARTICIPATING IN CONSULTATIVE BODIES TO SUPPORT POLICY CO-IMPLEMENTATION KEY MESSAGE: Joining or forming consultative bodies can help put a platform in direct contact with government representatives. This can jump-start the collaborative process and offer a more effective approach to policy influencing and co-implementation.
CO-AUTHORS: Bernard Baha (NLC Tanzania); Nicolás Avellaneda and Lilian Gregorio (NLC Argentina); Doreen Nancy Kobusingye (NLC Uganda); Berns Komba Lebbie and Yannick Wild (Land for Life Sierra Leone); Frédéric Djinadja (NLC Togo).
ABBREVIATIONS CB
Consultative body
CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women CESCR
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
CSO
Civil society organisation
FAO
UN Food and Agriculture Organization
M&E
Monitoring and evaluation
NLC
National Land Coalition
TWG
Technical working group
VGGT
Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure
3
INTRODUCTION Platforms that require a stepping-stone or entry point to policy co-implementation may consider joining or setting up a consultative body (CB) – a group organised around a specific sector or policy priority, which typically includes direct government representation and may also involve non-platform members. These may go by a variety of names, such as technical working groups (TWGs), committees, commissions, roundtables or task forces. Crucially, joining or setting up a CB offers many benefits to platforms seeking to strengthen their engagement with government. For example, CBs can grant platform members access to some of the most highly placed individuals in government, opening up opportunities to turn a platform’s advice into a mandate. Such initiatives may also create collaborative relationships between platform members and government officials, resulting in simplified communication and better allocation of skills and resources. However, CBs come with potential risks as well. If the government’s commitment levels are low, for example, implementation can take a back seat in terms of priorities. Unless government actors truly take ownership of policy implementation efforts, the desired results will not be achieved. This Learning Note draws on the experiences of multistakeholder land policy platforms in different country contexts, exploring three varieties of engagement: 1.
CBs set up by government;
2. CBs set up by external actors; 3. CBs convened independently by the platform itself. This note also provides guidance on how to make the most of CBs by carrying out regular monitoring activities and employing strategies to hold government accountable.
GUIDANCE 1) OPTIONS TO SET UP OR JOIN CONSULTATIVE BODIES The three approaches to engaging in CBs allow for different levels of policy influencing and platform autonomy. Platforms that join externally convened CBs may gain broader access to policy officials but are also likely to have less influence over the agenda. By contrast, independently convening CBs offers platforms greater autonomy to structure dialogue activities but may give them less direct influence over policy. Below are several examples from platforms that are participating in and/or have set up CBs themselves.
4
A) CBS SET UP BY GOVERNMENT Possibly the most direct entry point to policy co-implementation is to join CBs set up by government for this purpose. This format is the most likely to offer a platform direct access to powerful government authorities, and can accelerate policy processes and build long-term consultative relations. In Nepal, the NLC regularly conducts research to support its campaigning efforts. Based on the NLC’s research findings, the government established a National Land Commission to resolve land issues. The platform was invited to join the commission and continue to share its observations and recommendations. The platform’s working relationship with the government has also led to it being invited to join other working groups and commissions. For example, one of its members, a land expert and activist, was invited to join a task force formed by the Ministry of Land Management and Poverty Alleviation to help draft the ministry’s five-year plan. It is not always the case that the whole platform or multiple members need to join a CB convened by the government. In Togo, the platform has assigned one member to engage with the inter-ministerial committee on agropoles (agricultural growth corridors). This has led to a permanent collaboration with at least seven ministries and it suits the platform’s overall strategy, which involves representatives from other government institutions regularly attending platform activities. B) CBS SET UP BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS Another entry point to government engagement is joining CBs set up by international development agencies. In many instances, international organisations, such as those related to the United Nations, find it easier to obtain buy-in from government than a national platform would on its own. Often, these organisations will also seek to engage civil society, thereby providing a relatively easy route to collaboration with government. A well-known example of this approach is Land for Life Sierra Leone’s engagement with the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure (VGGT). The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) first set up CBs in the form of two working groups and a steering committee to align VGGT efforts in the country. The technical aspects of VGGT implementation, including monitoring and evaluation (M&E), were taken care of by a TWG comprising government officials, NGOs and civil society organisations (CSOs). The CSOs were represented, in turn, by the Land for Life platform. Because these CBs were introduced by FAO, the government quickly recognised the initiative and provided its full support. C) CBS SET UP INDEPENDENTLY BY THE PLATFORM Of course, a platform can also choose to set up a CB itself where no comparable body exists or none is accessible. This approach will give the platform the most autonomy to set its own terms. It may be more difficult to engage government directly, but there is
5
still ample potential for an independently created CB to increase policy influencing and facilitate policy co-implementation. In Tanzania, CSOs that would later become NLC members were already accustomed to collaborating with government through TWGs. After achieving its initial working group goals, the platform continued to use the structure of these CBs to collaborate with government representatives on policy co-implementation. For example, the working group on sustainable rangeland management monitors implementation by regularly collecting information on issues faced by local actors (Box 1). The Tanzania NLC has also organised roundtables where relevant government representatives are invited to debate important developments. For example, a roundtable was established around the revision of the National Land Policy, with the NLC and government representatives convening to examine the progress of policy formulation.
Box 1: Coordinating policy dialogue at the sub-national level in Cambodia One of NLC Tanzania’s earliest and most significant engagements was with the Sustainable Rangeland Management Project (SRMP). To execute this project, a TWG was set up, consisting of civil society and government representatives. Within this TWG there was a clear division of tasks among the stakeholders, as well as between the national and regional levels. Parties involved at the national level were mostly concerned with the formulation of policies. The main ministry concerned, the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries, took on the key coordinating role. Other ministries had lesser links to the project but were still consistently engaged. The government representatives provided leadership and ensured that the actions of the TWG fell within the legal framework. At the national level, the ministry representatives were accompanied by the NLC facilitator and the senior representatives of several CSO members of the platform. Importantly, some of the CSOs had already been collaborating on the SRMP prior to the creation of the NLC platform. Local interests were represented by sub-TWGs at regional and district levels. These included representatives of local government and (local) technical experts from the CSOs. This level took responsibility for implementing policies formulated by the national-level TWG. For smooth communication between the two levels, local TWGs had their own representatives who took part in meetings with ministry representatives and the NLC platform facilitator. Through this efficient allocation of tasks, the project has been able to successfully establish land use planning as a method of reducing conflict that has been recognised by the government. The members of the TWG have also trained numerous villages to implement land use planning, either independently or jointly with neighbouring communities. The latter approach has been included in the guidelines of the National Land Use Planning Commission and the National Land Use Framework, which is set to be implemented across Tanzania.1
1
6
ILRI (2019). Sustainable Rangeland Management Project Tanzania. ILRI Solution Brief 2. Nairobi, Kenya: ILRI. https://www. ilri.org/publications/sustainable-rangeland-management-project-tanzania-0
Argentina is another case where existing structures have inspired a platform to set up its own CB. Following recommendations by the UN to the state, the NLC created the Comité ENI Mujeres (Women’s Committee), to monitor the implementation of gendersensitive land policies. This committee regularly engages with rural women to obtain their inputs directly, for example by organising roundtables, and findings are used to make recommendations to government (Box 2).
Box 1: Coordinating policy dialogue at the sub-national level in Cambodia One of NLC Tanzania’s earliest and most significant engagements was with the Sustainable Rangeland Management Project (SRMP). To execute this project, a TWG was set up, consisting of civil society and government representatives. Within this TWG there was a clear division of tasks among the stakeholders, as well as between the national and regional levels. Parties involved at the national level were mostly concerned with the formulation of policies. The main ministry concerned, the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries, took on the key coordinating role. Other ministries had lesser links to the project but were still consistently engaged. The government representatives provided leadership and ensured that the actions of the TWG fell within the legal framework. At the national level, the ministry representatives were accompanied by the NLC facilitator and the senior representatives of several CSO members of the platform. Importantly, some of the CSOs had already been collaborating on the SRMP prior to the creation of the NLC platform. Local interests were represented by sub-TWGs at regional and district levels. These included representatives of local government and (local) technical experts from the CSOs. This level took responsibility for implementing policies formulated by the national-level TWG. For smooth communication between the two levels, local TWGs had their own representatives who took part in meetings with ministry representatives and the NLC platform facilitator. Through this efficient allocation of tasks, the project has been able to successfully establish land use planning as a method of reducing conflict that has been recognised by the government. The members of the TWG have also trained numerous villages to implement land use planning, either independently or jointly with neighbouring communities. The latter approach has been included in the guidelines of the National Land Use Planning Commission and the National Land Use Framework, which is set to be implemented across Tanzania. 2
2
ILRI (2019). Sustainable Rangeland Management Project Tanzania. ILRI Solution Brief 2. Nairobi, Kenya: ILRI. https://www. ilri.org/publications/sustainable-rangeland-management-project-tanzania-0
7
2) MAKING THE MOST OF CONSULTATIVE BODIES Success does not follow automatically once a platform has joined or set up a CB. While CBs generally provide a straightforward route to close collaboration with government, a platform still needs to be clear about the purpose of any CB in which it participates. To ensure that CBs remain effective, platforms should regularly monitor and evaluate their performance, while also holding participants from government to account.
A) SUSTAINING EFFECTIVENESS AND ENGAGEMENT A platform should consistently examine whether the CB remains relevant, whether the type of CB is appropriate and how best to sustain engagement by its members. Careful reflection on the platform’s participation in a CB can preserve the effectiveness of both the CB and the platform. The type(s) of CB most appropriate to engage in may change over time, particularly as progress is made towards the initial goal. For instance, in Argentina, the initial success of the Women’s Committee motivated the NLC to make CBs a permanent feature of the platform by establishing a total of three thematic working groups. These groups are concerned with the NLC’s current priority areas: rural women and gender (including the work of the committee but also extending to new members), family farming and youth. In addition to providing the platform with a proven structure, the division into working groups is also expected to make resource allocation more efficient as the platform’s member base continues to grow. Regular communication remains key to sustaining engagement in CBs (Box 3). In Tanzania, the NLC takes part in numerous TWGs, each of which has its own lead organisation. The individual working groups meet monthly to discuss and review their progress. Reports are formulated and discussed with the NLC facilitator and steering committee at quarterly meetings, where the leads of all working groups are represented.
8
Box 1: Coordinating policy dialogue at the sub-national level in Cambodia One of NLC Tanzania’s earliest and most significant engagements was with the Sustainable Rangeland Management Project (SRMP). To execute this project, a TWG was set up, consisting of civil society and government representatives. Within this TWG there was a clear division of tasks among the stakeholders, as well as between the national and regional levels. Parties involved at the national level were mostly concerned with the formulation of policies. The main ministry concerned, the Ministry of Livestock and Fisheries, took on the key coordinating role. Other ministries had lesser links to the project but were still consistently engaged. The government representatives provided leadership and ensured that the actions of the TWG fell within the legal framework. At the national level, the ministry representatives were accompanied by the NLC facilitator and the senior representatives of several CSO members of the platform. Importantly, some of the CSOs had already been collaborating on the SRMP prior to the creation of the NLC platform. Local interests were represented by sub-TWGs at regional and district levels. These included representatives of local government and (local) technical experts from the CSOs. This level took responsibility for implementing policies formulated by the national-level TWG. For smooth communication between the two levels, local TWGs had their own representatives who took part in meetings with ministry representatives and the NLC platform facilitator. Through this efficient allocation of tasks, the project has been able to successfully establish land use planning as a method of reducing conflict that has been recognised by the government. The members of the TWG have also trained numerous villages to implement land use planning, either independently or jointly with neighbouring communities. The latter approach has been included in the guidelines of the National Land Use Planning Commission and the National Land Use Framework, which is set to be implemented across Tanzania.3
B) HOLDING GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABLE Maintaining government engagement in a CB can prove difficult, especially in situations where the government’s participation is inconsistent, or when government officials dominate the discussion. In these circumstances, platforms may mobilise the CB itself to help hold the government accountable. In Sierra Leone, for example, despite the government’s immense dedication to the implementation of the VGGT, its most critical decision-makers were still reluctant to join working group meetings. Likewise, the state bodies responsible for drafting new laws were not part of any working group. The absence of both these groups of government actors made the working groups less effective and the policy processes less efficient. Furthermore, the government’s central role in the working groups occasionally led to
3
ILRI (2019). Sustainable Rangeland Management Project Tanzania. ILRI Solution Brief 2. Nairobi, Kenya: ILRI. https://www. ilri.org/publications/sustainable-rangeland-management-project-tanzania-0
9
CSOs being silenced, with critical perspectives ignored and key dimensions of the debate becoming politicised. Nevertheless, the platform in Sierra Leone, as well as those in Tanzania and Argentina, holds its government accountable through the working groups themselves. In these countries, CSO members monitor the government independently, organise follow-up meetings with responsible government departments and offer recommendations when policy implementation is not up to standard. NLC Argentina’s Women’s Committee has taken a systematic approach by designing an M&E matrix specific to new gender-related policies. Collaborating with external actors can further strengthen calls for accountability. In Sierra Leone, for example, the platform concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with major media outlets. Media coverage helps to raise awareness on tenure rights among urban and rural communities.4 Opportunities for reinforcing accountability can also often be strengthened by linking to international initiatives in the priority area. ILC’s Commitment-Based Initiatives, for example, can buttress the base of evidence, analysis and communications to advance priorities such as women’s land rights or the rights of indigenous peoples.
CONCLUSION This Learning Note highlights the role that consultative bodies can play in policy coimplementation. It describes a number of pathways to setting up or joining CBs, each with their own benefits and challenges to consider. While CBs can be a relatively easy channel to achieve close collaboration with government, to reap their full benefits and avoid risks a platform needs to be clear about what it is seeking to achieve through its participation. This spotlights the central role of consistent reflection on the effectiveness of the platform’s engagement in CBs and the need to adapt the approach as required.
4
10
FAO (2019). The Voluntary Guidelines: Securing our Rights. Sierra Leone. http://www.fao.org/3/ca3882en/ca3882en.pdf
3
LEARNING NOTE 3 Participating in Consultative Bodies to Support Policy Co-Implementation