2014 Duke Political Science Standard by Duke Political Science Standard

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The Race Towards the Arctic: A Rejection of the Common Heritage of Mankind Norm Haoxiaohan Cai Brazil’s Lei de Anistia: A Time to Forget Andrew Kragie Angell’s Missing Link: Why Peaceful Interdependence May Require Economic Voting David Allen “Strategic Mindsets” in Assertive Chinese Foreign Policy Anand Raghuraman The Chosen People and the People Choosing: The Effects of Public Opinion and Congress on Pre-WWII U.S. Jewish Refugee Policy Jacob Zionce Volume IV Issue 1 Spring 2014

DUKE POLITICAL SCIENCE STANDARD

VOLUME IV ISSUE 1 Daniel Strunk Co-Editor-in-Chief Chad Vincente Co-Editor-in-Chief Senior Editor Daniel Dorchuck Senior Editor Jay Ruckelshaus Editor Allison Candal Editor

Advisor Suzanne Pierce

Special thanks to the Duke Political Science faculty for their generous support and to Vilay Nidiffer for the original cover design. The Duke Political Science Standard publishes full-length academic papers related to the study of political science. All essays that appear in this issue will also be available for viewing on the DPSS website: http://polisci.duke.edu/undergraduate/opportunities/duke-political-science-standard

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Copyright ÂŠ 2014 by the Duke Political Science Standard (DPSS) at Duke University. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, in any form or by any means, electronic, photocopying, or otherwise, without permission in writing from the DPSS.

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VOLUME IV ISSUE 1

Table of Contents

Letter from the Editors v The Race Towards the Arctic: A Rejection of the Common Heritage of Mankind Norm Haoxiaohan Cai 1 Brazil’s Lei de Anistia: A Time to Forget Andrew Kragie 19 Angell’s Missing Link: Why Peaceful Interdependence May Require Economic Voting David Allen 31 “Strategic Mindsets” in Assertive Chinese Foreign Policy Anand Raghuraman 49 The Chosen People and the People Choosing: The Effects of Public Opinion and Congress on Pre-WWII U.S. Jewish Refugee Policy Jacob Zionce 67

iii

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Dear Reader, It is our honor to present to you the fourth edition of the Duke Political Science Standard. The Standard provides an excellent platform to showcase the extraordinary efforts of many of the best and brightest students here at Duke University who have committed themselves to The ingenuity and creativity of the students here at Duke University was clear from reviewing the submissions we received. This year the number of extremely impressive manuscripts timately the pieces we selected illustrate the breadth, quality, and intellectual rigor of the political science department here at Duke University. This edition of The Standard includes ranging from the norms surrounding the Arctic territory, to the effects of public opinion on Pre-WWII Jewish refugee policy, to Brazilian dictatorship. Most importantly, we would like to recognize and thank the countless people who have conour sincere gratitude to Ms. Suzanne Pierce. Her unwavering support of this publication since its inception has allowed The Standard to continue to grow in prominence and prestige. Additionally, we would like to thank the Duke University Political Science Department, without which none of this would be possible. The Duke Political Science Standard is one of the few journals of its kind in the entire country, and we are deeply honored and humbled to have served Duke by working for its publication. Being immersed in the essays of students so clearly committed to excellence in their craft has been one of the most powerful and inspiring memories we will take from our colworks in this edition intellectually stimulating and thought-provoking and that The Standard will continue to nurture the culture of scholarly engagement in the wider Duke community. Daniel Strunk, Co-Editor-in-Chief Chad Vincente, Co-Editor-in-Chief Daniel Dorchuck, Senior Editor Jay Ruckelshaus, Editor Allison Candal, Editor

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The Race Towards the Arctic: A Rejection of the Common Heritage of Mankind Norm Haoxiaohan Cai Duke University, Trinity ‘14 AbstrAct This paper analyzes the relationship between domestic oil prices and the adherence of national rhetoric to the Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM) norm. By chronologically examining the dimensions of the Arctic territorial claims made by Norway, Russia and the United States from the 1990s until present day, I explore what factors incentivize nations to discard the CHM norm of non-appropriation in favor of extending private sovereignty to the North Pole. The time period studied captures the history of the international race to appropriate the Arctic’s plentiful oil resources as well as the Arctic nations. The paper employs a country-level analysis of the three nations’ Arctic strategies and establishes a guideline for using the Common Heritage Adherence Metric as a qualitative tool to measure how much national rhetoric adheres to or deviates from the values of the CHM norm. In its analysis of Norwegian, Russian, correlation between domestic oil prices and the extent of adherence to CHM norms.

iNtrodUctioN he Common Heritage of Mankind is an international norm that outlines how nation states should act towards internationally “common” areas outside of any nation’s

towards the commons: non-appropriation, interpeaceful use, and protection of the commons for posterity. Since the introduction of the principle, Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM) norm has been extended to a great spectrum of common areas. The “Moon Treaty,” proposed in 1979 to regulate the use of the moon, was drafted according to CHM principles. In 1982, Antarctica’s governance was proposed under CHM terms. In the 1980s, the CHM was extended to issues of

environmental protection. Talk of CHM’s applicability has also permeated the realms of cultural landmarks, meteors, geostationary orbits, and space communication. CHM norm is the one unfolding in the Arctic. For centuries, the Arctic commons has eluded privatization and national conquest due to its isolated nature. Its perceived inaccessibility arose from upon its oceans. However, thanks to the deleterious effects of global warming in the recent decades, those same ice shelves have been melting at unprecedented rates and have left exposed not only new routes for maritime travel but also a new platform for energy resource exploitation. The US Geological Survey of 2008 estimates that 25% of the earth’s untapped oil resources lie 1

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buried underneath Arctic terrain. These modern incentives have caused the nations in the Arctic area who were previously supportive of the nonappropriations principle of the CHM, to renege on their support of the CHM principle. HYPotHEsis ANd PUrPosE This paper examines how three particularly aggressive Arctic nations (The Kingdom of Norway, the Russian Federation, and the United States) have engaged with the Common Heritage of Mankind principles as the perceived domestic

The Common Heritage of Mankind is a phrase coined by a Maltese representative to the UN General Assembly, Arvid Pardo, in a 1967 resolution that called for the deep seabed and tage of mankind.

scarcity of oil increases. My hypothesis predicts that positive changes in perceived scarcity of the common good, in this case, oil (my X independent variable) lead to weakened adherence to CHM principles (my Y dependent variable). I expect to see a causal relationship between the increase in the perceived scarcity of oil to generate incentives for Arctic-bordering nations to reject previouslyheld Common Heritage of Mankind norms in favor of nationalization and privatization. In other words, nations tend to adopt CHM principles when the opportunity cost of doing so is low, but reject CHM principles when they stand to gain re-

principles:2

principles. In addition to demonstrating this relationship, this paper provides a history of both the CHM principle as well as recent developments in divvying up the Arctic region.

War tensions: as technology progressed, stronger source exploitation. He believed that the disparity between industrialized and non-industrialized nations was growing too rapidly, and desired a way to bridge the gap. Pardo’s 1967 resolution preempted the development of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was ultimately

HistorY oF tHE coMMoN HEritAGE oF MANKiNd The Common Heritage of Mankind is a loosely

norm. Some refer to it as a concept, others, norms, and yet others call it a principle, ideal, doctrine, or even legal “term of art.”1 As such, nations can easily deviate from the CHM’s aspirational ideals

1. 2. 3.

4. 5.

Common Heritage areas are not to be appropriated by any one group. The areas should be internationally governed. If resources are derived from the area, then there should be an active and equitable sharing of common heritage area The CH areas should be peacefully used. Common resources from CH areas should be protected for the use and enjoyment of posterity.

Pardo was primarily concerned with the opening up of oil resources in an era characterized by Cold

Baslar 1998.

Ibid., 189.

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mary mechanism for resolving territorial disputes in the Arctic. While the Common Heritage of Mankind enjoys an extensive history stretching back to the old Roman legal concept of res communis,3 the the norm is new. Writing on the legal history of the norm, Kemar Baslar notes that the need for the concept internationally arises from the interplay of two factors: scarcity and accessibility of resources in the common area. In the context of the Arctic, the scarce goods are represented by oil reserves buried in contested continental shelves. The accessibility of the resources had been low until recent climate change started to remove barriers to Arctic exploration. stAtE oF tHE Arctic As global oil prices grow at an increasingly rapid pace and nations exhaust previously bountiful supplies of oil, the demand for new fuel sources has soared. The US Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic region still holds 25% of the world’s untapped energy resources.4 The Arctic was previously rendered inaccessible due to the large blockades of ice and unnavigable ocean, much of which has started to thaw. These two developments—the growing perception of oil scarcity and the growing likelihood of oil accessibility in the Arctic—have fueled a race toward the Arctic. In the last two decades, the Arctic region has experienced tremendous changes as a result of shifting climates. While the Arctic ice natural-

called Arctic Oscillation, which describes how the Arctic ice sprawls to a maximum by March and retracts to its minimum by September), the treme since the mid-1990s. We can see this trend in a visualization of the yearly minimum Arctic Sea Ice Extent, measured in millions of square kilometers, based on data collected from the National Snow and Ice Data Center from 1979 to 2008. The 1980s saw a relatively stable yearly minimum ice extent. However, we can see a pronounced pattern of Arctic ice decline from 1990 to 2002, followed by an extremely rapid ice melt from 2002 to the present. Analysts who have observed this trend remark that in the summer of 2007, “sea ice retreat was especially pronounced in the region encompassing the Beaufort, Chukchi, East Siberian, Laptev, and Kara Seas.”5 Some researchers have also predicted that all Arctic ice will be melted by the end of the 21st century if industrialized nations continue to churn out highemission gasses at an aggressive rate.6 These developments in the Arctic have greatly shifted accessibility in the area. Arctic GovErNANcE FrAMEWorK Since the Arctic region is composed of oceans and ice shelves, it falls under the governance of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Upon its creation in 1982, UNCLOS replaced four weaker maritime agreements and provided a framework for nations to consider their rights and responsibilities in exploring, nav5

Ibid., 45.

Holmes 2008.

Chart and information accessed from http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/ Features/SeaIce/page3.php. 6

Meehl, et al. 2007.

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igating, and exploiting the world’s oceans. UNa nation is given ten years within which to subin international waters and regards all oceans outside of a nation’s exclusive economic zone as a part of “The Area.”7 This international common Area includes not only the sea, but also the seaThe Area is especially relevant to my analysis, as the subsoil and seabed is where the precious resources like oil reside. I am especially interested in two sections of UNCLOS: Part XI, Section II, which describes

CLCS. Part IV of UNCLOS already allows a nation’s exclusive economic rights (to drill, conduct mining operations, etc.) to extend over parts of the ocean within 200 nautical miles that represent a “natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin.” The CLCS evaluates claims of territory outside of that 200-nautical-mile boundary based on whether a nation’s continental shelf can be proven to extend

the Common Heritage of Mankind principle; and Annex II, which created the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and presently serves as the mechanism for dispute settlement in the Arctic. The following descriptions of UNity. Under Article 136 of UNCLOS Part XI, Section II, the UNCLOS states, “The Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind.” ciples in Articles 136-148: non-appropriation of the Area, non-exploitation of the Area’s resources, peaceful use of the Area, preservation of the

beyond the boundary.

sharing of common resources among both coastal and land-locked states. In ratifying UNCLOS, nations are theoretically acknowledging and acquiescing to the CHM principles. Although the CHM norm governs the Area, where the Area stops and sovereign oceans begin is still up for debate. The Area can be appropriated into sovereign territory through a petition to the Commission on the Limits of the Continen-

ready made submissions to the CLCS (Norway and Russia), as well as those of the US. While the US Congress has refused to ratify UNCLOS, the US has not lost time in preparing for potential Arctic acquisitions. This paper comes at an especially critical time, as the deadline for submissions to the CLCS are rapidly approaching for Canada (2013) and Denmark (2014). The United States does not currently have a deadline set due

both upholds and undermines the CHM norm. Whereas Part XI, Section II seeks to protect the Area from national encroachment and privatization, the CLCS provides an avenue through which such appropriation can occur. Five nations border the Arctic Ocean and potentially stand to gain territory through CLCS: Norway, Denmark (via Greenland), the United States (via Alaska), Russia, and Canada. Of the other four have standing to issue Arctic claims to CLCS.8 This paper interrogates the claims and rhetoric of the two Arctic nations who have al-

See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 1, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].

Isted 2009.

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to its refusal to sign on to UNCLOS but stands to lose out on lucrative Arctic opportunities because of it. MEtHodoLoGY This paper compares the relationship of perceived

imposes on each barrel of oil sold.9 I assume that a nation’s desire to curb or facilitate oil consumption—whether for environmental considerations, citizen demands, or excess of available resourccally.

the Arctic region for three circumpolar nations. I look at these values for Norway, Russia, and the US for a period from 1990 until present day. I examine these three nations because they have been the most vociferous contenders for the Arctic re-

Measuring rhetoric regarding the Arctic: CHAM For a consistency of analysis, I am looking exclusively at speeches, statements, and documents issued by three kinds of national representatives: president (or an equivalent execu-

claim to the CLCS in 2001, while Norway was the second and only other nation to do so; and the US has also made considerable strides in researching the legitimacy of its own Arctic claims. The US case study additionally serves as a control in my analysis: the US has signed the UNCLOS but has

foreign ministers, and representatives to relevant UN committees. As this paper focuses especially

entirely bound to the CHM norm espoused by the UNCLOS, nor does it have as much international legitimacy in claiming Arctic territory since it cannot have its claims evaluated by the CLCS. Measuring perceived oil scarcity For the purposes of my analysis, the perceived scarcity of oil will be measured by data from the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) concerning oil prices for each country from the 1990s to present. I examine this span of time because the Arctic nations had not begun to ratify UNCLOS until the mid-1990s. While oil prices are generally globally determined, the GIZ data provides average yearly oil prices and identi-

CLCS, statements regarding either will also be recorded and analyzed. Of these documents, I search especially for two kinds of topics: 1.) the ception of the principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind. To this end, I have performed exhaustive searches of phrases for Arctic-related speech on the executive websites of the three nations. I searched for the terms “Arctic,” “Law of the Sea,” “UNCLOS,” “CLCS,” and “Heritage of Mankind” on the Norwegian Prime Minister website,10 the Russian Presidential website,11 and the American Presidency Project website.12 All three of these websites provide comprehensive 9

The 7th Edition of GIZ international fuel prizes are accessible: http:// www.giz.de/Themen/en/dokumente/giz-en-IFP2010.pdf 10

can be accessed: http://www.regjeringen.no/en 11

The website for the president of Russia can be accessed here http://eng. kremlin.ru/ for statements up until 2010, and for the documents from 1999 to 2010, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/ 12

A website of all presidential documents, maintained at the University of Southern California at Santa Barbara, can be found: http://www.presidency. ucsb.edu/

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records of presidential speeches, executive commands, joint meeting declarations, and high-proIn order to evaluate change in rhetorical adherence to CHM norms over time, I have organized the relevant statements in chronological order and assigned them a Common Heritage Adherence Metric (CHAM) value of 0, 1, or 2. I have devised the CHAM to evaluate how conCHM principles (outlined in section III above). Statements are evaluated as follows: 0. 1.

Low adherence: the statement rejects the CHM principles, or statement urges deviance from the UNCLOS regime. Middling adherence: the statement is neutral regarding the CHM principles, or incorporates some of the CHM principles but rejects others. High adherence: the statement outright applauds and institutionalizes the CHM principles, adopts CHM principles conceptually, or indicates that national ad-

For example, if a statement only discusses the common Arctic regions with regard to their oil reserves and recommends appropriation of the territory for its energy resources, then the statement will be evaluated as having a low CHAM value of 0, for its rejection of two CHM principles. In the third: namely, that Common Heritage areas should not be appropriated by any one nation, and exploiting a common territory. A statement is ranked with a CHAM value of 1 if it contains language in line with CHM principles as well as language deviant from them. A joint statement issued by two claimants, Nor6

way and Russia, to settle a dispute over a common area serves as an example. In professing to work together to resolve territorial disputes in the Arctic, the states demonstrate a commitment to the CHM principle, which calls for international governance of the Area. However, the joint statement also intends to make the debate over the commons an exclusively bilateral negotiation— extension of their sovereignty in the area, which would be contrary to CHM principle 1, which calls for a ban on the appropriation of any Common Heritage area. A statement with a CHAM ranking of 2 would only contain language strongly adherent to CHM ideals. For example, if a statement urges “peaceful resolution of disputes in the Arctic region.” As well as responsible and equitable benopment, the statement would be ranked with a CHAM value of 2. Alternative explanations There are other factors besides perceived scarcity of oil (and other valuable resources found of CHM support or rejection. One such factor is the ideological dimension of the CHM norm. Since the norm arose out of Arvid Pardo’s desire to bridge the gap North-South inequality, many critics of the both the CHM and the UNCLOS contend that the idea of global commons is untenable. Less adherence to or an outright rejection of CHM may then stem less from shifting perceptions of oil scarcity and more from an a priori ideological rejection of the communalist aspects of CHM. In order to control and account for this ideological dimension, I have included the US, a

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consistent opponent of the CHM norm, to study CHM adherence in a nation with no UNCLOS obligations. Additionally, by the virtue of the tragedy of the commons, adherence to the CHM norm may be affected by the territorial rhetoric of other nations. That is to say, if one nation starts to deviate from CHM principles and declares intentions to appropriate parts of the commons, other peripheral nations may also want to deviate from previously-held CHM norms in order to stake similar claims.

The nature of the oil price data was such that I have only gathered oil prices at intervals of 2-3 years, and the nature of national statements were such that I have only gathered statements on the Arctic when and if they were made. As such, the data is not as comprehensive as I had hoped when I envisioned this project. The limited number of relevant statements makes me hesitant causality. However, in examining the evidence gathered, it is undeniable that there is a noteworthy correlation between oil prices and Common Heritage of Mankind adherence among affected nations. proximate adherence to a legal norm is far from a perfect science. In only analyzing statements made by presidents, prime ministers, foreign

Nation (Total Statements) Russia (13) Norway (10) United States (11)

ministers, or UN representatives, I have assumed that the executive heads of state and their foreign diplomats accurately represent and portray the entire nationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s relationship with the CHM norm, though I acknowledge that individual political actors may use rhetoric that is not always congruent with national policy. However, since the CHM norm is not binding, its principles are only as strong as the statement made by national governments that support it, making rhetoric and lip service an appropriate measure of CHM adherence. RESULTS Comparisons of domestic oil prices against CHAM values for all three Arctic nations examined reveal a general pattern: as oil prices have increased since the 1990s, national rhetoric has exhibited a decrease in adherence to the CHM esis: as perceived oil scarcity increases, nations tend to shift away from CHM language in order to appropriate oil from the common area. However, this inverse relationship is not strictly linear: short periods of oil price decrease were not necessarily accompanied by increased CHAM values. Of the three nations, Norway has changed its stance on the CHM norm most evidently. In the 1990s, its statements demonstrated a relatively high adherence to CHM principles, but as oil prices rose from 33 cents per liter in 2000 to 89 cents a liter in 2010, the CHAM values of those

CHAM Average (1990-2000) 1.5 1.5 1.33

CHAM Average (2000--) .55 .50 .75

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statements dropped considerably. A similar phenomenon can be observed in Norway’s behavior. Its initial statements in the 1990s demonstrated general adherence to CHM norms, but its subsequent statements deviated more from CHM norms even more than that of Russia. At the beginning of the 1990s, the US’s statements were not as adherent to CHM norms as the other two nations, but on the other hand, unlike Norway or Russia, the US experienced a lesser decline in CHAM adherence in the 2000s.

ing, we see Norway’s pro-CHM statements and actions represented by one strongly pro-CHM statement and two neutral CHM statements. As oil prices in Norway escalated from 119 cents per liter in 2000 to 180 in 2012, we see a sizable drop in overall CHAM values. During this period, besides the Ilullisat Declaration, most of the other Norwegian statements gathered only earned

The Kingdom of Norway

and CHM take on lower adherence to the CHM norm as oil becomes more expensive and therefore, scarce.

background and claims

Norway has historically relied on Arctic exploration and a focus northward for both industry and “strategic self perception.”13 As such, Norway has been the quickest to act in the race

others, CHAM values of 1 (two statements). The Norway CHAM and oil price trend graph demonstrates just Norwegian statements on the Arctic

analysis of representative norwegian statements in context

To begin an assessment of Norway’s ratify the UNCLOS. In 2006, it was the second nation to submit its proposal to the CLCS. Norway’s territorial claim, if granted, would potentially increase Norway’s continental shelf ownership up to an extra 10%. The total territory that Norway claimed in its submission spans 250,000 kilometers squared14 and mainly concerns the Barents Sea, Loop Hole, and Banana Hole areas. Much of its disputed territories overlap with that of Russia. norway’s cham values and oil trends

A comparison of domestic oil prices against Norway’s CHAM values reveals an inverse relationship. During the 1990s, when Norway’s oil prices were relatively slowly increas-

Fjaertoft 2011.

Isted 361.

representative to the UN issued a statement: “The Government of the Kingdom of Norway declares pursuant to article 287 of the Convention that it chooses the International Court of Justice for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention.” This statement demonstrates Norway’s willingness to settle potential maritime disputes through the International Court of Justice. This statement entails with it, a concession of power and sovereignty to an international judicial organ. Keeping in mind Russia’s adamant refusal to even acknowledge the binding effect of UNCLOS decisions or any internationally regulated decision making apparatus, Norway’s concession to the ICJ in matrobustly interpreted as being strongly in support

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of CHM principle 2: governance of the common area should be determined internationally. These a high CHAM value of 2. Proceeding chronologically, in 2006, the same year that the CLCS proposal was submitted, Norway launched its High North Strategy, a shift in policy towards the Arctic and the High North. Norway towards engaging and building more website states that the New Building Blocks in the North initiative (part of the High North Strategy) will train its attention on “promot[ing] sustainable development of offshore petroleum and renewable marine resources.” However, since the CLCS had, at this time, not yet granted Norway access and sovereignty over the disputed Arctic territories, the nation’s signaling its desires to expand northward could be seen as preemptive and premature preparations to develop offshore projects. The language found in the Strategy can be interpreted as posturing on Norway’s part—

both the EU and the US have presented their own strategies for the High North. They plan to step up their engagement in this area, and so do Russia and many other key actors . . . It is our intention to stay ahead of these developments. This excerpt demonstrates Norway’s desire to participate in a world of direct competition and exclusion for the use of the North, which is contrary to the CHM principle 1. The statement also recommends militarization in the Arctic, which runs counter to CHM Principle 4; that of peaceful

a desire to exploit resources on not-yet-awarded guage used by the Norwegian government (and

use of common areas. These two aspects of the statement earn Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg’s statement a CHAM ranking of 0. In 2009, after CLCS recommendations called for bilateral resolution of the Loop Hole territory dispute between Russia and Norway both nations sent delegations to Oslo in 2010 to resolve a long-standing dispute over the Barents Sea.15 We see here a bilateral negotiation that preferred to take that arbitration power away from CLCS: together, national representatives from both nations signed off on the “Joint Statement on maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean.” The Joint Statement eventually led to the signing of the

especially Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg) in its High North Strategy is given a CHAM value of 0.

Treaty on Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and Arctic Oceans.16 This

In 2009, the Norwegian Prime Minister issued an updated statement on the High North Strategy that alluded to the zero-sum nature of the race to the Arctic:

and Norway over the Barents Sea region. Large parts of the treaty were devoted to explaining the equal exploitation of hydrocarbon found in the disputed continental shelf. This joint statement gets a CHAM value of 0 because it rejects not

The need to develop our High North Strategy is greater than ever. This is apparent when we look at how the world around us is changing. During the past few months

UNCLOS Annex VI, section 6.2 item 22.

Text of treaty available: http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/SMK/Vedlegg/2010/avtale_engelsk.pdf

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only CHM principles but also the CLCS mechanism itself. By bilaterally deciding the fate of the common Barents Sea, the two nations evade the international scrutiny of the CLCS, voiding CHM Principle 2. The treaty also outlines how both nations are to proceed if and when energy resources are found in the Barents area, with no mention of the two nations involved, which represents a rejection of CHM principle 3. The Russian Federation background and claims

Russia is the largest circumpolar nation. mit a petition to the CLCS in 2001. It is not difmon region—its landmass closely follows that of the Arctic territories and circumscribes half the region. Russia claims possession of the Lomonosov Ridges and the Alpha-Mendeleev Ridges. Both these territories promise to be lucrative and

who have, through the course of the 20th century, Northeast Passage, rescued stranded passengers from the frigid Chukchi Sea, but also landed the 21 In short, as historian John McCannon has written, “for as long as Russia has existed as a country, and particularly during the twentieth century, the Arctic has occupied a place of prominence in its national development.” Contemporary projections of Russian oil reserves present a dire need for more resources. in output from 545.1 billion cubic meters a year (2004) to only 344 billion cubic meters by 2020. Of Russia’s 100 billion tons of accessible offshore oil, 80% is believed to be located in the Arctic region.22 Procurement of said territory would present Russia with abundant mining and energy prospects.

four of the other circumpolar nations.17 In addition to these prominently contended territories, Russia claims that its continental shelves extend

russia’s cham value trends and oil trends

all the way to the North Pole, and that its total Arctic territory would comprise up to 1.2 million square kilometers of the Arctic commons.18 Historically, Russian (and Soviet) activity in the Arctic has been limited to exploration, in World War II and Cold War times.19 Russia has made explorations into the Arctic since the

tionship between the two. That is to say, since the beginning of the 1990s until present day, as the cial rhetoric has shifted from high adherence to the Common Heritage of Mankind to minimal adherence to the CHM norm. As oil prices climbed, we can see that there is a gradation of Russian deviance from the CHM norm.

Isted 2009.

Breyfogle and Dunifon 2012.

Ibid., 359.

McCannon 2008.

Roucek, 1983.

Yenikeyeff and Krysiek 2007.

fourteenth hundreds, and has perceived itself as an Arctic power since.20 Russian folklore and na-

An analysis of the Russian CHAM value and perceived oil scarcity reveals an inverse rela-

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From the early 1990s to the early 2000s, Russian statements earned CHAM values of 2, signaling a high adherence to the norm. The early the CHM norm, with three of the four statements regarding the Arctic earning a CHAM value of 1, and only one ranking at 0. The latter half of the 2000s saw a steep decline in Russian willstatements made between 2005 and 2010 were ranked at CHAM values of 0. However, the Russian statements made after 2010 rebound to claim CHAM values of 1, despite a continued rise in oil prices. analysis of representative russian statements in context

An analysis of Russian rhetoric on the Arctic and its developmental designs on the Polar Regions can be consistently found in the Russian Federation’s periodic National Security Concepts. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the new Russian Federation has issued three such and the third in 2009. The Concepts are especial-

to anchor Russia’s “integration into a multipolar world.” Russia cites the “growing gap between the developed and developing countries” which it believes will “affect the pace of and directions in the formation of a new structure of international relations”. The highlighting of international distributions of power points to Russia’s desire to mitigate the domination of more developed states than itself on international concerns. Keeping in mind that the Common Heritage of Mankind Principle was initially invoked and conceptualized to exploitation of common resources, wee see how this language is indicative of Russia’s ideological sympathy towards the CHM. More tellingly, rhetoric of posterity and generational trusteeship is invoked in section two of the Concept: A most important condition for implementing national interests in this sphere is [to] ensure the balanced solution of socioeconomic tasks and the problems of conservation of the environment with a view to satisfying the needs of present and future generations. This language of preserving resources for poster-

itself—they are essentially, a description of Russia’s grand strategy. The Concepts are thought to the collective security and well-being; articulat[e] collective interests, values and purpose; and outlin[e] the tactics for securing the objective.”23 Each Concept is drafted by the National Security Council and approved by the president himself.

ity is clearly resonant with the prescriptions of CHM principle 5 which calls for a preservations of the commons for the enjoyment of future generations. This provision of environmental and resource preservation for future generations is only found in the 1997 Concepts and not in the 2000 or 2009 editions. The 1997 Concepts therefore earns a high CHAM value of 2. By the early 2000s, Russia’s tone towards the CHM norm had shifted. The 2000 Concepts

Kassianova 2001.

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Concepts chastise “particular states” which have attempted to “belittle the role of existing mechanisms for ensuring international security, above all the United Nations and the OSCE.” Since the UN and then subsequently strengthened through UN resolutions (i.e. the Moon Treaty, UNCLOS, international environmental law endeavors) Russia’s allegations against uncooperative states are especially telling: when one considers that Russia in 2000 was only one year away to submitting its territorial claims to the CLCS, it then becomes

rejection of the UNCLOS framework of multilateral cooperation and the CLCS dispute regulation

easier to understand why Russia would be keen to assume a pro-UN institution tone in 2000. Additionally, in the 2000 document, there is a noticeable lack of discussion of energy security concerns. The 2000 Concept contains no rhetoric concerning the Arctic region directly, but territorial disputes are cited as one of the major international threats to Russian security. I assign this Concept a CHAM value of 1 for its neutral stance on territorial acquisitions and international cooperation. The rhetoric of the 2000 Concept is largely representative of the other Russian statements made in the early 2000s. The most audacious Russian statement on the Arctic did not explicitly take the form of

mechanism. The Arktika incident and Foreign Minister Lavrov’s statement did not adhere to CHM principles of non-appropriation and are assigned a deviating CHAM value of 0. The Russian push towards Arctic dominance did not stop there. On May 12, 2009, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev signed and passed the “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2020,” which outlined in sweeping strokes, Russia’s ideological, geopolitical, economic, and social plans for the decade ahead.25 Unlike previous National Security Concepts

an executive speech or declaration, but is perhaps the singularly most referenced event in any analysis of Arctic territorial disputes. On August 2, 2007, Russian researchers descended to the bottom of the North Pole and planted a Russian

egy. The Russian approach to the Arctic seems to be grounded in creating energy-procuring facilities on site and then forming the requisite infrastructure to protect said energy sources: “in the long term, the attention of international politics will be focused on ownership of energy resourc-

of this action as Russia’s signaling that the North Pole was singularly within its sovereign domain. This provocative gesture came as a culmination of the Arktika 2007 exploration sponsored by the Russian government to gather further research for 12

planting event is in no way a statement, I have incorporated it into the Russian dataset via statements made by Foreign Minister Lavrov to the Association of South East Asian Nations in August of 2007.24 The Russian statement issued on latory effect of the Russian Arktika expedition’s action was anything but. The unilateral nature of

mention of the Arctic disputes. Three of the 112 articles focused on Arctic development and strat-

Text of statement available: http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/432751A 496F921E9C325732C004BE119 25

Text of the strategy available: http://rustrans.wikidot.com/russia-snational-security-strategy-to-2020

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es, including in … the Barents Sea shelf and other parts of the Arctic…” Explicit orientation towards energy security is also laid out in Section 60: “One of the main long-term directions of national security in the economic sphere is energy security.” The Concept advises that energy security be strengthened through “the prevention of possible fuelstocks of fuel, reserve capacities and standard equipment” among other provisions. As a Norwegian Defense Institute study notes, “the ultimate objective of the state policy is to transform the Arctic into ‘Russia’s foremost strategic base for natural resources’ by 2020.”26 The 2009 Concepts deviates egregiously from the CHM norm: it directly opposes CHM norms by preparing for acquiring fuel in disputed Arctic territories without assigned a CHAM value of 0. The United States of America

America has had a long history with UNCLOS and the Common Heritage of Mankind principle. During the late 1960s, President Lyndon Johnson was one of the most outspoken advocates for the Common Heritage of Mankind, and is quoted as saying, “I thought it would make no sense to allow a competitive struggle to divide up the seabed. It was a global commons to be shared. I’ve never believed the concept meant any more than that.”27 Ironically, it was exactly the deep sea-bed mining provisions of UNCLOS that prevented and in Congress. Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama have all urged Congress to pass the convention through their respective terms, to no avail. Opponents of UNCLOS argue that the common heritage principle in the deep seabed posed an “unnecessary compromise of our basic free market principles” which would yoke the US’s superior mining capabilities to the whims of socialist “Third Worlders.”28

background and claims

The US borders the Arctic by virtue of the state of Alaska and is the only non-UNCLOS Arctic state examined for CHAM. CHAM values can nonetheless be assigned to US statements about US does not have the current ability to make territorial submissions to the CLCS, recent research expeditions to the Alaskan coast, coupled with a strong pivot in Arctic policy, indicate a growing interest in the region that makes the US approach to the Arctic worth studying.

american cham trends and oil trends

The interaction of American CHAM values and American oil prices is also found to be inversely related. A chronological approach to examining American statements on the Arctic regions reveals trends of neutral adherence to the CHM in the 1990s, low adherence between 2000 to 2005, and low to neutral adherence from 2005 onwards. Unlike statements on the Arctic or UNCLOS made by either Norway or Russia in the 1990s, the US CHAM values for statements made 27

Accessible here: http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/cgi/viewcontent. cgi?article=1297&context=ma_etds 26

http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-57/zysk.pdf

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between 1990-2000 start around 1, and only once reach a full adherence value of 2 before declining more pronouncedly in the later 2000s. Given the strong anti-CHM sentiment in American policy circles, this initial neutral adherence to UNCLOS is unsurprising. When compared to statements made by Russia and Norway in the same time period, we logically expect to see a lower CHAM average for the US than for Russia and Norway, who were quick to ratify the UNCLOS, CHM principle and all. Indeed, the data shows that American statements made during this time pe-

Oil prices leap from 63 cents a liter in 2006 to 76 cents a liter in 2010. However, CHAM values did

riod adhered less to the CHM than the statements

tions and exhibited a desire to develop the Arctic regionally, but not globally, as is prescribed by the CHM norm.

The neutral statements made by the US suggest that besides perceived oil scarcity, adherence to CHM is likely also correlated with whether the

my hypothesis. Of the four statements gathered for this period, two earned CHAM values of 1 and two others earned a CHAM value of 0. The GIZ oil price data does not extend beyond 2010, pertaining to the Arctic post 2010. The two statements evaluated both earned middling CHAM values of 1. Both statements were joint statements made with the Prime Ministers of other Arctic na-

analysis of representative us statements in context

the CHM norm. During this earlier period from the 1990s to the 2000s, the US price of oil steadily climbed from 32 cents per liter of oil in 1993 to 47 cents per liter of oil in 2000. CHAM values during this period average out to about 1.33, indicating that there is a slight adherence to the CHM norm during this period. From the period of 2000 to 2005, I was only able to gather one qualifying statement

The second statement analyzed in my US dataset is President Clinton’s Radio Address on November 24, 1995. In his address, Clinton denounces a Republican plan that would allow for unregulated drilling in the Alaskan Arctic region. He uses arguments evocative of CHM principle 5 (saving the commons for posterity) to make his point: “because we believe that what God created we must not destroy, each of us has a sa-

from the US. This statement was ranked with a CHAM value of 0 for its almost belligerent tone towards the CLCS and UNCLOS, and was issued in reaction to Russia’s territorial claim. Concurrently during this period, oil prices rose from 47 cents per liter in 2000 to about 60 cents a liter by 2005. If there was a strict inverse relationship between CHAM adherence and oil prices, then the period from 2005 to 2010 should play witness to the lowest ranking CHAM values from the US.

cred obligation to pass on a clean planet to future generations.”29 Clinton’s rejection of the Republican budget, which would open up drilling in the “unspoiled Arctic”, is in line with the non-appropriations goal of CHM and corresponds with principle 1. For this adherence to CHM norms, the address is ranked with a CHAM value of 2.

The text of this statement, as well as all other US statements succeeding it, is available on the Presidential Papers website upon searching the name of the statement.

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In the early 2000s, the US, like a couple of other Arctic nations, grew alarmed at possible Russian claims to the Arctic. In 2002 the US Representative sent a strongly-worded reaction letter to the UN Secretary General in response to Russia’s CLCS submission. The US letter said that lates to the continental shelf claim in the Arctic… The Russian submission is particularly complex and should be considered in a deliberate manner.

arctic Treaty-model for Arctic governance betrays the US’s intention to extend its own sovereignty, militarize and pursue commercial projects in the the Directive’s call for “assert a more active and interests and to project sea power throughout the region” and its focus on possible energy acquisitions. For this posturing and rejection of CHM norms, the Directive receives a low CHAM score of 0.

be required for the Convention to be carefully applied in a manner to promote stability.” The US decision mechanism. For the strong language of opposition to Russian claims, and the US’s suggestion of unilateral decision making on CLCS affairs, this statement ranks as a 0. The US itself has started posturing for a more involved Arctic stance in the later part of the 2000’s. In 2009, President Bush issued the Directive on Arctic Region Policy, also known as NSPD-66. This Directive called for Congresconservation of the Arctic environment, and dismissed the need for a governance regime like glance, the rhetoric of the Directive seems adherent to CHM principles. However, considered in context, the Directive is revealed as deviating from CHM principles. President Bush ruled out the possibility of Arctic governance according to “the lines of the Antarctic Treaty”, saying that the Antarctic Treaty is “not appropriate or necessary.” The Antarctic Treaty prevents any nation from making claims of sovereignty in Antarctica, as well as restricting commercial and military operations on the continent. The rejection of an Ant-

coNcLUsioN The race for claiming Arctic territory has been an undeniable development in international relations examine the Arctic dispute through the Common Heritage of Mankind norm and as the dispute relates to changes in domestic oil price. Through an analysis of the data, my initial hypothesis was found to be largely correct: there was indeed an inverse relationship between increasing oil prices and decreasing adherence to CHM values for interested and affected nations. The data showed that for each of the three Arctic nations studied, periods of high CHM adherence coincided with lower oil prices, while the periods of low CHM adherence came at a time of soaring oil prices. In other words, it was easier for Arctic nations to applaud the Common Heritage norms of non-approdid not present itself to be loaded with soughtafter resources. This study also demonstrates that previous compliance with and support of the Common Heritage of Mankind norm does not guarantee a continued adherence to its principles. Adherence to the CHM norm is not only based on shifting 15

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tuation of the perceived scarcity and value of resources lying within the commons. Additionally, as the study of Norway and Russiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s behavior in the Arctic has demonstrated, the defection of one nation from the CHM norm may provoke other nations with the same claims to do the same. especially interesting, as they remain relevant even outside of the Artic context. The Common Heritage norm has played a part in regulating international behavior not only in the Arctic region, but also for Antarctica, tropical rainforests, endangered species, the atmosphere, and cultural heritage sites.30 Each one of those at-risk commons is currently protected, in some form or another, by CHM principles enshrined in treaties or conventions. However, as this paper demonstrates, it is important to note how states quickly states can move towards a rejection of CHM norms when scarce resources are discovered within the commons. In fact, the same trend towards nationalization and privatization has already occurred in the debate over plant genetic resources. Like the Arctic region, seeds and plant genetic mate-

tempt to label plant genetic resources as private, sovereign goods.31 The battle over plant genetic resources is folding area of CHM concern is in outer space. The Outer Space Treaty, entered into force in 1967, demands the non-militarization of outer space or any celestial body on the basis that the extraterrestrial realm could not and should not be appropriated or used belligerently. Yet, as modern technology increases the potential for space space militarization grow, space-faring nations have made increasingly anti-CHM statements regarding the peaceful use of outer space. Further research similar to what has been accomplished in this paper should be pursued to evaluate the threats to extraterrestrial militarization and appropriation. In fact, should the reader decide to conduct further study into national adherence to the CHM norm, the Common Heritage Adherence Metric developed in this study may prove especially useful. Since this paper provides guidelines determining the CHAM value of any statement,

knowledge that could not be owned by private individuals or nations. However, as DNA technology rapidly progressed during the 1970s, the tion of plant materials could lead to miraculous -

Baslar xx.

Raustiala and Vigdor 2004.

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REFERENCES Allen, Monica. “An Intellectual History of the Common Heritage of Mankind as Applied to the Oceans.” University of Rhode Island DigitalCommons. (1992) Baslar, Kemal. The Concept of the Common Her. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1998. Print. Breyfogle, Nicholas, and Jeffrey Dunifon. “Russia and the Race for the Arctic | Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective.” Russia and the

International Organization, 58,(2004) 277309. Kassianova, Alla. “Russia: Still Open to the West? Evolutino of the State Identity in the ForeignPolicy and Security Discourse.” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 53, No. 6 (Sep., 2001) 821-839 McCannon, John, Red Arctic : Polar Exploration and the Myth of the North in the SoOxford University Press, 1998.

Conforti, Benedetto. “Territorial Claims in Antarctica: A Modern Way to Deal with an Old Problem.” nal 19 (1986): 249-58. HeinOnline. Web.

Meehl, G.A., T.F. Stocker, W.D. Collins, P. Friedlingstein, A.T. Gaye, J.M. Gregory, A. Kitoh, R. Knutti, J.M. Murphy, A. Noda, S.C.B. Raper, I.G. Watterson, A.J. Weaver and Z.-C. Zhao, “Global Climate Projections.” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2007).

Holmes, Stephanie. “Breaking the Ice: Emerging Legal Issues in Arctic Sovereignty. 9 (2008): 323-53. Print.

Roucek, Joseph, The Geopolitics of the Arctic, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 42, No. 4 (Oct., 1983), pp. 463471

Race for the Arctic. Origins, Aug. 2012. Web. 14 Apr. 2013.

Isted, Kathryn. “Sovereignty in the Arctic: An Analysis of Territorial Disputes & Environmental Policy Considerations.” (2009). Kal Raustiala and David G. Victor. “The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources.”

York Times, 4 July 1977, p. 17. Yenikeyeff, Shamil; Krysiek, Timothy. The Battle for the Next Energy Frontier: The Russian Polar Expedition and the Future of Arctic Hydrocarbons. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. Aug 2007.

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Brazil’s Lei de Anistia: A Time to Forget Andrew Kragie Duke University, Trinity ‘15 AbstrAct In 2011, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff signed a law to create a national truth commission. The commission is examining the repression and human rights violations undertaken by Brazil’s 21-year-long military regime; among the victims was Dilma herself. How could it take 25 years of civilian rule before the government sponsored an investigation of the dictatorship’s abuses? This paper uses the 1979 Amnesty Law as a lens into the debates about forgetting and forgiving to address that question. surrounding the amnesty. Who participated in these debates, and in what alliances? What were the central issues discussed? And perhaps most importantly, how does the

HISTORICAL CONTEXT: ANISTIA IN THE ABERTURA e must understand the historical context of the abertura (political opening that marked the beginning of redemocratization) before considering the debates surrounding the 1979 . The law came after 15 years of military rule, which began in a U.S.-supported 1964 coup against the democratically elected left-leaning president João Goulart. The generals established a ruling junta that would save democracy from Castro-style revolution and chaos. They kept Congress open and promised to respect the Constitution, consolidating all political parties into the pro-government Aliança de Renovação Nacional (Arena) and the opposition Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB). The coup itself was largely accepted, but social elites began to oppose the authoritarian regime and its repressive tendencies. Urban guerrilla groups organized in the late 1960s and began to rob banks

and kidnap foreign ambassadors to gain domestic and international attention and force prisoner exchanges. Hardline generals took charge of the of opposition from 1968 to 1974.1 After the Médici presidency crushed any serious opposition through censorship, repression, and torture, the Geisel administration began the process of distensão (détente) in response to elite and popular demands.2 This gradual political opening involved a near end to human rights vioversion’ and a decrease in censorship, the strictest of which ended in 1978.3 Schneider argues that the distensão responded to internal and external pressures. The regime’s moderates supported an 1

John Charles Chasteen, Born in Blood and Fire, 3rd ed. (New York: Norton, 2011), “Military Rule,” 290-312. 2

Nina Schneider, “Impunity in Post-authoritarian Brazil: The Supreme Court’s Recent Verdict on the Amnesty Law,” American and Caribbean Studies 90 (April 2011): 42. 3

Anne-Marie Smith, A Forced Agreement: Press Acquiescence to Censorship in Brazil (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997).

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eventual return to civilian democracy while the hard line favored military rule and repression. Geisel took note of the 1974 elections in which Arena “lost a substantial amount of votes” to the MDB despite an unfair campaign. The regime’s intelligence service, the SNI, called the election a “public condemnation of the [military’s] revolution” and heeded opinion polls that showed growing dissatisfaction.4 Pressure grew in the generally quiet civil society: São Paulo workers held massive strikes in 1978 that “announced the revival of popular opposition.”5

ers included a narrower and more conciliatory ‘anistia recíproca.’8 This paper uses the law itself and contemporary press coverage about its development as primary sources to answer questions about the debates surrounding the Lei de Anistia. Who were the key players? What were their positions? Did the public see that the amnesty would shield the military from future transitional justice?

Paulo Timm, a professor at the Universi-

source as we seek to understand the contemporary debates surrounding it. The law came from the military government but is still in force in Brazil today. General João Figueiredo, Brazil’s last military president, signed the Lei de Anistia on August 28, 1979. The law granted amnesty “to all those who, between September 2, 1961, and August 15, 1979, committed political or electoral crimes” and restored political rights to civilians whose rights were suspended under the Atos In-

Lei de Anistia, argues that as the regime committed more arbitrary injustices, the public came to demand a return to full democracy and an amnesty for those persecuted by the regime. Along with the growing calls for redemocratization came de6 ures. Growing awareness of human rights violations and Vladimir Herzog’s 1975 murder added to the push for amnesty.7 Key groups in the campaign included the Movimento Femenino pela Anistia (Women’s Movement for Amnesty) and the many Comitês Brasileiros pela Anistia (Brazilian Pro-Amnesty Committees); these groups demanded ‘uma anistia ampla, geral e irrestrita’ (a of the opposition pushed for the amnesty to in[and] the dismantling of the notorious repressive organs responsible for those crimes” while oth4

Schneider, “Impunity,” 42.

Chasteen, Blood and Fire, 293.

THE LAW AS A LENS The Lei de Anistia itself serves as a primary

were allowed to demand their restoration to active service. Families of the disappeared were permitted to demand a “declaração de ausência appearance. The law facilitated the return from abroad of exiles and forgave the ‘sin’ of challenging the military government. It excepted those condemned for “blood crimes” such as terrorism, assault, or kidnapping. Perhaps most importantly for today’s impunity debate, it also pardoned all government

Paulo Timm, “Uma breve historia da anistia,” Fórum de Entidades Nacionais de Direitos Humanos, 28 Aug 2009. 7

Schneider, “Impunity,” 42.

Schneider, “Impunity,” 43

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legislative, judicial, and military sectors of government. The vast majority of the law’s text focuses on returning rights and positions to opposition members who were removed from political life; the law focused on pardoning the opposition, yet it also quietly pardoned every member of the military regime for any “political crimes,” broadly of legality: it forgave “political crimes” rather than admitting political repression. CENSORSHIP AND LIMITS OF CONTEMPORANEOUS NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS The primary sources for this analysis come from prominent Brazilian newspapers and magazines in the late 1970s. We must consider two important factors before relying on these contemporary accounts. First, they were subject to extensive censorship. The military dictatorship sought to maintain a veneer of democracy, or at least continuous legitimacy. Therefore censorship was usually executed secretly and quietly. Anne-Marie Smith explains the regime’s approach: Despite being an authoritarian regime that aimed at social control, it also sought political legitimacy. In that varied and sometimes contradictory pursuit, one potential basis for legitimacy was the maintenance and protection of traditional institutions and legal forms. The regime, for example, purged but did not close Congress, passed Institutional Acts that violated the Constitution but nonetheless did not discard that document, and sought many ways to manipulate but still continue to hold elections. The generals desired to appear constitutional and respectful of individual rights. The premise of

the military government was ‘saving democracy’ from incompetent and corrupt civilian politicians. Inherent in the salvation of democracy was the maintenance of democratic institutions and freedoms—or at least the outward appearance of such. Despite their obsession with “political legitimacy,” the regime was also determined to control the political discourse and avoid public dissent. So they usually resorted to more subtle forms of pressure to support the government’s line. First, military leaders expressed disdain for the press and tried to undermine public trust in its reporting; the leader of the pro-government ARENA party in the Chamber of Deputies, José Bonifácio, said in 1976 that “[a]lmost all the journalists [who cover the Chamber of Deputies] are cryptocommunists, especially those with mustaches.”9 news organizations as threats or excuses for closing them.10 They would also withdraw the normally massive state advertising that accounted for much of papers’ revenues and pressure businesses to withhold their private advertising if the regime found anything disagreeable.11 Less often the state resorted to violence: the alternative weekly Opinião suffered as its owners were and the 2nd Army tortured journalist Vladimir Herzog to death in 1975.13 Censorship was usually subtle, but sometimes clear. From 1968 to 1978 news organiza12

Smith, A Forced Agreement, 61-62.

Smith, A Forced Agreement, 63.

Smith, A Forced Agreement, 65.

Smith, A Forced Agreement, 68.

zilian dictatorship,” Folha de São Paulo, 16 Mar 2013.

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tions followed the ‘suggested prohibitions’ sent by the Federal Police; they engaged in “self-censorship” to preserve their own interests but also to avoid harsher repression.14 The regime established a “centralized bureaucracy” to provide these guidelines and alert papers when they displeased the authorities.15 Thus every news source had to watch its words, even if it was not under direct censorship. A few of the most prominent national outlets did experience more direct prior censorship. These 7 or so organizations had to deliver every potential story to the Federal Po-

able columns analyzing political events,”18 so this paper looks at his writing about the amnesty law. A lack of critical analysis in these primary sources might point to state censorship, but it might also be due to a tradition of uncritical jour-

lice and receive approval before publishing; Veja magazine endured this treatment from 1974 to June 1976, while the Tribuna da Imprensa experienced occasional prior censorship the whole ten years between 1968 and 1978.16 While the government did not always directly control news organization’s writing, it always maintained implicit threats of prior censorship, lost advertising, or violence. Another limit to these primary sources is the quality of reporting. Smith critiques Brazilian news reporting even prior to the 1964 coup. “Mainstream newspapers were providing general reporting but little independent investigation,” and their lack of serious investigation or skepti-

full accounting of the campaign for amnesty or

cism of the government line makes it surprising “that these uncritical and uncombative publications would be viewed by the military regime as threats, and deemed worthy of censorship.”17 Smith does cite Carlos Castello Branco’s column in the as one of a few “depend-

types of public posts—from professors to police, from bank clerks to brigadier generals.” The language suggests that the magazine saw the regime’s punishments as an overreach. The article also gives a history of amnesties in Brazil, from 19th century emperor Pedro II to the 1932 coup attempt (interestingly, Gen. Figueiredo’s father was one of the pardoned generals) to the Getúlio

opinion and might uncritically support government decisions. Contemporary newspapers offer a useful window for discerning the main debates surrounding the Lei de Anistia, but do not offer a

CONTEMPORANEOUS ACCOUNTS OF THE AMNESTY DEBATE Brazil’s Veja magazine dedicated two cover ar1978, and cited many supporters of the amnesty movement.19 The article’s subtitle reveals a proamnesty perspective by calling one approach to amnesty “a correction of injustices committed since 1964.” The piece highlights the wide-ranging targets of cassation and dismissals: “politicians of the most diverse calibers and ideological orientations… civilians and soldiers who held all

Smith, A Forced Agreement, 119.

Smith, A Forced Agreement, 120.

Smith, A Forced Agreement, 44.

Ibid.

Smith, A Forced Agreement, 42.

“A anistia em julgamento,” Veja, 1 Mar 1978, 34-38.

political culture. This also presents another seri-

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Várgas’s 1945 decree. The author adopts the opposition’s argument that amnesty follows “the ancient Brazilian tradition in the area of forget-

He advocated a “reciprocal amnesty” that would cover both militants and military. Segments of the MDB opposition party also supported reci-

for violent acts.” The article describes the nature of the proamnesty campaign. The effort began in 1975 with a “Manifesto da mulher brasileira em favor de anistia (Manifesto of Brazilian women in favor of the amnesty)” signed by 16,000 women and delivered to the military government. That manifesto grew into the Movimento Femenino pela Anistia

opposition politician of any importance to speak of ‘mutual forgetfulness for those who acted and those who suffered.” Opposed to reciprocal amnesty stood the young CBA president—and, apparently, Veja. The 33-year-old CBA leader argued that “we cannot discuss amnesty for those accused of torture” because “such crimes were never punished, and one cannot pardon those

(MFA), which was headed by São Paulo lawyer Therezinha Godoy Zerbini, whose husband was a general dismissed after the coup. Zerbini said

who were never punished.” The magazine clearly shows its support for the CBA position when it lauds the president’s “sound logic.” The was a largely uncritical newspaper, but Smith calls Carlos Castello Branco’s weekly column one of the few “dependable columns analyzing political events.”21 The may never have been under the extreme prior censorship that faced Veja for several years,22 but the pall of ‘self-censorship’ still prevented any news source from truly writing freely. Thus we take the columnist’s writing with a grain of salt, knowing that he may have had to appeal to the government or risk losing his public voice. He wrote an August 23, 1979, piece about the am-

dread that, at times, I felt like a leper—all the world ran away from me.” The article describes the MFA’s growth over the intervening four years and sympathetically relates a member’s story. It also describes the founding meeting of the Comitê Brasileiro pela Anista (CBA) as “the most recent large-scale demonstration” in favor of amnesty, suggesting that other large gatherings have also supported the cause. The magazine’s attitude shines through even on the issue’s cover, which features pictures of those punished or exiled by the regime and the word “Anistia” in bright red block letters. The most relevant part of the article is the debate over reciprocal amnesty. Reserve General Pery Constant Bevilacqua, a member of the regime’s Supreme Military Tribunal until he was removed in 1969 under Institutional Act 5, toured the country to promote amnesty.20 He spoke at the February 21, 1978, inaugural meeting of the CBA. 20

“Peri Bevilacqua,” 1930, 2nd ed. (Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2001).

nesty law as it had been proposed to Congress by President Figueiredo;23 the column was published sion. Castello Branco endorsed the bill and the president’s effort in favor of it; the amnesty offered the best deal given the conditions, namely pressure from hardliners opposed to any amnesty. 21

Smith, A Forced Agreement, 42.

Smith, A Forced Agreement, 44.

Carlos Castello Branco, “Coluna do Castello: Anistia e suas frustrações,” , 23 Aug 1979.

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The writer argues that Figueiredo went farther towards democracy than other generals expected when he was chosen to succeed Geisel: amnesty “was an idea not yet accepted by the military chiefs,” but the new president pledged that he “would make of Brazil a democracy.” Figueiredo represents a sharper turn towards democracy. While praising the president for relatively bold action, Castello Branco also emphasized the role of a popular campaign for amnesty “to demonstrate to General Figueiredo the impracticality of revisão dos processos (review of the trials)” “had not been punished based on trials, but rather by clear acts of arbítrio (discretion).” This seems like a bold criticism of military overreaches under the Atos Institucionais. Castello Branco appears to criticize the regime’s past actions while praising the current president’s wisdom—perhaps to please the government’s media monitors. The columnist also seems to offer some clear reporting when he wrote that the amnesty still would not do much to improve the government’s image, partly because the “hunger strike by dozens of young prisoners excited public opinion” and cast the regime in a bad light even while it granted concessions to the opposition. The Folha de S. Paulo reported extensively on the amnesty debate throughout the summer of 1979. On June 3, the Folha’s Brasília reporter (initials R.L.) wrote an editorial titled “A Anistia Escalonada (A Staggered Amnesty)” that supported the administration’s limited amnesty with an interesting tack.24 The editorial reported a rumor that former communist party chief Luís Carlos Prestes—who had been cassated in 1964 and

was living in exile in the Soviet Union—thought that “an amnesty, like a democratic opening, needs to be slow and gradual.” The piece praises Prestes for this opinion, saying that he “deserves praise for his equilíbrio (reasonableness).” This editorial writer clearly supported the government’s push for a limited amnesty and might have been trying to please the generals by reporting a rumor that Prestes also supported it. Although Smith does not list the Folha as ever coming under prior censorship, she notes that it was nonetheless “monitored and pressured by the military regime.” One imagines that a political reporter in Brasília would have been on a tight leash; support for government policies may have been expected. However, the same R.L. in Brasília wrote another Folha editorial on June 28 that seriously challenged the government, slamming Figueiredo’s proposed amnesty as “ (piddling).”25 Unlike other contemporaneous coverage, this editorial recognized the nature of the reciprocal of the measure are those who killed and tortured on the Government’s side, since the rebels were expressly excluded.” R.L. saw that the amnesty would shield the dictatorship’s agents from any prosecution for human rights. In shockingly open opposition the reporter argues that the regime should be asking for pardon rather than granting it: “The cassated are those who should meet and vote on an amnesty for the despotic rulers who committed violence against them.” The editorial takes a remarkable stand against the regime and makes the often-missed point that the amnesty’s

R.L., “A Anistia Escalonada,” Folha de S. Paulo, Editorial, 3 Jun 1979, 2.

R.L., “A Anistia,” Folha de S. Paulo, Editorial, 28 Jun 1979, 2.

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Directly beside R.L.’s June 28 critical Folha editorial that represents the owners’ point of view.26 The piece expresses some mild criticisms of Figueiredo’s proposal but ultimately endorsed it. Shortcomings were noted; tors of Brazilian public opinion had wished,” and thus falls short. However, the paper sill praised the proposal as an advance in the political opeThe editorial voice supported Figueiredo’s incrementalist approach to liberalization and recogniz-

had “a good chance of being approved [because] various Arena legislators were enthusiastic” about the broader amnesty. MDB national president Ulysses Guimarães offered the rationale for an alternative bill: “The government’s amnesty bill, if approved, will create cruel injustices.... If there exist injustices, there’s no reason not to correct them.” The planned alternative would grant a “broad, general, and unrestricted amnesty, except for the torturers, who are expressly exlcluded.” Opposition forces were mobilizing against Figueiredo’s partial amnesty and rallying support

es his tough spot of needing to satisfy both public opinion and the regime’s hardliners. Interestingly, the writers predicted that the MDB would make a futile effort to propose amendments to widen the amnesty to a “perdão sem ressalvas (pardon without reservations)”; in the end, the amendments would be defeated by the pro-government majority. The opposition party clearly wanted a wider amnesty, but the Folha argues that this idea never truly had a chance in Congress. The offers a valuable perspective; it was operated by the Mesquita family that owned the Estado de São Paulo, which “was a traditional bastion of the mainstream conservative press” and had opposed Goulart, yet it also

cerns about how the bill would protect torturers while still punishing leftists who committed “blood crimes.” A month earlier the had published a news article that added another dimension to the amnesty debate. A July 5 piece reported a warning from an anonymous general from the army high command that “the opening could be ended” because of resistance to the military’s agenda and threats to the established order.29 The general cited a televised speech by Prestes that allegedly managed to “awaken some dormant points for the Armed Forces.” The general’s interview, published by a company that

suffered prior censorship from 1972 to 1975.27 A page of coverage on August 7 detailed the debate in congress over Figueiredo’s proposal.28 The MDB stood opposed to the bill because of its limited amnesty for the opposition but full amnesty for agents of the regime. The MDB planned to introduce its own alternative amnesty bill, which 26

“A anistia do Palácio,” Folha de S. Paulo, Editorial, 28 Jun 1979, 2.

Smith, A Forced Agreement, 43-44.

“Ulysses explica o que a oposição vai propor,” Aug 1979, 8.

and still experienced the euphemistic “self-censorship” described by Smith, would have served as a clear warning to the opposition from at least some of the generals: if you push too hard for amnesty, you might lose all that you have gained. The general also worried about what “interests hide themselves behind the movimentos reivindicatórios (revanchist movements),” apparently 29

“Um general adverte: a abertura pode acabar,” 1979, 6.

5 Jul

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showing concern about prosecution or punishment for human rights abuses perpetrated by the military. This interview suggests that hardliners opposed Figueiredo’s abertura efforts but also that the military recognized how they would benThe very next day, July 6, the da Tarde published a much more prominent article reporting on a retired pro-regime general’s demand for a broader amnesty (“Cordeiro”).30 General Cordeiro, who participated in the coup against Goulart and served several years as a junta minister, spoke at an event commemorating the 1922 revolution with military men who were pardoned by the 1930 amnesty. This article supports the Veja narrative that amnesty is a part of Brazilian tradition. The newspaper placed a headshot of the general with the simple caption: “Cordeiro: esquecer (forget).” The timing suggests that Cordeiro might have been responding to the anonymous general who questioned amnesty; perhaps this was an example of the administration’s ‘moderate’ supporters opposing the hardliners. quote from the president of the senate saying that the amnesty could be widened in a few months, depending on “the political behavoir of the peo-

was a majority in favor of Figueiredo’s decision to “não anistiar os terroristas condenadas (not give amnesty to the convicted terrorists).” Over 85% of Brasília residents surveyed said they supported the exclusion, while São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro polled 78.6% and 71% respectively. The amnesty, even though the survey’s primary goal was to evaluate “a repercussão da anistia (the amnesty’s repercussions).” It did not mention if the survey asked about support for a wider amnesty, or a reciprocal amnesty. The piece appears to be more propaganda than reporting, perhaps another article to rally support for igueiredo’s proposal. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION The of 1979 resulted from intense debate within the regime, between political parties, and in society. Contemporaneous news coverage reveals the debate between hardliners and moderates within the dictatorship. An anonymous general warned against the amnesty and darkly hinted that a broad amnesty could sow division in the ranks. A former top general publicly pushed for a more expansive measure in the great Brazilian tradition of forgetting. We also see the friction

the opposition to go along with its plans, perhaps especially the hotly-debated party reform. piece from July 14 cited an IBOPE survey to claim public support for the proposed amnesty law.31 The article 30

, 6 Jul

, 14 Jul

“Cordeiro: a anistia precisa ser mais ampla,” 1979, 5. “Pesquisa: governo diz ter apoio na anistia,” 1979, 4.

propose amendments and develop an alternative bill, likely knowing that their efforts were futile. Arena members criticized the opposition’s stance. In society, a campaign sprang up to push for amacts, others opposed pardoning “blood crimes,” yet others warned that the military’s torturers

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would be able to hide behind the amnesty instead of facing justice. The press coverage, however, can only get at the elites’ debate. Many questions remain. Did the average Brazilian follow the debate and have an opinion? How much did self-censorship limit press coverage of the debate? Did public opinion support a reciprocal amnesty? Did the generals realize how much they would rely on the reciprocal amnesty? Further research is obviously warranted. Public opinion polls might provide a window into more citizens’ opinions, but people

tive shift from illegitimate to legitimate rule.”33 Historical justice has become better known as truth commissions have spread, particularly in Latin America. This approach seeks to establish a true account of the previous government’s actions to shape society’s historical memory and to provide acknowledgment for victims. Reparatory justice pursues “the repair of prior wrongs” through monetary compensation for victims that “perform [both] functional and symbolic roles” in a transition; Teitel suggests this might be “the most common transitional form.”34 Administra-

might also have given pro-government answers out of fear rather than true opinion. The records of congressional debate could give insight into the most fought-over issues and the alternative ideas proposed by the opposition. The has shaped the almost 30 years since the return to civilian rule in Brazil. No one has been prosecuted for the hundreds of murders and instances of torture. Leaders of the autocratic regime retired in peace and died with their public images still intact. Until recently, Brazil did not pursue any form of transitional “as the conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal

tive justice is a form of political punishment that excludes members of the outgoing order as a punitive measure and also to “reshape the successor political order.”35 Lastly, transitional constitutionalism revises governing texts to transform institutions and create a new political landscape that repudiates the structures of the past. Brazil has largely avoided addressing past crimes and human rights violations. The national congress has periodically authorized some reparations for victims of the regime36 and in 2011 passed a law to establish the Comissão Nacional da Verdade to establish historical truth. However, the Amnesty Law remains in full force; in April 2010 the Supremo Tribunal Federal upheld it in

responses to confront the wrongdoing of repressive predecessor regimes.”32 types of transitional justice that might occur in-

the face of an Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruling.37 the Brazilian tendency to forget rather than re-

recognized is criminal justice: the prosecution

a desire to move on beyond the divisions of 1968-

role in human rights violations as a means of “draw[ing] a bright line demarcating the norma-

Ruti G. Teitel,

Teitel,

Ibid.

, (New York: Oxford UP, 2000), 7. , 8.

36 32

Ruti G. Teitel, “Transitional Justice Geneaology,” Harvard Human 16 (2003), 69.

Pablo de Greiff, Handbook of Reparations (Oxford Online Scholarship, 2006). 37

Schneider, “Impunity,” 39.

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74. Its continued validity shapes the national dialogue about justice and memory. General Cordeiro best summed up the meaning of the Anistia: â&#x20AC;&#x153;Esquecer

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REFERENCES “A Anistia de 1979.” Veja, 27 Jun 1979, 20-25. http://veja.abril.com.br/arquivo_veja/ capa_27061979.shtml “A anistia do Palácio.” Folha de S. Paulo, Editorial, 28 Jun 1979, 2. “A anistia em julgamento.” Veja, 1 Mar 1978, 3438. http://veja.abril.com.br/arquivo_veja/ capa_01031978.shtml “Anistia: Reuniões, manobras, críticas. E o debate empolga o Congresso.” ,7 Aug 1979, 8. Castello Branco, Carlos. “Coluna do Castello: Anistia e suas frustrações.” Brasil, 23 Aug 1979. http://www.carloscastellobranco.com.br/sec_coluna_view. php?id=913

Kritz, Neil J. (ed). Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1995. Osberg, Carson. “Inter-American Court Invalidates Amnesty Law Enacted During Brazil’s Military Dictatorship.” The Human Rights Brief. The Center for Human Rights , 23 April 2011. http://hrbrief.org/2011/04/inter-americancourt-invalidates-amnesty-law-enactedduring-brazil-military-dictatorship/ “Peri Bevilacqua.” Diccionário Histórico Bio, 2nd ed. Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2001. http://cpdoc.fgv.br/producao/dossies/Jan-

Chasteen, John Charles. Born in Blood and Fire: . 3rd ed. New York: Norton, 2011. “Military Rule,” 290-312.

“Pesquisa: governo diz ter apoio na anistia.” nal da Tarde, 14 Jul 1979, 4.

“Cordeiro: a anistia precisa ser mais ampla.” nal da Tarde, 6 Jul 1979, 5.

R.L. “A Anistia Escalonada.” Folha de S. Paulo, Editorial, 3 Jun 1979, 2.

“Cordeiro de Farias.” Diccionário Histórico Bio, 2nd ed. Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2001. http://cpdoc.fgv.br/producao/dossies/Fato-

Schneider, Nina. “Impunity in Post-authoritarian Brazil: The Supreme Court’s Recent Verdict on the Amnesty Law.” European Re-

R.L. “A Anistia.” Folha de S. Paulo, Editorial, 28 Jun 1979, 2.

Studies 90 (April 2011), 39-54. de Greiff, Pablo. Handbook of Reparations. Oxford Online Scholarship, 2006. nalist killed during Brazilian dictatorship.” Folha de São Paulo, 16 Mar 2013. http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/internacional/en/national/ 1247557-family-receivesduring-brazilian-dictatorship.shtml

Smith, Anne-Marie. A Forced Agreement: Press Acquiescence to Censorship in Brazil. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997. Teitel, Ruti G. Oxford UP, 2000.

New York:

Teitel, Ruti G. “Transitional Justice Genealogy.” 16 (2003), 69-94.

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Timm, Paulo. “Uma breve historia da anistia.” Fórum de Entidades Nacionais de Direitos Humanos, 28 Aug 2009. http://www.direitos.org.br/index.php? option=com_content &task=view&id=5377&Itemid=1.

“Ulysses explica o que a oposição vai propor.” , 7 Aug 1979, 8. “Um general adverte: a abertura pode acabar.” 5 Jul 1979, 6.

Spring 2014

Angell’s Missing Link: Why Peaceful Interdependence May Require Economic Voting David Allen Duke University, Trinity ‘14 AbstrAct Can interdependence be a force for international peace among industrial nations? years before the world was at war. Angell’s ideas have sparked a well-known debate in light of a new potential causal mechanism for peace-through-interdependence. The author uses linear regression to analyze the relationship between economic success and electoral outcomes across various time periods to test whether leaders may be riods. The results suggest that economic voting may have been Angell’s missing link. However, further studies need to be carried out to evaluate this possibility in more detail.

INTRODUCTION century ago, Norman Angell brought forth a foundational idea that has since

ists advancing this counter-argument are Kenneth Waltz2 and John Mearsheimer.3 Both contend that states in an anarchic system will be greatly concerned by the prospect of economic vulnerability brought about through trade, and will attempt to minimize this vulnerability. This induces states to adopt aggressive policies in order to broaden their scope of control over resources, which in turn leads to increased competition and potential for

essentially futile for major industrial nations. Various Neorealist scholars have since disputed Angell’s assertions, positing instead that economic interdependence not only fails to promote peace, but actually heightens the likeli-

Mearsheimer both repeatedly reference World War I as evidence against Angell’s theory. My essay will explore this claim in further detail.

In his seminal work, The Great Illusion,1 Angell argued that the global economic pattern of increasing economic interdependence – sparked by changes in the nature of production and increas-

Angell, Norman. The great illusion: A study of the relation of military power to national advantage. GP Putnam’s sons, 1913

Waltz, Kenneth N., 1970. “The Myth of Interdependence”, in Charles Kindleberger, ed., The International Corporation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (205-223). 3

Mearsheimer, John J. The tragedy of great power politics. WW Norton & Company, 2001.

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Christopher Gelpi and Joe Grieco offer a more recent contribution to this debate.4 Their conclusion – that the peace-promoting effect of international trade depends upon the prior presence of democracy – provides us with an alternative way of thinking about the interdependence peace argument. Gelpi and Grieco claim that democratic leaders, more so than autocratic leaders, need to provide broader policy successes in order to ensure political viability. Therefore economic growth, a critical type of policy success, will be more actively pursued by democratic than by au-

indicate that the interwar period witnessed the crossing of a new “threshold” in the balance between free market and state authority. Throughout the 19th century, state governments increasingly favored laissez-faire policies, leading to an international “Market Society.” Unrestrained market forces then produced certain social dislocations following World War I; Polanyi claims that a variety of international developments taking place in the interwar period can be attributed to this, including the emergence of mass movements from the Right and Left in Europe, revolution-

tocratic leaders. Democratic leaders, then, will be more likely to embrace policies that facilitate both the expansion of trade and its continuance.

ary and counterrevolutionary upheavals in central and eastern Europe, the General Strike of 1926 in Great Britain, and the New Deal in the U.S. Governments, in response to the societal disruptions caused by largely unchecked market forces, subsequently assumed more direct responsibility for domestic economic stability than they had in the past. Mitrany thus dubbed the 20th century the Social Century, where advanced democracies became welfare states less oriented toward power and prestige and more toward economic growth and social security. In sum, the scholars previously mentioned have highlighted two critical assumptions that together provide us with a novel way of in-

avoid disputes with trade partners. This yields an that interdependence will only be a peace-promoting factor when leaders associate electoral success with economic outcomes. Also essential to our reconsideration of the peaceful interdependence theory is the notion that state leaders became more actively involved in domestic economies over the course of the 20th century. David Mitrany,5 Karl Polanyi6 and John Ruggie7 (among others) have all suggested that such a shift in state-society relations indeed took place during the interwar period. These authors 4

Gelpi, Christopher F., and Joseph M. Grieco. “Democracy, interdependence, and the sources of the liberal peace.” Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 1 (2008): 17-36. 5

Mitrany, David. A working peace system: An argument for the functional development of international organization. Oxford University Press, 1944. 6

Polanyi, Karl. The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our time. Beacon Press, 1944. 7

Ruggie, John Gerard. “International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order.” International organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 379-415.

terpreting the relationship between economic interdependence and the likelihood of war: (1) sometime following World War I there was an international trend where state governments took steps to broaden their control over the performance of their respective domestic economies, and (2) economic interdependence will only be a peace-promoting factor when state leaders perceive a relationship between economic outcomes and electoral success.

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These two postulates together provide the framework for developing my empirical question. If state governments, out of a demand that arose in the interwar period for greater social protection from market forces, began to intervene more in the domestic economy, then it stands to reason that citizens in the new postwar economic order hold their leaders more accountable for their individual economic circumstances than they did previously. State leaders, in turn, would recognize this and perceive their electoral success as being more closely correlated with domestic economic performance. Since trade is an important determinant of economic growth, these leaders would then become more concerned with the vitality of their state’s international trade relationships. Unthe longevity of these relationships, state leaders with trading partners. All of this, though, is contingent on one critical assumption, which in turn serves as the foundation of my research: Hypothesis: There is a stronger relationship between electoral success and economic outcomes in the postwar economic order today than there was prior to World War I. The present study tests the validity of this rationale, using bivariate statistical regressions to compare the relationship between electoral success and economic outcomes before and after the emergence of the new postwar economic order. As with any empirical study, I must restrict my analysis to an appropriate scope and domain. In measuring my dependent variable, electoral success, I look at the percentage change in

the number of seats – for a given election – that are held by the incumbent party in the U.S. House of Representatives. To measure my independent variable, economic success, I look at the percentage change in real GDP per capita (which I refer to from here as real GDPPC) during the year prior to the given election. I use bivariate regression to compare the relationship between these variables across three distinct time periods: 1876-1914, 1948-1974, and 1976-2012. I later explain the reasoning behind these designations, as well as cation of my model. There are three possible answers to be entertained in this analysis. (1) There is a stronger relationship between electoral success and economic outcomes in the postwar economic order than there was prior to World War I. This result a possible explanation for why interdependence failed to promote peace during World War I. Such may, more so than in Angell’s time, be hesitant lieving that the harmful economic effects of such a scenario would negatively impact their political longevity. Hence, economic interdependence may promote peace in the contemporary world, even though it failed to do so a hundred years ago. Angell’s conclusions weren’t necessarily incorrect, but simply well ahead of their time. (2) ship between electoral success and economic outcomes in the postwar economic order than there was prior to World War I. This conclusion would suggest either that my rationale is unfounded – and thus that leaders in the postwar economic

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with trading partners than they were before – or that an alternative empirical model is needed. (3) There is a weaker relationship between electoral success and economic outcomes in the postwar economic order than there was prior to World War I. This result would greatly undermine my premise, suggesting the opposite to be true. Such more so than in Angell’s time, be inclined to enter smaller negative impact on their political careers. This would also provide support for the Neorealists’ claims by demonstrating that interdependence failed to promote peace even when state leaders were relatively less inclined to disrupt trading relationships. Additional theories would subsequently need to be developed to explain the weakening of the relationship between electoral success and economic outcomes over time. My discussion from here proceeds in three main stages. First, I will provide a formal description of my statistical regression model, including research design. Second, I will present my results and discuss their implications. Finally, I will conmeaning for the Liberal/Neorealist debate on interdependence, for future research, and for government policy.

in particular- Edward Tufte,8 Gerald Kramer,9 Michael Lewis-Beck and Tom Rice.10 As I mento the political system of the United States. This was partly done in an effort to emulate the research design of these scholars, who each examine the relationship between U.S. Congressional election outcomes and economic data, albeit with slightly different methods. There is another reason why the U.S. serves as an appropriate unit of analysis, however. When Angell originally set out to examine the peace-promoting effects of interdependence, he focused on the trading relationships between major industrial countries. As the world’s most developed nation and one of its most extensive traders (ranking among the top in aggregate imports and exports), the U.S. serves as a prototype for his claims. Since my analysis is essentially re-evaluating his arguments, it his criteria. Additionally, the U.S. boasts one of the world’s most transparent political systems. Under the U.S. democratic framework, shifts in government power can most directly be related to changes in public perception. This is especially appropriate for my design, which seeks to understand the degree to which leaders feel themselves accountable for economic outcomes. If electoral outcomes were dictated by factors other than voter opinions, it would reduce my model’s ability to

THE MODEL vious research conducted on economic voting. My approach borrows elements from four authors

Tufte, Edward R. “Determinants of the outcomes of midterm congressional elections.” American Political Science Review 69, no. 03 (1975): 812-826. 9

Kramer, Gerald H. 1896-1964. Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University, 1971. 10

Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Tom Rice. “Forecasting US house elections.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 9, no. 3 (1984): 475-486.

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assess the relationship between political fortunes and economic performance. As stated in the previous section, the dependent variable in my analysis is the electoral outcomes, while the independent variable is economic success. cations of each variable, including the operating metric and units of analysis I employ in measurderived from previous scholarly work, I will indicate from which author each element was bor-

satisfactory, they will vote to keep the incumbent ing successful policies. If individuals consider their performance unsatisfactory, then they will vote against the incumbent party in order to give the opposition party an opportunity to govern. One of the key factors that voters gauge to assess whether the incumbent party’s tenure was “satisfactory” is economic performance. Thus voters will be retrospective, and will use available economic data to evaluate the incumbent party. In a Downsian system, where voters make

rowed in an attempt to contextualize my study within a broader empirical framework. Kramer’s analysis is the most foundational, serving as a standard of comparison for the others and laying much of the theoretical groundwork for my research. His essay, “Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior,” seeks to determine which of the various economic indicators is most important to voters in measuring the incumbent party’s performance. I follow Kramer in assuming a Downsian voter model.11 According to the Downsian assumptions, voters are rational, self-interested actors who collect various kinds of relevant information (e.g. party platforms and policy positions, voting records on

decisions on individual candidates based entirely on the performance of the incumbent party, it is most appropriate to select as units of analysis -

past legislature, endorsements from important litical candidates and vote accordingly. However, the process of information-gathering bears substantial opportunity costs. Voters will therefore opt to use a more straightforward and discernable criteria: the past performance of the incumbent party. If individuals perceive this performance as

either House candidate in their district. Furthermore, of those who did know something about either candidate, only a negligible percent included legislative or policy issues. As Kramer states, “In general it seems that most Congressional candidates appear to most voters simply as Democrats alities with their own policy views and records;

Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957).

than by the candidate’s personal characteristics or policy preferences. Of all the races for national these theoretical assumptions. Although individual cases will undoubtedly vary, House elections – more so than Presidential or Senatorial elections – are determined largely by straight party loyalty. Stokes and Miller,12 for instance, found that, in the 1958 mid-term election for the House, only a small minority of the voters actually knew

Stokes, Donald E., and Warren E. Miller. “Party government and the saliency of Congress.” 26, no. 4 (1962): 531-546.

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and hence, variations in the overall popularity of the parties should be a major factor in producnal vote.”13 Given these arguments, I will adopt Kramer’s approach by using House elections as the relevant unit of analysis for my dependent variable: electoral outcomes. of “incumbent” party. I again utilize Kramer’s rationale here. Among the various Congressional ence over the workings of government and more direct control over policy matters than does the majority party of either house of congress. Thus when evaluating relevant economic data, voters will hold the president most directly responsible. Since the president is the most visible and preeminent member of his party, voters’ perceptions of party performance will be strongly related to their perceptions of the presidential performance. Therefore, if a president is viewed as having per(based on retrospective voters’ evaluations of

“incumbent” party as the party that controls the presidency, rather than the party that controls either the House or Senate. I depart from Kramer in my selection of an operating metric for electoral outcomes in the House, using Michael Lewis-Beck and Tom Rice’s measure instead. While Kramer looks at changes in the incumbent party’s vote share, Lewis-Beck and Rice examine net seat turnover in the House, or the net number of seats gained/ 13

Kramer, Gerald H. . p. 135.

lost during a given election. It is important to recall that my study is ultimately concerned with the degree to which state leaders will expect there to be negative electoral consequences in the event of economic policy failures. Declining vote share is not the most appropriate means of gauging this, since it doesn’t necessarily translate to actual changes in leadership and hence shifts in political control. Voter dissatisfaction will only be a concern to state leaders when it leads to lower overall representation in the House by their party. If vote share overall declines, but the number of seats held by each party remains relatively constant, then leaders may not care as much about generating positive economic results. Alternatively, if vote share overall remains relatively constant, but the number of seats changes, then leaders will likely be compelled to improve their economic policies. For these reasons, I adopt net seat turnover as my metric for electoral outcomes rather than vote share. It is imperative that I do not measure seat changes in absolute terms since the number of seats in the House of Representatives is not constant across my dataset. From 1876-1914, numerous states were added to the Union, and multiple reapportionments took place following a national Census. The total number of seats in 1876 was 293, and this number changed multiple times before reaching the present-day total of 435 in 1912. Measuring in absolute terms would thus likely introduce upward bias in the regressions for the later time periods, since the prospects for total number of seat changes would be higher. I therefore calculate seat turnover as a percentage of the total number of seats gained or lost in a given election.

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With both my unit of analysis, my operdent variable as the percentage of House seats gained or lost (as a net total) by the incumbent party in a given election. The independent variable in this study is the incumbent party’s economic success, or, stated more formally: the public’s perception of the incumbent party’s recent performance on economic issues. Kramer incorporates four economic variables into his analysis, including monetary personal income, prices, real income, and unemployment. Unlike Kramer, I am not interested in comparing the explanatory power of each economic indicator, but need only incorporate that which appears most relevant to voters in their decision-making. I therefore follow Tufte in using real personal income (or real gross domestic product per capita/real GDPPC), the most important indicator according to Kramer’s

economic concerns of most voters, for it assesses the short-run shift in the average economic conditions prevailing at the individual level – a shift in conditions for which some voters might hold the incumbent administration responsible.”14 Since economic conditions immediately preceding an election will be most relevant to voter choice, I join Kramer and Tufte in calculating changes in real GDPPC for the year prior to the given electhe percentage change in U.S. real GDP per

Tufte, Edward R. “Determinants of the outcomes of midterm congressional elections.” p. 141.

capita during the year prior to the given House election. Below I provide a more formal presentation of my regression model that brings in the independent and dependent variables:

Yi =

Xi + Ui

where:

Yi represents my dependent variable: the percentage change in House seats in the ith Congressional election for the incumbent party;

Xi represents my independent variable: the 1-year percentage change in real GDP per capita calculated for the year preceding the ith Congressional election; represents my intercept on the Y-axis. Average percentage change in House seats for a given election when there is no change in the percentage of real GDPPC; 0

r the average percentage change in House seats when the 1-year change in real GDPPC increases by 1 percent; and i

Ui is the disturbance term. Before presenting my results, two minor ties played a small yet perceptible role in the elections from the earliest dataset (1876-1914), and I to exclude them from my analysis. I interpret the 37

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minor party vote as part of the anti-incumbent vote, counting it along with the major opposition party. Second, Kramer claims that “there is no satisfactory way of interpreting the sizeable Progressive vote that occurred in 1912,” and subsequently excludes that election as a result; I follow him in doing so. Omitting this election is also -

RESULTS I have conducted three separate regressions, each using data on real GDPPC and House seat changregression, representing my pre-World War I data set, corresponds to the 19 Congressional elections that took place between 1876 and 1914 (the election of 1912 is omitted as mentioned previously). I did not collect data from earlier than 1876 for two reasons. First, American politics in the mid1800s was dictated heavily by the ideological divisions between the North and South. Personal economic conditions were likely somewhat insigas the prospects for war). I would therefore expect elections taken from these years to introduce downward bias into my estimation of the relationship between economic success and electoral outcomes. Second, as I have stated before, my study is based on Angell’s initial claims, and I therefore want the pre-World War I dataset to most accurately approximate the relationship between economic success and electoral outcomes as it was in 1909 when he authored The Great Illusion. Collecting data from earlier than 1876 would remove me too far from Angell temporally, and my model would become less relevant to his work. 38

The second regression, representing the immediate post-World War II dataset, accords to the 14 Congressional elections that occurred between 1948 and 1974. I decided to start with 1948 rather than 1946 because the 1946 elections were favoring the party of Roosevelt and Truman, the wartime presidents), while economic outcomes were only of marginal importance. The third and sional elections lasting from 1976 to 2012, and represents the later post-World War II dataset. After running the regressions, I then compare the i

the datasets. I can use these statistics to assess and then compare the relationship between economic success and electoral outcomes for each time period. The data on percentage change in incumbent party House seats was collected from Jerrold Rusk’s A Statistical History of the American Electorate.15 For the data on 1-year percentage changes in real GDP per capita, I referred to a website authored by two professors, Samuel Willists of various historical economic data for the United States.16 The dataset used for each regression (representing the earliest time period) is listed in the Evidence section (at the end of this paper) in Tables 1.1, 2.1, and 3.1 (separate numbers corresponding to separate regressions). A graphical plot of all the observations from each dataset is shown in Graphs 1.1, 2.1, and 3.1, along with a regression line depicting the relationship between 15

Rusk, Jerrold G. A statistical history of the American electorate. Cq Pr, 2001. 16

Samuel H. Williamson, “What Was the U.S. GDP Then?” MeasuringWorth, August 2013. http://www.measuringworth.org/usgdp/.

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Table 1.2: Regression 1 Output Estimate Standard Error T-Value -0.04357 0.03852 -1.131 0 0.22265 0.34399 0.647 i Residual Standard Error: 0.1264 on 17 degrees of freedom R-squared: 0.02405

Pr (> l T l) 0.274 0.526

the independent and dependent variables. A summary of the regression output for each regression is displayed in Tables 1.2, 2.2, and 3.2. cernable relationship between changes in real

– representing the slope of the line – is equal to 0.223, which would suggest that a 1% increase in real GDPPC leads to a 0.223% net seat gain on average. However, this result is -

GDPPC and changes in net seat turnover. Net seat changes, represented by the data points in the

timate is low relative to its standard error (0.343), and there exists a 52.6% probability that the co-

real GDPPC changes. Variations in real GDPPC changes do not appear to induce consistent changes in net seat turnover; rather, net seat turnover appears highly inconsistent and unpredictable. The regression output listed in the table

must reject it, and conclude that changes in real GDPPC do not generate consistent changes in net seat turnover.

The residual standard error of 0.126 indicates that the observations on average deviate 12.6% from of net seat turnover across the entire range of real GDPPC changes. It’s true that the regression line has a slightly upward slope, hinting that there may be a modest positive relationship between real GDPPC changes and changes in net seat turnover.

there was no apparent relationship between economic success and electoral outcomes in the period lasting from 1876-1914. Although we do not yet have enough information to assess the validity of my hypothesis, the demonstrated weakness of this relationship in the years leading up to World War I is consistent with our expectations. The second regression likewise depicts no apparent relationship between changes in real GDPPC and net seat turnover changes. Net seat

Table 2.2: Regression 2 Output Estimate Standard Error T-Value -0.02568 0.02616 -0.982 0 0.53640 0.74474 0.720 i Residual Standard Error: 0.08103 on 12 degrees of freedom R-squared: 0.04144

Pr (> l T l) 0.346 0.485

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changes again deviate substantially from the regression line, although the residual standard error sion, with a value of 0.08103. Net seat turnover does have a minor upward tendency as real GDP-

upward trend for net seat turnover here than in the

standard error (0.745), there being a 48.5% that it was derived only by chance. The R-squared statistic (0.041) is only slightly larger than that of the changes in net seat turnover can be explained en these results, we must once again reject the coGDPPC donâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t have a distinct causal impact on net seat turnover in this dataset. It thus seems that there was no perceptible relationship between economic success and electoral outcomes for the time period lasting from 1948-1974. There is another observation worth noting with regard to the second regression: the limited

ranging from -12.5% to 9.19%. In the second dataset, however, this variation is greatly reduced

â&#x20AC;&#x201C; real GDPPC shifts range from -2.37% to 6.9%. Not only is the range smaller in the second dataset, but the data points are bundled more closely together within that range. Whereas real GDPPC evenly along a 15% interval (from -5% to 10%), real GDPPC changes in the second dataset are mostly clustered within a 5% interval (from 0% to 5%). This clear reduction in annual real GDPcreased government intervention in the economy during the interwar period. As described previously, unrestrained market forces in the 19th centions, prompting governments to become more actively involved in protecting against domestic economic instability. The smaller real GDPPC nomic stability. from the previous two by portraying a noticeable and strong relationship between net seat changes and shifts in real GDPPC. Like the second regression, real GDPPC changes are clustered together within a narrow interval. However, unlike the net seat turnover are also packed relatively close together. Furthermore, net seat turnover appears

Table 3.2: Regression 3 Output Estimate Standard Error T-Value -0.05382 0.01916 -2.809 0 0.92888 0.50947 1.823 i Residual Standard Error: 0.04736 on 17 degrees of freedom R-squared: 0.1636

Pr (> l T l) 0.0121 0.0859

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to change in a predictable way as real GDPPC The regression output in Table 3.2 condard error is low (.047), indicating that the observations only deviate from the regression line over is estimated to be 0.929; with a high Tvalue (1.823) and a low standard error (0.509), level. Additionally, this regression obtains an Rsquared value of 0.1636, implying that 16.36% of the variation in net seat turnover can be explained by the variation in real GDPPC changes. We can then conclude that for the third dataset, changes in real GDPPC do have a causal effect on net seat increase in real GDPPC will cause the incumbent party to gain an additional .929% of the seats in the House. Hence, it appears that over the past 37 years there has been a positive relationship between economic success and electoral outcomes. Taken all together, the results provide at least some support for my hypothesis that the relationship between economic success and electoral outcomes is stronger today than it was prior ond regressions revealed that there was no idenand electoral outcomes during the time periods corresponding to 1876-1914 and 1948-1974, respectively. On the other hand, the third regression relationship between economic success and electoral outcomes for the most recent time period (1976-2012). It is thus conceivable that leaders today perceive a distinct causal linkage between

economic policy successes and positive electoral results, whereas leaders prior to World War I and shortly after World War II did not. Under such a scenario, leaders would have been more easily driven to war with trading partners in early and mid-twentieth century than they are today. Additionally, my analysis revealed that economic conditions following World War II were much less volatile than they had been prior to World War I. This lends further credibility to the previously discussed idea that, during the interwar period, governments intervened more directly in the domestic sphere in order to stabilize the economy. However, we also saw in the second regression that, despite the government’s more active role in the economy, there was no appreciable relationship between economic success and electoral outcomes. This may suggest that there was a “lag” between the time when governments began taking a more active economic role and the time when voters began holding their governments more accountable for their personal economic conditions. It is possible that the increased intervention by governments in domestic economies during World War I – which Ruggie, Polanyi and Mitrany alluded to – was actually a longterm, gradual process. As this process unfolded, voters may have associated economic outcomes with government policies increasingly over time. In other words, individuals didn’t suddenly hold their leaders accountable for economic outcomes “overnight,” but rather gradually over the years, as they became more accustomed to increased government involvement in the economy. While the link between economic success and government performance is undoubtedly instilled in the minds of voters today, it is possible that this association was still being formed in the immediate 41

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post-World War II epoch. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that leaders had yet to fully perceive the relationship between economic success and electoral outcomes by the mid-nineteenth century. Before proceeding to my conclusion, I will discuss some of the theoretical limitations of my analysis. First, as previously stated, my study does serve as an appropriate example of the major industrial countries that Angell originally set out to describe, neglecting to include other countries undoubtedly restricts the external validity of my model. The relationship between economic success and electoral outcomes is likely somewhat different for the U.S. than it is for other major industrial countries. Furthermore, the strength of this relationship over time may have changed in different ways for the U.S. than for other countries. For example, the U.S. has a far more extensive network of trading relationships and a stronger domestic economy than most other nations. It may therefore be that the economic would be relatively minor for the United States compared to other countries. If this is the case, then a perceived relationship between economic success and electoral outcomes would likely have less peaceful policy implications for the U.S. than for other countries. U.S. leaders wouldnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t feel as compelled as other leaders to avoid harmful disruptions of trade, recognizing that the economic fallout â&#x20AC;&#x201C; and hence the electoral repercussionswould be minimal. Recognizing this, my model ized to explain international phenomena. Nevertheless, it offers a suitable starting point in terms

of understanding interdependence as a promoter of peace. Second, my analysis omits a number of relevant control variables. For example, Kramer describes a potential coattail effect that takes place in Congressional elections that coincide with Presidential elections. In this situation, voters will sometimes use straight-ticket voting, selecting Congressional candidates simply based party as the desirable presidential candidate. Additionally, Tufte mentions a possible rally around president and his party members during wartime, regardless of domestic policies. Beyond these the personal characteristics of a candidate, or his position on various policy platforms. Non-economic social and cultural issues are often espeFinally, the different time periods I analyze each exhibit different social and political frameworks; this likely introduces unintended sources of variation in Congressional seat turnover between the time periods. For example, tion of the voting population occurred during this time period. Both African-Americans and women were politically disenfranchised in the earliest dataset, while both groups formed part of the voting population in the latest dataset. CONCLUSION This study has attempted to explore differences across time in the degree to which state leaders associate economic performance with electoral outcomes. In examining this relationship, I have

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sought to revitalize liberal theory on the peacepromoting nature of interdependence, by proposing a new causal mechanism to explain why Angell’s propositions may have failed then but remain fundamentally relevant today. Indeed, it is possible that state leaders a century ago were partners, not expecting harmful economic outlongevity. However, following World War I, state governments became increasingly involved in the domestic economy to bring stability and protection from unchecked market forces. In this new postwar economic order, economic outcomes policy. Social security and economic stability, more so than foreign objectives, became the new priority of governments. It is possible then that individuals began to view economic success as part of government’s mandate. If this were the case, then we would expect individuals to incorporate economic performance into their rational decision-making process as voters, using ecoState leaders, in turn, would feel greater pressure to deliver positive economic conditions. Since standing trade relationships are a necessary pillar of economic growth, it stands to reason that leaders would subsequently avoid foreign conrepresents a possible causal mechanism for peace through interdependence. When that pressure to produce positive economic outcomes is absent, however, the prospects for peace-promoting interdependence rapidly diminish. The goal of this essay has been to measure the changing extent to which leaders have felt this compulsion over -

lationship between economic success and electoral outcomes, whereas leaders in Angell’s time didn’t, then we may have contributed to understanding the failure of his theories one-hundred years ago, while preserving the validity of his rationale for the present-day. I tested for the relationship by using a bivariate regression model to compare changes in real personal income to changes in seat gains and losses in the U.S. House of Representatives. I conducted this regression across separate time intervals in order to compare the strength of the relationship over time. The results were relatively consistent with my hypothesis, depicting a discernable relationship between economic success and electoral outcomes in the present-day, while revealing an absence of any such relationship in Angell’s time. Thus it may be that interdependence only failed then because leaders believed they were limited in their scope given my research design and small sample size. However, the intention was primarily to initiate a dialogue on alternative possible explanations for liberal peace through interdependence. I hope that future scholars will investigate this concept further, testing across multiple countries and including additional control variables. In terms of policy implications, my analysis demonstrates the continued importance of accountability and transparency in political importance of political engagement by the citizenry. If leaders act on our behalf only when they feel pressured to do so out of a fear for their own political survival, then it is our duty to bring the pressure. And we can only do that by going to the

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EVIDENCE Table 1.1: Dataset 1

Table 3.1: Dataset 3

Year

% change real GDPPC

% change seats

Year

% change real GDPPC

% change seats

1876

0.01972

0.1058

1976

0.0437

-0.00230

1878

0.0125

-0.0341

1978

0.04451

-0.03448

1880

0.06138

0.0546

1980

-0.01392

-0.07816

1882

0.02466

-0.1785

1982

-0.02844

-0.05977

1884

-0.04099

0.0585

1984

0.06324

0.03678

1886

0.06036

-0.0492

1986

0.02576

-0.01149

1888

0.03557

-0.0181

1988

0.03261

-0.00460

1890

0.07691

-0.25

1990

0.0078

-0.01839

1892

0.02723

0.1208

1992

0.02188

0.02069

1894

-0.0673

-0.3025

1994

0.02783

-0.12414

1896

-0.03189

0.0644

1996

0.02593

0.00460

1898

0.09187

0.098

1998

0.03241

0.01149

1900

0.00761

0.0364

2000

0.02959

0.00230

1902

0.03039

0.0285

2002

0.00811

0.01839

1904

-0.05342

0.1062

2004

0.02865

0.00690

1906

0.02106

-0.0665

2006

0.01696

-0.06897

1908

-0.12523

-0.0128

2008

-0.01222

-0.04828

1910

-0.0102

-0.1396

2010

0.01668

-0.14483

1914

-0.09414

-0.1379

2012

0.02046

0.01839

Table 2.1: Dataset 2 Year

% change real GDPPC

% change seats

1948

0.0237

0.17241

1950

0.06926

-0.06437

1952

0.02303

-0.05057

1954

-0.02295

-0.04138

1956

0.00342

-0.00460

1958

-0.02367

-0.11264

1960

0.00506

0.04598

1962

0.04496

-0.00920

1964

0.04319

0.08276

1966

0.05374

-0.10805

1968

0.03865

-0.01149

1970

-0.00942

-0.02759

1972

0.0413

0.02759

1974

-0.01428

-0.11034

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Graph 1.1: Regression 1

Graph 2.1: Regression 2

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Graph 3.1: Regression 3

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REFERENCES Angell, Norman. The great illusion: A study of the relation of military power to national advantage. GP Putnam’s sons, 1913. Waltz, Kenneth N., 1970. “The Myth of Interdependence”, in Charles Kindleberger, ed., The International Corporation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (205-223). Mearsheimer, John J. The tragedy of great power politics. WW Norton & Company, 2001. Gelpi, Christopher F., and Joseph M. Grieco. “Democracy, interdependence, and the sources of the liberal peace.” Peace Research 45, no. 1 (2008): 17-36. Mitrany, David. A working peace system: An argument for the functional development of international organization. Oxford University Press, 1944.

ternational organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 379-415. Tufte, Edward R. “Determinants of the outcomes of midterm congressional elections.” American Political Science Review 69, no. 03 (1975): 812-826. Kramer, Gerald H. . Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University, 1971. Lewis-Beck, Michael S., and Tom Rice. “Forecasting US house elections.” Studies Quarterly 9, no. 3 (1984): 475-486. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957). Stokes, Donald E., and Warren E. Miller. “Party government and the saliency of Congress.” Public Opinion Quarterly 26, no. 4 (1962): 531-546.

Polanyi, Karl. The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our time. Beacon Press, 1944.

Rusk, Jerrold G. A statistical history of the American electorate. Cq Pr, 2001.

Ruggie, John Gerard. “International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order.” In-

Samuel H. Williamson, “What Was the U.S. GDP Then?” MeasuringWorth, August 2013. http://www.measuringworth.org/usgdp/.

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“Strategic Mindsets” in Assertive Chinese Foreign Policy Anand Raghuraman Duke University, Trinity ‘15 AbstrAct China’s newly assertive strategic posture marks a clear departure from its traditionally moderate international behavior. Yet the reasons for this change remain unclear. Recent scholarship casts the new posture as the product of an ongoing internal debate between many schools of Chinese thought. While this scholarship highlights the diversity of thought within Chinese foreign-policy circles, it fails to adequately emphasize the relative weight of each view. This paper offers a new framework ing guiding principles to guide an American response to Chinese foreign policy.

tarting in 2008 and peaking in 2010, Chinese foreign policy adopted a markedly different tone than in years past: a widely perceived shift to more ‘assertive’ strategic posture. This assertiveness – some say “arrogance” or even “brashness” – has manifested itself in China’s behavior in multilateral forums, its bilateral relations with its Asian neighbors, and its relationship with the United States. Taken together, these events make up a constellation of points which, if connected, could form the outlines of a worrisome long-term trend. But should American policymakers make that connection? ecy by making China an “adversary” as opposed to an “engager?” As the United States refocuses its attention towards Asia, China’s ‘disturbing behavior’ will come under increased scrutiny. American policymakers will need to reexamine and further analyze China’s assertive posture if the posture and the motivations that drive it.

DAVID SHAMBAUGH AND THE SPECTRUM OF CHINESE GLOBAL IDENTITY These efforts have already begun in full swing. In his recent analysis of China’s assertive policies, David Shambaugh characterizes the new posture as being “in part, the product of an ongoing intensive debate” regarding the future of China’s international identity. Shambaugh describes China as “new voices and actors” in shaping a posture that “exhibits diverse and contradictory emphases” The purpose behind examining “these competing ence on “Beijing’s multidimensional behavior” and to consider the different implications for US policy raised by each “orientation.” The central thrust of this argument – that we cannot think of China’s posture in monolithic or one-dimensional terms – is a welcome and insightful contribution to the debate. The opacity of China’s one-party system often blinds 49

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us to the fact that policies in the authoritarian regime are still forged through politics and subject to intense debate. Just as in the United States, different groups of Chinese elites support differing policies. Indeed, Shambaugh Chinese military as one of the underlying factors that shaped China’s recent assertive posture. Though it may seem obvious, we cannot ignore the nature of the actors that participate in the decision-making process; each group leaves a dis-

Shambaugh’s approach inherently lends support that these actors represent distinct intellectual traditions is hard to question. However, the existence of an intellectual tradition does not necessarily translate into substantive effects on Chinese policy. Shambaugh’s presentation of the various schools of thought tends to obscure this fact; for example, his “Spectrum of Chinese Global Identities” doesn’t weight deed the equal spacing along the continuum com-

Nevertheless, there are limits to Shambaugh’s line of inquiry and certain problems with his framework. In trying to classify and catego-

bined with Shambaugh’s fairly lengthy description of each identity makes it seem as though the different schools have had an equal impact on

rize the diversity in Chinese discourse, Shambaugh relies on the work of individual academics or think-tanks to represent a major school of thought. But other analyses conducted by veteran China observer Michael Swaine note that “nonauthoritative” and “quasi-authoritative” sources – academic papers and party, military, and government media – offer more varied and critical perspectives on the Sino-American relationship thoritative sources.” To some extent, therefore,

China’s assertive posture. This is simply not the case; to turn an Orwellian phrase: some schools of thought are more equal than others. To be fair, Shambaugh recognizes this “center of gravity” in Chinese debates today. But even here there is a problem; not all Chinese realists offer the same policy prescriptions with respect to the assertive posture. Indeed, the same could be said of nativists, globalists, or selective multilateralists. Certain realists may also

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or Major Powers schools. Shambaugh’s method of analysis fails to adequately consider this possibility – that various schools coalesce behind a smaller number of strategies. By focusing on the diversity of the voices and their institutional homes, Shambaugh downplays the more limited range of their policy prescriptions. INTRODUCING THE CONCEPT OF “STRATEGIC MINDSET” If we are interested in complementing and improving Shambaugh’s analysis, we need to narrow and alter our focus. Rather than thinking of Chinese posture as being forged out of a competing set of global identities, it may be more useful to think of it as being the product of a competing set of strategies, or “strategic mindsets.” What distinguishes a strategic mindset from Shambaugh’s “global identity” is its focus on the “what” and the “why,” rather than the “who.” An analysis that employs the “strategic mindset” framework examines China’s assertive posture from the standpoint of Chinese goals; it seeks to relate the aggressive

posture to the goals the strategic mindset hopes to accomplish. Figure 2, pictured below, outlines a spectrum of strategic mindsets and tries to estipolicy. The strategic mindsets are categorized in terms of “least aggressive” to “most aggressive,” and here we use the word “aggressive” to indi-

LAYING OUT A ROADMAP out the key events that scholars generally associate with China’s assertive posture. Second, it will consider each strategic mindset individually and examine their differing interpretations of the assertive posture. Third, it will argue that two spe-

mindsets in current policy and analyze what this says about China’s long term intentions. Fourth, it will use the conclusions about China’s assertive for an optimal US counterstrategy.

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KEY INSTANCES OF CHINA’S ASSERTIVE BEHAVIOR Multilateral Forums International observers generally became aware of China’s assertive behavior in the immediate Economic Forum in Davos, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao issued a sharp rebuke of the United States that criticized its economic irresponsibil-

Korea and the United States conducted joint naval exercises in the Yellow Sea as a response to the North Korean aggression, Chinese leaders vigorously protested against foreign military assets operating “in China’s coastal waters.”4 This warning came in spite of the fact that the drill was clearly held in international waters. Chinese provocations in the South China Sea have also been one of the major sources of contention. In February of 2011, a Chinese frig-

Spratly Islands and immediately demanded that

nancial crisis. But even after, this new assertive approach emerged in other multilateral settings. In 2011, Chinese representatives on the UN Security Council frustrated US diplomatic initiatives in Syria by wielding their veto alongside the Russians. Another prominent example is the 2009 Copenhagen Summit on climate change, where Chinese positions on greenhouse gas emissions were described as being “hard-line, obstructionist” and even “deliberately insulting.”2 Indeed, as one Western commentator put, “The truth is this: China wrecked the talks [and] intentionally humiliated Barack Obama.”3

the boats withdraw: “You are in Chinese territory. Leave the area immediately…I will shoot you.”5 Vietnam has also witnessed this assertive dynamic in its relations with China. On May 11, 2011,

Bilateral Relations with Asian Neighbors A sequence of events in 2009-2011 also saw China take a heavy-handed approach to its

2010 after escalations in the two countries’ long-

the 2009 sinking of the Cheonan, China refused to support a UN resolution that explicitly labeled North Korea as the responsible party. When South

Japanese Coast Guard after the boat collided with the Japanese ships. The arrest took place within 12 nautical miles of the Senkaku Islands. Chi-

China Sea, which Vietnam protested as violating its sovereignty over the Paracel archipelago.6 In response, China dispatched naval patrols to harass Vietnamese vessels that operated in their traHowever, the most prominent displays of China’s regional assertive posture have been seen in its dealings with Japan. Sino-Japanese

standing territorial disputes over the Senkaku and Diaoyu islands. In September 2010, the captain

4 1

Dinding Chen and Jianwei Wang, “Lying Low No More? China’s New Thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy,” China: An International Journal (2011), 195-216. 2 3

Swaine, “Perceptions of an Asssertive China,” 3.

Mark Lynas, “How Do I know China Wrecked the Copenhagen Deal? I was in the Room,” The Guardian, December 22, 2009.

Michael Swaine and M.T. Fravel “China’s Assertive Behavior—Part Two: The Maritime Periphery,” 32, (2010), 1-19. 5

Carlyle Thayer, “China’s New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea,” (working paper, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011). 6

Ibid., 15.

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na’s aggressive response to the arrest, however, escalated the incident into a full blown diplomatic crisis. Beijing imposed bilateral sanctions on Japan, which included “canceling high-level talks…halting visits to Japan by Chinese tourists” and withholding “exports of rare earth minerals vital to Japan’s automotive and electronic industries.”7 Both curious and troubling, the hostile diplomatic rhetoric of the Chinese continued

RAND study by political-scientist Andrew Scobell suggests that the move was designed to issue a warning: “America, take heed – the capabilities of our weaponry are ever-improving”11 Indeed, this incident only served to highlight other examples of China’s assertive military posture, which include its development of anti-access/area denial and cyberhacking capabilities.

Relationship with the United States

ANALYZING THE ASSERTIVE POSTURE WITH THE STRATEGIC MINDSET FRAMEWORK

Though China’s assertive posture in multilateral and regional settings has all indirectly involved American interests, China has also demon-

na’s assertive behavior, we can now turn towards analyzing the assertive posture using the “stra-

the United States directly. President Obama’s decision to meet with the Dalai Lama in 2010 was met with unprecedented protest by the Chinese as was his decision to authorize further arms sales to Taiwan in the same year. After the arms deal with Taiwan was announced, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs promptly announced the suspension of US-China “military exchanges” and for the

with “Triumphalism” and work our way down the spectrum to “Expanding Core Interests.”

US companies.8 To some observers, this response represented “one of the most concrete signs yet”

scholars like Joseph Nye dismiss the Chinese -

of Beijing’s “assertive stance towards the US and other countries.”9 was an incident in 2011, when the Chinese mili-

Triumphalism The basic insight that drives “Triumphalism” is a realist evaluation of the distribution of power—one that ultimately sees the balance tilting in China’s favor. Here, however, perceptions

different world.12 In this world, China’s economy enjoys robust growth, its military capabilities continue to develop, and the overriding logic that

Secretary Robert Gates’s visit to Beijing.10 A 7

Suk Kim, “China and Japan Maratime Disputes in the East China Sea: A Note on Recent Disputes,” 43, no. 3 (2012), 296-308. 8

Swaine, “Perceptions of an Asssertive China,” 12.

longer applies.13 For triumphalists, “China’s na11

Andrew Scobell, “The J-20 Episode and Civil-Military Relations in China” (RAND), 11.

Geoff Dyer, “China Flexes its Diplomatic Muscles,” Financial Times. January 31, 2010.

Elizabeth Bumiller and Michael Wines, “Test of Stealth Fighter Clouds Gates Visit to China,” The New York Times, January 12, 2011.

Joseph Nye, “China’s Bad Bet Against America,” Project Syndicate, March 10 2010. Kejin Zhao, “China’s Internal Debates on Strategic Choices in the Korea Observer 43, no. 2 (2012), 303-332.

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tional power has already reached a point where it needs to be more proactive” in defending its interests.14 What’s more, the triumphalist mindset predicts the looming inevitability of American decline and generally underestimates American power; it sees the gap between the two states’ relative power narrowing rapidly. As a strategic mindset then, “Triumphalism” seeks to leverage these trends and China’s current power to bring about immediate favorable changes to its regional relations. Furthermore, it fundamentally approaches Chinese foreign policy from a position

tutions.17 Thus, when Hu Jintao chastised Washington for its economic irresponsibility in 2008, other nations understood the powerful symbolic implications of the act: the “responsible stake-

ty expert Sheng Dingli aptly sums up the mindset: “China is a big power; we can handle any country one-on-one. No one should try to lead us, no one should tell us what to do.”15 If we examine China’s assertive posture through this lens of “Triumphalism,” we notice that the assertive posture is designed to achieve two major objectives. First, it signals China’s national stage. This may seem tautological—and in some ways it is. But here again, perceptions matter and shape the state of reality. “The image bility-shirking… Beijing of the past” writes Mi-

pendence with Japan – which has almost tripled from “1.45% to 4.32% during the period of 19972006” – and its control of 93% of the world’s rare earth minerals.18 The ensuing rare earth mineral export ban targeted Japanese vulnerabilities and quickly won the release of the captain. For triumphalists, the success of this diplomatic and economic pressure requires more than just objective calculations of Japanese vulnerabilities and Chinese strength. Rather, the success stems from China’s willingness to assertively use the “greater

assertive… anti-status quo power that is pushing back against the West.16 As Swaine goes on to suggest, observers “have linked assertive Chinese behavior with the promulgation of a ‘Beijing Consensus’” that contests the “Washington Consensus” of free markets and democratic insti-

Indeed, the pattern of Chinese pronouncements, and actions indicates that China has taken the top hierarchical position in the regional pecking order and bears all the requirements (economic and military might, diplomatic prowess, and willingness to pull its weight against the smaller powers) of a traditional power and is

Chen and Wang, “Lying Low No More? China’s New Thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy,” 201. 15 16

Swaine, “Perceptions of an Asssertive China,” 12.

tables on the United States. Second, the assertive posture aims to use China’s growing power as means of creating immediate, favorable changes to Chinese regional relations. China’s response to the arrest of its ample. Here, China leveraged its trade interde-

its disposal.19 De Castro draws similar conclusions from China’s more assertive behavior in the South China Sea:

Ibid., 4.

Kim,“China and Japan Maratime Disputes in the East China Sea: A Note on Recent Disputes,” 302. 19

Ibid.,

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determined to change the power game in East Asia.20 Responding to Bullying The motivations that underlie the “Responding to Bullying” mindset are fundamentally different than those that drive “Triumphalism.” Whereas “Triumphalism” projects Chinese conUnited States, “Responding to Bullying” approaches Chinese foreign policy with a deeply rooted sense of insecurity and resentment. According to this mindset, Chinese behavior is not really assertive, but rather reactionary; China is responding to what it perceives to be deliberate slights or threats. Part of these fears and frustrations are products of historical grievances – a narrative of “China as victim” as opposed to “China as victor.”21 The nation’s past experience with

Hypothetically the United States should take China’s interests…more seriously than before and change its international behavior. The reality, however, seems just the opposite.23 Jisi argues that this disparity exacerbates existing Chinese suspicions about the United States “making every effort to prevent China from rising up.”24 Indeed, many Chinese scholars paint the United States’ “Pivot to Asia” as a thinly-veiled attempt to contain China and isolate it further. Thus, the “Responding to Bullying” strategic mindset envisions two major goals for Chinese foreign policy: 1) revise the narrative of China’s historic sense of grievance, and 2) preserve China’s freedom of action while preventing US containment efforts. Observing China’s assertive behavior from this mindset, we can identify aspects of its posture that advance each of these goals. China’s assertive approach to the island disputes with

as the “Century of Humiliation” and there is a beatings, and extraordinary humiliations.”22 But in addition to historic grievances, the “Responding to Bullying” strategic mindset also factors in contemporary attempts by the West to key example of this as the divergence between cooperative American rhetoric – which, early on, its continued uncooperative or confrontational behavior:

Though previously discussed within the context of reshaping Sino-Japanese relations, China’s rewrites the historical and psychological context that colors those relations. In this way, the island dispute with Japan takes on a life and a meaning independent of the geopolitical game being played. Chinese willingness to defend itself on territorial issues, even in relatively minor disputes, challenges traditional memories of a China that suffered the Rape of Nanking – that was unable to guard against Japanese aggression during

Renato De Castro, “The Risk of Applying Realpolitik in Resolving the South China Sea Dispute: implications on Regional Security,” Focus 27, no. 2 (2012), 262-289. 21

Peter Gries, “Nationalism, Indignation, and China’s Japan Policy,” SAIS Review 25, no.2 (2005), 105-114.

Ibid., 110.

Wang Jisi, “China Deserves More Respect as a First-Class Power,” The Asahi Shimbun, October 5, 2012. Ibid.

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World War II.25 While Chinese successes in the island dispute will never fully obscure these legacies, they are certainly changing the context of China’s rise and its historical relations with its neighbors. The assertive posture advances the second goal of this strategic mindset – preserving China’s autonomy and preventing US containment efforts – at several distinct levels. Medeiros argues that China’s sharper diplomatic and military posture “seeks to…collectively create an environment in which the United States” can no

climate change” is a “Western conspiracy.”28 Carbon emissions agreements are thereby seen as part of this conspiracy; they force China to pay for the sins of the West and undermine the country’s future growth. From the “Responding to Bullying” mindset then, China’s scuttling of the Copenhagen negotiations was a fundamentally defensive move: a rational reaction to Western attempts to tie an anchor on China’s growing power.

longer “constrain China’s freedom of action.”26 Hence, we see increased Chinese spending on anti-access/anti-denial military capabilities as long-term countermeasures against US naval power. The “Responding to Bullying” strategic mindset is also particularly wary of “America’s C-Shaped encirclement,” and is sensitive to any perceived efforts to isolate China. US attempts to ‘multilateralize’ China’s territorial disputes with Vietnam or Japan are thus met with strong objections – as was famously the case at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum Meeting in Hanoi. Even China’s uncooperative behavior during the

that Chinese foreign policy is not isolated from domestic pressures and is in fact an “extension of domestic politics.”29 As a result, this mindset concerns itself with balancing two powerful forces in Chinese domestic politics: regime insecurity and nationalism. Protecting the security of the Communist Party has long been the “paramount emphasis” of Chinese foreign policy.30 But as the country experiences unprecedented economic growth and rapid modernization, the rigid structure of the authoritarian regime has come under new sources of strain: lack of government transparency, corruption scandals, and increased economic inequality. The rise of the Internet and new forms of social media has drawn attention

As mentioned before, China was largely blamed by Western audiences for sinking the talks, for pursuing a “hardline and obstructionist” strategy of “brazen stonewalling.”27 But according to Libthe growing belief that the “whole discourse of

Balancing Nationalism

to these failures – especially to the millions of Chinese “netizens” – and drives an underlying crisis of legitimacy.31 As Xiang argues, “Today, the Chinese people have grounds to challenge – potentially through widespread social protest – 28

Fravel, M. Taylor. “Explaining stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute.” US Relations, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution (2010). 26 27

Evan Medieros, “China’s international behavior: activism, opportun. Vol. 850. Rand Corporation, 2009.

Jonathan Pearlman, “China Flexes its Muscles,” The Age, December 23, 2009.

Kenneth Liberthal and Wang Jisi. “Addressing US-China Strategic Distrust.” (2012). 29

Sheng Ding, “Can the CCP really afford to play the nationalist card?” (2013). 30

Lian Ma, “Thinking of China’s Grand Strategy: Chinese Perspectives.” 13, no. 1 (2013): 155168. 31

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all three dimensions of the Communist Party’s legitimacy.”32 Beijing understands both the nature of this threat and the need to somehow show responsiveness to Chinese public opinion. Since major political reform at the domestic level inherently threatens the viability of the current regime, Chinese leaders ‘play the nationalist card’ in foreign policy as a compensatory mechanism. Thus, we can understand part of China’s assertive behavior as the result of this dynamic; the Communist Party uses nationalism to channel domestic anger

Sea disputes.36 In contrast 82.9% supported “military actions” while a sizable majority favored “severe military punishment to the Philippines and Vietnam”37 increases the “danger of overplaying popular nationalism” and projecting an excessively confrontational posture that triggers regional balancing behavior.38 Thus, the overarching goal of the “Balancing Nationalism” strategic mindset is to limit this possibility by curbing the policy impact of hypernationalist sentiments. At the same time, -

and resentment towards external ‘Enemies’ and away from the regime. However, excessive appeals to nationalism can be a double-edged sword, especially when a divergence between Chinese rhetoric and Chinese action becomes plain. Chinese leaders now feel pressures to not only “talk tough” but “act tough.”33 As Medeiros puts it:

ism to divert domestic resentments and strengthen regime security. Separating the aspects of the Chinese assertive posture that are directed towards both these ends is a complicated task. However, we can begin by tracing the outlines of an ‘upper boundary’ of acceptable nationalism by examining the counterfactual posture – the aggressive set of behaviors demanded by Chinese hypernationalists that China has refused to adopt. Indeed, even though hawkish civilian and military elements call upon China to “have the guts to ‘show sword’” or “replace the US as number one power,”39 Chinese leaders are not “willing to adopt a strategy of allout confrontation.”40 Medeiros outlines several

Although Chinese leaders have used nationalist sentiments as a tool to shape the domestic context of policy decisions, they face the inherent constraints of trying to manipulate nationalism.34 Here, the key constraint is the evolution of a ‘hypernationalism,’ which now criticizes Chinese foreign policy from the ‘right’ as being “too soft.”35 For example, a survey of Chinese opinion in June 2011 showed only 13.6% of the 23,000 participants supporting negotiations as the “most reasonable approach” to resolve the South China

other aggressive policy options that China has chosen not to employ: 36

Yinhong Shi, “Triumphalism” and Decision Making in China’s Asia Policy.” Science China Earth Sciences 1, no. 1 (2013): 107-119. 37

Ibid.,

38 32

Lanxin Xiang, “China and the ‘Pivot’.” Survival 54, no. 5 (2012): 113-128. 33

Sheng Ding, “Can the CCP really afford to play the nationalist card?”

Medeiros, “China’s International Behavior, Activism, Opportunism,

Chen and Wang, “Lying Low No More/ China’s New Thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy,” 209

Suisheng Zhao, “Foreign policy implications of Chinese nationalism revisited: The strident turn.” 22, no. 82 (2013): 535-553. 39

Chen and Wang, “Lying Low No More/ China’s New Thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy, 220. 40

Yan Xuetong and Haixia Qi, “Football Game Rather Than Boxing Match: China–US Intensifying Rivalry Does not Amount to Cold War.” 5, no. 2 (2012): 105127.

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China is not pursuing its core foreign policy objectives through territorial expansion, military intervention, permanent military deployments abroad, creation of client states…Chinese behavior could look far more aggressive than it currently does, either regionally or globally.41 While it is dangerous to overconclude from this counterfactual approach, the analysis challenges interested observers to consider the full range of possibilities – and most importantly, to not conmost aggressive posture. hypernationalists undercurrents have failed to shift the gravity of China’s posture. For example in 2005, China cracked down on anti-Japanese disturbances and arrested leaders striking in Japanese factories.42 However in 2012, it adopted a changed posture: Beijing encouraged demonstrations against the Japanese embassy and “clearly” lent them “government support.”43 China has made a similar about-face with its disputes in the South China Sea. Just as recent as 2011, the – China would “shelve disputes and seek joint development.”44 However, Zhao notes that since 2012, Chinese policy has been “more willing to follow popular nationalist calls for… economic -

Medeiros, “China’s International Behavior, Activism, Opportunism,

Ibid., 203.

Thom Shanker and Ian Johnson, “Beijing Mixes Messages Over AntiJapanese Protests,” The New York Times, September 16, 2012. 44

Peaceful Development,” (2012).

timidating means, to deal with territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas.”45 What motivates these reversals in policy? Is China’s heightened assertiveness designed to raise nationalistic sentiments to acceptable levels? Or, is it being used as a venting mechanism, which contains the effects of excessive nationalism and prevents the opening of a “dangerous Pandora’s Box?”46 Though this paper now moves into the realm of speculation, the answers to these questions cut to the heart of the “Balancing Nationalism” strategic mindset. My own view is that China is pursuing both strategies simultaneously – especially by adopting confrontational stances over issues with huge symbolic value, but relatively low strategic value. For example, by emphasizing a more assertive posture in the Senkaku-Diaoyu island disputes, China has chosen an issue that resonates deeply with the majority of its citizens. This builds a broad base of nationalism – in the media, the military, and the masses – that can be “channeled in its expression.”47 At the elevates a traditionally ‘peripheral’ interest and concentrates hypernationalist sentiment. While they are important issues, Senkaku and Diaoyu are not Taiwan or Tibet. By increasing the assertiveness of its posture on these issues, China wins the respect of extreme nationalists and diverts their efforts to dramatically shift policy on more ‘core interests.’ One might measure the success of this strategy by revisiting the counterfactual analysis. Thus, making selective concessions to

Zhao, “Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: The Strident Turn,” 5. 46

Ibid., 7.

Ibid.,

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hypernationalists and permitting “a lot of thunder,” thereby ensures “little rain.”48

makes sense.51 A new path must guide a China The second assumption follows directly

Expanding Interests The “Expanding

Interests”

strategic

power – and by extension, its wider set of core interests. In some ways this mindset is similar to “Triumphalism” – both are primarily based on a realist calculation about Chinese capabilities and the distribution of power in the international system. However, the “Expanding Interests” mindset employs a much more dispassionate method of analysis. It begins with a set of key assumptions about the current state of the world and then soberly deduces the realistic implications for Chinese foreign policy. one: China is a rising power. Rising economic clout forms the backbone of this assumption. In 2009, China replaced Germany as the world’s largest exporter, and in 2010, it overtook Japan as the world’s second largest economy.49 Chinese sovereign wealth funds have “already amassed over $1 trillion,” giving China “ample leverage in shaping the future economic landscape.”50 In view of this changed context, there is a sense among Chinese leaders that the grand strategy that shaped the past thirty years of development – “taoguang yanghui, yousuo zuowei” or “keep

hold a wider set of core interests. Chinese scholars often characterize this trend as being a “normal” or “natural” result: “it is natural that China’s presence and interests in global affairs have increased 52

He and Feng point out America’s historical experience as supporting this trend – “The United States isolated itself politically from the rest of the world…When its power increased, US interests expanded to every corner of the world.”53 These authors are quick to dismiss the idea that a rising China will challenge US interests globally. But echoing other scholars, they note that China’s interests are expanding both “vertically” and “horizontally.”54 In the vertical dimension, core national interests – sovereignty and development – are no longer being “subsumed by the imperative of… survival.”55 Instead, these core interests and their traditional conceptions are becoming increasingly robust.”56At the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum China Sea under its umbrella of ‘core interests’ – a term usually reserved for Tibet, Taiwan, and

Swaine, “Perceptions of an Assertive China,” 19.

Chen and Wang, “Lying Low More? China’s New Thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy,” 200. 53

He Kai and Huiyun Feng, “Debating China’s assertiveness: Taking China’s power and interests seriously.” International Politics 49, no. 5 (2012): 633-644. 48

S. Zhao, “Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited,” 2. 50

Matthew Burrows and Jennifer Harris, “Revisiting the future: GeoThe Washington Quarterly 32, no. 2 (2009): 27-38.

Ibid., 637.

Andrew Erickson and Lyle Goldstein, “Hoping for the Best, preparing for the worst: China’s response to US hegemony.” tegic Studies 29, no. 6 (2006): 955-986. 56

K. Ma, “Thinking of China’s Grand Strategy: Chinese Perspectives,”

159

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Xinjiang.57 In the horizontal dimension, Chinese interests move beyond a rigid focus on “core interests” and now extend to new domains – like the protection of Chinese nationals overseas. In 2011 for example, the Chinese Navy managed the successful evacuation of “35,000 citizens from chaotic Libya.”58 This move broke a longstanding “political taboo” on protecting citizens abroad and challenged China’s commitment to its longstanding norm of non-interference. Thus, as Chinese economic and political interests spread

fend its wider portfolio and richer conception of its interests. Though this move increases the number of ‘friction points’ between China and its neighbors – over Senkaku, Diaoyu, and the South China Sea – and even with the United States over climate change, the Dalai Lama, and the ASEAN, na’s “peaceful rise” concept. He and Feng expand on this line of thought and argue that the assertive posture actually signals a commitment to the ‘peaceful rise’ concept. In this counterintuitive variant of the “Expand-

new ways of protecting them. assumptions, the “Expanding Interests” mindset arrives at the following conclusion: a rising China should use its new power to defend expanded interests against perceived threats. This conclu-

ing Interests” mindset, China’s of its core interests is key. By making explicit and assertively defending core interests, China draws a red line for others not to cross. Thus we should view Chinese behavior in the South China Sea as indicating Beijing’s serious commitment to a

and offers a compelling explanation of China’s recent assertive behavior. From this perspective, Chinese behavior is admittedly assertive, but not aggressive. Echoing this point, Jisi notes, “China is more defensive and even passive rather than the seemingly Western interpretation of China’s recent behaviors as… aggressive.”59 Here again, we should consider the conclusions of Medeiros’

may balk at this prospect and view the expansion of China’s ‘core interests’ as being indicative of its regional hegemonic intentions. However, He and Feng argue that they should not. Instead, sues that fall behind the red line as being part of a signaling strategy that “communicates… private information with the outside world for future

counterfactual analysis: “Chinese behavior could look far more aggressive than it currently does, either regionally or globally.”60 Western perceptions of Chinese aggression are therefore seen as a consequence of China’s willingness to de-

cooperation.”61 The signaling strategy is therefore designed to initiate a bargaining process. So while the South China Sea may now fall under the aegis of China’s ‘core interests,’ He and Feng note that this opens up certain promising possibilities: “For example, North Korea and Iran are not specified as ‘core interests’ of China and that “if the price is right, it may be possible for China to reach a deal with the United States…on both

Zhao, “China’s Internal Debates on Strategic Choices in the Asia-

He and Feng, “Debating China’s Assertiveness,” 636.

Ma, “Thinking of China’s Grand Strategy: Chinese Perspectives,”

162 60

Medeiros, “China’s International Behavior, Activism, Opportunism, ,” 213

He and Feng, “Debating China’s Assertiveness,” 640.

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North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues.”62 In this vein, Yan Xuetong characterizes this bargaining approach as an attempt to foster a dynamic of “peaceful competition” between China and the West; or put differently, cooperation based on the horse-trading of individual interests.63 China’s forceful defense of its expanded interests thus becomes a bargaining tactic – a piece in a strategy designed to maximize the potential gains from China’s overall ‘peaceful rise.’ REVISITING THE SPECTRUM: PLACEMENT AND WEIGHTING Up until now, this paper has focused on laying out has also considered the various uses each strateBut looking back to the new spectrum, there are two other elements that this paper has yet to address: spectrum placement and mindset weighting. Moving now to the end of discussion, I will sights and principles that should guide an optimal US counterstrategy. Spectrum Placement: Ordering the Mindsets from The weighted spectrum lists “Triumphalism” as the most “aggressive” mindset because it radically increases the probability of long-term umphalism” seeks to heavily leverage China’s future and current capabilities in order to “change the power game in Eastern Asia.”64 At the same 62

time, its dismissive appraisal of US power lends it has the power to “show sword when necessary” against the US.65 Of all the four strategic mindsets then, “Triumphalism” is the most openly revisionist – and most prone to supporting intentionally aggressive acts. Following “Triumphalism” is “Responding to Bullying.” As a strategic mindset, “Responding to Bullying” eschews the outright ‘brazenness’ of “Triumphalism” and recognizes the staying power of the United States. Indeed, it is fundamentally reactionary, and therefore less likely to intentionally might of the United States or Asian neighbors. But while the “Responding to Bullying” mindon insecurity and historical grievances makes it extremely volatile – and especially prone to misStates rebalances towards Asia and forges stronger ties with China’s neighbors, these fears of a “C-shaped encirclement” will only grow.”66 Especially in a moment of acute vulnerability, a China that lashes out in the South China Sea or in its island disputes with Japan is not too far out of the range of possibility. A similar, albeit less strident, volatility characterizes the “Balancing Nationalism” mindset. As discussed before, the evolution of a ‘hypernationalism’ represents a worrying trend, particularly if this sentiment expands beyond Chinese the elite Chinese decision-makers. Indeed, if hy-

Ibid.

Yuetong, “Football Game Rather than Boxing Match: China-US Intensifying Rivalry Does Not Amount to Cold War,” 6.

De Castro, “The Risk of Applying Realpolitik in Resolving the South China Sea Dispute: Implications on Regional Security,” 282.

Chen and Wang, “Lying Low More? China’s New Thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy,” 220. Medeiros, “China’s International Behavior, Activism, Opportunism, ,” 50.

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pernationalist “thunder” induces “heavy rain,” However, these alarmist predictions are mitigated by the venting mechanism of the assertive posture. By concentrating nationalist sentiments on issues with huge symbolic value but relatively less strategic value, Chinese elites prevent domestic pressures from popping open a “Pandora’s Box.”68 While miscalculation is still possible within this strategic mindset – especially if the assertive concessions are dragged further to the right by hardliners – Chinese leaders current-

nistic intention, the effects of these frictions can

ly seem committed to keeping nationalism within a manageable range. Lastly, “Expanding Interests” lies at the other side of the spectrum. Though I have designated it as one extreme, we should not assume that this mindset entirely eliminates the prospect to the other strategic mindsets. In fact, even if we take the most optimistic interpretation of this mindset – Chinese assertiveness as a signaling exist. If American and Chinese red lines on ‘core interests’ overlap and both seriously commit to defending those red lines, a quickly escalating the fact remains that the “Expanding Interests” strategic mindset represents the most defensive posture on our spectrum. Though the scope and scale of Chinese interests have expanded, they do so within a framework of relatively benign long-term intentions. As long as all sides do

Weighting the Strategic Mindsets’ Effects on an Assertive Chinese Posture Which strategic mindset is exerting the question is relevant to this analysis. One needs to have a rough understanding of the dominant strating any principles to guide an optimal American response. Looking back to the weighted spec-

mindset wields on current posture. Of the four, “Expanding Interests” carries the most weight at present. This has especially been the case in the aftermath of the Obama Administration’s pivot to Asia, which reduced concede that the early impact of “Triumphalism” led China to “overplay its hand.”69 For instance, Shi argues that the United States “won the latest round of competition in East Asia.”70 because the triumphalist mindset shrank “China’s current voked “apprehension, suspicion, and discontent” amongst China’s neighbors.71 The recognition of and forced its policymakers to guard against overly hostile tones and incendiary actions. Furthermore, by shifting to this soberminded method, Chinese leaders have moved sharply away -

China’s rise with indicators of long-term antago69

Swaine, “Perceptions of an Assertive China,” 4.

Shi, “Triumphalism” and Decision Making in China’s Asia Policy,”

118.

S. Zhao, “Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: The Strident Turn,” 7.

Ibid. 111.

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sponding to Bullying” – they see China as it is, not as they wish it or fear it to be. However, the aspect of “Responding to Bullying” that stresses rewriting historical narratives has a pronounced effect on selective issues – especially the island disputes with Japan. When combined with the hypernationalist elements, this mindset shapes Chinese policy to be extremely reactive against perceived slights. Thus, when Japan ‘illegally’ purchased three of the Senkaku islands in 2012, anti-Japanese protests were reignited throughout China, often with the support of the government. WHAT INSIGHTS CAN THE STRATEGIC MINDSET FRAMEWORK PROVIDE THE US? Thus far, this paper has focused on presenting China’s strategic debate from a uniquely Chinese perspective. In conclusion, I now shift focus to the United States. China’s assertive posture has worried many American policymakers because its intentions remain clouded in a shroud of uncertainty. Former US PACCOM commander Admiral Timothy Keating articulates this problem well: “What are really their intentions, what is their strategic intent, where does China expect to be 10, 20, 50 years from now.”72 Our discussion of the Chinese strategic mindset was designed to get at the crux of these questions; or at the very least, to demystify the factors that shape China’s assertive posture and strategic intentions. Thus, using the insights gained from this framework, should guide US strategy as it seeks to respond to Chinese assertiveness.

If this examination of Chinese assertiveness has stressed anything, it is that the United States should not equate an assertive posture with an aggressive son for US strategy. There is a tendency amongst certain US commentators and policymakers alike to over-extrapolate from China’s assertive behavior. Swaine for example notes that “the vast majority of Western media commentators have depicted a China” that threatens “the future stability of the international system.”73 Likewise, more hawkish scholars like Aaron Friedberg argue that China seeks to create “a situation in which overt resistance to its wishes will appear futile.”74 But before sounding the alarm bells, Americans should always consider the counterfactual scenario. Could Chinese posture be even more assertive than it presently is? If the answer is yes, then it would be prudent for the United States to this. Doing so may lead to certain counterintuitive results – like the notion signaling mechanism with China’s core interests or the venting mechanism for hypernationalism. However, this search might yield previously unexplored paths that can help build strategic trust and maintain peaceful Sino-US relations. Second, the United States should not outwardly push China to democratize. This insight stems from our discussion of the “Responding to Bullying” and “Balancing Nationalism” strategic mindsets. Indeed, the “Responding to Bullying” mindset is particularly attuned to perceived slights and threats. American calls for democracy have long been interpreted by Beijing as direct 73

Ely Ratner, “The Emergent Security Threats Reshaping China’s Rise.” The Washington Quarterly 34, no. 1 (2011): 29-44.

Swaine, “Perceptions of an Assertive China,” 4.

Aaron Friedberg, “Bucking Beijing: An Alternative US China Policy.” Foreign Aff. 91 (2012): 59.

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challenges to the Communist regime. If Chinese they will be more likely to lash out – and proBlatant US advocacy of Chinese democracy also could have a negative impact on the balance of nationalism in Chinese foreign policy. As previously discussed, China’s assertive posture – especially in the island disputes – could actually be a venting mechanism, a way of channeling and controlling hypernationalist sentiments. The power of this ‘venting mechanism,’ however depends on elite Chinese decision-makers’ commitment to containing hypernationalist voices. However, if the United States adopts a posture that directly threatens these elite decision-makers, that commitment will waver. Chinese posture might then take a hard turn to the right, and more closely resemble the aggressive counterfactual posture that Meideros envisions. should think seriously about the implications of pecially relevant, given that the ‘Expanded Interests’ strategic mindset forms the center of gravity in the debate over China’s assertive posture. If ate a bargaining progress, the United States could seize this opening. High-level talks should therefore be used to probe China’s intentions about the bargaining process. They should seek to answer the question – what price would China be willing to accept for cooperation with Iran, North Korea, or even Syria? And conversely, the United States should determine what it would be willing to concede in exchange: control over the South China Sea, Senkaku, or even Tibet. As of now, the current focus of high-level meetings is placed on 64

maintaining contact and building strategic trust. However, when such talks fail to produce common understandings, they can sour the relationship and ultimately erode strategic trust. If both the United States and China can come prepared and willing to horse-trade on issues, they would tangibly demonstrate that cooperation within a framework of peaceful competition can yield mu-

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REFERENCES Bumiller, Elizabeth, and Michael Wines. “Test of Stealth Fighter Clouds Gates Visit to China.” The New York Times. N.p., 12 Jan. 2011. Web. 06 Apr. 2013. Burrows, Matthew. “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis.” The Washington Quarterly 32.2 (2009): 27-38. Chen, Dingding, and Jianwei Wang. “Lying Low No More? China’s New Thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy.” China: An International Journal (2011): 195-216. White Paper on China’s Peaceful Development. Beijing: n.p., 2011. De Castro, Renato C. “The Risk of Applying Realpolitik in Resolving the South China Sea Dispute: Implications on Regional SecuDing, Sheng. Can the CCP Really Afford to Play the Nationalist Card? N.p.: East-West Center, 2013. Dyer, Geoff. “China Flexes Its Diplomatic Muscles.” Financial Times. N.p., 31 Jan. 2010. Web. 1 Apr. 2013. Erickson, Andrew, and Lyle Goldstein. “Hoping for the Best, Preparing for the Worst: China’s Response to US Hegemony.” Journal of Strategic Studies 29.6 (2006): 955-86. Etzioni, Amitai. “China: Making an Adversary.” International Politics 48 (2011): 647-66. Fravel, M. T. “Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands.” Getting the Triangle Straight: Managing China–Japan–US Relations. Washington DC: Brookings Institute, 2010. 144-65.

Friedberg, Aaron. “Bucking Beijing: An Alternative U.S. China Policy.” Foreign Affairs 91.5 (2012): 48. Gries, Peter Hays. “Nationalism, Indignation, and China’s Japan Policy.” SAIS Review 25.2 (2005): 105-14. He, Kai, and Huiyun Feng. “Debating China’s Assertiveness.” International Politics 49.5 (2012): 633-44. Jisi, Wang. “China Deserves More Respect as a First-class Power.” Interview by Yoichi Kato. The Asahi Shimbun, 5 Oct. 2012. Web. 6 Apr. 2013. <http://ajw.asahi.com/ article/asia/china/AJ201210050003>. Kim, Suk K. “China and Japan Maritime Disputes in the East Chian Sea: A Note on Recent Disputes.” Ocean Development and & International Law 43.3 (2012): 296-308. Lieberthal, Kenneth, and Wang Jisi. Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust. Rep. Washington DC: Brookings Institute, 2012. Lynas, Mark. “How Do I Know China Wrecked the Copenhagen Deal? I Was in the Room.” The Guardian. N.p., 22 Dec. 2009. Web. 06 Apr. 2013. Ma, Lian. “Thinking of China’s Grand Strategy: Chinese Perspectives.” International RelaMedeiros, Evan. China’s International Behavior, tion. Working paper. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009. Nye, Joesph S. “China’s Bad Bet Against America.” Project Syndicate. N.p., 10 Mar. 2010. Web. 06 Apr. 2013. Pearlman, Jonathan. “China Flexes Its Muscles.” The Age 23 Dec. 2009: 1. Web. 6 Apr. 2013.

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Ratner, Ely. “The Emergent Security Threats Reshaping China’s Rise.” The Washington Quarterly (2011): 29-44. Scobell, Andrew. United States. US China Economic Security Review Commission. The J-20 Episode and Civil-Military Relations in China. Cong. Doc. N.p.: RAND, n.d. Scott, David. China and the International System, 1840-1949: Power, Presence, and Perceptions in a Century of Humiliation. Albany, NY: State University of New York, 2008.

Periphery.” China Leadership Monitor 35 (2011): 1-29. Swaine, Michael. “Perceptions of an Assertive China.” China Leadership Monitor 32 (2010): 1-19. Thayer, Carlyle. China’s New Wave of Aggressive Assertiveness in the South China Sea. Working paper. Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2011. Xiang, Lanxin. “China and the Pivot.” Survival 54.5 (2012): 113-28. Xuetong, Yan. “Football Game Rather than Box-

China.” The Washington Quarterly 34.1 (2011): 7-27. Shanker, Thom, and Ian Johnson. “Beijing Mixes Messages Over Anti-Japanese Protests.” New York Times. N.p., 16 Sept. 2012. Web. 6 Apr. 2013. Shi, Yihong. “”Triumphalism” and Decision Making in China’s Asia Policy.” Economic and Political Studies 1.1 (2013): 107-19. Swaine, Michael, and M. T. Fravel. “China’s Assertive Behavior--Part Two: The Maritime

ing Match: China-US Intensifying Rivalry Does Not Amount to Cold War.” Chinese Journal of International Politics 5.2 (2012): 105-27. Zhao, Kejin. “China’s Internal Debates on StraKorea Observer 43.2 (2012): 303-32. Zhao, Suisheng. “Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: The Strident Turn.” Journal of Contemporary China (2013): 1-20.

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The Chosen People and the People Choosing: The Effects of Public Opinion and Congress on Pre-WWII U.S. Jewish Refugee Policy Jacob Zionce Duke University, Trinity ‘15 AbstrAct American inaction regarding the Holocaust is often thought of as one of the darkest points in the nation’s past. Among this inaction was the United States’ inability to reform its immigration policy to accept more European Jewish refugees and save some Jews from the senseless killing that was to follow. While much attention has been paid to the isolated role President Roosevelt played in this inaction, the president’s personal beliefs were rather irrelevant in the eventual outcome of much of this policy. Instead, the Roosevelt Administration’s failure must be considered in the complex political ecosystem it was operating in. Roosevelt’s inaction resulted in large part from an isolationist Congress attempting to exert its will over the administration in a time of critical realignment. At the same time, Roosevelt’s willingness to accept the power of Congress can be properly considered by linking the Executive and Legislative Branch’s actions to public support for the Roosevelt administration and immigration reform policy at the time. In order to connect Roosevelt’s actions to both Congressional and public opinion, this paper will draw connections between public opinion polling, real-world events and policy suggestions such as the Wagner-Rogers Bill and the Évian Conference, congressional political theory, foreign policy theory, and reports from the Roosevelt administration.

merican inaction regarding the Holocaust is often thought of as one of the

over the course of American foreign affairs, Roosevelt was not the leading actor in Jewish refu-

darkest points in America’s past. In the direct run-up to World War II, the country, and the western world on the whole, failed to offer

gee policy, but rather was reacting to a complex group of other actors. By looking at Roosevelt’s actions regarding immigration policy in the late 1930s and early 1940s, I will argue that while Roosevelt may have in fact been in favor of reforming policy, the personal beliefs of the president were markedly irrelevant in the eventual outcome of American Jewish immigration policy. I will contend that the Roosevelt Administration’s failure resulted from an isolationist Congress attempting to exert its will over the administration

regime. Much of the blame for the feeble American response has fallen solely on the shoulders of Franklin Roosevelt, who was president prior to, and during, WWII, and history views him as an isolated entity responsible for America’s unwillingness to reform its immigration policy. While the president does of course have great power

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in a time of critical realignment. I will further argue, however, that Roosevelt’s willingness to accept the power of Congress can only be properly explained by linking both Congress and the president’s actions to anemic public support for both the administration and reforms to immigration policy. Looking at the July 1938 Évian Conference, it appears obvious that the international gathering set in Évian-les-Baines, France was destined to fail from the get-go due to the will of the American Congress. While Roosevelt con-

ated by the Jewish community5 and showed them some commitment on the part of the President to aid Jewish refugees. The unwillingness of Congress to change its policy, however, doomed the conference for failure. Congress and Roosevelt’s unwillingness to enact the Wagner-Rogers Bill in February of 1939, which sought to allow for the immigration of 20,000 Jewish children to America, further illustrated Congress’s opposition to changes in American refugee policy, and Roosevelt’s reluc-

vened the meeting to deal with the issue of Jewish refugees, the new 1938 Congress, in which “the strengths of the restrictionists… was high,”11 had made clear that they were unwilling to change existing immigration quota laws. This unwillingness to admit more immigrants restricted the United States from leading on the refugee problem by example, and forced the administration to include in the invitation that “no country would be expected to receive greater number of emigrants than is permitted by its existing legislation.”2 While the outcomes of the conference were meager, with only the Dominican Republic offering a substantial resettlement offer3 and the establishment of an Intergovernmental Committee on Political

Unlike the Évian Conference, which was a massive and complex international affair, the process required for the passage and implementation of the Wagner-Rogers Bill is striking and unique for the simplicity. Unlike at the Évian Conference, the scope of the legislation was rather small, focusing on 20,000 children as opposed to the entire Jewish population of Europe. Furthermore, the bill’s success was entirely dependent on political decisions taken by Congress and the Administration, and did not require the cooperation of any other nations or international bodies in its implementation.6 While it appears that Roosevelt was in favor of allowing Jewish children refugees to be admitted to America, as his own wife came out

Refugees as tangible results, the very establishment of the conference itself posed “a political risk” for Roosevelt in light of this new congressional sentiment. In holding the conference, Roosevelt was “making a gesture to the image of America as a refuge for the oppressed,”4 and by all accounts this impressive gesture was appreci-

in support of the bill7 and, as will be discussed in more detail later on, he allowed Jewish children from Vichy France to immigrate to the United States later in the war, 8 the administration did not

Feingold, p. 22

Ibid, p. 24

Ibid, p. 25

Baumel, p. 294

Ibid, p. 32

Through the Golden Door

Ibid, p. 23

Baumel, p. 302

isolationist division of Congress again stopped a change in immigration policy.

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In order to understand the antagonistic nature of Congress towards Roosevelt one must glance, one would assume that Congress would have been supportive of the Évian Conference and Wagner-Rogers Bill, as both houses of the Congresses in question, the 75th and 76th Congresses, featured strong majorities from Roosevelt’s own Democratic Party.9 Such an analysis would be mistaken, however. Roosevelt’s 1932 election campaign is thought of as the archetypal example of what Walter Burnham coined a “critical re-

policy views, in this case isolationist views, that Viewing Congress as an opposition party helps explain much of the antagonism between the legislative and executive branches. In fact, political scientist Glenn Hastedt holds that “the single best predictor of whether or not Congress will remain quiet or vocally oppose presidential calls for war is its partisan composition. When the opposition party controls, Congress raises its voice.”11 While in the case of immigration restriction Congress did not ‘raise its voice’ to directly

alignment,” or an election that drastically affects the makeup and identities of the competing political parties.10 Roosevelt drew support from voters in the Northeast who did not traditionally vote for Democratic candidates, leading to both his landslide presidential victory and Democratic control of both houses. However, Democratic Congressmen from the southern United States, which was colloquially referred to as ‘the solid south’ due to its overwhelming support of the Democratic Party, had served in Congress for much longer than their northern counterparts due to the lack of competition they had faced, and for the most part held different views from the president and the new Democratic legislators and voters. This

stop the United States from going to war, it did use its Congressional power to continue the nation’s policy of neutrality in an effort to prevent the country from being dragged into a future European war. This is an action that a Congress loyal to the president would not have taken, but one that a hostile, oppositional Congress, like the one in place in the late 1930s, would take. Congress’s willingness to voice opposition to Roosevelt’s opinions can also be traced to the very platform for which they were advocating.

southern seniority in turn led to Democrats hostile to the administration holding key leadership positions in the party, and being able to dictate Congress’s policy on the whole. While these more conservative Democrats would soon realign with the Republican Party, the Congress of the 1930s must still be considered as being controlled by, in effect, an opposition party that held foreign

lieves that “international engagement could itself prove a threat,” to use the words of modern-day scholar James Lindsay.12 For Congress, restricting immigrant quotas was simply part of their larger isolationist platform that centered around not provoking Nazi Germany and remaining neutral, a

Hastedt, p. 160

Lindsay, p. 533

http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0774721.html Burnham, p. 6

19th of political scientists, Congress takes a more active, and vocal, role in foreign affairs when it be-

willingness to get involved in, or at least prepare

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for, a war in Europe. This isolationist mindset led to Congress being actively, and vocally, opposed to any changes to immigration quotas. When faced with an adversarial, isolationist Congress, Roosevelt was forced to make ceive the brunt of his advocacy efforts. Simply put, the Jewish refugee problem was seen by the President as less important than the looming wars chose not to antagonize Congress with the issue of immigration, and instead focused his efforts on

the country.16 Even though these reforms would not have involved Congress, Roosevelt chose to “remain above the battle,”17 and the German quota would as a result remain underissued from 1934 to 1939.18 In order to account for Roosevelt’s unwillingness to counteract Congressional opinion through unilateral action, one must consider the role public opinion played in the proceedings. Congress has often been referred to as a ‘sounding board’ for public opinion, particularly in the House of Representatives, where members stand

militaristic needs, such as the expansion of the Air Corps and construction of new naval bases.13 Simply reclassifying Congress as an opposition party, however, cannot fully account for Roosevelt’s inaction regarding Jewish refugees, as the President could have taken unilateral, administrative action that would not have required Congressional approval but would have helped aid immigrants in their escape from the Nazi regime. While overall changes in quota numbers were the constitutionally guaranteed jurisdiction of Congress, Roosevelt could have, for example, reduced the red tape14 surrounding German and Austrian immigration the way he would for British and French evacuees later on in the war.15

for reelection every two years. Furthermore, members of Congress have fewer constituents than the president, and therefore often are more swayed by the opinions of those in their districts or states.19 Upon examining public opinion polls from the time, it becomes clear that a body so sensitive to public opinion would be opposed to changing quota numbers. In July of 1938, the same month as the Évian Conference, 4.9 percent of Americans said in a Fortune magazine survey that they were willing to raise quotas, and 87.4 percent expressed a desire to limit immigration beyond existing quotas.20 Even in the wake of Kristallnacht (the night of the broken glass),

Alternatively, Roosevelt could have eased regulations requiring people to prove a certain level of wealth prior to receiving a visa, as this requirement would prove nearly impossible for German

much more simple Wagner-Rogers bill, Gallup polls showed that over 60 percent of Americans opposed admitting children outside of the existing quotas.21 It does not appear that this public attitude resulted from any anti-Semitic bent, as it

of a number of severe taxes against them, includ-

13 14 15

Feingold, p. 43

Ibid, p. 18

Ibid, p. 16

Through the Golden Door

Feaver lecture, January 24th d

Breitman and Kraut, p. 17

Baumel, p. 296

Baumel, p. 301

Ibid, p.299

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made little difference to the polls whether or not 22 nor did events of Kristallnacht itself, as over 72 percent of Americans approved of Roosevelt’s calling US ambassador Hugh Wilson home after the pogroms and over 85 percent of Americans reported that they disapproved of Nazi treatment of Jews in two polls conducted in the two months after the violence.23 Public opinion, rather, was simply staunchly against the idea of reforming immigration laws themselves. While statisticians now know that the methodology used in early public opinion polls was rather shoddy, the accuracy of these surveys matters little. The fact that Congress would have been lead to believe that the public was vehemently opposed to increasing immigration quotas would have been enough for them to also oppose any increases. Roosevelt’s decision to bow to the will of Congress can also be sourced to these public presidents to make wide use of public polling.24 In a decade that saw the birth of polling giants Gallup and Public Opinion Quarterly, Roosevelt 25 ley Cantril, as a public opinion consultant, kept letters he received each day, and had the Democratic National Committee, the State Directors 27 and the 26

ries and analyses of public opinion.28 Roosevelt, therefore, would have been well aware of the strong opposition the public had to increasing immigration quotas, and would not have advocated for any changes, regardless of his personal feelings towards the topic. This analysis of public opinion’s effect on voting is not to say that public opinion caused Roosevelt, or can cause leaders in general, to implement a certain policy; there is little scholarly evidence of a causal link between public opinion and policy implementation.29 Rather, policymakers such as Roosevelt may be led to “rule out” policies based on public opinion.30 Jewish immigration policy seems to be sevelt, whose deep investments and interests in public polling shows that he cared deeply about public opinion, followed the will of Congress and did not unilaterally aid in the immigration of Jews due to its unpopularity with Americans. While one may argue that Roosevelt, the only president ever elected for four terms, was popular enough to ignore public opinion, such an analysis would ignore the difference between Roosevelt’s approval ratings before and after the start of WWII. Prior to the September 1939 German and Slovakian invasion of Poland, Roosevelt was a somewhat-popular president, with an approval rating in the 50 percent range. After the invasion, however, Roosevelt’s approval rating quickly rose – from 58 percent in the summer of 1940 to 64 in January of 1940 – and only continued to rise throughout the war, peaking at 84 percent in January of 1942, right after the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor. This sharp

Ibid, p. 299

Ibid, p. 297

Holsti, p. 441

Ibid, p. 441

Ibid, p. 198

Steele, p. 201

Holsti, p. 459

Ibid, p. 202

Foyle, p. 7

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increase in presidential approval can be in large a well-established political theory that states that the nation will support the president in times of crisis. Just as the American people would later rally around President George H.W. Bush following the beginning of the Persian Gulf War,31 and President George W. Bush following the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001,32 public support for Roosevelt swelled following the beginning of a dangerous foreign war, and increased again following attacks on the homeland at Pearl Harbor. Roosevelt himself showed his lessened concern for public support following the start of the war by changing his monitoring habits regarding public opinion. For example, the president stopped monitoring his own mail entirely after 1940.33 Prior to the beginning of this rally-around-thesevelt’s public support, however, the President was forced to follow public opinion in matters he did not believe to be of the utmost national interest, such as immigration. These theories of Roosevelt responding to public opinion in dealing with refugee issues and not caring about public support after the United changes in immigration policy following shifts in public opinion towards said policy and the president. In July of 1940, the State and Justice Departments announced that they would be removing much of the ‘red tape’ surrounding the immigration of British children seeking refuge in the United States, thereby allowing for an in-

and French women and children to seek refuge in the United States. In fact, there seemed to be so much public support for the idea of allowing refugees that recent surveys of the openly antiimmigration press have yielded no articles directly related to the topic, and opinion polls shifted their attention to the issue of the ‘Mercy Ships’ themselves, where 45 percent of those asked expressed a willingness to send ‘Mercy Ships.’ That number grew to 63 percent if Germany and Italy would agree not to attack the vessels,37 a result to be expected by public opinion scholars, who have found that public opinion for involvement in foreign affairs is dependent on the number of deaths that are to occur, or have occurred, from 38

In this scenario, Roosevelt and Congress both acted decisively in aiding refugees because public support favored such a policy, while in the cases of both the Évian Conference and the Wagner-Rogers bill these two actors failed to 34

Baumel, p. 301

The Argus Baumel, p. 302

Hastedt, p. 131

Lindsay, p. 537

Baumel, p. 302

Steele, p. 202

Feaver lecture, January 31st

United States each month on visitors’ visas,34 and in August of the same year Congress passed a bill authorizing U.S. vessels, coined ‘Mercy Ships,’ to enter contested waters to evacuate British children.35 In late 1941, similar efforts were made in both Vichy and Southern France,36 but unlike in the British effort these immigrant waves still included quotas. A number of Jewish children were included in this French evacuation effort. In June of 1940, 58 percent of Americans surveyed by the American Institute of Public Opinion had already said that they were in favor of permitting English

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support refugees because public support was opposed to such a policy. Roosevelt was further changes to his own approval rating, which as previously mentioned had risen sharply following the 1939 Nazi invasion of Poland, to go beyond public opinion and advocate for the use of ‘Mercy Ships,’ even though Berlin did not guarantee their safe passage.39 In doing so, Roosevelt acted as many presidents have since by using the presidency, and his own popularity, as a ‘bully pulpit’40 of sorts to shape public opinion and forced Congress to follow suit. None of the arguments stated in this essay should serve to absolve Roosevelt of responsibility for the United States’ immigration policy prior to World War II; while neither he nor anyone else could have predicted the full events of the Holocaust, the president still chose to prioritize other initiatives over Jewish refugees. Rather, one should instead note that there is plenty of blame to go around to the other domestic actors, Congress and the American public itself, for America’s un-

The Argus

Holsti, p. 451

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REFERENCES Baumel, Judith T. “The Jewish Refugee Children from Europe in the Eyes of the American Press and Public Opinion 1934-1945.” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 5.3 (1990): 293-312. Web. 8 Mar. 2013. <http://heinonline.org.proxy.lib.duke.edu/HOL/ Page?handle=hein.journals/hologen5&coll ection=journals&page=293>. Breitman, Richard, and Alan M. Kraut. American

. New York: Holocaust Library, 1980. Print. Foyle, Douglas C. Counting the Public In: Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy. New York: Columbia UP, 1999. Print. Hastedt, Glenn P. American Foreign Policy. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, 2011. Print. Holsti, Ole. “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy.” International Studies Quarterly 36.4 (1992): 439-66. Print.

. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1987. Print. Burnham, Walter Dean. Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics. New York: Norton, 1970. Print.

Shifting Rhythms of Executive-Legislative Relations in Foreign Policy.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 33.3 (2003): 530-46. Print.

“Composition of Congress, by Political Party, 1855–2015.” Information Please® Database. Infoplease, 2012. Web. 08 Mar. 2013. <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/ A0774721.html>.

“‘Send These... The Tempest-Tost To Me’: Through The Golden Door.” The Hidden Child 1.1 (1996): n. pag. ProQuest. Web. 8 Mar. 2013. <http://search.proquest.com. proxy.lib.duke.edu/docview/195539887>.

Feaver, Peter. “Lecture #5: Congress.” Political Science 365. LSRC B101, Durham, NC. 24 Jan. 2013. Lecture.

Steele, R. W. “The Pulse of the People. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Gauging of American Public Opinion.” History 9.4 (1974): 195-216. Print.

Feaver, Peter. “Lecture #7: Public Opinion.” Political Science 365. LSRC B101, Durham, NC. 31 Jan. 2013. Lecture. Feingold, Henry L. The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holo-

“US Mercy Ships Bill Passed.” The Argus [Melbourne] 23 Aug. 1940: 1. The Argus. Web. 8 Mar. 2013. <http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/ del/article/11296545>.

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