2015 Duke Political Science Standard by Duke Political Science Standard

Forging of the Modern Fourth Circuit: The Legislation and Politics of Post-Civil War Congress and the Supreme Court

Kelsey Warner

Speak Softly but Share the â&#x20AC;&#x153;Big Stickâ&#x20AC;?: German Leadership in Europe and Abroad, 1990-Present

Molly Walker

The Rational Actor Model as an Explanation for the 2001 Hainan Island Incident

Dana Raphael

The New Logic of Collective Action: From Theory to Practice

Benjamin Hand-Bender

Poking the Bear Too Many Times: Short-Term Gains and Long-Term Pains from Post-Cold War NATO Expansion

Luke Maier

DPSS Volume V Issue 1 Spring 2015

Duke Political Science Standard

Copyright ÂŠ 2015 by the Duke Political Science Standard (DPSS) at Duke University. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, in any form or by any means, electronic, photocopying, or otherwise, without permission in writing from the DPSS.

DUKE POLITICAL SCIENCE STANDARD

VOLUME V ISSUE 1 Chad Vincente Editor-in-Chief Daniel Dorchuck Senior Editor Jay Ruckelshaus Senior Editor Emily Berntsen Editor Aron Rimanyi Editor Eliza Warner Editor

Advisor Suzanne Pierce

Special thanks to the Duke Political Science faculty for their generous support and to Vilay Nidiffer for the original cover design. The Duke Political Science Standard publishes full-length academic papers related to the study of political science. All essays that appear in this issue will also be available for viewing on the DPSS website: http://polisci.duke.edu/undergraduate/opportunities/duke-political-science-standard

Duke Political Science Standard

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VOLUME V ISSUE 1

Table of Contents

Letter from the Editor v Forging of the Modern Fourth Circuit: The Legislation and Politics of Post-Civil War Congress and the Supreme Court Kelsey Warner 1 Speak Softly but Share the “Big Stick”: German Leadership in Europe and Abroad, 1990-present Molly Walker 19 The Rational Actor Model as an Explanation for the 2001 Hainan Island Incident Dana Raphael 29 The New Logic of Collective Action: From Theory to Practice Ben Hand-Bender 39 Poking the Bear Too Many Times: Short-Term Gains and Long-Term Pains from Post-Cold War NATO Expansion Luke Maier 55

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Dear Reader, It is our honor to present to you the fifth edition of the Duke Political Science Standard. The Standard provides an excellent showcase of the extraordinary efforts of many of the best and brightest students here at Duke University who have committed themselves to pushing the frontiers of research and scholarship in the many fields of political science. In reviewing all of this yearâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s submissions, we were greatly impressed with the extent of studentsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; commitment to research and scholarship, and the process of determining which papers we would print was a difficult one. Ultimately, we feel that the pieces selected illustrate the breadth, quality, and intellectual rigor of the Political Science Department. This edition of The Standard includes papers covering a wide spectrum of engaging topics within the fields of political science, from the politics of judicial reconstruction, to the dynamics surrounding the roles of Germany and Russia in post-Cold War Europe, to the analysis and application of classic political science theories. We would like to recognize and thank the countless people who have contributed their time to the continued success of this publication. As always, we must express our sincere gratitude to Ms. Suzanne Pierce. Her unwavering support of this publication since its inception has allowed The Standard to continue to grow in prominence and prestige. Additionally, we would like to thank the Duke University Political Science Department, without which none of this would be possible. The Duke Political Science Standard is one of the few journals of its kind in the entire country, and we are deeply honored and humbled to have served Duke by working for its publication. It is our hope that you will find the collection of works in this edition intellectually stimulating and thought-provoking, and that The Standard will continue to nurture the culture of scholarly engagement in the wider Duke community.

Chad Vincente Editor-in-Chief

Duke Political Science Standard

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Forging of the Modern Fourth Circuit: The Legislation and Politics of Post-Civil War Congress and the Supreme Court Kelsey Warner Duke University, Trinity ‘15 Abstract The modern Fourth Circuit was forged out of the fires left by the Civil War. In order to attain Reconstruction goals, a larger presence of the federal government was required. This vision was interrupted by southern localism, where former Confederate officers continued to control the courts. This work examines the series of sweeping federal acts, including the Federal Reorganization Act of 1862, Tenth Circuit Act of 1863, Judicial Circuits Act of 1866, and 1871 division of the district courts, which were enacted with the hope of applying federal power through jurisdiction. Through this increased presence, the federal courts were more accessible and able to better enforce national legislation. The structure of the modern Fourth Circuit echoes the issues born out of the fall of the Confederacy, and reflects how the federal government attempted to solve them through national legislation.

The doctrine of state sovereignty perished in the destruction of the Confederate armies. William Archibald Dunning, PhD (1897)

ollowing the end of the Civil War in 1865, the United States was a fragmented nation in desperate need of repair. Former States of the Confederacy were left with destroyed infrastructure, displaced populations, and enormous debt. The unresolved issues of race and labor continued to pit citizens against each other and often led to bloodshed. In order to secure a bright future for the United States, the South had to be pulled out of its postwar disrepair. The massive Reconstruction that followed would put unprecedented demands on the federal government.

In order to accomplish the goals of Reconstruction, the federal government had to play a bigger role in state policy. It was necessary to pursue “rehabilitation of [Confederate] states with civil authority.”1 The expansion of federal laws required greater application of federal justice. Many in the South fervently opposed this reform. During the process of Reconstruction, the majority of the Confederate states had to write 1 William Archibald Dunning, Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction and Related Topics (Norwood: Norwood Press, 1897), 64.

Duke Political Science Standard new constitutions in order to be fully accepted into the United States. However, hostility toward the South was prevalent, with some Republican congressmen even thinking there should not be any provisions for constitutional conventions, and urging that they “should simply refuse to recognize the southern states’ restoration to normal relations in the Union until they voluntarily modified their constitutions to guarantee equal civil and political rights.”2 The idea of replacing state sovereignty with a strong national government was enticing to those strongly opposed to the nature of the South. The prospect of expanded federal powers led some to believe that the old system of state sovereignty was dead. The speech of Richard H. Dana Jr., a prominent Republican lawyer, accurately displays this sentiment: We have never been willing to try to experiment of a consolidated democratic republic. Our system is a system of states, with central power; and in that system is our safety. State rights, I maintain. State sovereignty we have destroyed. Therefore, although I say that, if we are driven to the last resort, we may adopt this final remedy. Yet wisdom, humanity, regard for the democratic principles, common discretion, require that we should follow the course that we are now following. Let the states make their own constitutions, but the constitutions must be satisfactory to the Republic and… the Republic holds 2 Michael Les Benedict, “The Problem of Constitutionalism and Constitutional Liberty in the Reconstruction South,” Kermit L. Hall ed. and James W. Ely, Jr. ed., An Uncertain Tradition: Constitutionalism and the History of the South (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1989), 229.

them in the grasp of war until they have made such constitutions.3 This account gives a radical viewpoint on the role of the Confederate states in the postwar United States. The increasing demands put on the federal government forced many to reassess the relationship between the states and the national government. However, completely removing state sovereignty to accomplish national goals was not the dominant postwar vision held by Republicans. The Union had fought for freedoms and the balance between the national government and the rights of the states. This vision was not as radical as the words of some radical Republicans, such as Richard H. Dana, might make it seem. State sovereignty was still important to many within the Union. Historian Michael Les Benedict remarks, “after victory they wanted to make the rights inherent in that freedom secure, but they wanted to secure them within the old federal framework.”4 It is now recognized that “every Reconstructionera effort to protect the rights of citizens was tempered by the fundamental conviction that federalism required that the day-to day protection of the citizen had to remain the duty of the states.”5 While the goals of the national government were vitally important to Reconstruction, stepping on the toes of Southern leadership would have hampered the process. This had been labeled “statecentered nationalism,” which sought to preserve 3 Richard Henry Dana Jr., “Grasp of War” speech June 1865, in Major Problems in the Civil War and Reconstruction, Michael Perman ed. and Amy Murrel Taylor ed. (Boston: Cangage Learning, 2011), 326. 4 Michael Les Benedict, “Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court,” Kermit L. Hall, ed., A Nation of States: Federalism at the Bar of the Supreme Court (New York: Garland Publishing, 2001), 42. 5

Ibid., 49.

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state integrity while maintaining protection for citizens through the national government.6 The direct national control over the South was seen as necessary until satisfactory recovery from the war was accomplished. Following the Civil War, the Union was left with what many interpreted as a failed South. Not only was its economy crippled, the established structure of aristocracy and slave labor was viewed as incompatible with the Northern vision. Major General Carl Schurz, a radical Republican, was asked by President Johnson to gather information on the conditions in the South in order to better form Reconstruction policy. The sights he saw confirmed his held beliefs on the Southern condition. In Shurz’s “Report on the Condition of the South,” he claims: It is not only the political machinery of the States and their constitutional relations to the general government, but the whole organism of southern society that must be reconstructed, or rather constructed anew, so as to bring it into harmony with the rest of American society.7

was sought through sweeping federal legislation, which required a closer relationship between the state and national government for effective implementation. SWEEPING FEDERAL ACTS The Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery, was ratified on December 6, 1865. As scholar Heather Cox Richardson notes, the significance of its passing was that it was the “first [amendment] in the history of the nation that expanded rather than limited the powers of the national government. Critically, the Thirteenth Amendment linked the African-American free workers to a stronger national government.”9 However, this notion of centralization might be over-exaggerated in the narrative of Reconstruction. Writing in 1897, Dunning points to the lack of evidence for those that claim this objective and suggests that the powers from the amendment were being pushed by the national government at the turn of the century rather than right after the Civil War: The idea that the amendment carried with it an enormous centralization of power in the general government had never been heard of during the long discussion of the resolution in Congress. It was a recently devised scheme of the consolidationists attempt to change the whole foundation of the government by interpretation.10

The only solution he saw for the South was integration into the Union and instilling it with the national spirit. In order to accomplish this, radicals envisioned a complete “revision of Southern society.”8 While completely changing the structure of the South was unrealistic, key reform 6

Ibid., 55.

7 Carl Schurz, as quoted in The Death of Reconstruction: Race, Labor, and Politics in the Post-Civil War North, 18651901 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 18. 8 Heather Cox Richardson, The Death of Reconstruction: Race, Labor, and Politics in the Post-Civil War North, 18651901 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 9.

While it is possible that the Thirteenth Amendment was not intended to have a centralizing ef9

Ibid., 14.

10 Dunning, Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction and Related Topics, 94-95.

Duke Political Science Standard fect, its passage brought the condition of African Americans much closer to the national government. Violations of the amendment frequently required federal action because the constitutionality was questioned. 11 This speedily flooded the circuit courts with cases as some areas had difficulty accepting the amendment. In response to the Thirteenth Amendment, southern states began to pass Black Codes in 1865 and 1866. These laws “[recreated] slavery in everything but name.”12 Although African Americans were now free, these laws restricted their freedom and forced them to work for remarkably low wages or to simply pay off debts. Additionally, the vagrancy law allowed freedpeople to be arrested and forced into involuntary labor. This was in complete defiance of the Thirteenth Amendment. Dunning is of the view that these codes were “a conscientious and straightforward attempt to bring some sort of order out of the social and economic chaos which a full acceptance of the results of war and emancipation involved.”13 It was too difficult for the South to change their strict hierarchical society overnight. However, representing these codes as a Southern attempt to “nullify the result of the war” enraged Northerners and they demanded action from Washington.14 The enforcement clause of the Thirteenth Amendment gave Congress the ability to combat this Southern tendency by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 11

defined the role that United States federalism had in protecting the rights of citizens. The U.S. Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Land, more commonly known as the Freedmen’s Bureau, was signed into existence by President Abraham Lincoln in 1865. The Bureau was formed as part of the War Department. The initial design was to bring relief to refugees experiencing the negative effects of the war. The benefits were available to white and black refugees who were suffering from the dislocation and the dismal conditions in the South. Initially, conservative Republicans were hesitant toward the establishment because they did not want to “convert the national government into a permanent dispenser of charity. The act was regarded as based entirely upon the war power of the government.” 16 Despite existing misgivings, it initially passed.

12 Thomas C. Mackey, ed. A Documentary History of the American Civil War Era: Vol. 1 Legislative Achievements (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 2012), 169.

The extension bill for the Freedmen’s Bureau was vetoed by President Johnson on Feb-

13 William Archibald Dunning, The American Nation Vol 22: Reconstruction Political and Economic, 1865-1877 (New York,: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1907), 58.

Ibid., 95.

Although initially vetoed by President Johnson on March 27, 1866, the Civil Rights Act passed on April 9, 1866. This gave the same protection rights of person and property for blacks. Freedpeople then had the ability to use the law in order to protect their interests. If local or state courts did not properly enforce this act, the issue could then be moved to federal or circuit courts. This was a huge expansion of federal power because it “charged the federal district courts, the federal district attorneys, and federal marshals to oversee these rights pursuant to this legislation and went so far as to authorize the president to use the military to enforce the act.”15 The act re-

Ibid., 59.

Mackey, A Documentary History, 169.

16 Dunning, Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction and Related Topics, 74.

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ruary 19, 1866. Never a believer in prolonged military jurisdiction, Johnson thought that such a social service agency should be left to local and state authorities or private persons.17 The original bill did not include legal supervision, which Johnson stated could only “by the very nature of man, be attended by acts of caprice, injustice, and passion.”18 He also shared conservative Republicans’ fear that such programs would lead to dependency on the federal government. A revised version of the bill was passed on July 3, 1866. Although Johnson tried to veto the bill, Congress overrode it. This is a clear example of the conflict that existed between the aims of the executive and Congress in the era of Reconstruction. The Congress that was in power envisioned greatly expanded powers of the federal government. The Civil War had also brought the federal government closer to the wallets of citizens. Previously, revenue for government activities came largely from tariffs. Due to the expenses generated by the War, the government had to begin implementing internal taxes.19 This led to the passing of the Internal Revenue Act of 1864,20 which taxed citizens on their incomes using tax brackets. With this came the need for additional federal duties and revenue officers. The War greatly expanded the responsibilities and jurisdiction of the federal government. 17 Paul H. Bergeron, ed. The Papers of Andrew Johnson (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1992), 120. 18 Andrew Johnson “Veto of the Freedmen’s Bureau Act, February 19, 1866,” as quoted in in A Documentary History of the American Civil War Era: Vol. 1 Legislative Achievements Thomas C. Mackey, ed. (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 2012), 151. 19 Charles Fairman, History of the Supreme Court of the United States Volume VII: Reconstruction and Reunion, Paul A. Freund, ed. and Stanley N. Katz, ed. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987), 375. 20

13 Stat. 223 (June 30, 1864).

PROBLEMS FACING THE NATION The Southern states were not particularly accepting of some of the federal reforms. Notably, both Texas and Mississippi both initially rejected the Thirteenth Amendment. In order to combat the influx of national presence, former Confederate states chose their best to represent them: “Southerners elected ex-Confederates to a spate of state positions and sent Confederate congressmen, generals, colonels and state officials to the U.S. Congress.”21 The very types that were seen as the enemies of effective Reconstruction were the ones that became leaders on the national stage. This dominance over the Southern political system caused concern for the minorities that could potentially be combatted. Those that were sympathetic to the Northern mission were frequently silenced by the ruling majority. Richardson notes how “white gangs had been abusing and intimidating ex-slaves since the war ended, torturing and even killing freedpeople unlucky enough to fall into their hands.”22 The newly freed blacks were lost to the control of local custom.23 State organizations were not helpful in preventing these transgressions because the continual electing of old Confederates simply institutionalized the harassment. Southern localism proved to even be disruptive on the federal courts. The presence of a strong judiciary was ineffective against the presence of prominent ex-Confederates who “evaded federal enforcement” and judges that succumbed to local pressures, such as Richard Busteed who 21

Richardson, 17.

Ibid.

23 Kermit L. Hall, “The Civil War as a Crucible for Nationalizing the Lower Federal Courts,” Prologue (Fall 1975: Vol. 7, No. 3), 4.

Duke Political Science Standard employed former rebels to serve as reporters in the court.24 If individuals possessed wealth and held the same prevailing opinions, the presence of a federal court was easily overcome. The hopes of Reconstruction dissolved in this seemingly inescapable system. In order to further protect minorities against the “rebel party,” some thought the only answer was to enhance federal judicial power. Kermit Hall explains that in the former Confederate States: Effective federal power, either in the form of judicial or military authority, would have to be brought to bear against pervasive local interests in the South. An augmentation of federal jurisdiction, while imperative, could not of itself provide sufficient protection. For the courts to be effective, they had to establish a presence sufficient to afford suitors ready access.25 As scholar William M. Wiecek aptly states, “To a court, jurisdiction is power.”26 Congress saw a potential solution to the shortcomings of Reconstruction in the expansion of the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Through this, the federal courts would partner with Congress in implementing the ambitious national policy. The years that followed the Civil War reshaped the jurisdiction of the federal courts.

JUDICIAL REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1862 Even in the midst of the Civil War, Congress took actions in order to support the federal judiciary. The Judicial Reorganization Act of 1862,27 passed in July 15, 1862, was the first phase of reconstruction in which “the republicans had achieved their avowed purpose of equalizing the circuits.”28 While it did not significantly push the establishment of an effective federal power in the South, it did eventually lead to larger reform. The act brought the newer states into the judicial system while adjusting the circuits to reflect population changes. An interesting facet of this change is that the federal courts in the southern states were treated as if everything was normal. Scholar Thomas C. Mackey notes how “this action aligns with and reflects the Lincoln administration’s position that the states were not out of the Union; rather, insurrectionary disloyal bands of men had taken over the southern states.”29 To many, these changes were long overdue. Before the Civil War, the South had substantial control in Washington. “Congressional over-representation in proportion to the rest of the country and an informal seniority system operated to preserve [Southern] power.”30 The sectional imbalance of the circuits was a concern that the act directly addressed. Some desired significant change in 1862. There were hostilities toward the Southern-dominated Supreme Court (discussed later at length) that inspired a reform of the high court. Congressional Republicans had previously steered 27

Ibid., 6.

Ibid., 4.

26 William M. Wiecek, “The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863-1875,” The American Journal of Legal History (1969: Vol. 13, No. 333), 333.

12 Stat. 576.

28 Stanley I. Kutler, Judicial Power and Reconstruction Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 17-18. 29

Mackey, A Documentary History, 91.

Kutler, Judicial Power, 14.

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away from drastic measures of change because they held on to the traditional ideas of judicial representation, federal courts representing regional interests, and that the number of Supreme Court justices should be derived from the number of circuit courts. However, the challenges of Reconstruction “brought new jurisdiction and a new role for federal courts in the South that challenged these traditional notions.”31 The tides of change were coming. While the act aimed high, it fell rather short of its goals. Members of Congress agreed to curb the act away from significant reform because newer states were “reluctant to forfeit their opportunity to gain a seat on the high court either by reducing the size of the Court or ending the practice of appointing justices from the circuits.”32 The plan that was ultimately decided upon reduced the number of entirely Southern circuits from five to three. John Bingham, a Republican Congressman from Ohio, argued that the act simply “reduced the number of circuits in the extreme south where they are not needed.”33 The refusal to affect regional diversity led to the act simply creating a court system dominated by northern interests. The Judicial Reorganization Act of 1862 failed to have an impact on Reconstruction due to the prevailing political interests. If anything, the act was rather detrimental. As Hall notes, by reducing the number of courts in the South, the act decreased “federal presence in the area where it would prove most necessary after hostilities ended. The Republicans’ concern was not with reconstruction but rather with regional and Party inter31

Hall, “The Civil War,” 4.

Ibid., 3.

33 Congressional Globe, 37 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 173, 2563.

ests in the Northwest and trans-Mississippi.”34 Rather than being motivated by the promise of a stronger South, the act was more about “rewarding Republican partisans in the Northwest.”35 In addition, the reorganization removed the obligation for Lincoln to appoint southerners to the Court. 36 While the legislation accomplished political goals of reducing the influence of the South, they removed the federal presence where it was needed most. Many issues for the courts remained unresolved. One of the most pressing problems facing the federal courts was the problem of a severe backlog in cases. The progressive legal reform that swept the nation increased the number of cases that would move from the state courts to the federal courts. In addition to the responsibility of implementing and enforcing the Reconstruction Amendments, “after the Civil War came statutes to promote and regulate economic growth, the enforcement of which fell to federal courts through the diversity jurisdiction or pursuant to statutory grants of jurisdiction.”37 In order to fix these, many turned their eyes toward the concept of circuit riding. Circuit riding was established in the Judiciary Act of 1789 along with the system of federal courts.38 The Supreme Court justices were designated as the judges for the circuit courts as well. The original reasons for this concept were that it saved money for the federal government, brought immediate attention to pressing cases at the state level, and kept the judges connected 34

Hall, “The Civil War,” 4.

Ibid., 4.

Kutler, Judicial Power, 62.

37 Russell R. Wheeler and Cynthia Harrison, Creating the Federal Judicial System, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Federal Judicial Center, 2005), 12. 38

1 Stat. 73.

Duke Political Science Standard with the local communities. In the early federal system, “favorable public opinion was necessary to ensure survival of the young Republic and the active and visible presence of the justices would help foster loyalty toward the new form of government and somewhat weaken the people’s previous allegiance to their state’s government.”39 While circuit riding received complaints from the justices, it was helpful for the early United States. However, as the nation grew, this practice had become detrimental to the judicial process. The 1862 act, while inspired by the crippled federal judiciary, did little to alleviate this problem. Historian Justin Crowe describes the desperate nature of the situation: The circuits were more populous and sprawling than ever before. This, despite the fact that their time and attention were desperately needed in Washington, D.C., where the accumulation of Supreme Court cases meant a delay of well over a year, justices were still, as they had since 1789, traveling the nation and dispatching local judicial business. In sum, with both district judges and Supreme Court Justices overworked and (in some opinions, at least) underpaid, the Republican plan to empower the federal judiciary had created an unworkable situation.40 With the need for effective federal law implementation growing and the justices becoming in39 Joshua Glick, “On The Road: The Supreme Court and the History of Circuit Riding,” Cardozo Law Review (April 2003: Vol. 24 No. 4), 1758. 40 Justin Crowe, Building the Judiciary: Law Courts, and the Politics of Institutional Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 153.

creasingly overworked, Congress futilely sought a solution. THE SEARCH FOR EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL REFORM Further compounding these problems was the passing of the Tenth Circuit Act in 1863. This act created a Tenth Circuit in order to incorporate the far West, which consisted of California and Oregon.41 Additionally, a new justiceship was created in order to give the people of the new district a much-desired presence on the Supreme Court. This not only created the peak in the number of authorized seats for justices, but it also created an even number on the Supreme Court. This would prove incredibly unproductive when the Court was faced with voting on difficult cases and would lead to an even greater lag on the cases being handled. This expansion seems like a poorly thought-out decision. Crowe claims that it was surely another political move by the Republicans that were seeking to “transform the Court into a Northern institution.”42 Without an answer to the problem, hopeful legislation continued to be proposed. In 1866, Senator Ira Harris, a Republican from New York, introduced a bill that would create an intermediate court of appeals and increase the controversy needed for an issue to reach the proposed courts and the Supreme Court. While this was a valiant attempt to solve the issue of backlog, it did not consider more radical measures such as ending circuit riding. The proposal “preserved judicial representation by perpetuating circuit riding, while attempting to clear the 41

12 Stat. 794.

Ibid., 154.

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docket of the Supreme Court by damming up the flood of appellate cases before they could reach the high court. The measure would also have abolished the circuit courts, giving their jurisdiction to the district courts.”43 However, before it could pass, drastic revisions would craft it into the Judicial Circuits Act of 1866. Some major downsides of the initial bill were that it would only increase the business for the judiciary. There was no authorization for additional judges to work in the proposed intermediate court of appeals so the workload for the justices would not decrease. It was predicted that district courts would become further bogged down with business and fewer cases would make it to the Supreme Court. By slowing the flow of appeal cases, the voice of minorities would be heard even less. It would have “[excluded] poor blacks from the intermediate appellate courts and the Supreme court.”44 While it passed the Senate, the bill never made it past the House committee. More effective judicial reform was needed. JUDICIAL CIRCUITS ACT OF 1866 On July 23, 1866, the Judicial Circuits Act of 1866 was passed.45 It reorganized the circuits and reduced them to the previous number of nine while also preventing the filling of seats on the Supreme Court until it reached seven. This removed the ability of President Johnson to appoint more justices and also reduced the number of completely Southern circuits. The speculated motivations for this drastic reform have ranged from hostility toward the Supreme Court to simple readjustment to populations and easing the flow of cases.

Many historians have pointed to the 1866 realignment as an attempt to end the Southern majority on the Supreme Court. By reducing the number of Justices and Southern districts, the opinions reached by the Supreme Court would no longer be a reflection of that region. Hall notes how the “bulk of the party seemed satisfied to break the Southern hold on the Supreme Court through a reshuffling of districts.”46 Mackey also states that this action was “partly out of fear that the Supreme Court might meddle with Congress’ reconstruction policies.”47 These speculated sentiments were derived from distrust in past rulings, which many saw as components in the breakdown in relations that led to the Civil War. The decision to end the Southern majority on the Supreme Court has been seen as the Republican Congress chasing the Dred Scott decision. In this case, Dred Scott, a slave, unsuccessfully sued for the freedom of himself and his family. Scott’s claim was that his time spent in free territories emancipated him. The Court ruled that African Americans could not sue in federal court because they were not recognized as American citizens. Many Americans were shocked by this opinion, which they saw as based on racist beliefs. In the conflict between the North and South over slavery, the court ruled in favor of the South and slavery. The dangers of the politicized Court are detailed by Ethan Greenberg: The Dred Scott Court became so absorbed in the pursuit of the political agenda of the slaveholding South—an agenda that the pro-slavery Justices considered noble and

Hall, “The Civil War,” 5.

Ibid.

Hall, “The Civil War,” 7.

14 Stat. 209.

Mackey, A Documentary History, 186.

Duke Political Science Standard worthwhile—that the Court compromised its intellectual integrity. In the view of the Dred Scott majority, protecting slavery was the highest form of patriotism—because the majority believed that it was anti-slavery sentiment and ‘agitation’ that threatened the integrity of the Union. The Dred Scott Court therefore intentionally misread the law, and it did so in order to safeguard slavery and the South’s way of life. Dred Scott was in essence a political, and not a legal decision; and insightful observers—both pro and anti-slavery— understood this point at the time the decision was rendered.48 The North’s trust in the Supreme Court was severely diminished after this decision. The opinion “radicalized large numbers of northern Republicans. It encouraged them to believe that there was a vast Southern conspiracy afoot to expand and even nationalize slavery.”49 Many historians blame the Supreme Court for destabilizing the constitutional system, which led to the Civil War. Wiecek even dramatically notes that “if war is too serious to be entrusted to the military, at times the American constitution is too serious to be relinquished to the judges.”50 This decision has been viewed as the continuation of great ills in American society. However, the revelations of revisionist history have cast this decision in a light which makes the distrust in the Supreme Court seem 48 Ethan Greenberg, Dred Scott and the Danger of a Political Court (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2009), 301. 49

Ibid., 319.

50 William M. Wiecek, “Slavery and Abolition Before the United States Supreme Court, 1820-1860,” Kermit L. Hall, ed., Freedom and Equality: Discrimination and the Supreme Court (New York: Garland Publishing, 2000), 427.

like less of a motivation for the judicial reforms. One counter argument to the claim that the 1866 act was motivated by the desire to end the Southern Supreme Court was that racism was prevalent in all parts of society. The Southern majority on the Supreme Court did not necessarily guarantee the outcome of the Dred Scott case. It was just a sign of the times. While highly critical of the decision, Greenberg reflects upon how “the almost universal racism of the pre-Civil War era pervades the Dred Scott decision”51 It is impossible to know whether a different decision could have been reached if the Court were comprised of more Northerners. If the majority truly believed that the Southern Supreme Court was detrimental to the promotion of justice, it would have faced harsher reform. The Republicans were not acting vindictively toward the Supreme Court by reducing the numbers because it had transformed significantly since the decision in 1857. It was well respected by Republicans at the end of the War. Don E. Fehrenbacher notes how “the Supreme Court itself was never in any serious danger during the Civil War” and that “Lincoln’s appointees to the Court (five within three years) made it increasingly respectable in Republican eyes, the climax coming when Salmon P. Chase succeeded Taney as [Chief Justice] in December 1864.”52 The Dred Scott decision was largely left to the past. Kutler reiterates this point by detailing that “the 1862 reorganization, deaths, resignations, and subsequent appointments to the high bench indeed had wrought great changes in that body since 1857. 51

Greenberg, Dred Scott, 312.

52 Don E. Fehrenbacher, Slavery, Law, and Politics: The Dred Scott Case in Historical Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 298.

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When the reduction measure came up in 1866, there were only three survivors from the Dred Scott decision.”53 If the Republican-dominated Congress was truly continuing to fight Dred Scott, combatting the Supreme Court of 1866 would not have resolved lingering grievances because the Court of 1857 was in the past. The decision to reduce the numbers of the Supreme Court was supported by the Republicans themselves. A similar proposal was drafted by Chief Justice Chase in 1855 when he was a senator.54 He argued that a smaller court of seven members would command more respect and encourage stability.55 Later on, once he was a Justice, the motivation for the decrease could have been a possible case of wanting higher pay and consolidating power. According to the accounts of Republican congressmen, Chase had privately offered a proposal in 1866 that “provided for a substantial increase in judicial salaries and new arrangements for the Court’s Marshal.”56 Chase obviously had his eye on reduction for some time, although his motivations may have varied. The support of the 1866 act by the Supreme Court could have been a planned political move as well. Chase and Justice Miller engaged in correspondence concerning the reduction action without much conflict. Miller talked about his urging of Republican Congressman James F. Wilson to support the salary increase. If Wilson, a Republican, truly intended to radically change the Supreme Court, this request would have been out of line. Instead, Kutler suggests that “Chase’s and Miller’s implied support for the reduction

bill might be explained as a tactical gesture in exchange for congressional passage of the circuit court bill.”57 Such a move would not have been an anomaly in Washington. The move to reduce the seats on the Court did not stand out to Justice Stephen J. Field. In his book, titled Personal Reminiscences, he “made no mention of the reduction incident in a chapter wholly devoted to postwar hostility against the Supreme Court.”58 If this truly was legislation born out of sentiments against the Supreme Court, Field surely would have mentioned this in his retelling of the crusade against the Court. Some have attributed the motivations behind the 1866 act to an anti-Johnson political maneuver. By removing his ability to appoint more judges, Johnson would have less influence in affecting the future of judicial decisions. However, it is possible that Johnson did not see this move as acting against him. He let the opportunity to pocket veto this act pass. Through a comparison of voting records, Kutler notes that there was “little correlation between ‘supporting’ the President on Court reduction and general support for him in opposition to congressional policies.” 59 If these were based on feelings of Congress against Johnson, the voting divisions would have been clearer. There is also the possibility that President Johnson did not take advantage of his veto powers in this bill because it would have been quickly overridden. In Johnson’s history with the Republican Congress, multiple executive vetoes were overridden. His vetoes on the Freedmen’s Bureau Acts and the Civil Rights Act had all been eventually overridden by Congress. Just seven days pri-

Kutler, Judicial Power, 51.

Ibid., 53.

Ibid., 55.

Fairman, History of the Supreme Court, 380.

Ibid., 56.

Kutler, Judicial Power, 54.

Ibid., 51.

Duke Political Science Standard or to the passing of the Judicial Circuits Act, his veto of the Freedmen’s Bureau Act was vetoed. Perhaps taking away Johnson’s ability to appoint a justice was the intention of Congress. Johnson’s failure to use his veto power could have been born out of disillusionment in his executive powers in the face of a progressive Republican Congress. Additionally, the 1866 act was not a partisan push by the Republican-dominated Congress. As Crowe notes, the “legislative record of the act includes neither a single expression of Republican vitriol toward Johnson nor a single Democratic accusation of Republican impropriety or partisan manipulation.”60 The smooth passage of this bill is in sharp contrast to the outrage following the Federalist Judiciary Act of 1801, which was regarded as a highly partisan decision. The Federalist Judiciary Act of 1801, while meant to reduce problems faced by the judiciary, was more about advancing Federalist policy interests by extending the power of the judiciary in the pursuit of commercial economic development.61 Such reform was seen as an assault on the federal judiciary. Although Federalists were able to pass the bill due to their fleeting majority in both the House and Senate, it was quickly repealed in March of the following year. While it could be argued that repeal was not possible under the Republicandominated bodies, there was a significant lack of debate concerning the passage of the 1866 act. The view of judicial reform being used by a vindictive Republican majority is outdated and over-exaggerated. Kutler provides a summary of these flawed arguments:

Strange it is to read vindictive motives against Andrew Johnson in the passage of a bill that he himself accepted. Strange it also is to find vindictive motives against the Supreme Court at a time, in July, 1866, when the Radicals had not yet been given sufficient reason for attempting to bridle or punish the justices. Finally, it is strange to attribute vindictive motives against the Court when its members may well have desired the legislation or, at least, seemed unperturbed by its passage.62 While seeing the 1866 act as a way to rid the judiciary of the memory of Dred Scott is understandable, it is also possible that the reduction and realignment was simply an attempt to finally create effective judicial reform. One reason supporting the decision to reduce the number of the Court was that an odd number was more favorable. The uneven number that was added in 1863, when the Tenth District was created, proved to be “unwieldy and detrimental to the Court’s business.”63 It only succeeded in heightening the severity of the backlog of cases and inability to clear dockets. While there was conflict in determining how to reorganize the district, there was no significant argument in determining the appropriate number of Judges.64 It was noted during arguments how even the Court was in favor of the proposal.65 The realignment of the circuit courts was undoubtedly inspired by the need to equalize the 62

Kutler, Judicial Power, 49.

Ibid.

Crowe, Building the Judiciary, 154.

64 Congressional Globe, 39 Cong., 1 sess., pp.3697-98 (July 10, 1866).

Ibid., 63-65.

Ibid., 3909 (July 18, 1866).

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population of the circuits. As shown in Table 1, the realignments from the Judicial Reorganization Act of 1862 attempted to account for the changes in population since the Judiciary Act of 1837. When the Tenth Circuit was added and proved to be worthless in promoting judicial efficiency, the necessity of further reform became more apparent. The reshuffling of circuits attempted to account for both population and regional interests. However, the Fifth Circuit became the only circuit that was comprised of solely former slave states. This is quite a reduction from the former three left after the 1862 act. Such a move was clearly not made in a political void. Concerns of

sectional representation in the judicial circuits motivated the Republican majority to limit the South through expansion of the judicial courts. With expanded Southern circuits, there was less national representation. It is difficult to claim that the 1866 act was not done out of necessity. While it was not primarily fueled by a severe dislike of the former Confederate states, the specifics of the reorganization were potentially inspired by political motivation of reducing the general influence of the South in Washington. As Kutler aptly states, “the Republican-ruled Congress thus tailored the judicial system of the United States to suit better the demands and needs of the dominant section and, of course, the dominant party.”66 While perhaps not an attack on the judiciary, the Judicial Circuits Act was the reshaping of the judicial circuits into the idea of post-War federal jurisdiction that some Republicans envisioned. LIMITATIONS OF THE JUDICIAL CIRCUITS ACT OF 1866 Similarly to much of the legislation passed following the war, the Judicial Circuits Act of 1866 had some unintended consequences. The inefficiency of the Supreme Court remained unresolved. Without abolishing circuit riding, the justices had to spend much of their time continuing to play a dual rule. While earlier drafts of similar bills by Ira Harris contained ideas on relieving the workload of justices, such as creating an intermediate court of appeals, none of this innovation was put into the Judicial Circuits Act. The dockets of the justices were not close to being cleared. Relief for this would come decades

Kutler, Judicial Power, 61. 66

Kutler, Judicial Power, 62.

Duke Political Science Standard later in the form of the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, which finally eliminated circuit riding and established the Circuit Courts of Appeal with additional judgeship.67 The Judicial Circuits Act was a half-hearted attempt at serious judicial reform. Additionally, the act failed to provide clarity on how to implement the changes. The act passed by Congress was found to be lacking instructions regarding how to assign the number of justices to the reduced number of circuits.68 It was unknown whether the Justice should serve the circuit that was previously assigned or go to the area that was the same as the old circuit. This matter would remain unresolved until almost a year later when it was established that allotments would be made by the Court or, if not in session, the Chief Justice.69 While Congress envisioned change, it was shortsighted in determining exactly how to get there. The largest failure in the Judicial Circuits Act of 1866 was that it actually decreased the judicial presence in the southern states. The sweeping reforms following Reconstruction called for increased jurisdiction. The expansion of jurisdiction demanded an increased judicial presence. Kutler notes how “after the reduction and realignment of 1866, only one southerner, Justice Wayne, remained to handle the exclusively southern 5th district.”70 The strong hand of federal justice in superseding state laws was less available to those that needed it most. Crowe declares that after the judiciary acts of the 1860s, “federal judicial presence in the South was weaker than it

26 Stat. 826.

Fairman, History of the Supreme Court, 416.

14 Stat. 433.

Kutler, Judicial Power, 62.

had ever been.”71 CREATION OF THE MODERN FOURTH CIRCUIT: DIVIDING THE CIRCUIT COURTS In order to compensate for the shortcomings of the Judiciary Acts in expanding federal presence in the South, the district courts were divided. The addition of a district court makes federal justice more accessible for the local community. Additionally, it brings in a wide range of personnel, from the district judge to deputy U.S. marshals. These marshals would “provide local representation for the federal government within their districts…and performed other routine tasks needed for the central government to function effectively.”72 Les Benedict notes how these judges played an important part in local politics because they “were sustaining prosecutions of State officers for failures to administer State law equally, whether or not the laws were discriminatory on their face.”73 Additionally, the administrative separation aided in funneling cases to federal courts. While the Judiciary Act of 1866 decreased the representation of the South in Washington, the division of district courts in the following years increased the judicial presence. After the reorganization of the circuit courts, the Fourth Circuit was composed of Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina and South Carolina. Over half of these states are composed of former members of the Confederacy. Both North Carolina and Virginia were split into 71

Crowe, Building the Judiciary, 156.

72 Frederick S. Calhoun, The Lawmen: United States Marshals and Their Deputies (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Press, 1989), 3. 73 Les Benedict, “Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court,” 67.

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Whereas the judge of the district court for the district of Virginia has failed to hold any terms of his court at Staunton and Wytheville: Resolved, that the Committee on Judiciary inquire whether any amendment to the law or any legislation is necessary in regard to said terms of the said court.78

more districts in the decade that followed the reorganization of the Fourth Circuit in 1866. It is my cautious theory that these were moves to increase federal presence in states that required the attention of Reconstruction legislation in the wake of the Civil War. Prior to the final division of Virginia on February 3, 1871,74 the legal community was local in character. As historians W. Hamilton Bryson and E. Lee Shepard observe, the “bar of Virginia in 1870 was dominated by former Confederate officers” and “Virginians were generally excluded from the national legal scene.”75 The results of the War did not remove power from those behind Confederate efforts. Even in 1878, District Judge Alexander Rives charged the grand jury with “habitual neglect or the special denial in civil or criminal suits involving the antipathies of race.”76 Obviously, this sort of dynamic would be counterproductive to the objectives of the federal government. Minorities could not easily access federal justice. The 1871 division was an attempt to increase federal presence in an area where it was easily ignored. Previous to the division, the only federal courts in Virginia were at Richmond and Norfolk.77 The issue of local authorities ignoring the responsibilities of the district court and the possibility of redistricting was brought forth by Senator John W. Johnston of Virginia: 74

This led to the 1871 resolution. Additionally, the legislation that decided the division of Virginia into an eastern and western district also called for “a district court and a circuit court be held twice yearly at Richmond, at Norfolk, and at Alexandria in the eastern district, and twice yearly at Lynchburg, at Danville, at Abingdon, and at Harrisonburg in the western district.”79 As a response to the less than satisfactory application of federal justice in Virginia, the districts were divided in order to increase the federal presence and ensure proper judicial function. In a continuation of bringing federal law to the South, North Carolina was similarly re-divided into eastern and western districts on June 4, 1872.80 During the War, the state courts of North Carolina were active, “exercised final jurisdiction, and in the absence of a Confederate Supreme Court, decisions of the State Supreme Court on constitutional questions could not be reviewed.”81 Activities did not immediately become normal following the War. Although Chief

16 Stat. 403.

75 W. Hamilton Bryson and E. Lee Shepard, “The Virginia Bar, 1870-1900,” Gerard W. Gawalt, ed. The New High Priests: Lawyers in Post-Civil War America (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984), 172. 76 Alexander Rives, Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 1002 (C.C.W.D.Va. 1878) (No. 18,259). 77 Inventory of Federal Archives in the States: Series II The Federal Courts, No. 45 Virginia (Richmond: The Historical Records Survey of Virginia, 1942), xxix.

78 Congressional Globe, 41 Cong., 2 sess., 1251 (February 14, 1870). 79 Inventory of Federal Archives in the States: Series II The Federal Courts, No. 45 Virginia, xxxii. 80

17 Stat. 215.

81 Inventory of Federal Archives in the States: Series II The Federal Courts, No. 32 North Carolina. (Raleigh: The Survey of Federal Archives, 1940), 3.

Duke Political Science Standard Justice Chase was assigned to the Fourth District during the 1866 reshuffling of districts, he refused to come into North Carolina “until military power had been removed and civil authority entirely restored.”82 Restoration of normal relations between the courts of North Carolina and the federal government were a key part of Reconstruction efforts. The division of the districts and ordered meeting times ensured that federal court activities would become normalized. Prior to the War, the federal courts of North Carolina were not very busy. The number of cases increased dramatically after the war due to disturbances of the war, “passage of the bankruptcy act, enforcement of the internal revenue laws, and regulation of interstate commerce.”83 This was claimed to be the justification behind the division of North Carolina Districts. While the increase in caseload is understandable, this division might have had underlying political motivations. If the history of the judges taking seats on the district courts of North Carolina is scrutinized, it becomes apparent that the splitting of the districts allowed Republican authorities to take hold of the judiciary. At the time of the division, the seat on the Eastern court was occupied by a George Washington Brooks, a Unionist. The division occurred six years into his term. After Washington Brooks, the seat was occupied by Republicans until 1909. When the Western district was created, Robert Paine Dick, a Republican, was the first to hold the seat of judgeship. This position was held by Republicans until 1935. However, a temporary position was created in 1919 by President Wilson because Judge James Edmund

Ibid., 4.

Ibid., 5.

Boyd refused to retire and leave the bench, yet was unable to fulfill his duties. This was filled by Judge Edwin Yates Webb, a Democrat, whose position became permanent after Boyd’s death.84 The changes brought about by the re-districting of North Carolina established a Republican federal judicial presence. The Fourth Circuit, as we now know it, was forged out of the fires left by the Civil War. The sweeping federal acts that were aimed at restoring normality to the Union required the presence of a larger federal government. There is nothing quite like a war to expand the power of central government. Although it is difficult to point to specific motivations, the Judicial Circuits Act of 1866 was successful in reducing southern influence in Washington. The re-districting that went on in the Fourth Circuit was a method of asserting federal authority in the former Confederacy. Through this increased presence, the federal courts were more accessible and able to better enforce national legislation. The structure of the modern Fourth Circuit echoes the issues born out of the fall of the Confederacy, and reflects how the federal government attempted to solve them through national legislation. ♦

84 “North Carolina,” The Judicial Research Initiative at the University of South Carolina (Retrieved April 26, 2014) <http://artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/juri/north_carolina.pdf>.

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REFERENCES Bergeron, Paul H., ed. The Papers of Andrew Johnson (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1992). Bryson, W. Hamilton and Shepard, E. Lee. “The Virginia Bar, 1870-1900,” Gerard W. Gawalt, ed. The New High Priests: Lawyers in Post-Civil War America (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984). Calhoun, Frederick S. The Lawmen: United States Marshals and Their Deputies (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Press, 1989). Crowe, Justin. Building the Judiciary: Law Courts, and the Politics of Institutional Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). Dunning, William Archibald. Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction and Related Topics (Norwood: Norwood Press, 1897). Dunning, William Archibald. The American Nation Vol 22: Reconstruction Political and Economic, 1865-1877 (New York,: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1907). Fairman, Charles. History of the Supreme Court of the United States Volume VII: Reconstruction and Reunion, Paul A. Freund, ed. and Stanley N. Katz, ed. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987).

a Political Court (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2009). Hall, Kermit L. “The Civil War as a Crucible for Nationalizing the Lower Federal Courts,” Prologue (Fall 1975: Vol. 7, No. 3). Harrison, Cynthia, and Wheeler, Russell R. Creating the Federal Judicial System, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Federal Judicial Center, 2005). Inventory of Federal Archives in the States: Series II The Federal Courts, No. 32 North Carolina (Raleigh: The Survey of Federal Archives, 1940). Inventory of Federal Archives in the States: Series II The Federal Courts, No. 45 Virginia (Richmond: The Historical Records Survey of Virginia, 1942). Kutler, Stanley I. Judicial Power and Reconstruction Politics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968). Les Benedict, Michael. “Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court,” Kermit L. Hall, ed., A Nation of States: Federalism at the Bar of the Supreme Court (New York: Garland Publishing, 2001).

Fehrenbacher, Don E. Slavery, Law, and Politics: The Dred Scott Case in Historical Perspective (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).

Les Benedict, Michael. “The Problem of Constitutionalism and Constitutional Liberty in the Reconstruction South,” Kermit L. Hall ed. and James W. Ely, Jr. ed., An Uncertain Tradition: Constitutionalism and the History of the South (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1989).

Glick, Joshua. “On The Road: The Supreme Court and the History of Circuit Riding,” Cardozo Law Review (April 2003: Vol. 24 No. 4).

Mackey, Thomas C., ed. A Documentary History of the American Civil War Era: Vol. 1 Legislative Achievements (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 2012).

Greenberg, Ethan. Dred Scott and the Danger of

“North Carolina,” The Judicial Research Initia-

Duke Political Science Standard tive at the University of South Carolina (Retrieved April 26, 2014) <http://artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/juri/north_carolina. pdf>. Richardson, Heather Cox. The Death of Reconstruction: Race, Labor, and Politics in the Post-Civil War North, 1865-1901, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001). Rives, Alexander. Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 1002 (C.C.W.D.Va. 1878) (No. 18,259). U.S. Congress. Congressional Globe. 46 vols.

Washington, DC, 1834–73. Wiecek, William M. “Slavery and Abolition Before the United States Supreme Court, 1820- 1860,” Kermit L. Hall, ed., Freedom and Equality: Discrimination and the Supreme Court (New York: Garland Publishing, 2000). Wiecek, William M. “The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863-1875,” The American Journal of Legal History (1969: Vol. 13, No. 333).

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Speak Softly but Share the “Big Stick”: German Leadership in Europe and Abroad, 1990-present Molly Walker Duke University, Trinity ‘16 Abstract Perhaps unlike any other nation, Germany’s past remains a significant influence on its future role in global leadership. This paper analyzes Germany’s current leadership in both Europe and the rest of the world from 1990 through the present day by examining Germany’s current role in the context of unification and the Nazi past. I argue that a lack of nationalistic feeling and a desire to look inward prevails in Germany due to the shadow cast by its Nazi past. I will illustrate my argument by looking at Germany’s fiscal and foreign policies, and will compare these policies with those of Japan to show how two different approaches to remembering the past can dictate a nation’s future level of nationalism and economic risk-taking. An emphasis on discipline and caution as a response to previous historical events may be the reason for Germany’s tendency to favor cooperative teamwork instead of individual leadership in current global affairs.

ollowing the Spanish American War, President Theodore Roosevelt seized the chance to flex America’s muscles during the late 1800s. He is famous for using the quote, “Speak softly, but carry a big stick,” to describe his goal of increasing America’s presence across the world.1 An enthusiastic leader at a time when change was desperately needed in the era of machine politics and harmful monopolies, Roosevelt saw an opportunity to dictate both national and international goals. In the wake of the 2008 global financial meltdown, in which manufacturinggiant Germany became the unsung hero of a Europe mired in austerity and bankrupt nations, one could argue that Germany was itself experiencing a Roosevelt-like opportunity for global domi1 “Theodore Roosevelt: 1901-1909.” The White House. 27 Nov. 2014.

nance. However, vivid memories of the past linger in the minds of many Germans, steering them away from vigorously asserting a strong leadership role that is not shared with other countries. When great strides toward leadership are made, these strides are then balanced by an almost “reflexive” action of minimization.2 In the aftermath of a period when Germany’s global dominance resulted in disaster, present-day Germany is hesitant to jump at the seemingly open chance to be a global leader due to a persistent lack of nationalism, a strong desire to look inward, and fears from German leaders about what it may mean for Germany to lead alone, when for so long the nation has sought to be a quiet team player. 2 Simon Bulmer and William E. Paterson, “Germany in the European Union: Gentle Giant or Emergent Leader?” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 72.1 (1996), 23.

Duke Political Science Standard HISTORICAL CONTEXT Even before both halves of Germany reunited in 1990, West Germany sought a policy of European integration and conciliation. Scholars Simon Bulmer and William Patterson identified this trend by examining initiatives undertaken by three of Germany’s recent post-war chancellors: Brandt, Schmidt, and Kohl.3 Both Bulmer and Patterson agree that the most recent of the three, Helmut Kohl, emerged as the most eager to integrate more deeply with Europe, something they term the “Europeanization” of Germany.4 Interestingly, this “elite-led” tradition of seeing Germany as intricately linked to the broader European community in the aftermath of unification was shared widely by the public, in which a survey revealed that only 29% of the German people felt comfortable with a Germany that exerted forceful leadership in the region.5 Indeed, whereas other major European players like France or Britain wanted to see the European Parliament loosen its grip on the strings of power in the early years post-unification, Germany was a staunch, if polite, proponent of the Parliament’s increased power.6 Most central to this tradition of Europeanization was the sincere desire “to secure international acceptance by European neighbors,” much like a chastised child who bows his head in order to enjoy recess privileges again.7 Perhaps with sweaty palms, united Germany did get an early shot at leading, in the form of being the President of the European Union in

Ibid., 10.

Ibid., 13.

Ibid., 12, 24.

Ibid., 29.

Ibid.

1994.8 However, the understanding that Germany had in assuming this position was one of collaboration. A 1994 article in The Economist writes that German philosophy in leading the EU would follow the axiom that “whatever Germany does in the world…it does with partners”.9 Nearly two decades later, former UK minister for Europe Denis McShane claims that current German Chancellor Angela Merkel has “no one to partner with” in guiding Europe forward, and therefore Germany has been decidedly hesitant to slide into the driver’s seat without an assertive passenger at its side.10 In fact, Stephen Szabo of the Transatlantic Academy says that German law constricts Merkel from taking a stronger unilateral role, given that the German political system “was designed to make strong leadership difficult to achieve.” For example, the Bundestag elections are designed so that even small parties are able to retain representation. As a result, this means that multiple parties fill the available seats.11 Thus, chancellors are often beholden to carefully crafted multi-party coalitions, in which various parties make concessions to one another in order to decide upon a government formation. Because of this electoral system, there is no clear mandate for the chancellor to do as he or she sees fit – instead, there are many compromises to be made regarding major decisions. Examining a different executive office, one can see that post-war German presidents now occupy a role that is diminished since the days of Hindenburg, when emergency decrees could be 8 “Germany’s Europe.” The Economist 331.7867 (Jun. 11, 1994), 45-46. 9

Ibid.

10 “Is Germany Really Leading Europe?” Carnegie Europe: Judy Asks. 26 June 2013. 11 Leon Mangasarian. “How Germany’s Election System Works: What to Watch for Today.” Bloomberg. 21 Sept. 2013.

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enacted to circumvent a recalcitrant Bundestag. Now, post-war German presidents execute only the most basic functions, like receiving and accrediting envoys, granting pardons, and overseeing civil servant appointments.12 As such, in the aftermath of WWII, German political systems display a penchant for empowering institutions based on cooperation versus those based on individual leadership. It only makes sense that the nation has internalized these policies on the global stage as well. MODERN DILEMMAS: MONETARY POLICY Even before today’s global financial crisis, Germany used monetary policy as a symbol of its commitment to acting as a moral-bound team player within Europe—an important testament to its willingness to recognize its past. NYU scholar Christiane Lemke quoted an editorial in The New that noted Germany’s use of the euro to “enshrine the larger Germany in a new European order to ease its neighbor’s fears”—a move that would invest in the new single currency a meaning far greater than that of just exchange. At that time, Germany saw the euro as the “monetary equivalent of the ugly yet necessary military compact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.”13 Today, German fiscal policy is still predicated upon such notions that monetary discipline can act as a method of remembering and atoning for the past. As the global recession imperiled Eurozone nations from Greece to Spain, heads swiv12 “Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.” Deutscher Bundestag. Oct. 2010. 50-51. <https://www.btgbestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf>. 13 Christiane Lemke, “Germany’s EU Policy: Domestic Discourse.” German Studies Review: 33.2 (The John Hopkins University Press: 2010), 503.

eled toward the sulking elephant in the room with a wallet full of cash and negligible amounts of debt: Germany. And yet, despite the leadership vacuum that presents the country with the ability to seize the crown as Europe’s most powerful nation, it has remained an ardent supporter of increased Europeanization that spreads power out instead of concentrating it. In 2011, the Polish Foreign Minister was quoted as saying he “feared German inactivity more than I fear German action.”14 When Germany did step up to the plate and dole out cash to financially-strapped nations, it did so based on the promise that recipients would approve increased “European oversight of budgets,” a tactic that reveals a tendency toward “more Europe, not less” in regards to power structures that hinge upon relative levels of nationalism.15 It is not hard to imagine why Germany has carved out this policy for itself, given that despite its payments to a bankrupt Greece, Athenians still protested with signs of Angela Merkel donning the infamous Hitler mustache.16 Perhaps these instances strike fear into the hearts of German officials who, according to Open Europe Berlin think-tank leader Michael Wohlgemuth, “want to be loved and not hated by others” abroad. For Germany to be seen doing too much by itself often results in negative perceptions, which prompts the nation to think twice before taking a leadership role in which they are the only face for the international or regional community to focus on. An article by The Economist entitled “The Reluctant Hegemon” is an accurate summa14 Alan Little. “Why is Germany so Reluctant to Take a Lead in Europe?” BBC News: Europe. 18 Sept. 2013. 15

Ibid.

Duke Political Science Standard tion of the current situation, painting Germany as seeking to be “a bigger version of Switzerland: economically prosperous, politically modest.”17 There is no doubt Germany is indeed economically well positioned: in 2013, the nation’s trade surplus was nearly $300 billion, and Germany is the lead exporter in Europe.18 Despite this status, Germany practices extremely “risk-averse” fiscal policies within its borders. As a result, pundits have argued that Germany is stifling even greater internal growth, not to mention international economic stability, by keeping a tight seal on its coffers. The Washington Post columnist Charles Lane claims that Germany engages in these policies as a result of “the past century of hyperinflation, dictatorship and war.” Saving and strict financial policy becomes a sort of moral mantra for Germany to follow, a prescription that prevents the country from breaking those rules when other Eurozone nations need extraordinary fiscal help that falls outside of those moral monetary boundaries. German philosopher Theodore Adorno forecasted this sort of “malaise” in the face of relative personal prosperity in 1959, writing that Germans were “discomforted” by the feeling of prosperity.19 “Resentment strikes every happiness,” he said, and “humanity begrudges itself the comfort it all too well knows is still paid for by want and hardship.” Adorno claims that even when Germans do well economically, they are never too far away from feeling that the “economic upswing” could suddenly turn into 17 “Germany and Europe: The Reluctant Hegemon.” The Economist. 15 June 2013. 18 Charles Lane. “From Germany, an Economic Berlin Wall.” The Washington Post. 12 Nov. 2014. 19 Theodore Adorno. “The Meaning of Working through the Past.” 1959. Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, (New York: Columbia UP, 1998), 97.

a downward spiral—an emotional rollercoaster that he claims Germans are constantly worried will be “channeled up” and “manipulated to provoke a renewal of disaster.”20 Perhaps this philosophical analysis from the past offers some explanation for the austerity Germany champions in the present. Germans pay high tax rates and pay energy costs allegedly forty percent higher than companion countries, all in the name of preserving a balanced budget. The EU has released nation-specific recommendations urging Germany to reduce the “tax-wedge” on the working class.21 If Germany were to change course and relax its strict policies, it is possible Germany would see even more economic growth—but at the cost of setting a “moral hazard” that invites other nations to engage in risky financial behavior.22 Germany thus sees itself as morally bound in the world of economic policy, perhaps as a sort of retribution for an immoral past. In fact, Lane sees “fiscal discipline” acting as a way of accounting for the past where “modesty” is operationalized as a monetary version of “virtue.”23 Stepping outside the lines of these rules and guidelines just feels too dangerous and perhaps too reckless. As such, Germany does not want to pursue the rule-breaking route that Eurozone leadership requires. MODERN DILEMMAS: FOREIGN/DEFENSE POLICY With the destabilization of Eastern Europe during the summer of 2014, Germany has seen its 20

Ibid.

21 “EU Recommendations for Germany—2011-2014.” European Commission. 22 “Germany and Europe: The Reluctant Hegemon.” The Economist. 23 Charles Lane. “From Germany, an Economic Berlin Wall.” The Washington Post. 12 Nov. 2014.

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foreign policy clout rise dramatically—and yet it continues to try to look inward to balance out this rise in importance. Anne Applebaum, journalist and panelist during a recent German debate about Europe’s future, noted the lack of significance Germany’s role in international affairs held for the debate’s audience. When Ms. Applebaum mentioned a few particularly divisive topics, including Russia’s renewed aggressiveness, she recalls that the crowd simply “nodded” before “immediately changing the subject.”24 “Instead of NATO, the German audience wanted to discuss genetically modified food and chickens washed in chlorinated water,” she suggests. Germans perhaps are uncomfortable with the idea of “grand strategy,” something that may reek of Nazi-era plans to conquer the East and deport Jews and other persecuted groups.25 In fact, although Germany did ultimately send troops to Afghanistan, much to the displeasure of the German public, the nation only sent less than one percent of the number America sent, and they operated under “restricted” rules of engagement.26 Furthermore, this ingrained distaste for intricate international strategy is also seen in regards to the current Iran nuclear negotiations, in which Jeffrey Herf asserts that there exists strong support within Germany for the abolishment of any talk about involving militaristic force.27 By minimizing Germany’s active role in international security missions whenever possible, Germany insulates itself from having to take a bold, singular stance on the international stage. It is far easier for Germany to embed itself 24 Anne Applebaum. “Is Germany Ready to Assume a Global Role?” The Washington Post. 14 Nov. 2014. 25

Ibid.

26 Herf, Jeffrey. “Berlin Ghosts.” New Republic. 24 March 2011. 27

Ibid.

in diplomatic discussions than to put troops on the group, which could prompt other nations to accuse Germany of crossing the line set by their past. In fact, wherever Germany does elect to display uncanny leadership in the realm of foreign policy, it is often when the nation plays the part of a mediator between two opposing groups. Perhaps this niche comes out of a desire to “craft a new identity” that erases the “belligerent Deutschland of the past” in favor of “a new, peaceful, conciliatory Berlin [that] will broker peace on the continent.”28 In this situation, Germany occupies a unique space in that it joins the “winner” of the problem as a team, rather than being the winning (or losing) party itself. It is a partnership, where blame for potentially dangerous consequences can be shared. Such a role reduces Germany’s time in the global spotlight, something that is in keeping with the “politically modest” role that Germany seeks to maintain in the international sphere. In fact, Germany’s role as a mediator is perhaps most interesting when one considers the place where the nation has been a longstanding fixture in mediating heated debates: Israel.29 German foreign intelligence agency Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) works with Israel to negotiate with terrorist groups, and the Council of Foreign Affairs reports that the agency’s president “spent weeks at a time in the Middle East brokering exchanges.” And yet, the global public is widely unaware of this pivotal role Germany plays in the Middle East. The same Council of Foreign Affairs article states that 28 Paul Hockenos. “Merkel in the Middle.” Foreign Policy. 16 May 2014. 29 Lauren Harrison. “The German Connection: An Unlikely Middle East Mediator Works in the Shadows.” Foreign Affairs: Council on Foreign Relations. Nov. 10 2014.

Duke Political Science Standard when a few German officials were told about the important negotiations Germany had participated in regarding Israeli-Middle Eastern affairs, they were “genuinely surprised.”30 When asked why Germany is involved in these missions, former BND president August Hanning replies that the motivation is “purely humanitarian.” Perhaps as a mediator of prisoner releases that ultimately helps Israel, Germany finds a way to pay some sort of modern retribution. At the same time, mediation typically results in a solution that involves multiple countries—and thus Germany is protected from being seen as an aggressive foreign power dictating policy outside of its territory. COMPARISON: GERMANY VS. JAPAN Germany was not the only nation to atone for a brutal past in the aftermath of WWII. Japan was also guilty of despicable actions toward the Korean and Chinese people throughout the 1800s and during WWII. In one example that eerily mirrors the actions taken by Nazi Germany’s Dr. Mengele, the Japanese conducted their own series of “horrific medical experiments” within the notorious Unit 731.31 In fact, a 1920 pamphlet published by the Sacramento Bee predicted Japan’s future similarities to Germany, calling the Asian nation “the Germany of Asia”.32 However, Germany and Japan took sharply divergent paths in terms of acknowledging their world roles after the war. When Germany unified in the late 1980s, it continued an existing trend toward European 30

Ibid.

31 Jennifer Lind. “The Perils of Apology.” Foreign Affairs: Council on Foreign Relations. May/June 2009. 32 Valentine S. McClatchy. “The Germany of Asia; Japan’s policy in the Far East, her ‘peaceful penetration’ of the United States, how American commercial and national interests are affected.” The Sacramento Bee. 1920.

integration, seeking to immerse itself in the world it had previously sought to destroy. Japan, on the other hand, spent much of its postwar period distancing itself from Asia with the intent of isolating itself. In the world of foreign and monetary policy, Japan is Germany’s foil, and by comparing the two countries it becomes apparent how Germany’s own brand of memory has shaped its current retreat from a lone leadership position on the international stage. Where Germany is committed to European integration and cultivates a society in which national pride is taboo, Japan is outspoken in its assertion of nationalism and its penchant for isolation. According to Foreign Policy magazine, Japan is in constant pursuit of a permanent UN Security Council seat and seeks to take its “rightful place in the hierarchy of nations.”33 Similarly, in 2005 Japanese author Masahiko Fujiwara suggested that his brethren “should stop trying to learn English altogether as this would help preserve a barrier between their own exceptional culture and the rest of the world.”34 By contrast, nearly 56% of the German population, excluding military members, speaks English.35 In fact, when Netflix Germany launched in September of 2014, it provided movies in both English and German, suggesting that the market for English language television was large.36 Instead of trying to shore up friendships with countries the nation previously victimized, Japan continues to antagonize South Korea and China on a routine basis. For 33 Pilling, David. “Why is Japan So Different?” Foreign Policy. March 17, 2014. 34

Ibid.

35 “List of countries by English-speaking population.” Google Fusion Tables. 36 “Netflix Launches in Germany (in English too)”. The Local: Germany’s News in English. Sept. 15 2014.

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instance, in 2013 the Japanese Prime Minister was photographed in a plane bearing the ominous numbers of the aforementioned Japanese medical unit 731, inflaming South Koreans who saw it as a planned admonishment of their recent calls for Japan to properly apologize for the enslavement of Korean women during the 1900s.37 Contrastingly, even in 1995 Helmut Kohl was quoted at a Moscow commemoration ceremony, as publically apologizing for the “millionfold misery” that his nation had “brought to the Russians and the people of the Soviet Union.”38 It is worth noting that because this instance took place just after the Cold War, tensions between East and West were arguably present—yet Germany was still making efforts to reintegrate with its former enemies. Where Germany has sought to blend in with its former enemies and immerse itself in its neighbors, Japan has opted for the path of isolation and nationalism. Similarly, much unlike Germany’s attempts to lead from behind on international matters of security for fear or provoking unsavory memories, Japan actively engages in formidable militaristic exercises. Instead of going for the more neutral route of negotiations and diplomatic mediation that Germany has sought, Japan is actively engaged in military exercises over a “bitter island row” with China regarding a few islands in the East China Sea.39 Additionally, Japan has a

hefty defense budget—almost fifty billion USD.40 Germany, in contrast, spends less than the NATOrecommended two percent of national GDP on military spending.41 Where Germany has forgone military advancement for fear of evoking a past in which the nation pursued territorial policies such as Lebensraum, Japan has moved full-speed ahead in vigorously asserting territorial rights.42 Lastly, Japan has chosen an economic path dissimilar from that of Germany, showing a distinct difference in how both countries choose to remember their pasts through fiscal policy. While this paper has shown Germany to be a moralistic and tight budgeter that sees too much internal prosperity as a breach of virtue, Japan has engaged in a massive stimulus package leaving its debt-GDP percentage the “worst among industrialized nations.”43 Risk-averse Germany, perhaps emboldened by the constant memory of how their prosperity came into being in the first place, seeks to save and conserve in the name of moral and fiscal discipline. Japan, by contrast, has pursued a “now-or-never” policy that the Deutsche Welle, the German official international news outlet, claims has overtly “nationalistic motives.”44 It is worth noting that a German publication calls Japan out on this instrumentalization of economics for building a national identity, yet Germany itself has done something similar—albeit in a different way. 40 Pierre Bienaimié. “Japan’s Military is Revving Up to Meet China’s Growing Regional Ambitions.” Business Insider. 19 Nov. 2014.

37 Julian Ryall. “Japan’s Regional Isolation Higher than Ever.” Deutsche Welle. May 20 2013. 38 Bill Niven, Facing the Nazi Past: United Germany and the Legacy of the Third Reich, (New York: Routledge, 2011), 113. 39 “U.S., Japan To Conduct Joint Military Drill for Island Defense.” Reuters. 21 Oct. 2014.

41 Alison Smale. “Seeking Global Role, German Military Stumbles.” The New York Times. 29 Sept. 2014. 42 Pierre Bienaimié. “Japan’s Military is Revving Up to Meet China’s Growing Regional Ambitions.” 43 Fritz, Martin. “A Strong Economy, a Strong Japan.” Deutsche Welle. May 17 2013. 44

Ibid.

Duke Political Science Standard CONCLUSION Whereas Teddy Roosevelt carried a big stick and saw the chance to shape the world by capitalizing on the present, Germany shares the stick in favor of keeping a close eye on the past. Using fiscal and foreign policy to anchor itself as a team player within Europe and abroad, Germany operates in the “shadows” as a mediator between nations and employs strict fiscal measures to maintain a mindset of discipline and saving.45 The comparison between Japan and Germany only furthers this point, showing how two radically different approaches to remembering the past can dictate a nation’s future levels of nationalism and economic risk-taking. As Europe continues to face conflict on its own soil with the Ukraine-Russia standoff and the danger of bankruptcy for several southern European nations, it remains to be seen whether Germany will take the opportunity to act on its significant role as both a negotiator and a purse. If the past is any indication, Germany will continue quietly driving along—but only if its neighbors are along for the ride. ♦

45 Lauren Harrison. “The German Connection: An Unlikely Middle East Mediator Works in the Shadows.”

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REFERENCES

Adorno, Theodore. “The Meaning of Working through the Past.” 1959. Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords. New York: Columbia UP, 1998. 89-103. Print. Applebaum, Anne. “Is Germany Ready to Assume a Global Role?” The Washington Post. 14 Nov. 2014. Web. <http://www. washingtonpost.com/opinions/anne-applebaum-is-germany-ready-to-assumea-global-role/2014/11/14/2c4af52a6c1c-11e4-a31c-77759fc1eacc_story. html?hpid=z3>. “Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.” Deutscher Bundestag. Oct. 2010. Web. 27 Nov. 2014. <https://www.btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80201000.pdf>. Bienaimié, Pierre. “Japan’s Military is Revving Up to Meet China’s Growing Regional Ambitions.” Business Insider. 19 Nov. 2014. Web. 4 Dec. 2014. <http://www.businessinsider.com/japan-military-increasessouth-china-sea-2014-11>. Bulmer, Simon and William E. Paterson. “Germany in the European Union: Gentle Giant or Emergent Leader?” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-). 72.1 (1996). pp. 9-32. Web. 27 Nov. 2014. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2624746>. “Election of Members of the German Bundestag.” Deutscher Bundestag. Web. 27 Nov. 2014. <http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/ bundestag/elections/electionresults/election_mp/245694>. “EU

Recommendations for Germany—2011-2014.” European Commission. Web. 4 Dec. 2014. <http://ec.europa.eu/

europe2020/pdf/csr2014/challenges2014_ germany_en.pdf>. Fritz, Martin. “A Strong Economy, a Strong Japan.” May 17 2013. Web. 27 Nov. 2014. <http://www.dw.de/a-strong-economy-astrong-japan/a-16820646>. “Germany’s Europe.” The Economist Jun 11 1994: 45-6. ProQuest. Web. 15 Nov. 2014 <http://search.proquest.com/docview/2241 18454?accountid=10598>. “Germany and Europe: The Reluctant Hegemon.” The Economist. 15 June 2013. Web. <http://www.economist.com/news/ leaders/21579456-if-europes-economiesare-recover-germany-must-start-lead-reluctant-hegemon>. Harrison, Lauren. “The German Connection: An Unlikely Middle East Mediator Works in the Shadows.” Foreign Affairs: Council on Foreign Relations. Nov. 10 2014. Web. 27 Nov. 2014. <http://www.foreignaffairs. com/articles/142283/lauren-harrison/thegerman-connection>. Herf, Jeffrey. “Berlin Ghosts.” New Republic. 24 March 2011. Web. 27 Nov. 2014. <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/ world/85702/germany-libya-interventionqaddafi-merkel>. Hockenos, Paul. “Merkel in the Middle.” Foreign Policy. 16 May 2014. Web. 27 Nov. 2014. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/16/angela_merkel_in_the_ middle_germany_putin_russia_east_west_ america_freunde>. “Is Germany Really Leading Europe?” Carnegie Europe: Judy Asks. 26 June 2013. Web. <http://carnegieeurope.eu/ strategiceurope/?fa=52216>. 27

Duke Political Science Standard Lane, Charles. “From Germany, an Economic Berlin Wall.” The Washington Post. 12 Nov. 2014. Web. <http://www.washingtonpost. com/opinions/charles-lane-from-germanyan-economic-berlin-wall/2014/11/12/e8d8deb4-6a8c-11e4-a31c-77759fc1eacc_story.html?hpid=z3>. Lemke, Christiane. “Germany’s EU Policy: Domestic Discourse.” German Studies Review: 33.2 (2010). The John Hopkins University Press. JSTOR. Web. 28 Nov. 2014. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20787989>.

“Netflix Launches in Germany (in English too)”. The Local: Germany’s News in English. Sept. 15 2014. Web. 27 Nov. 2014. <http:// www.thelocal.de/20140915/netflix-tolaunch-in-germany-this-week>. Niven, Bill. Facing the Nazi Past: United Germany and the Legacy of the Third Reich. New York: Routledge, 2011. Print.

Lind, Jennifer. “The Perils of Apology.” Foreign Affairs: Council on Foreign Relations. May/June 2009. Web. 27 Nov. 2014. <http:// www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64975/ jennifer-lind/the-perils-of-apology>.

Pilling, David. “Why is Japan So Different?” Foreign Policy. March 17, 2014. Web. 27 Nov. 2014. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ articles/2014/03/17/why_is_japan_so_different>.

“List of countries by English-speaking population.” Google Fusion Tables. Web. 27 Nov. 2014.<https://www.google.com/fusiontables/DataSource?docid=1a429cDOixqWnl O0D0Z2uOYexqUjPLvgXVyz3HT4>.

Ryall, Julian. “Japan’s Regional Isolation Higher than Ever.” May 20 2013. Web. 27 Nov. 2014. <http://www.dw.de/japans-regionalisolation-higher-than-ever/a-16824957>.

Little, Alan. “Why is Germany so Reluctant to Take a Lead in Europe?” BBC News: Europe. 18 Sept. 2013. Web. <http://www. bbc.com/news/world-europe-24037698>.

Military Stumbles.” The New York Times. 29 Sept. 2014. Web. 4 Dec. 2014. <http:// www.nytimes.com/2014/09/30/world/europe/german-militarys-problems-prompttalk-of-more-defense-spending.html?_ r=0>.

Mangasarian, Leon. “How Germany’s Election System Works: What to Watch for Today.” Bloomberg. 21 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 Nov. 2014. <http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/2013-09-21/how-germany-s-election-system-works-what-to-watch-for-today.html>. McClatchy, Valentine S. “The Germany of Asia; Japan’s policy in the Far East, her ‘peaceful penetration’ of the United States, how American commercial and national inter-

ests are affected.” The Sacramento Bee. 1920. University of California Digital Library. 27 Nov. 2014.< https://archive.org/ details/germanyofasiajap00mcclrich>.

Smale, Alison. “Seeking Global Role, German

“Theodore Roosevelt: 1901-1909”. The White House. Web. 27 Nov. 2014. <http://www. whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/theodoreroosevelt>. “U.S., Japan To Conduct Joint Military Drill for Island Defense.” Reuters. 21 Oct. 2014. Web. 4 Dec. 2014. <http://www.reuters. com/article/2014/10/21/us-usa-japan-defence-idUSKCN0IA1BL20141021>.

Spring 2015

The Rational Actor Model as an Explanation for the 2001 Hainan Island Incident Dana Raphael Duke University, Trinity ‘17

y 1994, the Sino-American relationship that President Richard Nixon had so carefully nurtured began to sour. Beginning with Clinton’s policy of giving increased support to Taiwan, and continuing with the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) missile exercises in the Taiwan Strait and the U.S. accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade,1 tensions rose between China and the

U.S. In 2001, the United States would be faced with a crucial foreign policy decision that would shape Sino-American relations for years to come. On the first of April, a U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane conducted a routine mission in international airspace about 70 miles off the coast of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) Hainan Island2. After executing several close passes in “an apparent attempt to impress or intimidate” the American crew, it appeared that a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) F-8 fighter jet pilot miscalculated and accidently collided with the 1 “30 Years of U.S. - PRC Diplomatic Relations: Chronology of Bi-Lateral Relations,” Embassy of the United States Beijing China, accessed March 6, 2015, http://beijing. usembassy-china.org.cn/bilateral.html. 2 Shirley Kan et al., China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments and Policy Implications, CRS Report RL30946, (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 10 October 2001), accessed March 6, 2015, available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30946.pdf. pg 1.

EP-3 plane.3 The EP-3 made an emergency landing on Hainan Island after issuing numerous unanswered distress calls; the F-8 fighter crashed and the pilot was declared dead. The PRC subsequently detained the twenty-four American crewmembers for eleven days,4 refusing their release until the U.S. issued a formal apology for the incident. While the U.S. initially refused to issue an apology, blaming the Chinese for the incident, the U.S. reversed that decision and issued a formal apology in order to secure the return of the captured Americans. Although certain explanatory models, such as leader type, can explain portions of the U.S. response to the Hainan Island incident, the rational actor model most sufficiently explains the U.S. response due to the unitary pursuance of national self-interest through cost/benefit calculations. The first section of this paper shall establish the U.S. as a unitary actor. The second section shall use the first phase of the rational actor model (RAM)—the identification of the problems, identification and rankings of goals, gathering of relevant information, and identifying courses of action—to explain the choices the U.S. faced. The 3 Kan, China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001, pg 1. 4 Ibid., 2.

Duke Political Science Standard third section shall use the second phase of RAM— assessing the consequences of possible courses of action and then selecting the optimal decision— to elucidate the reasoning for issuing an apology. The fourth section examines RAM as a continued explanation after the crewmembers were released, followed by the fifth section that provides leader type as an alternative but insufficient explanation for the U.S. response. The final section shall elucidate the lessons learned and examine how the 2001 incident affects continuing Sino-American tensions over U.S. reconnaissance flights. OTHER EXPLANATORY MODELS AND THE UNITARY ACTOR Other models of analysis of foreign policy decisions, such as bureaucratic politics, rely on looking at the state as non-unified, highlighting the roles of individual decision-makers. According to scholar Derek Beach, states are rarely unitary actors with a single national interest; many players within the state often have conflicting goals.5 According to scholar Glenn Hastedt, “unitary” means that a “state can be viewed as calculating and responding to external events as if it were a single entity.”6 However, the Hainan Island incident is a great example of one of the few times the state truly acted unitarily, perhaps due to a rally around the flag effect produced by the fact that the PRC was holding twenty-four Americans. If the state were not unitary, an analyst would expect to find competing interests or players within the government, yet there is little public evidence of this. President Bush had support from both congres5 Derek Beach, Analyzing Foreign Policy (New York: Pelgrave Macmillan, 2012), pg 117. 6 Glenn Hastedt, American Foreign Policy, 9th ed. (Boston: Pearson, 2011), pg 223.

sional Republicans and Democrats in condemning the PRC’s detainment of the Americans, as well as the desire to see their return.7 Secretary of Defense David Rumsfeld, whose troops were the ones being detained, did not have any public role.8 The Ambassador to China, Joseph Prueher, who was appointed during President Clinton’s administration, communicated the U.S. demands to free the twenty-four Americans. Each of these groups and people did not stray from the goal of rescuing the Americans, and they communicated that goal in a very singular way. According to professor of international relations Daniel Drezner, those wanting to ratchet up Sino-American tensions “missed a golden opportunity” by not doing so, maintaining state cohesion.9 Because of this cohesion and singularity, the U.S. can be seen as a unitary actor, a crucial part of establishing the conditions under which RAM functions. As a result, according to Hastedt, there is no need to examine governmental organizations, politics, or personalities in trying to understand why the state selected a particular policy; the state can be treated as a “black box”: responding with once voice to the challenges that confront it.10

7 Alison Mitchell, “Collision with China: Capital Hill; Anti-China Coalition in Congress Is Emboldened,” The New York Times, April 5, 2001, accessed March 6, 2015, http:// www.nytimes.com/2001/04/05/world/collision-with-chinacapital-hill-anti-china-coalition-in-congress-is-emboldened. html. 8 David Sanger and Steven Lee Myers, “How Bush Had to Calm Hawks in Devising a Response to China,” The New York Times, April 13, 2001, accessed March 6, 2015, http:// www.nytimes.com/2001/04/13/world/13POLI.html. 9 Daniel Drezner, “Just a Wee Bit of the Old Historical Revisionism,” Foreign Policy, July 5, 2007, accessed March 6, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2007/07/05/just-a-wee-bitof-the-old-historical-revisionism/. 10

Hastedt, American Foreign Policy, 223.

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RAM: THE FIRST PHASE According to RAM theory, given a set of clearly ranked goals which it wants to achieve, and using the available information, the state will determine which choice will maximize the achievement of their goals with the lowest possible amount of risk. In short: RAM is the maximization of goals and the minimization of costs. Beach divides RAM into two phases, the first of which identifies the problems, goals, information, and available options for the state.11 The U.S. very quickly identified the problems they faced in the crisis: The PRC endangered a routine U.S. reconnaissance mission and caused the EP-3 to make an emergency landing. The PRC had captured twenty-four Americans. The PRC had possession of an EP-3 reconnaissance plane containing highly sensitive and classified information. Both countries disagreed over the cause of the crash: the U.S. maintained that dangerous PRC interception missions led to the collision, while the Chinese contended that the U.S. plane made a sudden turn into the PRC F-8 fighter, causing the collision.12 Once identifying those problems, the U.S., in accordance with RAM, identified and ranked its goals in the crisis. While the government never released a coherent set of goals, analysis of news, reports, and U.S. actions can help determine a likely order of preferences: 1) maintain diplomatic relations with China and return the captured Americans, 2) continue U.S. reconnaissance missions in accordance with international law, and 3) recover the EP-3 plane. As it is both a rising power and the most populous nation on Earth, 11

Beach, Analyzing Foreign Policy, pg 98.

Kan 2.

maintaining a cordial relationship with China was paramount, especially since the PRC controlled the fate of the twenty-four captured Americans. Although returning the captured Americans was a crucial goal, as expressed by statements issued by President Bush,13 Secretary Powell,14 and numerous other American advocates, the lack of any immediate condemnation of Chinese actions highlights the perceived U.S. importance of maintaining cordial relations. The U.S. also considered the continuance of flying reconnaissance missions as a lesser goal, which was evident in U.S. promises to address reconnaissance missions after the return of the crew (but without promising to end them). The final goal, recovering the EP-3 plane itself, was ranked last because while the U.S. wanted the plane back, it was likely the Chinese had already examined the technology and collected any useful intelligence; “American officials appear[ed] to be privately resigned to losing whatever secrets and technology on the plane that the crew could not destroy before landing,”15 decreasing the pressing need for the plane’s return. After identifying the problems and developing a ranked set of goals, the U.S. then 13 David Sanger, “Collision with China: The Washington View Bush Again Urges Return of Crew; Powell Sees No Need for Apology,” The New York Times, April 4, 2001, accessed March 6, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/04/ world/collision-with-china-washington-view-powell-sees-noneed-for-apology-bush-again.html. 14 Craig Smith, “Collision with China: The Crew; U.s. Officials Meet with 24 Still Detained with Aircraft,” The New York Times, April 4, 2001, accessed March 6, 2015, http:// www.nytimes.com/2001/04/04/world/collision-with-chinacrew-us-officials-meet-with-24-still-detained-with-aircraft. html. 15 Erik Eckholm, “Collision with China: Beijing; U.s. Envoy Meets Chinese Foreign Minister as Negotations On Plane’s Crew Continue,” The New York Times, April 6, 2001, accessed March 6, 2015,http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/06/ world/collision-with-china-beijing-us-envoy-meets-chineseforeign-minister-negotations.html.

Duke Political Science Standard sought to seek all relevant information it would need to understand the Chinese demands in order to make a foreign policy decision, which largely happened through conversations between American and Chinese diplomats. Ambassador Prueher met with Chinese officials in Beijing; China’s Ambassador to the U.S. met with the State Department.16 General Neal Sealock met with the detained crew but was unable to secure their release,17 information that signaled China’s resolve to the U.S.. Through these meetings, the U.S. was confronted by the PRC’s demands that the U.S. bear full responsibility for the incident, stop reconnaissance flights, and apologize.18 Next, all possible courses of action were identified, which can be demonstrated by New York Times reports that Secretary Powell sent a letter to senior PRC officials “outlining ways that the two countries could resolve the standoff.”19 While government officials declined to comment on the specifics in the letter, the simple fact that the U.S. sent the PRC a letter detailing methods of de-escalation signals that the U.S. considered all possible options. RAM: THE SECOND PHASE In preparation for deciding how to handle the Hainan Island incident, the U.S. adhered to every step in the first phase of RAM theory. The U.S. would continue to adhere to RAM in the 16 Erik Eckholm, “Collision with China: The Overview; Chinese Insisting U.S. Must Do More to End Standoff,” The New York Times, April 8, 2001, accessed March 6, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/08/world/collisionwith-china-overview-chinese-insisting-us-must-more-endstandoff.html. 17

Kan 3.

Ibid.

19 Eckholm, “Collision with China: The Overview; Chinese Insisting U.s. Must Do More to End Standoff.”

second phase, which, according to Beach, requires that the state assess the costs and benefits of each alternative, and then chooses the option that maximizes goals while minimizing costs.20 While not made public, it is highly likely that the U.S. assessed the costs and benefits of responses to the Hainan Island incident. Since the Chinese demanded that the U.S. give an official apology for the incident and death of their pilot, and even going so far as to suggest that the release of the American crew hinged on an apology,21 it is likely that the two alternatives the U.S. assessed were whether or not issue an apology. If the U.S. were to issue an apology to China, the likely benefits included getting the crew and plane back. The costs, however, would be that an apology could serve to legitimize dangerous Chinese flight patterns and jeopardize the ability to conduct future reconnaissance missions. Alternatively, the failure to issue an apology, while legitimizing the U.S. reconnaissance missions and reaffirming U.S. supremacy, could jeopardize the crew and plane’s return, which, according to the first phase of RAM, were the higher-ranked and thus more preferential goals. This particular fear was evident in the first attempt to bring the crew home by sending China the U.S.’s “regrets,” but not apology,

Beach 98.

21 Erik Eckholm, “Collision in China: The Overview Suggests Release of Crew Hinges On Official Apology; China Faults U.s. in Incident,” The New York Times, April 4, 2001, accessed March 6, 2015,http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/04/ world/collision-china-overview-china-faults-us-incidentsuggests-release-crew-hinges.html.

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for the situation,22 which China deemed insufficient, declining to release the crew at that time.23 In addition to thequestion of whether or not to issue an apology, the U.S. had other considerations to factor into its decision, including the issue of Taiwan and increased Sino-American economic interdependence. After the U.S. developed a more supportive strategy towards Taiwan in 1994, it began conducting annual arms sales to the Taiwanese government. The latest sale was authorized to occur sometime in late April, which was already a sore point for the Chinese. A failure to apologize could further antagonize the Chinese, who had previously made threats in 1998 that the government may resort to nuclear options should the U.S. or others intervene in the ChinaTaiwan relationship.24 A Chinese show of military force could seriously destabilize the region. The other factor, increased economic interdependence, was also a point of consideration. In 1999, the U.S. and China agreed that once China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), China would “remove a wide variety of tariff and non-tariff barriers on goods and services as well as restrictions on foreign direct investment,”25 which would be beneficial to the U.S. economy. According to a Congressional Research Service report, “a further worsening of political ties could negatively affect the business climate in China for U.S. firms, disrupt negotiations over China’s 22 David Sanger and Craig Smith, “Collision with China: The Overview; Bush and Jiang Exchange Drafts of a Letter Stating U.S. Regrets,” The New York Times, April 7, 2001, accessed March 6, 2015,http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/07/ world/collision-with-china-overview-bush-jiang-exchangedrafts-letter-stating-us.html. 23

Eckholm, “Chinese Insisting.”

24 Henry Nau, Perspectives On International Relations, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009), pg 267. 25

Kan 24.

WTO accession, and result in the imposition of economic sanctions by both nations against one another,”26 which the U.S. must have assessed as a potential consequence of not issuing an apology. The U.S. recognition of China’s economic importance can be seen in President Bush’s carefully crafted statements that included continued support for “deep economic ties with China”27 despite frustration over China’s detention of the crew. The final tenant of the second phase in RAM states that the actor will select the optimal course of action in order to minimize costs and maximize the actor’s goals. The U.S. did just this by eventually settling on an apology as the best course of action. This can be seen in the way the U.S. changed its dialogue about the incident. In the first few days, American officials issued statements focusing on the increasing recklessness of Chinese jets as the cause of problems, dismissing any blame on the U.S.,28 and stating, “We have nothing to apologize for.”29 However, in the span of a couple days, the U.S. completely changed its stance and began working on a draft of a letter that would settle on wording that would “enable China’s leaders to argue that they received an apology and allow American officials to say they got the crew members and the plane out of China with-

Ibid 26.

27 Jane Perlez and David Sanger, “Bush Aides Saying Some Hope Is Seen to End Standoff,” The New York Times, April 6, 2001, accessed March 6, 2015, http://www.nytimes. com/2001/04/06/world/06PREX.html. 28 Craig Smith, “Collision with China; American Embassy Officials Waiting to See Plane’s Crew,” The New York Times, April 3, 2001, accessed March 6, 2015, http://www.nytimes. com/2001/04/03/world/collision-with-china-american-embassy-officials-waiting-to-see-plane-s-crew.html. 29 Sanger, “Collision with China: The Washington View Bush Again Urges Return of Crew; Powell Sees No Need for Apology.”

Duke Political Science Standard out acknowledging any blame for the collision.”30 The change marked a rational decision on the part of the U.S. to accept the option that would maximize the U.S.’ goals—maintaining diplomatic relations with China and returning the crew members—while minimizing costs, which included escalation of tensions that could have affected Taiwan and economic considerations. The issuance of the formal apology on the eleventh day of the crew’s detainment resulted in their release. AFTER THE CREW’S RETURN: RAM AS A CONTINUED EXPLANATION Returning the crew to the U.S. under mutually agreeable standards satisfied the U.S.’s most important goal in the Hainan Island incident. With that goal no longer a consideration, RAM’s ranked ordering of preferences then changed to favor continued reconnaissance missions and the return of the EP-3 plane, which is evidenced by the U.S.’s return to more stringent language and actions. The day after the PRC returned the crew to the U.S., Secretary Rumsfeld held a news conference and gave a scathing report of the PLAN F-8 fighter’s reckless flight path, the significant damage to the EP-3 plane, and the near-deaths of the crew members aboard.31 That the U.S. waited until the crew was returned substantiates the notion that the apology was given solely to satisfy the Chinese and return the crew, and not out of any actual remorse; the U.S. made a rational calculation based on a cost/benefit analysis. Additionally, after the return of the crew, the U.S. began to focus on “maintaining the interest of all countries to fly in international airspace, includ30 Sanger “Collision with China: The Overview; Bush and Jiang Exchange Drafts of a Letter Stating U.S. Regrets.” 31

Kan 6.

ing near China,”32 a focus that was essentially absent prior to the crew’s return, substantiating the idea that the U.S. ranked the desire for the crew’s return higher than a desire to reaffirm the legitimacy of reconnaissance missions. Furthermore, a few weeks after the crew’s return, the U.S. military resumed reconnaissance flights off China’s coasts despite the failure to secure the EP-3 plane’s return, further evidentiary support that the U.S. was moving down its list of ranked preferences in tune with a RAM explanation. OTHER EXPLANATIONS: LEADER TYPE While RAM does a remarkably good job of explaining U.S. action in response to the Hainan Island incident, RAM does not, however, take into account the impulsive reaction of citizens and officials to crisis. RAM doesn’t account for U.S.’s initial statements blaming the Chinese for the incident and refusal to issue an apology; RAM would have stipulated that these were calculated rational responses. Rather, they were rash statements. A leader type form of analysis, which looks at the leader’s psychology—thus not viewing the state as a black box—could better explain the initial response. For instance, President Bush’s tough ‘decider’ persona was evidenced by his decision to go on the offensive through giving a “belligerent speech” warning that the Chinese refusal to return the Americans was “inconsistent with standard diplomatic practice.”33 Some would analyze that initial show of public strength as evidence 32

Ibid 7.

33 Andy Jones, “China and the United States: An Analysis of the Diplomacy Implemented by Richard Nixon and George W. Bush,” E-International Relations Students, July 7, 2008, accessed March 6, 2015, http://www.e-ir.info/2008/07/07/ china-and-the-united-states-an-analysis-of-the-diplomacyimplemented-by-both-richard-nixon-and-george-w-bush/.

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that “Bush did not fear hardball negotiation, nor did he doubt his ability to handle the fallout.”34 However, despite Bush’s initial show of strength, he eventually acquiesced to the Chinese and exclaimed his regret for the Hainan Island incident. Leader type analysis doesn’t fully explain Bush’s actions, especially since he had run on a campaign that portrayed the Chinese as competitors, not close partners. In the end, RAM is a better explanation for why the U.S. acted the way it did. Furthermore, a major component of RAM is that the state is a unitary actor; individual decisions are irrelevant to analysis, begging the question: Would the outcome of the incident been different if there had been a different leader? RAM says no; the unitary state pursues its own interest based on rational cost/benefit analysis. There is little convincing evidence that could suggest a radically different outcome had there been a different leader, which is why leader type is an insufficient model of explanation. LESSONS LEARNED RAM sheds light on why the powerful U.S. reacted the way it did, by issuing an apology, given that U.S. reports believed the Chinese were really at fault: the U.S.’s main goal was to ensure the return of the crew members while maintaining diplomatic relations with China. This case is particularly interesting because of how well RAM describes it; usually RAM’s weakness lies in the fact that the state isn’t unitary. States often have to balance competing interests between branches of government and the public. In this case, however, the rally around the flag effect produced by the perceived downing and 34

capture of Americans helped create a state with a relative degree of unity, and the shared national goal of returning the captured Americans helped keep the U.S. united throughout the handling of the crisis. These qualifications mean that RAM could be a potentially useful model of analysis especially for crisis situations where the lives of American citizens hang in the balance. The Hainan Island incident is also a particularly interesting case because of recent U.S. tensions with China over the same issue: the U.S. flying reconnaissance missions in international airspace that the Chinese perceive as threatening, thus conducting risky interception operations that could, potentially, lead to an incident similar to the 2001 Hainan incident.35 It will be interesting to see if RAM would sufficiently explain another potential crash, or if the lack of a unitary response would warrant the selection of another method of analysis. ♦

35 Kevin Rudd, “A Maritime Balkans of the 21st Century?” Foreign Policy, January 30, 2013, accessed March 6, 2015,http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/30/a-maritime-balkans-of-the-21st-century/.

Jones, “China and the United States.”

Duke Political Science Standard REFERENCES Beach, Derek. Analyzing Foreign Policy. New York: Pelgrave Macmillan, 2012. Drezner, Daniel. “Just a Wee Bit of the Old Historical Revisionism.” Foreign Policy. July 5, 2007. Accessed March 6, 2015. http:// foreignpolicy.com/2007/07/05/just-a-weebit-of-the-old-historical-revisionism/. Eckholm, Erik. “Collision in China: The Overview Suggests Release of Crew Hinges On Official Apology; China Faults U.S. in Incident.” The New York Times. April 4, 2001. Accessed March 6, 2015. http:// www.nytimes.com/2001/04/04/world/collision-china-overview-china-faults-us-incident-suggests-release-crew-hinges.html. Eckholm, Erik. “Collision with China: Beijing; U.s. Envoy Meets Chinese Foreign Minister as Negotations On Plane’s Crew Continue.” The New York Times. April 6, 2001. Accessed March 6, 2015. http:// www.nytimes.com/2001/04/06/world/collision-with-china-beijing-us-envoy-meetschinese-foreign-minister-negotations.html. Eckholm, Erik. “Collision with China: The Overview; Chinese Insisting U.s. Must Do More to End Standoff.” The New York Times. April 8, 2001. Accessed March 6, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/08/ world/collision-with-china-overview-chinese-insisting-us-must-more-end-standoff. html. Embassy of the United States, Beijing, China. “30 Years of U.S. - PRC Diplomatic Relations: Chronology of Bi-Lateral Relations.” Accessed March 6, 2015. http://beijing. usembassy-china.org.cn/bilateral.html.

Hastedt, Glenn. American Foreign Policy. 9th ed. Boston: Pearson, 2011. http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/30/a-maritime-balkansof-the-21st-century/ Jones, Andy. “China and the United States: An Analysis of the Diplomacy Implemented by Richard Nixon and George W. Bush.” E-International Relations Students. July 7, 2008. Accessed March 6, 2015.http:// www.e-ir.info/2008/07/07/china-and-theunited-states-an-analysis-of-the-diplomacy-implemented-by-both-richard-nixonand-george-w-bush/. Kan, Shirley, Richard Best, Christopher Bolkcom, and Robert Chapman. China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments and Policy Implications. CRS Report RL30946. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 10 October 2001. Accessed March 6, 2015. Available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30946.pdf. Mitchell, Alison. “Collision with China: Capital Hill; Anti-China Coalition in Congress Is Emboldened.” The New York Times. April 5, 2001. Accessed March 6, 2015.http:// www.nytimes.com/2001/04/05/world/collision-with-china-capital-hill-anti-chinacoalition-in-congress-is-emboldened.html. Nau, Henry. Perspectives On International Relations. 2nd ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009. Perlez, Jane, and David Sanger. “Bush Aides Saying Some Hope Is Seen to End Standoff.” The New York Times. April 6, 2001. Accessed March 6, 2015.http://www.nytimes. com/2001/04/06/world/06PREX.html. Rudd, Kevin. “A Maritime Balkans of the 21st Century?” Foreign Policy. January 30,

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2013. Accessed March 6, 2015. http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/30/a-maritimebalkans-of-the-21st-century/. Sanger, David, and Craig Smith. “Collision with China: The Overview; Bush and Jiang Exchange Drafts of a Letter Stating U.s. Regrets.” The New York Times. April 7, 2001. Accessed March 6, 2015. http:// www.nytimes.com/2001/04/07/world/ collision-with-china-overview-bush-jiangexchange-drafts-letter-stating-us.html. Sanger, David, and Steven Lee Myers. “How Bush Had to Calm Hawks in Devising a Response to China.” The New York Times. April 13, 2001. Accessed March 6, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/13/ world/13POLI.html. Sanger, David. “Collision with China: The Washington View Bush Again Urges Return of Crew; Powell Sees No Need for Apology.”

The New York Times. April 4, 2001. Accessed March 6, 2015.http://www.nytimes. com/2001/04/04/world/collision-with-china-washington-view-powell-sees-no-needfor-apology-bush-again.html. Smith, Craig. “Collision with China; American Embassy Officials Waiting to See Plane’s Crew.” The New York Times. April 3, 2001. Accessed March 6, 2015.http://www. nytimes.com/2001/04/03/world/collisionwith-china-american-embassy-officialswaiting-to-see-plane-s-crew.html. Smith, Craig. “Collision with China: The Crew; U.s. Officials Meet with 24 Still Detained with Aircraft.” The New York Times. April 4, 2001. Accessed March 6, 2015.http:// www.nytimes.com/2001/04/04/world/collision-with-china-crew-us-officials-meetwith-24-still-detained-with-aircraft.html.

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The New Logic of Collective Action: From Theory to Practice Ben Hand-Bender Duke University, Trinity ‘15 Abstract The following essay analyzes the concepts and findings from public goods experiments and collective action literature in order to identify a plausible framework for ensuring the benefits of a stable global climate. Conventional models, and modifications thereof, are discussed and applied to the context of African nations’ response to climate change. A recent initiative, the ClimDev-Africa Special Fund, is evaluated based on the findings of previous research on collective action to address global climate change.

IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION DILEMMAS “Global public goods offer benefits that are both non-excludable and non-rival,” meaning that no country can be limited from accessing the benefits of the good nor can one “country’s enjoyment of the good impinge on the consumption opportunities of other countries.”1 The mitigation of global climate change is often described as prototypical public goods dilemma2, 3 largely due to the effects of the zero-contribution thesis. Mancur Olson notably articulated this objection to contemporary collection action theory, [i]t does not follow [that groups composed of self-interested and rational members will act in support of their group interests], because all of the individuals in a group 1

(Barrett 2007), 1.

(Santos and Pacheco 2011), 15739.

(Heitzig, Lessmann and Zou 2011), 10421.

would gain if they achieved their group objective, that they would act to achieve that objective, even if they were all rational and self-interested. Indeed, unless the number of individuals in a group quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common group interests.4 The logic of Olson and his prediction of noncooperators can be clearly seen in the context of the global public good of stabilizing the Earth’s atmosphere in response to human contributions to global climate change.5 Each distinct country, firm, and individual faces private 4

(Olson, Jr. 1965) 2.

5 For the purpose of this essay, it is assumed that human activities are changing the global climate through the release of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007); (The National Academies 2010).

Duke Political Science Standard costs to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, costs which can be in the billions of dollars,6 whereas the benefits of a stable and healthy atmosphere may be enjoyed regardless of levels of contribution to this public good. As Olson (1965) discusses, simply because an action is in the interest of the group—as is providing a stable and healthy global atmosphere—does not mean rational individuals will sacrifice their interests or preferences to achieve this group interest. Despite this concerns, it is clear on several levels why we should care if this global public good is provided—humans have certain atmospheric requirement for survival, but there are imperative additional concerns. “We should care [about global public goods] because our wellbeing, the wellbeing of future generations, and even the fate of the Earth depends on them being provided… [p]roviding them expands human capabilities.”7

Furthermore, mitigating the effects of climate change presents a collective action problem in that the economic price of goods and services in global markets fails to include the costs of externalities due to global climate change and thus there is a lack of restraint on pollution.8 There also exists a “global, inter-generational collective action problem”9 because the choices regarding consumption and contribution to the global public good will have significant impact on the welfare of future generations.10 Individual actors further face a competing incentive to continue environmental degradation in pursuit of greater economic gains. Elinor Ostrom dubbed this collective ac-

mate change will be costly and require diversion of resources, and reducing the world’s greenhouse gas emissions depends on the aggregate effort of all countries. Approaches to climate change that do not involve the contributions—or potential sanctions—of all nations run the risk of “free-riders”, who still have access to the global public good but do not contribute to its maintenance or future provision of benefits. These reasons, in combination with the Olson inspired zero-contribution thesis, have led many to conclude that the only possible solution exists at the global institutional level, because voluntary collective action will not produce the benefit of the global public good.13 14

These conclusions have been influenced and supported by game theory and the development of “public good(s)” games and behavioral experiments. Traditional public goods experi11

(Ostrom 2010), online.

(Shinner and Citro 2006).

(Barrett 2007), 1.

(Frankel 2010), 508.

12 Some African regions for example may see an increase rainfall and derive economic benefits from climate change (Collier, Conway and Venables 2008), 338.

(Anomaly 2013), 4.

(Stavins 1997).

(Wiener 2007).

tion problem “potentially the largest dilemma the world has ever knowingly faced” and invoked the work of Mancur Olson that “[t]he classic theory of collective action predicts that no one will change behavior and reduce their energy use unless an external authority imposes enforceable rules that change the incentives faces by those involved”.11 Long-term and sustainable responses to address global climate change have proven very difficult, as can be seen by the failure of the Kyoto Protocol. Barrett (2007) identifies four critical reasons for this difficulty: climate change does not threaten the survival of the human species, climate change has varying effects on countries and regions (including positive ones12), mitigating cli-

(Stern, et al. 2006).

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ments involve a set number of players with equal individual endowments, who are asked to voluntarily contribute to a group pool anonymously. Contributions are collected by the experimenter, totaled and then doubled—this collective pool is then equally divided between the players. The traditional “economic-theory prediction is that no one will ever contribute anything… no matter what the others do… However, the group would be best off if all would contribute [the maximum]… Individual self-interest is at odds with group interest.”15 In accordance with game theory, such public goods games exemplify the “tragedy of the commons,” where individuals’ rational incentive to maximize their personal gains eventually leads to a loss of the entire commons.16 Yet despite

many researchers’ and analysts’ use of public goods experiments to confirm that the collective benefit will not be produced,17 others have rejected this conventional theory and game application: The applicability of the conventional theory is considered to be so obvious by many scholars that few questions have been raised about whether this is the best theoretical foundation for making real progress toward substantially reducing greenhouse gas emissions and taking other actions to reduce the threat of massive harm brought about climate change. However, two major grounds exist for doubting whether sole reliance on the conventional theory of collective action as a foundation for thinking about global change is a wise scientific strategy. The

first is the weakness in empirical support for the conventional theory of collective action… [and t]he second is the existence of multiple externalities at small, medium, and large scales within the global externality that has been of primary concern in academic and policy literature.18 In addition to extensive empirical support for the theory of collective action, Elinor Ostrom offers convincing explanations and justifications for the existence of “norm-using players.”19 Additional critiques of conventional public good experiments raise valid questions regarding the application of these games to the real-world problem of global climate change. Heitzig, et al. (2011) suggest modifications to conventional public good games; such as making individual contributions public, playing iterated rounds of the game, and devising the experiment as a dynamic game with a stock pollutant—each of which produce higher levels of voluntary contributions. Santos and Pacheco’s (2011) modifications of the game offer valuable insight: … on the scale at which public goods problems of cooperation are best solved. Instead of large-scale endeavors involving most of the population, which… may be counter-productive to achieve cooperation, the joint combination of local agreements within groups that are small compared with the population at risk is prone to significantly raise the probability of success. In addition, our model predicts

(Milinski, et al. 2006), 3994.

(Hardin 1968).

(Ostrom 2010), online.

(Ledyard 1995).

(Ostrom 2000).

Duke Political Science Standard that, if one takes into consideration that groups of different sizes are interwoven in complex networks of contacts, the chance for global coordination in an overall cooperating state are further enhanced.20 The key tweak to the game that Santos and Pacheco (2011) make is the inclusion of varying levels of risk that all members will lose the remainder of their endowments if collective action is not taken, a necessary requirement for addressing global climate change according to Barrett (2007). Milinksi et al. (2006) offer a new form of public goods experiments where the “contents of the public pool were not redistributed among all players but transferred to a ‘climate account’” which was then used to fund collective action on climate change. This modified experiment alternated between iterations of n-player public goods games and two-player indirect reciprocity games, thus to allow for reputation effects to be examined. The combination of an indivisible climate account, social reputation considerations, and varying levels of information on the state of knowledge in climate research “demonstrate that players can behave altruistically to maintain the Earth’s climate given the right set of circumstances.”21 Heitzig et al. (2011) build on the iterated public goods experiments by conceptualizing the collective action dilemma as an “emissions game”, where player’s contributions (“liabilities”) are determined by the amount of emissions they produce minus the amount of emission permits bought on the market over an infinite number of periods (rounds)—in effect a

model of cap-and-trade systems but with a cap on total liabilities. The authors conclude that “players can ensure compliance with a given negotiated target allocation of contributions by adopting a certain simple dynamic ‘strategy’ to choose their actual contributions over time. In each period, the allocation of liabilities is redistributed in reaction to the preceding compliance levels. The redistributions are basically proportional to shortfalls—i.e., to the amount by which players have failed to comply in the previous period—but with a strategically important adjustment to keep total liabilities constant.”22

Hasson et al. (2010) focus on the potential trade-off between countries investment in mitigation versus adaptation strategies. This includes two fundamental differences to conventional public goods experiments, “first… we express our model in terms of a loss environment [unlike Milinksi et al. 2006]… [and second], we model [the uncertainty of climate change research and risk that mitigation will not avoid negative impacts] by including a stochastic risk element in the public goods game [to account for the probabilistic destruction in a climate-change setting].”23 This modification of the game has additional value in its distinction between mitigation and adaptation strategies (and the necessary opportunity cost trade-off in choosing either) as “[m]itigation of greenhouse gases can be viewed as a global public good, while an investment in adaptation is best described as a private good.”24

THE CONDITIONS OF COOPERATION As each of these modifications to conventional 22

(Heitzig, Lessmann and Zou 2011), 15739.

(Santos and Pacheco 2011), 10421.

(Hasson, Löfgren and Visser 2010), 332.

(Milinski, et al. 2006), 3994.

(Hasson, Löfgren and Visser 2010), 331.

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public goods experiments attempt to update collective action theory and demonstrate under what conditions cooperation on global climate change is possible and likely, they still are limited by the extent that simplistic game theory models can accurately and validly mimic the real-world. After considering the research of Ostrum (2000 and 2010), Milinksi et al. (2006), Heitzig, et al. (2011), Hasson et al. (2010), and Santos and Pacheco (2011), the likeliest approach to provide the global public good of a stable environment would be through an international system where contributions to climate change mitigation would be made publically and to a resource-protection pool, which would be used to educate all members of the harms and risk behind climate change as well as reverse human activities’ effects. This resource pool would only become available once a minimum number and aggregate target of contributions had been received. Moreover, there would need to be a method of punishing defectors, wherein those who did not contribute relative to their share of the change in the atmosphere would be penalized from receiving benefits from the indivisible “climate account”, and would be required to make-up previous shortfalls. Described as such, this system appears possible only at the global institutional level, to ensure transparency, equitable determinations of liabilities, and utilize the reputation effects to enhance cooperation. And yet, other global solutions have been attempted and failed—specifically the Kyoto protocol, but also in the breakdown of recent WTO Doha Round discussions.25 Additionally, this approach to overcome noncontributors and free-riders ignores important re25

(Frankel 2010).

search about the realities of climate change and needs to be readdressed and conceptualized.26 Ostrom discusses that a largescale government-only solutions are 27 not the only, or best, option available: Extensive research on institutions related to environmental policies has repeatedly shown that creative, effective, and efficient policies, as well as disasters, have been implemented at all scales. Dealing with the complexity of environmental problems can lead to “negative learning” by scientist and policy maker at all scales (Oppenheimer et al., 2008). Reliance on a single ‘solution’ may in fact result in more of a problem than a solution (Pritchett and Woolcock, 2003). It is important that we recognize that devising policies related to complex environment processes is a grand challenge and that reliance on one scale to solve these problems is naïve.28 Santos and Pacheco (2011) echo this conclusion, finding that “social political dynamics are often grounded on a strong diversity in roles and positions” and their research results “suggest that decentralized agreements between smaller groups, possibly focused on region-specific issues where risk is high and goal achievements involves tough requirements, may be preferable to world summits….”29 Some researchers blame the failure of the Kyoto protocol on its reliance on the conclusions of conventional public goods game theory,

(Aldy, Orszag and Stiglitz 2001).

(Ostrom 2010).

(Ostrom 2009), 27.

(Santos and Pacheco 2011), 10423.

Duke Political Science Standard which “treat free-riding as some form of debt to be repaid with interest… such a rule would lead to inefficient contributions… making renegotiations likely that lower all liabilities… Even worse, if a player never fulfills his liabilities, he gets away with it.”30 Others have concluded that without clear individualized incentives, beyond the suffering of others and fear of the future, the collective-risk dilemma can never be solved in a large global scale.31 There is a clear distinction between mitigation and adaptation strategies, and the existence of a necessary trade-off between these two when climate change policies are made at the global level.32 This issue is

greatly complicated by the fact that current collective action efforts to address climate change primarily focus on mitigation-only strategies.33 The failure of global solutions is further exacerbated by the ever-present critiques of collective action—there is an unequal distribution of responsibility for the causes and the suffering of the effects of climate change. Less developed nations are at the greatest risk from natural disasters associated with human influenced climatic variability.34 Developing nations are the most vulnerable to the risks associated with climate change and face the greatest challenges in their capacity for future adaptation.35

sphere, most regions in the continent will experience adverse climatic effects quicker and more devastating than the global average, and finally, many of these nations are constrained by limited resources and domestic institutions—inhibiting their influence on global solutions and placing the environment in conflict with development goals and policies.36 Additionally, considering the failure of global collective action on mitigating climate change, these nations must prioritize adaptation strategies—policies that are specifically challenging to African nations37 and ignored in conventional public goods model-based international solutions.38 Finally, as the African con-

tinent and the rest of the developing world continue to modernized and industrialize, their share of global greenhouse gas emissions will increase, potentially negating any mitigation actions taken by more developed countries.39 Findings support this concern, as African nations’ land-use policies40 and deforestation activities41 have already significantly increased their output of emissions. These facts, and deficiencies in global mitigation-based approaches, highlight the need for a unique solution to enable African nations’ enjoyment of the benefits of the global public good of a stable planetary environment. The justifications for [i]nternational actions to assist African adaptation have both an ethical and a practical rationale. The ethical rational is evidently that the rising levels of carbon

In specific, African nations are in a unique position regarding global collective action: these nations have historically played a minor role in the human species influence on the Earth’s atmo-

(Heitzig, Lessmann and Zou 2011), 15742.

(Milinski, Sommerfeld, et al. 2008).

(Hasson, Löfgren and Visser 2010).

(Collier, Conway and Venables 2008).

33 e.g. (Stern, et al. 2006); (Ostrom 2010); (Hasson, Löfgren and Visser 2010); (Collier, Conway and Venables 2008).

(Hasson, Löfgren and Visser 2010).

(Stern, et al. 2006).

(Brooks and Adger 2003).

(Collier, Conway and Venables 2008).

(Adger, et al. 2003).

(Fleischman and Coleman 2012).

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dioxide are not attributable to Africa but to economic activity elsewhere, and so there is a strong case that the costs of African adaptation to these adverse externalities should be borne by others. In practical terms, some of the public goods required for adaptation are a regional in nature, such as climate information, agricultural research, and transport infrastructure. Africa’s extreme political sub-division means that it faces intense problems in supplying regional public goods, and international assistance can usefully substitute for these missing public goods.42 The practical rational for international assistance in African adaptation is further supported by what economists call the Environmental Kuznets Curve, where “at relatively low levels of income per capita, [economic] growth leads to greater environmental damage, until it levels offs at an intermediate level of income, after which further growth leads to improvements in the environment.”43 Yet these explanations do not in themselves justify externally imposed development conditions or adaptation policies—nor does the logic of traditional or modified public goods experiments. South African case studies have demonstrated that in externally initiated collective action fails due to issues of accountability, transparency, leadership, and lack of cultural awareness.44 Research into international environmental politics finds that indigenous peoples must be seen as valuable stakeholders,45 and their 42

(Collier, Conway and Venables 2008), 347.

(Frankel 2010), 513.

(Vollan 2012).

(Guha-Sapir, et al. 2013).

input is a necessary condition for any effective climate change action. There is the additional problem faced by newly industrialized African countries and their relative scarce levels of domestic investment capital, “[t]o make a material difference [on climate change mitigation], fundamental new energy technologies will be needed. In the richer countries, where there already exists an installed base of capital, investment is especially need to replace depreciating assets… The poor countries cannot be expected to finance this investment all by themselves. A significant share of this cost will have to be financed by rich countries. Financing this technological transformation will require an aggregate effort by the rich countries, and on a scale many times greater than the world has ever attempted before.”46 Finally,

whatever climate change action is taken in Africa and globally, a multi-scale approach is necessary to overcome collection action problems:

[a]cknowledging the complexity of the problem, as well as the relatively recent agreement among scientists about the multiple, local-level causes of climate change, leads to recognition that waiting for effective policies to be established at the global level is unreasonable. Instead focusing on a global-scale effort, a multiscale approach to the problem of climate change would be more effective and encourage experimentation and learning… extensive empirical research on collective action… has repeatedly identified a necessary central core of trust and reciprocity among those involved that is as46

(Barrett 2007), 8-9.

Duke Political Science Standard

sociated with successful levels of collective action. If the only policy related to climate change was adopted at the global scale, it would be particularly difficult to increase the trust that citizens and firms need to have that other citizens and firms located halfway around the globe are taking actions similar to those being taken ‘at home.’ When participants fear they are being ‘suckers’ for taking costly action while others enjoy a free ride, more substantial effort is devoted to finding deceptive ways of appearing to reduce emissions while not actually doing so.47

TESTING SPECIFICS: THE CLIMDEVAFRICA SPECIAL FUND (CDSF) Thus, we turn to the critical question of how to address climate change from the perspective of African nations. As cited above, any strategy implemented in the 50+ country continent must be multi-scale, internally developed and accepted, and focus on adaptation. Ostrom’s described “social dilemma” inherent to collective action is exacerbated by the limited amount of culpability these nations have for global climate change (and resources to implement mitigation strategies) and increased incentives to prioritize economic growth over long-term assurance of global public goods. A recent initiative, The Climate for Development in Africa (ClimDev) Programme, has been developed by a partnership between the African Union Commission (AUC), the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), and the African Development Bank (AfDB) in 2009—mandated by African 47

(Ostrom 2009), 31-35.

leaders at an AU Summit of Heads of State and Government.48 The ClimDev initiative’s purpose “is to explore actions required in overcoming climate information gaps, for analyses leading to adequate policies and decision-making at all levels.”49 The initiative includes three interconnected components: the African Climate Policy Center at the UNECA, the Climate Change and Desertification Control Unit at the AUC, and the ClimDev-Africa Special Fund (CDSF). While the first two focus on information gathering and sharing related to the causes and effects of climate change, “the goal of the CDSF is to pool resources to contribute to sustainable development and, in particular, poverty reduction by preparing and implementing climate-resilient development programs that mainstream climate change information at all levels in Africa. The objective of the CDSF is to strengthen the institutional capacities of national and sub-regional bodies to formulate and implement effective climate-sensitive policies.”50 Thus, CDSF will help make infor-

mation more accessible, localize the risks of climate change, support pilot projects, and develop coordination regionally and across the continent. The CDSF requires a total of €22.4 million before it can become active—and originally aimed to raise a total of €144 million to finance and manage 72 projects between 2012 and 2014—all of which were sought from international donors. On its face, the CDSF seems to meet many of the criteria for addressing global climate change that much of the literature discussed earlier recommends. The CDSF is designed to allow small local communities, regional economic net48

(ClimDev-Africa 2013).

(African Development Bank Group 2014), online.

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works, national governments and regional institutions to benefit from locally derived information and propose appropriate adaptation projects. Additionally, it does not require these developing nations to fund this projects themselves, but rather seeks this financing from developed nations and individual donors. The CDSF is also intended to allow complementary and overlapping projects across communities, countries and regions, building up a multi-scale approach and the necessary complementary institutions. Despite its well-design structure, currently the CDSF has yet to fully implement its proposed framework and activities as it has failed to meet its total funding requirements. A €20 million grant from the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) rendered the CDSF operational in 201351 and an additional EU pledge of an

€8 million has further enabled the CDSF to carry out projects for three years52—but this is far below minimum estimates of the funds needed. The objectives for qualifying projects must support one of three areas of interventions: climate information in Africa, policy development, and pilot adaptations. The CDSF has been actively evaluating proposals since mid-2013, but has yet to publish any grant awards or on-going pilot adaptations. As such, a specific evaluation of the effectiveness of these programs is not possible, nor should they be expected to be for several years to come. Even still, the CDSF as a concept seems promising, and appears to meet the criteria that can be pieced together from the pertinent African climate change literature. Once fully implemented, the CDSF’s development of national and re-

gional climate information and policy institutions in Africa53 and the practical need for Africa to focus on adaptation strategies to climate change54 offer an alternative approach for the continent to climate change than previously envisioned.55 The flexibility of the CDSF to develop projects ranging from the communal to the regional to the international is a complex multi-scale system in line with the recommendations of Ostrom (2010). The combination of externally funded mitigation and adaptation projects enables developing African nations to minimally sacrifice growth for environmental protection, circumventing many trade-offs represented by the Environmental Kuznets Curve.56 The CDSF framework addresses each of the four the difficulties for collective action on global climate change discussed by Barrett (2007). The adaptation-focus of the CDSF hinges on accepting that climate change is not an existential threat to the human species nor are climatic effects uniform or purely negative. Furthermore, the very scope of the Fund and its mission indicates an understanding of the cost of climate change response, and the need for international and aggregate effort from all players. Finally, the CDSF is designed to be accessible to indigenous communities and rejects externally imposed institutions, addressing concerns raised by Vollan (2012) and Guha-Sapir, et al. (2013), respectively. The CDSF framework may be viewed less optimistically when considered in in light of game theory models. To be fair, such an examination will be invalid and incomplete, as the very nature of game theory research is limited by the 53

(Dinku 2010).

(Collier, Conway and Venables 2008).

(African Development Bank Group 2013).

(Hardin 1968).

(AllAfrica 2012).

(Frankel 2010).

Duke Political Science Standard particular methods and elements of the experiment and/or model—particularly difficult in the case of the CDSF. Under the CDSF structure, many traditional public goods game roles also have been drastically altered. The CDSF projects will directly effect African populations, and the donors will likely often include non-African nations or organizations. Thus, the CDSF roles do not parallel those in most public good games and collective action models. CDSF donors are pure volunteer contributors, and users of the collective resource pool will rarely ever be contributors. In conventional game theory jargon, the donors may be described as the “cooperators” and the recipients as the “defectors”—despite the opposite intention by CDSF organizers and framers. This is further complicated by a shifting set of what can be considered “the global public good” in the CDSF case study. Under the standard operationalization of the global public good as the stability of the global atmosphere and access to a livable/productive environment, the CDSF’s Africa-only focus makes the collective action limited in its potential to discount future risks for all players involved (unless the projections for Africa’s future emissions dramatically increase). Under a different operationalization, the global public good can be defined as the ability to adapt to climatic effects, under which the CDSF may be viewed differently, as it can discount future losses through information, policy, and project sharing to all players. A final general consideration for the application of these experiments and models to the CDSF is the perceived existence of a “prior injustice,” in that the recipients of the Fund have very limited responsibility for the conditions and activities that have culminated in climate change. The existence of this moral externality cannot 48

be ignored in understanding the decisions of nations and organizations to donate to the CDSF. In applying specific public goods experiments and collective action research, a central question of the CDSF concept immediately arises: can the CDSF continue to operate in the long-term by relying on donations from foreign governments and international organizations? The African Climate Policy Centre at the UNECA could only be formed with the altruistic behavior of Sweden.57 The existence of “norm-using players” 58 and those who exhibit “strong-reciprocity”59 have already challenged traditional conclusions60 about the likelihood of cooperation. Yet these findings do not contend that cooperation and altruism are guaranteed or self-sustaining, and many of the modified public goods experiments delineate how to maximize or reinforce collective action—lessons the CDSF has mixed success at integrating. The CDSF is a self described “ad hoc investment fund,”61 and in many ways differs from the Milinksi et al. (2006) indivisible “climate account.” The Fund is clearly divisible, as the pooled collection plans to be distributed and awarded to projects with extreme variation in their scale. Yet this issue seems less pressing as it is not the African project applicants who contributed to the funds creation, and therefore most of the reputation effects and punishment/reward strategies are irrelevant among the CDSF grantees. On the other hand, the “climate account” modification to the public good game has implications for the donor nations and organizations the CDSF. Miliniski et 57

(Service 2009).

(Ostrom 2000), 141-143.

(Bowles and Herbert 2008), 956-961.

(Olson, Jr. 1965).

(African Development Bank Group 2013).

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al. (2006) found that players’ investments in sustaining the global change can be purely altruistic, but must be reinforced with the ability reward cooperators and punish defectors. The CDSF system relies entirely on pure altruistic means of receiving funds—limited by the importance potential donors place in the ethical or practical need to help climate change adaptation in Africa. Therefore, donor countries like Sweden have no formal way to punish other nations who have failed to support the ClimDev-Africa Initiative. The model of the CDSF fails to allow donor players a forum and mechanism to overcome the classic pitfalls of collective action on global climate change. The “simple dynamic strategy of linear composition (LinC)” that was found to be an effective combatant against free-riders and renegotiators,62 is fundamentally impossible under the CDSF framework. First, the assumption that all players discount future payoffs the same way is inapplicable to donor concern over climate change and the continent in Africa. Among international actors, there exists denial over the actual existence, and harm, of human influenced climate change63 as well as skepticism over the need for African mitigation or adaptations.64 Moreover, the LinC strategy entirely depends on the formation of the “emissions game” to enable contribution liabilities to be proportionality linked to previous shortfalls. Donor nations to the CDSF have no pre-agreed estimation system for contributions levels, and those altruistic players who voluntarily donate are unable to utilize the threat of future losses to free-riders and 62

(Heitzig, Lessmann and Zou 2011).

63 (Stern, et al. 2006); (The National Academies 2010); (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007). 64

(Collier, Conway and Venables 2008).

defectors who choose not to contribute at all. As Santos and Pacheco (2010) find, cooperation in public goods games depends on risk of the collective failure of the commons and lose of all players’ endowments. Thus, the CDSF faces a significant challenge in linking the emissions risk and adaptation capabilities of Africa to the perceived future risks of loses to the rest of the world, or most importantly, the Funds’ target donors. Finally, the CDSF approach does removes the binary trade-off in the opportunity cost of choosing mitigation or adaptation strategies respectively by relying not on scarce domestic sources of capital, but on external donations. This circumvents inhibitors to collective action on adaptation policies and challenges the assumption that these strategies are private goods.65 The greatest strength of the CDSF lies in the integrated and flexible scope of eligible projects, as well as the Funds focus on localized adaptation. Such a framework and strategy is justified by the conclusions of many experts on collective action, climate change, and African development. Yet, the CDSF still fails to overcome many fundamental problems of traditional collective models as well as modified public goods experiments. The fact that the CDSF seeks external funding is both a blessing and a curse to the future of the Fund. Altruistic players have helped the CDSF become active and in its early phases of operation. But the framework of the Fund renders it very limited in addressing the difficulty of getting non-African actors to voluntarily contribute to the CDSF. The organizations and actors that compose and support the CDSF will have to convince donors that the ability of African nations 65

e.g. (Hasson, Löfgren and Visser 2010).

Duke Political Science Standard to adapt to climate change is ethically required and practically connected to their own risks of future losses. As game theory models demonstrate, the moral or social justifications for collective action must be reinforced or they will dissipate over time. The CDSF entails no formal or coercive means for imposing the external costs of climate change on those proportionally responsible, and as such is constrained in its ability to mitigate climatic effects, guarantee contributions from all actors, and overcome barriers to collective action on the provision of stable atmosphere. If donor nations and organizations are able to use existing international institutions and reputational effects to continually expand the donor base, it is possible that the CDSF framework could achieve its goals and objectivesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;but as of yet, the structure and progress of the Fund do not generate a positive long-term future outlook. â&#x2122;Ś

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REFERENCES Adger, Neil W., Saleemul Huq, Katrina Brown, Declan Conway, and Mike Hulme. “Adaptation to climate change in the developing world.” Progress in Development Studies 3, no. 3 (2003): 179-195. African Development Bank Group. ACP Grants €20 million to AfDB, AU and ECA in the Fight Against Climate Change. 02 19, 2013. http://www.afdb.org/en/news-andevents/article/acp-grants-eur20-millionto-afdb-au-and-eca-in-the-fight-againstclimate-change-11501/ (accessed 10 30, 2013). —. AfDB Board Approves the Establishment of ClimDev-Africa Special Fund. 11 12, 2009. http://www.afdb.org/en/news-andevents/article/afdb-board-approves-theestablishment-of-climdev-africa-specialfund-5485/ (accessed 10 30, 2013). —. Climate for Developmebt in Africa (ClimDevAfrica) Initiative. 2014. http://www.afdb. org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/climate-for-development-in-africa-climdev-africa-initiative/ (accessed 10 30, 2014). Aldy, Joseph E., Peter R. Orszag, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. “Climate Change: An Agenda for Global Collective Action.” The Timing of Climate Change Politicies. Pew Center on Global Climate Change, 2001. AllAfrica. Africa: EU 8 Million Euro Grant to Strengthen Continent’s Response to Climate Change. April 27, 2012. http://allafrica.com/stories/201205030092.html (accessed October 31, 2013). Anomaly, Jonathan. “Collective Action and Individual Choice: Rethinking How We Regu-

late Narcotics and Antibiotics.” Journal of Medical Ethics, 2013. Barrett, Scott. Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2007. Bowles, Samuel, and Gintis Herbert. “The Evolutionary Basis of Collective Action.” In The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, by Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman, 951-965. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. Brooks, Nick, and W. Neil Adger. Country level risk measures of climate-related natural disasters and implications for adaptation to climate change. Tyndall Working Paper, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, Tyndall Centre, Tyndall Centre, 2003. ClimDev-Africa. ClimDev-Africa. 2013. http:// www.climdev-africa.org/ (accessed October 25, 2013). Collier, Paul, Gordon Conway, and Rony Venables. “Climate change and Africa.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy (Oxford University Press) 24, no. 2 (2008): 337-353. Dinku, Tufu. “The need for national centres for climate and development in Africa.” Climate and Development 2 (2010): 9-13. Fleischman, Forrest D., and Eric A. Coleman. “Forest Decentralization and Local Institutional Change in Bolivia, Kenya, Mexico, and Uganda.” World Development 40, no. 4 (2012): 837-849. Frankel, Jeffrey. “Globalization and the Environment.” International Politcal Economy (W. W. Norton & Company), 2010: 536-545. Guha-Sapir, D., O. D’Aoust, F. Vos, and P.

Duke Political Science Standard Hoyois. “The frequency and impact of natural disasters.” In The Economic Impacts of Natural Disasters, edited by D. GuhaSapir and I. Santos. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Hardin, Garrett. “The Tragedy of the Commons.” Science 162 (December 1968): 1243-1248. Hasson, Reviva, Ása Löfgren, and Martine Visser. “Climate change in a public goods game: Investment decision in mitigation versus adaptation.” Ecological Economics 70 (2010): 331-338. Heitzig, Jobst, Kai Lessmann, and Yong Zou. “Self-enforcing strategies to deter free-riding in the climate change mitigation game and other repeated public good games.” PNAS 108, no. 38 (September 2011): 15739-15744. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Fourth Assessment Report, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press, 2007. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The Physical Science Basis. Fourth Assessment Report, Intergovernmental Panel on Cliamte Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Ledyard, John O. “Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research.” In Handbook of Experimental Economics, edited by John H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth. Princeton University Press, 1995. Milinski, Manfred, Dirk Semmann, Hans-Jürgen Krambeck, and Jochem Marotke. “Stabilizing the Earth’s climate is not a losing game: Supporting evidence from public goods 52

experiments.” PNAS 103, no. 11 (March 2006): 3994-3998. Olson, Jr., Mancur. The Logic of Collective Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965. Ostrom, Elinor. “A Multi-Scale Approach to Coping with Climate Change and Other Collective Action Problems.” Solutions 1, no. 2 (02 2010): 27-36. Ostrom, Elinor. A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change. Background Paper to the 2010 World Development Report, Development Economics, The World Bank, 2009. Ostrom, Elinor. “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, no. 3 (Summer 2000): 137-158. Santos, Francisco, and Jorge Pacheco. “Risk of Collective Failure Provides an Escape From the Tragedy of the Commons.” PNAS 108, no. 26 (June 2011): 10421-10425. Service, ECA Information and Communication. “Sweden supports ECA’s African Climate Policy Centre with $8.5 million.” UN Economic Commission for Africa. UN Economic Commission for Africa. November 26, 2009. http://www1.uneca.org/ TabId/3018/Default.aspx?ArticleId=1689 (accessed October 31, 2013). Shinner, R, and F. Citro. “A road map to U.S. decarbonization .” Science, 2006: 1243-1244. Stavins, Robert. “Policy Instrument’s for Climate Change: How Can National Goverments Address a Global Problem?” University of Chicago Legal Forum, 1997: 293-329. Stern, N., et al. Stern Review: The Economics of

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Climate Change. Goverment, London: HM Treasury, 2006. The National Academies. Strong Evidence on Climate Change Underscores Need for Actions to Reduce and Begin Adapting to Impacts. May 19, 2010. http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem. aspx?RecordID=05192010 (accessed October 20, 2013).

Vollan, Björn. “Pitfalls of Externally Initiated Collective Action: A Case Study from South Africa.” World Development 40, no. 4 (2012): 758-770. Wiener, J.B. “Think Globally, Act Globally: the Limits of Local Climate Politicies.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 155 (2007): 1961-1979.

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Poking the Bear Too Many Times: Short-Term Gains and Long-Term Pains from Post-Cold War NATO Expansion Luke Maier Duke University, Trinity ‘16 Abstract Compared to traditional rational and neorealist models of alliance formation, a presidential and bureaucratic politics perspective better describes why NATO expanded its membership in 1999 and 2004. Presidential and electoral politics largely drove the 1999 expansion, whereas bureaucratic inertia prevailed in the latter 2004 expansion. Rushed by institutional momentum and distracted by 9/11, U.S. support for the 2004 ascension of the Baltic States resulted in a suboptimal strategy that placed Russia in a structurally unstable situation. Russia’s activities in Georgia, Moldova, and most recently Ukraine can to some extent be traced back to threatening signals and insecurities incurred when NATO expanded to the Baltic. Looking back, while the combination of the presidential politics and bureaucratic politics models provide a superior description of why NATO expanded, the realist and rationalist frameworks arguably would have prescribed a better strategy. U.S. policymakers should be more reticent of using alliances to promote democracy and other ideals in lieu of security necessities.

THE FAILURES OF THE RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL After the USSR disintegrated, many wondered if its doppelganger—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—would too, just as the Grand Alliance among Britain, the United States, and Russia did after the defeat of the Axis powers.1 Yet after the ostensible end of the Cold War, NATO in fact expanded even though the world was manifestly unipolar. Realist theorists begin with the observation that the international arena is plagued by systemic anarchy. This lack of structural hierarchy implies that a state’s strength is its own best protection against unpredict-

able aggression from other states. The condition of self-help and zero-sum power competition causes all states, without coordination, to simultaneously strive to maximize their relative power and balance against foreign threats and improve their probability of survival—their primary goal. For all states, this “condition of insecurity… acts against their cooperation,”2 however even archetypical realists qualify this by acknowledging that alliances can emerge when the self-interests of multiple states converge. Realists believe states form alliances for two main purposes: 1) to balance against a common threat or 2) to bandwagon with a potential

2 Waltz 2013, p. 48.

E.g., see discussion in Ikenberry 1998.

Duke Political Science Standard adversary or stronger state to avert conflict.3 NATO has its roots in the first of these. The alliance’s twelve original members sought to balance against the massive capabilities the Soviet Union built during World War II. Subsequent expansion of NATO to Greece, Turkey, and Spain brought mid-sized regional powers into the alliance and meaningfully strengthened its strategic geography. While Greece, Turkey, and Spain had modest militaries when they ascended to NATO, they offered access to chokepoints along the Black and Mediterranean Seas. However, when the Soviet Union fell, so too did the major threat it posed to the West. Yet the alliance persisted. In fact, some argued that the U.S. and Russia should have bandwagoned together through NATO to reduce the likelihood they would return to conflict.4 Expanding NATO in absence of the Soviet threat seemed like “a solution in search of a problem” that could have become a self-fulfilling prophesy by reigniting mutually reinforcing suspicions between the previous rivals.5 So at first glance, many realists would argue that expanding NATO was at minimum unnecessary post-1991.6 But another camp within the realist discipline says rational alliances—like individual states—will seek to maximize their power even in absence of a clear and present danger, because anarchy creates an uncertain future filled with potential threats for which actors must constantly prepare.7 Assuming alliances do maximize power even without clear threats to balance against, the rational actor model would 3

Walt 2013.

E.g., see discussion in Skalnes 1998.

only explain NATO expansion to states that enhanced its power. However, NATO’s rejection of Slovenia and Romania—the wealthiest and most populous Eastern European states, respectively—belies the claim that the alliance based expansion decisions on power calculations.8 After the USSR chaotically withdrew in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Eastern and Central European states could make little material contributions to the alliance. Their militaries were perfunctory, because the Soviets feared dissent. And the first three states admitted in 1999—Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland—were all historic buffer states that the USSR had long exploited to slow potential Western invasions. The rational actor model predicts alliances will form to balance against common threats or to deter would-be rising powers. Mearsheimer took this reasoning a step further; in 1990, he predicted that this balancing behavior would lead many states in Europe to balance against the United States, which was the only state that truly possessed enough power to threaten Europe existentially.9 But it appears that bandwagoning, rather than balancing, seems to have ensued in Europe. This rationalist and realist reasoning would also predict that weak states (such as former Warsaw Pact countries) will bandwagon with more powerful states to piggy-back on their security. At the time, the alliance’s European members embraced expansion under the spirit of integration and the auspice of American leadership, which had proven a mainstay of European security when regional powers failed to act decisively during the Yugoslavian and Bosnian crises. Like many small states,

5 Walt 1997, p. 173.

6 Also see Ikenberry 1998.

Schimmelfennig 2000.

Mearsheimer 1990.

Schweller 1994; Mearsheimer 1995; Zakaria 1992.

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the Baltic States seemed to have pursued this strategy, and they have adroitly maneuvered in international organizations to gain outsized influence on international and regional policy. Lamoreaux and Galbreath (2008) argue these small states engage Western international organizations to reinforce their negotiating stature vis-à-vis Russia. But although the ostensibly weaker Baltic States had incentives to join NATO, NATO seems to have had little incentive to let them ascend. The 1999 and 2004 expansion did not occur with either of the structural conditions that lead powerful rational actors to expand their alliances: 1) NATO faced no threat against which it needed to balance and 2) it did not select new members that provided the most net-gains to the alliance’s security. The admitted states had fairly benign militaries and strategic geographies unsuitable for defense. If anything, adopting the precariously positioned Baltic States (as opposed to the nine other states that applied for membership in 2002) increased the likelihood that the alliance would be entangled in direct confrontation with Russia.10 Adding more members always risks complicating consensus-based alliances like NATO,11 threatening to undermine the alliance’s function to reduce the costs of signaling and information sharing. PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS LEADS TO IDEALIST EXPANSION IN 1999 President Clinton brushed the above concerns aside when he said during his 1992 presidential campaign, “In a world where freedom, not tyranny, is on the march, the cynical calculus of pure power politics simply does not compute. It is ill-

suited to a new era.”12 Throughout the 1990s, top U.S. policymakers—particularly Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton—saw an historic opportunity to guide fledgling democracies into the democratic liberal fold while pursuing détente with their splintered rival. In January 1994, President Clinton declared in a speech in Prague that it “is no longer [a question of] whether NATO will take on new members but when and how.”13 At a later speech, an NSC staffer said that an expanded alliance “should not just deter outside aggression ... but serve as a force for integration, democratization, and stability in Europe.” Clinton echoed this principle several times, including in a seminal address on NATO in 1996 when he declared that “we have an opportunity to build a peaceful, undivided, and democratic continent,” referring to Europe. Statements like these led Goldgeier (1999) to characterize President Clinton and his National Security Adviser Anthony Lake as “intellectual heirs of Woodrow Wilson.” These and other statements by the administration are symptomatic of a broader U.S. triumphalism and an eagerness to shape the post-Cold War order. Though less important than the presidential leadership on expansion, top State Department officials drove a convergent bureaucratic thrust to build support for expansion among U.S. policymakers and NATO allies. Clinton’s Czechborn Secretary of State Madeleine Albright strongly favored expansion and simply exclaimed “Hallelujah” when she was speaking in Prague to celebrate her birth-country’s ascension to full membership.14 The State Department pivoted to pro-enlargement writ large when Richard Hol12

Quoted in Mearsheimer 1995.

Schimmelfennig 2000; Goldgeier 2010.

Clinton 1994.

Oye 2013.

Perlez 1999.

Duke Political Science Standard brooke (a previous U.S. ambassador to Germany) became Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. In 1994, Hungarian-born State Department advisor Charles Gati also accompanied then-U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Albright on a tour of Central and Eastern Europe to explain the administration’s vision for NATO expansion.15 At the behest of Holbrooke, the State Department drove NATO’s decision-making process and participated heavily in preparing the three prospective nations’ membership applications.16 At the principle level, the important role of these Clinton Administration figures highlights that policymakers with particular world views are appointed by the President to import them a fortiori into the executive organs. In this way, presidential leadership can emanate through the bureaucracies. But the bureaucracies themselves nonetheless retain some influence independent of the president. Both the influence of specific individuals as well as the processes in which they operated must be considered in the context of NATO expansion. For the remainder of 1994, an imbroglio between the State and Defense Departments ensued in which Secretary of Defense William Perry questioned whether Holbrooke’s prerogative aligned with presidential policy. The Defense Department initially opposed expansion because it did not want to have to defend more nations who would not be able to make meaningful military contributions to NATO.17 However, the President quickly settled this dispute in December 1994 in an interagency meeting.18 Bureaucratic politics has relatively more sway on a policy matter when

the president and Congress do not have a clear electoral mandate on the issue. President Clinton tended to defer to his advisers on most foreign policy issues, in large part because he sought to direct national attention toward his domestic platforms;19 President Bush also did not have public spotlight on the question of expanding NATO, which was far overshadowed by the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. This initially gave prominent executive staff and agency heads more room to affect the outcome. But eventually the bureaucratic impasse between State and Defense largely neutralized the role of either agency in the initial internal debates and made space for President Clinton to play a more decisive role in the decision-making. Congressional Republicans—particularly their 1996 presidential nominee Senator Bob Dole (R-KS)—further pressured Clinton to expedite the ascension timeline. The Republicans included NATO expansion in their 1994 “Contract with America” platform, which further drove the administration to articulate a NATO policy. At least one author has asserted Clinton had additional motivation to assist Eastern European states because in the 1992 election he won twelve out of the fourteen states with the largest populations of Eastern European voters.20 In fact, Clinton surprised some observers by publically committing NATO to completing the first round of expansion by 1999.21 This was the first of two times that he made a public announcement on behalf of NATO before the alliance itself did. The second was when Clinton announced the official ascension of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary in 1999. Overall, these electoral pressures, the

Douglas 2008.

Schimmelfennig 2000; Douglas 2008.

Goldgeier 2010, p. 8.

Schimmelfennig 2000.

Stuart 1996.

See Schimmelfennig 2000, p. 37 for discussion.

Schimmelfennig 2000.

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concurrence of key State Department leaders, and—most importantly—the liberal world order aspirations of the Clinton administration coalesced to develop the necessary presidential decisiveness to fast-track NATO expansion and meet the 1999 target for ascension. In the 1999 at least, presidential politics seem to have overridden any realist concerns about expansion. BUREAUCRATIC MOMENTUM PUSHES EXPANSION IN 2004 NATO’s 2004 expansion followed a different story. Unlike in 1999, presidential politics in the 2004 expansion played a smaller role because Bush had relatively little electoral mandate regarding what to do in Eastern Europe. The post-USSR euphoria to promote democracy died down among Western leaders, which created the space for a larger role for bureaucratic interests to assert themselves. While presidential politics led the way in the 1990s, bureaucratic politics had greater sway in the process leading up to the 2004 expansion. The bureaucratic politics model argues that agencies themselves exert an independent influence on policymaking outcomes; this influence results in part from the ability of agencies to interpret laws and executive decisions, in part from the agencies’ self-interests, and in part from interagency dynamics, which filter the alternatives presented to top decision-makers.22 The end result is that bureaucracies have some latitude to drive policy toward outcomes that the president and Congress may not intend. In the context of NATO expansion, bureaucratic politics manifested in two manners, which became especially prominent in

Goldgeier 2010.

the second round of expansion.23 First, the departments assumed “parochial roles” associated with their purview: the Defense Department couched all issues as military matters, and the State Department framed them as mostly diplomatic or even cultural endeavors. Second, the interagency process produced compromises among these parochial views that both supported expansion. By the 2000s, while the key personalities had cycled out of the State Department and White House, enough bureaucratic inertia had been built within U.S. agencies as well as NATO’s staff to propel a very swift ascension of the Baltic States. Throughout that time, U.S. planning and analytical resources (including the President and his staff) were absorbed in managing engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq. NATO membership affairs in Eastern Europe went on the back burner. It is possible the post-9/11 focus on Middle Eastern theaters caused analysts to underestimate the substantial strategic distinctions (at least in Russia’s eyes) between Baltic ascension and the previous ascensions of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. The internal administration debates surrounding the 1999 enlargement settled the major strategy questions and resolved the main qualms of the Defense Department, thereby paving the way for another round of expansion in 2004. Each NATO member can issue its own criteria for evaluating membership applications, and Secretary of Defense Perry issued four principles (“the Perry Principles”) for ascension that steered both the 1999 and 2004 processes. With the major “why” and “how” questions regarding NATO expansion settled running up to 23

Ibid.

Duke Political Science Standard 1999, the 2004 expansion progressed through the bureaucratic process. This, unfortunately, resulted in less presidential attention and considered analysis of the consequences of expansion. The 2004 enlargement to the three Baltic States—all former Soviet republics and Czarist satellites before that—marked an unprecedented penetration of Russia’s historic sphere of influence and defensive geography. NATO sought the Baltics in part because they would extend the alliance’s reach along Russia’s border, helping curtail Russian access to the Baltic Sea and station operational assets within no-notice striking distance of all major Russian cities. Moscow also seemed to realize that admitting Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia into NATO in 2004 sapped Russia’s century-old buffer zone along the Baltic Sea. However advantageous this may have seemed to NATO, it put Russia in an insecure position. First, it sandwiched Kaliningrad between NATO states, thereby isolating Moscow geographically from its Baltic naval headquarters and only ice-free winter port on the Baltic Sea. Second, it thrust an asymmetric security dilemma on Russia. Decades earlier, the prospect of Soviet missiles in Cuba vaulted America into crisis because it would have given Moscow a tremendous first-strike advantage.24 Similarly, the prospect of stationing NATO assets about 650 miles from Moscow threatened to give Western powers an offensive advantage that Russia could not reciprocate. Russia no doubt was weary of why NATO seemed keen on this advantage, given Cold War tensions had supposedly thawed. As Jervis argues, “the security dilemma is at its most vicious when commitments, strategy, or technol24 Allison and Zelikow 1999.

ogy dictate that the only route to security lies through expansion.”25 Observers hoped the fall of the USSR would end decades of competitive Soviet and American expansionism in third-party countries. Moscow could easily perceive each successive round of NATO expansion—especially admission of the Baltic States—as another step toward the borders of Russia and reversion to the expansionism against which Jervis had forewarned. Furthermore, admitting the Baltic States was the first time NATO professed to protect ethnic Russian populations, which, although not necessarily a security priority, gave Moscow moral ammunition to domestically justify interventions to protect ethnic Russians abroad. In Moscow’s eyes, NATO expansion to the Baltic States belied Western powers’ interest in entente, and it suggested NATO had a renewed intent to balance against Russia; predictably, by the rational actor model, Moscow began to deter further enlargement by fomenting instabilities in former Soviet states—namely Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine—aspiring to NATO membership. And, it has increasingly harassed Baltic militaries to signal resolve and make it seem risky to station NATO “tripwire” assets in the Baltics. Overall, these political and bureaucratic decisions that did not rigorously prioritize security gains instilled subtle structural frictions that are ultimately succumbing to predictable patterns of systemic security dynamics predicted by rational and realist theories. CONCLUSION While presidential leadership guided NATO’s expansion in 1999, bureaucratic momentum drove 25

Jervis 2013.

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the process leading up to expansion in 2004. The actuarial security calculations predicted by rationalists and realists failed to account for the powerful but ethereal goals that guided key personalities holding the U.S. foreign policy reigns after the downfall of communism. Although the bureaucratic debate informed Clinton’s thought process, ultimately his decision was driven by ideological and electoral dividends. Bureaucratic politics were present but somewhat self-neutralizing in the initial decision to expand NATO in 1999. In contrast, President Bush’s focus on Iraq and Afghanistan let the bureaucratic process play a larger role in the 2004 expansion. Russia may have been able to manage NATO expansion in 1999, but expansion to the Baltic States in 2004 may have inadvertently poked the Russian bear too many times. NATO’s newfound offensive advantage vis-à-vis its Baltic members made Russia’s situation less stable, and it signaled renewed Western interest in balancing against Russia. It seems to be no coincidence that Russia’s interventions to protect ethnic Russians (which reside in dozens of countries) have all concentrated on aspiring NATO members—Georgia, Moldova, and now Ukraine. While bureaucratic and presidential politics provide a superior description of the causes of this strategy, the U.S. could have perhaps developed a preferable course of action had it abided by rational actor and realist prescriptions; such prescriptions would have weighted the threats to Russian security against democratic endorsement of objectively weak states, likely recommending other forms of assistance short of security guarantees and membership in the most

prized Western security regime.26 The absence of a serious competitor in the 1990s and early 2000s allowed the United States to be strategically sloppy and pursue foreign policy luxuries— such as a “Why not?” democratization policy in Eastern and Central Europe—that did not follow the dictates of security-maximizing necessity. Today, the U.S. has imposed harsh sanctions and rhetoric against Moscow that are only getting harsher. President Obama’s early attempt to “reset” relations with Russia has about-faced.27 As both sides dig in, the related cases of the 1999 and 2004 NATO expansions should be taken as examples of how bureaucratic and presidential politics can fuel momentum toward policies that are not optimal in all scenarios and that are vulnerable to predictable patterns of systemic security dynamics. ♦

Feaver et al. 2000.

Deudney and Ikenberry 2009.

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