1 TOM MINOR Epictetus on freedom: the master – slave dilemma In Book Four of his ‘Discourses’ Epictetus, presents a hypothetical dialogue between someone who (by virtue of their birth into the ‘master’ class of ancient Roman society) feels themselves to be free, and ‘the philosopher’ – as represented by Epictetus, the protagonist himself—who advocates for the relinquishing any attachment to the world of freedom, as the only path to freedom. The third party, in his discourse is the abstract incarnation of ‘the slave’, and through presenting the conditions of the prevailing master-slave dichotomy, Epictetus passes his judgment on the validity of attributing freedom to either party. Ultimately, Diogenes and Socrates are said to exclusively portray the special class of people who uniquely satisfy Epictetus’ criteria for the experience of freedom. This essay aims to give a sympathetic account of Epictetus’ main points in regards to freedom. Due to the peculiarity of his ancient use of language and the inherent problems of validity in translation, the most authentic method for achieving this goal would appear to be a close re-iteration of some of the Discourses most poetic and philosophical statements: as such, a liberal use of direct quotation will be employed to facilitate our investigation of freedom from an Epictetian standpoint. ‘Free man lives as he wishes, free from compulsion, hindrance and force’; ‘free man has freedom to act’; ‘free man’s desires get satisfied and free men do not fall into that which they would avoid’. These are all sentiments we can extract from Epictetus’ fourth chapter in his Discourses. Bad men are thus not free and live deceived, erroneously and unjustly: “…unrestrained, discontented…in sorrow, fear, envy, pity, desiring and failing in his desires, attempting to avoid something and falling into it.”1 To be clear, Epictetus believes that no man ‘chooses’ to be bad. Nonetheless men that are bad are not free. Slaves are not bad men, but nor are they free, because they serve a master. Epictetus would venture to say that even masters of slaves are not necessarily free: “…most excellent senatorial man, perhaps your father also was a slave in the same kind of servitude, and your mother, and your grandfather and all your ancestors in an ascending series.”2 Even if one’s noble ancestors were free, Epictetus would question the value this fact would have for the mean-natured, cowardly descendents of nobility, to whom his rhetoric is targeted. So what, he says, if fearlessness and self-restraint are your birthright, if: “…you are not able to exercise it.”3 The nobleman tries to justify his social position, providing Epictetus with ample ammunition for more dymythologizing when he says: “…but who is able to compel me, except…Caesar?”, to which the philosopher replies: “Then even you…have admitted that you have one master…And…if any man compelled you to kiss Caeser’s feet, you would think it an insult and excessive tyranny. What else, then is slavery?”4 So even masters serve some master in this Epictetian scheme, and hence no master can be free. What then, is it to be free, according to Epictetus? Fortunately he gives a variety of 1
Epictetus, Discourses Book IV. Chapter I, http://philosophy.eserver.org/epictetusdiscourses.txt. 2 ibid 3 ibid 4 ibid
2 examples. A line such as: “…was he free enough neither to desire nor to fear?”5, can be read as ‘to be free, one neither desires nor fears’ and this tenet to Epictetian freedom becomes crucial later on in the discourse. Another example can be found when Epictetus asks us to consider the caged lion—the more domesticated—the more enslaved! Or the pet birds that suffer trying to escape, before starving to death: “… rather than submit to such a kind of life.”6 The comparison to human existence is not disguised here, nor in reading of a statement such as: “…many of them live, hardly live and with suffering pine away; and if they ever find any opening, they make their escape. So much do they desire their natural liberty, and to be independent and free from hindrance”7. It is difficult to miss the obvious correspondence to human beings in such statements and this is all the more profound since it also has contemporaneous meaning for today’s societies. Such an example amasses many clear statements regarding Epictetus’ message in this section of his Discourses: how many humans could we ascribe this state of affairs to? How many humans ‘hardly live’ and ‘pine away in suffering’—desperately awaiting an opportunity to ‘escape’ their natural bondage? But the nobleman says: “I am formed by nature to fly where I choose, to live in the open air, to sing when I choose: you [philosopher] deprive me of all this…”8, to which Epictetus replies: “…animals only are free which cannot endure capture, but, as soon as they are caught, escape from captivity by death. So Diogenes [the ‘free man’] says that there is one way to freedom, and that is to die content…”9. So the free man, in the same manner as the voluntary demise of the caged bird, is only free to extent that he can resist slavery (at all costs), even if that means forfeiting life. From such sentiments, we can say that for Epictetus, a life of containment and bondage, is no life at all and one should rather die than live such a life of servitude. This must not be examined as a point of view completely isolated from the cultural context within which it was developed. Surely, Epictetus himself did not live outside of the ‘master-slave’ paradigm which dominated his (ancient Roman) society. He must have been a product of this mentality, just as much as his target audience; indeed, he would have been raised as part of precisely this ‘aristocratic-nobility’ class with whom he seems most at odds with. But he isn’t just saying slavery is bad, he is commenting on the very structure of his contemporary consciousness, which divides good and bad, into master and slave into freedom and servitude. Epictetus turns this dichotomy on its head and shows that even masters, who conceive themselves to be free and good, are (by virtue of their enslavement of others and indeed their subordination under a further ‘higher authority’) neither good, nor free, and worse still, they do not know it! The slaves on the other hand, at least know they are not free and do not become bad because they themselves do not enslave others: slaves merely serve, and to some extent can be happier in light of this fact. Again, we beg the question: who is free? And Epictetus answers: “…neither those who are called kings live as they choose, nor the friends of kings…are free…”10— then who? Is it: “…he who obtains the greatest good.”11? Even, he can be unhappy 5
ibid ibid 7 ibid 8 ibid 9 ibid 10 ibid 11 ibid 6
3 and fare badly, says Epictetus, and furthermore: “Whomsoever…you…see unhappy, unfortunate, lamenting…are not free.”12 Here, suddenly, the range of individuals across the master-slave divide are subsumed within the same basic class: a class living in ‘unfree, human misery’. The dialogue between the ever-doubtful antagonist and the philosopher continues as the question of freedom as a: “…great…noble and valuable…”13 virtue is posed. Again, the social commentary towards his own peers does not go amiss as Epictetus ponders on the possibility that acquiring such a noble and valuable freedom may not preclude the owner of such freedom from being mean or bad, which we have already been told mandates slavery in the sense of not being free (since all ‘bad’ masters of slaves serve some higher master). Self-ordained noblemen of freedom not only subject others to slavery but they betray themselves when they assume the position of sycophant to whomever endows upon them their authority, be it the state, the monarch or God: such obsequious men are not free in Epictetus’ mind. Freedom then, can be seen as: “…a thing independent and selfgoverning.”14 Gradually, we build a picture of freedom in Epictetian terms: free men are not bad men; noblemen serve their master and are thus not free; free men, neither desire, nor fear; free men cannot endure capture and would rather die than live in bondage; men who enslave others (noblemen) are not good men, nor are they free; slaves are not bad nor free. We begin to see Epictetus’ criteria in action and are now equipped to tackle his central question: “What, then, is that which makes a man free from hindrance and makes him his own master? For wealth does not do it, nor consulship, nor provincial government, nor royal power; but something else must be discovered.”15 The next part of this essay will deal with this ‘something else’ and it will become clear that ‘freedom from hindrance’ and ‘autonomy’ occupy a definite role in the experience of freedom, according to Epictetus. He says that: “…he who desires any of the things which depend on others….cannot be free.”16 Presumably this is because being dependent on others opens the way for them to impede your progress or become a hindrance to your freedom hence the ‘something else’ being revealed as a notion of independence. What else does Epictetus give us to answer this riddle: “Keep, then… not only your hands but…even your desires. If you do not, you have surrendered yourself as a slave…subjected your neck, if you admire anything not your own, to everything that is dependent on the power of others and perishable, to which you have conceived a liking.”17 To be free thus requires one to distinguish between that which belongs to others and is therefore subject to hindrance and that which belongs to oneself and is therefore free from hindrance: “…to keep your desire steadily fixed to the things which do concern yourself, and turn…from the things which do not…”18 What else, Epictetus asks, have we been studying for, than to make this very distinction between that which is in- and that which is out- of our control? The free 12
ibid ibid 14 ibid 15 ibid 16 ibid 17 ibid 18 ibid 13
4 man regulates his desires to focus on what is within the power of his will: he does not desire what is outside the power of his will such as irrationality, impatience or hastiness. Following on from the ‘something else’; the distinction between what is- and what is not- our own, where desiring only what is our own is prerequisite for independence, Epictetus demands that free men begin their journey to freedom by relinquishing their attachment to a number of things. He includes bodies, bodily functions, possessions, reputation, civil office, honours of all kinds, children, family and friends – since all these apparently ‘belong’ to others. Epictetus calls this the ‘banishing of tyrants’ and the ‘abolition of the acropolis within us’. Here is something of an echo of ancient Eastern mysticism, indeed, pure Buddhism, as Epictetus describes what is commonly known as the ‘non-attachment’ of the sage in Daoist, Zen and Zoroastrian belief systems. The character in Asiatic spirituality, who is deemed free, is free by virtue of having nothing to lose; he has no attachment whatsoever to anything material, corporeal or indeed human! The sage in Eastern mysticism had certainly been written about by the time the Discourses were written in the beginning of the second century (ad), but the extent to which they may have been influenced by this Oriental movement of ‘enlightenment’, would be difficult to establish. One can only point out the palpable harmony between temporally- and spatially- distal developments of thought, and draw tentative syntheses that might suggest some fundamental commonalities to man’s search for freedom, throughout history and around the globe. The interesting point here is that, not only Epictetus (as a representative of ancient Western thought), but also, an even more ancient, putatively more Materiarchal consciousness (i.e., Eastern Buddhist thought) agree, that an indispensable aspect of freedom, is the freedom of non-attachment to the material or ‘organised’ world. The sages or wise men of ancient China that you encounter in the ‘Dao De Ching’ or ‘Chuang-Zou’ (arguably two of the oldest texts ever written), were considered to be wanderers and Epictetus does not differ on this point: “Thus the more cautious traveler…has heard that the road is infested by robbers; he does not venture to enter on it alone, but he waits for…companionship…and when he has attached himself to such persons he goes along the road safely. So in the world the wise man acts.”19 The similarities, however, come to an end here: Epictetus diverges, on the point of companionship, from the Daoist sages who are notoriously solitary. Continuing in his story of the traveler, Epictetus reminds us of the other ‘great power’ vested in the ancient Roman consciousness: “There are many companies of robbers, tyrants, storms, difficulties, losses of that which is dearest…what if the fellow-companion himself turns against me…? I will be ‘a friend of Caeser’….no man will wrong me…[but] Then…he is also mortal. And if Caeser…becomes my enemy, where is it best for me to retire? Into a desert? Well does not fever come there?...Thus he considers and perceives that if he attaches himself to God, he will make his journey safely.”20 Metaphysical accounts such as this do no seem out of place in a culture very much centred around worship and reverence, even sacrifice to the Olypium Gods; though clearly, this ‘wise man’ no longer resembles the Eastern sage, who although rendered divine by history, was no God-fearing man. The ‘traveler’, contemplates attaching 19 20
ibid ibid
5 himself to God, which by Epictetus’ standards, would result in him not being free, but this does not seem to ring true when we read a passage that would appear to advocate for such an attachment to God, and which should be achieved through: “…examining the movements of God and his administration [to ask] What has He given me as my own and in my own power? What has He reserved to Himself?”21 God, according to Epictetus, and not social ranking: “…has given to me the things which are in the power of my will…free from impediment and hindrance.” But why then, Epictetus asks, does man fight God and will to have what is—absolutely—not granted to him? The antagonist answers for us: “For whence I had things when I came into the world? My father gave them to me. And who gave them to him? And who made the sun? and who made the fruits of the earth? And who the seasons? And who made the connection of men with one another and their fellowship?”22 Epictetus would say, it was God, and asks the doubter: “Who are you, and for what purpose did you come into the world? Did not He introduce you here, did He not show you the light…[or] give you…perception, and reason?...did He not introduce you as a subject to death, and as one to live on the earth with a little flesh, and to observe His administration… to join with Him in the spectacle and the festival for a short time?23 On account of Epictetus’ question to the doubter, we may lament: ‘why has God chosen these conditions?’ And Epictetus would offer us our leave: “He has no need of a spectator who is not satisfied. He wants those who join in the festival…who take part in the chorus…But those who can bear no trouble, and the cowardly…they did not…behave as they ought to…nor fill up their place properly…they lamented, found fault with the deity, fortune, their companions; not seeing both what they had and their own powers…”24 Suggesting that these powers were given to us by God, to use, for as long as ‘He’ so chooses, but Epictetus warns us not to: “…attach yourself to them…do not say to yourself that they are necessary, and then they are not necessary.”25 I believe this to be an attempt by Epictetus to reconcile his search for freedom within the confines of his dogmatic, prescribed faith. Freedom becomes Gods will and: “…whatever God wills…man shall also will; and what God does not will…man shall not will.”26 With such a strong religious impulse as we see from these damning statements, Epictetus goes further and argues for the daily practice of purging all material, physical, political and mental possessions so that “…nothing cleave to you of the things which are not your own, that nothing grow to you, that nothing give you pain when it is torn from you…”27 He calls this practice, not philosophizing as that would be an ‘arrogant expression’ for Epictetus, but a practice which asserts true freedom. As we move towards the final recapitulation of the fourth chapter, Epictetus begins to make some of his strongest social, philosophical and moral statements about the master-class of his contemporaries, reminding us that not even they are free, since they are bad, and suffer for it: “…no man can do what is unjust without suffering for it. And what is the penalty for him who puts his own slave in chains….if you choose 21
ibid ibid 23 ibid 24 ibid 25 ibid 26 ibid 27 ibid 22
6 to maintain the truth, that man is…but a tame animal. For when is a vine doing badly? When it is in a condition contrary to its nature. When is a cock? Just the same. Therefore a man also is so.”28 But! you interject, what is man’s nature? Is it the nature of the mean-spirited master of slaves: “To bite, to kick, and to throw into prison and to behead?”29 Epictetus would deny this self-negating nature and preach rather that the free man’s nature is: “to do good, to cooperate with others, to wish them well.”30 To conclude then, let us restate what Epictetus has agreed in Book IV, Chapter I of his polemic Discourses: “…man who is not under restraint is free, to whom things are exactly in that state which he wishes them to be; but he who can be restrained or… hindered…against his will, is a slave.”31 Freedom from restraint can be understood in terms of the man who desires nothing that belongs to others, desiring only the things that are within the power of his will. Freedom qua non-attachment is the message Epictetus wants us to understand, it is this road of non-attachment that: “…leads to freedom…”32 and is: “…the only way of escaping from slavery…”33 His sentiments are exactly clear: freedom involves autonomy and freedom from hindrance, which is understood and non-attachment (the ‘something else’). Epictetus equates his contemporary society of noblemen and aristocrats to slaves, counting their masters: “…the old women and old men…”34 as evidence of their slavery. One does not fail to notice the underlying similarities to Nietzsche’s disgust for the ‘noble’ and ‘good men’ of his 19th century Germany. In ‘The Gay Science’ Nietzsche finds these men of education and officialdom simply unbearable precisely because they ventured to remake this distinction between good and bad, noble and common, free and not free. Epictetus says: “…who could endure you who are in love with old women and old men…and give them presents, and…wait on them like a slave when they are sick, and at the same time wish them dead…And…in order to obtain…great and much admired magistracies and honours you kiss the hands of these slaves of others…so you are not the slave even of free men…I would not even choose to live, if I must live by help… arrogance adn servile insolence: for I know what a slave is, who is fortunate, as he thinks, and puffed up by pride.”35 We can see from this unforgiving declaration that noone escapes Epictetus’ powerful judgment on the ranks of freedom that surely must have existed during his epoch, his condemnation reaches even into the future when we consider the saliency of the master-slave mentality today. One can imagine all kinds of high-ranking men, in powerful positions: Kings, Consuls, Governors, Senators, Land owners – all enslaved, akin to the aforementioned caged bird. We recall then, that the only truly free action in such heinous circumstances would be to die—such is the constitution of the free man with his non-attachment to life. Since none of these high-ranking figures appear dead in the Discourses, we can only assume that none of them are free. For certain, freedom was no small matter to Epictetus as he concludes his fourth chapter with this 28
ibid ibid 30 ibid 31 ibid 32 ibid 33 ibid 34 ibid 35 ibid 29
7 poignant testimony: “…look to these examples, if you would be free…For the sake of this which is called ‘liberty’, some hang themselves, others throw themselves down precipices, and sometimes even whole cities have perished: and will you not for the sake of the true and unassailable and secure liberty give back to God when He demands…the things which He has given? Will you not, as Plato says, study not to die only, but also to endure torture, and exile, and scourging…to give up all which is not your own?”36 If the answer is no (leaving all metaphysical debates aside for the moment), you will become, according to Epictetus: “…a slave among slaves, even you be ten thousand times a consul; and if you make your way up to the Palace, you will be no less a slave…”37 Freedom is more than just a belief in God, for we could erase this element to the Discourses and it would still have a strong message with interesting implications for humans today. Freedom is achieved when one removes desires for possessions and becomes: “…vigilant for the purpose of acquiring an opinion…”38 We have now covered all that was hitherto possible with just a selective reading of the fourth chapter in the Discourses. We can say with some certainly that, contrary to popular belief (in ancient Greece, and many civilizations thereafter), noble birth is not a necessary or sufficient condition for freedom for Epictetus. He requires something else and this involves a complete inversion of the pre-eminent and illusory masterslave mentality, and recognizing that freedom is not about possession but, quite to opposite, freedom is about non-possession and in agreement with Lao Zou and Chuang-Zou from ancient China, freedom is the freedom of non-attachment.
36
ibid ibid 38 ibid 37