Latest Issue by Editors In Chief

FALL 2014/WINTER 2015 • Vol.XXXVI • No. 2

John Kakonge

Kenyan Ambassador, UN Oﬃce at Geneva

Jordan Ryan

Assistant Secretary-General, UN Development Programme

HIR.HARVARD.EDU

Karen Musalo

Director, Center for Gender & Refugee Studies

THE PERSONAL AND THE POLITICAL

Gender in International Relations

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LETTER FROM THE EDITORS

f recent century-long trends in social history can be defined by the slow dissolution of the barriers of prejudice and ignorance that have divided the people of this world—whether by race, religion, social or economic class, sex, or nationality—then continuing these trends must involve dissolving the barriers surrounding gender. Today, only nine out of 196 countries have a female head of state, and two thirds of illiterates are female. An estimated 41 percent of people live in nations where homosexuality is criminalized. In most countries, gender is defined by two categories; a handful allow individuals to choose from three; while Facebook allows 56. It is clear that gender is a global and a changing issue.

The academic discourse on gender issues has evolved substantially since the works of early feminists or even the first Gay Pride parades. Now, we discuss breaking down gender binaries, reflecting the continuum of identity in political structures, as well as continuing to challenge all forms of discrimination based upon sex, sexuality, or gender. However, it is clear that such ideas are not yet political realities. Moreover, in the twenty-first century, ideas can unite the world, whereas politics do not. The authors in this issue detail what more must be done to spread these ideas around the world. This Fall 2014/Winter 2015 issue of the Harvard International Review, entitled The Personal and the Political: Gender in International Relations, traverses the topic of gender, from recent developments in the traditional gender equality debate to globalizing the LGBTQ movement. Professor Karen Musalo, Director of the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, discusses the evolving standards in gender asylum; Iranian gay rights activist Arsham Parsi discusses the status of queers in Iran; and staff writers Sarah Moon, Alice Hu, and Kevin Xie discuss specific gender issues in India, the US, and China respectively. Considering international relations more broadly in our Perspectives section, Dr. John Kakonge, Kenyan Ambassador to the UN Office in Geneva, discusses developmental challenges in Africa; Professor Leonardo Vivas, former Director of the Latin American Initiative at the Harvard Kennedy School, writes about human rights in Latin America; and Jordan Ryan, Director of the UN Development Program’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, analyzes the impact Ebola will have on post-war Liberia. In an interview, US Special Envoy Robert King talks about human rights in North Korea. In our World in Review section, staff writers Gregory Dunn and Mason Barnard talk about the conflict between a global economy and international relations and Russia’s changing foreign policy strategy respectively. We are also excited to announce that the HIR is preparing to publish an anniversary book to celebrate 35 years of publication, featuring the best articles from across our colorful history—an article by President Bill Clinton can be found at the end of this magazine as a teaser. In order to prepare for the publication of this book, we have merged the Fall 2014 and Winter 2015 editions of the HIR for this issue. The topic of gender continues to cause division and controversy across the world and in all spheres of life: social, political, and economic. Issues of gender, sex, and sexuality have an unavoidable influence on international affairs; we must view these issues through a global lens. This issue’s feature articles remind us, therefore, that the personal is not merely the political, as Carol Hanisch first claimed, but indeed the personal is global. To challenging norms —

James Watkins & Neha Dalal Editors-in-Chief

Fall 2014/Winter 2015 • H A R V A R D I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E V I E W

Vol. XXXVI, No. 2 • Fall 2014/Winter 2015

WORLD IN REVIEW

Follow the Money: The Rise of Economics in Geopolitics by Gregory Dunn Putin a Stranglehold: The Changing Strategies of a Resurgent Russia by Mason Barnard

PERSPECTIVES

GLOBAL NOTEBOOK

A New Role for Egypt: Sisi’s Government and the ArabIsraeli Conflict Pill Too Big to Swallow: Challenges in Chinese Health Care

New Development? The BRICS Bank and the International System The Forgotten State: Rifts in Post-Revolutionary Libya The Crisis-Monger: Where Did Things Go Wrong for Argentina?

Latin America: A Backlash in Human Rights? by Leonardo Vivas, Professor, Global Studies and International Relations, Northeastern University

A Vexing Issue Revisited: Confronting Africa’s Developmental Challenges by John O. Kakonge, Kenyan Ambassador, UN Office in Geneva

Can a Post-Crisis Country Survive in the Time of Ebola? by Jordan Ryan, Director, UN Development Programme’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

INTERVIEWS

Interview with Dr. Robert R. King by Sally H. Na

FEATURE: THE PERSONAL AND THE POLITICAL

The “Missing Girls” From China: Reforms are Too Little, Too Late by Kevin Xie Innovators of Inequality: Why the “Woman Solution” Does Not Work by Alice Hu

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emBODYindia: The State of Women’s Rights in India by Sarah Moon Personal Violence, Public Matter: Evolving Standards in Gender-Based Asylum Law by Karen Musalo, Director, Center for Gender & Refugee Studies

Iranian Queers and Laws: Fighting for Freedom of Expression by Arsham Parsi, Iranian LGBTQ Human Rights activist

HIR 35TH ANNIVERSARY BOOK TEASER Bill Clinton’s Article for the Summer 1992 Issue of the HIR analysis by Richard Wang

Photos Courtesy Reuters

Fall 2014/Winter 2015 • H A R V A R D I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E V I E W

WORLD IN REVIEW

Putin a Stranglehold

The Changing Strategies of a Resurgent Russia

staff writer MASON BARNARD

t has been a good year for Russian President Vladimir economic giants like Germany, the UK, and France, but it will Putin. His country annexed a strategic peninsula in the remain in place for more gas dependent Eastern Europe—at Black Sea, he retains high approval ratings at home, least for a while. Although EU plans to reduce energy deand his aggressive military actions in Ukraine remain pendence on Russia exist, they rely upon nonexistent infralargely unanswered. There have been a few minor structures. Proposals to construct new pipelines from North obstacles on the way—but nothing that truly outweighs Africa, jumpstart European alternative energy sectors, or even Putin’s recent gains. Even with a political shift in Eastern import coal from fracking operations in the United States Europe towards the West, Russia still determines the region’s abound, but all of these ideas require significant investments economic vitality through of both time and capital. its control of vast natural With the right amount gas reserves. If Russia’s rise of political will and the is to continue, however, proper economic policies, Putin must not only wield the European Union can energy reserves, but also likely find the latter, but curb his authoritarian the former will always tendencies in Crimea and remain a finite resource. other Russian satellite Thus, it will be difficult for states. Only by doing so the European Union to will he keep NATO out alter Putin’s course in the of new satellite allies short term. and welcome more proBut time is also a fiRussian separatists into nite resource for Presihis country’s orbit. dent Putin. He knows that Mainland Europe rehis ability to twist the lies heavily upon Russian European Union’s arm natural gas—at least half by monopolizing energy of which is piped through markets is a short-term Ukraine—for energy readvantage, but it is an sources. The continent as advantage he hopes to a whole receives 24 perutilize for maximum gain. cent of its natural gas from The leverage that energy Russia; Estonia, Latvia, exports grant Russia enand Lithuania, all NATO ables Putin to appear as a allies, receive 100 percent practical dealmaker while Vladimir Putin speaks at an investment forum in Moscow, of it from their Eastern still supporting Ukraine’s promising to increase the capital of domestic banks in reneighbor. While Western rebels. In September sponse to recent economic sanctions from Western nations. European countries have 2014, he orchestrated a large gas stores and alterceasefire between Russian native means to receive gas supplies, relying solely upon these separatists and the Ukrainian government, giving the hardalternatives will be costly and is only viable in the short run. pressed separatist forces time to reorganize and granting Current trends suggest an even starker outlook: European gas them legal recognition. Later, on October 17, he signed a deal imports from Russia are expected to increase over the coming with the pro-West Ukrainian government to renew shipments decade, reaching 413 billion cubic meters in 2020 from 327 of natural gas before the winter months set in. Although a billion cubic meters today. necessary success for Ukraine in the short term, the deal plays Partially due to these gas dependencies, many European into Putin’s hands. Another year-long gas deal is another year nations have been reluctant to employ broad sanctions or spent relying upon Russia—a year Ukraine may not have. take strong military action to thwart Russian aggression. That Despite the backlash against pro-Russian sentiment reluctance may have started to waver for Western European in Kiev, the relationship between Ukraine and Russia is still

Photo Courtesy Reuters

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WORLD IN REVIEW complex. Ukraine spent decades under Soviet leadership, and retains religious and cultural ties to its northeastern neighbor. Russian is widely spoken across Ukraine, and when a group of Ukrainian parliamentarians attempted to outlaw Russian as a second language following the removal of the previous, proRussian president in February, they were met with immediate backlash. A few weeks later, Russian separatists announced their plans to return Eastern Ukraine to Russian rule. Today, Ukrainians remain divided on how to treat their Eastern neighbor. Few desire to sever ties completely, but most desire more dialogue with the West and greater independence from Russia. This complex relationship was apparent in Russia’s latest round of talks with Ukraine and the European Union. By

the region. It mirrors Joseph Stalin’s 1944 mass deportation of Russian Tatars to death and misery in Siberia, and worse, from Putin’s perspective, it weakens the credibility of calls for selfdetermination for ethnic Russians in nearby nations. Rather than silence the Tatars through intimidation and arrest, Putin should soothe their claims against Russia by treating them as equals of Crimea’s majority Russian population. In this era of internet communication and international human rights law, forceful coercion is not a long-term option for controlling populations. By allowing Tartars to retain their cultural homogeneity as Russian citizens, Putin sends a message to other regions torn between pro-Russian majorities and ethnic minorities: the two do not need to be mutually exclusive.

“The integration of mass communications and human rights enables almost any minority group to reach the global audience—as long as the global audience is open to listening. Putin must not ignore that.” providing gas supplies, but not a permanent truce, President Putin catered to the Ukrainian people, but not to Ukraine. He plays this game well. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and especially during Putin’s tenures as president and prime minister, Russia has used its military might and energy resources to provoke conflicts in former Soviet Republics with large ethnic Russian populations, such as Georgia and Moldova. Putin usually picks these battles wisely, but often pursues them too aggressively—alienating potential, more moderate allies. Like in Ukraine, citizens of these countries are torn between Russia and the West. Many are of Russian descent, speak Russian as their native language, and desire at least a cultural connection with their former Soviet master. Transnistria, a breakaway region of Moldova, retains Russian soldiers and a communist government. Citizens of South Ossetia, the center of a brief conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008, use the Russian ruble as often as their national currency. In other regions, Russia has returned in full force. Crimea, annexed by Russia in 2014, initially struggled beneath Russian administration, but has adjusted to living under Putin’s authority. Most Crimeans still celebrate the takeover, with only a few minorities, such as the Muslim Tatars and the LGBTQI community, speaking out against Russian rule. Putin’s response to these criticisms will likely define the long-term success of further territorial grabs and annexations—making Crimea a testing ground for future Russian actions. So far, Crimea is one area where Putin’s authoritarianism has done more harm than good. Since Russia’s takeover, numerous laws have been put in place to restrict the movement and freedom of speech of outspoken groups, especially the Tatars. Persecuting the Tatar population, although it has long been antagonistic to the Russian state, only strengthens the international community’s case against Russia’s annexation of

If Russia’s regional ambitions are to be realized, it must come to terms with this undeniable truth: self-determination, while a key component in Russian power grabs, is a two-way street. It gives Russian majorities outside Russia’s boundaries a chance at reunification, but it also gives other groups a right to be heard. By muting Tatar voices, Russia is undermining the rights of its own Russian minority exclaves spread across former Soviet states. If Putin plans to continue Russia’s expansionist policies, he will need to rely upon the voices of Russian exclaves and the voluntary quiet of other ethnic minorities. For a man like Putin, who rose to power in the depths of the Cold War, this logic may be difficult to accept. But it should not be. The Chechnyan War, Russia’s longest and deadliest post-Cold War conflict, centered on minority rights. More than a decade after the end of the violence, the region remains tumultuous. This instability is not something Russia can afford in its new prize. Crimea, with its strategic position on the Black Sea and its offshore oil reserves, is too critical to Russia’s future. The world has changed. The integration of mass communications and human rights enables almost any minority group to reach the global audience—as long as the global audience is open to listening. Putin must not ignore that. But there is little within Russia that will force Putin to face the new reality of human rights and global media. To his people, excluding a few outspoken liberal activists and business leaders, Putin is a hero. State-owned media outlets cast him as the liberator of Crimea and the defender of persecuted Russian minorities across Eastern Europe. Humanitarian aid convoys to beleaguered civilians in Ukraine, as well as missteps, both real and perceived, by the Ukrainian and Western governments, contribute to that illusion. However, without a significant shift in his treatment of Russia’s newest citizens, Putin’s heroic aura in Crimea and other mixed ethnic regions

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WORLD IN REVIEW may fade, and, when it does, so too will the political support driving Russia’s expansion. But with the right mix of force and a touch of compassion towards Crimean minority groups, Putin will likely keep his valiant image, and will retain the political will to weather economic sanctions and keep the West at bay. But while Putin ignores the changing reality of human rights and global media, NATO is ignoring him. Thus far, NATO and the West have done little in response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. A few measly sanctions nibble away at Russia’s economy, and speakers constantly berate Putin at the United Nations, but no real efforts to punish Russia have been made. Even the tragic loss of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 only prompted renewed aid for the Ukrainian military and stronger economic sanctions—both of which Russia has endured with moderate success. Although NATO has conducted more active military operations since the Soviet Union’s collapse than it did throughout the entire Cold War, its military readiness and will for major military action are at an all-time low. The war in Afghanistan sapped the alliance’s political capital amongst its member states, and even successful missions like Operation Unified Protector in Libya displayed the alliance’s dearth of munitions, fuel, and personnel for long-term engagements. Ukraine is not a member of the military alliance and thus is unable to call upon the mutual defense pact at the core of the NATO treaty, nor ask for consultation with NATO members. Without these two elements, Ukraine can only collaborate with NATO on humanitarian projects. However, after a decade of war in the Middle East and a push for austerity measures across Europe, this too is unlikely. NATO has instead attempted to thwart Russian ambitions in NATO member states, increasing air patrols, strengthening air defense systems, and stationing more soldiers at Eastern European bases. Despite such actions, NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe remains startlingly weak. An internal report

from the UK Commons Defence Committee noted major weaknesses in NATO’s readiness to respond to a Russian attack on a member state. The report noted that the conventional military conflicts NATO was founded to fight bear little resemblance to the current threat in Eastern Europe, and instead, the alliance must now consider the use of irregular militias and cyber-attacks within the bounds of its mutual defense pact. From a strategic standpoint, this logic is perfectly sound. Russia’s takeover of Crimea relied heavily upon paramilitary units and a major cyber-attack against Estonia in 2007 was traced to Russian hackers. But altering the NATO treaty in such a way would likely place NATO soldiers in combat zones far more often than most member nations would like, making change unlikely. Triumph against Russian separatists in Ukraine, should it occur, will be but one small victory for the West amid major losses in the new proxy war with Russia. The annexation of Crimea, with its strategic location on the Black Sea and access to major offshore oil deposits, is a major coup for Putin. It is also a testament to the effectiveness of his strategies in areas with major ethnic Russian exclaves. As Russia continues to ponder pockets of pro-Russian sentiment around Eastern Europe, Crimea’s example will no doubt prove enduring. If Russia’s stranglehold on European energy resources is allowed to continue any longer than it must, Putin’s short-term window for intervention in Eastern Europe will evolve into something far more enduring: a permanent Russian threat to any Eastern European state with a restless ethnic Russian population. For EU and NATO leaders constrained by Russian energy conglomerates and an outdated NATO treaty, Crimea is already a lost cause. But it is a crucial warning as well. Little can be done in the short term to thwart Russian ambitions. Strengthening the NATO treaty, while difficult, would likely help, placing Russia squarely in the bullseye for any asymmetrical military actions against NATO member states. But in the long term, the European Union, in consultation with NATO, must develop legitimate military and economic policies to end outside dependency on individual nations. Austerity measures will need to be relaxed, reliance on the United States for military support reduced, and reinvestment in military and energy industries undertaken. But empowering Russia’s neighbors is only half the battle. Legitimizing ethnic minorities within Russia by calling attention to their narratives is just as important. Putin’s censorship can only block out so much information in the modern era, and highlighting that authoritarianism within Russia would undermine his political support. It is only with the loss of People walk past a public mural in Moscow depicting a map of Crimea in that support that Putin’s bear will truly the Russian national colors. The words “Crimea and Russia” next to the re-enter hibernation. map show the public’s trust in Putin’s expansionist actions and policies. Photo Courtesy Reuters

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GLOBAL NOTEBOOK

A New Role for Egypt

EGYPT

Sisi’s Government and the Arab-Israeli Conflict staff writer EDYT DICKSTEIN

ver the past few years, Egypt has experienced dramatic shifts as the country has been rocked by multiple rebellions and transitions of power. Its violent upheavals have not only led to domestic destabilization, but have also considerably impacted t h e d y n a m i c o f t h e re gi o n . I n particular, Egypt’s key relationships with Palestinians and Israelis have transformed, as Sisi’s government embarks on the development of a dramatically new Egyptian foreign policy. Three years ago, President Hosni Mubarak was deposed by protests during the Arab Spring, and Mohamed

with its neighbors to the east, namely Gaza and Israel. Cairo currently views Gaza’s ruling party, Hamas, as a militarist extension of the Muslim Brotherhood and an illegitimate governing body. Former President Morsi is accused of conspiring with Hamas, Hezbollah, and other terrorist organizations to instigate violence in the Sinai Peninsula and destabilize the country. Sisi’s government has also declared that Hamas played a central role in the Muslim Brotherhood’s plot to break Morsi free from prison during Mubarak’s rule. Hamas is not acknowledged as the governing body of Gaza in any statement by the Egyptian

lationship between Egypt and Gaza. The Egyptian government closed the Rafah border crossing, stopping the flow of goods and individuals that traveled between Egypt and Gaza during Morsi’s rule. Sisi also targeted the tunnels connecting Egypt and Gaza, which previously enabled widespread smuggling. Cairo has further ignored other Arab nations’ requests to open the border and aid Gaza: it refused Tunisia’s demand to allow a plane transporting wounded Gazans into Egypt, prohibited Palestinian medical delegations and aid from crossing into Gaza, and were accused by Iran of generally hindering the flow of humanitarian aid. This lack of support has left Hamas in dire need, as Hamas depleted much of its stockpiled energy, construction equipment, and weaponry during its fight with Israel this past summer and requires billions of dollars to reconstruct Gaza after Israel’s attacks. Moreover, Palestine as

“Once a relatively reliable arbiter of Gaza-Israel conflicts, and then a supporter of Hamas, Egypt is now defining a new role for itself” Morsi, the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, was elected president in 2012. During his tenure, Morsi expanded executive power, imprisoned his detractors, and supported an Islamist-backed constitution. One year later, in the midst of widespread protests, the Egyptian Armed Forces again seized control, and Minister of Defense and Chief of the Armed Forces Abdel Fattah el-Sisi became First Deputy Prime Minister. When the new regime held elections, he was chosen as Egypt’s next president. Sisi and his government set out to eradicate the Muslim Brotherhood, considering it a terrorist organization. All Muslim Brotherhood activities are now illegal in Egypt, many leaders have been arrested, and the Muslim Brotherhood continues to be portrayed throughout the country as a promoter of worldwide terror. This mindset has directly impacted Egypt’s relationship 10

government and is only mentioned on the official government information website in terms of its connection with Muslim Brotherhood terror. The censure of Hamas has further spread beyond the government. Egyptian television presenters denounce Hamas as a terrorist organization, and media tycoons tweet their condemnation of the organization, while others still applaud Israel for attacking Hamas. Historically, Egypt has played a major role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Following its participation in the 1948 Israeli War of Independence, Egypt maintained control over Gaza, which it held until its defeat in the 1967 ArabIsraeli war. Since then, it has pushed for increased Palestinian independence and control, and has been seen by Palestinians as an important friend and supporter in the region. Sisi’s dismissal of the current Hamas government has greatly altered the re-

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a nation seems to have lost legitimacy and support from Egypt; on the fairly comprehensive list of Egyptian Arab policies on the State Information Service website, 18 of the Arab League countries are listed, with no mention of Palestine, which is a member of the Arab League, an omission that is notable given that the introduction to the section explicitly mentions the Arab-Israeli conflict. Egypt’s relationship with Israel, in contrast, has become stronger under President Sisi. Egypt is considering an agreement by which Israel would supply up to 6.25 trillion cubic feet of natural gas to Egypt, a deal that would be far larger than Israel’s previous contract with Jordan. Additionally, Israel and Egypt are rumored to have a military agreement in the Sinai Peninsula, by which Israel attacks terrorist groups in the area via drones and the Egyptian government takes responsibility so as

GLOBAL NOTEBOOK to avoid the accusation that Israel is violating Egyptian airspace. The Egyptian government’s rhetoric regarding Israel has become less strident as well. On Egypt’s State Information Service website, Egypt’s introductory statement on “Israeli Aggression on Gaza” discusses the conflict in very mild terms, stressing peace negotiations and equating both sides. Nowhere on the website is Israel declared illegitimate; instead, the website stresses the need for the establishment of a Palestinian state, an implied acceptance of a two-state solution. This change in mindset has shifted Egypt’s role in the region. Once a relatively reliable arbiter of Gaza-Israel conflicts, and then a supporter of Hamas, Egypt is now defining a new role for itself. It faces the difficulty of having to balance its dislike of Hamas and its refusal to recognize the organization’s legitimacy with its wishes to remain the key player in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Egypt is also motivated by its desire for Israel to deliver a crippling blow to Hamas prior to the establishment of any permanent ceasefire between the two sides. These goals are evident in the various ceasefires that Cairo proposed during the summer 2014 conflict between Israel and Gaza. While the shortterm demands that both sides stop fighting appear straightforward and similar to those put forth by Egypt in the past, the longer-term plans bear some critical differences. Egypt’s proposal defers all authority on Palestinian matters to the Palestinian Authority (PA), and declares that Israel shall coordinate all security concerns with the PA rather than with Hamas. In essence, Egypt has eliminated Hamas from the equation, sending the message that they will assist in the creation of a Palestinian state only under the jurisdiction of the PA, and that other countries should operate according to this principle as well. As the international community moves forward in its attempts to establish a two-state solution, it must take into account and utilize Egypt’s new position. In dealing with the Hamas-Fatah unity government, members of the international community should compare the Fatah-controlled PA’s successes

in the West Bank with those of Hamas in Gaza. They should consider expanding the jurisdiction of the PA over areas such as security and reconstruction oversight in Gaza, which they were hesitant to afford to Hamas, recognizing that Hamas would prioritize terror over rebuilding Gaza. While it is important to acknowledge that the Palestinians in Gaza should retain the right to elect their representatives, it is simultaneously critical that any international sup-

port be funneled into infrastructure and economic opportunities and not into militarism and smuggling operations. If such a path hinges, as Egypt suggests, on the Palestinian Authority’s adopting a greater role and responsibility, then the international community might do well to support Cairo in its new view for the region.

Pill Too Big to Swallow Challenges in Chinese Health Care

ebruary 18, 2014: a man bursts into a doctor’s office in a large hospital in Yixian, in the Hebei province of Northern China. Instead of collapsing onto the examination table complaining of aches and pains, he pulls out a knife and threatens to avenge his brother who had been treated in that hospital, but had never fully recovered. Whether or not this particular physician on the hospital’s staff actually examined or operated on the brother is irrelevant. The man stabs the doctor to death and leaves him to be discovered by the hospital staff the next morning. Since the implementation of a reformed national health care plan in 2003, these kinds of attacks are becoming all too common. Many Chinese must cope with the shortcomings of the new health care system, and for frustrated patients the doctors, nurses, and hospitals are the scapegoats. Over a decade ago, the Chinese government implemented the New Rural Cooperative Medical Care System (NRCMCS) to extend affordable health care to rural populations. In theory this plan would give people in isolated areas access to cheap, professional medical care. In practice, it has spread Chinese doctors too thin, draining health care resources across the country, and making it difficult to find reliable, high-quality treatment. The hierarchy of funding distribution in the NRCMCS

CHINA

staff writer MADELEINE SNYDER

plan makes basic, local care affordable but does nothing to mitigate the high costs of more complicated treatment at central city hospitals. The consequences of this are twofold: the people in need of complex procedures still only have a slim chance of receiving treatment at a price that they can pay, and doctors must shoulder the burden of more patients while they are expected to perform the same quality procedures in the same limited amount of time on the same slim salary. Ultimately this has led to overworked doctors, sloppier procedures, and angry patients. Unfortunately, the number of patient attacks on doctors is only increasing. According to survey results from the China Hospital Management Association, disputes about medical treatment have risen 23 percent every year since 2002. In some cases the patient will personally attack the doctor who treated them; in others, family or close friends of the patient will retaliate. Frustrated patients are looking for someone to blame, and doctors are the easiest to point fingers at. Ultimately, the Chinese government is responsible for the systematic failures of national health care, but patients are so removed from the medical system that they have no effective way to voice their grievances, receive compensation for legitimate malpractice, or siphon frustration at the cost of medical care. Thus, in many cases the doctor is not

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GLOBAL NOTEBOOK just the scapegoat for the government’s mistakes, but an enemy with bad intentions who deserves to be punished. In the eyes of some patients, this entirely justifies physical retaliation. But perhaps the most troubling consequence of the current medical care system is the prevailing attitude that backroom deals are the only way to receive adequate care and payment. The NCRMCS does nothing to subsidize the costs of complex procedures, and patients must pay exorbitant fees for access to these operations. At the same time, doctors are underpaid and overworked, and many patients realize that they have little incentive to operate as well as they can. Doctors just need to fill their ever-expanding quotas, and if getting the job done on time requires cutting corners during a routine tumor removal, then the surgeon has every reason to underperform. Thus, families may slip a little red envelope of cash under the operating room door to provide some extra incentive. This perpetuates the corruption on the doctors’ end, contributing to the already shaky reputation of what it takes to get an operation done well. It also puts more pressure on doctors and gives patients more reason to retaliate if the procedure doesn’t go as planned. Doctors have no room to breathe, stuck between unrealistic quotas, demanding and frustrated patients, and expectations of perfection. Patients are suspicious of doctors’ motivations, fearful of malpractice, and overpaying for treatment. For families of those that failed to survive complex procedures, the doctor now has the patient’s blood on their hands. In the Chinese medical system, where lawsuits (much less successful ones) are few and far between, direct violence is the easiest option. Looking to the future, what will happen to Chinese health care? Will the violence continue to escalate? Will some backroom system develop to siphon all the frustration and bribery away from violent attacks? Will there even be enough doctors in the years to come to support China’s ambitious health care spending budget of 1 trillion dollars by the year 2020? In addition to the current battle between doctors and patients, there are two forces at odds with one 12

another within the Chinese health care system. First, the potentially dangerous, tiring, underpaid, and overworked lifestyle of a doctor in China is less than appealing. This is causing young medical students to change professions and current practitioners to dissuade their children from going into medicine. In the coming years, the current shortage of doctors may get worse, even as more doctors are needed to treat millions of new patients. Second, multinational pharmaceutical companies are investing heavily in Chinese health care. This is further increasing the expansion of health care, pushing the limits of how many people the system can treat. When put together, the shortage of doctors and pressure to expand health care spread China’s doctors even more thinly. Taking into account both sides of

the Chinese medical system, it is apparent that something has gone wrong. Patients are angry. Doctors are too tired to perform well. The two groups have no way of communicating. Violence is spreading and sucking the trust out of the doctor-patient relationship. It is apparent that the Chinese health care system is in need of a serious change. The lack of an effective legal outlet for legitimate malpractice, the communication gap between doctors and patients, the poor distribution of limited government funds for medical resources, and the unreasonable quantity of patients doctors are expected to provide care for all contribute to the system’s failure. A barrier has risen between doctor and patient, and seems to take the “care” out of health care, turning medicine in China into a begrudging and dangerous occupation.

New Development?

DIPLOMACY

The BRICS Bank and the International System staff writer DANIEL EPSTEIN

hen Goldman Sachs traders coined the term BRIC—an acronym for the emerging Brazil, Russia, India, and China—in 2001 it was just handy shorthand for a flashy new investment opportunity. Now, the BRICS (which, since 2010, have included South Africa) are a real, functioning diplomatic network. On July 15, the BRICS countries signed a treaty providing for the establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB), a multilateral institution intended as an alternative to the IMF and the World Bank, two bodies in which the BRICS countries have long pushed for more influence. Its architects are hopeful that it can compete with its Westerndominated counterparts, changing the power balance of the international system. But can the NDB really disrupt the status quo? At the turn of the millennium, the BRIC countries caught the attention of major financial institutions as promising locations for new investments.

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Most of these investments paid off. Between 2003 and 2008, the BRIC countries experienced monumental growth. Soon, “BRIC” became part of the wider lexicon, indicating four breakout nations that were changing the landscape of the world financial system. There was a sense that this was something historic—that Brazil, Russia, India, and China were rising from the poor and middle class of the world to join the elite, ending Western dominance over the global economy. However, influence in the world economy is based on more than GDP and sphere of commerce. Since the Bretton Woods conference of 1945, the IMF and the World Bank have wielded tremendous sway over the global system, especially in issues pertaining to developing countries like the BRICS. While the global market is largely a meritocracy, controlling shares of the IMF and World Bank are rigid, reflecting a balance of power that looks more like 1945 than 2014. China, for example,

GLOBAL NOTEBOOK has only a 4 percent voting share in has dimmed since the mid-2000s, and veloping country. Having made such the IMF, despite accounting for more extracting billions from their respecmagnificent leaps in the last decade, than 16 percent of global GDP and over tive domestic economies will not be a they have experience and credibility in 19 percent of world population. Other simple task. The remaining US$50 bileconomic development and poverty BRICS countries are similarly underreplion depends on attracting investments alleviation that those in charge of the resented. The BRICS could increase their from other nations and institutions, IMF and the World Bank cannot match. voting shares by contributing more to which could prove difficult if the five Perhaps competition from the NDB the two institutions, but the continued leaders do not contribute sufficiently. can pressure the Bretton Woods twins existence of sole veto power for the Even if the bank manages to gather all to reduce voting share discrepancies United States would limit the utility of the capital it plans to, the World Bank and soften conditionality, two changes this investment. will still dwarf it by a ratio of almost five that are long overdue. When asked if Instead, the BRICS have decided to to two. If the BRICS remain committed the founding of the NDB represented a pursue influence through the NDB. This to the project, they should be able to move away from the IMF and the World bank will provide both development raise the funds they have promised, Bank, Brazilian President Dilma Rousgrants and emergency seff responded: “On reserves, uniting functhe contrary, we wish tions of both the World to democratize it and Bank and the IMF in make it as representaone institution. The tive as possible.” If the five founding members NDB helps accomplish will hold a minimum this, it will have done of 55 percent voting enough. power between them The BRICS are a at all times, of which peculiar diplomatic they will hold equal network. They span shares, while any future four continents and members, likely other share no common lanemerging nations, will guage or cultural hissplit the other 45 pertory. They are viewed cent equally. The BRICS as a kind of countercountries have already weight to Western committed US$50 bileconomic hegemony, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra lion in base capital, and yet they were Modi, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, Chinese president Xi with the goal of raisconceived in one of Jinping and South African President Jacob Zuma pose for a group ing that number to its temples. There’s photo at the sixth BRICS Summit in Fortaleza, Brazil on July 15, 2015. US$100 billion with no telling how long contributions from this arranged marbut reports of a historic change to the future members. The bank will also riage will last, but so far, the five BRICS international financial system and a feature a US$100 billion contingent have seized it. The group has proWaterloo moment for dollar dominance reserve arrangement, set aside for duced a BRICS Interbank Cooperation are drastically overstated. emergency liquidity in times of crisis, Mechanism, a BRICS Business Council, The NDB will never supplant the normally the function of the IMF. Frusa BRICS Banking Forum, and a BRICS Bretton Woods institutions, nor does trated with the status quo, the BRICS Exchanges Alliance. Russia has even it have to. Instead, it can make the have built something substantial of floated proposals for a BRICS Energy world of international development their own. Union, complete with a fuel reserve and stabilization multi-polar, with the But the NDB has a difficult road and a multilateral policy-making instiNDB supplementing the actions of the ahead. The US$100 billion in base capitution. The heterogeneity of the BRICS IMF and the World Bank when it can tal for the Bank’s development division may prove not to be a weakness but a and providing an alternative when is, as of now, just a number on a page. strength, as they transcend regionalist necessary. Though the NDB cannot The BRICS countries have promised restrictions and become a kind of cospossibly compete with the IMF and the a meager US$150 million each in the mopolitan non-West, champion of sorts World Bank in sheer size, it may prove short-term, and raising the rest of for those weary with the state of things. a more attractive option for countries their US$50 billion quota over the next With the New Development Bank, the weary of Western dominance and the five to six years will be difficult politiBRICS make their first foray into collecstringent conditions that often come cally, as the majority of the BRICS are tive global leadership. Perhaps this is with IMF and World Bank assistance. cash-strapped and mired in their own only the beginning. The BRICS know what it is to be a deeconomic problems. The BRICS’ star Photo Courtesy Reuters

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GLOBAL NOTEBOOK

The Forgotten State

LIBYA

Rifts in Post-Revolutionary Libya

staff writer ANDREW MA

ast year, pieces in The New York Times, Washington Post, Harvard International Review, and other outlets marked the threeyear anniversar y of the Libyan revolution. Many covered why the USbacked NATO intervention to remove dictator Muammar Gaddafi was a misinformed strategy, one that has since led to a crumbling government and a virtually nonexistent public security sector. Today, in the midst of increasing civil warfare and on the verge of humanitarian crisis, the “forgotten case” of the Arab Spring has only recently again caught the attention of international media. However, recent articles on the topic have made Libya’s uptick in civil violence appear novel or unexpected. A range of articles, whether journalistic or analytical, have presented Libya’s

turned into a power struggle between two larger groups: the June 25 elections of Libya’s new parliament saw the convincing win of national secular representatives over a growing Islamist contingent within the nation’s House of Representatives. As a result of this sudden loss, Islamist militias, most notably Ansar al-Sharia and the Misrata militia, have attempted to control large parts of Tripoli and Benghazi and usurp central power. A large number of ports across the country’s northern Mediterranean coast have been captured by armed groups, and, most recently, Islamist militias have raided and occupied the abandoned US embassy compound in the country’s capital. Compounding this is the recent campaign conducted by retired general Khalifa Haftar, a renegade military official who has, since May, begun

tion to meet the needs of the displaced in Libya, which increase daily. Due to a lack of information on the ground—the UN Support Mission in Libya, with all UN-affiliated staff, had evacuated the country due to security concerns—the international organization remains in the dark, just as Libya approaches its own twilight hour. The necessity, whether political or humanitarian, to address the situation in Libya has only increased, and will continue to do so. Estimates have projected that up to two million within the country—numbers similar to those stranded within Iraq’s Islamic Statecontrolled areas—could be in severe need of international assistance should conflict continue unabated. In addition, the Tunisian government has closed its borders intermittently to refugees and labor migrants fleeing violence, leading to thousands stranded along the country’s western border crossing, without access to food, water, or money. The lack of international attention on the conflict in Libya is fitting given the circumstances which have led to the situation at hand. The US-led intervention into the country removed

“The current dismal situation...was not a result of a lack of will or of ignorance, but rather of strained resources...the UN is hardly in a position to meet the needs of the displaced in Libya, which increase daily” case as a sudden-onset phenomenon, erupting from recently renewed social tensions. In fact, the current case of the country is anything but unexpected or unprecedented. Libya’s current plague of civil conflict has been long in the making, with recent violence just a symptom of a larger systemic trend. The lack of national recognition of the House of Representatives has marred the country’s nascent democracy since its graduation from the Transitional Council in 2012. As events continue to unfold, what seemed a muddled mess of militias refusing to disarm has 14

a statewide operation to eliminate Islamist militias from the country. The end result is a country torn in a variety of different directions in a conflict that has become increasingly difficult to understand or explain. The current dismal situation—in which facts on the ground continue to remain unknown to the international community and thousands remain internally displaced from their homes—was not a result of a lack of will or of ignorance, but rather of strained resources. With five emergencies requiring interagency action across the globe, the United Nations is hardly in a posi-

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a leader who, for all his vices, held his country together. Worse, the NATOallied nations that stood to initiate security sector and governance reform and other state-building measures in the wake of the 2011 revolution have failed to do so, leaving Libya in a mess of insecurity and factional warfare. International pundits, at last recognizing this growing urgency, have looked to US and NATO forces to coordinate a peacekeeping operation. Some have even asked for US airstrikes against extremist elements—numerous as they may be—threatening the country’s stability, though such mea-

GLOBAL NOTEBOOK sures are not likely to solve the country’s underlying problems. Egyptian and UAE air strikes, though surprising to Western nations, have left nothing resolved. Repeating the 2011 operation would be to step on broken glass, resulting in further fragmentation and posing reputational repercussions to interventionists who still point to 2011 as a milestone achievement. Air strikes cannot and do not address the root of all of Libya’s problems: easy access to weapons and an incompetent security apparatus. The answer to the dilemma of Libya rests in longer-term reforms, including fairer democratic inclusion and widespread security sector reform. These might be more complicated than dropping bombs or sending troops, but, as the last three years have demonstrated, Libyan civilians will continue to suffer if these reforms are not enacted. However, not all problems faced by the Libyan populace can be solved through a centralized, top-down solution. As the most recent elections demonstrate, the lack of respect for the state’s House of Representatives stems from historical and regionalist tensions between Libya’s Tripoli and Cyrenaica areas. In addition, Islamist militia leaders are most afraid that Gaddafi-era remnants will strive for a revival of the overthrown dictatorship, and promises of greater federalist autonomy can soothe such suspicions. But in order for a model solution to be engineered, stakeholders on all sides must come to the table and discuss an end to the fighting. Negotiations like this cannot occur in the racket of gunfire. The Islamist militias’ tactic of taking over the Tripoli International Airport may have been a self-defeating strategy, as it entrenches Benghazi-based secularists and Islamists in their respective urban centers, preventing formal and informal leaders from meeting in one area and resolving outstanding political disputes. Ultimately, among the escalating chaos, one thing is certain: if they want peace and change, Libya’s players must agree to lay down arms and pick up their pens.

Photo Courtesy Reuters

The Crisis-Monger

ARGENTINA

Where Did Things Go Wrong for Argentina?

staff writer NICK WOOD

ll across Buenos Aires, there are clandestine currency exchange operations; strictly enforced caps on the amount of money one can exchange have created a thriving secondary market in US dollars. To get an accurate reading of the exchange rate, we must turn to these illegal outfits, and the picture is a grim one. By the day, more porteños (the name given colloquially to residents of Buenos Aires) are trading in their Argentinian pesos for the stability of the US dollar, causing the Argentinian peso’s value to tumble and imported inflation to climb ever higher. As it stands, 2014 is likely to go down as yet another year of crisis in the blighted modern economic history of Argentina. Just 13 years after the country flirted with complete economic and social collapse, it has suffered yet another messy default, thanks in large part to stubbornness and poor governance on the part of President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. Let us rewind to 2011. Everything was looking up for the former jewel

of the Southern Cone. Real economic growth was north of 7.5 percent, inflation was under control, and the Argentinian peso was experiencing remarkable stability both officially and in the black market. The country was also on the verge of rejoining polite international economic society, thanks to two debt-restructuring deals, signed in 2005 and 2010 respectively. The vast majority of investors had agreed to a significant write-down on the debt left over from the 2001 default, and so the country was able to take tentative steps towards rejoining international financial markets. However, some investors did not sign the deals in 2005 and 2010, choosing instead to pursue a legal settlement that would reward them the entirety of their due return. In early 2014, these investors won their legal battle, and a court in New York City ruled that the government of Argentina had to pay them what they were owed. Citing an equal treatment clause in the 2005 restructuring deal, which mandates that all investors are

Argentinian President Christina Fernández de Kirchner concludes her remarks at a joint news conference with German Chancellor Angela Merkel at the chancellery in Berlin on October 6, 2010.

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GLOBAL NOTEBOOK treated as the one that receives the best treatment, Argentina’s government opted not to pay, since to pay these investors in full would require paying all of the investors in full. However, the debate surrounding whether the clause would actually have applied, given that it was a legal settlement forcing the government to pay and not a choice to treat certain investors differently, was largely ignored. Instead, President Kirchner chose to take a firm stance on the issue, decrying the meddling of US “vulture funds” and extinguishing any hope of a last minute settlement. This caused the country to stumble

both the central bank and the government must take decisive action. First, the peso should be allowed to devalue. Yes, this will exacerbate imported inflation for a time, but it is a price worth paying for a return to growth. Devaluation would likely increase exports and reignite real GDP growth. Second, and most importantly, the government needs to bury the default issue forever, so that the country can return to, and stay in, international financial markets. The best way to do this would be to settle the remaining disputes regarding the overhanging debt from the 2001 debt, and then do everything possible to convince the international

Brazil is also struggling with an image problem, as the infrastructure projects linked to the 2014 FIFA World Cup Finals and 2016 Olympic Games have come under fire for squandering public money and exploiting labor. It is losing the goodwill of the international community, and should be well aware of the danger of doing so. Not long ago, Brazil was counted alongside India and China as a future driver of growth in the developing world. Now its name is merely grumbled as a synonym for wasted potential and underperformance. Chile too, the long-time success story of the Southern Cone, is struggling with the

“Just 13 years after the country flirted with complete economic and social collapse, it has suffered yet another messy default...” once again into defaulting upon its sovereign debt, stifling any nascent hope in Argentina’s ability to maintain macroeconomic security. So as we enter late 2014 and the new year, the outlook is bleak. In a desperate attempt to regain control of the plummeting peso and maintain what remains of the country’s meager currency reserves, President Kirchner orchestrated the resignation of Juan Carlos Fábrega, the governor of the central bank at the end of September. In his place, she appointed Alejandro Vanoli, whose qualifications are scarce apart from his vocal support of the executive. His job is going to prove almost impossible. The Kirchner government radically opposes further devaluation of the peso, but Vanoli doesn’t have access to the necessary reserves to prop up its value, especially as more and more of the population begin to consider switching their cash to US dollars to avoid the volatility of their home currency. Inflation is rearing its ugly head—already well into double figures and climbing—and growth has stagnated, leaving Argentinians with little to celebrate. To reverse Argentina’s fortunes, 16

community that Argentina has turned an economic corner. A large part of this would be achieved by bringing about macroeconomic stability, however President Kirchner must also repair relations with the developed world and drop the anti-US rhetoric that has marked her public persona this past year. This remains very possible, if only the President were able to offer some humility and pragmatism in the face of the economic nightmare her country faces. However, Kirchner’s platform is based upon the populist rejection of perceived US interference, and so she will most likely shy away from any deal. Sadly, this means the Argentinian public is likely to be stuck in stasis, if not decline, until at least the next election, in which she is ineligible to run. The most worrying aspect of this dark portrait of Argentina is that it is indicative of a general negative trend throughout the Southern Cone of South America. Yes, the troubles of Argentina’s surrounding countries are not the same as its own, yet the simultaneous decline of the majority of the continent is nothing to be shrugged off. After a decade of rapid growth, Brazil slowed to a crawl, and then fell into recession.

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weight of ever-rising economic inequality and growing civil unrest (especially among the younger generation) over the provision of public services such as higher education. Before long, Chile could also inherit some of its neighbors’ economic malaise; although its export portfolio is globally diverse, it cannot escape totally unscathed from the stagnation gripping Brazil and Argentina. This contagion spells bad news for the entire continent, because no other country is capable of driving South American growth. However, if Argentina can reverse its fortunes, it could mark the beginning of yet another fruitful burst of growth for South America. A large part of the continent’s potential remains untapped, and a return to growth in the Southern Cone would likely mark the beginning of a virtuous cycle of more positive animal spirits—business and consumer confidence—and therefore increased foreign investment. For the sake of South America, Argentina and the rest of the Southern Cone must do their utmost to engender macroeconomic stability and prosperity.

PERSPECTIVES

Latin America:

A Backlash in Human Rights? LEONARDO VIVAS is a lecturer on Latin America in the Global Studies and

International Relations Program at Northeastern University. He has also served as the director of the Latin American Program at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvardâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s John F. Kennedy Jr. School of Government.

s a source of political upheaval, Latin America has to a large extent abandoned international news headlines. Since the two-decade-long democratization process unleashed from 1978 to 2000, countries in the region have regularized their political processes, making electoral politics the only game in town. As a result, the most terrible atrocities that shocked the world in places like Argentina and Chile during the 1970s and 1980s and the savage civil wars that ravaged Central America until the early 1990s have become things of the past. Because democratization coincided with an economic overhaul whereby most Latin American countries embraced more stable and open economic policies, there have also been important gains in economic and social rights, such as diminished levels of extreme poverty. However, making respect for human rights a daily matter in all societies is not an automatic outcome of democratization. First, granting justice for the atrocities of the past, essential to restore confidence in the future, has been a convoluted process with greater gains in countries such as Argentina and Chile, while places like Guatemala and Colombia have experienced a slower trend toward regularization of justice. Second, democracy does not automatically lead to the abolition of human rights violations. It may be a necessary condition but

Photos Courtesy Reuters

it is certainly not a sufficient one. Third, the democratization process has not necessarily led to fully democratic societies. Extreme presidential regimes have accommodated the long caudillo tradition in the region, in some cases leading to important violations such as the restriction of freedom of the press in Ecuador, the denial of citizenship in the Dominican Republic to hundreds of thousands of Dominicans of Haitian descent, and the manipulation of decisions by the Nicaraguan Supreme Court to allow the president to remain in power. Perhaps the country accumulating the most ample list of violations is Venezuela, where after 15 years of excessive use of force and torture by the police, the use of the judicial system as a political weapon, political apartheid, and the use of economic measures to reduce individualsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; access to economic and social goods have become built-in features of the current regime.

A Swift Democratization

For the last two decades the preferred theme of Latin Americanists was the extent to which democratization in the region would lead to completely democratic countries. Given the 20th century tradition of autocratic forms of government, including highly personalistic rule by populist caudillos, there were justifiable concerns about democratic success in nations

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PERSPECTIVES only recently overcoming bloody dictatorships, civil wars, or extreme political instability. As the map to the right shows, the democratization process was pretty swift, perhaps because most countries were able to get rid of one of the major reasons for political unrest: economic instability. After the 1980s, which have been dubbed “The Lost Decade”, many countries of very different political persuasions—right, right-to-center, and center-left— opted for drastic reforms in line with the Washington Consensus. Even if the social impacts were severe—and acutely so in a number of countries—economic reforms cleared the way for greater economic stability and the potential to take advantage of more favorable terms of trade of primary products, which still are the main economic endowment of the typical Latin American nation. Democratization has been no easy task. Two major factors have been at play. One is that as the military returned to their barracks, extreme right wing forces, usually associated with powerful business groups, accepted that a democratic course was better for the rule of law and for taking advantage of a better economic environment. The second factor is that almost all parties and groups leaning to the left of the political spectrum also realized that democracy is in the interest of the majority of the population. In fact, the 21st century has witnessed a solid trend where the left has won election after election. There are, naturally, some exceptions, such as the FARC-EP (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia—People’s Army) and other minor guerrilla groups in Colombia. Even there, peace negotiations have been taking place for the last two years between the Santos administration and the FARC-EP and peace now seems to be an attainable goal in the longest armed conflict in the world. This democratization trend in Latin America has been amply supported by public opinion in the region. Latinobarometro, a regular poll including all countries in the region (with the exception of Cuba), shows that between 1996 and 2008 a solid majority of people responded with a strong preference for democracy over authoritarianism.

Seeking Accountability with the Past

In societies that have experienced massive political murder, kidnappings, torture, or even genocide, recovering a sense of justice is essential for democracy to become credible and stable. This difficult process of transitional justice refers to a number of mechanisms that include bringing perpetrators to justice, granting reparations to victims, hosting truth commissions, enforcing partial amnesties, and implementing a gamut of reconciliation measures. As Pablo de Greiff, the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, wrote in Colombia’s Semana weekly magazine, “transitional justice is not a peculiar type of justice, far less a ‘soft’ form of justice, but a strategy for allowing rights to gain ground under transitional circumstances.” Human rights advocates and specialists argue that without some combination of the aforementioned measures it is difficult to grant a wider sense of justice to those societies. 18

The Latin American Democratization Wave Panama 1994

Ecuador 1979 Peru 1985 Bolivia 1982

Brazil 1985

Chile 1990 Argentina 1983

Uruguay 1985

South American nations and their years of democratization Scholars such as Kathryn Sikkink have argued that activism on the part of international, regional, and national organizations, as well as the positive precedent set by a few countries have had an important impact in widening the response by societies to crimes committed on a wide scale. In Latin America, the country setting the best example for transitional justice was Argentina. A number of factors made that possible. First, the transition from dictatorship did not result from a negotiation but instead occurred after the defeat of the Argentine army in the Falklands (Malvinas) War. Thus, its leverage was at its weakest, so the amnesty executive order approved as the military abandoned power was reversed. Second, the human rights movement was very vibrant and composed of an array of organizations with different political persuasions. Given the bulk of the victims (greater than the population of Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile combined), the pressure has been permanent to this day. Third, because bringing perpetrators to justice was everything but straightforward—a second amnesty was granted to the higher rank officers shortly after they had been condemned in a civilian court—pro-justice governments and human rights advocates had to find different ways to keep the momentum. One method consisted of presenting an appeal to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, while another

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Image Credit:: Author

PERSPECTIVES involved contesting the constitutionality of amnesty laws in local courts. Finally, the Argentine criminal justice system allowing for “private prosecutions” opened new legal routes to incriminate both the big and the small fish. No other countries experiencing atrocities similar to those of Argentina have provided such a solid response, both in legal and political terms. The extent to which justice has been granted has depended on the political-military conditions prevailing by the end of the conflicts. Chile, for instance, was reluctant to include in daily judicial decisions judgments on human rights, as the ruling elite deemed human rights a highly politicized theme. This trend continued even after the dictator was forced to step down after a defeat in a referendum. It was only in October 1998, when the British government arrested Augusto Pinochet after an indictment by a Spanish judge, that both Chile and Britain agreed that the former dictator would be prosecuted in his own country, leading to his release. This unexpected event changed the process of transitional justice in Chile and paved the way for expediting justice for many perpetrators that had remained covered by a mantle of silence. Similarly, in January 2013 in a widely reported case, Gua-

Security with a Human Face. Though violence associated with crime can originate from different sources, it seems incontestable that drug trafficking has served as fuel for its expansion and deepening along the cited corridor. The drug issue has fired up violence in other forms, such as the maras phenomenon of bloody juvenile delinquency in countries like El Salvador; the control of certain border districts by criminal organizations in Guatemala and Honduras; and the collusion of the criminal organizations with local, regional, and sometimes national police in several countries. It has been argued that the recent trend of immigrant children entering the United States mainly from El Salvador originates from the uncertain future of children facing impending violent lives. The most salient case, however, is Mexico. With the launch of a national battle against drug trafficking under the Calderón administration (2006-2012), it soon became clear that the country’s institutional mechanisms were not up to the task of pursuing the war against drugs along the entire value chain of law enforcement. This challenge forced the administration to bring in the army to confront the drug trafficking organizations. The result has been a long wave

“The extent to which justice has been granted has depended on the political-military conditions prevailing by the end of the conflicts” temala’s former president General Ríos Montt was taken to court under charges of genocide and crimes against humanity. Allegedly, under his watch during the early 1980s around 100 villages of Guatemalans of Mayan descent were murdered by the army. A few years earlier the thought of bringing a former president to justice would have been unthinkable, but with the United Nations supporting the overhaul of the judicial system, the emergence of a new generation of legal and forensic specialists, and the revival of human rights organizations this became possible. In May 2013 he was convicted for the genocide of 1,770 indigenous Ixil Mayans but the sentence was later overturned by another judge for “procedural errors.” However, the trial, made public and shown on television, allowed Guatemalan society to watch hundreds of testimonies of family members of the victims of the massacres. Even if it is unclear where a new trial will lead, Guatemalan society will not be the same.

New Wine in Old Bottles

While democratization has helped settle deep political scores from the recent past, clearing the way for more credible justice systems in many countries, new problems have emerged that cloud the picture of human rights in the region. In particular, rising crime in the long stripe going all the way from Mexico’s border with the United States to Venezuela, Brazil, and some parts of the Caribbean has become a worrisome trend, as argued by the 2013 UNDP report, Citizen

of violence that has infected Mexico for the last eight years, causing a dramatic loss of human life, a lack of security in cities, and a long list of human rights violations by non-state actors, the army, and the police. The recent kidnapping and massacre of 43 college students in Iguala, a small city in the state of Guerrero by a combination of the mayor, the local police, and the drug cartel operating in the area, has brought again to the forefront the drama of violence in Mexico—in this case a combination of politics and criminal groups. The effort made by the Peña Nieto administration to temper the national drama of violence through a forceful program of economic and social reforms has been yet again reduced to mid-term illusions in the face of the assassination of students, one of the groups that until now had been spared by drug trafficking organizations. Another type of problem surfacing in the region is related to ethnic divisions due to differences in race, culture, language, and nationality. The most extreme case is that of the Dominican Republic, where different administrations and the judicial system have continuously taken actions against nationals of Haitian descent. A long trend of discrimination, especially regarding electoral and citizenship rights ended up in a case brought before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 2005, which ruled against the Dominican state for violating its constitution when it rejected two Dominican children their right to a nationality. Sadly, the response was a greater retrenchment by all powers in the country

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PERSPECTIVES

Indigenous women from the Ixil region of Guatemala sit in the Supreme Court of Justice in Guatemala City, listening through headphones to the genocide trial against Guatemala’s ex-dictator Efraín Ríos Montt. The court later found Montt guilty for the genocide of Ixil Mayans but his conviction was overturned within a year.

against these Dominicans of Haitian heritage. Statelessness has become more troubling since a September 23, 2013 constitutional court decision. The ruling has the potential to increase the stateless population to over 200,000 de jure stateless persons.

The Backlash

Unfortunately, the human rights violations taking place in the region are not exclusively a matter of new trends. Democratization itself has not occurred without difficulties. For

by former President Manuel Zelaya to test the waters for a plausible reelection. The latest incumbent to announce the possibility of a third reelection has been Ecuador’s president, Rafael Correa. This trend toward presidents remaining in power has resulted in the weakening of a host of civil and political rights. During President Álvaro Uribe’s era in Colombia the balance was mixed. He had great success in combating the FARC-EP and weakening the paramilitaries’ activities. However, perhaps due to that success and the polarization that ensued, his rule

“Unfortunately, the human rights violations taking place in the region are not exclusively a matter of new trends. Democratization itself has not occurred without difficulties “ starters, Latin America’s strongmen and caudillo traditions have translated into occasionally extreme presidential regimes where other constitutional powers end up at the mercy of the strong president’s decisions or favors. In practical terms, presidential reelection has become the favored mechanism of regimes from both left and right. While presidents such as Luiz Inácio Lula de Silva in Brazil or Néstor Kirchner in Argentina were reelected for one additional term only, others like Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua have achieved what amounts to permanent reelection, giving birth to dubious regimes that some scholars have characterized as hybrid or “competitive authoritarian” regimes. Additionally, let us not forget that the 2009 crisis in Honduras arose in part from moves made 20

resulted in many arbitrary actions against journalists, social leaders, and human rights defenders, some of whom were persecuted (and in some instances murdered) for their ideas. At the same time, some of the president’s supporters allegedly maneuvered to allow former paramilitary groups to appoint their preferred political barons in a number of regions where they exercised important military control. To the country’s fortune, even before Uribe left power things began to change in Colombia. As a result, an important number of elected deputies and senators were indicted and put in prison and, as mentioned previously, there are currently peace negotiations underway. In Ecuador there is a different paradox. After Rafael Correa entered the political scene, the country began to recover

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Photos Courtesy Reuters

PERSPECTIVES a sense of stability. Despite promoting important economic and social improvements, the main target of the president’s powers has been freedom of the press. With full support from Congress and the judiciary, the president has promoted legislation limiting ownership of media outlets and criminalizing opinions, and he personally confronts media outlets when they openly criticize him or his administration. The most wellknown examples are those of El Universo, a newspaper from Guayaquil with a large audience and Hoy, another dissenting media group. During a confusing episode in November 2010 when policemen from Quito declared a strike, the president went in person to resolve it. As a result, the police rioted and held the president captive for around 10 hours. The president reacted by accusing the police of a coup. El Universo took a different stance and one of their op-ed pieces accused the president of dictatorial manners. Correa immediately retaliated, charging the newspaper with near treason and sued it for an amount that would have led it to bankruptcy. The editorial writer fled the country and following the pattern of other media, El Universo has resorted to self-censorship. Recently, the newspaper Hoy was forced to close down after

pointed Nicolás Maduro as caretaker of the revolution. In April 2013, Maduro was elected president with a margin of less than 1percent against his contender. Ever since, Maduro’s government has showed a harsher stance on human rights. When in February 2014 student unrest unraveled, the Maduro administration opted for an outright repressive police and military response. Several police branches, the National Guard, and armed militia groups —colectivos (collectives)—set out a strong wave of repression with a substantial legal backing by the prosecutor’s office and the courts. According to a recent report by Foro Penal and Provea, two prominent Venezuelan human rights organizations, as of August 2014 the balance is 43 deaths (23 shot), 854 wounded, around 3,293 detentions (of which 1,724 were freed under cautionary measures), 154 tortured, two mayors and a legislator stripped of their elected offices, and a major opposition leader accused of being an instigator of the upheaval. The international impact of the Bolivarian revolution has also been felt in the weakening of the Organization of American States and particularly of the inter-American human rights system. Venezuela has not allowed missions from the

“It would seem that the spirit of strong presidential regimes has also transpired into the working of most regional organizations and their ways of doing their business” economic pressures and an equally aggressive campaign from the government. Again, the accumulation of power in presidents’ hands has proven to be a burden for achieving stronger democracies in Latin America. However, no rulers in the region can compare to the direct damage made by Hugo Chávez and his successor Nicolás Maduro to human rights in Venezuela and the collateral damage to the region as a whole. The deterioration of human rights during the Chávez era has been well documented by Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International, and other national and international organizations. Given his long-term purpose and electoral mandate to radically transform Venezuelan society, individual and collective rights that stood in the way of that process were systematically transgressed. President Chávez, who called his regime a “revolutionary” project, always considered the political opposition an internal enemy. For him dissent was not a political right, it was short of treason and those who expressed it ought to be persecuted. As a result, through state laws and policies, the domestic implementation of international human rights standards on civil and political rights receded substantially. HRW has stated that under Chávez’s several administrations “the concentration of power and erosion of human rights protections [gave] the government free rein to intimidate, censor, and prosecute Venezuelans who criticized the president or thwarted his political agenda.” In December 2012, before passing away, Chávez ap-

Inter-American Commission on Human Rights since 2002. Despite its promotion of a host of new regional organizations (Union of South American Nations in South America and Community of Latin American and Caribbean States in the entire region with the exception of Canada and the United States), Venezuela denounced the Inter-American Human Rights Charter in 2012, announcing the decision to quit the organization. Venezuela finally abandoned the system a year later. Other countries like Bolivia and Ecuador have on occasions made public declarations regarding similar actions and, with Venezuela, promoted an internal reform of the region’s human rights system. Had they succeeded, inter-American human rights organizations would have ended up greatly impaired. Fortunately, a majority of countries chose a prudent path. However, a number of recent decisions by the Court point to a more lenient view toward strong governments. It would seem that the spirit of strong presidential regimes has also transpired into the working of most regional organizations and their ways of doing their business. Once again, Latin America faces a critical crossroads. What is at stake today is a path of either sustained democratization—expanding a greater fulfillment of human rights—or the advance of institutions, practices, or even full-blown regimes where civil and political rights are more fiction than reality. Hopefully the region will choose the former.

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A Vexing Issue Revisited:

Confronting Africa’s Developmental Challenges DOCTOR JOHN O.KAKONGE IS THE AMBASSADOR OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA TO THE UN OFFICE IN GENEVA AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION. AMBASSADOR KAKONGE ADDRESSES ISSUES ON AFRICA’S ROAD TO DEVELOPMENT, FOCUSING ON HOW NATIONS CAN FACILITATE PROGRESS THROUGH ADJUSTMENTS IN INTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS.

ver the past decade, African countries have experienced varying economic and political fortunes. Several economies, such as the ones of Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Tanzania, have experienced growth rates between 8 and 10 percent while making major progress in the areas of health and education. Others, however, such as the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea Bissau, Mali, and, more recently, South Sudan, have suffered precipitous declines in living standards, and worsening human development trends. Why is it that progress eludes so many African countries, and what can be done to reverse these troubling trends? Only by understanding the root causes of the problem is it possible to transform the continent’s many deep-seated challenges into opportunities. Such opportunities would allow for Africa’s diverse, dynamic, creative, and innovative populations to create value, promote economic growth, and improve living standards.

Changing the Civic Mindset

Adopting a “can do” mindset is a prerequisite if Africa is to transform its fortunes. For far too long, Africa’s leaders have 22

been blinkered by orthodox approaches, reluctant to embrace new approaches to growth and development. By contrast, the positive and self-reliant “can do” attitude of Asian economies, especially the so-called “Asian Tigers,” has generated rich rewards, engendering many powerful emerging economies. The experience of these countries underlines the importance of taking ownership of a country’s own development and of galvanizing its capacities and resources in a concerted effort to boost economic performance and living standards. Modifying mindsets, however, is a notoriously challenging process. Some believe revolution is the only way to do so, especially where corruption is rife. Others highlight the benefits of cultivating a more entrepreneurial mentality among students and young people to ensure that Africa’s private sector thrives. At a meeting organized by the African Leadership Institute, former South African President Thabo Mbeki noted that, “Africa has the resources and human capital to turn the 21st century into the African century.” We Africans must believe that we can rise to the challenge and that we can all contribute to transforming the continent’s fortunes. We need to embrace the fact that Africa has the capacity to find solutions to the challenges it faces. While adopting a more positive and proactive outlook will

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Photo Courtesy Reuters

PERSPECTIVES not occur overnight, there are a number of steps that can be taken to help pave the way. Although literacy rates are low across Africa, radio programs and traditional get-togethers are invaluable means to inform and educate the public about critical everyday issues such as health care, water conservation, and agricultural best practices, among other topics. Stories, puppet shows, music, and concerts are all effective means of conveying messages and ensuring that such messages take root in the minds of local people while bringing about social, political, and economic change within communities. Policymakers and community leaders also have a key role to play in shaping perspectives at the community level. For example, when a tribal chief asked his president to instruct the Ministry of Health to post female staff to his area to attend to the local women, his request was met with an emphatic “no.” The president said he would not send other people’s daughters unless the chief sent the girls in his community to school. This ultimatum brought about a significant shift in local cultural practice because, under the chief’s guidance, parents stopped marrying their daughters young—preferring to send them to school to get an education and the health care they needed. These isolated examples demonstrate what can be achieved when Africans put their minds to something. Such shifts in perspective are necessary across Africa if the continent is to raise living standards and realize its full potential. Poverty can no longer be used as an excuse for inaction.

Moving away from Dependency

While countries in Africa have enjoyed political independence for decades now, some continue to be emotionally dependent on former colonizers. There is, however, no future in perpetuating such dependency, which belongs to another era. Some characterize this as an addiction to foreign aid and lay the blame for this squarely on lackluster African leaders. Africa’s future depends on breaking this addiction. If Africa is to thrive, policymakers need to focus their energy not on winning declining development assistance, but on exploring ways to foster entrepreneurialism in Africa and to develop its private sector. While development assistance plays a role, in many African countries, donor agencies have fallen into the foreign aid trap. All too often the first reflex of policymakers is to call for outside assistance to resolve problems in blind belief that such action will suffice. Unfortunately, all too often such blind faith has proven to be misplaced. The experience of the UN Millennium Villages Initiative illustrates the risks that policymakers expose themselves to when they hand over responsibility to external donors. The Millennium Villages project, a five-year plan touted as a new approach to fighting poverty, sought to increase economic growth through food production, health care, and education. The sponsors of the initiative stubbornly continued despite evidence that the initiative was failing to achieve its stated goals. Instead of pulling the plug on the initiative, the sponsors simply moved the goalposts and sought additional funding. To avoid repeating such costly mistakes, African leaders need to focus on creating an en-

abling environment that stimulates and attracts investment. We need to focus on encouraging local angel investors and venture capitalists to ensure that our fledgling companies can attract the resources they need to develop their operations. African governments also need to continue to encourage and strengthen public-private partnerships, such as the 40-year-old collaboration that has existed between the De Beers diamond company and the Government of Botswana, the proceeds of which have enabled Botswana’s economy to thrive and attain the economic status of a middle-income country. Every effort should be made to both stimulate the involvement of the local business community and to harness local resources. The Kenyan tradition of “harambee,” meaning “all pull together” in Swahili, and the self-help initiatives it has inspired, including in the areas of education, health, and infrastructure, offer interesting examples of what can happen when Africans pull together to resolve the challenges they face. By adopting a “harambee”-like approach, African countries can start focusing on devising innovative solutions that add value to local products such as fruit, coffee, tea, and cocoa. In this respect, the experiences of Kenya and Rwanda are instructive. Both have been successful in transforming their abundant local resources into high value products and are now reaping the financial benefits of such an approach, which in turn fuels the development of their respective national economies.

Focusing on Action

While the continent’s policymakers have proven very talented in formulating policies, they have not enjoyed equal success in the implementation of these policies. This can be attributed to a number of factors. First, many of the least developed countries suffer a genuine lack of resources and capacity to translate policies into reality, even in the core areas of agriculture, education, and health. It is all too common to find one single official tasked with the implementation of multiple projects in all three sectors. This unworkable situation means that progress is slow at best and would likely grind to a halt in the event of the officer’s absence. Second, new faces occupying senior-level government posts is a common consequence of the frequent reshuffling of government positions. Recent appointees are keen to disassociate themselves from the past and often want to start with a clean slate. Regrettably, in so doing, many good projects and ideas disappear or fade into the obscurity of bureaucratic limbo. Third, implementation can be hampered as a result of inadequate risk analyses at the design stage of a project. For example, implementation of a tobacco project in western Kenya was hindered by the fact that a road cut straight through the project site. The population on one side of the road perceived tobacco negatively, and those on the other side, while their views toward tobacco were more liberal, had no experience in planting the crop. Those responsible for design-

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PERSPECTIVES ing and implementing the project did not understand how critical working with communities and understanding their beliefs could be to the successful design and implementation of development projects. Fourth, project implementation is almost certainly affected by changes in government policies and priorities, as well as by civil war. In such cases, projects may easily come to a standstill, as seen in in South Sudan and the Central African Republic. Notwithstanding these constraints, African leaders and policymakers need to adopt a more measured, results-oriented approach that focuses on developing and implementing projects that will generate realistic, tangible, and sustainable benefits for the communities concerned.

Learning by Example

Amid the many challenges confronting Africa, there are a number of success stories that may serve as sources of inspiration for policymakers. For example, the West African River Blindness Programme, conducted between 1974 and 2002, was an outstanding success. Its implementation is an excellent example of sound cooperative governance. The

precipitate constructive and fruitful discussion. To be effective, study tours need to be well planned and the feedback reports of participants carefully reviewed to ensure any useful insights are captured. If Africa is to transform its development landscape from one littered with failed development projects to one that cultivates success stories, its policymakers need to adopt a cool-headed, open, and pragmatic approach underpinned by incisive analyses of what works and what does not work in different cultural settings. In Africa, we need to embrace the idea that our “home-grown” ideas have as good a chance as any, if not a better one, of solving the challenges we face.

Ensuring Quality Leadership

Effective leadership is the key to transforming the economies of developing countries and to Africa’s success in fostering economic growth and improving living standards. Corruption, on the other hand, continues to be rife in many countries, and many others are ill-equipped to manage the affairs of state properly. In Africa, we do not need look far for examples of inspiring leadership. The late former President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, for example, believed in

“...African leaders and policymakers need to adopt a more measured, results-oriented approach that focuses on developing and implementing projects that will generate realistic, tangible, and sustainable benefits for the communities concerned” program, which lasted 28 years, directly involved 11 countries and 32 partners. Its success is attributable to good governance and, in particular, to transparency in all financial dealings and rigorous implementation of planned activities. The role played by ECOMOG (the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group) in liberating Liberia from its brutal civil war offers another source of inspiration. Without the intervention of ECOMOG, it would have been all but impossible to achieve agreement among the warring parties in that vicious conflict and to organize elections in 1997. The M-PESA mobile phone based system for money transfer and microfinancing offers a third example of how Africa can find innovative solutions to its problems and have an impact on practices elsewhere. Established by Safaricom and Vodacom in Kenya, M-PESA enables those with no chance of opening a conventional bank account to pay bills and make financial transactions within Kenya and beyond. The concept is now gaining traction around the world as a convenient way for individuals to settle their bills. Study tours where officials are sent abroad to gather new ideas and practices offer yet another practical means of bringing about the changes needed in African policy and practice. By nominating the right people for these tours, it is possible to generate valuable feedback reports that can 24

Africa, the importance of collective leadership, and in giving credit where credit is due. Through his efforts, South Africa has emerged as a rainbow state embracing everyone regardless of race, color, ethnicity, or religion. His qualities of leadership have transformed a region socially, economically, and politically. Over the last 50 years, Africa has been a laboratory for failed development experiments, such as structural adjustment programs piloted by the World Bank and the IMF. In the wake of this experience, it is up to the African people to take charge of their own destiny and to develop their continent. With a view to ensuring that Africa is a full partner in its development and not just a recipient of hand-outs, former South African President Thabo Mbeki and his colleagues spearheaded the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001. To date, NEPAD’s success has been partial. If we are to translate NEPAD’s aspirations into reality, we must change our mind set; we must break the bondage of dependency; we must overcome the foreign aid trap; we must talk less and do more, learn from best practices and elect honest leaders who can drive development and add value to Africa’s rich resource endowments. Only then can we change outside perceptions of Africa and make the world believe that we are a “can do” continent.

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Can a Post-Crisis Country Survive in the Time of Ebola? Issues Arising with Liberia’s Post-war Recovery

JORDAN RYAN HEADED THE UN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME’S BUREAU FOR CRISIS PREVENTION AND RECOVERY FROM 2009 UNTIL RETIRING THIS SEPTEMBER. HE HAS ALSO SERVED AS THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL’S DEPUTY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN LIBERIA FROM 2005 TO 2009. RYAN HAS WORKED AS A LAWYER IN SAUDI ARABIA AND CHINA AND WAS A VISITING FELLOW AT THE HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL IN 2001.

e suspect that the first case of the current outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) began with the illness of a two-year old child who died at the end of December 2013. This occurred in Guéckédou prefecture, Guinea, located in the sub-region adjoining Liberia and Sierra Leone. This area is well known for its porous borders and peoples who share ethnic and tribal identities, and it has been a cauldron for the brutal conflict that enveloped the area for well over 15 years. We may never see the face or know the name of “Patient S1.” That infant’s death and the thousands of others since the EVD outbreak provoked the near collapse of the health systems in these three countries. It is a catastrophe that demands more than an emergency response from the world. Now at stake are health systems, their scope, quality, and impact— and more broadly, governance, policy choices, and progress. At a more fundamental level, the EVD outbreak requires nothing less than a wholesale reordering of our priorities and Photo Courtesy Reuters

the way in which we respond to crisis and to the emerging threats, including infectious diseases—especially in areas emerging from violent conflict. This article will consider some of these issues in broad terms, drawing on my personal experience and association with Liberia’s progress over the past nine years. Following a review of progress and challenges, it will provide a perspective on the lessons and priorities for doing development differently in post-Ebola Liberia and the neighboring countries. One point is clear: building on the creative energies of the Liberian people, the international system needs to learn to act in a proactive manner, rather than wait until a global crisis arises.

Some Starting Points

First, to be absolutely clear, there can be no doubt of the paramount need to support the all-out effort to stop the spread of EVD now. Although the initial response was unfortunately marked with far too much hesitation, there is now a robust Security Council approved mission, the UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER). Now is the time Winter 2015 • H A R V A R D I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E V I E W

PERSPECTIVES for UNMEER, with all concerned national authorities, bilateral and other partners, including philanthropies and the private sector, to act in concert with one single goal. Donors need to provide immediate and generous support now, not next year when it will be too late. Second, it will be important to look carefully at why the epidemic flourished and what factors allowed it to do so. This outbreak must serve as a wake-up call to the international community, for certainly this situation is and will not be an isolated incident. We are witnessing the dawn of a much more complicated world to come: one which is regularly challenged by upheavals that may at first sight appear local, but because of the nature of globalization, can have a dramatic impact upon populations living far away. Finally, the unleashing of Ebola in the 21st century is not a case of science fiction coming true. It is instead the result of a series of failures: failures to invest in a timely manner in the right infrastructure; failures to build accountable systems; failures to concentrate on resilience; and failures to put an end to the taxing, time-consuming bureaucracy which saps the ability of people to focus on what matters most—making a difference in the lives of people, especially the poorest.

Liberia: A Story of Hope and Work

I arrived in Liberia in November 2005 to serve as the deputy special representative of the UN secretary-general (DSRSG) in the peacekeeping mission, UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which had been established under a Security Council mandate to support a successful peace process. Within the first days, I had the thrill of witnessing a former UN colleague, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, win the run-off presidential election to become Africa’s first democratically elected female president. In the mid 1990s, she had held senior positions within the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and prior to that, the World Bank. In her inaugural address on January 6, 2006, President Sirleaf called on her fellow compatriots to “break with the past,” declaring: “The future belongs to us because we have taken charge of it. We have the resources. We have the resourcefulness. Now, we have the right government. And we have good friends who want to work with us.” Each year since then, the international community has invested over US$1.5 billion to support the government of Liberia’s five-pillar strategy of security, economic revitalization, basic services, infrastructure, and good governance. The international community embraced this strategy and its aim to direct assistance to support tangible development gains for rural Liberians. My primary task as the DSRSG for UNMIL was to coordinate the provision of life-saving humanitarian aid as well as the longer-range development assistance of the United Nations and international partners. Working closely with the Special Representative, I had the vast logistical, technical, and military resources of UNMIL at my disposal. I could also call on the UN agencies which were collectively known as the UN Country Team, a number of which—including UNDP, the UN Refugee Agency, UNICEF, and the World Food Programme— 26

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had been working in Liberia for many years. My job was to harness and integrate the different strengths and activities of the peacekeeping mission and the UN Country Team in a “one UN” effort to provide relief assistance, strengthen the capacity of Liberian institutions to govern and deliver basic services (e.g., security, justice, policing, and social services like health and education), revive economic activity (particularly in rural areas), and, ultimately, to foster national healing and reconciliation. As I realized during my first visit with the minister of health (whose office was unreliably lit by a single electric bulb dangling from a wire), the war had left the Liberian health sector (and many others) in shambles. The minister told me that the primary provider of health services, both during and after the war, had been international NGOs. The country’s health facilities had been completely looted and vandalized during the war, and medical supplies were simply unavailable. A country of over 4 million people had only 26 practicing doctors. In most parts of rural Liberia, health services and referral systems (including any kind of maternal or reproductive health care services and information) simply did not exist. It was clear that in the health sector, as in several other sectors, the work of strengthening institutions would be a case of rebuilding them virtually from scratch. The Liberian government and its international partners took several key steps to rebuild these institutions. We understood from the past that the concession economy and the politics of elite capture and bribery had mutually reinforced one another, creating the dynamics that led to civil war and the deprivation, suffering, and traumatization of the Liberian people. This led to the initial institution-building focus on building up much needed capacities and systems within government institutions, with the aim of developing the systems for accountable and transparent financial management, budgeting, and procurement. Steps were taken to put in place accountability mechanisms to reduce corruption and increase transparency, introduce a cash management system, devise a new procurement commission, and establish a general auditing commission. Another critical task was to restore trust and public confidence between the Liberian people and the government. This needed to begin early and with quick support from Sweden and the UNDP/UN Country Team, which simultaneously began the process of decentralizing governance by supporting local development initiatives in each of the 15 administrative regions. Steps were taken to foster citizen involvement to build peace and re-establish trust between the government and the general population. Transparency International (TI) ranked the transparency of Liberia’s government as the third best in Africa, citing the independence of the General Auditing Commission, support for the establishment of the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission, the promotion of transparent financial management, public procurement and budget processes, and the establishment of a national law to ensure Liberia’s compliance with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. The economy was also

PERSPECTIVES growing at an impressive rate. Trade, production, commerce, and construction expanded rapidly. A series of government plans were issued to outline the way that the Johnson Sirleaf Administration would capitalize upon this post-conflict economic boom, starting with her 150-day Action Plan to jump-start economic recovery. This was followed by an 18-month Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy, and in 2008, the government completed its first Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), whose formulation drew on countywide consultations and citizen engagement.

have disintegrated as they quickly as it rose. The 2010 TI Global Corruption Barometer graded Liberia as among the world’s most corrupt countries, especially in the area of citizens who need to pay bribes to public servants. The forward march and the bright future to which the president called her compatriots at her first inauguration appear to have stalled. Instead of building on a promising foundation of public hope that greeted Liberia’s post-war government, its performance began to erode rather than continue to build trust.

“Within months, the disease dislocated the institutional fabric of Liberia, disrupting not just the health system, but also the entire system of governance. Of the 10,129 reported cases globally as of October 23, 2014, 4,665 are in Liberia and 2,705 have died” Framed around the five pillars mentioned above, the “Lift Liberia” strategy was specifically designed to promote rapid, shared growth. Officials at all levels sought to assure the Liberian population that “growth without development,” which prior to the war had generated extreme inequality and deprivation, was gone forever. Promoting shared growth entailed the provision of quality public services (especially education and health) and the revival of small-scale agriculture and rural livelihoods supported by the expansion of infrastructure (roads, bridges, water, and sanitation) throughout the whole country. This was music to the international community’s ears. Aid continued to pour in. As a result, investor confidence rose dramatically. Starting with the rubber plantations, the concession economy (iron ore, rubber, and timber) began attracting large-scale international investors. Private investment increased rapidly in residential and commercial property, telecommunications, and transport.

Growth Without Development: A Return of Despair?

When I left Liberia in 2009, the story was still one of hope, and there was still widespread confidence in the national leadership. In fact, the nation’s narrative of peace, stability, and recovery was heralded as a prized example of postconflict stability, reconstruction, and development. Up until the outbreak, Liberia had experienced a sustained peace, two successful democratic elections, improved access to justice and human rights, a restoration of public services, and a reemergence of private sector activity. In conjunction were unprecedented growth rates, showcasing Liberia’s considerable strides since the August 2003 Comprehensive Peace Accord and the profound chaos and disorder the country found itself in at that time. Since my departure, the robust transparency and accountability architecture that led to the country being ranked favorably by TI and various international watchdog groups

It has become evident that the old, tired pursuit of “growth without development,” as well as its perennial companion, the politics of greed, have indeed begun to settle in Liberia—as is far too often the case in many resource-rich countries. While the economy continued to grow, its impact on the lives of ordinary Liberians has been limited. The original promise of broad-based engagement with citizens in order to foster countrywide development faded as government’s attention turned to the revival of the concession economy. A rail line from the port to the mines was rebuilt and the iron ore mines were reopened, while after a corruption-tainted start, large-scale timber concessions were granted and the rubber plantations were rehabilitated and expanded. With the discovery of oil along the Gulf of Guinea (especially in Ghana), Liberian officials began contemplating and preparing for the emergence of a petroleum industry. The lofty mission to “Lift Liberia” as captured in the PRS, especially as it related to small-scale agriculture, rural infrastructure, and strengthening rural public services, has failed. Rural poverty has remained high, exacerbating the low levels of health, poor standards of education, and food insecurity. Sadly it appears that Liberia has firmly moved onto a trajectory that it has already been before: once more growing but not developing.

Ebola in a Time of Crisis

It is against this background—one of governance failures—that the EVD outbreak began. Within months, the disease dislocated the institutional fabric of Liberia, disrupting not just the health system, but also the entire system of governance. Of the 10,129 reported cases globally as of October 23, 2014, 4,665 people are in Liberia and 2,705 have died. The estimated figures will be more alarming if the epidemic is not brought under control. Many health centers have shut down as health workers abandoned their posts for fear of contracting the virus, leavWinter 2015 • H A R V A R D I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E V I E W

PERSPECTIVES ing hundreds of Liberians without access to health services. These centers have done so due to poor conditions, and provide no protective equipment and incentive to perform the life-threatening work for which they were created. They have already seen over 95 of their fellow health workers die, and hundreds of others fighting for their lives. Consequently, there are widespread reports that people with high blood pressure and diabetes are no longer cared for. Pregnant women have been turned away from hospitals. They are left to die or lose their babies before they are born. Desperate Liberians have abandoned neighbors or relatives suspected of having EVD to die slow and painful deaths. Both Liberia’s society and culture are being challenged in many new and desperate ways. This is a different type of war now, not the civil war of the 1990s, but a war brought about in part by a health system unable to cope with the scale of the Ebola outbreak. The Ebola epidemic is not just devastating the Liberian population. It is also severely crippling all sectors of the country’s economy: notably health, trade and commerce, and education. The World Bank recently projected major reductions in the economy over the coming years—destimating that Liberia could see significant contractions of its growth. The impact of EVD has seen the original GDP growth projections revised downwards from the initial 8.7 percent, progressively to 5.9 percent, 2.5 percent, and most recently, to 1 percent. This will have a direct impact on the country’s Human Development Index. With villages decimated by the disease and agricultural fields being abandoned, famine is becoming a reality. The prices of food have been rising due to shortages. Liberian professionals who hold foreign passports, many of whom returned with high hopes of contributing to the development of their motherland, are leaving the country. This will accentuate Liberia’s deficiencies in human resources. Schools have closed, business has declined, and international connections (via air and sea transport) have been curtailed. In rural Liberia, communities shun many who contract the virus for bringing calamity upon their neighbors. This is further undermining the fragile social fabric that had been slowly rebuilding after the war.

infectious diseases break out. We should expect both an increasing number of epidemics and mega multi-hazards. The WHO has warned that climate change will see the rise of infectious diseases. Many of these would likely originate in socalled conflict-affected fragile states, so we must learn quickly to engage these states in ways that increase their resilience as the first line of defense in our emerging complex new world. In my role as director for the former Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery in UNDP, we supported the work of the g7+ (a group of self-identified fragile states) that organized themselves under what is called the New Deal for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. The specific goal was to determine how the countries could transition out of fragility to become more resilient. At the heart of the New Deal is the building of institutions to promote inclusive politics, security, justice, revenue and jobs, and basic services. These countries recognize that until they build more resilient and participatory governance systems, their prospects for peace and sustained development are limited. We cannot continue this firefight since the resources and the know-how are simply not available to respond in an ad-hoc manner to all of these mega-hazards. Resilient

Lessons for Re-engaging on Recovery in Liberia

There will be plenty of calls for lessons learned from future analysis of what happened in Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia during the early months from the death of S1 in December 2013. Looking even further back, the efforts and choices made by the government of Liberia, as well as other governments in the regional and international community, in strengthening institutions appear to be either inappropriate, misguided, or too superficial to support the country’s development. We need to learn from this so that we can build new and robust local, national, regional, and global architectures that can effectively respond to current and future epidemics. For me, the following lessons are worth heeding: (1) Effective and accountable institutions remain key in post-conflict recovery and transition out of fragility. It is already expected that climate change will shift where 28

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An alternative approach to medicine found on the road in Liberia. institutions are essential. According to the World Bank, these are institutions that “can sustain and enhance results overtime, can adapt to changing circumstances, anticipate new challenges, and cope with exogenous shocks.” Building such institutions requires that they be embedded in the societal, political, and geographical contexts from where they derive meaning and legitimacy. Creating such an institutional context means investing in education so that these countries can have the critical Photo Courtesy Reuters

PERSPECTIVES mass through which a supportive institutional environment can develop. While institution-building is for the long-term, this is a great opportunity to experiment with the concept of the use of the country system, national ownership, and the rebuilding of trust between government and society as well as governments and international partners. These are the core principles of the New Deal for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding. (2) Timely, targeted, coordinated, and coherent resultoriented response. The Ebola crisis is not just a health emergency; it is a multi-dimensional social and humanitarian crisis. It requires a complex, multi-pronged response involving health, aidcoordination, personal security, food security, appropriate budgetary decision-making, and responsive governance, among others. It is a whole of government challenge. While this point cannot be ducked we in the international community regularly develop “whole of government” approaches in ways that overextend the agendas of already fragile countries well beyond their capacities to respond. We often call on the government to act in a coordinated manner, but as international partners we can be disorganized and consequently fail to act in a unified or coordinated manner ourselves. Rolling back an epidemic is not the time for long complicated layers of bureaucracies and agency-driven interests. We need targeted and efficient responses that produce results rapidly. In their immediate response, these countries need enough ambulances to quickly collect the sick and the dead. They need health workers including infectious disease control doctors on the ground in all affected parts of the countries. They need funds to pay health workers adequately for undertaking such dangerous work. Most importantly, they need the international community to accompany them by nurturing the use of their respective country systems. This includes the training programs at the local and regional level that will continuously build capacity to stay abreast with medical science, technology, and innovation. In the medium-term, the network of health workers across the countries must be strengthened to exchange experiences and build practices on a regular basis. But much more is needed if the countries are to rebound. They need considerable support to revitalize the productivity of their agricultural sectors, and they need innovative ways to open the schools. Early recovery activities should be prioritized, including cash transfers targeting not only the directly impacted, but also the affected households; enterprise recovery must be a key component as well. These are concrete tasks and should be carried out without being subject to the typical bogs of bureaucracy and complexity. How can this be done differently? Where is the venture-capitalist mindset behind all the Silicon Valley startups for all of West Africa? We need to adopt modern methods of training rural health workers, the young women and men who are ready to stay in the provinces and counties and who are willing to provide real services to their fellow citizens, in exchange for being paid real salaries on time. (3) Limit coordination layers.

There are multiple actors who are returning to these countries to help. They must be coordinated and the governments must be at the center of these coordination platforms, but these should not result in multiple and burdensome transaction costs for coordination. Coordination at the center of government is one of the core functions that needs to be strengthened, particularly in countries where such systems are still not fully consolidated. There is absolutely no time for competing layers of coordination. As director of the former Bureau for Crisis Response and Recovery in UNDP, I saw firsthand how effective a network of actors across the government can be. In fact, it is critical. As the former UN resident coordinator in Vietnam, I witnessed firsthand that nation’s response to SARS and the avian flu. The remarkable success in that country was primarily due to the cohesive response of the government, as well as its clarity of purpose and its decisiveness. (4) From knee-jerk international mobilization to global solidarity to shared security. We all hope the current epidemic will be brought under control as rapidly as possible. Soon we will need to face the next challenge: rebuilding the affected countries. Yes, there will be calls to build back better. But it will take much more than slogans this time. The world will be challenged to make the right investments. It cannot be business as usual nor can we allow ourselves to slip simply into old comfortable patterns of working. We should be measured as to whether we are doing the right things. Who are the best judges? The people on the ground are. Do they see an improvement in the education system, the delivery of health, and access to clean water, all of which make life livable? It is no longer a cliché to say that our security and existence are intertwined even with that of remote villages and impoverished fragile states. It is no longer a world of them and us. Whatever support we give to affected countries is not an act of a good Samaritan. It is for our very own personal safety and well-being. In our affluent and technologically sophisticated world, complacency is not an option. We cannot glibly dismiss seemingly faraway threats as problems of the poor and remote parts of the world. As the Ebola epidemic in West Africa has revealed in just a matter of months, it is in our personal interest to address those problems at their source before they escalate. This will reduce the tragic impact of the epidemic locally and avoid having it become a global crisis. With 2015 approaching, and its world of conferences and goals, now would be time to take decisive action that fundamentally reinvigorates the ability of the international system to work in a more effective and cohesive manner with human, physical, and financial resources upfront to support national response plans as well as those that transcend national boundaries in the way modern threats do. Whether this requires fine-tuning or a complete overhaul, now is the time for action, and hopefully for something a bit more ambitious than just making the United Nations “fit for purpose” which seems to mean simply “good enough to get the job done”.

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INTERVIEW

Interview with Dr. Robert R. King an interview by

SALLY H. NA Doctor ROBERT R. KING is an US diplomat. He was nominated by the president of the United States and the US Senate in 2009 to become the special envoy for North Korean human rights issues.

To start things off, can you give a brief description of your role and responsibilities as the special envoy for North Korean human rights issues? The position of special envoy for North Korean human rights issues is a position that Congress created by law, because there was a feeling that the US government was focusing too much attention and energy on the security issue, and we needed to give attention to the human rights issue as well. So the North Korea Human Rights Act, when it was passed in 2004, created this position and the legislation has been renewed since that time, so it continues to be a position that is filled. But the idea is that we need to focus on the human rights issue and the special envoy for North Korean human rights issues has the responsibility of keeping track of what is going on on that front, working with our allies, working with the United Nations, and working with other international agencies on human rights issues, what we can do internationally to call attention to them, information policy, and the rest of the human rights portfolio. So I work within the State Department, and I work with my State Department colleagues here, and do that kind of thing. For background, I worked for 25 years on Capitol Hill as chief of staff to a congressman from California, and I was also the staff director of the House Foreign Affairs Committee when he was the chairman of the committee and when he was a ranking member of the committee. The citizens of North Korea suffer from a wide range of grave human rights abuses—is the United States and/ or South Korea’s Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights particularly prioritizing any of these abuses? The baseline in terms of the North Korean human rights abuses is the report by the Commission of Inquiry, which was created by the UN Human Rights Council just over a year ago 30

and issued in February of this year. The Commission wants to catalogue abuses based on extensive interviews with refugees from North Korea as well as meetings, discussions with specialists, and so forth. The most important conclusion it came up with is that many of the human rights abuses in North Korea reach the standard where they are considered crimes against humanity, which are very, very serious violations of human rights. But the range of issues identified—and these are listed in paragraph 76 of the report issued—include murder; enslavement; torture; imprisonment; rape; forced abortion; sexual violence; persecution on political, religious, racial, and gender grounds; forced transfer of population; enforced disappearance of persons; and known prolonged starvation. All of these are among the most serious of human rights violations, and we do not go through and say this is a priority, or this is the most important of these violations. I think our attitude is that these violations are all part of an attitude towards human rights that is out of touch with the standards that other countries, or many and eventually all countries, accept for human rights, and the North Koreans ought to make improvements and changes to move away from these violations. It seems to be a long established fact, and certainly one of the greatest difficulties of this issue, that the North Korean government will continue to deny claims that it is violating its citizens’ rights, and will refuse to cooperate with international players—does the United States or United Nations have any specific plans for combatting this obstacle? One of the main things we have done is try to bring attention to these human rights violations. We, as you know, are very active supporters of the creation of the Commission of Inquiry, and we have supported the work and the efforts of the Commission. One of the four places it has held public hear-

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INTERVIEW ings was here in the United States in Washington, DC, for two days. We have tried to work through many of the UN agencies that deal with these human rights issues—to call attention to them, to urge the North Koreans to take corrective action, and so on—and we continue to do this on an ongoing basis. What are your thoughts on South Korean President Park Geun-hye’s approach on inter-Korean relations, and which type of advances or reforms do you think the South Korean administration should primarily and/or initially push for in North Korea to have the greatest resulting impact on humanitarian efforts? We work very closely with South Korea in terms of dealing with North Korea. We have a treaty relationship with South Korea. We have a cordial relationship: we discuss issues of all kinds with South Korea, and one of the main topics we discuss with South Koreans frequently is the situation of North Korea, particularly the human rights situation in North Korea. There are frequent exchanges between think tanks in South

of need, and when there is a need it should be done based on that need and not based on political considerations. This is something that is not written into US law, but it is a fundamental principle of international humanitarian assistance everywhere. We do not provide food on the basis of requesting political action. The second consideration in terms of humanitarian aid is that we need to be able to monitor the distribution of the assistance, to make sure that it reaches those who are most in need—in other words, those for whom the aid is intended. Again, this is a principle that humanitarian assistance workers all around the world accept and follow in their practice and that I think is an important consideration as well. When we have provided aid to the North Koreans in the past, it was important to us to be able to monitor where and how it was distributed. The third consideration is that when we make decisions in the United States on providing aid, we have got to balance the demand, the needs, and the conditions that we are facing in other places around the world and make the decision based on competing interests and by answering where the need is greatest and where we can have

“...these are all part of an attitude towards human rights that is out of touch with the standards that other countries, or many and eventually all countries, accept for human rights, and the North Koreans ought to make improvements and changes to move away from these violations”

Korea and the US—I have participated in many conferences, both in Washington and in Seoul, where South Koreans and Americans get together to talk about these issues. So we coordinate, we talk, we discuss, and we share information. I am not sure that it is terribly appropriate for me to be talking about where South Korea is headed or what it is going to do, but I think that whatever happens, we are going to work closely together and make sure that we share information about what we are doing and where we are going. Many have criticized former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy and the concept of humanitarian aid with no strings attached. How do you feel about this, and what kind of policies related to humanitarian efforts do you think foreign players other than South Korea should approach the North Korean government with? With regard to humanitarian assistance to North Korea, the United States has a policy that involves three major points. Number one, in providing humanitarian assistance, the decision to provide aid should be based on assessment

the greatest impact. These are important considerations. They are the kind of issues that people who provide humanitarian assistance either bilaterally and by different governments or UN agencies take into account. I firmly believe that those conditions ought to be met, and I think most governments, including the South Korean government, accept these principles as well. It seems like China and Russia seem to be following differing paths with regards to their evolving relationships with the North Korean regime, as each possibly adopt different attitudes toward the regime than they have in the past. How do you think the Chinese-North Korean and Russian-North Korean relationships will affect North Korea’s global position and stance in the future? China is obviously very important to North Korea. Most of the foreign investment that takes place in North Korea, or much of it, comes from China. Also, a lot of the shipping that goes into North Korea comes through China, so China is a very important player; also, of course, China and North Korea have historically been very close. At the same time,

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INTERVIEW there are very clear indications that China is uncomfortable with North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. It is very clear that the relationship between North Korea and China has had problems, in part, I think, because of the North’s insistence on the pursuit of nuclear weapons. The president of South Korea was in Beijing within a few months of being inaugurated, and South Korea recently hosted the president of China for an important state visit. It is noteworthy that the new leader of North Korea and the president of China have not exchanged visits yet. I think this reflects some strain in the relationship because of the nuclear issue. Russia is another interesting question. Russia is a partici-

mainstream. I think there is a real interest in bringing North Korea into the international mainstream if North Korea is willing to make the changes to make this possible. One of the things that I think contributes to the isolation in North Korea is the state-imposed isolation on information. North Korea is a country where it is illegal to listen to foreign radio broadcast. It is illegal for North Koreans to watch South Korean-produced radio, television, movies, and so forth. Because of the changes that are taking place in the world, I think many of these efforts to isolate North Korea are breaking down. There is increasing contact between the North Koreans and Chinese as trade increases between their two countries. There are increasing

“North Korea’s isolationism is something that I think we would like to see end. There is a real advantage to having North Korea involved in and participating in the world... I think there is a real interest in bringing North Korea into the international mainstream if North Korea is willing to make the changes to make this possible.” pant in the Six-Party talk process, and historically, particularly at the beginning of the Korean War and continuing up until the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and North Korea have had a fairly cordial relationship. The Russians continue to have a good relationship with North Korea, but there is less of an urgent connection—there is not that much of a trade relationship between North Korea and Russia. There are railroad links that have been recently improved, and this continues, but there is not a lot of common interest between the two countries. The North Koreans recently supported Russia on issues related to Ukraine in what was probably an effort to try to improve that relationship, but the relationship is not as developed or as important as many of the other ties that North Korea has or would like to have. What kind of role, if different from the past or present, do you see the United States playing within the next few years regarding North Korea’s general isolationism, including issues, such as nuclear disarmament and the denial of human rights? North Korea’s isolationism is something that I think we would like to see end. There is a real advantage to having North Korea involved in and participating in the world. One of the things that is clear is that right now North Korea is outside the consensus of where most other nations are in terms of standards of relationship with neighbors and other countries. Clearly on human rights, North Korea is outside the

numbers of Chinese going back and forth into North Korea because of economic investments there. It is increasingly difficult to isolate North Korea from international information. Yes, North Korea is one of the few places on the face of the Earth where there is not some access to the internet. China and Iran, by contrast, are very much open societies compared with North Korea. But increasingly, there is greater information getting into North Korea. Radio broadcasts in the Korean language from China and South Korea, as well as broadcasts such as Voice of America and Radio Free Asia are reaching North Korea, and there are indications that significant numbers of North Koreans listen to foreign radio broadcasts. North Korea is one of the few places left where even though it is illegal to listen to foreign broadcasts, such broadcasts are one of the most important sources of foreign news information. We also have tried to encourage contacts between US NGOs and North Korea; this, however, is increasingly difficult because of the arrest of US citizens in North Korea, which has made many people leery of going into North Korea. But I think North Korea’s isolation is beginning to break down. That is positive and should be encouraged. In closing, do you have anything else to add? North Korea is one of the more serious and difficult problems that the world is facing and that the United States is facing in terms of our foreign policy.

H A R V A R D I N T E R N A T I O N A L R E V I E W • Fall 2014/Winter 2015

THE “MISSING GIRLS” FROM CHINA:

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Reforms Are Too Little, Too Late

Photos Courtesy Reuters

KEVIN XIE is a staff writer for the Harvard International Review . upheaval that could negatively affect China and its neighbors. Bolder social and political changes, such as tougher legal restrictions on sex-selective neonatal practices and a broader education campaign, are required to resolve this demographic crisis.

The One-Child Policy, Then and Now

Instituted in 1979, the one-child policy—referred to as the “family planning policy” by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—was designed to control China’s dramatic population growth. At the time, China was experiencing rapid population increases which threatened to disrupt the country’s social and economic stability. Chinese policymakers, inspired by Western environmentalist literature, decided to institute the policy. They paid heed to warnings from organizations, such as the Sierra Club, that advocated a population restructuring to resolve environmental issues.

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hina is currently “missing” more females than the size of Canada’s total population. In China, the decades-old one-child policy has created a substantial gender imbalance, with substantially more males than females. The sex ratio at birth (SRB) has risen over the past few decades from a natural 103 males for every 100 female infants to a peak of 121 boys per 100 girls in 2005 (recent numbers put the current ratio at 118 boys to 100 girls). Some estimates predict that there will be 55 million more males than females by 2020. In the fall of 2013, the Chinese government announced its promise to reform its one-child policy as a way of partially rectifying the male-female gender gap. However, these policy changes to fix China’s gender gap are too little, too late. While reforms to the one-child policy are long overdue, the current reforms are not substantial enough to reverse China’s gender imbalance. The Chinese government says that the country currently has 40 million “extra” males. According to most predictions, this gap between the number of males and females will only increase. This growing disparity in population risks social and political

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R eforms

The “Missing Girls” From China

The goal was to decrease China’s population to 700 million individuals by 2080. There were some exceptions for rural inhabitants and China’s minority ethnic groups, in order to preserve rural populations and to maintain minority levels. However, the vast majority of Chinese couples—urban, majority-Han—were only afforded one child. While effective at slowing the pace of China’s population growth, the policy also skewed the gender ratio, creating unforeseen demographic impacts on Chinese society. Late in 2013, as part of a package of reforms, the Communist Party announced a revision of the one-child policy. The goal of the reforms, stated in the documents from the Third Plenum meeting of the Communist Party, is to “promote long-term balanced development of the population in China.” This change allowed couples to have a second child if one of the parents was a single child. This is a policy change that will likely have a substantial effect on the overall population level as the next generation reaches reproductive age. Such population changes will be effective at addressing some of the CCP’s concerns about the low birthrate. For instance, an increase in births will provide a future respite from the problems of an increasingly aging population. Various economic studies have shown that the absence of a young working-age population would make it difficult to support the larger numbers of older retirees. Furthermore, this lack of young workers threatens China’s economic prospects by creating the possibility of a labor shortage and decreased productivity. These reforms certainly provide the stability that China needs to help its economy and political influence grow. However, these changes are not sufficient enough to

resolve the increasing risks from a growing gender gap. The reforms were made with no explicit consideration of the current disparities between the male and female populations. These policy changes fail to address the widespread preference for male children in China, which is caused by various economic and cultural factors. As a result, the reforms are too narrow and general in scope to effectively change the birth rates of either gender.

Economic and Cultural Factors of the Gender Gap

Cultural and economic hindrances are arguably the most important reasons why recent reforms are not going to fix the gender gap. Many families desire male children in order to ensure an extra source of income. In China, females are perceived as less valuable for labor and unable to provide sustenance. This is especially true in rural areas, where many families rely predominately on male labor to farm, harvest, and work the fields. Furthermore, male children are expected to grow up and support their parents as they age, while females are supposed to merely attend to their in-laws. The absence of a strong social safety net for young children and the elderly also creates incentives to have male children. Chinese parents have little assistance paying for childcare and other necessities; this makes it important for prospective parents to have children that will be able to work and contribute to household income. In addition, most parents will not have a reliable source of income after retirement, leaving them heavily dependent on their male children to provide economic security in their old age. In addition to economic factors, there are cultural causes that underlie the gender disparity. There is a deep-

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Chinese parents are now allowed to have a second child if either one of the parents is a single child. This policy change is likely to have a subsatantial effect on the overall population level as the next generation reaches reproductive age.

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rounding what constitutes sex-selective abortion. Unscrupulous physicians may classify these abortions as medically necessary, thereby bypassing regulations. This has allowed parents to abort unwanted female children. Some parents resort to other unsavory methods; many female newborns are either abandoned or killed. Numerous reports of neglect and infanticide have been reported in China.

Dangers of the Gap

have certainly contributed to the overwhelming preference for male children. As a result of these factors, many Chinese families are driven to obtain male children by any means necessary. They have been aided by several Beijing initiatives that have made it easier to have sex-selective births. The increasing supply of prenatal scanning equipment, combined with policies intended to make scans accessible to rural patients, has allowed parents to determine the sex of the child prior to birth. This has facilitated the increase in sex-selective abortions. While such practices are technically illegal under Chinese law, there are ambiguities surPhotos Courtesy Reuters

basic crime, this demographic shift raises the risk of creating a substantial restless class of single men. Studies have shown that single men tend to be more dissatisfied with their social situations and exhibit aggressive behavior. The development of that faction, combined with an increasingly difficult economic outlook, raises the likelihood of broader social unrest directed against the government. Even now, China’s gender gap has indirectly exacerbated transnational crime and contributed to regional instability. The lack of women has led some men to demand wives from other Asian countries. This demand for foreign females has given rise to one of the worst cases of human

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because of a lack of females”

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“...one out of every five young man will not be able to find a wife

R eforms

Beyond the significant harms of illegal unsafe abortions, neglect, and infanticide, the growing gender imbalance threatChinese tradition values men more than women because men pass down family ens the stability of China names, and are believed to be central to preserving the ancestrial traditions. and its regional neighbors. There is danger of internal rooted cultural tradition that encourages having male violence as a result of a male-dominated society. According children. Many of these attitudes have existed in China for to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, one out of every a long time, coming from traditional Confucian conceptions five young men will not be able to find a wife because of a of the family. Because men pass down family names, society lack of females. A plethora of sociological evidence reveals regards male children as vital to preserving ancestral tradithat a high population of unmarried males can increase the tions. In contrast, female children are “given away” to their incidence of crime. The lack of strong social ties created by husband’s family. Furthermore, male heirs are supposed marriage and familyhood can incentivize risky, immoderate to perform ancestral rituals, while females are often not behavior. The Insti-tute for the Study of Labor found that permitted to. For example, Chinese tradition views men, a 1 percent increase in the sex rate at birth corresponded who are heads of family, as necessary to pay respects to with a 5 percent increase in the crime rate. In addition to deceased family members. These differing cultural practices

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FEATURES trafficking in the world. Criminal gangs from Southeast Asia traffic poor women into China to sell them into marriage. Many are duped or kidnapped from countries such as Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand. This illicit arrangement raises the risks of physical and sexual exploitation. Furthermore this burgeoning human market funnels money to regional criminal organizations, strengthening their operations and promoting regional instability. The United Nations recognized the risks of strengthened criminal gangs, noting that successes with human trafficking embolden organizations to engage in higher-risk actions. Such smuggling also makes it hard to track the flow of individuals across borders

restrictions by ordering these practices for illegitimate medical reasons. The Chinese government should aggressively pursue and prosecute physicians who engage in these unprofessional practices. Furthermore, the government should direct its National Health and Family Planning Commission, which is in charge of implementing the one-child policy, to more tightly regulate prenatal operations. This could be potentially done by having local child planning officials strictly evaluate proposed medical procedures. This would go a long way towards ensuring that parents do not have the means to selectively abort female children. Furthermore, the Chinese government should consider

“The Chinese government says that the country currently has 40 million “extra” males. According to most predictions, this gap between the number of males and females will only increase”

while wasting crucial law enforcement resources. The possibility of rising domestic instability raises its own risks. As explained in Bare Branches, a book by Valerie Hudson and Andrea den Boer, a disproportionately large male population often drives states to implement aggressive, anti-democratic policies in an attempt to prevent unrest. It is conceivable that the CCP, wary of an increasingly restive male population, will crack down and further restrict personal liberties. This would be a major step backwards in China’s slow yet steady march towards liberalism, and would have significant impacts on regional and international democratic trends. Along similar lines, Hudson and den Boer argue that China may become militarized as a result of the gender gap. It is indeed possible that Chinese policymakers, in a desperate attempt to avoid protests of disgruntled men, will rely on intense nationalism to distract them. The government could also potentially resort to forced conscription and other mass-mobilization activities. These political consequences would likely contribute to the destabilization of an already precarious situation in East Asia.

Potential Solutions to China’s Demographic Woes

Based on current trends, it would be reasonable to conclude that China’s current approach to resolve the gender gap has failed to substantially improve the situation. Part of the problem stems from the narrow nature of the Party’s reforms. It is time for China to directly address the underlying roots of the gender problem, instead of relying upon tangential policies to treat the symptoms. Under current Chinese law, sex-selective abortions and certain types of prenatal scanning are already banned. However, local doctors are often able to circumvent these 36

further modifications to its one-child policy. A gradual expansion of eligibility for second children could be promising. The government can pledge to allow all parents the ability to have a second child, which would reduce the incentive to abandon female children, since parents would be able to try for a second baby. This policy would likely not have major deleterious effects on the population size; China has reached the point where a population increase might even be welcomed. However, parents who desire male children would be willing to raise a second child if it increased their chances to have male progeny. The recent nature of reforms, combined with slow and often uncooperative local bureaucracies, however, makes these changes unlikely. Lastly and most importantly, the CCP must increase its efforts to shift social and cultural attitudes surrounding girls. While the government has some public campaigns that address the issue, relatively little attention is paid to them. The Chinese government needs to step up its educational campaign to inform parents about the value of having girls. This can also be done through the National Health and Family Planning Commission. The Chinese State Council needs to mandate that the organization invest in public messaging regarding birth practices. Expanding cultural messaging to persuade prospective parents to avoid female abandonment is also necessary. China’s persisting gender gap presents many challenges for the country and the world as a whole. Certainly, the increasing gender disparity threatens to destabilize China’s distinctly structured society, with social and political risks for the region at large. While China’s recent reforms to its one-child policy are a step in the right direction, it remains clear that more action is needed.

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Innovators of Inequality

Why the “Woman Solution” Does Not Work

ALICE HU

he US government and the Western world have seldom hesitated to call for women’s rights in Muslim nations in recent years. With events ranging from Pakistani education activist Malala Yousafzai standing against the Taliban to the rise of the Islamic State, the US government’s push for women’s empowerment in the Muslim world seems to have gained unprecedented momentum. However, as a mere continuation of previous political agenda, US efforts to improve women’s rights lack credibility and often fall short of bringing real change. The US government assumes that its push to empower and educate women will help curb terrorism, facilitate democratization, and foster Western ideals. Yet this assumption neglects key differences among women in the Muslim world. It treats an immensely diverse demographic as a single entity motivated by similar ideologies and goals. Indeed, many women’s organizations in the Muslim world view democratization as a priority. However, treating women as a solution for violent conflicts and as a means to establish a Western-approved government undercuts any attempt by local women to initiate organic political

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ALICE HU is a staff writer for the Harvard International Review . changes, thus precluding the establishment of an authentic democracy. Assumed to be a channel for Western democracy, women’s rights have been established as a strategic interest for the United States. As such, US President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry may emphasize women’s empowerment in their diplomatic rhetoric, but when the matter conflicts with US military and economic interests in the Muslim world, the United States often abandons its commitment to the issue. The United States’ inconsistent stance and exclusive approach to women’s rights has undermined its international legitimacy as a harbinger and supporter of equality. The time has come for the country to reevaluate its approach—in order for the US to be recognized by people as a legitimate actor in international women’s rights, it must challenge its histori-

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INNOVATORS OF INEQUALITY: W hy the “W oman S olution ” D oes N otW ork

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FEATURES cal top-down initiatives and reposition itself in a manner that consistently prioritizes the political agency of the women themselves.

Women’s Rights as a Political Strategy

Indeed, human rights violations are rampant in conflict-ridden countries, but the rhetoric that targets human rights, particularly women’s rights, has almost always served to justify the actions of political leaders to an ambivalent public. After the attacks by the Islamist terrorist network al-Qaida on September 11, 2001, the administration of US President George W. Bush launched the War on Terror, an international military, political, and ideological campaign against terrorist organizations and the regimes that support them. To rally domestic support for the War on Terror, President Bush employed rhetoric about the oppression of women in Muslim countries. In November 2001, one month after the United States invaded Afghanistan, the US Department of State released the Report on the Taliban’s War against Women. The report described in detail the commonplace brutality endured by Afghan women under the Taliban, from the deprivation of medical care Young Muslim women protestors march during a rally in and education to the enforcement of a restrictive dress Sydney, Australia in response to the Bush adminstracode and house imprisonment. tion’s call for air strikes over Afghanistan in 2001. In one particular anecdote, the report recounted the experience of an Afghan woman who tried to seek however, highlighting the Taliban’s violation of women’s medical attention for her sick child across town: “To go rights suddenly became an effective political strategy. Poron her own meant she would risk flogging…she had no traying the US involvement in Afghanistan as one driven by choice. Donning the tent-like burqa as Taliban law required, humanitarianism and equality shifted attention from the she set out…she was spotted by a teenage Taliban guard complex relationship the United States had with the region. who tried to stop her…he raised his weapon and shot her The appeal of fighting for women’s rights was strengthrepeatedly.” While these anecdotes provided a grounded ened by inadequate media coverage of Muslim tradition understanding of how women were treated under the and culture. With the US media focused on news of jihad Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, it is difficult to separate them and terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism became apparfrom the underlying political intent. ently synonymous with Islam as a whole. The misconcepThe Taliban, an Islamic fundamentalist group consisttions about Muslim countries were further reinforced by ing primarily of Pashtuns (an ethnic group in Pakistan and the long-standing ideas of Orientalism, a term coined Afghanistan), has been active on the Pakistani-Afghan by literary scholar Edward Said referring to the Western border since the early 1990s. It consolidated its rule over ideological construction of the Middle East as uncivilized Afghanistan in 1996, imposing Pashtuns’ tribal code and backward. In one of his speeches after the invasion of combined with strict Wahhabi interpretation of Sharia, or Afghanistan, President Bush appealed to such Orientalist Islamic, law. Taking away previously protected civil liberties, stereotypes when he said that, “ruling cabals like the Taliban the Taliban enforced public executions, banned most forms show their version of religious piety in public whippings of mass entertainment, and required women to don an allof women.” The women under the rule of the Taliban were covering burqa and men to grow their beards. In 1998, the therefore construed as victims of a religion rather than UN Security Council passed two resolutions condemning of any particular regime or extremist group. Thus, the US the Taliban’s treatment of women, and in 1999, the Council government was able to position itself as the leader of an imposed sanctions on the regime for supporting al-Qaida. ideological campaign against the “Axis of Evil,” making the Until the 2001 invasion, however, the US government had preservation of fundamental values such as freedom and been mostly silent on women’s rights in Afghanistan. Given justice contingent upon military success in the region. the fact that the United States had funded the Mujahideen, the jihadist faction that had given rise to the Taliban, to Women, Misrepresentation, and Democratization fight the Soviet Union during the Cold War, it made sense The characterization of women in the Muslim world as for the United States to be selective in its condemnation victims has been instrumental in generating consensus on of the regime. military mobilization. At the same time, it has also played a In building public support for the war in Afghanistan, vital role in democratization. In December 2002, the Bush 38

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administration launched the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), which aimed to “uproot” terrorism and promote democracy through widespread organizational reforms in the region. These reforms focused on advancing women’s empowerment, citizen entrepreneurship, and the capacity building of civil society. MEPI, which continues to be administered under President Obama, targets a region that spans from Morocco to Pakistan. Despite the vast diversity in this region’s political and societal values, the initiative approaches women as uniformly oppressed. Operating under the perception that Islamic fundamentalism is a movement initiated and sustained by men, MEPI assumes that women, as primary victims of rising terrorism, will unquestionably oppose Islamist movements and align with Western forces. Concurrently, it assumed in its “women solution” that empowering

“...the establishment of authentic structural changes can only occur when the women themselves are the primary agents” women through US-led, top-down initiatives would weaken terrorism and initiate a transition to Western democracy. In reality, the political and social conditions of women vary as much among different Muslim countries as they do in other parts of the world. There are progressive trends in Muslim countries that Western countries have yet to experience: Indonesia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh—the three most populous Muslim-majority nations—have all had female heads of state. Geographic proximity also cannot be used to generalize women’s political status. While Tunisia and Algeria have legislatures that are approximately one-third female, Egypt—also a Muslim-majority nation in North Africa—elected a parliament that was only 1.8 percent female in the 2012 election. High female political representation, often a result of legislative gender quotas, do not always translate into improved rights for women. On the other hand, low rates of political participation does not necessarily signify an absence of women’s rights. Arab states tend to fare worse than other Muslim nations in women’s political representation—Oman and Kuwait rank in the bottom four out of more than 150 countries. However, the same two countries are also forerunners in addressing crucial women’s issues such as gender-based violence and reproductive rights. Indeed, the use of the term “Muslim nation” is generalizing. There are even more wide-ranging nuances when considering intra-national differences in class, ethnicity, geographic location, and political ideology. The one strand that connects this diverse population is its religion, and even within that there are religious sects that divide the

population. Given MEPI’s neglect of key differences that define the experience of women in Muslim nations, it is unsurprising that both feminist and Islamist women’s movements in countries such as Morocco have dismissed the initiative. In their view, MEPI, like so many other US-led initiatives, was “another failed attempt by the US government to co-opt women’s organizations and create consent about the War on Terror,” as described by Zakia Salime, professor of Middle East and US relations. The skepticism many women’s organizations have towards Western governments stems from their controversial history with European colonialism. Some organizations such as L’ Association Démocratique des Femmes Marocaines, (Democratic Association of Moroccan Women), emerged from the independence movements of former colonies. Other organizations like the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA), the oldest political organization for women in Afghanistan, began as campaigns against foreign occupation and control of the government. Women’s rights movements in Muslim nations and other parts of the developing world have been historically inseparable from the struggle for individual and national sovereignty. When the US government promotes women’s rights as a means of Western democratization, it runs the risk of acting as a neo-imperialist force rather than a supporter of women’s rights. If the United States wants to be recognized by women’s organizations as a legitimate presence in the movement, it must move away from its emphasis on massive top-down initiatives. Instead, the US government should devote more resources to regionallyfocused, community-based initiatives, and engage in active consultation and collaboration with local women’s organizations. Women’s organizations around the world share the struggle for equality, freedom, and justice—these ideals are not limited to the West, as some cultural relativists would argue. “Culture does not justify suffering”, as stated by Paul Farmer, professor of global health at Harvard University and former deputy UN special envoy for Haiti. Indeed, all too often, culture has been used by the powerful as an “alibi” for blatant violations of human rights against the marginalized. However, in order to achieve enduring progress toward these shared ideals, the approach must be tailored to the social and political environment of each country and locality. The United States could provide instrumental support in this respect, but the establishment of authentic structural changes can only occur when the women themselves are the primary agents.

Current Policy and the Woman Solution

Despite its ostensibly renewed commitment to women’s empowerment, the US government seems to continue to prioritize its interests over the rights of women. More than a decade after the establishment of MEPI, Secretary of State John Kerry has continued to employ an approach that operates under the same Bush-era assumptions about

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FEATURES women in Muslim countries. Since coming into office, Kerry has vowed to maintain the momentum his predecessor, Hillary Clinton, had created to empower women. He has issued statements supporting the creation of a consolidated UN Agency for Women and condemning the attacks against girls in Afghanistan. However, in his speech to the US Agency for International Development (USAID), Kerry states, “we can be proud that even as we’re engaging the government and working to build their capacity of governance, we are also building it around a set of principles that are our values about those opportunities women ought to have.” The prioritization of “our values” in the building of governance capacity and enactment of reforms is exactly what drives away groups such as the women’s organizations in Morocco and Afghani-

In his visit to Saudi Arabia in March 2014, President Obama did not bring up any human rights concerns in his meeting with Saudi King Abdullah, despite the recent crackdown on human rights activists and peaceful dissent. In fact, Saudi Arabia has one of the worst women’s rights records in the Middle East, with male guardianship still legally required for women still largely in place. The United States has been reluctant to speak out against the policies of its diplomatic and military ally in the Arab peninsula in the same way it did with nations such as Afghanistan and Iran. Whereas promoting “the women solution” was advantageous for the war in Afghanistan, pushing for the matter in Egypt or Saudi Arabia would have threatened US regional security interests. Despite its firm rhetoric, the standards the US government holds for women’s rights appear to be flexible, depending on its relation with the country and the interests at hand. Little more than a strategic interest, women’s rights have almost always been deemed a secondary concern when military and economic alliances are at stake. Using women’s rights to antagonize the Muslim world has been detrimental for both the United States and the populations it is attempting to help. In positioning itself as the moral authority on international women’s rights and using the issue as a channel to push its own ideals and interests, the US government is perceived by many more as an imperialist force than an advocate for equality and justice. Women’s rights, as politicized by the United States and other actors, have beMuslim women organize in an anti-Morsi demonstration in Cairo in come a site of cultural politics, one which 2012. The Morsi regime was accused of silencing dissent, yet the US gives rise to hypocritical standards, disconspicuously did little to aid Egyptians suffering from the rule of the trust, and a lack of progress. Rather than Muslim Brotherhood. perpetuating the East-West dichotomy that has dominated much of the disstan. If the United States cares at all about having popular course on women’s rights, it would be mutually beneficial legitimacy for women in Muslim countries, then it needs to for the United States to recognize the women themselves stop making the acceptance of Western ideals a prerequisite as agents within dispersed human rights movements that to partnership and collaboration. fall under an umbrella of shared ideals, and collaborate Though President Obama made commitments and with them as such. promises, he faltered at crucial moments for international If the US government wants to establish itself as lewomen’s rights. When the short-lived regime of Egyptian gitimate proponent of women’s rights, it cannot promote president Mohamed Morsi was overthrown in July 2013, women’s rights when it simply serves a political or economic many women’s organizations were subjected to the crackpurpose. It must take a consistent stance and use an apdown by the military-backed interim government. Rather proach that works with the diverse composition and condithan validating its stance on women’s and human rights, tions of women in Muslim countries. Instead of using the the US government, “completely abandoned human rights advancement of women’s rights as means to export Western as an agenda in Egypt,” according to Cynthia P. Schneider, political ideals, the United States can play a crucial role by former US ambassador and senior fellow at the Brookings prioritizing the attainment of true agency for women. The Institution’s Center for Middle East Policy, in an interview answer to terrorism and authoritarian oppression is not “the with the Harvard International Review. Consequently, woman solution” as constructed by the United States and women’s rights activists, among others, have been impristhe West. Rather the answer lies in women themselves, in oned, and approximately 20,000 individuals remain political their will, and in their push to create a more equal society. prisoners in Egypt today. 40

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The State of Women’s Rights in India

The Back Story

One recent example of this is emBODYindia, a photo Photo Courtesy emBODYindia

SARAH MOON is a staff writer for the Harvard International Review. campaign and movement that, at first glance, seems only to show the struggles of women in India. The campaign, which was initiated by the undergraduates of the USIndia Initiative at Harvard College, has inspired people from around the world to come together in defense of Indian women. The premise is simple: women and men alike write messages and pose for the camera, pictorially representing their stance against injustices they have observed, read about, or, in many cases, experienced firsthand. The concept behind this movement has gone viral, touching cultures, ages, and genders of all kinds. The brief messages supporters share are powerful as they encompass some of the most important challenges facing Indian women today. What initially sparked emBODYindia was a tussle between The Times of India, India’s most reputable newspaper, and Bollywood actress Deepika Padukone. The Times of

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One of the biggest debates in international relations today is over the pros and cons of globalization. Many believe that globalization is causing a resource imbalance, and that the increased movement of money, goods, and so on, is disproportionately benefitting those who are already wealthy. Others claim that globalization is improving the lives of all, and while some might benefit more than others, it has allowed society’s overall quality of life to improve. Whatever side of the controversy one stands on, it is clear that technological advancements and the mobility of talent, ideas and information are connecting diverse nations more than ever. As one country celebrates a success, the rest of the world can now celebrate with it in real time. Likewise, countries can engage in discussions together about larger, cross-cutting problems. One such problem is the battle against gender stereotypes. It is one that both developed and developing nations are facing, and while nations are in different stages in this struggle against prejudice, people who have never met, and likely never will, can join forces to erase the hardships this issue causes.

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FEATURES India posted a tweet reading, “OMG: Deepika Padukone’s cleavage show,” eliciting a fiery reaction from the actress. It was offensive and shocking to many Indians that such a well-respected news source would be posting something that many perceived as hurtful, discriminatory gossip. The Times followed up defending its position, and apologized for the headline but did not apologize for the article. In response it stated, “as one of the largest media houses in the world with interests in print, TV, radio and online, we approach each medium differently as do our audiences,” and defended its right to comment on Ms. Padukone’s appearance. Despite the newspaper’s defense, Indian men and women alike rushed to the actress’ defense. Social media hosted a number of conversations discussing the outrage of the scenario, and people showed their solidarity, standing

India are unlikely to work. However, the dowry system is still an important factor in the lives of the lower castes, and the financial and emotional burden is so significant that it is seen as one of the main causes for female feticide in Indian families. The issue of sex selection is a prevalent issue; according to the 2011 census, there are 940 women per thousand men in India. The Dowry Prohibition Act, passed in 1961, made it illegal for the bridegroom’s family to demand a dowry, but the law is not well enforced, as is proven in part by the significant gender imbalance in India.

Sex Selection and Violence Against Women

Sex selection in India, in conjunction with the increasingly young age of brides, in India is currently creating what is known as the “marriage squeeze.” This refers to

“...the heated reactions and frustration many felt does not entirely bring to light the true gravity of the underlying issue about women. It is a symptom of a more widespread discriminatory attitude towards women in India today” in support of the actress and the against abuse of women through articles, commentary, and various media outlets.

The Dowry System

Yet the heated reactions and frustration many felt does not entirely bring to light the true gravity of the underlying issue about women. It is a symptom of more widespread discriminatory attitudes towards women in India today. Women face challenges not only in the media, but also in deeply-rooted Indian societal infrastructures, such as the issue of dowry and a woman’s rights in marriage. Although legally women’s rights are supposed to be equal in marriage, in practice a large number of women and their families are still supposed to provide large dowries to the bridegroom and their families. Dowries can include cash, jewelry, or other expensive gifts and can be an enormous financial burden on the family of the bride, especially because the dowry becomes an increasingly large burden with decreasing socioeconomic status. If the bride’s family refuses or fails to pay the dowry that was originally promised, this can lead to violence, extortion, or both, which are most often directed at the bride. According to an article published by the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, trends regarding the prevalence and frequency of dowries differ greatly across India. In the southern India, for example, money traditionally flows from the groom to the bride’s family; this is true of lower and upper castes. In the northern Indian castes, both upper and lower, the dowry system is very prevalent. Traditionally, the dowry system is more prevalent in the upper castes, which is often due to the fact that upper class women in 42

the decreasing relative numbers of marriageable men for women according to Ranjana Kesarwani in A Study of Marriage Squeeze in Selected Asian Countries. Therefore, sex selection is only propagating the dowry problem that Indian families are working to avoid, as women are forced to vie harder for their husbands by paying more in dowries. Furthermore, dowries are considered to be a major contributor to domestic violence in India. The dowry promotes the power and influence of men over women, and has been attributed by the National Crime Records in India as the cause of 6,000 to 7,000 deaths and approximately 43,000 to 50,000 mental and physical torture accounts from 1999 through 2003. The trend also appears to be getting worse: the Asian Women’s Human Rights Council estimated in 2009 that the dowry tradition was the cause of 25,000 deaths in India for women between the ages of 15 and 34 each year. The most dangerous dowry-related violence occurs when the husband’s family has a significant amount of leverage over the bride’s family, such as in cases where the bride is especially young or pregnant. This is an issue particularly in India, which currently has had the highest percentage of child brides in recent years: 47 percent in 1998 and 30 percent in 2005. Despite the government’s efforts to discourage parents, through monetary payments, from marrying their daughters at a young age, the numbers remain high. If the dowry issue is left unchecked, India will likely continue to fall behind in women’s rights.

The BJP, Modi, and Women’s Rights

In working to understand the state of gender rights in

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percent of whom were women, turned out for the 2014 election. Although this represents a success, concerns have been raised about the literacy rates of women and lack of women’s involvement in local and national political debate, which would limit the presence of women’s opinions. In the 2011 census, only 65.5 percent of Indian women were literate, compared to 80 percent of Indian men. Narendra Modi, the new Indian prime minister, has stated that he is advocating for greater female political participation. However, some citizens are concerned that moving more towards the Hindu right is a bad sign for women’s rights in India. While this remains to be seen, it is no doubt going to be increasingly important for women to become politically active, both in casting their ballots and in vocalizing their opinions through political discourse. Prime Minister Modi’s own marital scandal is making it difficult for those in favor of increased women’s rights to trust him. Although Prime Minister Modi has championed his unmarried status as a supposed sign of supposed political incorruptibility throughout his career, news arose that he had actually been married for over 50 years. His former wife, Jashodaben Chimanlal Modi, is still alive, and is a retired schoolteacher. Ms. Jashodaben has publicly stated that she was hurt and surprised by the separation (Prime Minister Modi had reportedly taken a trip to the Himalayas and never returned), but accepted the act because she understood it to be her “destiny”. Prime Minister Modi’s brother has also stated that the marriage did indeed exist, but was forced on his brother due to traditions of the low Ghanchi caste in Vadnagar and was never actually consummated. It is difficult to unearth the implications of an inconsistent story that began 50 years ago, but Modi’s critics indicate that the purposeful cover-up is something to be concerned about. Namely, they believe it to be a representation of his overall disrespect for the legitimacy of women’s opinions and their role in society, and citizens have little trust in his claims that he wants to be a champion of women’s rights. Additionally, individuals have claimed that the primary reason Prime Minister Modi left his wife is attributable to his religion, a confirming notion for those who believe that the BJP party is too religiously radical. According to many, under the BJP and the general Sangh Parivar collection of Hindu right organizations, gender rights are unlikely to Harvard students pose for an online photo campaign that be protected. Key evidence in this argument is has received international attention. that Gujarat, where Prime Minister Modi was Chief Minister from 2001 to 2014, is perceived to be in India today, it is important to consider what influence the a particularly poor state relative to national standards in recent election of the right-wing Hindu nationalist Bharatiya representing women’s rights. According to the 2011 census Janata Party (BJP) will have. The voter turnout for the Indian statistics, Gujarat had only 918 women for every 1000 men democratic election was massive: 540 million people, 49

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FEATURES compared to the national average of 940 women per 1000 according to the National Crime Records Bureau of India, men. In addition, Gujarat has some of the lowest rates of which states that two women in every 100,000 were raped female enrollment in schools as well as some of the lowbetween 2008 and 2012, which is lower than the UK (3.6), est conviction rates for rape and the abduction of women. Morocco (4.6), and the United States (28.6), there have been Although it is difficult to definitively blame Modi and his multiple flagrant incidents over the last decade, including politics for the problems Gujarat faces, it is poor evidence the gang rape of a 23-year old student on a public bus in for the BJP’s claim that it is dedicated to the promotion and 2012. Additionally, there have been numerous allegations protection of women’s rights. of gang rape by Indian armed forces and Islamist militant The Sangh Parivar’s access to Indian politics through groups. While the statistics are not especially significant in Modi’s election is a defining India as a concern for many country with a prombecause of the inent rape culture, religious conflict these graphic incibetween Muslims dents have provided and Hindus in India, cause for alarm, and which has been a they certainly do not source of gender bode well for those violence. A group hoping to promote of secular intellecwomen’s rights. tuals has named Consistent with itself “India United the predominant Against Fascism” global trend, India and has taken on has seen significant the dut y of exdevelopment in amining both the women’s rights in BJP’s claim that it is the last 50 years. Not “exemplary in the long ago, women in area of women’s India were still, by rights” and its critlaw, considered to be ics (mostly Muslim) the property of their who claim that it husbands. The Hindu is the exact oppoMarriage Act of 1955 site. On October amended and codi28, 2013, India fied the law dictatUnited Against Fasing marriage among cism published a Hindus. Separation paper entitled The and divorce were Sexual Politics of recognized legally Modi, the BJP and for the first time, and A Harvard student poses for the emBODYindia campaign. the Sangh Parivar, a minimum age was put which argues that in place for marriage to the BJP’s true attitude toward women is based on fascist, prevent child marriages. Women in India are legally considcommunally-based politics in which women are not seen ered to be equal to men, a privilege that is not present in all as individuals but instead as representatives of their comcountries. However, laws are very different in theory and in munity and its honor. This can lead to strong protection in practice, and treating and respecting women as equals in terms of the community’s own women, or rape in terms of India is far from completely realized. Despite legal progress, the enemy’s women. This attitude has made women the it is clear that India has many hurdles to face in terms of victim of much religious conflict, as some men use it as an achieving equal rights for men and women in practice. As explanation for sexual violence against women. While it is of late, it has been argued that Prime Minister Modi and difficult to say whether or not this is attributable directly to the BJP are a significant threat to progress on this front, Modi and his party’s philosophies, the mounting evidence despite their claims of working to protect and promote is enough to make dissatisfied women’s rights activists and women’s rights. Yet, one can be sure that if the people of concerned citizens even more alarmed. India and foreign supporters are dissatisfied with the state By no means does this article exhaustively attend to of affairs they will find a way to tell the broader international every challenge women in India face today. Rape violence community, perhaps in a way that is as engaging as the is one of the most prominent issues in India. While the overemBODYindia campaign. all statistics of rape frequency are not especially alarming 44

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Personal Violence, Public Matter: Evolving Standards in Gender-Based Asylum Law

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n August 2014, the US Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the highest immigration tribunal in the country, conceded that women fleeing domestic violence could meet the refugee definition and qualify for protection. The case in question, Matter of A-R-C-G- et al., involved Aminta Cifuentes, a Guatemalan woman who had suffered egregious brutalization over a 10-year period at the hands of her spouse. Her husband beat and kicked her, including incidents where he broke her nose and punched her in the stomach when she was eight months pregnant with such force that the baby was born prematurely and with bruises. Ms. Cifuentes told her husband she would call the police, but he said it would be pointless since “even the police and the judges beat their wives.” Unfortunately, her husband’s claim bore true; she called the police on at least three occasions and they dismissed her complaints as marital problems and told her to go home to her husband. The decision in Matter of A-R-C-G-et al. is notable for many reasons, not the least because it put an end to a controversy that had been raging in US law since 1999 when the same body denied protection to another Guatemalan woman, Rody Alvarado, whose case presented very similar

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KAREN MUSALO is a law professor and director of the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies at the University of California Hastings College of the Law. She has made major contributions to asylum law, especially gender asylum, through her scholarship and her litigation of landmark cases. facts. Ms. Alvarado, like Ms. Cifuentes, had suffered more than a decade of violent abuse, and her appeals to both the police and the judicial system had been met with scorn, indifference, and inaction. In the interim—between 1999 when the BIA denied Ms. Alvarado’s claim, and 2014 when it ruled in favor of Ms. Cifuentes—there existed a remarkable level of disagreement at the highest levels of the US government on the central issue of whether women fleeing domestic violence are entitled to asylum protection. No fewer than three Attorneys General of the United States (Janet Reno, John Ashcroft, and Michael Mukasey) became personally

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FEATURES involved in the issue, and various federal agencies adopted diametrically opposed positions. These entrenched differences in policy positions led to a virtual deadlock that lasted for 15 years. Why has the issue of protection for women who are brutalized by their intimate partners been such a lightning rod for controversy and evoked such strong dissension and resultant gridlock? In order to answer, it is necessary to situate the question of asylum protection for victims of domestic violence within the broader context of “gender asylum” (claims for protection arising from gender-motivated rights violations), and to examine both the origins of our modern refugee protection regime and the historical resistance to recognizing women’s rights as human rights.

Historical Context

The birth of our international refugee protection regime can be traced back to the aftermath of World War II and the recognition of the failure to protect Jews and other victims of the Holocaust. Many who fled and attempted to seek haven were turned back. One of the most shameful and iconic examples of this refoulement occurred when the US refused safe harbor to a ship, the St. Louis, carrying Jews from Europe after they were denied promised landing in Cuba. The St. Louis with its more than 400 passengers was forced to return to Europe, where many of the people on board perished in concentration camps. When representatives of state governments came together to draft an international treaty to address refugees, the World War II experience stood foremost in their consciousness. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) and its 1967 Protocol defined a refugee as an individual with a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,” grounds which reflected the historical period and the drafters’ understanding of reasons for persecution. The drafting of these treaties preceded the recognition of women’s rights as human rights, and therefore, it is not surprising that gender is absent from the list of criteria. There are currently 147 countries, including the United States, that are parties to the Refugee Convention, its Protocol, or both. These countries have, with some qualifications, adopted the international refugee definition in their domestic legislation, with its requirement of demonstrating that persecution be linked to one of the five aforementioned “protected grounds.”

Growing Recognition of Women’s Rights

Historically, the violation of women’s rights was not seen as an issue of concern within the international human rights framework. Violations of women’s rights were often considered expressions of cultural norms or were justified as being mandated by religion. In addition, there persisted a perceived delineation between violations by governments committed against its citizens in the public sphere and violations by non-state actors of women in the so-called 46

“private sphere.” It was only through the efforts of women’s rights activists that this distinction has been largely eroded, and within the human rights arena there has been growing acceptance that violations of women’s rights, even if they take place in “private,” are a matter of public concern and state responsibility. Such progress came much more slowly in the area of refugee protection, where two principal conceptual barriers were in play. First, there was the reluctance to recognize traditional practices, such as female genital cutting (FGC), as acts of “persecution.” Second, and equally important, was that the definition of “refugee” in the UN Refugee Convention—which has been adopted by most countries that are parties to it—does not include gender as one of the five protected grounds. In 1985, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), whose role it is to provide guidance to governments on their application of the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol, began to address the potential exclusion of women from refugee protection. The UNHCR encouraged a broader recognition of gender-related harms as persecution, as well as the use of the “particular social group” protected ground to include claims based on gender. In 1993, the UNHCR, in Executive Committee Conclusion 73, recommended that state parties to the Refugee Convention or Protocol develop “appropriate guidelines on women asylum-seekers in recognition of the fact that women refugees often experience persecution differently from refugee men.” In 1995, in an apparent response to the UNHCR’s recommendation, the United States issued gender guidelines, which were generally positive in their approach towards recognizing violations of women’s rights as deserving of asylum protection. Their impact, however, was limited by the fact that they were directed only to the first tier of decision-makers in the US system, asylum officers. Even at that level, the guidelines had no binding effect, leaving it up to the discretion of each asylum officer whether to follow them or not. An immigration judge’s denial of asylum to Fauziya Kassindja, a young woman from Togo fleeing FGC, provided clear demonstration of the guidelines’ circumscribed effect. Ms. Kassindja appealed the judge’s ruling to the BIA, and there, the principle of protection for women fleeing gendered harms prevailed. In a 1996 decision known as Matter of Kasinga, the BIA ruled that the physical and psychological harm inflicted by FGC met the legal definition of “persecution,” and that it would be imposed on Ms. Kassindja because of her “membership in a particular social group,” defined in significant part by gender. The BIA’s holding was a landmark in US law as the first to accept that women fleeing harms inflicted because of gender could qualify for refugee status. However, it had a strong basis in existing law; the definition of persecution had long included acts of physical and psychological harm analogous to FGC, and a 1985 precedent decision, Matter of Acosta, had specifically ruled that social groups could be defined by “sex.”

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The 15-Year Controversy in the United States

Shortly after the BIA’s positive decision in Fauziya Kassindja’s case, Rody Alvarado—a Guatemalan woman fleeing brutal domestic violence, whose case is referred to above—was granted asylum by an immigration judge in San Francisco. The judge applied the same rationale as the BIA had in Ms. Kassindja’s case—that egregious harms inflicted because of a woman’s gender in combination with other characteristics can be the A group of Kenyan girls who left their homes to avoid female genital basis for a successful claim to asylum. cutting (FGC) by their community in 2002, like Ms. Kassindja, whose Implicit in the decision was that the 1996 asylum decision ruled FGC to be persecution under US asylum laws. judge saw no reason to treat the harm With the help of the NGO Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, of domestic violence any differently they became the first Kenyan girls to successfully win a restraining order against anyone attempting to subject them to FGC. than the harm of FGC. Although they took different forms, both rose to the required level of severity, and both a refugee and should be granted protection. This made it were imposed or motivated by the gender-defined social quite impossible for Ashcroft to reinstate the denial, when group of the victim. Given the rationality of this approach, it the government itself (albeit the DHS, a different agency was a surprise to many when the attorney representing the from Ashcroft’s Department of Justice) was arguing that she US government decided to appeal the grant of asylum to should be granted asylum. Ashcroft decided to dodge the Ms. Alvarado, and even more of a surprise three years later issue by declining to decide it and sending the case back to when the BIA, which had granted asylum to Ms. Kassindja, the BIA with the same directive as had his predecessor Janet reversed the grant of asylum to Ms. Alvarado in a decision Reno—to decide the matter once the proposed regulations known as Matter of R-A-. were issued as final. The Board’s decision in Matter of R-A- set off a series of The depth of controversy around this issue affected Executive Branch actions which often conflicted with each the ability of the relevant government agencies to agree other, and laid bare the deep divides between governmenon issuing regulations; by 2008 the regulations proposed tal actors on the issue. In December 2000, then-Attorney in 2000 had still not been finalized, and to this date have General Janet Reno issued proposed regulations specifically not been finalized. At that point Michael Mukasey, the third intended to sweep away the legal barriers to asylum for Attorney General to involve himself, decided to intervene. domestic violence survivors imposed by the decision in He certified the case to himself, and ordered the BIA to Matter of R-A-. She next took the unusual step of personally decide Ms. Alvarado’s case on the basis of the existing law, intervening in the R-A- case (in a process called “certificaand not await finalized regulations. tion”), and wiped out the negative ruling. She directed the In compliance with his order, Ms. Alvarado’s case went board to decide the case anew once the proposed regulaback to the BIA, which agreed to send it back to an immigrations were issued as final. tion judge. During the trial, the DHS repeated its statement In the subsequent years, Attorneys General Ashcroft from 2004 when the case was in front of John Ashcroft: that and Mukasey would also undertake the somewhat rare Rody Alvarado qualified for relief and should be granted measure of directly intervening in Rody Alvarado’s case. In protection. She was thus granted asylum once more, 13 2003, Ashcroft certified the case to himself and asked both years after she had originally been granted asylum—but parties—Ms. Alvarado and the government, represented by this time the decision was not appealed, and her odyssey the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—to submit for protection came to a positive conclusion. Nonetheless, briefs on the issue of whether Ms. Alvarado met the refugee this did not by any means resolve the issue on a national definition. level. Decisions by immigration judges do not bind other Information leaked from government sources indicated immigration judges, and it would be five more years until that Ashcroft took the case with the intention of reinstating there would be binding precedent assuring protection the earlier board denial. However, in an unexpected change for women fleeing gender-based harms such as domestic of position, the government—the party that had disagreed violence. That binding precedent was Matter of A-R-C-G-. with the asylum grant to Ms. Alvarado in 1996 and lodged the appeal that resulted in the reversal—filed a brief in Why all the Controversy? 2004 stating that Ms. Alvarado met the legal definition of Why has there been such resistance? There is probPhotos Courtesy Reuters

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FEATURES ably no single answer, but rather a long list of factors. The comments of some who oppose protection often reveal a resistance to accepting that women’s rights are indeed human rights, and therefore of legitimate concern within a human rights and refugee rights framework. Their remarks frequently demonstrate an adherence to the old public/private sphere approach, stating that one should not “expect asylum law to address ‘personal’ or ‘family’ issues.” But this argument ignores the fact that the fundamental purpose of the refugee regime is to provide a safe haven to those who are persecuted in situations where their governments fail to protect them. There is no legitimate reason to exclude women from this arc of protection. Asylum is one of the few areas of immigration law not subject to maximum quotas; any individual who makes it to the United States and passes preliminary screening procedures can apply for protection. It should be noted however, that the process of applying is difficult, and the legal standard quite demanding. Notwithstanding these challenges, there is the fear of floodgates opening, and it is not hard to see how this fear has fueled the controversy over protection. Fear of the opening of the floodgates was repeatedly given voice around the case of Fauziya Kassindja, with some commentators observing that approximately 3 million girls are subject to FGC each year, and that a positive decision in her case would lead to the United States being deluged with girls and women seeking protection. However, the positive decision in her case came down 18 years ago, and the hordes of refugee women have not materialized. The experience of Canada also refutes this fear: it has recognized gender-based refugee claims since 1993 (including, explicitly, domestic violence) and has not experienced any appreciable increase in women’s claims. There are many reasons why skyrocketing numbers of women asylum seekers have not resulted from recognition of their legitimate claims to protection. Included is the fact that women who have claims to protection often come from countries where they have little or no rights, which limits their ability to leave in search of protection at all. They are frequently the primary caretakers for their children and extended family, and have to choose between leaving family behind or exposing them to the risks of travel to the potential country of refuge. In addition, they often have little control over family resources, making it very difficult for them to have the money to travel to countries where they might seek asylum. Unfortunately, the fear of floodgates has continued to have currency, notwithstanding the fact that predicted deluges have not materialized, and that there are genuinely good reasons that explain why they have not.

Different Asylum Claims?

A common narrative accompanying the claims of female asylum seekers is that they are asking for special treatment. This discourse assumes women fleeing genderrelated persecution would not qualify for protection absent 48

some twisting of the legal standard to accommodate their claims. This erroneous perspective harkens back to the largely repudiated vision of a human rights system, discussed above, which places women in a private sphere and privileges culture and religion over universality of rights. It is quite ironic that opponents continue to make the argument that the protection of women requires special (that is, favorable) rules, when in reality, women have been excluded from protection precisely because of a refusal to fairly apply the refugee definition in an unbiased and neutral fashion. The multitude of harms that women (and women in particular) suffer—sexual slavery, rape, female genital cutting, honor killings—are clearly grave enough to constitute persecution. Furthermore, as early as 1985, in Matter of Acosta, US law recognized that particular social groups could be comprised of individuals who share an immutable or fundamental characteristic, such as “sex.” There is simply no credibility to the argument that recognizing women as refugees accords them special treatment or requires a distortion of the legal standards.

Conclusion

The right to protection for women fleeing female genital cutting, although contentious at the time the courts first heard the issue, was accepted almost 20 years ago in Matter of Kasinga. The principles established in that decision should have been applied to cases involving domestic violence. Instead it has taken the nearly two decades since to accept that women fleeing brutal partner abuse are entitled to protection. There are other forms of gender violence that frequently arise in claims for protection raised by female asylum seekers. These forms include practices such as forced marriage, rape, sexual slavery, trafficking for labor or sexual exploitation, honor killings, and repressive social norms (e.g., forbidding education or employment). In a number of these areas, there is still no binding legal precedent that would assure protection for the women who have escaped such violations. In the absence of binding precedent, many judges refuse to apply the Kasinga principles to find that these harms are acts of persecution inflicted because of gender or social group membership. It would be unfortunate if judges continued to read Kasinga and subsequently, A-R-C-G- so narrowly, viewing them simply as decisions that apply to FGC and domestic violence—rather than as landmarks with far broader implications. The legal principles in both cases chart an analytical approach for gender claims in general. The two decisions demonstrate that special interpretations and rules are not necessary in order to extend protection to women fleeing gender-motivated harms. To the contrary, the rulings stand for the proposition that an unbiased application of the law—particularly of the terms “persecution” and “particular social group”—will result in protection for women who fear grave harms because of their gender in situations where their governments cannot or will not protect them.

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Iranian Queers and Laws Fighting for Freedom of Expression

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phobic Sharia law, they are victims of judicial proceedings that prosecute and convict them because of their sexual orientation. The true lives of queer Iranians are readily hidden, sheltered, or censored from public appearances. It is almost as if they do not exist. Makwan Moloudzadeh’s bitter trial and execution is testament to this harsh reality, one that Amnesty International deemed “a mockery of justice.” Makwan had been found guilty of multiple counts of anal rape, allegedly committed when he was only 13 years old. The alleged victims in his case later withdrew their testimony, claiming to have lied

Photos Courtesy Reuters

ARSHAM PARSI is an Iranian queer activist and founder of Iranian Railroad for Queer Refugees (IRQR). Parsi works as a queer activist to make sure Iranian queer citizens are not being improperly treated. Parsi has faced death threats and excommunication, but he is resilient in his fight.

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ahmoud Ahmadinejad, the former Iranian president, once declared to the world: “in Iran, we don’t have homosexuals. In Iran we don’t have this phenomenon. I don’t know who has told you we have it.” At the time, Ahmadinejad’s remarks at Columbia University were met with much laughter and criticism. However, his claim is not far from the truth. This narrative is reflexive and representative of the state’s policies and practices that do not support a homosexual ‘subject’. Conversely, despite how this subject is named, same-sex relationships have historically existed and continue to persist even in today’s toxic environment, though silenced and under-recognized. This is because every cultural apparatus, from family to society to government, deny their sexual identity and human rights. In other words, the Iranian queer’s fight for survival, liberty, and dignity begins first and foremost as a struggle for acknowledgement and existence. Iranian queers are often surrounded by friends and family who encourage and enforce heteronormativity; subjected to a social contract that largely supports the homo-

ARSHAM PARSI

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FEATURES under duress. Makwan also informed the court that his confession had been coerced, and pleaded not guilty. Most importantly, Makwan was only a minor and under Article 49 of the Iranian Penal Code, minors (“those who have not yet reached maturity [puberty] as defined by Islamic Law”) are exempt from criminal responsibility. Nevertheless, according to Article 120 of the Penal Code, in cases of anal sex between men, the judge “can make his judgment according to his knowledge which is obtained through conventional methods.” Accordingly, the judge relied on his discretionary powers under this article to rule that Makwan could be tried as an adult. Both the Seventh District Criminal Court of Kermanshah, and later the Iranian Supreme Court, found him guilty, and ordered his execution. Makwan was executed in Kermanshah’s Central Prison on December 5, 2007, in the absence of medical evidence testifying to his state of maturity at the time of the crime, and in spite of widespread international uproar. Makwan was invisible throughout the proceedings to those who turned on him, to the prosecutor, to the executor, and most significantly, to the society and the status quo that

another, lie, without necessity, naked under the same cover, they will each be punished by up to 99 lashes of the whip” (Article 123). It is important to note that there are many negative repercussions of the “morality laws” in Iran. Moreover, the rigorous enforcement of the laws results in disproportionate harm to people who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, or intersex (LGBTQI) in Iran in comparison to laws that apply to Iranians more generally. Sexual minorities are singled out for such treatment and for the deprivation of their human rights. This is a brief summary of the discriminatory penal code that is regularly and rigorously enforced. As recently as May 2012, an Iranian court sentenced four men—Saadat Arefi, Vahid Akbari, Javid Akbari and Houshmand Akbari—to death by hanging for sodomy. There are two important issues in this case, as pointed out by London-based lawyer Mehri Jafari: the location of the alleged occurrence and the interpretation of the law, which requires a strict Sharia punishment. The Kohkiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad provinces of Iran are two of the country’s most undeveloped, and it

“Over 4000 members of sexual minorities (LGBTQI) have been executed from when the Ayatollahs seized power in 1979 to the year 2000.” stood idly by and witnessed it all. Queer Iranians live in an atmosphere of uncertainty, peril, and pressure. There are various factors that contribute to their inhumane living conditions. First and foremost, the religious and patriarchal elements characteristic of the present Iranian republic view homosexuality as something to be feared and controlled. Moreover, the Penal Code of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based on strict Sharia law that reserve some of the harshest penalties for those convicted of same-sex sexual conduct. Furthermore, queers in Iran may face arrest as well as physical and sexual assault during detention, summary prosecution, and corporal punishment due to their consensual same-sex acts. Finally, familial and societal pressures to be other than themselves deprive Iranian queers of their dignity, leaving them stranded and invisible in stark vulnerability.

The Penal Code Against Homosexual Acts in Iran

In Iran, the Penal Code proscribes same-sex sexual expression and imposes harsh sentences. A man found guilty of kissing another man “with lascivious intent” is punishable “by up to 60 lashes of the whip” (Article 124). Likewise, Tafkhiz—non-penetrative sex—and other sexual behavior between two men are punishable by 100 lashes to each partner. Four convictions of Tafkhiz may lead to the death penalty (as does sexual “penetration”). The Penal Code further stipulates that “if two men, unrelated to one 50

is obvious that a lack of access to lawyers and a fair trial is a serious issue in this case. After this announcement, it is very likely that the execution will be carried out soon, and the remote location makes it difficult to exert any external influence on the process. Regarding access to lawyers, it is worth recalling that judges are enabled to bear in mind their own view of facts regardless of any defense. They may also consider confessions extracted through coercion that would be excluded from court proceedings in most jurisdictions. Presence of informed legal counsel, a right in such jurisdictions, is therefore not always supportive of human rights as a result. The law is equally punishing for Iranian lesbians. According to Articles 129 and 131, the punishment for mosaheqeh—sexual relations between two females—is 100 lashes for each partner for the first three offenses, and the death penalty for the fourth. According to a report by Amnesty International, the Iranian Supreme Court issued a quick verdict of execution for Atefeh Rajabi Sahaaleh, a 16-year-old woman who had confessed to her crime for the fourth conviction of mosaheqeh. Based on eyewitness accounts, “as Atefeh was taken to the crane for execution, she repeatedly asked Allah for forgiveness…When asked later why [the] case was rushed, [the judge] was reported to have said that, in his opinion, there was too much ‘immorality’ in Neka,” Atefeh’s hometown. The case of Atefeh illustrates the complete discretion conferred to judges in Iranian courts

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LGBTQI Iranians have also reported that physical and

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psychological abuse during detention—including the threat and use of torture—have been used in order to extract confessions of homosexual conduct to be adduced in Iranian criminal trials. In 2002, Iran’s Guardian Council of the Constitution—a committee of 12 senior clerics who oversee all judicial, governmental, and parliamentary legislation— vetoed a bill passed by the Iranian parliament that would put limits on practicing torture and presenting confessions obtained from it in judicial proceedings. Though this may seem like an improvement, the proposed bill also stated that political dissidents and homosexuals were exempt from the proposed limits on torture. With that bill, the Iranian government clearly acknowledged that protection against torture should be provided, but that sexual minorities do not deserve such fundamental legal protection. A Human Rights Watch report documents instances in which police and the militia have allegedly physically and sexually assaulted individuals before obtaining an arrest warrant. Several of those interviewed spoke of how they had been sexually assaulted or raped during detention. A July 2012 email from Ahmad, a queer Iranian who currently lives in Canada, to Demonstrators in front of the Iranian embassy in Madrid demand that the Iranian govthe Iranian Railroad ernment respect homosexual people and their human rights. for Queer Refugees (IRQR), clearly lays thereby continuing to curtail sexual minorities’ rights to out the consequences for being arrested for being gay in life and security as well as obscuring the circumstances Iran. He was arrested at a gay birthday party in Iran by the surrounding their executions from reports. basij (militia), was then taken to a police station, and raped Furthermore, people charged with sexual crimes often in the detention center. Afterwards, he was told that he endure summary trials that do not adhere to principles of could enjoy his life from now on as a “faggot. ” Three months fairness. In “morality” cases, such as those aforementioned, later, when trying to donate blood, he discovered that he the stringent standards of evidence are likely to be flouted had contracted HIV during this ordeal. by the judiciary in the name of protecting cultural and reFarshid, another queer Iranian interviewed by the ligious standards. For example, according to Article 117 of Iran Human Rights Documentation Center (IHRDC), also the Penal Code, “the witnesses of four just men who have vividly recalls his rape by two members of the militia. He observed the act proves the crime of sodomy.” Given that was initially arrested under the pretext that what he was judges may draw from their own views of circumstances, wearing was considered “inappropriate” clothing by the this provision opens the way to slander and rumormonmilitia. He was eventually taken to an unknown residential gering. apartment where he was severely beaten and raped by two senior officers. The Invisible Penal Code Against Homosexual Acts to disregard rules of evidence and render decisions based on personal attitudes towards homosexuality. This is not an isolated incident. Human rights campaigners report that over 4000 members of sexual minorities (LGBTQI) have been executed from when the Ayatollahs seized power in 1979 to the year 2000. However, it is estimated that the number and frequency of executions is much higher, due to the fact that queer Iranians are often condemned under the charges of rape, acting against national security, or other fabricated charges in order to “justify” their criminality when proof of sexual acts cannot be found. These camouflaged charges allow the Iranian government to conceal the punishment of queer citizens,

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Unsafe Handling: Sex Reassignment Procedures

Numerous LGBTQI Iranians are also forced to undergo medical and psychological treatment under the pretext of curing their same-sex sexual orientation. During interviews with Human Rights Watch, individuals described how their families had sought the intervention of a variety of health care providers such as family practitioners, gynecologists, neurologists, and psychologists. These individuals recounted a process that was psychologically and at times physically abusive in the sense of the denial of freedom to decide on matters bearing on their sexuality, and of pressures to undergo extensive or invasive treatment to change that sexuality. To illustrate, some Iranians reported how their parents had taken them to sexologists and psychiatrists who

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her boyfriend, her brother continues to refuse to identify her as his sister. “They pray for me to die soon. If I’d known that my family would truly shun me like this, I would never have done it.”

Publishing and Media: A History of Censorship

Positive dialogue or images of LGBTQI Iranians can rarely be found in state-controlled media outlets. This reinforces widespread ignorance and prejudice against minority sexualities, creating a national population that avoids or neglects the issues that lead to and reinforce discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. A lack of information, and, more importantly, the fear of talking about social phenomena, result in negligent people and negligent experts. Today, in Iran, there is complete silence

“...queers in Iran may face arrest as well as physical and sexual assault during detention, summary prosecution, and corporal punishment due to their consensual same-sex acts”

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specialize in the diagnosis and treatment of sexual and gender issues. Treatment options varied depending on the diagnosis of the symptoms: psychological counseling, drug therapy, etc. There have been cases where lesbians required hospitalization after being prescribed dangerous medication typically given to patients with serious mental illnesses. Such cases of mistreatment may be seen as culminating in a medical recommendation for sex reassignment surgery and the accompanying hormonal drug therapy. Gay Star News reports that in less than four years, from 2006 to 2010, over 1,360 gender reassignment operations were performed in Iran. These operations almost invariably lead to serious physical complications, depression, and in some cases, suicide. Certain cases have shown sex reassignment to be inappropriate as an alternative to prohibited sexual orientations, and has worsened the circumstances of those who have undergone the treatment, as it makes them think that their situation will improve. This is especially the case when factors such as familial and societal pressures the are main reasons for the reassignment, and not the decision of the individual herself or himself. Government pressures are another factor, given the probation on homosexuality and official encouragement (though not real support) of sex reassignment. Where sexual orientation remains the same, for example, the individual may find her choice of sexual partners rejected by family and friends, in spite of the sex reassignment. For example, Anahita, a male-to-female transgender Iranian, deals with a family who is not accepting of her new gender identity. Although she is now engaged to 52

about homosexuality in official media. This taboo on homosexuality extends beyond the news media and pervades the publishing world. On June 8, 2012, government officials ordered the permanent closure of a renowned and respected Tehran publishing house, Cheshmeh. The government originally justified the decision by stating that some of the content published by this outlet was offensive to religious tenets. However, on June 22, a high-ranking Iranian official was quoted as saying that the publishing house was also accused of disseminating content “promoting homosexuality, incest, and immoral sexual relations.” He went on to declare that, “even the censorship officers were ashamed to review the books.” Hossen Alizadeh, a representative of the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, interprets the recent closure of Cheshmeh as an example of “how the sodomy law and anti-LGBTQI hysteria harm the entire society, including intellectuals and members of civil society who are simply interested in examining the issue of homosexuality.” Gorji Marzban, an activist and chair of the Austria-based Oriental Queer Organization, also points out that, “there is not even one single book in Iran published about homosexual relationships.” A gay Iranian poet also notes that, “alternative literature is censored by the Ministry of Culture and Guidance, but gay literature is prohibited from even being sent to the Ministry; we are non-existent, even in literature.” In another instance, Shahed Baazi in Iran’s Literature by Doctor Cyrus Shamisa was ordered off the shelves—despite being initially approved—because it named certain notable Persian authors as homosexuals or bisexuals. The

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homophobic Iranian censorship machine is both systematic and totalitarian.

A Discriminating Hand with Many Heads

The religious fundamentalism that characterizes the attitude of the Iranian judiciary toward homosexuality is longstanding. To contextualize the strict upholding of such judiciary practices, one must first consider the ideology of the Islamic Republic as it is embodied in its religious and political leaders. Within months of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the birth date of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini—then the highest-ranking political and religious authority in the Islamic Republic of Iran and its Supreme Leader—called for homosexuals to be exterminated. They were to be understood as the “parasites and corruptors of

most severe punishments for homosexual men and women. When their homosexuality has been proven on the basis of Sharia, the authorities should seize them and split them in two by sword while they are standing and then cut off their head. He concluded: “they get what they deserve.” It is evident, therefore, that the authoritative and flawed practice of justice in the cases of Makwan and Atefeh mentioned at the beginning of this piece is connected to the prevailing attitudes defining the core of Islamic Republic religiosity. It is also connected to the opposition that it continuously strives to mount as its irreconcilable exterior: homosexuality. The discrimination against sexual minorities is arguably one of the main tenets of the legal and ideological discourses of the Islamic Republic’s regime. These discourses squeeze out minority expression and make the

“The Iranian government denies LGBT Iranians a voice and does its utmost to prevent them from interacting with each other or speaking out in public. ”

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queer community virtually invisible, if for no other reason than the absolute prohibition of the community’s very identity. The logic behind the Iranian government’s denial of the existence of homosexuals is simple: if something does not exist, it is not eligible for basic human rights. The Iranian government denies LGBTQI Iranians a voice and does its utmost to prevent them from interacting with each other or speaking out in public. Implicit in this observation is that certain basic rights, such as freedoms of association, assembly, and speech, are conditional upon conforming to the religious and legal beliefs and codes of the Republic, or at the very least upon abstaining from expressing sexual identity and gender. Indeed, this trend is not going towards either liberalization or the expansion of human rights for Iranian’s queer citizens. Iran’s regime, especially its Supreme Leader, is careless about all Iranian citizens, but especially queer individuals. To accept the fact that there are homosexuals in Iran is to bring all their fundamental and ideologies into question—unacceptable in such an authoritative regime. Even the most democratic and popular government officials in Iran have lines they are unwilling and unable to cross. Given this, the issue of Iranian queers seems to be permanent. As activists for these very groups, this permanence makes our jobs harder. We have to roll up our sleeves and work with people one-on-one to change hearts and minds in hope that future generations will have the support that their forefathers did not.

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the nation” who “spread the stains of wickedness.” Even under the reformist government of President Mohammad Khatami, the Islamic judiciary remained one of the bulwarks of religious conservatism in Iran, a judicial and legal status that was strengthened under the hardline rule of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In fact, the refusal of any recognition of civil rights for sexual minorities is seen as an unassailable cultural, religious, and ideological cornerstone of the state itself. As recently as January 2012, in a meeting with the head of the Human Rights Commission of the German Parliament, Doctor Mohammad Javad Larijani, the international advisor to the Iranian judiciary, referred to homosexuality as a “perversion and a form of sexual disease [that is] not acceptable” to Iranians. Consequently, any discussion of the rights of homosexuals in Iran with Western officials has been superficial and fleeting. Admittedly, nation states have always responded to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in varying degrees. Yet, Larijani’s staunch position on curtailing sexual minority rights for cultural reasons is deplorable and clearly contrary to the Declaration. Endemic homophobia in Iran also stems from the teachings of Islam as provided in Sharia and Sunnah— Sharia is the moral code and religious law of Islam; the Sunnah is the next important source, and is commonly defined as the traditions and customs of the Prophet Mohammad. When serving as the head of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary, Ayatollah Musavi-Ardebili celebrated the “most severe punishments” as befitting the Islamic prohibition against homosexuality. While delivering a sermon at Tehran University in 1990, he remarked that Islam prescribed the

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The Rise of Economics in Contemporary Geopolitics

staff writer GREGORY DUNN

hen the Harvard International Review was founded, the world of finance was far from cohesive. In the 1970s, the lines of the Cold War prevented one half of the world from trading with another, and even within alliances, international economies were nowhere near as connected as they are today. However, the twin miracles of modern computation and communication technologies, when combined with the fall of the barriers of the Cold War, changed the picture fundamentally. If the turn of the century represented a golden age in global market integration, the decades that follow may represent a new development: nations leveraging global markets for geopolitical ends. The 2010s have featured a rapid increase in the manipulation of financial markets for geopolitical gain, and this trend is likely to accelerate in the future. While the use of economics as a geopolitical tool has proven to be a stabilizing factor in foreign policy so far, the rapid increase in geopolitically-motivated manipulation of financial markets may prove to have catastrophic effects on the modern global economy. Perhaps the most consequential example of using economic integration for the purposes of foreign policy can be found in the interactions between the United States and China. The first substantial foreign policy decision the United States made regarding China was an economic one, when the United States established its famous Open Door policy with the aim of allowing international access to Chinese markets. As China has developed, access to these markets became an increasingly contentious proposition in the United States. A major issue in the latest US presidential election was whether to label China’s export-oriented monetary policy as currency manipulation. While President Barack Obama’s victory precluded such a step, the policy was evidence of a larger trend in the United States to attempt to influence China via economic means. The largest unresolved issue in contemporary US-China trade policy is that of multilateral free trade agreements. The United States joined the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a comprehensive free trade agreement that has a substantial regulatory component promoting environmental protection and workers’ rights. China, participating in TPP negotiations, has concurrently focused its efforts on a competing treaty, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Protocol (RCEP). This treaty encompasses most of the countries in the TPP, with the exception of the United States. The RCEP also features far fewer regulations—this would have a disproportionate

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WORLD IN REVIEW impact on Chinese industry. China’s resistance to the TTP is not only rooted in its desire to maintain low costs of labor, but also its desire to counter US influence in the Asian economy. As the TPP negotiations enter their 10th year, it seems as if China’s fears are unlikely to be realized any time soon. The use of economics as a tool of foreign policy is not limited to the Pacific region. When the European Union was founded, the idea of a common European identity was the chief justification for integration. Such idealism is gone, and the impetus for the further integration of the European Union has become financial. To overcome the Eurozone financial crisis, the European Union has centralized economic control away from individual nations and into the hands of wealthier countries (notably Germany), technocrats affiliated with the European Central Bank, and the broader government of the European Union. Evidence that financial issues are propelling EU integration can be found in the aggressive and effective policies of the European Central Bank, led by Mario Draghi, who seeks to do “whatever it takes” to overcome the crisis. The powerful policy of the European Central Bank stands in stark contrast to the current stagnation within the European Commission, illustrating where the true force within the European Union resides. Europe demonstrates the replacement of the political, cultural, and security-based reasoning that led to the creation of the European Union with reasoning based in economics. While these trends alarm many in Europe, as seen in the rise of the reactionary right in the United Kingdom and France, the strength of the reaction (as manifest in their remarkably strong showing in elections to the European Parliament) reveals the power of the economically-led centralization in Europe today. Economics has played a role in foreign policy since ancient times, when Constantinople paid tribute to barbarians to stop them from attacking the city. However, the contemporary use of economics in foreign policy has more of an impact than mere payments between states—rather, economics has risen to the forefront of contemporary multinational policy aimed at having truly global impacts. Argentina recently defaulted on debt that it was unable to pay to a group of banks, led by New-York-based Eliott Management Corporation, which was unsatisfied with Argentina’s previous restructuring of its debt. Tellingly, the move was sold domestically as a punitive response to a predatory global financial order. Previously, the management of debt was a matter of accounting, finance, and revenue. Now, debt policy has become a means by which financial institutions around the world can be critiqued, as a part of Argentinian President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s populist policies. The opposite effect has arisen in Russia. As Russian involvement in Eastern Ukraine became more obvious, the nations of the world united in a financial response, imposing severe multilateral sanctions that caused Russian stocks to fall over 10 percent. In both Russia and Argentina, global financial markets have played an outsize role in foreign policy. Leveraging economics for the purpose of foreign policy is a useful strategy in times of economic crisis, when leaders can turn wealth into diplomatic power. However,

contemporary markets are precarious and fraught with risk, making the future of economics in foreign policy bleak. This negative outlook is not a function of leaders’ desire to shift towards other modes of engagement; in fact, many nations seek to conduct their foreign policy with economics as the focus of their efforts, thus avoiding capital expenditures on militaries and diplomatic corps. Rather, to put economics at the forefront of foreign policy in today’s market engenders substantially more risk to the global financial order than it did in the past. Yet the reckless use of economics within foreign policy continues. Many people would dispute that the economy has recovered from its collapse in 2007 and 2008, despite economic indicators in the United States reaching record highs. This strength, however, has not been seen throughout the world— Europe continues to lag, Japan’s new policy of ‘Abenomics’ has failed to yield expected dividends, and China’s growth rate seems increasingly precarious. German manufacturing, once the engine of growth in a faltering Europe, has recently fallen into recession, and Chinese property developers are facing financial difficulties—a stark departure from the steady returns that have characterized the previous decade of Chinese development. South Korea’s most prominent conglomerate, Samsung, has fallen short of analysts’ expectations. South America’s economic growth spurt seems to have ended, with Brazil’s economy, once lauded as the “B” in BRICS, likely entering recession. Africa’s growth has been hindered by geopolitical instability in the north and Ebola in the west, which offset the growth displayed in many of the region’s countries. In this fragile economic ecosystem, the practice of using economics towards the ends of foreign policy has a greater potential to go awry, and a far greater potential to wreak havoc when inevitable miscalculation occurs. The most concerning trend, however, is for economic tools within foreign policy to be used towards shortsighted, ill-considered ends, resulting in an increase in reckless policymaking at the precise time caution is needed. In 1986, US Professor Richard Rosecrance wrote in his widely cited The Rise of the Trading State that conventional means of international relations were being replaced by international economic engagement. In such a system in which trade dominates international organizations, there is little incentive to go to war because conflict stops trade, thereby negatively impacting people’s livelihoods. Through economic engagement, trust-building cooperation, and the rise of global citizens, Rosecrance predicts that war would be an outmoded and inefficient way to conduct international affairs. Unfortunately, this prediction, while appealing, only holds in times of economic expansion. The conflict between Russia and Ukraine was rooted in a Ukrainian debt crisis, the starkest example in recent times of a disturbing corollary to Rosecrance’s theory—if prosperous times breed peace, economic contraction and conflict go hand in hand as well. One of the most pronounced examples of the interaction between poor diplomacy and poor economic situations has been China’s harassment of US firms operating within China. Many US corporations do business in China, investing their

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WORLD IN REVIEW capital and expertise towards the furtherance of the world’s largest purchasing-power-adjusted economy. However, the US-China relationship frayed over the summer of 2014, owing to accusations of cyber-espionage, aggression in the South China Sea, and negotiation in bad faith. As a result, Chinese officials have begun pestering American firms operating in China, launching dawn raids on their offices to investigate vague charges related to corporate business practices. The network corporation Cisco, the world leader in industrialgrade computer networking equipment, has been severely harassed in China as a means to pressure the US government over the activities of the National Security Agency. As a result of the targeting of US firms, a rift is opening between the two largest economies in the world, leaving China without US technology and the United States without access to the world’s largest market. In an era when trade and global interconnectedness is key to long-term economic prosperity, the United States and China lose out massively as overzealous government officials decide to sabotage US-China economic cooperation in the name of politics. Here, conflict is leading to failures in economic cooperation, which in turn lead to further conflict and economic malaise. Economic trouble can also lead to failure in diplomatic cooperation as well. One of the most pronounced examples of this trend is the reaction of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to the fall in energy prices in fall 2014. OPEC is traditionally seen as an ironbound alliance that can bring even the United States to its knees, thanks to its ability to control global energy supply and pricing. OPEC has functioned as a counter to western hegemony in the past, using its broad economic powers to mount a serious challenge to the interests of the United States and its allies. However, this hold on power has weakened as energy prices

have fallen, forcing members of the alliance to make tough decisions about how to produce oil when it costs more to extract the substance than the amount for which it can be sold. Many of the OPEC economies have government sectors that are highly dependent on oil revenues—if these sectors were deprived, they would easily be destabilized. Recently, OPEC has had to respond to oil prices well below US$100 dollars per barrel. According to the Wall Street Journal, Iran’s government requires US$140-per-barrel oil to fund its governmental operations, Venezuela and Algeria require US$121-per-barrel oil. Other member nations, like the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, can still make a profit with oil prices below US$7-per-barrel oil. This massive disparity in economic conditions has driven a rift through the organization, and pleas by Venezuela for an emergency meeting with the aim of raising prices have gone unheeded. Poor economic conditions have torn apart a formerly powerful international organization, and thanks to the hydraulic fracturing boom in the United States, the price will likely remain low, further straining OPEC. While the structure of OPEC makes the organization inherently stronger when prices are high, this is a case that demonstrates a broader trend—alliances made in fair economic weather suffer when times are poor. OPEC countries became accustomed to conducting foreign policy with the aid of oil wealth, and the removal of this oil wealth has left these countries bickering and disorganized. Social scientists have observed the “rentier effect’” in countries with resourcedriven economies, where oil wealth leads to the decay of governmental institutions, because buying loyalty is easier than governing effectively. The decline of OPEC demonstrates a similar phenomenon at play in foreign policy—now that oil wealth is disappearing, the foreign policy of OPEC countries is left adrift. Reliance on economics, a force OPEC countries counted on to forge a powerful role in the world, has failed. A version of the international relations rentier effect can be seen globally. Wealth seems to be disappearing, and mistrust, malice, and myopic policymaking has risen to replace it. The international economic order which has given the world unparalleled growth over the past hundred years has also made us dependent upon its bounty—and now that it is receding, the weak foundations of global diplomacy have been revealed. While the peace that economic growth brings is always welcome in a chaotic world, it is important that this peace does not come at the expense of diplomacy, strategic thought, and international negotiation. While economics can bring about success in international relations, it is an unreliable foundation Ocotober gas prices in California show the effect of falling oil prices, for global diplomacy, as revealed by the currently just above $90 per barrel. A level last seen in 2012, these prices economics-based diplomatic relationships are putting pressure on OPEC nations to call for a meeting in order to that are unraveling today. prop up prices.

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Photo Courtesy Reuters

ANNIVERSARY BOOK TEASER

RESHAPING US FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

ANALYSIS BY RICHARD WANG n this 1992 Harvard International Review article adapted from a speech given by Bill Clinton on December 12, 1991 at Georgetown University, he writes that the United States must “define a new national security policy that builds on freedom’s victory in the Cold War” and “forge a new economic policy to serve ordinary Americans by launching a new era of global growth.” In 1992, the United States had successfully overseen the fall of the Soviet Union and the defeat of Saddam Hussein in the Gulf War. However, a recession in the early 1990s caused rising levels of unemployment and increased domestic discontent with the incumbent President George H.W. Bush. Bill Clinton, who was governor of Arkansas at the time, would leverage this discontent to be elected president of the United States later that year and go on to serve two terms until January 2001.

A Democrat Lays Out His Plan: A New Covenant for American Security I was born nearly half a century ago at the dawn of the Cold War, a time of great change, enormous opportunity, and uncertain peril. At a time when Americans wanted nothing more than to come home and resume lives of peace and quiet, our country had to summon the will for a new kind of war—containing an expansionist and hostile Soviet Union that vowed to bury us. We had to find ways to rebuild the economies of Europe and Asia, encourage a worldwide movement toward independence, and vindicate our nation’s principles in the world against yet another totalitarian challenge to liberal democracy. Thanks to the unstinting courage and sacrifice of the American people, we were able to win the Cold War. Now that we have entered a new era, we need a new vision and the strength to meet

a new set of opportunities and threats. We face the same challenge today that we faced in 1946—to build a world of security, freedom, democracy, free markets, and growth at a time of great change. Anyone running for president right now—Republican or Democrat— is going to have to provide a vision for security in this new era. Given the problems that we face at home, we must first take care of our own people and their needs. We need to remember the central lesson of the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union: we never defeated them on the field of battle. The Soviet Union collapsed from the inside out—from economic, political, and spiritual failure. Foreign and domestic policy are inseparable in today’s world. If we are not strong at home, we cannot lead the

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BY BILL CLINTON

world that we have done so much to make. If we withdraw from the world, it will hurt us economically at home. We cannot allow this false choice between domestic and foreign policy to hurt our country and economy. Our president has devoted his time and energy to foreign concerns and ignored dire problems here at home. As a result, we are adrift in the most serious economic slump since World War II, and in reaction to that, elements in both parties now want America to respond to the collapse of communism and a crippling recession at home by retreating from the world. I have agreed with President Bush on a number of foreign policy questions, including his efforts to kick Iraqi President Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. I think that President Bush did

Photo Courtesy of the White House, accessed via Wikmedia Commons

ANNIVERSARY BOOK TEASER a masterful job in pulling together the victorious multilateral coalition, and I support his desire to pursue peace talks in the Middle East. I also agree with the president’s assertion that we can not turn our back on NATO, and I supported giving the administration fast-track authority to negotiate a sound and fair trade agreement with Mexico. However, because the president seems to favor political stability and his personal relations with foreign leaders over a coherent policy of promoting freedom, democracy, and economic growth, he often does things that I disagree with. For example, his close personal ties with foreign leaders helped forge the coalition against Saddam Hussein but also led him to side with China’s communist rulers after the democratic student uprising. The president forced Iraq out of Kuwait, but, as soon as the war was over, he seemed so concerned with the stability of the area that he was willing to leave the Kurds to an awful fate. He is rightfully seeking peace in the Middle East, but his desire to personally broker a deal has led him to take public positions that may undermine the ability of the Israelis and the Arabs to agree on an enduring peace. In the aftermath of the Cold War, we need a president who recognizes that in a dynamic new era, our goal is not to resist change, but to shape it. The president must articulate a vision of where we are going. The president and his administration have yet to meet that test—to define the requirements of US national security after the Cold War. Retreating from the world or discounting its dangers is wrong for the country and sets back everything else that democrats hope to accomplish. The defense of freedom and the promotion of democracy around the world are not merely a reflection of our deepest values; they are vital to our national interests. Global democracy means nations at peace with one another, open to one another’s ideas and commerce. The stakes are high. The collapse of communism is not an isolated event; it is part of a worldwide march toward democracy whose outcome will shape the next century. If individual liberty, political pluralism, and free enterprise

take root in Latin America, Eastern and Central Europe, Africa, Asia, and the former Soviet Union, we can look forward to a grand new era of reduced conflict, mutual understanding, and economic growth. For ourselves and the millions of people who seek to live in freedom and prosperity, this revolution must not fail. Yet even as the American Dream is inspiring people around the world, the United States is on the sidelines, a military giant crippled by economic weakness and an uncertain vision. The United States faces two great foreign policy challenges today. First, we must define a new national security policy that builds on freedom’s victory in the Cold War. The communist idea has lost its power, but the fate of the people who lived under it and the fate of the world will be in doubt until stable democracies rise from the debris of the Soviet empire. Second, we must forge a new economic policy to serve ordinary Americans by launching a new era of global growth. We must tear down the wall in our thinking between domestic and foreign policy. The United States needs a coherent strategy that enables us to lead the world that we have done so much to make and that supports our efforts to take care of our own here at home. We cannot do one without the other. We need a New Covenant for American Security after the Cold War, a set of rights and responsibilities that will challenge America’s people, leaders, and allies to work together to build a safer, more prosperous, and more democratic world. The strategy of American engagement that I propose is based on four key assumptions about the requirements of security in our new era. First, the collapse of communism does not mean the end of danger. A new set of threats in an even less stable world will force us, even as we restructure our defenses, to keep our guard up. Second, the United States must regain its economic strength to maintain our position of global leadership. While military power will continue to be vital to our national security, its utility is declining relative to that of economic

power. We cannot afford to go on spending too much on firepower and too little on brain power. Third, the irresistible power of ideas rules in the Information Age. Television, cassette tapes, and the fax machine helped ideas to pierce the Berlin Wall and bring it down. Finally, our definition of security must include common threats to all people. On the environment and other global issues, our very survival depends upon the United States taking the lead. Guided by these assumptions, we must pursue three clear objectives: first, we must restructure our military forces for a new era. Second, we must work with our allies to encourage the spread and consolidation of democracy abroad. And third, we must reestablish the Unites States’ economic leadership at home and in the world. When Americans elect a president, they select a commander-in-chief. They want someone they can trust to act when their country’s interests are threatened. To protect our interests and values, we are sometimes obliged to stand and fight. The next president must maintain military forces strong enough to deter and, when necessary, to defeat any threat to our essential interests. Today’s defense debate centers too narrowly on the size of the military budget. But the real questions are what threats do we face, what force do we need to counter them, and how must we change? We can and must substantially reduce our military forces and spending, because the Soviet threat is decreasing and because our allies are able to and should shoulder more of the defense burden. But we still must set the level of our defense spending based on what we need to protect our interests. First we should provide for a strong defense, then we can talk about defense savings. I want to make one thing clear from the outset: the world is still rapidly changing. The world we look out on today is not the same world we will see tomorrow. We need to be ready to adjust our defense projections to meet threats that could be either heightened or reduced down the road. Our defense needs were clear

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ANNIVERSARY BOOK TEASER during the Cold War, when it was widely accepted that we needed sufficient forces to deter a Soviet nuclear attack, to defend against a Soviet-led conventional offensive in Europe, and to protect other US interests, especially in northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf. The collapse of the Soviet Union shattered that consensus leaving us without a clear benchmark for determining the size or mix of our armed forces. However, a new consensus is emerging on the nature of the post-Cold War security period. It assumes that the gravest threats that we are most likely to face in the years ahead include: first, the spread

capable of projecting power quickly when and where it is needed. This means that the Army must develop a more mobile mix of mechanized and armored forces. The Air Force should emphasize tactical air power and airlift, and the Navy and Marine Corps must maintain sufficient carrier and amphibious forces, as well as more sealift. We also need strong special operations forces to deal with the terrorist threat. Technology: The Gulf War proved that the superior training of our soldiers, tactical air power, advanced communications, space-based surveillance, and smart weaponry produced a shorter

to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction. We need to clamp down on countries and companies that sell these technologies, punish violators, and work urgently with all countries for tough, enforceable, international non-proliferation agreements. Although the president’s plan does reduce our conventional force structure, I believe that we can go farther without undermining our core capabilities. We can meet our responsibilities in Europe with less than the 150,000 troops now proposed by the president, especially as the former Soviet republics withdraw their forces from the Red Army. We

“Retreating from the world or discounting its dangers is wrong for the country... The defense of freedom and the promotion of democracy around the world are not merely a reflection of our deepest values: they are vital to our national interests” of deprivation and disorder in the former Soviet Union, which could lead to armed conflict among the republics or the rise of a fervently nationalistic and aggressive regime in Russia still in possession of long-range nuclear missiles; second, the spread of weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical, and biological—as well as the means for delivering them; third, enduring tensions in various regions, especially the Korean peninsula and the Middle East and the attendant risks of terrorist attacks on Americans traveling or working overseas; and finally, the growing intensity of ethnic rivalry and separatist violence within national borders, such as we have seen among the Yugoslavian states, in India, and elsewhere, that could spill beyond those borders. To deal with these new threats, we need to replace our Cold War military structure with a smaller, more flexible mix of capabilities, including: Nuclear deterrence: We can dramatically reduce our nuclear arsenals through negotiations and other reciprocal actions. But as an irreducible minimum, we must retain a survivable nuclear force to deter any conceivable threat. Rapid deployment: We need a force

war with fewer US casualties. We must maintain our technological edge. Better intelligence : In an era of unpredictable threats, our intelligence agencies must shift from military bean-counting to a more sophisticated understanding of political, economic, and cultural conditions that can spark conflicts. To achieve these capabilities, I would restructure our forces in a number of ways. First, now that the nuclear arms race has finally reversed its course, it is time for a prudent slowdown in strategic modernization. We should stop production of the B-2 Bomber. That alone could save US$15 to US$20 billion by 1997. Since Ronald Reagan unveiled his “Star Wars” proposal in 1983, America has spent US$26 billion in the futile pursuit of a fool-proof defense against nuclear attack. Democrats in Congress have recommended a much more realistic and attainable goal: defending against very limited or accidental launches of ballistic missiles. This allows us to proceed with research and development on missile defense within the framework of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty—a prudent step as more and more countries acquire missile technology. At the same time, we must do more

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can defend the sea lanes and project force with 10 carriers rather than 12. We should continue to keep some US forces in northeast Asia as long as North Korea presents a threat to our South Korean ally. To upgrade our conventional forces, we need to develop greater air and sealift capacity, including protection of the C-17 transport aircraft. But we should end or reduce programs intended to meet the Soviet threat. Our conventional programs, like the new Air Force fighter and the Army’s new armored systems, should be redesigned to meet regional threats. The 1990 budget agreement called for a 2 percent cut in military spending through 1995, based on the assumption, now obsolete, that the Soviet Union would remain intact. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, we can cut defense spending by over a third by 1997. Based on calculations by the Congressional Budget Office, my plan would bring cumulative savings of about US$100 billion beyond the budget agreement. If favorable political and military trends continue, and we make progress in arms control, the United States may be able to scale down defense spending still more by the end of the decade. However,

ANNIVERSARY BOOK TEASER we should not commit ourselves now to specific deeper cuts 10 years in the future. The world is changing quickly, and we must retain our ability to react to potential threats. We must also not forget about the real people whose lives will be turned upside down when defense is cut deeply. The government should look out for its defense workers and the communities in which they live. We should insist on advanced notification and help communities plan for a transition from a defense to a domestic economy. 31 percent of our graduate engineers work for the defense industry. They and other highly-skilled workers are a vital national resource at a time when our technological edge in the world economy must be sharper than ever before. I have called for a new advance research agency—a civilian Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)—that could help capture for commercial work the brilliance of scientists and engineers who have accomplished wonders on the battlefield. Likewise, those who have served the nation in uniform cannot be dumped into the job market. We must enlist them to help meet our many needs at home. By offering early retirement options, limiting reenlistment, and slowing the pace of recruitment, we can build down our forces in a gradual way that does not abandon people of proven commitment and competence. Our people in uniform are among the most highly skilled in the areas we need most. We need to transfer those human resources into our workforce and even into our schools, perhaps in part by using reserve centers and closed bases for community-based education and training programs. The defense policy that I have outlined helps keep America strong and still yields substantial savings. The American people have earned this peace dividend through 40 years of unrelenting vigilance and sacrifice and an investment of trillions of dollars. They are entitled to have the dividend reinvested in their future. Finally, the United States needs to reach a new agreement with its allies for sharing the costs and risks of maintain-

ing peace. While Desert Storm set a useful precedent for cost sharing, our forces still did most of the fighting and dying. We need to shift that burden to a wider coalition of nations of which the United States will be part. In the Persian Gulf, Namibia, Cambodia, Croatia, Slovenia, and elsewhere in recent years, the United Nations have begun to play the role that US Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman envisioned for it. We must take the lead now in making their vision real—by expanding the Security Council and making Germany and Japan permanent members; by continuing to press for greater efficiency in UN administration; and by exploring ways to institutionalize the United Nations’ success in mobilizing international participation in Desert Storm. One proposal worth exploring calls for a UN Rapid Deployment Force that could be used for purposes beyond traditional peacekeeping, such as standing guard at the borders of countries threatened by aggression, preventing attacks on civilians, providing humanitarian relief, and combating terrorism and drug trafficking. In Europe, new security arrangements will evolve over the next decade. While insisting on a fair sharing of the common defense burden, we must not turn our back on NATO. Until a more effective security system emerges, we must give our allies no reason to doubt our constancy. As we restructure our military forces, we must reinforce the powerful global movement towards democracy. US foreign policy cannot be divorced from the moral principles that most Americans share. We cannot disregard the manner in which other governments treat their own people, whether their domestic institutions are democratic or repressive, or whether they help encourage or check illegal conduct beyond their borders. This does not mean we should only deal with democracies or that we should try to remake the world in our image. However, recent experience from Panama to Iran to Iraq shows the danger of forging strategic relationships with despotic regimes. It should matter to us how others govern themselves. Democracies do not

go to war with each other. The French and British have nuclear weapons, but we do not fear annihilation at their hands. Democracies do not sponsor terrorist acts against each other. They are more likely to be reliable trading partners, protect the global environment, and abide by international law. Over time, democracy is a stabilizing force. It provides nonviolent means for resolving disputes. Democracies do a better job at protecting ethnic, religious, and other minorities, and elections can help resolve fratricidal civil wars. Yet President Bush too often has hesitated when democratic forces needed our support in challenging the status quo. I believe that the president erred when he secretly rushed envoys to resume cordial relations with China barely a month after the massacre in Tiananmen Square; when he spurned Boris Yeltsin before the Moscow coup; when he poured cold water on Baltic, Ukrainian, Croatian, and Slovenian aspirations for self-determination and independence; and when he initially refused to help the Kurds. The administration continues to coddle China, despite its continuing crackdown on democratic reforms, brutal subjugation of Tibet, irresponsible export of nuclear and missile technology, support for the homicidal Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and abusive trade practices. Such forbearance on our part might have made sense during the Cold War, when China was a counterweight to Soviet power. But it makes no sense to play the China card now, when our opponents have thrown in their hand. In the Middle East, the administration deserves credit for bringing Israel and its Arab antagonists to the negotiating table. Yet I believe that the president is wrong to use public pressure tactics against Israel. In the process, he has raised Arab expectations that he will deliver Israeli concessions and fed Israeli fears that its interests will be sacrificed to a US-imposed solution. We must remember that even if the Arab-Israeli dispute were to be resolved tomorrow, there would still be ample causes of conflict in the Middle East: ancient ethnic and religious hatreds, control of oil and water, the bitterness

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ANNIVERSARY BOOK TEASER of the have-nots toward those who have, the lack of democratic institutions to hold leaders accountable to their people and restrain their actions abroad, and the territorial ambitions of Iraq and Syria. We have paid a terrible price for the administrationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s earlier policies of deference to Saddam Hussein. Today, we must deal with President Hafez AlAssad in Syria but we must not overlook his tyrannical rule and domination of Lebanon. We need a broader policy toward the Middle East that limits the flow of arms into the region, as well as the materials needed to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction. Such a policy should promote democracy and human rights and preserve our strategic relationship with the one democracy in the region, Israel. In Africa as well, we must align the United States with the rising tide of democracy. The administration has claimed credit for the historic opening to democracy now being negotiated in South Africa, when, in fact, it resisted the sanctions policy that helped make this hopeful moment possible. The referendum in South Africa was a historic victoryâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;one of those rare moments when a people summon the courage to break with the past and accomplish fundamental change. Today, we should concentrate our attention on insuring that the process toward dismantling apartheid and constructing an open society is irreversible. We should do what we can to help end the violence that has ravaged the South African townships, by supporting with our aid the local structures that seek to mediate these disputes and by insisting that the South African government uses the mandate it has received from the referendum vote to prosecute the perpetrators of the violence with the same zeal as it did in the past when pursuing the leaders of the anti-apartheid movement. The administration and our states and cities should only relax our remaining sanctions as it becomes clearer that the day of democracy and guaranteed individual rights is at hand. And when that day does dawn, we must be prepared to extend our assistance to make sure that democracy, once gained, is not lost.

A US foreign policy of engagement for democracy will unite our interests and values. Such a policy would need to include a number of steps. First, we must respond more forcefully to one of the greatest security challenges of our time, the need to help the people of the former Soviet empire demilitarize their societies and build free political and economic institutions. Congress has passed a law to provide US$500 million to help the Soviets destroy nuclear weapons and provide humanitarian aid. We can do better. As Senator Sam Nunn and Representative Les Aspin have argued, we should shift money from marginal military programs to this key investment in our future security. We can radically reduce the threat of nuclear destruction that has dogged us for decades by investing a fraction of what would otherwise have to be spent to counter that threat. And, together with our G7 partners, we can supply the Soviet republics with the food and medical aid they need to survive as they move boldly down the long and arduous road of reform. We should do all that we can to coordinate aid efforts with our allies and to provide the best technical assistance we can to distribute food and aid. No national security issue is more urgent than the question of who will control the nuclear weapons and technology of the former Soviet empire. Those weapons pose a threat to the security of every American, to our allies and to the republics themselves. It may be bad politics for any aid program. But we owe it to the people who defeated communism and the coup, and we owe it to ourselves. A small amount spent stabilizing the emerging democracies in the former Soviet empire today will reduce by much more the money we will have to commit to our defense in the future. And it will lead to the creation of lucrative new markets, which mean new US jobs. Having won the Cold War, we must not now lose the peace. Next, we should work closely with the newly independent Ukraine, as well as the other former republics who pursue democratic reforms. But we should link US and Western non-humanitarian aid to agreements by the republics to

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abide by all arms agreements negotiated by Soviet authorities, demonstrate responsibility with regard to nuclear weapons, demilitarize their economics, respect minority rights, and proceed with market and political reforms. The US should use its diplomatic and economic leverage to increase the material incentives to democratize and raise the costs for those who will not. We have every right to condition our foreign aid and debt relief policies on demonstrable progress toward democracy and market reforms. In extreme cases, such as that of China, we should condition favorable trade terms on political liberalization and responsible international conduct. The United States also needs to support evolving institutional structures favorable to countries struggling with the transition to democracy and markets, such as the new European Bank for Reconstruction and Development whose mission is to build the societies of Central and Eastern Europe. We are right to encourage European countries to open their doors to those societies by creating an affiliate status that carries some but not all of the privileges of membership. In addition, we should encourage private US investment in the former Soviet empire. The Soviet republics are rich in human and natural resources. One day, they and Eastern Europe could be lucrative markets for us. We should regard increased funding for democratic assistance as a legitimate part of our national security budget. We should support groups like the National Endowment for Democracy, which work openly rather than covertly to promote democratic pluralism and free markets abroad. I would encourage both the Agency for International Development and the US Information Agency to channel more of their resources to promoting democracy. And just as Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America helped bring the truth to the people of those societies, we should create a Radio Free Asia to carry news and hope to China and elsewhere. Finally, just as President John F. Kennedy launched the Peace Corps 30 years ago, we should create a Democra-

ANNIVERSARY BOOK TEASER cy Corps today that will send thousands of talented American volunteers to countries that need their legal, financial, and political expertise. Our third major strategic challenge is to help lead the world into a new era of global growth. Any governor who has tried to create jobs over the last decade knows that experience in international economics is essential and that success in the global economy must be at the core of national security in the 1990s. Without growth abroad, our own economy cannot thrive. American exports of goods and services will be over half a trillion dollars in 1991—about 10 percent of our economy. Without global growth, healthy international competition turns all too readily into economic warfare, and there can be no true economic justice among or within nations. I believe that the negotiations on an open trading system in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are of extraordinary importance, and I support the negotiation of a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), so long as it is fair to US farmers and workers, protects the environment, and observes decent labor standards. Freer trade abroad means more jobs at home. Every US$1 billion in exports generates 20-30,000 more jobs. We must find ways to help developing nations finally overcome their debt crisis, which has lessened their capacity to buy US goods and probably costs us 1.5 million US jobs. We must be strong at home to lead and maintain global growth. Our weakness at home has caused even our economic competitors to worry about our stubborn refusal to establish a national economic strategy that will regain our economic leadership and restore opportunity for the middle class. How can we lead when we have gone from being the world’s largest creditor to the world’s largest debtor nation—now owing the world over US$400 billion? When we depend on foreigners for US$100 billion a year of financing, we are not masters of our own destiny. We must rebuild our nation’s economic greatness, for the job of restoring the United States’ competitive edge truly begins at home. I have offered a

program to build the most well-educated and well-trained work force in the world and put our national budget to work on programs that make the United States richer, not more indebted. Our economic strength must become a central defining element of our national security policy. We must organize to compete and win in the global economy. We need a commitment from US business and labor to work together to make world-class products. We must be prepared to exchange some shortterm benefits—whether in the quarterly profit statement or in archaic work rules—for long-term success. The private sector must maintain the initiative, but government has an indispensable role. A recent Department of Commerce report is a wakeup call that we are falling behind our major competitors in Europe and Japan on emerging technologies that will define the high-paying jobs of the future—such as advanced materials, biotechnology, superconductors, and computer-integrated manufacturing. I suggest that a civilian advanced research projects agency work closely with the private sector, so that its priorities are not set by government alone. We have hundreds of national laboratories with extraordinary talent that have put the United States at the forefront of military technology. We need to reorient that mission, working with private companies and universities, to advance technologies that will make our lives better and create tomorrow’s jobs. Not enough of our companies engage in export—just 15 percent of our companies account for 85 percent of our exports. We have to meet our competitors’ efforts to help small- and medium-sized businesses identify and gain foreign markets. Most importantly, the government must assure that international competition is fair by insisting to our European, Japanese and other trade partners that if they will not play by the rules of an open trading system, then we will play by theirs. We have no more important bilateral relationships than our alliance with Japan, a relationship that has matured from one of dependency in the 1950s to one of partnership today. Our relation-

ship is based on ties of democracy, but as we cooperate, we also compete. And the maturity of our relationship allows US presidents to insist on fair play. As we put our own economic house in order, Japan must open the doors of its economic house or our partnership will be imperiled with consequences for all the world. Now we must understand that our national security is largely economic. The success of our engagement in the world depends not on the headlines it brings to Washington politicians, but on the benefits it brings to hardworking, middle class Americans. Our “foreign” policies are not really foreign at all. When greenhouse gas emissions from developed nations warm the atmosphere and CFCs eat away at the ozone layer, our beaches, farmlands, and people are threatened. When drugs flood into our country from South America and Asia, our cities suffer and our children are put at risk. When a Libyan terrorist can go to an airport in Europe and check a bomb in a suitcase that kills hundreds of people, our freedom is diminished and our people live in fear. Let us no longer define national security in the narrow military terms of the Cold War. We can no longer afford to have foreign and domestic policies. We must devise and pursue national policies that serve the needs of our people by uniting us at home and restoring the United States’ greatness in the world. To lead abroad, a president of the United States must first lead at home. Half a century ago, this country emerged victorious from an all-consuming war into a new era of great challenge. It was a time of change, a time for new thinking, a time for working together to build a free and prosperous world, and a time for putting that war behind us. In the aftermath of that war, President Harry Truman and his successors forged a bipartisan consensus in the United States that brought security and prosperity for 20 years. Today we need a president, a public, and a policy that are not caught up in the wars of the past—not World War II, not Vietnam, not the Cold War. What we need to elect in 1992 is not the last president of the

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ANNIVERSARY BOOK TEASER 20th century, but the first president of the 21st century. This spring, when the troops came home from the Persian Gulf, over 100,000 people attended a ‘Welcome Home’ parade in Little Rock. Veterans came from all across Arkansas—not just those who had just returned from the Gulf, but men and women who had served in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. I will never forget how moved

I was as I watched them march down the streets to our cheers and saw the Vietnam veterans finally being given the honor they deserved all along. The divisions we have lived with for the last two decades seemed to fade away amid the common outburst of triumph and gratitude. That is the spirit we need as we move into this new era. As President Abraham Lincoln told Congress in

another time of new challenge, in 1862: “The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country. Fellow citizens, we cannot escape history.”

resident Clinton’s article lays out a vision of a post-Cold War United States leading the world towards a new era of peace and democracy through social and economic growth. While Clinton maintains that US military forces should be “strong enough to deter and, when necessary, to defeat any threat,” he notes that “its utility is declining relative to that of economic power.” In the face of new threats to democracy in instable regions such as the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe, Clinton argues that foreign intervention should primarily be accomplished through “diplomatic and economic leverage” and that “economic strength must become a central defining element of our national security policy.” During his presidency, Clinton largely realized his goal of economic power. In 1993, he passed NAFTA, removing trade barriers in North America. A boom in the US economy and increase in free trade would subsequently create over 20 million jobs, decrease poverty levels, and lead to the first federal budget surplus since 1969. In foreign policy, however, the Clinton doctrine of selective intervention would be severely tested by a number of international conflicts during the president’s two terms. Just before Clinton took office, his predecessor, President George H.W. Bush, initiated US military intervention in Somalia to assist humanitarian relief during civil war and famine. The conflict, however, quickly escalated with the presence of a UN peacekeeping force, culminating in the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, or “Black Hawk Down,” in which 18 US soldiers were killed and their bodies desecrated by Somalis. After a large public outcry, Clinton was ultimately forced to withdraw US forces, leading to anarchy in Somalia and warlords battling for control even today. With the unsuccessful intervention in Somalia, Clinton decided against intervening in another African civil war in Rwanda, ultimately leading to the mass genocide of hundreds of thousands. At the same time, ethnic and civil conflict in Bosnia was escalating to genocide. Though at first reluctant to intervene, Clinton eventually set up a NATO response plan which brought an end to the fighting in the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. In this article, President Clinton advocates a post-Cold War shift in the foreign policy paradigm towards a more selective intervention doctrine focusing on strong economic growth domestically. Clinton would go on to implement his vision during his presidency through the signing of NAFTA and increasing focus on joint UN intervention. Though the Lewinsky scandal rocked his presidency during his second term, Clinton would ultimately leave office in 2001 with the highest end of

office approval rating of any president since World War II.

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