DRESDEN : Destroying and Reconstructing Monumentality by Edris Goubin L'Azou

DRESDEN DESTROYING AND RECONSTRUCTING MONUMENTALITY

GOUBIN L'AZOU Edris 2016, ENSA Paris Malaquais, PATTERSON Brent encadrant

Aerial bombing was introduced shortly before the First World War, when an Italian pilot leaned out of his airplane and manually dropped a hand grenade over a rebel camp in Libya.1 This technique was to become a characteristic of modern warfare, and prove itself to be of the utmost efficiency when it came to destruction. World War II provided a context for experimenting with this new method of warfare. Methods such as aerial bombing that can be characterised by the disassociation of the pilot, the perpetrator, and the extent of the damage inflicted. As a result, cities were levelled, and rebuilt, with a precise urban plan, becoming the tabula rasa the Futurists glorified in their manifesto. 2 Nevertheless, the destruction of entire buildings and cities, â&#x20AC;&#x153;urbicideâ&#x20AC;?, evokes the massacre of population, the genocide. The Allies were then faced with an ethical problem: should they try to prevent a genocide, by perpetrating another? Would the Nazis have stopped the extermination in the camps, in exchange for the ceasefire of aerial bombing, if such an offer had been made? 3 While bombing German cities, could the violence unfurled upon the civilian population cause a revolt among the people and bring an end to the Nazi's war crimes? How can a city and its inhabitants face violence in the form of aerial bombing, and rebuild itself afterwards? In the case of Dresden, this resilience was a complicated matter: for the city, facing a scale of destruction never encountered before, became after the war a part of the German Democratic Republic, under Soviet governance, and had to deal with both the physical and human destruction as well as the Socialist government's preservation policy for the historical city, characterised by a renowned Baroque architecture. How could the aerial bombing, given the very nature of the destruction, influence the old city's reconstruction process, in both its physical as well as psychological aspects?

1 2 3

Lindqvist, Sven, a History of Bombing, Granta books, 2001, 4 Marinetti, Manifeste du Futurisme, Le Figaro, Paris, 1909 Lindqvist, op. cit., 207

The city burns On the 13th of February, 1945, the British bomber command squad flew to Dresden with orders to bomb the city, dropping over 1400 tons of incendiary bombs4 resulting in a fire, that turned wild by the phosphor and the dry weather. The number of casualties varies, but is generally estimated around 25 000 to 35 000 victims. As for the physical destruction, 85% of the city was destroyed, 5 mainly the southern and eastern parts of the city, characterised by residential areas, whereas the more industrial areas, located north of the city, were largely untouched. At the beginning of the war, the city had 630 000 inhabitants, and by the end in 1945 there were only 370 000 left 6 In the aftermath of the bombings the inhabitants and refugees had to clear out the damage, and its 42,8 cubic meters of rubble per inhabitant, 7 making it a total of 15 million cubic meters of rubble.8 It would take decades to clear out, and decades more for the city to be rebuilt. Up to that point in the war, Dresden had been spared, for it had not been considered as an important military target. The Nazi government did not think the city could be targeted, and that is precisely why it had very little aerial military defences, turning it into an easy target. As a result of previous Allied bombings on other German cities such as Hamburg or Berlin, and the eastern progression of the Soviet Army, numerous refugees had found shelter in the yet untouched city of Dresden. For the Allied forces, the purpose of aerial bombing was simple: by destroying the industries, they intended to undermine the Nazi's military forces. By destroying the residential areas, they would undermine the morale of the German people, in the hope that they would rebel against their government. This technique was also known as morale bombing, for its sole purpose was to spread fear and terror among the civilian population. This strategy was wildly employed by Arthur Harris, head of the bomber command. Member of the Royal Air Force since World War I, he was convinced 4 5 6 7 8

Ibid, 194 JĂźrgen, Paul, Reconstruction of the City Center of Dresden: Planning and Building during the 50's, in Diefendorf, Jeffry, Rebuilding Europe's Bombed Cities, Palgrave Macmillan, 1990, p 171 Fuchs, Anne, After the Dresden bombing, Pathways of memory, 1945 to the present, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p 90 Sebald, W.G., De la destruction comme ĂŠlĂŠment de l'histoire naturelle, translated by Patrick Charbonneau, Arles, Actes Sud, 2004, p 14 Fuchs, op. cit. p. 93

of the utility of morale bombing, and kept sending bombers to German residential areas, even after he was ordered to focus on more industrial targets. 9 He was supported by Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, that is until Churchill realised that in the case of an eventual occupation, which was definitely envisioned at the time, of Postwar Germany, it would be more convenient not to destroy the remaining housing, in order to provide lodging for occupational troops after the war. 10 Churchill was indeed planning for the postwar occupation of Germany as early as 1944. As for Harris, he was following the Point Blank directive 11 adopted in January 1943, whereby the United States of America Air Force (USAAF) were to bomb industrial targets, to undermine the military assets of the enemy, following the method of strategic bombing, and the Royal Air Force (RAF) the civilians, in order to demoralise both the German troops and population. This method was known as area bombing, for the bombs were dropped without precision on large residential areas. The aerial bombing strategy provoked a shift in modern warfare, as it turned the horizontal confrontation into a vertical one. Indeed, if soldiers on foot, fighting other soldiers had roughly equal chances to vanquish their opponent, targeting from the air introduced a new sense of disproportion into the fighting.12 At this point, it might prove interesting to compare the use of the term “wanton”, in both Sven Lindqvist's a History of bombing and Anne Fuchs' After the Dresden bombing. Where Lindqvist underlines the British Parliament's position on its politics of aerial bombing, more specifically that of the civilian population, and the government's insistence that they were not doing it “wantonly”.13 However, they were not denying that their targets were civilian populations, Fuchs uses that word far more freely. 14 It is plausible that the usage of this term is merely the reflection of the types of sources she refers to, which are mostly German. This insistence of either Lindqvist or Fuchs underlines the on the British as well as the German's subjective perception of the attack. Semantics illustrates that guilt and defence are mere matters of perception. 9 10 11 12 13 14

Lindqvist, op. cit., 209 Ibid, 213 Ibid, 181 Fuchs, op. cit. p. 27 Lindqvist, op. cit., 200 Fuchs, op. cit. p 4

The bombing of Dresden was used by on each part in order to motivate the general population, and increase its participation in the war effort. Indeed, where the Allied glorified the bomber command, Goebbels, the head of Nazi propaganda, spread the word that the number of casualties was ten times higher, up to 100 000 deaths, in order to encourage the population to resist the enemy. Such news was even spread out to â&#x20AC;&#x153;neutralâ&#x20AC;? countries, such as Sweden, so that Germany was seen as a victim.15 The official order of the bomber command squad for the raid on Dresden was to destroy the transport route to the Eastern German front, and weaken the troops. The bridge crossing the Elbe was an access to the front, and therefore was a target. However, one of the few remaining landmarks of Dresden after the attack is, was in fact that specific bridge. 16

FIGURE 1: TARGET MAP Map released in 1962 by Maurice Smith, commander in the Bomber Command Squad, showing his target map

15 Ibid. p 21 16 Lindqvist, op. cit., 214

FIGURE 2: EXTENT OF DESTRUCTION Map of the destruction, issued by the Bomber Command, 1945, purple represents the completely destroyed areas, red areas fully built at the time of the bombing, green residential areas, black are industrial areas.

The areas where the extent of the damage was the most important were actually the residential areas, located to the east and south of the city. 17 If we were to compare the maps of the planned target and the one of the extent of the damage, it becomes clear that the area bombing strategy was either wildly ineffective, or that the bombing had nothing to do with targeting military assets. Yet, the unofficial target being the civilians, it could be considered that the city was only a mere casualty. However, the purpose of the bombing was to cause the German people to rebel. How could they do so, after being so heavily attacked? But perpetrating violence against a city, and its status as an untouched target, as well as its reputation of the “Florence of the Elbe”, 18 turns this act of bombing into an “urbicide”, seen as an end in itself. Destroying the urban aspect of a city, attacking its immaterial aspects such as the impact on culture, for the sole purpose of annihilating it. 17 Jürgen, Paul, op. cit., p 172 18 . Fuchs, op. cit., p 4, It was a title given by one of Dresden's visitor, Herder: “Flower, German

Florence, with your treasures of a world of art! Safeguard Dresden, this Olympia for us”

The urbicide continues Urbicide is characterised as an attack on an urban space, and its destruction, at least to a certain extent. But it goes beyond this physical destruction of the urban fabric, it is an attack on the way of life of the city, which gives the city its “urban” quality.19 However, the term urbicide has often been extended to the metaphorical destruction of the city by its reconstruction, as the city's history and style of urbanism was either erased or unwillingly turned into ridicule by a pastiche reproduction.20 The physical destruction of the city makes it obvious that it was an urbicide: for housing only, there were 220 000 apartments in Dresden in 1945. Out of these, 75 000 were completely destroyed, 11 500 suffered heavy damage and therefore were inhabitable, 7000 suffered medium damage and 80 000 light damages. 21 In relation to infrastructure, water, gas and electricity were completely destroyed when the Red Army marched into the city in May, 8 th 1945.22 Following the Yalta conference, post-war Germany was divided among the Allies: the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia. In 1949, in reaction to the formation of the Western Federal Republic of Germany, 23 the Eastern part of Germany formed the German Democratic Republic, and was placed under Soviet Governance. At the end of the war, Germany as a nation had to face the consequences of its leaders' actions as well as the collective guilt felt throughout the country, for the blame fell on German people. The sense of belonging was gone for most of its people. Going back into Germany's history, it appears that the formation of a nation was not following the usual pattern. For instance, France was considered as a united nation not only because of its centralised leadership, but even more because its people shared a united culture and sense of belonging, throughout the actions lead in unity, such as the Revolution. The German word for it is Kulturnation, a nation unified through its culture. Whereas Germany sought out to unify its different states, or Landers, while building itself as a unified culture. 24 19 20 21 22 23 24

Coward, Martin, Urbicide, The Politics of Urban Destruction, Routledge, 2009, p38 Nahoum Grappe, Véronique, Vukovar, Sarajevo, la guerre en Yougoslavie, Esprit 1993, p 33 Fuchs, op. cit. p 92 Ibid p 91 Jürgen, Paul, op. cit., p 174 Fuchs, op. cit. p 73

There was an obvious opposition between France's culture of centralisation and Germany's tradition to give more power to its different states. Throughout its history French people were united as nation when they have collectively overthrown their imposed government, whereas Germany, before being united as a country, was formed by smaller independent and self-determinative regions, which exercised power over their lands. These actions have impacted both countries' way to govern as well as their citizen's culture and way of apprehending their identity. Therefore the matter of reconstruction was not only about repairing the physical damage, clearing out the rubble, rebuilding the ruins, it was also a matter of national attachment: how could Germany reform itself as a Kulturnation? The usual reconstruction pattern was, at first, to keep the old layout of the town, while leaving space and anticipating further construction. 25 Architecturally speaking, new typologies were favoured, and reproduction of the old style was prohibited altogether. Modernist style from the 1920's was emphasised and the governance sought to impose a radical new urbanism, 26 not unlike what the Futurist had wanted.27 This was indeed an opportunity to experiment with the separation of function, and exercise the neighbourhood as a separate unit, as the Charter of Athens proclaimed in 1933. Indeed, Hans Scharoun, 27 who was to become the head of department of building and housing in Berlin 1945 to 1946, was a fervent advocate of a city divided into units, without a defined city centre. The shift from a modernist projection for the city to an elaborate plan of action from the Soviet government for the urban reconstruction happened in May, 1950. A study trip to Soviet Union was organised for some key German architects to showcase the importance of a city centre and the political function of a city, as streets and squares were designed for public demonstrations. 28 Socialist Realism arose as a new architectural style dedicated to the reconstruction, and was widely imposed in Soviet Union as well as in its dominions, where monumental architecture was based on national heritage. As Anne Fuchs sums 25 26 27 28

Ibid p 79 Ibid p 80 Ibid p 81 Ibid p 85

up “The cosmopolitan aspect of modernist architecture […] had to be socialist in content and national in form”. 29 Indeed, while it theoretically wants to convey the values of communism and socialism, the Socialist Realism style is designed to be able to be adapted to each and every situation, based on the national heritage of the region, or country. Shortly after this trip, three architects, Durth, Düwel and Gutschow drafted a summary of their observations that could be applied in any case of reconstruction: Sechzehn Grundsätze des Städbaus, or so the Sixteen Principles of Urban Design adopted on July, 27 th 1950.30 The first through five principles underlined the importance of the management of economy, administration, and the cultural function of a city. The first one particularly focuses on expressing the national consciousness of the people as a political structure, as a way to make architecture express the needs and desires of its people. 29 The second demonstrates the four major needs of society as identified in the Charter of Athens, work, housing, culture and leisure. The sixth showcased the importance of a city centre for public demonstrations. With this principle appears the formal and architectural realisation of an ideology of power and control. The ninth stated that a Socialist city must have high rises, as a symbol of modernity. The fourteenth emphasised the need of architecture to find balance between monumentality and vernacular. How to adapt and insert Socialist ideals and its ideology within a partially destroyed city, known for its historical architecture? Could the complete denial of its history be considered as an action undertaken against everything history and culture stand for, or would it be working against the urban evolution, killing the very nature of the city, to try and preserve the historical city at all cost, obliterating any evolutions in techniques or in style?

29 Jürgen, Paul, op. cit., p 194 30 Fuchs, op. cit. p 89 29 Jürgen, Paul, op. cit., p 194

Reconstruction: the urban theory applied to Dresden's ruins In the context of the aerial destruction of Dresden, architects as well as urban planners were to find a balance between following the guidelines given by the government and preserving the historical patrimony of the city while planning the New Dresden. There was a conflict when it came to design, for the state controlled the process to follow national heritage oriented projects when the city itself pressed for a smaller scale inspired by local heritage. 30 Such opposition was already present immediately after the War, as propositions, that is, actual urban proposals, were made by people from across the country and Dresdners, some of them even proposing utopian design. 31 For instance, W. Boden thought that a factory hall in the very middle of the city centre would be emblematic of the post-war city that Dresden was. On the other hand, M. BĂśttinger wanted to take into account the trauma undergone by the city, and offered the use of ruins as a memorial.31 Even before the Sixteen Principles for Urban Design were enacted, the city of Dresden organised a competition in July 1946 and the result were published in an Exhibition for reconstruction: Das neue Dresden (The new Dresden).32 However politics got in the way of this local initiative: for the first election in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), several political parties were allowed to compete. It was the one and only time. 33 However they went on to merge into a new party, the SED (Socialist Unity Party), which will rule over the GDR until 1989. For the cities' reconstruction, they made a list of 53 of them, including Dresden, where they wanted to implement a socialist society, opposed to a previous bourgeois society that was only partially industrialised. 34 The SED decided to back the Sixteen Principles up with reconstruction laws, determining precise reconstruction areas. It was these laws that were to identify Dresden as a city to be rebuild as a priority, and making an example of Socialist Realism out of it.35 Out of this top down chain of decision came the directive to shift the priority of housing to urban space, and more especially parade grounds. 31 32 33 34 35

Ibid p 94 Ibid p 95 Ibid p 99 JĂźrgen, Paul, op. cit., p 172 Fuchs, op. cit., p 98

The squares were to be able to hold at least 200 000 people, and a main avenue, Magistrale, was to be drawn.36 As a communist approach to spatial organisation, any piece of land was susceptible to have its ownership handed over to the government. These methods also gave way to some misuse. For instance, in Dresden, if reasonable excuses were given, such as public safety, or budget, it was easy enough to have a building tore down rather than rehabilitated. 36 The most important example of it is without a doubt the Neuemarkt square (The new market square) that served as a parking lot up to 1989. The expropriation, with or without financial compensation, was mostly concentrated within the city centre, where the political, administrative and cultural facilities were to be implemented.37 It was a government's policy that these facilities were monumental; and were to dominate the skyline, reinforcing the importance of a socialist society. The square intended for demonstrations raised quite a lot of debate and ideas. Out of eight sites, the one chosen for the future competitions was the Altmarkt square (the old market square, nearby the Neuemarkt). Walter Pisternik, of the Ministry for Reconstruction, which directed the city in March 1951 to develop a town plan with the Altmarkt as a city centre, so competitions were held about this precise demand.38 For Walter Ulbricht, leader of the GDR, these buildings were to imply that they would last for a century, and the typologies of building were important, as much as a political statements and manifestos. The vast square, large principal avenue leading up to it and most importantly the tower house were to demonstrate the power and long lasting influence of the Soviet Union over urban planning, the city and the city's architecture.39 The competitions were limited to four architectural collectives, and the brief was fairly straightforward: the Altmarkt had to be enlarged as well as a Haus der SED (A Socialist party House) and a building for the city council had to be built. As a result of controversies, no first prize was awarded in November 1951. The different responses to the directives given by the competition reflect the indecision and incertitude as to what the city was to become. BĂ¤rber presented a project that was too modest in its scale, as he wanted to respect the traditional 36 37 38 39

Ibid p 104 JĂźrgen, Paul, op. cit., p 174 Fuchs, op. cit., p 106 JĂźrgen, Paul, op. cit., p 176

skyline of the city. Wolfgang Rauda did not present any high rises in his project, for he underlined the importance of local preservation, having already worked for the city before the war, 40 where Johannes Rascher demonstrated a certain monumentalism, while maintaining a vernacular style for the façades of his apartment blocks. And Herbert Schneider presented a socialist high rise for a signature building. Johannes Rascher and Herbert Schneider, having given the priority in their respective projects to the new elements and therefore approaching the Socialist demands for the city, had to combine their project and resubmit within a month.41 Neither the city or the state were the only ones to propose competitions for architects. Indeed, in 1952, a newspaper launched its own competition, and the focus shifted to a high rise that had to be over 76 meters high, and were to become the new focal point of the city. 41 There were a strong opposition between the locals, who vehemently refuted the idea of a tower, arguing that it would assuredly ruin the city's historical skyline, and the government in Berlin, which demanded such a tower. 42 The same government, in order to initiate action, unilaterally decided to reshape the Altmarkt, following, while exaggerating, Rascher and Schneider's plan. It was expanded to three times its size, resulting in a square of 140 meters by 240. 42 It impacted the urban fabric, as well as the main avenue, the Ernst-ThälmannStrasse, immediately connected to the square. Buildings' height were determined up to 27 meters, and while the style was to remain a resemblance of a Baroque one, as in typologies were to be respected, but the proportions of both the square and the avenue were entirely different from the ones from the 18th century, resulting in a poor result. Following the example of rapid urban changes on a large scale directed by one power, only the façades were built, leaving space to build immediately behind, 43 not unlike the place Vendôme in Paris. However, the decorations were gradually reduced in order to lower the costs.44

40 41 42 43 44

Ibid p 177 Fuchs, op. cit., p 113 Jürgen, Paul, op. cit., p 178 Ibid p 180 Ibid p 179

FIGURE 3 and 4: PLANNING THE ALTMARKT Diagrams showing the difference in scale after the reconstruction of the Altmarkt Source : JÃ¼rgen, Paul, Reconstruction of the City Center of Dresden: Planning and Building during the 50's, in Diefendorf, Jeffry, Rebuilding Europe's Bombed Cities, Palgrave Macmillan, 1990,

FIGURE 5: PLANNING THE ALTMARKT Schneider's project for the Altmarkt in the 1952 competition.

So the construction of the Altmarkt began in 1953, and the apartment blocks were built shortly before the project stalled, mainly because of the controversy posed by the high rise. 45 Indeed, after Stalin died in 1953 and was replaced by Nikita Khrushchev, monumentality was replaced by a more pragmatic approach of urban design. Developing the Seven Year plan of Economy, it caused a shift from the monumental projects in the city centre to the development of housings in the outer parts of the city.46 At the same time, Schneider was asked to redesign a plan for the tower house. However, the Technical University's faculty of Architecture in Dresden intervened and made a photomontage in order to prove that such a tower would ruin the landscape of the city. They suggested a low building with far less impact and less monumentality.47 From then on the city had chosen a more local and historical approach to urbanism.

FIGURE 6: THE NEW ALTMARKT The Altmarkt as reconstructed

45 Fuchs, op. cit., p 114 46 JĂźrgen, Paul, op. cit., p 182 47 Fuchs, op. cit., p 181

The Frauenkirche: an exception in Dresden's landscape Reconstruction in post-war Germany, and especially in the German Democratic Republic dealt with important matters of guilt and memory. Located in the very centre of the city, within the Neuemarkt, the Frauenkirche, the Church of Our Lady has a symbolical importance for Dresdners, and has been an important landmark of its skyline, contributing to enforce the Baroque reputation of Dresden. Built in 1743 by George BĂ¤rh, it is a Lutheran church. Due to its location, it was badly destroyed on February, 13 th 1945 and collapsed two days later, its structure weakened, as a result of the raging fire. This constitutes an exception in the plans for reconstruction for it was an important part of Dresden's history and it would have been in keeping with the Socialist Realism principles to reconstruct, but not to restore the church, because of its monumentality and its local importance. Nevertheless, the Soviet regime was firmly opposed to religion and churches, and the Lutheran Church was focused on maintaining its remaining political influence. The Frauenkirche is exceptional because of its relation to memory and ruins, for it had been left as a memorial on the central square of the city for over 60 years, until 2005, marking the beginning of its reconstruction. Throughout its peculiar history, the Frauenkirche appears as a ruin, a monument, as well as a symbol. Firstly, the targeted attack on the city centre and therefore the monuments it contained was an attack on the symbolism of these monuments. As a part of an urbicide, the violence on the city and its way of life is prominently characterised by an attack on the symbol of its culture. 48 Then, in the aftermath of the bombing, the inhabitants were required to clear out the rubble, or debris, in order to allow the Red Army circulate through the city with their tanks and vehicles. Once these were cleared out, the remains of destruction began to appear. But could they truly be defined as ruins? What are ruins, in a context of utter destruction? The most simplistic definition might recognize that, once the rubble removed, the remaining parts of the building still standing would be called ruins. However it does not cover everything the term 'ruin' entails. They appeal to specifics notions of both time and memory. Nevertheless, we may wonder if the ruin is an object or a process. What are the functions of ruins? 48 Forty, Adrian, The Art of Forgetting, Berg, 1999, p 2

Interestingly, Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi Minister of Propaganda addresses this issued when speaking to soldiers in 1943 in the bombed city of Kassel: “[after a German victory] you will march through the field of rubble in happiness… You will view these ruins as pledges and guarantors of victory. You will stand still in front of every house and say: we have sacrificed this house, too, for the victory.”49 Here, Goebbels makes a significant differentiation between rubble and ruins. Whereas rubble is a mere outcome of the destruction, ruins imply a view of the mind, a process turning it into something sacred. In the context of the Frauenkirch, ruins have a particular history: they were successively a matter of reconstruction, a memorial for the dead, then a memorial against war, a place to organise peaceful protests and sit-ins, and finally a vital part of the city's late urban development. The monumentality of the Frauenkirche's remains is another reason why it became ruins. The open wound left for over sixty years also played a part in the impact of the event, that is the bombing, on collective memory. The importance of the church beforehand, as well as its location in the city centre made its ruins almost a monument “by default”. The extent of the destruction could only bring forth an important movement for peace and collective memory. The iconic image the church was before only increased the emotional reach it had, and became a new monument, not only as a church, but a reminder of that night. Here, an important distinction should be made between the memory of an individual, that has a limited time span and reach, and the collective memory of a society. This memory is far more affected by an act than any other resulting object, that is, for Dresden, that the destruction of the church has an impact that runs far deeper than any rubble, and that impact, this memory of the violence, even for the individuals that have not experienced it, was what made, in a rather automatic manner, the Frauenkirche both a ruin in its process and a monument. For the importance of its significance should transcend generations and time, as a memorial of a time worthy of remembrance, important for society itself. The use of the building through time becomes somewhat different as to the purpose 49 Hell, Julia and Schönle Andreas, Ruins of Modernity, Duke University Press Book, 2010, p 262

of the monument shifts. And it becomes necessary to preserve it beyond its existence, as it acts as a catalyst of memory, remembrance, grief, loss, but also a certain forgetting.50 Could it be that a memorial's purpose is, involuntarily, to allow a society to forget? The rubble that were cleared out at the very end of the war, under the supervision of the Red Army, were carefully stored and used for the reconstruction. The process only started after the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union in 1991, and was not lead by institutions such as the newly unified German party, nor the Lutheran church, nor the state of Saxony, but by a group of citizens, under an association founded in 1990 named FĂśderkreis zum Wiederaufbau der Frauenkirche Dresden e.V. (Supporting the reconstruction of the Church of our Lady in Dresden), and went on to lead a campaign of international funding, arguing that the reconstruction of the Frauenkirche was a matter of international memory, both from a human and an architectural point of view. The British Royal family participated to the funding of the reconstruction.51 However, some have argued that the reconstruction was actually counterproductive in regards to memory: leaving the Frauenkirche as it was, a ruin, an open wound for all to see, would have had a bigger impact, and reached an importance far more influential on collective remembrance. 52 What is unsettling and paradoxical is that some of the advocates for the reconstruction of the church were people that had not seen it as a church, but only as a ruin. Nevertheless, the reconstructed church is also a symbol of the newly reunited Germany, showing a collective effort towards its past. A comparison to the Kaiser Wilhelm GedĂ¤chtniskirche in Berlin might prove itself useful in this context. Rebuilt in the aftermath of the war, after being nearly utterly destroyed, the style chosen for this church, which formerly was a neoclassical church, makes it an emblem of modernist architecture in the Federal Republic of Germany, as well as a fine example of memorial and reconstruction.

50 Forty, op. cit., p 4 51 Fuchs, op. cit., p 2 52 .Ibid, p 179

FIGURE 7: KAISER WILHELM GEDÃ&#x201E;CHTNISKIRCHE IN BERLIN, 1957

FIGURE 8: THE FRAUENKIRCHE AS RUINS IN DRESDEN, 1958

However, the Gedächtniskirche is a relatively new church, consecrated in the 19th century, whereas the Frauenkirche is a Baroque church, far more likely to be rebuilt as regards as to its historical patrimony and its impact on popular culture.53

FIGURE 9: THE FRAUENKIRCHE REBUILT IN DRESDEN, 2005

Artists already perceived the monumentaly of these ruins. In his book of photography on Dresden, published immediately after the war, Ein Kamera Klagt (a camera accuses), Richard Peter presents the city as a pile of rubble, ruins and ashes. While his most famous pictures depict the figure of an allegory of Goodness looking upon the destroyed city from the town hall, he went on to underline the destruction by the extent of the damage. These black and white pictures, and especially the ones of “Goodness overlooking the ruins of Dresden”, are a fine example of the aestheticisation of violence and destruction.54 Photography is collectively perceived to be far more “objective” than other means of conveying an image, and therefore the viewer tends to rely on photography to be the only means of conveying information. However it puts some distance between the viewer and the object of contemplation. Such a distance causes the pain of destruction to be put aside. In art and its aestheticisation, there is almost an attempt to forget about the suffering as the 53 James-Chakraborty, Kathleen, The Use of Ruins in Postwar German Church Reconstruction, in

Mancini and Bresnahan, eds, Architecture and Armed Conflict, Routledge, 2015, p 200

54 Fuchs, op. cit., p 15

focus shift to the aesthetics of it. In collective memory, even the pictures of the Frauenkirche manage to maintain some of that shock caused by the contemplation of the picture, for the very reason that the ruins cohabits with construction, and the force of destruction is still present. On the other hand, Wilhelm Rudolph's drawings, before and after the destruction, tend to demonstrate a more empathic approach to the destruction: far more subjective than a photograph might be, or appear to be, it allows an atmosphere of despair to appear through the drawing, contemplating the extent of both the destruction, and of the future reconstruction. 55

FIGURE 9: GOODNESS OVERLOOKING THE RUINS OF DRESDEN BY RICHARD PETER FIGURE 10: DRESDEN IN 1930 AS SKETCHED BY WILHELM RUDOLPH

Therefore the Frauenkirche illustrates many notions about Dresden's reconstruction. It demonstrates the use and aim of collective remembrance, and furthermore underlines the importance of a civic democratic movement, 56 involving the city's citizens in the reconstruction. It also shows the preference 55 Ibid, p 46 56 Ibid, p 3

given to an exact reconstitution over what the power of ruins, laying as an open wound, might have on collective memory and the reinstitution of a Kulturnation.

The city could not find precise guidelines between historical preservation and socialist reconstruction. This indecision could actually be the second phase of the city's urbicide, even more potent than its destruction. For Dresden reconstructed landscape faced the monumentality imposed by the Socialist regime and did not fully acknowledge it, and the result pales in comparison of the romanticised past of the Baroque city. While still shocked by the intensity of the aerial attack, Dresden, like many cities in the same case, had to reinvent itself in order to survive. After the levelling of its city centre, Dresden had to deal with material needs as urgent as housing reconstruction, or needs on a more spiritual level, throughout the leadership of the Soviet government. This reconstruction period, remarkable in its long lasting temporality, and its result, is a precise example of an urbicide. And while the SED wanted monumentality to be an important feature of the reconstruction, it failed to measure up to the monumentality of either the memory of the old city, or the sheer violence of aerial bombing. The city's image had become more powerful than the city itself.

FIGURE 11 and 12: DAS ZERSTÃ&#x2013;RTE DRESDEN (DRESDEN DESTROYED), SKETCHES OF WILHELM RUDOLPH Sketch of Dresden realised in the immediate aftermath of the bombing, in 1945. The Frauenkirche is represented, as a ruin emerging from the rubble.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Andrusz, Gregory, Harloe, Michael and Szelenyi, Ivan, Cities After Socialism, Urban and Regional Change and Conflict in Post-Socialist Societies, 2011 Cohen, Jean-Louis, Architecture en uniforme, Projeter et construire pour la Seconde Guerre mondiale, Paris, Centre Canadien d'Architecture, Hazan, 2011 Coward, Martin, Urbicide, The Politics of Urban Destruction, Routledge, 2009 Forty, Adrian, The Art of Forgetting, Berg, 1999 Fuchs, Anne, After the Dresden bombing, Pathways of memory, 1945 to the present, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012 Harris, Arthur, Bomber offensive, London, Pen and Sword military classics, 1947, Kindle edition Hell, Julia and Schönle Andreas, Ruins of Modernity, Duke University Press Book, 2010, Hippler, Thomas, Le gouvernement du ciel, Histoire globale des bombardements aériens, Les prairies ordinaires, 2014 James-Chakraborty, Kathleen, The Use of Ruins in Postwar German Church Reconstruction, in Mancini and Bresnahan, eds, Architecture and Armed Conflict, Routledge, 2015 Jürgen, Paul, Reconstruction of the City Center of Dresden: Planning and Building during the 50's, in Diefendorf, Jeffry, Rebuilding Europe's Bombed Cities, Palgrave Macmillan, 1990 Lamers-Schütze, Petra, Architectural Theory, from the Renaissance to the Present, Taschen, 2003 Lindqvist, Sven, a History of Bombing, Granta books, 2001 Marinetti, Manifeste du Futurisme, Le Figaro, Paris, 1909 Muñoz Rojas, Olivia, Ashes and Granite, Sussex Academic press, 2011 Nahoum Grappe, Véronique, Vukovar, Sarajevo, la guerre en Yougoslavie, Esprit 1993 Preti, Monica and Settis, Salvatore, Villes en ruine, images, mémoires, métamorphoses, Paris, Hazan, 2015 Sebald, W.G., De la destruction comme élément de l'histoire naturelle, translated by Patrick Charbonneau, Arles, Actes Sud, 2004

APPENDIX 16 Grundsätze des Städtebaus Von der Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik am 27. Juli 1950 beschlossen: Die Stadtplanung und die architektonische Gestaltung unserer Städte müssen der gesellschaftlichen Ordnung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, den fortschrittlichen Traditionen unseres deutschen Volkes sowie den großen Zielen, die dem Aufbau ganz Deutschlands gestellt sind, Ausdruck verleihen. Dem dienen die folgenden Grundsätze: 1. Die Stadt als Siedlungsform ist nicht zufällig entstanden. Die Stadt ist die wirtschaftlichste und kulturreichste Siedlungsform für das Gemeinschaftsleben der Menschen, was durch die Erfahrung von Jahrhunderten bewiesen ist. Die Stadt ist in Struktur und architektonischer Gestaltung Ausdruck des politischen Lebens und des nationalen Bewußtseins des Volkes. 2. Das Ziel des Städtebaues ist die harmonische Befriedigung des menschlichen Anspruchs auf Arbeit, Wohnung, Kultur und Erholung. Die Grundsätze der Methoden des Städtebaues fußen auf den natürlichen Gegebenheiten, auf den sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Grundlagen des Staates, auf den höchsten Errungenschaften von Wissenschaft, Technik und Kunst, auf den Erfordernissen der Wirtschaftlichkeit und auf der Verwendung der fortschrittlichen Elemente des Kulturerbes des Volkes. 3. Städte ‚an sich‘ entstehen nicht und existieren nicht. Die Städte werden in bedeutendem Umfange von der Industrie für die Industrie gebaut. Das Wachstum der Stadt, die Einwohnerzahl und die Fläche werden von den städtebildenden Faktoren bestimmt, das heißt von der Industrie, den Verwaltungsorganen und den Kulturstätten, soweit sie mehr als örtliche Bedeutung haben. In der Hauptstadt tritt die Bedeutung der Industrie als städtebildender Faktor hinter der Bedeutung der Verwaltungsorgane und der Kulturstätten zurück. Die Bestimmung und Bestätigung der städtebildenden Faktoren ist ausschließlich Angelegenheit der Regierung. 4. Das Wachstum der Stadt muß dem Grundsatz der Zweckmäßigkeit untergeordnet werden und sich in bestimmten Grenzen halten. Ein übermäßiges Wachstum der Stadt, ihrer Bevölkerung und ihrer Fläche führt zu schwer zu beseitigenden Verwicklungen ihrer Struktur, zu Verwicklungen in der Organisation des Kulturlebens und der täglichen Versorgung der Bevölkerung und zu betriebstechnischen Verwicklungen sowohl in der Tätigkeit wie in der Weiterentwicklung der Industrie. 5. Der Stadtplanung zugrunde gelegt werden müssen das Prinzip des Organischen und die Berücksichtigung der historisch entstandenen Struktur der Stadt bei Beseitigung ihrer Mängel. 6. Das Zentrum bildet den bestimmenden Kern der Stadt. Das Zentrum der Stadt ist der politische Mittelpunkt für das Leben seiner Bevölkerung. Im Zentrum der Stadt liegen die 24

wichtigsten politischen, administrativen und kulturellen Stätten. Auf den Plätzen im Stadtzentrum finden die politischen Demonstrationen, die Aufmärsche und die Volksfeiern an Festtagen statt. Das Zentrum der Stadt wird mit den wichtigsten und monumentalsten Gebäuden bebaut, beherrscht die architektonische Komposition des Stadtplanes und bestimmt die architektonische Silhouette der Stadt. 7. Bei Städten, die an einem Fluß liegen, ist eine der Hauptadern und die architektonische Achse der Fluß mit seinen Uferstraßen. 8. Der Verkehr hat der Stadt und ihrer Bevölkerung zu dienen. Er darf die Stadt nicht zerreißen und der Bevölkerung nicht hinderlich sein. Der Durchgangsverkehr ist aus dem Zentrum und dem zentralen Bezirk zu entfernen und außerhalb seiner Grenzen oder in einem Außenring um die Stadt zu führen. Anlagen für den Güterverkehr auf Eisenbahn und Wasserwegen sind gleichfalls dem zentralen Bezirk der Stadt fernzuhalten. Die Bestimmung der Hauptverkehrsstraßen muß die Geschlossenheit und die Ruhe der Wohnbezirke berücksichtigen. Bei der Bestimmung der Breite der Hauptverkehrsstraßen ist zu berücksichtigen, dass für den städtischen Verkehr nicht die Breite der Hauptverkehrsstraßen von entscheidender Bedeutung ist, sondern eine Lösung der Straßenkreuzungen, die den Anforderungen des Verkehrs gerecht wird. 9. Das Antlitz der Stadt, ihre individuelle künstlerische Gestalt, wird von Plätzen, Hauptstraßen und den beherrschenden Gebäuden im Zentrum der Stadt bestimmt (in den größten Städten von Hochhäusern). Die Plätze sind die strukturelle Grundlage der Planung der Stadt und ihrer architektonischen Gesamtkomposition. 10. Die Wohngebiete bestehen aus Wohnbezirken, deren Kern die Bezirkszentren sind. In ihnen liegen alle für die Bevölkerung des Wohnbezirks notwendigen Kultur-, Versorgungs- und Sozialeinrichtungen von bezirklicher Bedeutung. Das zweite Glied in der Struktur der Wohngebiete ist der Wohnkomplex, der von einer Gruppe von Häuservierteln gebildet wird, die von einem für mehrere Häuserviertel angelegten Garten, von Schulen, Kindergärten, Kinderkrippen und den täglichen Bedürfnissen der Bevölkerung dienenden Versorgungsanlagen vereinigt werden. Der städtische Verkehr darf innerhalb dieser Wohnkomplexe nicht zugelassen werden, aber weder die Wohnkomplexe noch die Wohnbezirke dürfen in sich abgeschlossene isolierte Gebilde sein. Sie hängen in ihrer Struktur und Planung von der Struktur und den Forderungen der Stadt als eines Ganzen ab. Die Häuserviertel als drittes Glied haben dabei hauptsächlich die Bedeutung von Komplexen in Planung und Gestaltung. 11. Bestimmend für gesunde und ruhige Lebensverhältnisse und für die Versorgung mit Licht und Luft sind nicht allein die Wohndichte und die Himmelsrichtung, sondern auch die Entwicklung des Verkehrs. 12. Die Stadt in einen Garten zu verwandeln, ist unmöglich. Selbstverständlich muß für ausreichende Begrünung gesorgt werden. Aber der Grundsatz ist nicht umzustoßen: In der 25

Stadt lebt man städtischer, am Stadtrand oder außerhalb der Stadt lebt man ländlicher. 13. Die vielgeschossige Bauweise ist wirtschaftlicher als die ein- oder zweigeschossige. Sie entspricht auch dem Charakter der Großstadt. 14. Die Stadtplanung ist die Grundlage der architektonischen Gestaltung. Die zentrale Frage der Stadtplanung und der architektonischen Gestaltung der Stadt ist die Schaffung eines individuellen, einmaligen Antlitzes der Stadt. Die Architektur verwendet dabei die in den fortschrittlichen Traditionen der Vergangenheit verkörperte Erfahrung des Volkes. 15. Für die Stadtplanung wie für die architektonische Gestaltung gibt es kein abstraktes Schema. Entscheidend ist die Zusammenfassung der wesentlichen Faktoren und Forderungen des Lebens. 16. Gleichzeitig mit der Arbeit am Stadtplan und in Übereinstimmung mit ihm sind für die Planung und Bebauung bestimmter Stadtteile sowie von Plätzen und Hauptstraßen mit den anliegenden Häuservierteln Entwürfe fertigzustellen, die in erster Linie durchgeführt werden können.“

TRANSLATION 1. The city as an agglomeration of function is not a random decision. It has to be the richest and most cultural form of agglomeration for society, as seen through centuries of city practice. The city is a structure and an architectural construction emphasising political life and the national preoccupation of the people. 2.These new cities are to be the product of the needs of working, housing, culture and leisure. The fundamental principles of urban planning are derived from natural conditions, economic needs and acquired knowledge of the city. They are, technically and artistically, the result of the application of these elements to the popular culture. 3. The city cannot exist without industries. The city in constituted by them and for it. them is the industry that balances the city. 4. The city's importance is a decisive element when it comes to its scale and should determine its principal boundaries. The population and size are relative as to its structure. 5. The existence of the city is a response to a need for work. 6. The city centre defines the heart of the city. Every political, administrative and cultural building should be found there. The central square is intended to be for demonstrations and parties. This space's composition is to be defined with the greatest of care. 7. A city located next to a river will see its architecture adapt to it and its main street should cross the river.

8. Traffic should be defined by the city and its population. It should neither smother the city nor hamper the population. The main axis of the city should go through the city centre. 9. The â&#x20AC;&#x153;faceâ&#x20AC;? of the city should be defined by its urban space, that is its squares, main streets and important buildings within the city centre. 10. Residential areas should be connected to the city centre and count numerous schools, and housing complexes should be isolated. 11. The two most important things when it comes to town planning and its housing are air and light. 12. Sufficient green spaces should be provided within the city. 13. Building's shapes, scales and materials are what gives a city its character. 14. The key question of urban planning and its architectural realisation is the result of an individual and shared identity. 15. There is no such thing as a general scheme for town planning. It must be done accordingly to the individual city. 16. The city must balance every need and desire. It should be a centre for education, work and research.