Arguing on Political Change in Debates Beyond Arms and Numbers An article by: Fadhilah Fitri Primandari (EDS UI 2016)
If you have participated in at least three debate tournaments, it is very unlikely that you have not come across a motion necessitating you to argue about political change—with the term usually referring to both the change in institutions and the transition between regimes (Almond, 1963, p. 5). These types of motions are very common that you can almost always predict how the logics of the arguments will go. Throughout my past three years of involvement in the debating circuit, I have found two analyses that debaters most commonly use in arguing for the success of political change, both through revolution and evolution: a) the larger the number of protesters protesting in the streets, the bigger the likelihood that political change will happen; and b) the more advanced the tools or weapons a movement possesses, the more likely that the movement will achieve its goals. These ways of explaining the process of political change simplifies the complexities that occur when struggles for political change takes place, which in consequence also simplifies the outcomes of the struggle and how various actors are affected. This article aims to criticize this approach and provide insights to enrich the perspectives we use to analyze
political change in debates. This article covers four main areas: 1) the variety of actors that play part in a state’s political process; 2) the significance of the roles of actors in the government during political change; 3) the responses that authoritarian regimes may take to address mass protests; and 4) the outcome of a successful regime overthrow. Firstly, it is important to break away from the narrative that the drivers of political change and transition only come from the grassroot society, especially when we are speaking of democratization. Not only that this narrative is factually incorrect, it also contributes to, if not emboldens, the misconception that individuals and groups from the grassroot society are always supportive of democracy and social justice. Just as democratic backsliding may be initiated by institutions or government actors, democratization may also be initiated or supported by these actors.
To understand the complexity of political change, we need to look at the political landscape at large and realize that there are many actors involved in the process. The first actor who usually comes to mind besides the grassroot society or movement is the government—usually because many motions about political change discuss uprisings or protests against the government. Let’s now note that the government should not be
regarded as a single or unitary body. The government comprises of many actors, who may have different and even conflicting interests: politicians in positions of power, political parties, and the military are the main actors that one should be aware of, although each of those actor groups are also very likely to not be homogenous. For example, political parties as well as the military body may have factions, who may or may not have good relations with each other. Since the general political landscape comprises of many actors, it is only logical to acknowledge that they all play a certain role in shaping the political dynamics of their country or region. Thus, if there are many actors involved in a political landscape, then it is impossible to say that there can only be one driver for political change and transition. Secondly, we should recognize how significant the roles that actors besides the grassroot society may play in the process of political change and transition. For example, it would be difficult to say that it was not the elites who liberalized the economic and political sphere in the Soviet Union prior to its demise (Gel'man & Steen, 2003, pp. 1-2), or that Nigeria’s attempt to hand their government to civilian rule in 1975 was not, to a significant extent, steered by the military (Amadife, 1999, p. 626). Even the democratization in Indonesia cannot be purely attributed to the students’ demonstrations in 1998; without powerplay and negotiations between the political elites (Suparno, 2012, pp. 187-188), it is arguable whether Soeharto would have stepped
down and handed over the presidency to Habibie. Analyzing the internal dynamics of a regime or government helps us to understand that, due to the various actors that make up the government as well as their different interests, these internal dynamics can also contribute— either positively or negatively—to the process of political change. As actors who make up a government or regime is not homogenous, there is a possibility that some actors are in favor of change and thus helps to achieve it. For example, one of the reasons why the protests in Tunisia during the Jasmine Revolution was successful in ousting Ben Ali was that the military chose to not fight the protesters (Maclean, 2011), thus indirectly supporting the push for regime change. Frictions between actors or factions can also contribute to the crippling of a regime, as lack of cohesion between actors in the government makes it easier for movements to target or lobby certain actors. Just as how social movements are easily dispersed when ununited, regimes are also prone to collapse when actors who make up the regimes cannot agree on issues that are crucial to maintain their power and stability. Thirdly, most often than not the process of political change and transition is regarded as linear and only follows one
direction: that the fight against an unjust regime will always lead to victory if protesters or fighters are large in numbers and employ advanced weaponry. Very little attention has been given to how regimes, especially authoritarian ones, respond to protests. It is very naive to assume that authoritarian regimes will respond to pressure and demands by immediately giving up their power, either by voluntarily handing it over to a new political ruler or having the dictator flee the country. A regime becomes undemocratic due to fear of losing power, therefore it is unwise to not argue about the type of responses that a regime may give towards public pressure. Arguing that demonstrations or other forms of demands for change will be met with repression is one of the ways to argue for the failure of efforts fighting for political change. However, repression on protests should not be taken as given, nor should it be regarded as always effective. Authoritarian regimes operate on a rational basis: they will choose measures that give them the most benefits with efficient costs (Josua & Edel, 2015, p. 291). Deploying military forces is costly and risky. Not only that the decision may cost the number of military personnel and weaponry, it may also lead to the escalation of conflict and further political instability. In making these decisions, regimes do not only analyze the scale of civilian protests, but also whether protests have occurred in the past and how they were successfully and unsuccessfully dealt with. Thus, if there are other methods that the regime perceives to be effective
and cost efficient to suppress demonstrations and demands, authoritarian regimes will likely opt for that method. Authoritarian regimes are also rational in the sense that they listen to the protests and grievances, although their awareness of dissatisfaction clearly do not always lead to its fulfilment. If there are pressing demands for economic reform, for example, without the demand for democratization or transition of power, these regimes may resort to economic policies to appease the demands. This strategy, although not indiscriminately, was employed by Saudi Arabia when faced with uprisings during the Arab Spring. As measures taken by authoritarian regimes to respond to protests are calculated, we must be critical and not simply assume that the lack of (massive) military deployment means the success of fight for political change. Now we turn to the guise of political opening. Sometimes, authoritarian regimes respond to demands for democratization with the opening of the political sphere, such as allowing certain movements to form political parties or hold elections to include opposition groups in the government. This type of response is chosen when the demands for change challenges the existing power structure, but it is costly for the regime to use military repression. Political openings should not always be equated to democratization as sometimes they are purposely initiated by authoritarian regimes as a political strategy to co-opt oppositional groups and curb dissent. It is not unusual for authoritarian regimes to design
elections and campaign regulations that significantly disadvantage opposition parties. The strategy of opening up the political sphere can be effective to curb dissent because it pushes the opposition to shift its focus to formal politics, such as retaining their seats, instead of its initial goal and in doing so ensures that they don’t appear threatening to the regime to avoid being barred from competing in future elections. As I have mentioned earlier, undemocratic regimes are unlikely to voluntarily give up power, thus democratic openings initiated by undemocratic regimes may indicate the regime’s confidence in its ability to maintain power despite the opening up of the political sphere rather than the power of social movements in pushing for democratization. The inclusion of the Islamist opposition groups in formal politics in Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt demonstrates the strategic value of this decision. Fourthly, an argument about political change is incomplete without analysis on the outcome of the transition. The collapse of an authoritarian regime does not equate to automatic democratization; it can be followed by the emergence of a new authoritarian regime, if not vacuum of power and political instability. The question of outco me necessitates us to return to the actors involved in the political process and inquire into their characteristics and behavior. Who are these actors and what do they aim for? Do they wish to establish democracy after they succeed in ousting their ruler? Protests against an authoritarian ruler do not always
stem from the public’s dissatisfaction with repressive methods of governance; they may arise from discontent towards certain policies and poor legitimacy of the incumbent ruler, accompanied by preference for a new political ruler who may also support undemocratic values. Teams arguing against the likelihood of success of a democratic political transition may benefit immensely from the analysis on the lack of democratic values and culture among protesters. Looking at the cohesion—or lack thereof—of a movement also helps to analyze whether the movement will be able to achieve and sustain its goal in the long run. If a movement consists of fragmented groups who band together to fight an unjust ruler without a clear goal in mind, it is very unlikely that the movement will remain united after the common enemy is toppled down. The likelihood of this possibility is heightened if these groups have fundamental differences, such as conflicting ideologies. This context is important as it is unusual for a radical political change to be massively endorsed by one homogenous group— even the passing of one policy or bill in a relatively democratic state often requires the support of various groups. Thus, it is crucial for teams in debates about political change to analyze the sustainability of the movement fighting for change, especially if it involves the transition of power. Analyses on an outcome of political process and change should go beyond the type of regime they produce. As
political struggles and process towards change are often time very lengthy and involve various actors, it may be helpful to take a look at how the steps or phases of the process impact these actors differently. For example, while a fight for new elections and amendments to a constitution may seem like a good start for democratization, we can scrutinize who the elections will allow to compete and what the articles in the amendment process consist of. Will the elections be inclusive? What do the competing candidates need to win the elections? Will the new constitution protect minority groups? Does the political process allow minority groups to speak up and fight for their rights? Or, rather, is the process dominated by a group that only wishes to establish change in areas that benefit them? It is important to note that actors who want a democratic political system may be against fully liberal and democratic values. The main conclusion to these various explanations and questions is that there is more to look at beyond the scale of protests and power of weapons used by protesters in arguing about the success of political change. I argue that a) sometimes, key actors who determine the outcome of political change are not those standing among the crowd in the streets protesting the government, but rather the very people or institutions targeted by the protesters; b) political struggles involve at least two conflicting actors, which makes it necessary for us to analyze how these actors interact and engage with each other; and c) even a force or entity that is commonly viewed as united may be fragmented, and these very fragments may be the key in analyzing whether a struggle for political change will succeed or fail.
I feel that I need to close this article with a disclaimer. The explanations I have provided is not enough to represent the various trajectories of political change around the world, nor does it provide answers to the many and layered questions that exist on the issue. It is impossible to include the many perspectives available to take on debates about political change in a short essay. The analyses I have provided in this article are only a small portion of the plethora of approaches in the study of movements, regime resilience, and political change. I hope this article can aide readers in their journey to look for rich and sophisticated analyses useful for their arguments in future debates about politics—and help break away from the common assumption that grassroot movements are the main drivers and determinants of political change.
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Josua, M., & Edel, M. (2015). To Repress or Not to Repress Regime Survival Strategies in the Arab Spring. Terrorism and Political Violence, 27(2), 289309. Maclean, W. (2011, January 18). Tunisia Army Pivotal to Ben Ali Ousting - Reports. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-tunisia-protests-army/tunisiaarmy-pivotal-to-ben-ali-oustingreportsidUSTRE70G52B20110117 Suparno, B. A. (2012). Reformasi & Jatuhnya Soeharto. Jakarta: Kompas Media Nusantara.