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mi © 1999 Massachusetts Institute of Technology

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, record¬ ing, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher.

This book was set in Baskerville by Asco Typesetters, Hong Kong, and was printed and bound in the United States of America.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Palmer, Stephen E.

Vision science—photons to phenomenology / Stephen E. Palmer, p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-262-16183-4

1. Vision. 2. Visual perception. 3. Cognitive science.

I. Title.

QP475.P24 1999

612.8'4—dc21 99-11785

In loving memory of my mentor, colleague, and friend, Irvin Rock (1922—1995), who taught me more about visual perception than everyone else combined and who showed me by example what it means to be a scientist.

Glossary 701

References 737

Name Index 771

Subject Index 780

An Introduction to Vision Science 3 1.1 Visual Perception 5 1.1.1 Defining Visual Perception 5

1.1.2 The Evolutionary Utility of Vision 6

1.1.3 Perception as a Constructive Act 7 Adaptation and Aftereffects 7 Reality and Illusion 7 Ambiguous Figures 9

1.1.4 Perception as Modeling the Environment 10 Visual Completion 10

Objects 11

the Future 12

1.1.5 Perception as Apprehension of Meaning 13

13

and Consciousness 13 1.2 Optical Information 15 1.2.1 The Behavior of Light 15

15

with Surfaces 16 The Ambient Optic Array 18 1.2.2 The Formation of Images 19 Optical Images 20 Projective Geometry 20 Perspective and Orthographic Projection 21

1.2.3 Vision as an “Inverse” Problem 23 1.3 Visual Systems 24

1.3.1 The Human Eye 24 Eye and Brain 24

Anatomy of the Eye 25

Physiological Optics 26

1.3.2 The Retina 28 Neurons 28

Photoreceptors 29 Peculiarities of Retinal Design 33 Pathways to the Brain 35

1.3.3 Visual Cortex 35 Localization of Function 35 Occipital Cortex 37 Parietal and Temporal Cortex 38 Mapping Visual Cortex 39

The Physiological Pathways Hypothesis 42

2 Theoretical Approaches to Vision 45

2.1 Classical Theories of Vision 47

2.1.1 Structuralism 48

2.1.2 Gestaltism 50

Holism 50

Psychophysiological Isomorphism 51

2.1.3 Ecological Optics 53

Analyzing Stimulus Structure 53

Direct Perception 54

2.1.4 Constructivism 55

Unconscious Inference 56

Heuristic Interpretation 57

2.2 A Brief History of Information Processing 59

2.2.1 Computer Vision 59

The Invention of Computers 59

Blocks World 60

Computational Approaches to Ecological Optics 61

Connectionism and Neural Networks 62

2.2.2 Information Processing Psychology 63

2.2.3 Biological Information Processing 64

Early Developments 64

Single-Cell Recording 64

Autoradiography 66

Brain Imaging Techniques 66

2.3 Information Processing Theory 70

2.3.1 The Computer Metaphor 71

2.3.2 Three Levels of Information Processing 71

The Computational Level 72

The Algorithmic Level 72

The Implementational Level 73

2.3.3 Three Assumptions of Information Processing 73

Informational Description 73

Recursive Decomposition 74

Physical Embodiment 77

2.3.4 Representation 77

2.3.5 Processes 80

Implicit versus Explicit Information 80

Processing as Inference 80

Hidden Assumptions 81

Heuristic Processes 83

Hidden Assumptions versus Ecological Validity 83

Top-Down versus Bottom-Up Processes 84

2.4 Four Stages of Visual Perception 85

2.4.1 The Retinal Image 85

2.4.2 The Image-Based Stage 87

2.4.3 The Surface-Based Stage 88

2.4.4 The Object-Based Stage 90

2.4.5 The Category-Based Stage 91

3 Color Vision: A Microcosm of Vision Science 94

3.1 The Computational Description of Color Perception 96

3.1.1 The Physical Description of Light 96

3.1.2 The Psychological Description of Color 97 Color Space 97

Hue 98

Saturation 98

Lightness 98

Lightness versus Brightness 99

3.1.3 The Psychophysical Correspondence 99

3.2 Image-Based Color Processing 101

3.2.1 Basic Phenomena 101

Light Mixture 101

Color Blindness 104

Color Afterimages 105

Simultaneous Color Contrast 106

Chromatic Adaptation 107

3.2.2 Theories of Color Vision 107

Trichromatic Theory 107

Opponent Process Theory 108

Dual Process Theory 110

3.2.3 Physiological Mechanisms 112

Three Cone Systems 112

Color Opponent Cells 113

Reparameterization in Color Processing 114

Lateral Inhibition 115

Adaptation and Aftereffects 119

Double Opponent Cells 119 Higher Cortical Mechanisms 120

3.2.4 Development of Color Vision 121 3.3 Surface-Based Color Processing 122

3.3.1 Lightness Constancy 125

Adaptation Theories 125

Unconscious Inference versus Relational Theories 126

The Importance of Edges 128 Retinex Theory 128

The Scaling Problem 129

Illumination versus Reflectance Edges 130

Distinguishing Illumination from Reflectance Edges 132

3.3.2 Chromatic Color Constancy 133

Constraining the Problem 133

Illumination versus Reflectance Edges Revisited 134

Development of Color Constancy 136

3.4 The Category-Based Stage 137

3.4.1 Color Naming 137

3.4.2 Focal Colors and Prototypes 139

3.4.3 A Fuzzy-Logical Model of Color Naming 140

Fuzzy Set Theory 140

Primary, Derived, and Composite Color Categories 141

143

4 Processing Image Structure 145

4.1 Physiological Mechanisms 146

4.1.1 Retinal and Geniculate Cells 147

Ganglion Cells 147

Bipolar Cells 148

Lateral Geniculate Nucleus 148

4.1.2 Striate Cortex 151

Hubei and Wiesel’s Discovery 151

Simple Cells 151

Complex Cells 153

Hypercomplex Cells 153

4.1.3 Striate Architecture 154

The Retinotopic Map 155

Ocular Dominance Slabs 155

Columnar Structure 156

4.1.4 Development of Receptive Fields 157

4.2 Psychophysical Channels 158

4.2.1 Spatial Frequency Theory 159

Fourier Analysis 160

Spatial Frequency Channels 162

Contrast Sensitivity Functions 163

Selective Adaptation of Channels 165

Spatial Frequency Aftereffects 166

Thresholds for Sine Wave versus Square

Wave Gratings 167

Development of Spatial Frequency Channels 168

4.2.2 Physiology of Spatial Frequency Channels 169

4.3 Computational Approaches 171

4.3.1 Marr’s Primal Sketches 172

4.3.2 Edge Detection 172

Edge Operators and Convolution 173

The Marr-Hildreth Zero-Crossing Algorithm 175

Neural Implementation 179

Scale Integration 180

The Raw Primal Sketch 180

4.3.3 Alternative Computational Theories 182

Texture Analysis 184

Structure from Shading 184

4.3.4 A Theoretical Synthesis 186

Local Spatial Frequency Filters 186

Exploiting the Structure of Natural Images 188

4.4 Visual Pathways 193

4.4.1 Physiological Evidence 193

4.4.2 Perceptual Evidence 195

5 Perceiving Surfaces Oriented in Depth 199

5.1 The Problem of Depth Perception 201

5.1.1 Heuristic Assumptions 202

5.1.2 Marr’s 2.5-D Sketch 202

5.2 Ocular Information 203

5.2.1 Accommodation 203

5.2.2 Convergence 205

5.3 Stereoscopic Information 206

5.3.1 Binocular Disparity 206

Corresponding Retinal Positions 207

The Horopter 208 Stereograms 210

5.3.2 The Correspondence Problem 211

Random Dot Stereograms 212

Autostereograms 214

Binocular Rivalry 216

5.3.3 Computational Theories 216

The First Marr-Poggio Algorithm 217

Edge-Based Algorithms 220 Filtering Algorithms 221

5.3.4 Physiological Mechanisms 222

5.3.5 Vertical Disparity 224

5.3.6 Da Vinci Stereopsis 224

5.4 Dynamic Information 225

5.4.1 Motion Parallax 225

5.4.2 Optic Flow Caused by a Moving Observer 226

5.4.3 Optic Flow Caused by Moving Objects 228

5.4.4 Accretion/Deletion of Texture 229

5.5 Pictorial Information 229

5.5.1 Perspective Projection 230

5.5.2 Convergence of Parallel Lines 231

5.5.3 Position Relative to the Horizon of a Surface 231

5.5.4 Relative Size 232

5.5.5 Familiar Size 234

5.5.6 Texture Gradients 234

5.5.7 Edge Interpretation 236

Vertex Classification 237

Four Types of Edges 237

Edge Labels 238

Physical Constraints 239

Extensions and Generalizations 241

5.5.8 Shading Information 243

Perceiving Surface Orientation from Shading 243

Horn’s Computational Analysis 245

Cast Shadows 246

5.5.9 Aerial Perspective 246

5.5.10 Integrating Information Sources 247

Dominance 247

Compromise 248 Interaction 249

5.6 Development of Depth Perception 249

5.6.1 Ocular Information 250

5.6.2 Stereoscopic Information 251

5.6.3 Dynamic Information 252

5.6.4 Pictorial Information 252

6 Organizing Objects and Scenes 254

The Problem of Perceptual Organization 255

The Experience Error 257

6.1 Perceptual Grouping 257

6.1.1 The Classical Principles of Grouping 257

6.1.2 New Principles of Grouping 259

6.1.3 Measuring Grouping Effects

Quantitatively 261

6.1.4 Is Grouping an Early or Late Process? 263

6.1.5 Past Experience 266

6.2 Region Analysis 266

6.2.1 Uniform Connectedness 268

6.2.2 Region Segmentation 269

Boundary-Based Approaches 270

Region-Based Approaches 271

Evidence from Stabilized Images 273

Parts and Parsing 274

6.2.3 Texture Segregation 275

Discovering the Features of Texture 276

Texture Segregation as a Parallel Process 276

A Theory of Texture Segregation 277

6.3 Figure/Ground Organization 280

6.3.1 Principles of Figure/Ground Organization 281

6.3.2 Ecological Considerations 283

6.3.3 Effects of Meaningfulness 284

6.3.4 The Problem of Holes 285

6.4 Visual Interpolation 287

6.4.1 Visual Completion 288

Figural Familiarity Theories 289

Figural Simplicity Theories 289

Ecological Constraint Theories 290

6.4.2 Illusory Contours 292

Relation to Visual Completion 293

Physiological Basis of Illusory Contours 294

6.4.3 Perceived Transparency 296

6.4.4 Figural Scission 298

6.4.5 The Principle of Nonaccidentalness 299

6.5 Multistability 300

6.5.1 Connectionist Network Models 301

6.5.2 Neural Fatigue 302

6.5.3 Eye Fixations 304

6.5.4 The Role of Instructions 304

6.6 Development of Perceptual Organization 305

6.6.1 The Habituation Paradigm 306

6.6.2 The Development of Grouping 306

7 Perceiving Object Properties and Parts 311

Constancy and Illusion 312

Modes of Perception: Proximal and Distal 313

Size 314

7.1.1 Size Constancy 315

The Size-Distance Relation 315

Demonstrations of Size Constancy 315

Departures from Constancy 317

Taking Account of Distance 317

Texture Occlusion 318

Relative Size 319

The Horizon Ratio 321

Development of Size Constancy 321

7.1.2 Size Illusions 322

The Moon Illusion 322

The Ponzo Illusion 324 Illusions of Relative Size 325

Occlusion Illusions 326

Shape 327

7.2.1 Shape Constancy 327 Perspective Changes 327

Two-Dimensional Figures 328

Three-Dimensional Objects 329

Development of Shape Constancy 331

7.2.2 Shape Illusions 332 Orientation 333

7.3.1 Orientation Constancy 333

7.3.2 Orientation Illusions 336 Frames of Reference 336

Geometric Illusions 337 Position 338

7.4.1 Perception of Direction 338

7.4.2 Position Constancy 339

Indirect Theories of Position Constancy 340

Direct Theories of Position Constancy 341

7.4.3 Position Illusions 342

Perceptual Adaptation 343 Parts 348

7.6.1 Evidence for Perception of Parts 348 Linguistic Evidence 348

Phenomenological Demonstrations 349

Perceptual Experiments 350

7.6.2 Part Segmentation 351

Shape Primitives 351

Boundary Rules 353

7.6.3 Global and Local Processing 354

Global Precedence 355

Configural Orientation Effects 357

Word, Object, and Configural Superiority Effects 359

Representing Shape and Structure 362

8.1 Shape Equivalence 363

8.1.1 Defining Objective Shape 364

8.1.2 Invariant Features 365

8.1.3 Transformational Alignment 367

8.1.4 Object-Centered Reference Frames 368 Geometric Coordinate Systems 369 Perceptual Reference Frames 370 Accounting for Failures of Shape Equivalence 371

Orientation and Shape 373 Heuristics in Reference Frame Selection 374

8.2 Theories of Shape Representation 377

8.2.1 Templates 377 Strengths 378 Weaknesses 379

8.2.2 Fourier Spectra 383 Strengths 384 Weaknesses 384

8.2.3 Features and Dimensions 385 Multidimensional Representations 387

Multifeatural Representations 390 Strengths 391 Weaknesses 392

8.2.4 Structural Descriptions 394

Shape Primitives 396 Strengths 397 Weaknesses 397

8.3 Figural Goodness and Pragnanz 398

8.3.1 Theories of Figural Goodness 399 Classical Information Theory 399 Rotation and Reflection Subsets 400 Symmetry Subgroups 401

8.3.2 Structural Information Theory 402 Primitive Codes 403 Removing Redundancies 403 Information Load 404 Applications to Perceptual Organization 405 Strengths 405 Weaknesses 405

Perceiving Function and Category 408

9.1 The Perception of Function 409

9.1.1 Direct Perception of Affordances 410

9.1.2 Indirect Perception of Function by Categorization 413

Four Components of Categorization 413

Comparison Processes 414 Decision Processes 414

9.2 Phenomena of Perceptual Categorization 416

9.2.1 Categorical Hierarchies 416

Prototypes 417

Basic-Level Categories 418

Entry-Level Categories 419

9.2.2 Perspective Viewing Conditions 420

Canonical Perspective 421 Priming Effects 424 Orientation Effects 426

9.2.3 Part Structure 427

9.2.4 Contextual Effects 428

9.2.5 Visual Agnosia 431

9.3 Theories of Object Categorization 433

9.3.1 Recognition by Components Theory 434 Geons 434

Nonaccidental Features 435 Geon Relations 436 Stages of Object Categorization in RBC 437 A Neural Network Implementation 438

9.3.2 Accounting for Empirical Phenomena 440 Typicality Effects 440

Entry-Level Categories 440

Viewing Conditions 441

Part Structures 442

Contextual Effects 442

Visual Agnosia 443

Weaknesses 443

9.3.3 Viewpoint-Specific Theories 444

The Case for Multiple Views 444 Aspect Graphs 445

Alignment with 3-D Models 448 Alignment with 2-D View Combinations 448

Weaknesses 451

9.4 Identifying Letters and Words 453

9.4.1 Identifying Letters 453

9.4.2 Identifying Words and Letters Within Words 455

9.4.3 The Interactive Activation Model 458 Feature Level 458

Letter Level 458

Word Level 459

Word-to-Letter Feedback 460 Problems 460

III Visual Dynamics 463

10 Perceiving Motion and Events 465

10.1 Image Motion 466

10.1.1 The Computational Problem of Motion 466

10.1.2 Continuous Motion 469

Adaptation and Aftereffects 470

Simultaneous Motion Contrast 470

The Autokinetic Effect 471

10.1.3 Apparent Motion 471

Early Gestalt Investigations 472

Motion Picture Technology 473

The Correspondence Problem of Apparent Motion 474

Short-Range versus Long-Range Apparent Motion 477

The Aperture Problem 479

10.1.4 Physiological Mechanisms 481

The Magno and Parvo Systems 481

Cortical Analysis of Motion 482

Neuropsychology of Motion Perception 483

10.1.5 Computational Theories 484

Delay-and-Compare Networks 484

Edge-Based Models 485

Spatial-Frequency-Based Models 485

Integrating Local Motion 486

10.2 Object Motion 487

10.2.1 Perceiving Object Velocity 487

10.2.2 Depth and Motion 488

Rigid Motion in Depth 489

The Kinetic Depth Effect 489

The Rigidity Heuristic and the Correspondence Problem 490

The Stereo-Kinetic Effect 491

Perception of Nonrigid Motion 492

10.2.3 Long-Range Apparent Motion 493

Apparent Rotation 493

Curved Apparent Motion 495

Conditions for Long-Range Apparent Motion 497

10.2.4 Dynamic Perceptual Organization 498

Grouping by Movement 498

Configural Motion 499

Induced Motion 501

Kinetic Completion and Illusory Figures 502

Anorthoscopic Perception 502

10.3 Self-Motion and Optic Flow 504

10.3.1 Induced Motion of the Self 504

Position and Orientation 504

Balance and Posture 506

10.3.2 Perceiving Self-Motion 506

Direction of Self-Motion 506

Speed of Self-Motion 509

Virtual Reality and Ecological Perception 510

10.4 Understanding Events 511

10.4.1 Biological Motion 511

10.4.2 Perceiving Causation 513

Launching, Triggering, and Entraining Events 513

Perceiving Mass Relations 514

10.4.3 Intuitive Physics 515

Recognizing versus Generating Answers 515

Particle versus Extended Body Motion 517

11 Visual Selection: Eye Movements and Attention

519

11.1 Eye Movements 520

11.1.1 Types of Eye Movements 521

Physiological Nystagmus 521

Saccadic Movements 523

Smooth Pursuit Movements 524

Vergence Movements 525

Vestibular Movements 525

Optokinetic Movements 526

11.1.2 The Physiology of the Oculomotor System 527

11.1.3 Saccadic Exploration of the Visual Environment 528

Patterns of Fixations 528

Transsaccadic Integration 531

11.2 Visual Attention 531

11.2.1 Early versus Late Selection 533

Auditory Attention 533

The Inattention Paradigm 534

The Attentional Blink 537

Change Blindness 538

Intentionally Ignored Information 539

11.2.2 Costs and Benefits of Attention 541

The Attentional Cuing Paradigm 542

Voluntary versus Involuntary Shifts of Attention 543

Three Components of Shifting Attention 544

11.2.3 Theories of Spatial Attention 544

The Spotlight Metaphor 545

The Zoom Lens Metaphor 546

Space-Based versus Object-Based Approaches 547

11.2.4 Selective Attention to Properties 549

The Stroop Effect 549

Integral versus Separable Dimensions 550

11.2.5 Distributed versus Focused Attention 554

Visual Pop-Out 554

Search Asymmetry 556

11.2.6 Feature Integration Theory 556

Conjunction Search 557

Texture Segregation 558

Illusory Conjunctions 558

Problems with Feature Integration Theory 559

Object Files 561

11.2.7 The Physiology of Attention 563

Unilateral Neglect 563

Balint’s Syndrome 565

Brain Imaging Studies 566

Electrophysiological Studies 567

11.2.8 Attention and Eye Movements 568

12 Visual Memory and Imagery 572

12.1 Visual Memory 573

12.1.1 Three Memory Systems 573

12.1.2 Iconic Memory 575

The Partial Report Procedure 575

Duration 576

Content 576

Maintenance 577

Loss 577

Masking 578

Persistence versus Processing 579

12.1.3 Visual Short-Term Memory 580

Visual STM versus Iconic Memory 581

Visual STM versus Visual LTM 582

The Visuo-Spatial Scratch Pad 584

Transsaccadic Memory 585

Conceptual Short-Term Memory 586

12.1.4 Visual Long-Term Memory 588

Three Types of LTM 588

Visual Routines 589

Recall versus Recognition 589

How Good Is Episodic Visual LTM? 590

Visual Imagery as a Mnemonic Device 591

Dual Coding Theory 592

Photographic Memory 593

Mnemonists 594

Neuropsychology of Visual Memory 594

12.1.5 Memory Dynamics 596

Tendencies toward Goodness 596

Effects of Verbal Labels 597

The Misinformation Effect 597

Representational Momentum 601

12.2 Visual Imagery 602

12.2.1 The Analog/Propositional Debate 603

The Analog Position 603

The Propositional Position 604

12.2.2 Mental Transformations 605

Mental Rotation 605

Other Transformations 606

12.2.3 Image Inspection 607

Image Scanning 607

Image Size Effects 607

Mental Psychophysics 608

Reinterpreting Images 608

12.2.4 Kosslyn’s Model of Imagery 609

12.2.5 The Relation of Imagery to Perception 611

Behavioral Evidence 611

Neuropsychological Evidence 612

Brain Imaging Studies 613

13 Visual Awareness 615

13.1 Philosophical Foundations 618

13.1.1 The Mind-Body Problem 618

Dualism 618

Idealism 620

Materialism 621

Behaviorism 621

Functionalism 623

Supervenience 624

13.1.2 The Problem of Other Minds 624

Criteria for Consciousness 624

The Inverted Spectrum Argument 625

Phenomenological Criteria 627

Behavioral Criteria 628

Physiological Criteria 629

Correlational versus Causal Theories 630

13.2 Neuropsychology of Visual Awareness 630

13.2.1 Split-Brain Patients 631

13.2.2 Blindsight 633

The Case History of D.B. 633

Accurate Guessing without Visual Experience 634

The Two Visual Systems Hypothesis 635

Methodological Challenges 635

13.2.3 Unconscious Processing in Neglect and Balint’s Syndrome 636

13.2.4 Unconscious Face Recognition in Prosopagnosia 637

13.3 Visual Awareness in Normal Observers 638

13.3.1 Perceptual Defense 638

13.3.2 Subliminal Perception 639

Marcel’s Experiments 639

Objective versus Subjective Thresholds of Awareness 641

Functional Correlates of Consciousness 642

13.3.3 Inattentional Blindsight 643

13.4 Theories of Consciousness 644

13.4.1 Functional Architecture Theories 645

The STM Hypothesis 645

An Activation-Based Conception of STM 646

The Attention Hypothesis 647

Working Memory Theories 648

The 2.5-D Sketch Theory of Consciousness 649

13.4.2 Biological Theories 649

Activation Thresholds 650

Duration Thresholds 651

The Cortical Hypothesis 651

The Crick/Koch Conjectures 652

ERTAS: The Extended ReticularThalamic Activating System 654

Causal Theories of Consciousness: An Analogy 655

13.4.3 Consciousness and the Limits of Science 656

Relational Structure 657

The Isomorphism Constraint 658

Relation to Functionalism 659

Biology to the Rescue? 661

Appendix A: Psychophysical Methods 665

A. 1 Measuring Thresholds 665

A. 1 1 Method of Adjustment 666

A. 1 2 Method of Limits 666

A. 1.3 Method of Constant Stimuli 666

A. 1 4 The Theoretical Status of Thresholds 667

A.2 Signal Detection Theory 668

A.2.1 Response Bias 668

A.2.2 The Signal Detection Paradigm 668

A.2.3 The Theory of Signal Detectability 669

A.3 Difference Thresholds 671

A.3.1 Just Noticeable Differences 671

A.3.2 Weber’s Law 671

A. 4 Psychophysical Scaling 672

A.4.1 Fechner’s Law 672

A. 4.2 Stevens’s Law 673

Appendix B: Connectionist

B. l Network Behavior 676

Modeling 675

B. 1 1 Unit Behavior 677

Combining Input Activation 677

Determining Output Activation 678

B. 1 2 System Architecture 678

Feedforward Networks 678

Feedback Networks 678

Symmetric Networks 679

Winner-Take-All Networks 679

B. 1 3 Systemic Behavior 679

Graceful Degradation 679

Settling into a Stable State 680

Soft Constraint Satisfaction 680

Pattern Completion 680

B.2 Connectionist Learning Algorithms 681

B.2.1 Back Propagation 681

The Delta Rule 682

The Generalized Delta Rule 683

B. 2 2 Gradient Descent 683

Input Vector Space 683

Partitioning the Input Vector Space 684

State Space 684

Weight Space 685

Weight-Error Space 686

Gradient Descent 686

Local versus Global Minima 686

Appendix C: Color Technology 689

C.l Additive versus Subtractive Color Mixture 690

C. 1.1 Adding versus Multiplying Spectra 691

C.l.2 Maxwell’s Color Triangle 691

C. 1 3 C.I.E. Color Space 692

C.1.4 Subtractive Color Mixture Space? 693

C.2 Color Television 694

C.3 Paints and Dyes 696

C.3.1 Subtractive Combination of Paints 696

C.3.2 Additive Combination of Paints 697

C.4 Color Photography 697

C.5 Color Printing 699

Glossary 701 References 737

Name Index 771

Subject Index 780

Preface

Writing this book has been a long and difficult under¬ taking. Because several good textbooks are available that present the basic facts about vision in a clear and readable fashion, the reader may wonder why I em¬ barked on this journey. Indeed, I often wonder myself! It was not that I thought I could do a better job at what these other books do. Truthfully, I doubt I could. It was that I felt the need for a different kind of textbook, one that accurately reflects the way most modern research scientists think about vision. In fact, the scientific under¬ standing of visual perception has changed profoundly over the past 25 years, and almost all the current text¬ books are still in the “old” mold in both structure and content. New results are included, of course, but the new approach to vision is not.

So what is this new approach? The change in the na¬ ture of visual research began in the 1970s, resulting from the gradual emergence of an interdisciplinary field that I will call vision science. It arose at the intersection of several existing disciplines in which scientists were concerned with image understanding: how the structure of optical images was (or could be) processed to extract useful information about the environment. Perceptual psychologists, psychophysicists, computer scientists, neu¬ rophysiologists, and neuropsychologists who study vision started talking and listening to each other at this time because they began to recognize that they were working on the same problem from different but compatible and complementary perspectives. Vision science is a branch of a larger interdisciplinary endeavor known as cogni¬ tive science that began at about the same time. Cog¬ nitive science is the study of all mental states and processes—not just visual ones—from an even greater variety of methodologically distinct fields, including not only psychology, computer science, and neuroscience, but also linguistics, philosophy, anthropology, sociology, and others. In my own view, vision science is not just one branch of cognitive science, but the single most co-

herent, integrated, and successful branch of cognitive science.

Central to this new approach is the idea that vision is a kind of computation. In living organisms, it occurs in eyes and brains through complex neural information processing, but it can, at least in theory, also take place when information from video cameras is fed to properly programmed digital computers. This idea has had an important unifying effect on the study of vision, en¬ abling psychologists, computer scientists, and physiolo¬ gists to relate their findings to each other in the common language of computation. Vision researchers from dis¬ parate fields now read and cite each other’s work regu¬ larly, participate in interdisciplinary conferences, and collaborate on joint research projects. Indeed, the study of vision is rapidly becoming a unified field in which the boundaries between the component disciplines have become largely transparent.

This interdisciplinary convergence has dominated the cutting edge of vision research for more than two dec¬ ades, but it is curiously underrepresented or even absent in most modern textbooks about perception. One reason is that most textbooks that cover vision also include hearing, taste, touch, and smell. With the exception of hearing, the computational approach has not yet gained a firm foothold in these other sensory modalities. The attempt to provide a consistent framework for research in all modalities thus precludes using the computational approach so dominant in vision research.

Another reason the computational approach to vision has not been well represented in textbooks is that its essential core is theoretical, and introductory textbook authors tend to shy away from theory. The reasons are several, having to do partly with many authors’ lack of computational background, partly with the difficulty of presenting complex quantitative theories clearly without overwhelming the reader, and partly with students’ de¬ sire to learn only things that are “right.” In the final analysis, all phenomena are “right,” and all theories (except one) are presumably “wrong”—although some are “wronger” than others. Students are understandably wary of expending much effort on learning a theory that is surely flawed in some way or other. Such consid¬ erations have led to a generation of textbooks that are as theoretically neutral as possible, usually by being as atheoretical as possible. But the importance of theories in science lies not so much in their ultimate truth or

falsity as in the crucial role they play in understanding known phenomena and in predicting new ones. Given that we have few, if any, truly adequate theories in vision science yet, virtually every insight we have into known phenomena and every predicted new one have been generated by incorrect theories! They are, quite simply, an essential component of vision science.

In this book I have therefore taken the position that it is just as important for students of vision to understand theories as to know about phenomena. Most chapters include a healthy dose of theory, and some (e.g., Chap¬ ters 2 and 8) are almost entirely theoretical. But I have tried to do more than simply catalog bits and pieces of existing theory; I have tried to present a theoretical syn¬ thesis that is internally consistent and globally coherent. This is a tall order, to be sure, for the classical theories of visual perception seem so different as to be diametri¬ cally opposed. Structuralist theory, for example, claimed that wholes are nothing but associations of elementary parts, whereas Gestalt theory championed the primacy of wholes over parts. Helmholtz’s theory of unconscious inference claimed that vision is mediated by thoughtlike deductions, whereas Gibson’s ecological theory coun¬ tered that perception is direct and unmediated. How can a theoretically coherent position be fashioned from such diverse and contradictory components? I do not claim to have succeeded completely in this synthesis, for I do have to deny some important tenets of certain posi¬ tions. But not many. Much has been made of differences that are more apparent than real, and I believe that the computational approach presented in this book can span the vast majority of them without strain. The strong form of Gibson’s claim for direct perception is an ex¬ ception, but weaker forms of this view are quite com¬ patible with the computational view taken in this book, as I explain in Chapter 2.

The unified theoretical viewpoint I present is not so much my own theory as my construction of what I think of as the current “modal theory.” Experts on vision will naturally find aspects of it to which they take exception, but I believe the vast majority will find it consistent with most of their firmly held beliefs. The theoretical frame¬ work I advocate owes much to the influential proposals of the late David Marr and his colleagues at MIT, but this is true of the field in general. In many cases, I have generalized Marr’s specific proposals to make clear how his own detailed theories were examples of a more gen-

eral framework into which a variety of other specific theories fit quite comfortably. Even so, I do not consider the view I describe as exclusively or even primarily Marr’s; it owes just as much to classical perceptual theo¬ rists such as Helmholtz, Wertheimer, Gibson, and Rock. The interweaving of such diverse theoretical ideas is not difficult to achieve, provided one avoids divisive dogma and instead concentrates on the positive contributions of each view.

Because the book is much more theoretical and inter¬ disciplinary than most perception textbooks, it is corre¬ spondingly longer and more difficult. It is designed for an upper division undergraduate course or an entry-level graduate course on vision, most likely as part of a pro¬ gram of study in psychology, cognitive science, or op¬ tometry. I have tried to explain both theories and phenomena clearly enough to be understood by intelli¬ gent, motivated students with no prior background in the field of vision. I do presume that readers have some basic understanding of behavioral experiments, com¬ puter programming, and neurobiology. Those who are unfamiliar with this material may find certain portions of the text more difficult and have to work harder as a result, but the technical prerequisites are intended to be relatively few and low-level, mainly high school geome¬ try and algebra.

Despite the strongly interdisciplinary nature of this book, it is written primarily from a psychological per¬ spective. The reason is simply that I am a psychologist by training, and no matter how seriously I have read the literature in computer vision and visual neuroscience, the core of my viewpoint is still psychological. In keep¬ ing with this perspective, I have avoided presenting the complex mathematical details that would be central to a computer scientist’s presentation of the same topics and the biological details that would figure prominently in a neuroscientist’s presentation. By the same token, I have included details of experimental methods and results that they might well have omitted by nonpsychologists. Vision science may have made the boundaries between disciplines more transparent, but it has not eliminated them. Psychologists still perform experiments on sighted organisms, computer scientists still write programs that extract and transform optical information, and neuro¬ scientists still study the structure and function of the visual nervous system. Such methodological differences will not disappear. Indeed, they should not disappear,

because they are precisely what makes an interdisciplin¬ ary approach desirable. What is needed is a group of vision scientists who are well versed in all these dis¬ ciplines. It is my sincere hope that this book will help create such a community of scientists.

In addition to being used as a textbook, I hope that this book will be useful as a reference text for members of the expanding vision science community. Although the sections describing one’s own field of specialization may seem elementary, the rest of the book can provide useful background material and relatively sophisticated introductions to other areas of vision research. The cov¬ erage is not intended to be at the same level as a profes¬ sional handbook, in which each chapter is expected to be a definitive treatment of a specific topic written by a world-class expert for an audience of other experts, but it is also more accessible and internally consistent than any handbook I have ever seen. It is therefore particu¬ larly useful for someone who wants to get a global view of vision science—the “lay of the land,” if you will— within which the focused chapters that one finds in pro¬ fessional handbooks will fit comfortably and make more sense.

Organization of the Book

Because the aim of this book is to integrate material across disciplines, each chapter includes findings from many different approaches. There is no “physiology chapter,” no “psychophysics chapter,” no “devel¬ opmental chapter,” no “neuropsychology chapter,” and no “computational chapter” in which the separate and often conflicting mini-views within each of these dis¬ ciplines can be conveniently described in isolation. I have avoided this approach because it compartmental¬ izes knowledge, blocking the kind of synthesis that I am trying to achieve and that I view as essential for progress in the field. Rather, the topic of each chapter is discussed from the perspectives of all relevant disciplines, some¬ times including those that writers of textbooks on vision traditionally ignore, such as computer science, philoso¬ phy, and linguistic anthropology. Even within the more standard visual disciplines, the coverage is not uniform because the distribution of knowledge is not uniform. We know a great deal more about the physiology of early image processing, for example, than we do about the physiology of categorization and visual imagery.

This unevenness is merely a reflection of the current state of understanding.

The overall organization of the book is defined by its three parts: Foundations, Spatial Vision, and Visual Dynamics.

Foundations. The Foundations section covers a basic introduction to the interdisciplinary science of vision. Chapter 1 introduces the problem of visual perception and sets forth an interdisciplinary framework for ap¬ proaching it. It covers many of the most important perceptual, optical, and physiological facts on which vision is based. Chapter 2 then discusses theoretical approaches to vision from an historical perspective. It covers the classical theories of vision as well as the infor¬ mation processing (or computational) approach, includ¬ ing several important proposals from the work of the late David Marr (1982) that play a large role in defining the superstructure of the rest of the book. The key idea is that visual perception can be analyzed into a sequence of four basic stages: one that deals with extracting image structure (Marr’s “primal sketch”), one that deals with recovering surfaces in depth (Marr’s “2.5-D sketch”), one that deals with describing 3-D objects (Marr’s “vol¬ umetric descriptions”), and one that deals with identify¬ ing objects in terms of known categories. This sequence of processes—which I call image-based, surface-based, objectbased, and category-based—is then traced for each of the major topics covered in the book: color, space, and mo¬ tion perception. The final chapter of the Foundations section, Chapter 3, is a long but important one. It tells “the color story,” which spans vision science from the physiology of retinal receptors to the linguistic analysis of color names in different cultures of the world. Its importance derives from the fact that the current under¬ standing of color processing illustrates better than any other single example in all of cognitive science why an integrated, interdisciplinary approach is necessary for a complete understanding of a perceptual domain.

Spatial Vision. Chapters 4 through 9 cover spatial perception as a sequence of processes: extracting image structure (Chapter 4), recovering oriented surfaces in depth (Chapter 5), organizing perception into coherent objects (Chapter 6), perceiving object properties and parts (Chapter 7), representing shape (Chapter 8), and identifying objects as members of known categories

(Chapter 9). This material on spatial processing of im¬ ages is the heart and soul of classical visual perception. Because it is much more complex than color processing, we understand it much less well. It is hard at times not to be overwhelmed by the mountains of facts and frus¬ trated at the lack of good theory, but I believe we are beginning to get some clearer notion of how this all fits together.

Visual Dynamics. The final section concerns percep¬ tual dynamics: how visual perception and its aftereffects change over time. Perception of motion and events is the first topic considered (Chapter 10), being essentially an extension of spatial perception to the domain of space-time. Then we discuss ways in which the visual system selects different information over time by makingovert eye movements and covert attentional adjustments (Chapter 11). Next we consider memory for visual infor¬ mation within a multistore framework—iconic memory, short-term visual memory, and long-term visual mem¬ ory—and examine how such stored information can be reconstructed and transformed in visual imagery (Chap¬ ter 12). Finally, Chapter 13 takes up what is perhaps the most fascinating of all topics: the nature of visual awareness (and its absence in certain neurological syn¬ dromes) and various attempts at explaining it. This topic is very much on the cutting edge of modern vision sci¬ ence and is finally getting the attention that it deserves.

Tailoring the Book to Different Needs

Because the book contains more topics and material than can comfortably fit into any single-term under¬ graduate course, instructors are encouraged to be selec¬ tive in using it. I have included too much rather than too little because I find it easier to skip what I do not want to cover in a single unified textbook than to find external readings that cover the desired material at an appropri¬ ate level and in a framework that is compatible with the main textbook—a nearly impossible task, I have found. There are several ways of tailoring the present book to different needs. Most obviously, certain chapters can be skipped in their entirety. For example, if color is not a high priority, Chapter 3 can be omitted with only minor ramifications for later chapters. Chapter 10 on motion perception is likewise reasonably independent of the rest of the book. For courses that are restricted to

classical visual perception, Chapter 11 on eye move¬ ments and attention and Chapter 12 on memory and imagery are probably the least relevant. A course em¬ phasizing high-level vision can reasonably omit Chapter 4 on image-based processing.

Another approach to selective coverage is omitting subsections within chapters. For traditional courses on the psychology of vision, the sections on computational theory and other technical material may be eliminated or assigned as optional. (One effective approach I have used is to teach an honors section of the course for addi¬ tional credit in which the more difficult material is required and other sections for which it is not.) Elimi¬ nating this material has the advantages of making the book substantially shorter and easier to understand for students with less technical backgrounds. The devel¬ opmental sections can also generally be omitted without much affecting the book’s continuity and cohesion.

For students with strong scientific backgrounds who are highly motivated to learn about modern vision science, I encourage instructors to use as much of the book as possible. It is perfectly reasonable, for example, to cover the entire book in a graduate course on vision that lasts a full semester.

Acknowledgments

There are many people I wish to thank for helping me in various phases of writing this book. First and foremost, I gratefully acknowledge my debt to my late colleague and friend, Irvin Rock, to whom this book is dedicated. Irv not only taught me about perception in his own gen¬ tle, probing, inimitable way, but he also read and com¬ mented on earlier drafts of the first nine chapters before his death in 1995. Moreover, his 1975 textbook An Intro¬ duction to Perception served as a model for this one in cer¬ tain important ways. In that book, Irv tried to present the phenomena of visual perception at an introductory level yet within a coherent and principled theoretical view of perception as a problem solving process. While it was still in print, it was my favorite perception text, and I know that some instructors continue to use it in photocopied readers to this day.

Irv’s influence on this book has been substantial, as careful readers will surely discover. Had he lived, I be¬ lieve his continued contributions would have improved it further and kept me from making some mistakes I

doubtless have made in his absence. After Irv’s death, Arien Mack, one of Irv’s most distinguished students and collaborators, became my primary reviewer for the remaining chapters of the book. One or the other of them has read and commented on every chapter. Many other experts in vision science have also read more limited portions of the book, either at my own request or at that of MIT Press, and provided valuable comments on material in their specialty areas. I wish to thank the following scholars, plus several anonymous re¬ viewers, for the time and effort they spent in evaluating portions of the manuscript:

Chapter 1: Irvin Rock, Jack Gallant, Paul Kube

Chapter 2: Irvin Rock, James Cutting, Ulric Neisser, Paul Kube, Jitendra Malik, and an anonymous re¬ viewer

Chapter 3: Irvin Rock, Karen DeValois, Alan Gilchrist, C. Lawrence Hardin, Paul Kay, and an anonymous reviewer

Chapter 4: Irvin Rock, Jitendra Malik, Jack Gallant, Ken Nakayama, and an anonymous reviewer

Chapter 5: Irvin Rock, Jitendra Malik, Ken Nakayama, and an anonymous reviewer

Chapter 6: Irvin Rock, Jitendra Malik, and Michael Kubovy

Chapter 7: Irvin Rock, Arien Mack, and an anonymous reviewer

Chapter 8: Irvin Rock, John Hummel, and an anony¬ mous reviewer

Chapter 9: Irvin Rock, John Hummel, and an anony¬ mous reviewer

Chapter 10: Arien Mack, James Cutting, Dennis Prof¬ fitt, and an anonymous reviewer

Chapter 11: Arien Mack, Michael Posner, Anne Treisman, and William Prinzmetal

Chapter 12: Arien Mack and Martha Farah

Chapter 13: Arien Mack, Alison Gopnik, John Watson, Bruce Mangan, Bernard Baars, and C. Lawrence Hardin

Appendix A: Ken Nakayama and Ervin Hafter

Appendix B: John Kruschke and Jerome Leldman

Appendix C: Alan Gilchrist

Several students, postdoctoral fellows, and visitors in my lab have also taken the time to comment on various portions of the book. Without differentiating among chapters, I wish to thank Daniel Levitin, Elisabeth Pa-

chiere, Joel Norman, Akira Shimaya, Diane Beck, Justin Beck, Sheryl Ehrlich, Craig Fox, Jonathan Neff, Charles Schreiber, and Christopher Stecker for their helpful comments. In addition, I would like to thank Christo¬ pher Linnett, Sheryl Ehrlich, Diane Beck, Thomas Leung, William Prinzmetal, Gregory Larson for doing some of the more complex and technical illustra¬ tions, Lisa Hamilton for working on design issues, and Richard Powers for improving my work environment. For their help in copy editing and preparing the final manuscript for production, I would like to thank Bar¬ bara Willette and Peggy Gordon, respectively. Last, but not least, I must thank Edward Hubbard for his tireless help in tracking down references, obtaining permission to reprint figures, checking page proofs, and generally overseeing the final stages of preparing the manuscript for publication.

This book took a long time to write—certainly a good deal longer than I had planned or than I would like to admit—and its writing put a significant strain on all other aspects of my life. During this time, many people have contributed emotional support and understanding, for which they are due both thanks for their help and apologies for the time this project has stolen from them. They include Paul Harris, Stephen Forsling, David Shiver, and Andy Utiger, as well as Linda, Emily, and Nathan Palmer.

Foundations

An Introduction to Vision Science

1.1 Visual Perception

1.1.1 Defining Visual Perception

1.1.2 The Evolutionary Utility of Vision

1.1.3 Perception as a Constructive Act

Adaptation and Aftereffects

Reality and Illusion

Ambiguous Figures

1.1.4 Perception as Modeling the Environment

Visual Completion

Impossible Objects

Predicting the Future

1.1.5 Perception as Apprehension of Meaning

Classification

Attention and Consciousness

1.2 Optical Information

1.2.1 The Behavior of Light

Illumination

Interaction with Surfaces

The Ambient Optic Array

1.2.2 The Formation of Images

Optical Images

Projective Geometry

Perspective and Orthographic Projection

1.2.3 Vision as an “Inverse” Problem

1.3 Visual Systems

1.3.1 The Human Eye

Eye and Brain

Anatomy of the Eye

Physiological Optics

1.3.2 The Retina

Neurons

Photoreceptors

Peculiarities of Retinal Design

Pathways to the Brain

1.3.3 Visual Cortex

Localization of Function

Occipital Cortex

Parietal and Temporal Cortex

Mapping Visual Cortex

The Physiological Pathways Hypothesis

Most of us take completely for granted our ability to see the world around us. How we do it seems no great mystery: We just open our eyes and look! When we do, we perceive a complex array of meaningful objects located in three-dimensional space. For example, Figure 1.1.1 shows a typical scene on the Berkeley campus of the University of California: some students walking through Sather Gate, with trees and the distinc¬ tive Campanile bell tower in the background. We per¬ ceive all this so quickly and effortlessly that it is hard to imagine there being anything very complicated about it. Yet, when viewed critically as an ability that must be explained, visual perception is so incredibly complex that it seems almost a miracle that we can do it at all.

The rich fabric of visual experience that results from viewing natural scenes like the one in Figure 1.1.1 arises when the neural tissues at the back of the eyes are stimulated by a two-dimensional pattern of light that in¬ cludes only bits and pieces of the objects being per¬ ceived. Most of the Campanile, for example, is hidden behind the trees, and parts of the trees are occluded by the towers of the gate. We don’t perceive the Campanile as floating in the air or the trees as having tower-shaped holes cut in them where we cannot currently see them. Even objects that seem to be fully visible, such as the gate towers and the students, can be seen only in part because their far sides are occluded by their near sides. How, then, are we able so quickly and effortlessly to perceive the meaningful, coherent, three-dimensional scene that we obviously do experience from the incom¬ plete, two-dimensional pattern of light that enters our eyes?

This is the fundamental question of vision, and the rest of this book is an extended inquiry into its answer from a scientific point of view. It is no accident that I began the book with a question, for the first step in any scientific enterprise is asking questions about things that are normally taken for granted. Many more questions will prove to be important in the course of our dis¬ cussions. A few of them are listed here:

• Why do objects appear colored?

• How can we determine whether an object is large and distant or small and close?

• How do we perceive which regions in a visual image are parts of the same object?

Figure 1.1.1 A real-world scene on the Berkeley campus. Viewers perceive students walking near Sather Gate with the Campanile bell tower behind a row of trees, even though none of these objects are visible in their entirety. Perception must some¬ how infer the bottom of the bell tower, the trees behind the gate towers, and the far sides of all these objects from the parts that are visible.

• How do we know what the objects that we see are for?

• How can we tell whether we are moving relative to objects in the environment or they are moving relative to us?

• Do newborn babies see the world in the same way we do?

• Can people “see” without being aware of what they see?

Posing such questions is just the first step of our jour¬ ney, however, for we must then try to find the answers. The majority of this book will be devoted to describing how vision scientists do this and what they have discovered about seeing as a result. It turns out that different parts of the answers come from a variety of different disciplines—biology, psychology, computer science, neuropsychology, linguistics, and cognitive an¬ thropology—all of which are part of the emerging field of cognitive science. The premise of cognitive science is that the problems of cognition will be solved more quickly and completely by attacking them from as many perspectives as possible.

The modern study of vision certainly fits this in¬ terdisciplinary mold. It is rapidly becoming a tightly integrated field at the intersection of many related

disciplines, each of which provides different pieces of the jigsaw puzzle. This interdisciplinary field, which I will call vision science, is part of cognitive science. In this book, I try to convey a sense of the excitement that it is generating among the scientists who study vision and of the promise that it holds for reaching a new understanding about how we see.

In this initial chapter, I will set the stage for the rest of the book by providing an introductory framework for understanding vision in terms of three domains: 1. phenomena of visual perception, 2. the nature of optical information, and 3. the physiology of the visual nervous system. The view presented in this book is that an understanding of all three domains and the relations among them is required to explain vision. In the first section of this chapter, we will consider the nature of visual perception itself from an evolutionary perspective, asking what it is for. We will define it, talk about some of its most salient properties, and examine its usefulness in coupling organisms to their environments for survival. Next, we will consider the nature of optical information, because all vision ultimately rests on the structure of light re¬ flected into the eyes from surfaces in the environment. Finally, we will describe the physiology of the part of the nervous system that underlies our ability to see. The eyes are important, to be sure, but just as crucial are huge portions of the brain, much of which vision scientists are only beginning to understand. In each domain, the coverage in this introductory chapter will be rudimen¬ tary and incomplete. But it is important to realize from the very beginning that only by understanding all three domains and the relations among them can we achieve a full and satisfying scientific explanation of what it means to see. What we learn here forms the scaffold onto which we can fit the more detailed presentations in later chapters.

1.1 Visual Perception

Until now, I have been taking for granted that you know what I mean by “visual perception.” I do so in large part because I assume that you are reading the words on this page using your own eyes and therefore know what

Figure 1.1.2 The eye-camera analogy. The eye is much like a camera in the nature of its optics: Both form an upside-down image by admitting light through a variable-sized opening and focusing it on a two-dimensional surface using a transparent lens.

visual experiences are like. Before we go any further, however, we ought to have an explicit definition.

1.1.1 Defining Visual Perception

In the context of this book, visual perception will be defined as the process of acquiring knowledge about en¬ vironmental objects and events by extracting informa¬ tion from the light they emit or reflect. Several aspects of this definition are worth noting:

1. Visual perception concerns the acquisition ofknowledge. This means that vision is fundamentally a cognitive activity (from the Latin cognoscere, meaning to know or learn), distinct from purely optical processes such as photographic ones. Certain physical similarities between cameras and eyes suggest that perception is analogous to taking a picture, as illustrated in Figure 1.1.2. There are indeed important similarities between eyes and cameras in terms of optical phenomena, as we will see in Section 1.2, but there are no similarities whatever in terms of perceptual phenomena. Cameras have no perceptual capabilities at all; that is, they do not know anything about the scenes they record. Photographic images merely contain information, whereas sighted people and animals acquire knowledge about their environments. It is this knowledge that enables perceivers to act appro¬ priately in a given situation.

2. The knowledge achieved by visual perception con¬ cerns objects and events in the environment. Perception is not merely about an observer’s subjective visual experiences, because we would not say that even highly detailed hallucinations or visual images would count as visual perception. We will, in fact, be very interested in the nature of people’s subjective experience—particularly in Chapter 13 when we discuss visual awareness in detail—but it is part of visual perception only when it signifies something about the nature of external reality.

3. Visual knowledge about the environment is obtained by extracting information. This aspect of our definition implies a certain “metatheoretical” approach to under¬ standing visual perception and cognition, one that is based on the concept of information and how it is pro¬ cessed. We will discuss this information processing approach more fully in Chapter 2, but for now suffice it to say that it is an approach that allows vision scientists to talk about how people see in the same terms as they talk about how computers might be programmed to see. Again, we will have more to say about the prospects for sighted computers in Chapter 13 when we discuss the problem of visual awareness.

4. The information that is processed in visual percep¬ tion comes from the light that is emitted or rflected by ob¬ jects. Optical information is the foundation of all vision. It results from the way in which physical surfaces inter¬ act with light in the environment. Because this re¬ structuring of light determines what information about objects is available for vision in the first place, it is the appropriate starting point for any systematic analysis of vision (Gibson, 1950). As we will see in Section 1.2, most of the early problems in understanding vision arise from the difficulty of undoing what happens when light projects from a three-dimensional world onto the twodimensional surfaces at the back of the eyes. The study of what information is contained in these projected images is therefore an important frontier of research in vision science, one that computational theorists are con¬ stantly exploring to find new sources of information that vision might employ.

1.1.2 The Evolutionary Utility of Vision

Now that we have considered what visual perception is, we should ask what it is for. Given its biological impor¬ tance to a wide variety of animals, the answer must be

that vision evolved to aid in the survival and successful reproduc¬ tion of organisms. Desirable objects and situations—such as nourishing food, protective shelter, and desirable mates—must be sought out and approached. Danger¬ ous objects and situations—such as precipitous drops, falling objects, and hungry or angry predators—must be avoided or fled from. Thus, to behave in an evolutionarily adaptive manner, we must somehow get informa¬ tion about what objects are present in the world around us, where they are located, and what opportunities they afford us. All of the senses—seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling—participate in this endeavor.

There are some creatures for which nonvisual senses play the dominant role—such as hearing in the naviga¬ tion of bats—but for homo sapiens, as well as for many other species, vision is preeminent. The reason is that vision provides spatially accurate information from a distance. It gives a perceiver highly reliable information about the locations and properties of environmental ob¬ jects while they are safely distant. Hearing and smell sometimes provide information from even greater dis¬ tances, but they are seldom as accurate in identifying and locating objects, at least for humans. Touch and taste provide the most direct information about certain properties of objects because they operate only when the objects are actually in contact with our bodies, but they provide no information at all from farther distances. Evolutionarily speaking, visual perception is useful only if it is reasonably accurate. If the information in light were insufficient to tell one object from another or to know where they are in space, vision never would have evolved to the exquisite level it has in humans. In fact, light is an enormously rich source of environmental information, and human vision exploits it to a high degree. Indeed, vision is useful precisely because it is so accurate. By and large, whatyou see is whatyou get. When this is true, we have what is called veridical percep¬ tion (from the Latin veridicus meaning to say truthfully): perception that is consistent with the actual state of af¬ fairs in the environment. This is almost always the case with vision, and it is probably why we take vision so completely for granted. It seems like a perfectly clear window onto reality. But is it really?

In the remainder of this section, I will argue that per¬ ception is not a clear window onto reality, but an actively constructed, meaningful model of the environment that allows perceivers to predict what will happen in the

future so that they can take appropriate action and thereby increase their chances of survival. In making this argument, we will touch on several of the most important phenomena of visual perception, ones to which we will return at various points later in this book.

1.1.3 Perception as a Constructive Act

The first issue that we must challenge is whether what you see is necessarily what you get: Is visual perception unerringly veridical? This question is important because the answer will tell us whether or not vision should be conceived as a “clear window onto reality.”

Adaptation and Aftereffects. One kind of evidence that visual experience is not a clear window onto reality is provided by the fact that visual perception changes over time as it adapts to particular conditions. When you first enter a darkened movie theater on a bright af¬ ternoon, for instance, you cannot see much except the images on the screen. After just a few minutes, however, you can see the people seated near you, and after 20 mi¬ nutes or so, you can see the whole theater surprisingly well. This increase in sensitivity to light is called dark adaptation. The theater walls and distant people were there all along; you just could not see them at first be¬ cause your visual system was not sensitive enough. Another everyday example of dark adaptation arises in gazing at stars. When you leave a brightly lit room to go outside on a cloudless night, the stars at first may seem disappointingly dim and few in number. After you have been outside for just a few minutes, however, they appear considerably brighter and far more numerous. And after 20-30 minutes, you see the heavens awash with thousands of stars that you could not see at first. The reason is not that the stars emit more light as you continue to gaze at them, but that your visual system has become more sensitive to the light that they do emit. Adaptation is a very general phenomenon in visual perception. As we will see in many later chapters, visual experience becomes less intense1 as a result of prolonged exposure to a wide variety of different kinds of stimula¬ tion: color, orientation, size, and motion, to name just a

few. These changes in visual experience show that visual perception is not always a clear window onto reality be¬ cause we have different visual experiences of the same physical environment at different stages of adaptation. What changes over time is our visual system, not the environment. Even so, one could sensibly argue that although some things may fail to be perceived because of adaptation, whatever is perceived is an accurate reflection of reality. This modified view can be shown to be incorrect, however, by another result of prolonged or very intense stimulation: the existence of visual aftereffects.

When someone takes a picture of you with a flash, you first experience a blinding blaze of light. This is a veridical perception, but it is followed by a prolonged experience of a dark spot where you saw the initial flash. This afterimage is superimposed on whatever else you look at for the next few minutes, altering your subse¬ quent visual experiences so that you see something that is not there. Clearly, this is not veridical perception be¬ cause the afterimage lasts long after the physical flash is gone.

Not all aftereffects make you see things that are not there; others cause you to misperceive properties of visible objects. Figure 1.1.3 shows an example called an orientation aftereffect. First, examine the two striped gratings on the right to convince yourself that they are vertical and identical to each other. Then look at the two tilted gratings on the left for about a minute by fixating on the bar between them and moving your gaze back and forth along it. Then look at the square between the two gratings on the right. The top grating now looks tilted to the left, and the bottom one looks tilted to the right. These errors in perception are further evidence that what you see results from an interaction between the external world and the present state of your visual nervous system.

Reality and Illusion. There are many other cases of systematically nonveridical perceptions, usually called illusions. One particularly striking example with which you may already be familiar is the moon illusion. You

1 It may be confusing that during dark adaptation the visual system during dark adaptation the visual system is, in a sense, becoming less senbecomes more sensitive to light rather than less. This apparent difference sitive to the dark. from other forms of adaptation can be eliminated if you realize that

Figure 1.1.3 An orientation aftereffect. Run your eyes along the central bar between the gratings on the left for 30-60 seconds. Then look at the square between the two identical gra¬ tings on the right. The upper grating should now appear tilted to the left of vertical and the lower grating tilted to the right.

have probably noticed that the moon looks much larger when it is close to the horizon than it does when it is high in the night sky. Have you ever thought about why?

Many people think that it is due to refractive dis¬ tortions introduced by the atmosphere. Others suppose that it is due to the shape of the moon’s orbit. In fact, the optical size of the moon is entirely constant throughout its journey across the sky. You can demonstrate this by taking a series of photographs as the moon rises; the size of its photographic image will not change in the slight¬ est. It is only our perception of the moon’s size that changes. In this respect, it is indeed an illusion—a nonveridical perception—because its image in our eyes does not change size any more than it does in the photo¬ graphs. In Chapter 7, we will discuss in detail why the moon illusion occurs (Kaufman & Rock, 1962; Rock & Kaufman, 1962). For right now, the important thing is just to realize that our perception of the apparent differ¬ ence in the moon’s size at different heights in the night sky is illusory.

There are many other illusions demonstrating that visual perception is less than entirely accurate. Some of

Which horizontal line is longer?

Which horizontal line is longer?

Are the long lines parallel or tilted?

Do the diagonal lines line up or not?

Which central circle

Figure 1.1.4 Visual illusions. Although they do not appear to be so, the two arrow shafts are the same length in A, the horizon¬ tal lines are identical in B, the long lines are vertical in C, the di¬ agonal lines are collinear in D, and the middle circles are equal in size in E.

these are illustrated in Figure 1.1.4. The two arrow shafts in A are actually equal in length; the horizontal lines in B are actually the same size; the long lines in C are actually vertical and parallel; the diagonal lines in D are actually collinear; and the two central circles in E are actually equal in size. In each case, our visual system is somehow fooled into making perceptual errors about seemingly obvious properties of simple line drawings. These illusions support the conclusion that perception is indeed fallible and therefore cannot be considered a clear window onto external reality. The reality that vision provides must therefore be, at least in part, a con¬ struction by the visual system that results from the way it processes information in light. As we shall see, the nature of this construction implies certain hidden as¬ sumptions, of which we have no conscious knowledge, and when these assumptions are untrue, illusions result. This topic will appear frequently in various forms throughout this book, particularly in Chapter 7.

It is easy to get so carried away by illusions that one starts to think of visual perception as grossly inaccurate and unreliable. This is a mistake. As we said earlier,

vision is evolutionary useful to the extent that it is accurate—or, rather, as accurate as it needs to be. Even illusory perceptions are quite accurate in most respects. For instance, there really are two short horizontal lines and two long oblique ones in Figure 1.1.4B, none of which touch each other. The only aspect that is in¬ accurately perceived is the single illusory property—the relative lengths of the horizontal lines—and the dis¬ crepancy between perception and reality is actually quite modest. Moreover, illusions such as these are not terribly obvious in everyday life; they occur most fre¬ quently in books about perception.

All things considered, then, it would be erroneous to believe that the relatively minor errors introduced by vision overshadow its evolutionary usefulness. More¬ over, we will later consider the possibility that the per¬ ceptual errors produced by these illusions may actually be relatively harmless side effects of the same processes that produce veridical perception under ordinary cir¬ cumstances (see Chapters 5 and 7). The important point for the present discussion is that the existence of illusions proves convincingly that perception is not just a simple registration of objective reality. There is a great deal more to it than that.

Once the lesson of illusions has been learned, it is easier to see that there is really no good reason why per¬ ception should be a clear window onto reality. The ob¬ jects that we so effortlessly perceive are not the direct cause of our perceptions. Rather, perceptions are caused by the two-dimensional patterns of light that stimulate our eyes. (To demonstrate the truth of this assertion, just close your eyes. The objects are still present, but they no longer give rise to visual experi¬ ences.) To provide us with information about the threedimensional environment, vision must therefore be an interpretive process that somehow transforms complex, moving, two-dimensional patterns of light at the back of the eyes into stable perceptions of threedimensional objects in three-dimensional space. We must therefore conclude that the objects we perceive are actually interpretations based on the structure of images rather than direct registrations of physical reality.

Ambiguous Figures. Potent demonstrations of the interpretive nature of vision come from ambiguous figures: single images that can give rise to two or more distinct perceptions. Several compelling examples are

Figure 1.1.5 Ambiguous figures. Figure A can be seen either as a white vase against a black background or as a pair of black faces against a white background. Figure B can be seen as a cube viewed from above or below. Figure C can be seen as a duck (fac¬ ing left) or a rabbit (facing right).

shown in Figure 1.1.5. The vase/faces figure in part A can be perceived either as a white vase on a black back¬ ground (Al) or as two black faces in silhouette against a white background (A2). The Necker cube in Figure 1.1.5B can be perceived as a cube in two different ori¬ entations relative to the viewer: with the observer look¬ ing down and to the right at the cube (Bl) or looking up and to the left (B2). When the percept “reverses,” the interpretation of the depth relations among the lines change; front edges become back ones, and back edges become front ones. A somewhat different kind of ambi¬ guity is illustrated in Figure 1.1,5C. This drawing can be seen either as a duck facing left (C1) or as a rabbit facing right (C2). The interpretation of lines again shifts from one percept to the other, but this time the change is from one body part to another: The duck’s bill becomes the rabbit’s ears, and a bump on the back of the duck’s head becomes the rabbit’s nose.

There are two important things to notice about your perception of these ambiguous figures as you look at them. First, the interpretations are mutually exclusive. That

A. Vase/Faces
B. Necker Cube

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