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China and the Indo-Pacific: Maneuvers and Manifestations Swaran Singh
Title: Indo-Pacific security : US–China rivalry and regional states’ responses / edited by Nicholas Khoo, University of Otago, New Zealand; Germana Nicklin, Massey University, New Zealand; Alexander C. Tan, University of Canterbury, New Zealand.
Other titles: US–China rivalry and regional states’ responses
Description: New Jersey : World Scientific, [2024] | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2023028653 | ISBN 9781800614840 (hardcover) | ISBN 9781800614857 (ebook) | ISBN 9781800614864 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Indo-Pacific Region--Foreign relations--United States. | United States--Foreign relations--Indo-Pacific Region. | United States--Foreign relations--China. | China--Foreign relations--United States. | Indo-Pacific Region--Strategic aspects. | Competition--United States. | Competition--China.
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Desk Editors: Logeshwaran Arumugam/Rosie Williamson/Shi Ying Koe
Nicholas Khoo is an associate professor in the politics programme at the University of Otago. His research focuses on Chinese foreign policy, Asian security, great power politics, and international relations theory, with a focus on alliances and coercive diplomacy. Nicholas has been a visiting fellow at the School of International Studies at Peking University and a visiting professor at the Foreign Affairs College, both in Beijing, China. In addition, he has held positions at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies in Singapore, the Council of Foreign Relations in Washington, DC, and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. Nicholas’s single-authored publications include Collateral Damage: Sino-Soviet Rivalry and the Termination of the SinoVietnamese Alliance (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011) and Return to Power: China and East Asia Since 1978 (Edward Elgar, 2020). His co-authored publications include Asian Security and the Rise of China: International Relations in an Age of Volatility (Edward Elgar, 2013), Security at a Price: The International Politics of U.S. Missile Defense (Rowman and Littlefield, 2017), and Chinese Foreign Policy Since 1949: The Emergence of a Great Power (Routledge, 2022).
Germana Nicklin is an honorary research associate for the School of People, Environment and Planning, Massey University, Wellington, New Zealand. From 2016 to 2023, she was a senior lecturer at the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at Massey University, teaching border security and resource security. She researches and has published on Trans-Tasman borders, Antarctic borders, supply chain disruptions, maritime security, and public policy. She is the only researcher in New Zealand focusing on border security. She has presented her work at various New Zealand and international conferences and seminars, including to the Royal Geographical Society as part of an Antarctic panel and to the inaugural Maldives border agency conference. She has a PhD in public policy from Victoria University of Wellington, for which she was granted an EU Erasmus grant and a Deans Award. Prior to joining Massey University, Germana worked in the New Zealand and Australian public services for over 30 years, 17 of which were with the New Zealand Customs Service.
Alexander C. Tan is a professor of political science and international relations at the University of Canterbury, a university chair professor of political science at the National Chengchi University in Taiwan, and an honorary professor of the New Zealand Defence Force Command and Staff College. He is also a fellow of the John Goodwin Tower Center for Political Studies in Dallas, US, and the founder and principal research fellow at the Institute for Indo-Pacific Affairs. He was a visiting scholar at universities in the US, UK, Germany, Japan, and Taiwan and represented New Zealand in Track II security/economic dialogues. Alex writes extensively in the areas of parties and elections, political economy, Taiwan and Asian politics, and international relations in the Asia-Pacific, and his recent publications include Asia Pacific Small States: The Political Economies of Resilience (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2023). Alex is an editor of Frontiers in Political Economy and an editorial board member of several international academic journals, such as Political Behavior, Asian Survey, Political Science, Politics and Governance, Issues and Studies, Journal of Asian Security & International Affairs, Politicka Misao: Croatian Political Science Review, and the Journal of Electoral Studies.
Prashanth Parameswaran is a fellow at the Asia Program, Wilson Center, Washington, DC, USA.
Kanghee Park is a research fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research, Washington, DC, USA.
Bhubhindar Singh is an associate professor at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
Rebecca Strating is the director of La Trobe Asia and an associate professor of politics and international relations at La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia.
John Tai is a professorial lecturer at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, DC, USA.
Neel Vanvari is a research fellow at the Institute for Indo-Pacific Affairs, Christchurch, New Zealand.
T. Y. Wang is a university professor at the Department of Politics and Government, Illinois State University, USA.
Nutthathirataa Withitwinyuchon is the associate dean at the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies, Rangsit University, Thailand.
This book is the outgrowth of a regional security workshop held in Wellington on October 2021 with the generous support of a New Zealand–Taiwan lecture series grant awarded to Alexander Tan and the Research Initiative on Taiwan Studies at the University of Canterbury by the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office (TECO) in New Zealand. The one-day workshop was sponsored by the University of Canterbury and co-hosted by the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at Massey University in Wellington. The editors thank Representative Bill K. M. Chen and Ms. Claire Chin of TECO-NZ for their support of this workshop, Dr. Natalie Watson at World Scientific Publishing for her support of this book project, and Massey University for hosting the workshop.
Nicholas Khoo, Germana Nicklin, and Alexander C. Tan
The Origins of This Book
This book has its origins in a tour of Hawaii sponsored by the United States Department of State for New Zealand-based academics in December 2019. Unsurprisingly, the well-selected on-site locations, weather, and overall environment in Hawaii made for an enjoyable experience. But as academics, what really gave the trip an invaluable quality were the insights that we were able to garner from the well-honed briefings at the various institutions we visited and, it must be added, the equally compelling informal discussions with staff whom we interacted with.
Towards the end of the trip, we reached a consensus to formalize our excellent discussion in a special issue of a journal. Given its status as one of the leading international security journals in New Zealand, the National Security Journal struck us as a natural venue for this endeavour. Following a workshop on regional security co-hosted by Canterbury University and Massey University in Wellington in 2021, the editors of this volume decided to increase the number of countries by expanding the project into book format. While many of the authors of the chapters in this volume presented at the workshop, a number of additional chapter contributors have been invited to capture the perspectives of a range of states in the Indo-Pacific.
Indo-Pacific Security: US–China Rivalry and Regional States’ Responses
A qualitative change in China’s foreign policy towards a more assertive stance emerged soon after the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008–2009. But it is during the tenure of China’s leader Xi Jinping (2012–present) that this policy change has effected a systematic deterioration in US–China relations. The Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) openly acknowledged a fundamental change in the US’ China policy from that of ‘engagement’ to ‘strategic competition.’ The US policy of strategic competition has been affirmed by the Biden administration.
This structural change in US–China relations has had important regional effects. States in the Indo-Pacific region have had to adjust to the reality of increasing great power rivalry. This book explores these developments. In the process, it fills a gap in the literature on regional studies, international relations, and security studies, seeking to provide a compelling account of the trajectory of US–China relations, even while illuminating the varied responses of states in the Indo-Pacific on or close to the Asian continent, including Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, and the states in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Island region. The choice of states is significant and merits comment. While the authors recognize that the ongoing strategic competition between the US and China is a major structural development in world politics, a full understanding of that development necessarily requires an investigation into its varying effects on regional states. Accordingly, this book examines Indo-Pacific security principally from the perspective of the regional states, from India in the west to the US in the east, China in the north, and Antarctica in the south.
Great Power Competition in the Indo-Pacific
When Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping launched the reform era in late 1978, few would have doubted China’s potential. But most observers would have had some reservations about the country’s ability to deliver economic growth as quickly as has occurred, with simultaneous and complex effects across a myriad of areas stretching from the environment to health, wealth, political development, and the regional and global military balance. After more than four decades of rising Chinese economic power,
we now have a Chinese challenge to the US’ strategic position in the IndoPacific region. The chapters that follow seek to provide insight into the international effects of China’s rise and, more precisely, the varying responses of actors in the region to the structural change in US–China rivalry. More specifically, this development has simultaneously increased regional actors’ appreciation of the need to balance Chinese power, catalyzing a degree of ambivalence towards Beijing and Washington, even while increasing their value in this new era of strategic competition.
About the Chapters in the Book
Chapter 2: The Trump Administration and the Unravelling of the United States’ China Engagement Policy
Nicholas Khoo sets the scene with his discussion of how power politics drives US–China relations. Khoo contends that the era characterized by a broad-based US engagement policy (1972–2016) has passed. He begins with the observation that, while US–China relations from 1972 to 2011 were never completely smooth, they nevertheless contributed to an era of heightened regional stability, even while meeting basic US and Chinese economic and military interests. That said, during the tenure of Chinese leader Xi Jinping (2012–present), the consensus in the US supporting engagement with China was seriously eroded by increasing dissatisfaction with developments in China’s domestic and foreign policies. As a consequence, a policy of near-full-spectrum US engagement has been replaced with one of strategic competition, in which conflict increasingly outweighs cooperation. More specifically, the chapter describes the relationship’s breakdown during the Trump administration. Two major competing explanations for the deterioration are evaluated, emphasizing either the role of identity or aspects of power politics, specifically state interests and the distribution of capabilities.
Chapter 3: How Japan Is Managing US–China Competition
Bhubhindar Singh begins with the observation that intensifying US–China strategic competition presents Japan with a strategic dilemma. On the one hand, Tokyo supports the maintenance of the status quo order defined by US hegemony and liberal internationalism. This has brought peace, stability, and prosperity to Japan, even while deterring China. On
the other hand, with China’s emergence as a peer competitor to the US, Japan simultaneously recognizes and is concerned by the relative weakening of US influence and power in the Indo-Pacific. This potentially weakens the stability provided by the US–Japan alliance and raises the likelihood of the emergence of a Chinese-led order in East Asia and the uncertainties associated with it. For Tokyo, it is critical that it manages its strategic dilemma effectively. In practice, this translates into a Japanese policy of actively seeking to preserve the US-led regional order while preparing for a relative weakening of US power and influence in the IndoPacific. Bhubhindar’s chapter poses two questions. First, how is Japan managing the intensification of US–China competition? Second, what type of foreign policy is Japan pursuing? The chapter explores Japan’s pursuit of a ‘smart power-based’ foreign policy, reflected in the use of hard and soft power tools. The argument is illustrated by reference to three areas of Japanese policy: preserving the regional balance of power, reinforcing multilateralism in the Indo-Pacific, and stabilizing Japan–China relations.
Chapter 4: Negotiating the Challenges of Asymmetry: South Korea and US–China Rivalry
John Tai and Kanghee Park take as their point of departure the idea that asymmetry is a structural factor in South Korean foreign policy. Seoul’s management of asymmetry takes on an added layer of complexity as its longstanding alliance partner, the US, and its top trade partner, China, are in competition with each other. As the power balance between Beijing and Washington has shifted in the former’s favour, these structural constraints have been magnified. This has compelled South Korea to expend increasing efforts to seek balance in its relationship with the US and China. Events over the past decade have accentuated these asymmetrical dynamics. The persistent threat from North Korea and China’s use of economics as a tool in an overall policy of coercive diplomacy have compelled Seoul to strengthen its security and political ties with the US. Tai and Park note that, despite the challenges posed to it by US–China rivalry, South Korea can leverage its economic strength and the shared security interests of the two great powers on the Korean Peninsula. By doing so, it can mitigate the negative effects of this rivalry in service of its foreign policy objectives and national interests.
Chapter
5: Thailand’s Alignment
Policy in US–China Competition: From Cold War to Present
Nutthathirataa Withitwinyuchon traces Thailand’s security relationships with the US and China from the Cold War to the present. The chapter highlights an important dynamic in Thailand’s foreign policy. When competition between great powers is low or moderate, secondary states, such as Thailand, have more space to manoeuvre. Accordingly, Bangkok has adopted a policy stance of hedging. However, when great power competition is high, smaller states experience more constrained alignment options and are compelled to balance against the imminent threat. The case of Thailand’s foreign policy, set against the backdrop of US–China competition from the Cold War until the present, is used to illustrate this argument.
Chapter 6: Taiwan’s Strategic Choices in the Era of a
Rising China
T. Y. Wang and Alexander C. Tan emphasize the central role of domestic politics in Taiwan’s strategic responses to a rising China. Their data demonstrate a clear association between public opinion and Taipei’s crossStrait policy. Wang and Tan show that Taiwanese citizens’ risk-averse attitude supports a hedging strategy. That said, high-profile developments in Beijing’s Hong Kong policy and the Trump administration’s policies have contributed to a shift in citizens’ policy preferences, which is mirrored in Taipei’s approach towards China. As Beijing is expected to continue its assertive stand and the Biden administration has adopted a more competitive approach towards China, the chapter concludes that, in accordance with their argument highlighting the centrality of domestic politics in Taipei’s cross-Strait policy, there is a prediction of a stronger balancing component.
Chapter
7:
Reliable, Reticent, or Reluctant? India and US–China Rivalry
Neel Vanvari explains how India’s post–Cold War era foreign policy has been shaped by two imperatives. The first is a shared concern with the US over aspects of China’s foreign policy, reflected in India’s increasingly
close cooperation with the US during the Trump and Biden presidencies. At the same time, a second and often overlooked imperative sets limits on its relationship with Washington. Specifically, New Delhi’s longstanding preference for strategic autonomy reflects India’s own interests and ambitions of becoming a great power. This accounts for New Delhi’s strategy of multi-alignment and its preference for multipolarity in an age of increased US–China strategic competition.
Chapter 8: Southeast Asia and US–China Competition: Realities, Responses, and Regional Futures
Prashanth Parameswaran investigates the Southeast Asian perspective on US–China rivalry. Three arguments are advanced. First, the current phase of this rivalry and Southeast Asia’s responses must be understood with reference to the multiple uncertainties faced by Southeast Asian states, which include, but are not limited to, the US–China competition and previous phases of adjustment to the dynamics between the two countries. Second, the responses of Southeast Asian states can be profitably viewed through the prism of the following major components that extend beyond their ties with Beijing or Washington: the management of bilateral equities with the US and China, the domestic environment, regional processes, and the wider alignment mixes in foreign policy. Third, looking ahead, assessing Southeast Asian regional responses to evolving US–China dynamics will involve a focus on the shifting ties between the two and a variety of other factors. These include the respective Southeast Asian states’ independent assessments of the US and China; wider domestic, regional, and international factors that affect Southeast Asia; the range of tools available to these states to manage intensifying geopolitical competition; and the ability of these states to subtly and flexibly adjust their approaches amid increasingly granular engagement by Washington and Beijing, and growing public scrutiny of their positions.
Chapter 9: Spatialities of Power in the Antarctic Ross Sea Region: New Zealand, the United States, and China
Germana Nicklin’s chapter is the first of two covering Oceanic states. Her chapter proceeds from the vantage point that Antarctica is a space where smaller states have more influence than in other regions and where the
influence of the collective interests of the Antarctic Treaty System is the distinguishing feature. Accordingly, the chapter re-examines the interactions among the US, China, and New Zealand in the Ross Sea region using a political geography lens to explore the dynamics of intersecting maritime and other activities. The alternate reality of collective Antarctic governance, plus the actual activities of these states in the Ross Sea region, tells stories of state interrelations in time-space that are connected with relations elsewhere. This examination shows how actions in the Ross Sea are affected by the mutual mistrust of the great powers in the Indo-Pacific.
Chapter 10: Maritime Insecurity and the Changing Regional Order: Australia as an ‘Indo-Pacific Power’
Rebecca Strating’s chapter examines Australia’s redeveloped role conception as an ‘Indo-Pacific’ regional power. While historically taking a pragmatic approach to its relations with the US and China, it has now effectively ‘chosen’ Washington. Australia’s reinforced commitment to the US alliance as the backbone of its security policy has been apparent in its approach to maritime security, including in its shift to minilateralism through membership in the Quad and AUKUS and its ambitious defence procurement plans. As a corollary, a high-level freeze on diplomatic relations between Australia and China lasted over two years, even though — unlike some other US allies — they have no territorial or maritime disputes. The shift from conceptualizing an Asia-Pacific region to an Indo-Pacific region has been driven by two key concerns: first, China’s rise and implications for regional order; and second, the credibility and endurance of the US’ commitment to Asia. The chapter seeks to answer the question of how governments and elites have viewed ‘seapower’ as best serving and securing Australia’s interests in this shifting geopolitical landscape. Ultimately, this chapter argues that Australia’s approach to its vast range of maritime security issues remains fragmented and incoherent.
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https://doi.org/10.1142/9781800614857_0002
Chapter 2
The Trump Administration and the Unravelling of the United States’ China Engagement Policy
Nicholas Khoo*
Introduction
US–China relations have faced many challenges since Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong brokered a dramatic diplomatic rapprochement in 1972, but none as serious as the present. Contention is now the dominant characteristic in issue areas ranging from trade and military affairs to human rights and democracy. Indeed, even before the Trump administration came to power, a consensus had developed among US–China specialists that US engagement policy with China had failed, even as debate existed on what policy to replace it with. Thus, in 2015, Harry Harding, a leading China expert, lamented the poor state of the US–China relations. According to Harding, the US’ ‘present [China] policy is widely believed to have failed’ (Harding, 2015: p. 95). Looking to the future, his concern was that the US–China relations would become ‘essentially competitive or even degenerate into open rivalry’ (Harding, 2015: p. 119). That time has come.
* Nicholas Khoo acknowledges the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at Massey University (and specifically, Managing Editor John Battersby) for granting permission to reuse his article from the 2021 issue ‘The Trump administration and the United States’ China engagement policy,’ National Security Journal 3(2): 1–19.
N. Khoo
Since 2017, there has been open acknowledgement in the US of ‘geopolitical competition’ and ‘strategic competition’ with China and serious discussion of how to ‘decouple’ the relationship (OPUS, 2017: p. 45). Meanwhile, the Chinese perspective is that policies pursued by the US, particularly during the Trump presidency, are responsible for the present state of the relationship (State Council, 2019). This chapter describes and analyses the Trump administration’s abrogation of a near-full-spectrum US policy of engagement with China and its replacement with a more conditional posture that reflects a greater US tolerance for conflict, reflected in the concept of ‘strategic competition’ (OPUS, 2020: p. 16). It then proceeds to evaluate two major competing explanations for this policy change. These emphasize either the role of the concept of identity, or aspects of power politics — specifically, state interests and the distribution of capabilities.
A Policy Unravelled
The unravelling of the US policy of engagement with China occurred over a sustained period in the post–Cold War era, culminating in the Trump administration’s adoption of a policy designed to actively seek changes in Chinese behaviour in multiple spheres, both domestic and international. The first major document outlining this change was the administration’s December 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS). In an interview to introduce the NSS, National Security Adviser Herbert McMaster commented that China was a ‘revisionist power’ that ‘was undermining the international order’ (Donnan and Sevastopulo, 2017). In a significant departure, the NSS questioned the fundamental premise of engagement that had underpinned US’ China policy since 1972 (OPUS, 2017: pp. 2–3). The NSS opined that ‘China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region,’ a region where Beijing is ‘using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda’ (OPUS, 2017: pp. 25, 46). While critical of aspects of Chinese policy, the three previous NSS documents (in 2002, 2010, and 2015) had not adopted such stark language. These reports referenced ‘managing competition from a position of strength’ (OPUS, 2015: p. 24), underlined that ‘a pragmatic and effective relationship between the United States and China is essential to address the major challenges of the 21st century’ (OPUS, 2010: p. 43), and emphasized cooperation even while acknowledging differences (OPUS, 2022: pp. 27–28).
The administration’s January 2018 National Defense Strategy reasserted the new line, noting that ‘the central challenge to US prosperity and
security is the re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition by […] revisionist powers,’ a category which it identified as including, among others, China and Russia (DOD, 2018: p. 2). The document reverted to describing China as a ‘strategic competitor’ of the US (DOD, 2018: p. 2) — a description previously used in 2000 by then presidential candidate George W. Bush (Lippman, 1999). The 2019 Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy report buttressed this perspective, cataloguing China’s revisionist policy practices even while highlighting the erosion of the US’ regional deterrence posture (DOD, 2019: pp. 7–10, 16). This was followed by the February 2020 United States’ Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China report, which called for a ‘clear-eyed assessment of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) intentions and actions, a reappraisal of the United States’ many strategic advantages and shortfalls, and a tolerance of greater bilateral friction’ (OPUS, 2020: p. 1).
Given that China’s post-1978 economic growth model has been predicated on a robust relationship with the US, the unravelling of US engagement policy is a disastrous outcome.1 Nonetheless, at the same time, this development is also a confirmation of a longstanding Chinese worldview. To be specific, there has been a persistent assertion by both official and non-official Chinese sources of the US’ alleged malign view of China’s rise. As early as the 1990s, references were being made by Chinese analysts to a US intent to ‘contain’ China’s rise (State Council, 1998; Pillsbury, 2000). This feature of Chinese commentary has strengthened over time. In a not-so-veiled reference to the US, a Chinese government Defence White Paper declared in October 2000 that: ‘No fundamental change has been made in the old, unfair and irrational international political and economic order. Certain big powers are pursuing “neointerventionism,” “neo-gunboat diplomacy,” and “neo-economic colonialism,” which are seriously damaging the sovereignty, independence, and developmental interests of many countries, and threatening world peace and security’ (cited in Pomfret, 2000). Undoubtedly, this stance reflected the incoming George W. Bush administration’s more robust stance towards
1 This is reflected in the reality that the US has been China’s top export trading partner on a country basis for much of the post-1978 reform era. See US Census Bureau foreign trade figures from 2004–2019. Available at https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/ highlights/top/index.html. See also the entry for China in the World Bank’s database. World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), China Trade Statistics, 18 February 2021. Available at https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/CHN https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/ en/Country/CHN/Year/2018/TradeFlow/Export/Partner/USA/Product/All-Groups.
China during that year’s presidential campaign. Despite a contentious start that was marked by the EP-3 crisis of April 2001, the imperative of prosecuting the Global War on Terror after 9/11 focused US attention on maintaining a stable relationship with China throughout Bush’s two-term tenure, even as his administration kept its eye on balancing China’s rising power (Silove, 2016). Frictions intensified as the Obama administration responded to China’s growing post-2008 Global Financial Crisis power position by articulating a ‘rebalancing’ of Indo-Pacific policy over the course of the 2010–2011 period. And it was not uncommon to hear repeated claims from Chinese academics that the US was adopting a policy ‘posture [that is] seemingly intent to contain China’ (Jiang, 2013: p. 159).
Chinese grievances escalated with the Trump administration’s adoption of a more robust China policy, exemplified by US trade policy since early 2018 (Khoo, 2020: pp. 82–85, 135–137). This watershed development was underpinned by longstanding and specific complaints from the US Trade Representative’s Office (USTR, 2019). In the face of these developments, an authoritative 2019 Chinese government White Paper on China’s role in the world counselled that ‘cooperation is the only correct choice for the two countries’ (SCIO, 2019: p. 44) before advising that ‘the US should abandon the Cold War mentality’ (SCIO, 2019: p. 45) and disassociate itself from a ‘surging’ trend in world politics of ‘hegemonism and power politics’ (SCIO, 2019: p. 32). It quickly became clear to the Chinese leadership that the US was not going to back down on its demand for a renegotiation of the economic relationship. Accordingly, a Phase One agreement was reached in late 2019, taking effect on 15 January 2020 (Swanson, 2019). In an ironic twist, Trump’s signature achievement on China was torpedoed by a combination of idiosyncrasies. Specifically, the CCP leadership’s historically well-established proclivity to place the party’s image and interests before their citizens’ health interacted with President Trump’s bizarre decision-making on the COVID-19 pandemic with catastrophic consequences. Despite having been directly and repeatedly notified of the pandemic in January 2020, Trump took what is manifestly insufficient action. And, to compound matters, rather than cooperate to solve the most pressing international health crisis in a century, Beijing2 and Washington have politicized the issue.3
2 China’s embassies and diplomats have encouraged countries and international organizations to make positive statements about China’s response, and regardless of whether such a positive response has been received, they have portrayed the response as positive.
3 President Trump repeatedly focused on the World Health Organization’s failure to more aggressively confront China over its handling of the outbreak in Wuhan.
In the meantime, the Trump administration hardened its stance on China, laying out its critique of China in a systematic quartet of public speeches over the June–July 2020 period. These involved the national security advisor, the FBI director, the attorney general, and the secretary of state (Barr, 2020; O’Brian, 2020; Pompeo, 2020a; Wray, 2020). Indeed, it is difficult to think of a sphere in the relationship that has not been targeted by the administration. US sanctions on China have ranged from adding Chinese entities4 to two separate blacklists, the first list overseen by the Commerce Department, and the second managed by the Department of Defense; requiring Chinese news agencies operating in the US to register as foreign government operatives, thus subjecting them to the same rules governing Chinese diplomats (Khoo, 2020: pp. 84–85); barring specific Chinese officials responsible for implementing its widely criticized national security law on Hong Kong from entry into the US (Jacobs and Wadhams, 2020); enacting legislation against US investments in companies owned or operated by the Chinese military (Ali et al., 2020); finding that China is pursuing a policy of genocide towards its Uighur minority in Xinjiang (Buckley and Wong, 2021); tightening visa rules for visiting CCP members (Mozur and Zhong, 2020); launching a vast investigation of Chinese efforts to acquire research by scientists employed by US universities and research institutes (Kolata, 2019), even as the administration publicly warned of China’s efforts to exploit US universities in various ways (Pompeo, 2020a); and targeting Beijing’s strategic neuralgia by deepening US relations with Taiwan (Kuo and Shih, 2021).
These actions prompted a furious Chinese response. On 25 May 2020, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi declared that American politicians ‘are taking China–US relations hostage and pushing us to the brink of a new Cold War’ (Fifield, 2020). On 9 July, Wang opined that the China–US relationship ‘is faced with the most severe challenge since the establishment of diplomatic ties’ (Shepherd, 2020). In his view, the US’ China policy has reached a ‘point of paranoia,’ where ‘it seems as if every Chinese investment is politically driven, every Chinese student is a spy, and every cooperation initiative is a scheme with hidden agenda’ (Myers and Mozur, 2020). Tensions culminated on 24 July, with the Trump administration’s decision to order the closure of China’s consulate in Houston, the charge being that it was serving as a hub for espionage activities (Fifield et al., 2020).
4 Defined as including businesses, companies, research institutes, individuals, governments, private organizations, and other types of legal persons.
Explaining the Unravelling
How can we explain the unravelling of the US engagement policy with China and the accompanying tolerance for a relationship where aspects of conflict prevail over cooperation? Space considerations limit our review to what are arguably the two most influential explanations: identity theory and neorealist theory.
There is a burgeoning research programme on the concept of identity in great power politics, in which the China–US relationship is prominently featured (Allan et al., 2018; Brands, 2018; Friedberg, 2019; Haas, 2012; Kagan, 2019). In addition, identity-related dynamics serving as a source of intense conflict in US–China relations comport with the rhetoric of some of the major participants in the relationship (Pompeo, 2020b; Xi, 2017). On the US side, various official reports since 2017 have juxtaposed ideological regime differences with standard inter-state power struggles to explain the deterioration in relations.5 Thus, the 2017 NSS report described the China–US relations as one of the ‘power contests’ facing the US in world politics, which it characterized as ‘fundamentally political contests between those who favour repressive systems and those who favour free societies’ (OPUS, 2017: p. 25). In his introductory statement for the 2019 Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy report, Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan singled out the CCP-led China as typifying the phenomenon of ‘inter-state strategic competition,’ where ‘geopolitical rivalry between free and oppressive world order visions’ is ‘the primary concern for US national security’ (DOD, 2019, Foreword). The February 2020 United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China report added specificity to this, acknowledging ‘long-term strategic competition between our two systems’ (OPUS, 2020: p. 16), ‘a system rooted in Beijing’s interpretation of Marxism–Leninism ideology’ (OPUS, 2020: p. 5), and calling for ‘a competitive approach to the People’s Republic of China’ (OPUS, 2020: p. 1). Finally, the State Department Policy Planning Staff’s November 2020 report on China noted that ‘the Chinese Communist Party has triggered a new era of great power competition’ (DOS, 2020: p. 1), stating that ‘in the face of the China challenge, the United States must secure freedom’ (DOS, 2020: p. 1).
5 In theoretical terms, such an explanation is consistent with either liberal democratic peace theory or the identity strand of constructivist theory.
The emphasis by the US on regime-based identity differences has been mirrored by China. That this has occurred is also not surprising. China’s state identity manifestly reflects its Marxist–Leninist ideology, with the CCP at the vanguard. The leadership of the Peoples’ Republic of China views itself as an exemplar of a state that practises ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,’ which, according to Xi Jinping, the President and General Secretary of the CCP, offers ‘a new option for other countries and nations that want to speed up their development while retaining their identity’ (Xi, 2017: p. 9). Central to this identity are the Four Cardinal Principles,6 first articulated by Deng Xiaoping in 1979 and advanced as the ‘basic prerequisite for achieving modernization’ (Joseph, 2010: p. 156). These principles are enshrined in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, establishing the Party’s dominance over China’s politics and society on a Marxist–Leninist basis (Constitution of the Communist Party of China, 2017: p. 4). And consistent with the foundational Marxist–Leninist texts, the Chinese leadership believes in ‘building a socialism that is superior to capitalism, laying the foundation for a future where we will win the initiative and have the dominant position’ (Xi, 2013).
The differences in the two states’ identity-based self-perceptions are stark and so are the differences in the significance of these diverging identities. In the Chinese self-conception, a Marxist–Leninist China pursues an ‘independent foreign policy of peace’ and ‘will never seek hegemony or engage in expansion’ (Xi, 2017: p. 53). Accordingly, China ‘absolutely reject[s] the Cold War mentality and power politics’ (Xi, 2017: p. 53). In contrast, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has highlighted the CCP’s identity as a source of conflict in bilateral relations, declaring in early 2020 that the CCP is ‘the central threat of our times’ (Santora, 2020). In Pompeo’s view, ‘today, China is increasingly authoritarian at home, and more aggressive in its hostility to freedom everywhere else. […] If the free world doesn’t change Communist China, Communist China will change us. (Pompeo, 2020b). Accordingly, ‘the old paradigm of blind engagement with China simply won’t get it done. We must not continue it. We must not return to it’ (Pompeo, 2020b).
The China–US dyad manifestly involves states with deeply contrasting identities, but what is the specific causal role and impact of identity in
6 The principles are the Socialist Road, the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, the Leadership of the Communist Party, and adherence to Marxism–Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.
