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Persuasion:

Theory and Research Third Edition – Ebook PDF Version

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Detailed Contents

Preface

1 Persuasion, Attitudes, and Actions

The Concept of Persuasion

About Definitions: Fuzzy Edges and Paradigm Cases

Five Common Features of Paradigm Cases of Persuasion

A Definition After All?

The Concept of Attitude

Attitude Measurement Techniques

Explicit Measures

Semantic Differential Evaluative Scales

Single-Item Attitude Measures

Features of Explicit Measures

Quasi-Explicit Measures

Implicit Measures

Summary

Attitudes and Behaviors

The General Relationship

Moderating Factors

Correspondence of Measures

Direct Experience

Summary

Encouraging Attitude-Consistent Behavior

Enhance Perceived Relevance

Induce Feelings of Hypocrisy

Encourage Anticipation of Feelings

Summary

Assessing Persuasive Effects

Attitude Change

Beyond Attitude Change

Conclusion For Review

Notes

2 Social Judgment Theory

Judgments of Alternative Positions on an Issue

The Ordered Alternatives Questionnaire

The Concept of Ego-Involvement

Ego-Involvement and the Latitudes

Measures of Ego-Involvement

Size of the Ordered Alternatives Latitude of Rejection

Own Categories Procedure

Reactions to Communications

Assimilation and Contrast Effects

Attitude Change Effects

Assimilation and Contrast Effects Reconsidered

The Impact of Assimilation and Contrast Effects on Persuasion

Ambiguity in Political Campaigns

Adapting Persuasive Messages to Recipients Using Social Judgment Theory

Critical Assessment

The Confounding of Involvement With Other Variables

The Concept of Ego-Involvement

The Measures of Ego-Involvement

Conclusion For Review

Notes

3 Functional Approaches to Attitude A Classic Functional Analysis

Subsequent Developments

Identifying General Functions of Attitude

Assessing the Function of a Given Attitude Influences on Attitude Function

Individual Differences

Attitude Object

Situational Variations

Multifunctional Attitude Objects Revisited

Adapting Persuasive Messages to Recipients: Function Matching

The Persuasive Effects of Matched and Mismatched Appeals

Explaining the Effects of Function Matching

Commentary

Generality and Specificity in Attitude Function Typologies

Functional Confusions

Some Functional Distinctions

Conflating the Functions

Reconsidering the Assessment and Conceptualization of Attitude Function

Assessment of Attitude Function Reconsidered

Utilitarian and Value-Expressive Functions

Reconsidered

Summary

Persuasion and Function Matching Revisited

Reviving the Idea of Attitude Functions

Conclusion For Review

Notes

4 Belief-Based Models of Attitude

Summative Model of Attitude

The Model

Adapting Persuasive Messages to Recipients Based on the Summative Model

Alternative Persuasive Strategies

Identifying Foci for Appeals

Research Evidence and Commentary

General Correlational Evidence

Attribute Importance

Belief Content

Role of Belief Strength

Scoring Procedures

Alternative Integration Schemes

The Sufficiency of Belief-Based Analyses

Persuasive Strategies Reconsidered

Belief Strength as a Persuasion Target

Belief Evaluation as a Persuasion Target

Changing the Set of Salient Beliefs as a Persuasion Mechanism

Conclusion For Review

Notes

5 Cognitive Dissonance Theory

General Theoretical Sketch

Elements and Relations

Dissonance

Factors Influencing the Magnitude of Dissonance

Means of Reducing Dissonance

Some Research Applications

Decision Making

Conflict

Decision and Dissonance

Factors Influencing the Degree of Dissonance

Dissonance Reduction

Regret

Selective Exposure to Information

The Dissonance Theory Analysis

The Research Evidence

Summary

Induced Compliance

Incentive and Dissonance in Induced-Compliance

Situations

Counterattitudinal-Advocacy–Based Interventions

The “Low, Low Price” Offer

Limiting Conditions

Summary

Hypocrisy Induction

Hypocrisy as a Means of Influencing Behavior

Hypocrisy Induction Mechanisms

Backfire Effects

Revisions of, and Alternatives to, Dissonance Theory

Conclusion

For Review

Notes

6 Reasoned Action Theory

The Reasoned Action Theory Model

Intention

The Determinants of Intention

Attitude Toward the Behavior

Injunctive Norm

Descriptive Norm

Perceived Behavioral Control

Weighting the Determinants

The Distinctiveness of Perceived Behavioral Control

The Predictability of Intention Using the RAT Model

Influencing Intentions

Influencing Attitude Toward the Behavior

The Determinants of AB

Changing AB

Influencing the Injunctive Norm

The Determinants of IN

Changing IN

Influencing the Descriptive Norm

The Determinants of DN

Changing DN

Influencing Perceived Behavioral Control

The Determinants of PBC

Changing PBC

Altering the Weights

Intentions and Behaviors

Factors Influencing the Intention-Behavior Relationship

Correspondence of Measures

Temporal Stability of Intentions

Explicit Planning

The Sufficiency of Intention

Adapting Persuasive Messages to Recipients Based on Reasoned Action Theory

Commentary

Additional Possible Predictors

Anticipated Affect

Moral Norms

The Assessment of Potential Additions

Revision of the Attitudinal and Normative Components

The Attitudinal Component

The Normative Components

The Nature of the Perceived Control Component

PBC as a Moderator

Refining the PBC Construct

Conclusion

For Review

Notes

7 Stage Models

The Transtheoretical Model

Decisional Balance and Intervention Design

Decisional Balance

Decisional Balance Asymmetry

Implications of Decisional Balance Asymmetry

Self-Efficacy and Intervention Design

Intervention Stage-Matching

Self-Efficacy Interventions

Broader Concerns About the Transtheoretical Model

The Distinctive Claims of Stage Models

Other Stage Models

Conclusion For Review

Notes

8 Elaboration Likelihood Model

Variations in the Degree of Elaboration: Central Versus Peripheral Routes to Persuasion

The Nature of Elaboration

Central and Peripheral Routes to Persuasion

Consequences of Different Routes to Persuasion

Factors Affecting the Degree of Elaboration

Factors Affecting Elaboration Motivation

Personal Relevance (Involvement)

Need for Cognition

Factors Affecting Elaboration Ability

Distraction

Prior Knowledge

Summary

Influences on Persuasive Effects Under Conditions of High Elaboration: Central Routes to Persuasion

The Critical Role of Elaboration Valence

Influences on Elaboration Valence

Proattitudinal Versus Counterattitudinal Messages

Argument Strength

Other Influences on Elaboration Valence

Summary: Central Routes to Persuasion

Influences on Persuasive Effects Under Conditions of Low Elaboration: Peripheral Routes to Persuasion

The Critical Role of Heuristic Principles

Varieties of Heuristic Principles

Credibility Heuristic

Liking Heuristic

Consensus Heuristic

Other Heuristics

Summary: Peripheral Routes to Persuasion

Multiple Roles for Persuasion Variables

Adapting Persuasive Messages to Recipients Based on the ELM

Commentary

The Nature of Involvement

Argument Strength

One Persuasion Process?

The Unimodel of Persuasion

Explaining ELM Findings

Comparing the Two Models

Conclusion

For Review

Notes

9 The Study of Persuasive Effects

Experimental Design and Causal Inference

The Basic Design

Variations on the Basic Design

Persuasiveness and Relative Persuasiveness

Two General Challenges in Studying Persuasive Effects

Generalizing About Messages

Ambiguous Causal Attribution

Nonuniform Effects of Message Variables

Designing Future Persuasion Research

Interpreting Past Persuasion Research

Beyond Message Variables

Variable Definition

Message Features Versus Observed Effects

The Importance of the Distinction

Conclusion

For Review

Notes

10 Communicator Factors

Communicator Credibility

The Dimensions of Credibility

Factor-Analytic Research

Expertise and Trustworthiness as Dimensions of Credibility

Factors Influencing Credibility Judgments

Education, Occupation, and Experience

Nonfluencies in Delivery

Citation of Evidence Sources

Position Advocated

Liking for the Communicator

Humor

Summary

Effects of Credibility

Two Initial Clarifications

Influences on the Magnitude of Effect

Influences on the Direction of Effect

Liking

The General Rule

Some Exceptions and Limiting Conditions

Liking and Credibility

Liking and Topic Relevance

Greater Effectiveness of Disliked Communicators

Other Communicator Factors

Similarity

Similarity and Liking

Similarity and Credibility: Expertise Judgments

Similarity and Credibility: Trustworthiness Judgments

Summary: The Effects of Similarity

Physical Attractiveness

Physical Attractiveness and Liking

Physical Attractiveness and Credibility

Summary

About Additional Communicator Characteristics

Conclusion

The Nature of Communication Sources

Multiple Roles for Communicator Variables

For Review

Notes

11 Message Factors

Message Structure and Format

Conclusion Omission

Recommendation Specificity

Narratives

Complexities in Studying Narrative and Persuasion

The Persuasive Power of Narratives

Factors Influencing Narrative Persuasiveness

Entertainment-Education

Summary

Prompts

Message Content

Consequence Desirability

One-Sided Versus Two-Sided Messages

Gain-Loss Framing

Overall Effects

Disease Prevention Versus Disease Detection

Other Possible Moderating Factors

Summary

Threat Appeals

Protection Motivation Theory

Threat Appeals, Fear Arousal, and Persuasion

The Extended Parallel Process Model

Summary

Beyond Fear Arousal

Sequential Request Strategies

Foot-in-the-Door

The Strategy

The Research Evidence Explaining FITD Effects

Door-in-the-Face

The Strategy

The Research Evidence

Explaining DITF Effects

Conclusion For Review

Notes

12 Receiver Factors

Individual Differences

Topic-Specific Differences

General Influences on Persuasion Processes

Summary

Transient Receiver States

Mood

Reactance

Other Transient States

Influencing Susceptibility to Persuasion

Reducing Susceptibility: Inoculation, Warning, Refusal

Skills Training

Inoculation

Warning

Refusal Skills Training

Increasing Susceptibility: Self-Affirmation

Conclusion For Review

Notes

References

Author Index

Subject Index

About the Author

Preface

This preface is intended to provide a general framing of this book and is particularly directed to those who already have some familiarity with the subject matter. Such readers will be able to tell at a glance that this book is in many ways quite conventional (in the general plan of the work, the topics taken up, and so forth) and will come to see the inevitable oversimplifications, bypassed subtleties, elided details, and suchlike. Because this book is pitched at roughly the level of a graduateundergraduate course, it is likely to be defective both by having sections that are too shallow or general for some and by having segments that are too detailed or technical for others; the hope is that complaints are not too badly maldistributed across these two categories. This book aims at a relatively generalized treatment of persuasion; in certain contexts in which persuasion is a central or recurring activity, correspondingly localized treatments of relevant research literatures are available elsewhere, such as for consumer advertising (e.g., Armstrong, 2010) and for certain legal settings (e.g., Devine, 2012). Readers acquainted with the second edition will notice the addition of chapters concerning social judgment theory and stage models, revision of the treatment of the theories of reasoned action and planned behavior, and new attention to subjects such as reactance and the use of narratives as vehicles for persuasion.

This edition also gives special attention to questions of message adaptation. One broad theme that recurs in theoretical treatments of persuasion is the need to adapt persuasive messages to their audiences: different recipients may be persuaded by different sorts of messages. Thus one way of approaching any given theoretical framework for persuasion is to ask how it identifies ways in which messages might be adapted to audiences. For this reason, a number of the chapters concerning theoretical perspectives contain a section addressing this issue (and, as appropriate, this matter also arises in other chapters).

Some readers will see the relationship of this theme to concepts such as “message tailoring” and “message targeting.” In the research literature, these labels have often been used to apply quite loosely to any sort of way in which messages are adapted to (customized for) recipients, although sometimes there have been efforts to use different labels to describe different degrees or kinds of message customization (e.g., sometimes

“targeting” is described as adaptation on the basis of group-level characteristics, whereas “tailoring” is based on individual-level properties). But no matter the label, there is a common underlying conceptual thread here, namely, that different kinds of messages are likely to be persuasive for different recipients and hence to maximize persuasiveness, messages should be adapted to their audiences.

As should be apparent, there are quite a few different bases for such adaptation: messages might be adapted to the audience’s literacy level, cultural background, values, sex, degree of extroversion, age, regulatory focus, level of self-monitoring, or race/ethnicity. A message may be customized to the audience’s current psychological state as described by, say, reasoned action theory (e.g., is perceived behavioral control low?), protection motivation theory (is perceived vulnerability sufficiently high?), or the transtheoretical model (which stage is the recipient in?). It may be superficially personalized (e.g., by mentioning the recipient’s name in a direct mail appeal), mention shared attitudes not relevant to the advocacy subject, and so on.

For this reason, it is not fruitful to pursue questions such as “are tailored messages more persuasive than non-tailored messages?” because the answer is virtually certain to be “it depends” if nothing else, the answer may vary depending on the basis of tailoring. For example, it might be that adapting messages through superficial personalization typically makes very little difference to persuasiveness, but adapting messages by matching the message’s appeals to the audience’s core values could characteristically substantially enhance persuasiveness.

Still, the manifest importance of adapting messages to recipients recommends its prominence. Aristotle was right (in the Rhetoric): the art of persuasion consists of discerning, in any particular situation, the available means of persuasion. Those means will vary from case to case, and hence maximizing one’s chances for persuasion will require adapting one’s efforts to the circumstance at hand. Whether one calls this message adaptation, message tailoring, message targeting, message customization, or something else, the core idea is the same: different approaches are required in different persuasive circumstances.

Adding material (whether about audience adaptation or other matters) is an easy decision; omitting material is not, because one fears encouraging the loss of good (if imperfect) ideas. Someone somewhere once pointed out

that in the social and behavioral sciences, findings and theories often seem to just fade away, not because of any decisive criticisms or counterarguments but rather because they seem to be “too old to be true.” This apt observation seems to me to identify one barrier to social-scientific research synthesis, namely, that useful results and concepts somehow do not endure but rather disappear making it impossible for subsequent work to exploit them.

As an example: If message assimilation and contrast effects are genuine and have consequences for persuasive effects, then although there is little research attention being given to the theoretical framework within which such phenomena were first clearly conceptualized (social judgment theory) we need somehow to ensure that our knowledge of these phenomena does not evaporate. Similarly, although it has been some time since substantial work was done on the question of the dimensions underlying credibility judgments, the results of those investigations (the dimensions identified in those studies) should not thereby fail to be mentioned in discussions of credibility research.

To sharpen the point here: It has been many years since the islets of Langerhans (masses of endocrine cells in the pancreas) were first noticed, but medical textbooks do not ignore this biological structure. Indeed, it would be inconceivable to discuss (for example) mechanisms of insulin secretion without mentioning these structures. Now I do not mean to say that social-scientific phenomena such as assimilation and contrast effects are on all fours with the islets of Langerhans, but I do want to suggest that premature disappearance of social-scientific concepts and findings seems to happen all too easily. Without forgetting how grumpy old researchers can sometimes view genuinely new developments (“this new phenomenon is just another name for something that used to be called X”), one can nevertheless acknowledge the real possibility that “old” knowledge can somehow be lost, misplaced, insufficiently understood, unappreciated, or overlooked.

It is certainly the case that the sheer amount of social-scientific research output makes it difficult to keep up with current research across a number of topics, let alone hold on to whatever accumulated information there might be. In the specific case of persuasion research which has seen an explosion of interest in recent years the problem is not made any easier by the relevant literature’s dispersal across a variety of academic locales. Yet somehow the insights available from this research and theorizing must

not be lost.

Unfortunately, there are not appealing shortcuts. One cannot simply reproduce others’ citations or research descriptions with an easy mind (for illustrations of the attendant pitfalls, see Gould, 1991, pp. 155–167; Gould, 1993, pp. 103–105; Tufte, 1997, p. 71). One hopes that it would be unnecessary to say that as in the previous editions, I have read everything I cite. I might inadvertently misrepresent or misunderstand, but at least such flaws will be of my own hand.

Moreover, customary ways of drawing general conclusions about persuasive effects can be seen to have some important shortcomings. One source of difficulty here is a reliance on research designs using few persuasive messages, a matter addressed in Chapter 9. Here I will point out only the curiosity that generalizations about persuasive message effects generalizations intended to be general across both persons and messages have commonly been offered on the basis of data from scores or hundreds of human respondents but from only one or two messages. One who is willing to entertain seriously the possibility that the same manipulation may have different effects in different messages should, with such data in hand, be rather cautious.

Another source of difficulty has been the widespread misunderstandings embedded in common ways of interpreting and integrating research findings in the persuasion literature. To illuminate the relevant point, consider the following hypothetical puzzle:

Suppose there have been two studies of the effect on persuasive outcomes of having a concluding metaphor (versus having an ordinary conclusion that does not contain a metaphor) in one’s message, but with inconsistent results. In Study A, conclusion type made a statistically significant difference (such that greater effectiveness is associated with the metaphorical conclusion), but Study B failed to replicate this result.

In Study A, the participants were female high school students who read a written communication arguing that most persons need from 7 to 9 hours of sleep each night. The message was attributed to a professor at the Harvard Medical School; the communicator’s identification, including a photograph of the professor (an attractive, youthful-looking man), was provided on a cover sheet immediately

preceding the message. The effect of conclusion type on persuasive outcome was significant, t(60) = 2.35, p < .05: Messages with a concluding metaphor were significantly more effective than messages with an ordinary (nonmetaphorical) conclusion.

In Study B, the participants were male college undergraduates who listened to an audio message that used a male voice. The message advocated substantial tuition increases (of roughly 50% to 60%) at the students’ university and presented five arguments to show the necessity of such increases. The communicator was described as a senior at the university, majoring in education. Although the means were ordered as in Study A, conclusion type did not significantly affect persuasive outcome, t(21) = 1.39, ns.

Why the inconsistency (the failure to replicate)?

A typical inclination has been to entertain possible explanatory stories based on such differences as the receivers’ sex (“Women are more influenced by the presence of a metaphorical conclusion than are men”), the medium (“Metaphorical conclusions make more difference in written messages than in oral messages”), the advocated position (“Metaphorical conclusions are helpful in proattitudinal messages but not in counterattitudinal ones”), and so on. But for this hypothetical example, those sorts of explanatory stories are misplaced. Not only is the direction of effect identical in Study A and Study B (each finds that the concludingmetaphor message is more effective) but also the size of the advantage enjoyed by the concluding-metaphor message is the same in the two studies (expressed as a correlation, the effect size is .29). The difference in the level of statistical significance achieved is a function of the difference in sample size, not any difference in effect size.

Happily, recent years have seen some progress in the diffusion of more careful understandings of statistical significance, effect sizes, statistical power, confidence intervals, and related matters. (Some progress but not enough. It remains distressingly common that even graduate students with statistical training can reason badly when faced with a problem such as that hypothetical.) With the hope of encouraging greater sensitivity concerning specifically the magnitude of effects likely to be found in persuasion research, I have tried to include mention of average effect sizes where appropriate and available.

But there is at present something of a disjuncture between the available methods for describing research findings (in terms of effect sizes and confidence intervals) and our theoretical equipment for generating predictions. Although research results can be described in specific quantitative terms (“the correlation was .37”), researchers are currently prepared to offer only directional predictions (“the correlation will be positive”). Developing more refined predictive capabilities is very much to be hoped for, but significant challenges lie ahead (for some discussion, see O’Keefe, 2011a).

Even with increasing attention to effect sizes and their meta-analytic treatment, however, we are still not in a position to do full justice to the issues engaged by the extensive research literature in persuasion, given the challenges in doing relevant, careful, reflective research reviews. For example, research reviews all too often exclude unpublished studies, despite wide recognition of publication biases favoring statistically significant results (see, e.g., Dwan, Gamble, Williamson, Kirkham, & the Reporting Bias Group, 2013; Ferguson & Heene, 2012; Ioannidis, 2005, 2008). Similarly, meta-analytic reviews too often rely on fixed-effect analyses rather than the random-effects analyses appropriate where generalization is the goal (for discussion, see Card, 2012, pp. 233–234). All these considerations conspire to encourage a rather conservative approach to the persuasion literature (conservative in the sense of exemplifying prudence with respect to generalization), and that has been the aim in this treatment.

Of course, one cannot hope to survey the range of work covered here without errors, oversights, and unclarities. These have been reduced by advice and assistance from a number of quarters. Students in my persuasion classes have helped make my lectures and so this book clearer than otherwise might have been the case. Many good insights and suggestions came from the reviewers arranged by Sage Publications: Jonathan H. Amsbary, William B. Collins, Julia Jahansoozi, Bonnie Kay, Andrew J. Kirk, Susan L. Kline, Sanja Novitsky, Charles Soukup, Kaja Tampere, and Beth M. Waggenspack. Jos Hornikx also provided especially useful commentary on drafts of this edition’s chapters. And I thank Barbara O’Keefe both for helpful conversation and for an unceasingly interesting life: “Age cannot wither her, nor custom stale / Her infinite variety.”

Chapter 1 Persuasion, Attitudes, and Actions

The Concept of Persuasion

About Definitions: Fuzzy Edges and Paradigm Cases

Five Common Features of Paradigm Cases of Persuasion

A Definition After All?

The Concept of Attitude

Attitude Measurement Techniques

Explicit Measures

Quasi-Explicit Measures

Implicit Measures

Summary

Attitudes and Behaviors

The General Relationship

Moderating Factors

Encouraging Attitude-Consistent Behavior

Assessing Persuasive Effects

Attitude Change

Beyond Attitude Change

Conclusion For Review

Notes

This book surveys social-scientific theory and research concerning persuasive communication. The relevant work, as will become apparent, is scattered across the academic landscape in communication, psychology, advertising, marketing, political science, law, and so on. Although the breadth and depth of this literature rule out a completely comprehensive and detailed treatment, the main lines of work are at least sketched here.

This introductory chapter begins, naturally enough, with a discussion of the concept of persuasion. But because social-scientific treatments of persuasion have closely linked persuasion and attitude change, the concept of attitude is discussed as well, some common attitude assessment procedures are described, and the relationship of attitudes and behavior is considered; a concluding section discusses the assessment of persuasive effects.

The Concept of Persuasion

About Definitions: Fuzzy Edges and Paradigm Cases

A common way to clarify a concept is to provide a definition of the concept. But definitions can be troublesome things, precisely because they commonly are treated as providing sharp-edged distinctions between what is included in the category and what is not. What is troublesome about such sharp lines is that no matter where they are drawn, it is possible to sustain objections to their location; for some the definition will be too broad and for others too narrow.

Definitions are almost inevitably open to such criticisms, no matter where the definitional lines are drawn, because most concepts have fuzzy edges, that is, gray areas in which application of the concept is arguable. For any concept, there are some cases that virtually everyone agrees are cases of the concept (few would deny that a chair is an instance of the category “furniture”), and there are some cases that virtually everyone agrees are not cases of the concept (a pencil is not an instance of furniture) but there are also some cases that fall in a gray area and can give rise to disagreements (is a television set a piece of furniture? or perhaps is it an appliance?). No matter how the line is drawn, some objection is possible.

So, for example, if one defines persuasion in such a way as to distinguish cases of persuasion from cases of manipulation by requiring that in genuine instances of persuasion, the persuader “acts in good faith” (as do Burnell & Reeve, 1984), then some will object that the definition is too narrow; after all, such a definition almost certainly excludes at least some instances of advertising. But including manipulation as instances of persuasion will meet objections from those who think it important to exclude instances of sheer manipulation from the definition of persuasion.

Happily, it is possible to clarify a concept without having to be committed to a sharp-edged definition of the concept (and thus without having to settle such border disputes). Such clarification can be obtained by focusing on the shared features of paradigm cases of the concept. Paradigm cases of a concept are the sorts of instances that nearly everyone would agree were instances of the concept in question; they are straightforward, uncontroversial examples. By identifying the common features of paradigm cases, one can get a sense of the concept’s ordinary central

application, without having to draw sharp-edged definitional lines.

Five Common Features of Paradigm Cases of Persuasion

Consider, then: What is ordinarily involved when we say that someone (a persuader) has persuaded someone else (a persuadee)? In such straightforward applications of the concept of persuasion, what sorts of shared features can be observed? (For an alternative to the following analysis, see Gass & Seiter, 2004.)

First, when we say that one person persuaded another, we ordinarily identify a successful attempt to influence. That is, the notion of success is embedded in the concept of persuasion. For instance, it does not make sense to say, “I persuaded him but failed.” One can say, “I tried to persuade him but failed,” but to say simply “I persuaded him” is to imply a successful attempt to influence.1

Second, in paradigm cases of persuasion, the persuader intends to influence the persuadee. For example, if I say, “I persuaded Sally to vote for Jones,” you are likely to infer that I intended to obtain that effect. For just that reason, it is entirely understandable that someone might say, “I accidentally persuaded Mary to vote for Brown” precisely in the circumstance in which the speaker does not want a hearer to draw the usual inference of intent; absent such mention of accident, the ordinary inference will be that the persuasion was purposeful.

A third feature shared by paradigm cases of persuasion is some measure of freedom (free will, free choice, voluntary action) on the persuadee’s part. Consider, for example, a circumstance in which a person is knocked unconscious by a robber, who then takes the victim’s money; one would not (except humorously) say that the victim had been “persuaded” to give the money. By contrast, being induced by a television ad to make a donation to a charitable cause is obviously an instance of persuasion.

When the persuadee’s freedom is minimized or questionable, it becomes correspondingly questionable whether persuasion is genuinely involved; one no longer has a straightforward exemplary case of persuasion. Suppose a robber threatens to shoot the victim if the money is not forthcoming, and the victim complies: Is this an instance of persuasion? We need not settle this question here, as it requires a sharp line of

definition that we are avoiding.2 It is enough to notice that such cases are borderline instances of persuasion, precisely because the persuadee’s freedom is not so clear-cut as in paradigm instances.

Fourth, paradigm cases of persuasion are ones in which the effects are achieved through communication (and perhaps especially through the medium of language). My physically lifting you and throwing you off the roof of a building is something quite different from my talking you into jumping off the same roof; the latter might possibly be a case of persuasion (depending on the circumstances, exactly what I have said to you, and so on), but the former is certainly not. What distinguishes these two instances is that communication is involved in the latter case but not in the former.

Finally, paradigm cases of persuasion involve a change in the mental state of the persuadee (principally as a precursor to a change in behavior). Some ordinary instances of persuasion may be described as involving only a change in mental state (as in “I persuaded Jan that the United States should refuse to recognize the authority of the World Court”). But even when behavioral change is involved (as in “I persuaded Tom to take golf lessons”), there is ordinarily presumed to be some underlying change in mental state that gave rise to the behavioral change (e.g., Tom came to believe that his golf skills were poor, that his skills could be improved by taking lessons, etc.). Thus even when a persuader’s eventual aim is to influence what people do (how they vote or what products they buy), at least in paradigm cases of persuasion that aim is ordinarily accomplished by changing what people think (what they think of the political candidate or of the product). That is, persuasion is ordinarily conceived of as influencing others by influencing their mental states (rather than by somehow influencing their conduct directly).

In persuasion theory and research, the relevant mental state has most commonly been characterized as an attitude (and thus the concept of attitude receives direct discussion later in this chapter).3 Even when a persuader’s ultimate goal is the modification of another’s behavior, that goal is often seen to be achieved through a process of attitude change the presumption being that attitude change is a means of behavioral change.

A Definition After All?

These shared features of exemplary cases of persuasion can be strung

together into something that looks like a definition of persuasion: a successful intentional effort at influencing another’s mental state through communication in a circumstance in which the persuadee has some measure of freedom. But it should be apparent that constructing such a definition would not eliminate the fuzzy edges of the concept of persuasion. Such a definition leaves open to dispute just how much success is required, just how intentional the effort must be, and so on.

Hence, by recognizing these shared features of paradigm cases of persuasion, one can get a sense of the central core of the concept of persuasion, but one need not draw sharp definitional boundaries around that concept. Indeed, these paradigm case features permit one to see clearly just how definitional disputes can arise for instance, disputes about the issue of just how much, and what sorts, of freedom the persuadee must have before an instance qualifies as an instance of persuasion. It is also easy to see that there can be no satisfactory definitive solution to these disputes, given the fuzzy edges that the concept of persuasion naturally has. Definitions of persuasion can serve useful functions, but a clear sense of the concept of persuasion can be had without resorting to a hard-edged definition.

The Concept of Attitude

As mentioned above, the mental state that has been seen (in theory and research) to be most centrally implicated in persuasion is that of attitude. The concept of attitude has a long history (see D. Fleming, 1967). Early uses of the term “attitude” referred to posture or physical arrangement (as in someone’s being in “the attitude of prayer”), uses that can be seen today in descriptions of dance or airplane orientation. Gradually, however, attitudes came to be seen as “orientations of mind” rather than of body, as internal states that exerted influence on overt behavior.

Perhaps it was inevitable, thus, that in the early part of the 20th century, the emerging field of social psychology should have seized on the concept of attitude as an important one. Attitude offered to social psychologists a distinctive psychological mechanism for understanding and explaining individual variation in social conduct (Allport, 1935). And although for a time there was considerable discussion of alternative definitions of attitude (e.g., Audi, 1972; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, pp. 1–21; McGuire, 1985), a broad consensus emerged that an attitude is a person’s general evaluation of an object (where “object” is understood in a broad sense, as

encompassing persons, events, products, policies, institutions, and so on). Even when conceptual treatments of attitude differ in other ways, a common theme is that an attitude is an evaluative judgment of (reaction to) an object (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp. 75–79).

Understood this way, it is perhaps obvious why attitude should so often be a mental state of interest to persuaders. What products people buy, which candidates they vote for, which policies they endorse, what hobbies they pursue, which businesses they patronize influencing such things will often involve influencing people’s attitudes. Precisely because attitudes represent relatively stable evaluations that can influence behavior, they are a common persuasive target.

Attitude Measurement Techniques

If persuasion is conceived of as fundamentally involving attitude change, then the systematic study of persuasion requires means of assessing persons’ attitudes. A great many attitude measurement techniques have been proposed, and a large literature addresses the use of attitude measures in specific circumstances such as public opinion polling and survey research. The intention here is to give a brief overview of some exemplary attitude measurement procedures (for more detailed information and reviews, see Banaji & Heiphetz, 2010, pp. 359–370; Krosnick, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2005; Schwarz, 2008).

Attitude assessment procedures can be usefully distinguished by the degree of explicitness (directness) with which they assess the respondent’s evaluation of the attitude object. Some techniques directly obtain an evaluative judgment; others do so in more roundabout ways.

Explicit Measures

Explicit attitude measurement techniques directly ask the respondent for an evaluative judgment of the attitude object. Two commonly employed explicit assessment procedures are semantic differential evaluative scales and single-item attitude questions.

Semantic Differential Evaluative Scales

One popular means of directly assessing attitude is to employ the

evaluative scales from the semantic differential scale of Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957). In this procedure, respondents rate the attitude object on a number of (typically) 7-point bipolar scales that are end-anchored by evaluative adjective pairs (such as good-bad, desirable-undesirable, and so forth). An example appears in Figure 1.1. The instructions for this scale ask the respondent to place a check mark at the point on the scale that best represents the respondent’s judgment. The investigator can straightforwardly assign numerical values to the scale points (say, +3 for the extreme positive point, through 0 for the midpoint, to 3 for the extreme negative end) and then sum each person’s responses to obtain an indication of the person’s attitude toward (general evaluative judgment of) the object.

Figure 1.1 Example of a semantic differential scale.

Single-Item Attitude Measures

Another explicit means of assessing attitude is simply to have the respondent complete a single questionnaire item that asks for the relevant judgment (see Figure 1.2 for an example). There are various ways of wording the question and of anchoring the scale (e.g., “In general, how much do you like the United Nations?” with end anchors “very much” and “not at all”), and it is possible to vary the number of scale points, but the basic procedure is the same. A single-item attitude measure familiar to U.S. survey researchers is the “feeling thermometer,” which asks respondents to report their evaluation on a scale akin to a Fahrenheit thermometer; the endpoints of the scale are zero degrees (very “cold” or unfavorable feelings) and 100 degrees (very “warm” or favorable feelings; see, e.g., Alwin, 1997).

Figure 1.2 Example of a single-item attitude measure.

A single-item attitude measure is an understandably attractive technique for circumstances such as public opinion polling. The attitude assessment

can be undertaken orally (as in telephone surveys or face-to-face interviewing); the question is typically straightforward and easily comprehended by the respondent; the question can be asked (and answered) in a short time.

The central drawback of single-item assessments of attitude is potentially weak reliability. That is, a person’s response to a single attitude question may not be as dependable an indicator of attitude as the person’s response to three or four items all getting at roughly the same thing.

Features of Explicit Measures

Explicit attitude measurement techniques obviously offer the advantage of being simple and straightforward, easy to administer, and so forth. Another advantage of these techniques is that they are relatively easy to construct. For instance, a public opinion survey of attitudes toward possible presidential candidates can easily accommodate some new possible candidate: The surveyor simply asks the standard question but inserts the name of the new candidate. General evaluative scales from the semantic differential can be used for rating all sorts of attitude objects (consumer products, political candidates, government policies, etc.); to assess attitudes toward Crest toothpaste rather than toward the United Nations, one simply makes the appropriate substitution above the rating scales. (This may be a false economy, however: for arguments emphasizing the importance of customizing semantic differential evaluative scales for each different attitude object, see Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp. 79–82.)

One salient disadvantage of these explicit techniques is that because they are so direct, they yield an estimate only of the respondent’s attitude. Of course, this is not a drawback if all the researcher wants to know is the respondent’s attitude. But investigators will often want other information as well (about, for example, beliefs that might lie behind the attitude), and in such circumstances, direct attitude assessment techniques will need to be supplemented or replaced by other procedures.

Quasi-Explicit Measures

Quasi-explicit attitude measurement techniques assess attitude not by directly eliciting an evaluative judgment of the attitude object but by eliciting information that is obviously attitude-relevant and that offers a straightforward basis for attitude assessment. For example, paired-

comparison procedures and ranking techniques do not ask directly for an evaluation of any single attitude object but ask for comparative judgments of several objects. In a paired-comparison technique, the respondent is asked a series of questions about the relative evaluation of each of a number of pairs of objects (e.g., “Which candidate do you prefer, Archer or Barker? Archer or Cooper? Barker or Cooper?”); in a ranking procedure, the respondent ranks a set of attitude objects (e.g., “Rank these various leisure activities, from your most favorite to your least favorite”). The obtained responses obviously permit an investigator to draw some conclusions about the respondent’s evaluation of a given object.

The two most common and well-known quasi-explicit attitude measurement procedures are those devised by Louis Thurstone and by Rensis Likert. In their procedures, the respondent’s attitude is inferred from agreement or disagreement with statements that are rather obviously attitude-relevant. The attitude assessment instrument, then, consists of statements to which the respondent reacts (by agreeing or disagreeing with each one), and the respondent’s attitude is inferred from the pattern of responses.

Obviously, however, if a researcher is going to gauge respondents’ attitudes by examining respondents’ reactions to a set of statements, not just any statements will do; for example, one is not likely to learn much about attitudes toward the United Nations by assessing persons’ agreement with a statement such as “Baseball is a better game than football.” Thus the task faced in constructing a Thurstone or Likert attitude scale is the task of selecting items (statements) that appear to serve as suitable indicators of attitude. One may start with a large pool of statements that might possibly be included on a final attitude instrument, but the problem is to somehow winnow that pool down.

This winnowing is accomplished by gathering and analyzing data about respondents’ reactions to a large number of possible items. Detailed descriptions of these procedures are available elsewhere (for some specifics, see Green, 1954; Likert, 1932; Thurstone, 1931), but the key is to identify those items (statements) that can dependably be taken as indicators of attitudes. For example, if the topic of investigation concerns attitudes toward the First Federal Bank, suitable statements might turn out to be ones such as “This bank is reliable,” “This bank is inefficient,” “This bank has unfriendly personnel,” and so on; by contrast, a statement such as “This bank has a branch at the corner of Main and Elm” would be unlikely

to be included (because knowing whether a respondent agreed or disagreed with such a statement would not provide information about the respondent’s attitude).

Given a set of suitable statements, one elicits respondents’ agreement with each statement. This can be accomplished in various ways. For example, respondents can be given a list of statements and asked to check the ones with which they agree (this is Thurstone’s, 1931, procedure). Or the strength of agreement with each statement can be assessed through some appropriate scale (this is Likert’s, 1932, procedure; see Figure 1.3). An overall attitude score can then be obtained straightforwardly for each respondent, to serve as estimate of that person’s overall attitude.

Figure 1.3 Example of an item on a Likert quasi-explicit attitude measure.

There is a good deal of variation in quasi-explicit attitude assessment techniques, but as a rule, these procedures provide more information than do explicit attitude measurement techniques. For example, when a Thurstone or Likert scale has been employed, a researcher can see what specific items were especially likely to be endorsed by respondents with particular attitudes; an investigator who finds, for instance, that those with unfavorable attitudes toward the bank very often agreed with the statement that “this bank has unfriendly personnel” may well have learned about a possible cause of those negative attitudes. Similarly, ranking techniques can give information about a large number of attitudes and so provide insight about comparative evaluations. Precisely because quasi-explicit procedures involve acquiring attitude-relevant information (rather than the attitude itself), these procedures offer information not available with explicit measurement techniques.

But this additional information is obtained at a cost. Thurstone and Likert attitude scales have to be constructed anew for each attitude object; obviously, one cannot use the First Federal Bank attitude scale to assess attitudes toward other objects. (Indeed, the substantial effort needed to obtain a sound Thurstone or Likert scale is often a deterrent to the use of such techniques.) Procedures such as paired-comparison ratings or ranking tasks may take more time to administer than would direct attitude measures.

Implicit Measures

Explicit and quasi-explicit measures are overwhelmingly the most common ways of measuring attitudes. But a variety of other techniques have been developed that assess attitude not by directly eliciting an evaluation of the attitude object or even by eliciting information obviously relevant to such an overall evaluation but instead by some more roundabout (implicit, indirect) means.

Quite a few different implicit measures of attitude have appeared (for collections and general discussions, see De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009; Goodall, 2011; Petty, Fazio, & Briñol, 2009a; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007). These include physiological indices, such as autonomic responses (e.g., heart rate) and measures of brain activity (for general reviews, see Cunningham, Packer, Kesek, & Van Bavel, 2009; Ito & Cacioppo, 2007); priming measures, in which attitudes are assessed by examining the speed (reaction time) with which people make evaluative judgments when those judgments are preceded (primed) by the attitude object (for a review, see Wittenbrink, 2007); the Implicit Association Test (IAT), in which attitudes are assessed by examining the strength of association (as measured by reaction time) between attitude objects and evaluative categories (for reviews and discussion, see Fiedler, Messner, & Bluemke, 2006; Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; Lane, Banaji, Nosek, & Greenwald, 2007; Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, Jaccard, & Tetlock, 2013); and a variety of others (for examples and discussion, see Kidder & Campbell, 1970; Tykocinski & Bareket-Bojmel, 2009).

What is common to all implicit measures is that it is generally not obvious to respondents that their attitudes are being assessed. For that reason, implicit measures are likely to be most attractive in circumstances in which one fears respondents may, for whatever reason, distort their true attitudes. In most research on persuasion, however, these circumstances are rather uncommon (respondents are ensured anonymity, message topics are generally not unusually sensitive ones, etc.); consequently, implicit attitude measures are rarely employed (for examples and discussion, see Briñol, Petty, & McCaslin, 2009; Hefner, Rothmund, Klimmt, & Gollwitzer, 2011; Maio, Haddock, Watt, & Hewstone, 2009).4

Summary

As this survey suggests, a variety of attitude measurement techniques are available. The overwhelmingly most frequently used attitude measurement procedures are explicit or quasi-explicit techniques; reliability and validity are more readily established for attitude measures based on these techniques than for measures derived from implicit procedures. Explicit procedures are often preferred over quasi-explicit techniques because of the effort required for constructing Thurstone or Likert scales. But which specific attitude assessment procedure an investigator employs in a given instance will depend on the particulars of the situation. Depending on what the researcher wants to find out, the time available to prepare the attitude assessment, the time available to question respondents, the sensitivity of the attitude topic, and so forth, different techniques will recommend themselves.

Attitudes and Behaviors

The General Relationship

Attitude has been taken to be a key mental state relevant to persuasion because of a presumed relationship between attitudes and actions. The assumption has been that attitudes are important determinants of behavior and, correspondingly, that one avenue to changing a person’s behavior will be to change that person’s attitudes.5 This assumption is generally wellfounded: A number of systematic reviews have found that attitudes and behaviors are commonly reasonably consistent (for some reviews, see Eckes & Six, 1994; Glasman & Albarracín, 2006; M.-S. Kim & Hunter, 1993a; Kraus, 1995).6

Moderating Factors

The degree of attitude-behavior consistency has been found to vary depending on other “moderating” factors factors that moderate or influence the relationship between attitudes and behaviors. A large number of possible moderating variables have been explored, including the degree to which the behavior is effortful or difficult (Kaiser & Schultz, 2009; Wallace, Paulson, Lord, & Bond, 2005); the perceived relevance of the attitude to the behavior (Snyder, 1982; Snyder & Kendzierski, 1982); attitude accessibility (Smith & Terry, 2003); attitudinal ambivalence (Conner et al., 2002; Jonas, Broemer, & Diehl, 2000); having a vested

interest in a position (Crano & Prislin, 1995); the extent of attituderelevant knowledge (Fabrigar, Petty, Smith, & Crites, 2006); and many others. In what follows, two well-studied factors are discussed as illustrative: the correspondence between the attitudinal and behavioral measures, and the degree of direct experience with the attitude object.

Correspondence of Measures

One factor that influences the observed consistency between an attitudinal measure and a behavioral measure is the nature of the measures involved. Good evidence indicates that substantial attitude-behavior correlations will be obtained only when the attitudinal measure and the behavioral measure correspond in specificity (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). A general attitude will probably not be especially strongly correlated with any one particular specific behavior. A general attitude measure corresponds to a general behavioral measure, not to a specific one.

For example, general attitudes toward religion might or might not be strongly correlated with performance of the particular act of (say) reading books about religious philosophy. But attitudes toward religion may well be strongly correlated with a general religious behavior index an index based on multiple behaviors (whether the person reads books about religious philosophy, attends religious services, watches or listens to religious programs, owns religious music, donates money to religious institutions, consults clergy about personal problems, and so on). No one of these behaviors may be very strongly predicted by religious attitude, but the overall pattern of these behaviors might well be associated with religious attitude. That is, although the correlation of the general attitude with any one of these behaviors might be relatively small, the correlation of the general attitude with a multiple-act behavioral measure may be much greater.7

Several investigations have yielded information about the relative strength of the attitude-behavior association when single-act and multiple-act behavioral measures are predicted on the basis of general attitudes. In these studies, the average correlation between general attitude and any single-act index of behavior was roughly .30; by contrast, the average correlation between general attitude and a multiple-act behavioral measure was approximately .65 (Babrow & O’Keefe, 1984; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974; O’Keefe & Shepherd, 1982; Sjoberg, 1982; Weigel & Newman, 1976; see also Bamberg, 2003). These findings plainly indicate that

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