"The Grenfell Inquiry goes to the heart of what is wrong with fire policy and the fire service"

Government & Politics

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“The Grenfell Inquiry goes to the heart of what is wrong with fire policy and the Fire Service”

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As the Grenfell Inquiry continues to hear evidence from firefighters, FIRE Correspondent Catherine Levin talks to FBU General Secretary Matt Wrack about his concerns with the inquiry

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FBU Involvement Fire Brigades Union General Secretary Matt Wrack attended on most days. Speaking to Matt about his impressions after the first six weeks, he explains: “For us it’s been a huge exercise. Over 1,000 firefighters have been interviewed and we’ve tried to have an FBU rep at all of these. Some of those interviews lasted four to six hours. We’ve drawn on health and safety reps from across the country.”

Matt wrote personally to all the FBU members that have been called as witnesses. Every day, two FBU officials accompany the witness, travelling from London Fire Brigade headquarters to the inquiry and staying with them, providing valuable support for their wellbeing throughout the process.

Fire Brigades Union General Secretary Wrack told FIRE that the inquiry is “approaching issues back to front” and that the order is “chronologically and causally wrong” Photo by Stefano Cagnoni

EXCLUSIVE interview: Matt Wrack The last edition of FIRE looked at the early weeks of the Grenfell Inquiry, providing an insight into how it worked and some thoughts about the emerging themes. Throughout this phase of the inquiry the Fire Brigades Union has been a constant presence.

Union officials supported firefighters giving evidence, some sat in the pressroom day after day following proceedings and commenting to the wider media, even interpreting fire language for reporters who found some of the terminology baffling.

“There is a structural failing in how we run fire and fire policy in the UK. There is no obvious body who can take control” www.fire–magazine.com | September 2018 | 9

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I think for anyone who has watched will see that firefighters are very open, straightforward, honest, even where there are contradictions in their own recollections.” He is right.

Over time, witnesses have been willing to admit when they do not know something and appear comfortable with that.

“I think the stories that have come out, the accounts and some of the detail that has emerged have been extremely horrifying on lots of levels and very powerful and moving in others. Hopefully, it has given people an impression of what firefighters on the night had to deal with.”

And, of course, those who gave evidence later had the chance to watch their colleagues doing so via the inquiry’s YouTube channel. “They are more aware of what to expect,” he says. He is quick to clarify that the FBU was not allowed to brief witnesses; the FBU could familiarise their members with the process but not discuss their evidence.

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Inquiry Recommendations – Past and Present The Grenfell Inquiry website is a valuable resource. It provides a list of issues that the inquiry will consider through phases one and two. Number ten on the list is Response to Recommendations. It asks what recommendations from previous inquiries were relevant to the risk of fire at Grenfell Tower and goes on to ask: ‘Were appropriate steps taken by local and central government and other relevant bodies to act upon such recommendations insofar as they were relevant to the risk of fire in high-rise residential buildings?’

Turning to how the Grenfell Inquiry recommendations can make a difference to how the Fire and Rescue Service operates in the future, Matt is scathing about the handling of recommendations from previous inquiries. He talks about the buck passing between different organisations, both public and private, concluding: “They all pass them on to someone else and it just disappears into the quagmire”.

“There is a structural failing in how we run fire and fire policy in the UK,” argues Matt. “There is no obvious body who can take control. We will find everyone will run for cover when we’re asked why weren’t these recommendations implemented?”

How can that cycle be broken? “That’s the million dollar question. That goes to the heart of what’s wrong with the Fire Service.”

Matt warms to this theme and sets out his own vision of the future. “We don’t have any structures for allowing follow-up [after inquiries]. In an ideal world you would have a genuine, open, well-resourced stakeholder body. It would include the Fire Service, government, unions, and other key players. It would monitor and assess operational issues, technical issues, policy, equipment and things like recommendations from inquiries would sit well here.”

Matt is talking about something akin to the Central Fire Brigades Advisory Council (CFBAC) that was abolished by the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004. This will not be new

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With no internal legal facility, the FBU calls on the services of Thompsons Solicitors with the FBU’s counsel, Martin Seward QC, and his team representing them at the inquiry. The FBU, along with the Fire Officers Association, are the only trade unions recognised as core participants (although five applied for that status). There are 581 core participants in total.

As a core participant they can apply for financial support under s22 of the Inquiry Rules 2006 (SI no. 1838), but Chairman Sir Martin Moore Bick sets the level and the qualifying criteria.

It is a costly exercise to provide this level of support to FBU members. “We just have to find the money”. It’s expensive, but we took the decision that we would put the resources in that we could, to do the best job.”

In addition to this the FBU is analysing the witness statements ahead of when the witness appears before the inquiry. From the start, as core participants, the FBU used its assessment of the written statements and the oral evidence to suggest specific additional questions or lines of questioning to the lead counsel, Richard Millett QC. This has been a vital part of the process, says Matt. “We are a key organisation with fire experts who have a grasp of the operational issues which the inquiry may not have initially had.”

With the conclusion of six weeks of evidence and confirmation that firefighters will continue to give evidence throughout September, the FBU is considering whether there are specific matters arising from the inquiry that require a response at this stage. Matt is clear that he does not want to wait until the inquiry completes before putting forward what they think should be recommended by the Chairman.

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Upsetting Evidence So what of those first six weeks; what has changed? Well, the tone for one. Matt reflects on the evidence of Watch Manager Michael Dowden. “Michael Dowden’s experience upset a lot of people, including us. He was scheduled for one-and-a-half days and ended up giving evidence for three days. We were not happy with the tone of the questioning as well as some of the specific questions.

I wonder whether any witness should end up on the stand for that long.”

He continued: “The mood on the ground was very angry. People thought that he was being held responsible.

I think the press coverage was generally unfortunate. They referred to him as a fire chief, which he is not. We did a lot of work with the media to correct that.”

This misunderstanding about the rank structure in part stems from a lack of visual props during the inquiry, where the absence of organisational charts or imagery showing technical equipment has made it hard for those following the inquiry to understand it fully.

“I think the tone has improved since those early days.

Photo by Catherine Levin

“We don’t have any structures for allowing follow-up [after inquiries].

In an ideal world you would have a genuine, open, well-resourced stakeholder body” 10 | September 2018 | www.fire–magazine.com

Government & Politics

“To me, it all comes back to a lack of central oversight, a lack of planning. Why has no-one done exercises to simulate a mass evacuation out of a tower block?”

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Back to Front Approach Looking at the specific issue of cladding and the continued risk it presents to firefighter safety, Matt restates the FBU position: “We have called for a ban on flammable materials on buildings.” He is pragmatic and accepts that cladding will remain for the foreseeable future and as a result, “you clearly have to plan for what to do if you have a fire there.”

He does not think that is the responsibility of individual fire and rescue services but is a national issue that requires a national response.

“To me, it all comes back to a lack of central oversight, a lack of planning. Why has no-one done exercises to simulate a mass evacuation out of a tower block? After 9/11 there was work undertaken to see how the UK would respond to similar incidents. After Grenfell, why is no one doing something similar?”

After six weeks of evidence, the summer break gives the FBU and others time to take stock. With over 1.2 million words already in evidence, it is a hard job to go through and analyse it all.

“We’ve got two tasks now,” says Matt. “The inquiry is behind schedule and more firefighters have been called.

We are getting ready for another round of firefighter evidence. We are also working on our submission for phase two of the inquiry.” Phase two will look at a range of issues including construction and modification of the building.

Matt said at the start of the inquiry that he thought it was “approaching issues back to front” and that the order of the inquiry was “chronologically and causally wrong”.

Six weeks on, he has heard nothing to change his mind. He accepts that the firefighter response is important but the inquiry needs to look at how flammable cladding ended up on buildings. How did all the failings in Grenfell’s fire precautions happen? He reels off a list including failings in fire doors, the fire lifts, the dry risers and so on.

Richard Millett’s questioning has revealed a lot about the way the building’s fire precautions performed, but there is much more to learn from the evidence of others beyond London Fire Brigade. It will take time to piece it all together and establish the facts, but it is the length of time that concerns Matt. “I just worry that by the time we get to it [the process before the fire] that the public interest will have waned.”

If, as Matt says, the Grenfell Inquiry goes to the heart of what is wrong with the Fire and Rescue Service, then the FBU under his leadership needs to be inextricably involved in providing solutions. Ensuring that the learning is captured, disseminated and embedded requires a joinedup approach; perhaps it is time to reconsider how best to do this so that we do not end up bemoaning the lack of action to the Grenfell Inquiry recommendations in years to come.

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to anyone who has been around the fire world; the FBU has often bemoaned its loss.

The Bain Report from 2002 recommended replacing the CFBAC with a new body stating that: ‘The new body should draw on the widest range of expertise relevant to helping the Minister decide upon the strategic principles under which the Fire Service should be operated, and the future direction of policy... The board would not be concerned about consensus building. It will be important to ensure that part of the membership is completely independent of the Fire Service’.

While the Practitioners Forum was established shortly after the 2004 Act as a partial response to this recommendation in the Bain Report, it did not last and today there still is no replacement or equivalent.

www.fire–magazine.com | September 2018 | 11