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The state of the (fire) nation
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riginally scheduled to be published alongside the HMICFRS’s tranche 3 report in December, it was pushed back to January 15 and, unlike the tranche reports, it is laid in parliament fulfilling HMICFRS’s obligations under the amended Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004. Remember that the Policing and Crime Act 2017 created the new inspection regime, reviving a process that had been dormant for a decade. Elsewhere in this edition of FIRE, there is a dissection of the tranche 3 reports (see pg 18). FIRE looked at tranche 1 and 2 in previous editions, so what has the State of Fire to say that has not been said before?
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State of Play The most significant addition is the discussion about the role of the Fire and Rescue Service and its people. There is existential angst in the State of Fire. The last time the Fire and Rescue Service was prodded in the same way was in 2002 when Sir George Bain carried out his review as a result of industrial action that saw red fire engines firmly parked in appliance bays while green goddesses roamed the streets instead. The result of that effort was the 2004 Fire and Rescue Services Act, replacing legislation largely unchanged since 1947. Is this the same? Maybe, but not quite: it is true that there are many references – veiled or blatant – to the big stick of legislation. Take National Operational Guidance as an example. The report says that services should, ‘Intensify
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The State of Fire is the first report of its kind and a milestone in Fire Service history. FIRE Correspondent Catherine Levin reports on the 160-page document that summarises the view of Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Fire and Rescue, Sir Tom Winsor, based on the inspection of 45 fire and rescue services in England
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Government & Politics
their efforts to implement these national arrangements. Otherwise, Parliament should make them do it’. Two of the four new recommendations (there are a couple more in the tranche 2 report, confusingly) contain explicit references to legislation. One relates to the operational independence of chief fire officers and seeks to clarify the demarcation between those who are responsible for governance and the operational decision making by the chief fire officer (see pg 14 for more on operational independence). This feels a bit left field and very policeoriented but deserves further exploration through a future governance-focused thematic inspection. The other recommendation states, ‘The Home Office needs to determine – in consultation with the fire sector – whether the functions specified in the 2004 Act are still current’. This is the big one. The 2004 Act made fire safety a core duty for the first time alongside firefighting, road traffic accidents and emergencies. Responding to flooding and emergency medical incidents are not part of the core role of the firefighter as set out in the Act. The Fire Brigades Union, assisted in the past by the likes of Lyn Brown MP, the erstwhile shadow Fire Minister, regularly used the opportunity of extreme flooding to tell the public and government that responding to flooding should be a core duty and as such pay should be commensurate with that additional responsibility. The same argument applies to responding to emergency medical calls, but this is more recent.
“The most significant addition is the discussion about the role of the Fire and Rescue Service and its people. There is existential angst in the State of Fire” www.fire–magazine.com | February 2020 | 11