Imbalance Tariff 2012 – 2015 Users’group 29/09/2011
Disclaimer •
This presentation is a work in progress
•
Because it is a work in progress, it ‘s possible that parts of this proposition will be revised.
•
The definitive imbalance tariffs can only be communicated after regulatory approval.
11/10/2011
Content
• • • •
New imbalance tariffs Parameters; α & β, Cap & Floor Some examples of the new imbalance tariff Information to be published on the website
11/10/2011
Imbalance Tariffs as from 1/11/2010
11/10/2011
Points for improvement The current imbalance tariff has its merits but can be improved: • • •
Incentives to keep the balance/ restore balance: create incentives for ARP with a stronger focus on the real time market (vs. currently Belpex). Asymmetric incentives: on average low compensation for positive imbalances Complexity (customer survey Elia 2009) culminating with negative prices
11/10/2011
Key modifications new imbalance tariff • •
•
6
Marginal prices (instead of average) give an adequate incentive to ARP’s to balance and to deliver Elia-requested activations. Adaptation of spread R2 • gives symmetric incentives • avoids merit order distorsion (consistent with marginal pricing) • is leading to a decrease in imbalance costs for ARP’s as a market-based compensation is being paid for positive imbalances. Single pricing instead of double pricing • is cheaper for ARP’s which are having a balanced portfolio on the long term (50% long, 50% short) • avoids reference to Belpex day-ahead
11/10/2011
New imbalance tariff
MDP=Marginal Decremental Price = Lowest downwards activation price MIP = Marginal Incremental Price = Highest Upwards activation price
7
11/10/2011
Adaptation of R2 activation prices proposal for 2012
• • •
Ibid =< max(FC;Belpex) + 5€ Dbid >= Ibid – 10€ I-offers and D-offers can be <0 only if Belpex<0
Gradually increase in flexibility to reflect market/ system circumstances Opportunity to improve price signals Compatible with negative prices
8
11/10/2011
Introduction of a balancing volume fee
•
Reasoning: Imbalance tariffs should reflect the real balancing costs. As a result they should also reflect a part of the reservation costs. At this moment this is already done in an implicit way by means of the balancing margin. Due to the new imbalance tariffs the margin will decrease significantly. A fee based on volumes of load and production will recuperate these costs in an explicit way. Using a fee based on load and production volumes - and not on imbalances -will guarantee a correct repartition of the reservation costs between ARP’s. Principle:
• • • •
9
11/10/2011
Cap & Floor α&β
10
11/10/2011
Cap & Floor
11
11/10/2011
Coefficients as incentive component (1) Elia proposed the following coefficients:
With β = 0 With formula for α: •
If ABS(System imbalance) < 140 MW
α1 = α2 = 0 •
If ABS(System imbalance) > 140 MW
α1 = α2 = AVG8qh (System Imbalance)²/15.000
System imbalance = ACE – NRV
12
11/10/2011
(€/MWh)
Coefficients as incentive component (2)
â&#x201A;Ź/MWh
86% of the time
13
11/10/2011
Proposition new imbalance tariffs
14
11/10/2011
Some examples
15
11/10/2011
Example 1: normal situation
16
11/10/2011
Example 2: zone short
17
11/10/2011
Example 3: zone long
18
11/10/2011
Information to be published on the website
19
11/10/2011
Website information 4 categories • Current system imbalance Reflect the real time system imbalance • Available balancing energy availability of regulating power and corresponding price • Activation of balancing energy Activation (MWh/price) done per category • Imbalance prices Composition of the imbalance tariff
20
11/10/2011
Current system imbalance
NEW
21
11/10/2011
Available balancing energy No changes
22
11/10/2011
Activation of balancing energy : volume
NEW
23
11/10/2011
Activation of balancing energy : Price
NEW
24
11/10/2011
Imbalance prices
NEW
25
11/10/2011
Questions ? 26
11/10/2011