irish english battle of hastings

The Battle of Hastings: Math, Myth and Melee Author(s): Edd Wheeler Source: Military Affairs, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Jul., 1988), pp. 128-134 Published by: Society for Military History Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1988246 .

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FirstScene intheBayeuxTapestry:KingEdwardtheConfessor

e B

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atinS as i

Math,Mythand MeZee HaroldGodwinson, FORTY weeksafterhiscoronation, king

northwest ofEngland,was indefensive ofHastformation, and his army. ings,awaitingattackby Williamof Normandy Thecontestwas toprovetobe "one ofthebattleswhichat rare intervals havedecidedthefateofnations."' Thecompostofthe battlehas smolderedin the inkpotsof historians, especially during thepastcentury.

Thrustandparryaretermswhichhave takenon newandpersonalmeaning forsomeofthecontending scholars.Thisarticleis notintended tojointhefraybutrather to helpclearthedebrisfromaroundoneofthepersistent questions on thebattle,namely,whatnumberof contestants stoodand fought nearHastingson 14 October1066?

Thequestionhas notlackedthosewhoproffer answers,and is to somehaveansweredveryably.2Mypurposehere,though, castthediscussion infreshtermsandtopresentan analysisthat historian is morereadilycomprehensible to thegeneralmilitary thanstudieswhichrely,andI thinkoverlyrely,on assumptions the abouttheprobablecaloricintakeoftheNormanshipwright, forestreservesof the Seine basin in the 11thcentury,and whether theNormansloaded theirvesselsin rotationsto ten shipsusingexactly40 ramps.3 Thisarticleuses quantification techniquesmerelyto establishcredibleordersof magnitude.

It also addressestheSaxon I amawareof sideoftheequation.In making thisinvestigation, theimagined perilsamongmedievalists.

"Never was therea moretreacherousbog to strayinto thanthis," warnedan anonymous criticto thosewho wouldwriteabouttheAngloSaxonarmy.4 Butto lookonlyat William'sforcesis to shunan integrated viewofHastings.Itis truethatan investigation ofthe Saxonsidepresentsspecialdifficulties; however,thisdoes not meanthatthequestis uselessorhopeless.Besides,thedangers arenottooformidable, evenwhenventuring againsteagle-eyed andassertivescholars,becauseall sightsare varyingly blurred inthishuntforsmallgamewithlargeboreson remoteslopes.

by Edd Wheeler

The Windowto Events HE windowopeningon Hastingsis smallbutnotclosed. factswithreasonable We know,forexample,thefollowing Williamwas stirred towar. certainty.

UponHarold'scrowning, hisfleetand menon the He spentseveralmonthsmarshalling Normancoast. Haroldexpectedtheattack.Overcoming difficulties,WilliamcrossedtheEnglishChanneland debarkedat Pevenseyon 28 September1066.The invadersmaraudedthe come frombattleat and forcedHarold,recently countryside them.Duke WilliampredistantStamford Bridge,to confront vailedaftera desperate,day-long struggle inwhichvictory was severaltimesin doubt.

Estimatesof the contendingforcesvary widely.A contemporary to theConqueror,Williamof Poitiers,saysthatthe Normansnumbered about60,000.5Wace,theFrenchpoetwho wroteofHastingstowardtheendofthe12thcentury, tellsofa granderscale. In theRomande Rou, Wace's Williamrefersto hisarmyas "Sixtyodd thousandand more."Wace portrays a

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Harold who wildly exaggerates the English host at 400,000.6

Modem historians assigndecidedlysmallernumbersto both sides,withestimatesgenerallyin therangeof 7,000foreach army.7 One scholarattributes "perhaps7,000menandas many as 3,000horses"to William,whileestimating Harold'sforceat "possibly8,000men."8Another, though, propounds"thatthe Englisharmywas notmuchmorethan3,000strong;and it is was verymuch unlikelythatthe effective Normanstrength greater."9 toHastingsinsizeandscopewas Thebattlemostcomparable The thatat Stamford Bridge,lessthanthreeweeksbeforehand. importance ofStamford Bridgewas immense, firstin diverting Haroldfromthe southwherehe had beenon invasionwatch againstWilliam,nextin sappingHarold's resourcesthrough combatand long march,and lastly,in conveyingto Harold whichmayhave provedfatalin his preparations expectations &mom TV-A

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FromtheBayeux Tapestry:Ships ofWilliam'sInvasionFleetCrossingthe EnglishChannel.

for Hastings.

The Northmenunder Harald Hardrada came into Yorkshire witha fleetof300 ships. There is no clear evidence on thesize of these ships, althoughseveral Norse vessels have been excavated. A Skuldelev ship (c. 1000) measures about 50 feet in lengthand approximately13 feetin widthamidship.The Gokstad ship(c. 900) was larger.A royalshipof royalproportions,it was 76 feetlongand morethan 16 feetwide."' Not everyvessel, however,was of ducal design. Care then mustbe exercised in formingconclusions about the size of Norse ships. Imagine archeologistsof the futurefindinga silent-screenstar buriedin his Duesenberg, and concluding that folk of the early 20th centurydrove sleek, 20-foot-longsports cars.

The Skuldelev ship is likelymorerepresentativeof the large, ocean-goingcraftoftheperiod. It mightbe expectedto transport a contingentofperhaps40 to 45 armedmen,or alternatelyabout 10 to 12 knightswiththeirmounts.Ships of only slightlymore thanhalfthiscapacity,though,were reportedin use as military transportin the 12thcentury."

Ifone assumes thatHarald Hardrada's fleetconsistedofships all roughlyof the Skuldelev class, then it is conceivable that more than 13,000 Northmen may have foughtat Stamford Bridge.'2However, it is more likelythatHardrada's ships and those of Williamas well were of varyingsize. Let us assume, therefore,thathalfthe Norse fleetconsisted of Skuldelev-type shipsand theotherhalfwere ofless capacity- say, on average, one-halfthe capacity of the largerships. Using this scenario, Hardrada's forcemighthave numberedsomethinglike 9,000 or 10,000 men." In the event, Harold marched northover a distance of200 milesin fourdays, and won a victoryso completeat StamfordBridgethat24 ships sufficedto returnthe survivorsto Norway. 4 For Hastings,however,theannals recordneitherthe number who foughtnorthe numberwho fell.The annals do suggestthat William's venturewas withoutprecedentin 11th-century England. The Normans came in a mannerunpracticedamong Vikings. They came as an armyof invasionand rule ratherthanof plunder.They came afterextensivemaneuvering,carefulpreparation, apparentlyby night,in great numbers,and very sigwithcavalry. Accordingto theAnglo-Savon C/liloninificantly, icle, fleets of even 20 to 30 ships were large for the decades precedingtheConquest."lThere ofcourse wereexceptions.The chroniclersreportthatin 911 King Edward the Elder sentabout 100 ships against the Danes and that in 1047 King Swein of Denmarkasked Edward the Confessorto contribute50 ships to assist himagainsttheNorwegians.'Ih The Vikingsrarelybrought mountswiththemby ship,choosinginsteadto capturehorsesas one of the initialobjectives of theirraid.

The Normans

Itis true return to WacetomeasuretheNormaneffort.

thatWace was notan eyewitnessto Hastingsnoreven to occurrencesof the 11thcentury.Wace in factbeginshis account more than a centuryafterHastings. His fatherwas not bom at the timeof the battle. The factsand faces of the battlereached Wace throughthose who, at best, receivedthemsecondhand. In addressingthe numbersand deeds at Hastings, Wace already was lookingintoa crevice of math,mythand melee. And so do we still.

Nonetheless, Wace cannot be discounted as a source. If Homer held close communionwithheroes dead forat least six centuries,it is reasonable to suppose thatWace was sufficiently familiarwithhis subject across a more narrowspace. In many ways, people of previous centuriesstood closer to theirgreatgrandfathers.Hence, when Wace speaks we mightlisten. He alludes to ships promised by the nobles of France to support William,but acknowledgesabout the totalthat"the numberso promis'd, I never could hear." "All Summerand August," the Normans, "labor'd and wrought" the invasion fleet in the "Ports of all Normandy." Wace says thathis fatheroftenspoke of William's 696 ships, but adds that "I find it recorded that three thousand Sall.' 17On this point, Gillmor states that "Wace's referenceto contemporarydisputesabout the number of ships stronglysuggeststhateven the approximatenumberof ships cannot be determined.'"8But why Wace's musingsmake intelligentapproximationimpracticalis not at all clear. The poet probably did not set up the recurringfigurefrom his father'smemoryas a kindof strawman. It is likelythatWace putthe statedNormanhostof 60,000 menand 696 ships,figures attested to by Williamof Poitiers and Wace's father,respectively, in a more certaincategorythan. forexample, singleand palpably questionable allusions to 3,000 invasion craftagainst 400,000 Saxons. Actually, 700 ships is not an unreasonable number.Given the importanceof the prize, monthsof preparation,and the resources not only of Normandybut of French and otherallies as well, Williamwould have been quite capable of assemblinga fleetgreater,and maybedecidedlygreater,than the 300 ships Hardrada is said to have commanded. This is especially the case when we consider that William's plans, thoughfraughtwithperil,involvednegotiatinga Channelcrossingof some 60 to 80 miles instead of the North Sea passage by Hardrada across a distance of more than 300 miles.'9 William's forces were prepared for a crossing many weeks beforehand.Harold had expected themduringthe Summer,but William's plans were delayed by bad weather. William of Poitiers,writingin the decade followingthe invasion, tells of storm and travail. But he records that the Conqueror was "daunted neitherby thedelay, norby thecontrarywind,norby the loss of ships, nor even by the craven flightof many who brokefaithwithhim.' '2 Williamof Poitiersrefersto the French fleetas greaterthan the thousand vessels whichfollowedAgamemnonto Troy,thoughthiscomparisonmaybe intendedmore to set the Norman venturewithinan heroic traditionthan to renderan accurate accountingof size.

It is possible of course thatthe estimatesof the Normanfleet may be reconciled, at least in part. The figureof 3,000 ships whichWace mentionsin passing is implausible.The poet notes the numberbut gives no indicationof adoptingit. As I have pointed out, the 700 ships cited by Wace's father is more feasible. This numberat any rate is in the same order of magnitudeas the thousandplus ships to which Williamof Poitiers alludes. It is entirely possible that the invasion force was dissipated. The French may have managed at some point to assemble in excess of a thousand vessels in theirports; but throughdelay, doubtand chance, theirforcewas whittleddown to a lesser size. Seen in thisvein,thefigureof700 ships appears as reasonable as any in the literature.

If we assume then that the Normans sailed with about 700 We learnfromWilliamof ships, whatforcesdid theytransport'?

JULY1988

129

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From theBayeux Tapestry: UseofBipennis at Hastings.

against theNormal Cavalry

ofthreeranks:bowmen, Poitiers thattheNormanhostconsisted We do notknowtheirratios,but armedinfantry, and knights. of its the size of the totalforcewas necessarilya function Thatis, knights andhorsesoccupiedmorespace configuration. thanidenticalnumbersof archersor pikemen.The largerthe to cavalry,thesmallerthetotalforce. commitment

F rom thatgreatgaugeof artand history,theBayeux

Tapestry,we knowthattheNormanshipswereof single also showswhatlogicwouldsuggmastand sail. The tapestry sizes. Gillmor est, namely,thatthe shipswere of different "portrays foursizes ofhorsetransobservesthatthetapestry but portswithcapacitiesofthree,four,eight,andtenhorses,"~ forindicating thenumerical addsthat"thereis nosoundmethod distribution of thesevessels.''21 Actually,one of theNorman onlytwohorses;anotheris shown craftis showntransporting debarking twohorses.But Gillmoris obviouslycorrectabout Evenso, itis highly probablethattheinvasion lackofcertainty. craftwererelatively small.Some mayhave been of theSkuldelev class, but othersdoubtlesswere smaller.All the ships Therewouldbe no dockwereintended forsimpledebarkation. of inguponarrival.Even in the largerships,the movement horseswas a novel operationand posed special problems. to Vessels withhighsides would have been verydifficult unload.Thentoo,it is almostcertainthattheNormanswould to fullcanot have loaded theirdesginatedhorsetransports pacity.Theyfarmorelikelywouldhave followeda relatively esapproachin executingan untestedoperation, conservative scale. The sea passage of peciallyon such an unprecedented wellprovemoreunruly thanthatfor horsesinopenboatsmight accustomed,stoicalVikings.

TheBayeuxTapestry (c. 1070)is,ofcourse,commemoration, itgivesan interestYetas a testamental document, notgraphics. ingpictureofWilliam'sfleet,indeedoftheentirebattle.The 11 seemaboutequally shipsdepictedunderwayfromNormandy will dividedbetweenlargerand smallervessels.22I therefore speculateforpurposeshere-and I wouldnotclaimthatit is -that William's fleet anything morethanreasonedspeculation oflargeandsmallervessels.If consisted ofaboutequalnumbers hold,thismeansthatapproximately 350ofthe myassumptions large,perhapsof theSkulNormanshipswerecomparatively halfwereof a smallervariety. delevclass, and theremaining Theprecisesizesofthesevesselsmustremainanopenquestion. thatthesmallershipsinthe However,I believeitis significant tapestryseem, on average,abouthalfthe size of the larger withthesmaller is consistent vessels.Thisperceivedsymmetry alludedto earlier. military transport size of the 12th-century These ships,again,apparently wereabouthalfthecapacityof for theSkuldelevvessels. The comparisonis also consistent, I

the largerships,withscholarshipon the Englishoverseas whenlargershipswerejudged ofthe13thcentury, expeditions to carryabout44 men.23 ofthesize tomovetowarda calculation We arenowprepared threescenarios, of William'sarmy.I willdo so by examining anotherfeatuse of transport, a proportionate one involving in William'sarmy,and a uringtheequal sizingofcomponents halfoftheNormanfleetused as horse thirdscenarioinvolving All of thesescenariosare guidedby thefollowing transports. assumptions.First,William'slargerships,as prethreshold from40 to45 armed viouslystated,werecapableoftransporting men,from10 to 12 knights,or some combinationthereof.

Second,thesmallershipshad abouthalfofthecapacityofthe largerones on average,i.e., 20 :o 22 soldiersor fiveto six underknightsin each vessel. Third,forsuch a momentous sailedloaded to capacity;but,for taking,all trooptransports sailedat something reasonsstatedabove,thehorsetransports less thanfullcapacity.I shall assume,forpurposeof this loadedto, weregenerally thatthesetransports demonstration, capacity.Finally,I also assumethatfew,if say,three-fourths any,shipswerelost in crossingtheChannel.24 The firstscenariosupposesthattheNormansusedtheirfleet and thatequal numbersof shipswere comproportionately each of thearmy'sthreecomponents. mittedfortransporting The approachis givenin tabularformbelow. I followthis formatnotto infuseobviouslysubjectivedata withfalsecertainty but rather for purposes of simplification.The scenariosuggeststhatWilliam'sarmymay proportionate-use have consistedof roughly15,000to 17,000men.

First Scenario: ProportionateUse of Fleet by Normans Bowmen

Armed

Infantry

Cavalry

(knightswith

Army

Numberofmen in I) 350large ships:1/3, 4,680-5,265*4,680-5,265 877-l,053** 10,237-11,583 or 117ships, to each component II) 350smaller 5,118-5,674 ships:1/3, 2,340-2,574 2,340-2,574 438-526 or 117ships, to each component

Total(Range) 7,020-7,839 7,020-7,839 1,315-1,579 15,355-17,257

. The simple math used for bowmenand armed infantry is as follows: 117 shipsx 40 menper ship = 4,680 men; 117 shipsx 45 men per ship = 5,265 men. ** The computationfor cavalry in large craftloaded to capacity would be 1,170 to 1,404 (i.e., 117 x 10 to 117 x 12).

However, since I assume thatall horse transportswere loaded to only75 percentcapacity,therange becomes 877-1053(1,170x 75/to 1,404 x 751).

Its The secondscenarioemphasizesthecavalrycomponent. for oftheera's idealinstrument is itsprojection attractiveness The was inascendancy. shockandforay.Theage ofknighthood longbowmanhad not yet assertedhimself.In addition,the English,who reliedon the shieldwall in battle,would be expectedto fieldlittleor no cavalry.Williammightbe interestedin pressinghis advantagein thiscategory.Anotherata symmetrical ofthisscenariois thatitpresents feature tractive on anyofthethreecomponents. force.Thereis nooverreliance Buttheequal-sizing scenariocallsforover70 percentofthe We see, therethecavalry.25 entireNormanfleetto transport fore,thatthisapproachyieldsan armyofabout8,500to 9,500 menr.

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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FromtheBayeux Tapestry:Harold WoundedbyArrow(left);HaroldSlain in (right).

Second Scenario: Equal Sizing of Forces by Normans Bown|s

Arned Infantry

percentsmaller.It is hardlylikelythatWilliamwould have 3,000knights ofhisfleettotransport usedalmostthree-quarters thattherealmsoftheNormansand withhorses,evenassuming of sucha largenumber theirallieswerecapableofcommitting cavalryfortheinvasion.

It is morelikelythatWilliamwouldhave been willingto commitsome largeportionof his fleet,but less thanthreequarters,in orderto maximizehisadvantagein cavalry.Many scholarsarguethatabouthalfof thefleetwas used as horse thisnotion.This Thethirdscenarioaccommodates transports.26 that,byusinghalfof his shipsto transport scenarioillustrates cavalry,Williammighthavebeenable to fieldabout12,500to 14,000men. It is worthnotingthat,as seen in the Bayeux Williamwouldnothaveused hislargershipsexclusTapestry, thiscourse.Hence,inthisscenarioandinthe ivelyinpursuing othersas well,I have used bothlargeand smallershipsproby category. portionately

Cavalry (knghts with horse)

Army

Number of men in

I) 350large ships: A) Morethan ofships 13.6%o 1,904-2,142 forbowmen*1,904-2,142** B) Morethan 13.6%for 1,904-2,142 1,904-2,142 armedinfantry C) Less than for 72.8%o 1,904-2,142 1,904-2,142 cavalry II) 350smaller ships: A) Morethan 13.6%of ships 952-1,047 forbowmen 952-1,047*** B) Morethan 13.6%for 952-1,047 952-1,047 armedinfantry C) Less than for 72.8%o 952-1,047 952-1,047 cavalry 2,856-3,189 2,856-3,189 2,856-3,189 8,568-9,567 Total(Range)

Or, .75 divided by 5.5 equals just over 13.6 percent.

The computationis approximate:350 ships x 13.61x 40 [or 451 men per ship = 1904 to 2142 men. All componentforces in large ships are equally sized for this scenario.

That is, 350 shipsx 13.61x 20 [or22] menper ship = 952 to 1047 men. All componentforces in smaller ships are equally sized.

Thisscenariomorethandoublesthesize ofthecavalry;though armyis smaller,in factabout45 as indicated,the resulting

Bowmn

Annr Infantry

Number of men in I) 350 large ships: A) 1/4,or 87 3,480-3,915* ships 3,480-3,915 B) 1/4,or 87 ships C) 1/2,or 176 ships II) 350 smaller ships: 1,740-1,914 A) 1/4,or 87 ships B) 1/4,or 87 ships C) 1/2,or 176 ships Total (Range)

5,220-5,829

Cavalry (knightsand

Army

3,480-3,915 3,480-3,915

1,320-1,584*- 1,320-1,584

1,740-1,914 1,740-1,914

1,740-1,914

660-792 5,220-5,829

660-792

1,980-2,376 12,420-14,034

That is, 87 large shipsx 40 [or45] menper large ship = 3480 to 3915 men. Similarly,for smallerships,themathis: 87 x 20 [or 22] = 1740 to 1914. . Or, 176shipsx 10 [orl2]cavalrypershipx .75 = 1320to 1584 cavalry.Forsmallerships, themathis: 176x5 [or6]x .75 =660 to 792.

Duke Williamdid not use a calculator.He was unfamiliar

with the modern language -

or jargon

-

of "force maxi-

There werenotaccountants. mization."'Normancommanders is no evidenceeventhattheNormansknewbasicalgebra.But The eviWilliam'sabilitieswentbeyondmerequantification. denceshowsprimafacie thathe knewwhatwas requiredand it.Itwouldnothaveoccurredtohimtostrivefor howto extract did occurto army.It certainly or symmetrical a proportionate orcavalry. enoughbowmenorinfantry tomuster him,however, Sufficiencyof course may be either proportionateor symmetrical. in hugepartby is determined My pointis simplythateffort menas posone's resources.Williamraisedas manyfighting them.It sibleand doubtlessthenassembleda fleetto transport was an expansivefleet.Williamof Poitierslikenedits masts, We toa forest.27 theChannelcrossing, during together clustered beganwitha reasonedestimateof the size of thisfleet(700 havebeenused. ships)and proceededto examinehowitmight the largestarmy The firstscenarioemphasizestransporting of cavalry.The secondempossible,witha solid contingent thecavalry.The last scenarioatphasizesgreatlyincreasing 131

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temptsto strikea balance between total numbersand strong cavalry.Ofthethreescenarios,thefirstand thirdcorrelatemost closely to my own view of the invasion force. William of Normandywould have been interestedsurely in pressinghis advantagein cavalry,buthe probablywas even moreinterested in puttingashore, and in decisive numbers,the provenstockfor Vikinginvasion,his bowmenand pikemen.Looking forranges in the subjective marginswhere the firstand thirdscenarios seem to merge,I would conclude thatWilliammay have landed at Pevenseywithan armyofabout 14,000to 15,000men,perhaps 1,500 to 2,000 of whom were on mounts.

Harold and the Saxon Band Ethe size of William'sfleetand theextentof his commitment to cavalry are keys in determiningthe numberof Normans, thensome of theanswers in measuringHarold's armyare found in an investigationof the available levies, the terrainon which thebattlewas fought,and theeffectoftherelianceoftheEnglish on the shieldwall as a defensiveformation.Beforeproceeding, however, we must recognize that the inordinatepressure of eventspreventedHarold fromfieldinga largerforce,althoughit is problematicalthat he could have matched the Norman invaders under the best of circumstances.The road to Hastings was by way of StamfordBridgeforHarold and his stalwarts,the housecarls. The joumey took them across 500 miles and a violentclash withperhaps9,000 to 10,000Norse, all inthe space of less thanfourweeks. The obstacles leadingto Hastingswere surmounted,butthe housecarlswere muchtaxed and thinnedin the process. The same chroniclerdescribes StamfordBridge and Hastings. He refersto Harold in both instances only as leading "a great host," and records for each battle that the victor"had possession of the place of slaughter.''21 We cannot be certain whetherthis language is a conscious comparison betweenthe two events or merelya convenientformof shorthand. For our purpose,though,it seems likelythat,to have won such a signalvictoryat StamfordBridge,Harold musthave led a host somewhereon the same scale in size with the Norse.

Would not Harold have attemptedto raise an armyof at least comparablestrengthto confrontWilliam,his archenemy,in the south? The answer is clearly, yes, unless Harold had become overconfidentby the victoryover Hardrada - or unless there simplywas insufficient time in which to prepare.

Some of the English whom Harold led at StamfordBridge were surelylevies raised in the north,possibly even followers ofHarold's allies, Edwin and Morcar. It is doubtfulthatmanyof these men fromthe northernshires marched southwardwith Harold to meet William. Many of the housecarls had fallen at StamfordBridge. It seems improbable that more than 2,000 housecarls29accompanied Harold back to London, where for six days the English made preparations.Harold doubtless was able to raise some levies, even at harvesttime, on the march fromYorkshire to London, but most of his force would be expected to come from levies in the south. The southern countieswere, and remain,the most populous in England. Yet giventhelimitationsof time,Harold was preventedfromraising the army he otherwisemighthave rallied to his cause.

The forceswhicha leader mightgatherin medieval England, even given adequate time,were limited.Accordingto Domesday references,substantialtowns such as Cambridgeand Colchester would contributeonly 20 men each under the normal systemof levyingby "hide" in the 11thcentury.Round estimatesthatunderHenryII, a centuryafterHastings,"the whole servitiumdebitum, clerical and lay, of England can scarcely have exceeded, if it indeed reached, 5,000 knights."'" To be sure, the levyingfor knightsand thatforinfantry are different propositions.Nevertheless,in 1339, Edward III musteredonly slightlymore than 2,500 soldiers fromthe 11 English counties touched by a 75-mile radius drawn from Hastings.3' Oman claims that these men were trained and "not hasty and miscellaneous shire-levies." The soldiers of Edward III were in-

I

tended for the king's campaigns in France. Edward II earlier raised significantlylarger levies, especially in the northern counties, against the more proximateScots.2 Williamposed a dangerat least as imminentto the crown as thatposed later by the Scots, but Harold had nothinglike the time enjoyed by Edward II to gatherforces. Hence, it can be argued that Harold indeed would have been fortunate,at harvest, to raise 2,500 men in the southerncounties fromwhich Edward III moredeliberatelymustereda similarnumberalmost 275 years later. And it mustbe emphasized thatHarold's levies were hardly well-equipped. They in fact were precisely the "hasty and miscellaneousshire-levies"to whichOman alludes.

In any event,addingthisnumberto, say, Harold's 2,000 housecarls, the scant levies fromthe north,and the probablysomewhat more substantial levies from London, it is difficultto attributeto Harold more than about 5,000 or 6,000 men. I will test this tentativenumberagainst the terrainof the battlefield and the likelyalignmentof the English on it.

It is necessaryto discuss fullythe reasons forHarold's haste to confrontWilliam. Harold may have wished to push the Normansintothe sea beforetheycould be reinforced,or he may have been anxious to strikeagainst the ravishersof his native Sussex. It mightalso have been that,flushwithrecentvictory, Harold thoughthimselfcapable of repeatingthe lightningsuccess of StamfordBridge. Whatever his motives, Florence of Worcester says of Harold that, even though '"one-halfof his armyhad notyetarrived,he did not hesitateto advance withall speed into Sussex against his enemies." But if Harold left London in confidence,he soon musthave realized thathe faced a host superiorto the foes he had vanquished in Yorkshire.It is highlyerroneousto assert,as does one historian,that"Hastings was an altogetherslighteraffairthan StamfordBridge.""

Sensing himselfoutnumberedand withmanyraw recruits,it was naturalfor Harold to draw his forces into the traditional English defensiveformation,the shield wall. Florence of Worcester writes that "the English were drawn up in a narrow place."34 The English in fact were aligned in a concentrated formationatop a glacial slope, near the highgroundof Telham Hill, withthegreatforestoftheWeald to theirbacks. The forest offeredrefugein case of rout.

Harold's housecarls, however, would not be easily overwhelmed.The housecarl was the mainstayof the Englisharmy.

His great axe, the bipennis or Danish axe, was a fearsome a weapon about fourfeetin lengthand, accordingto instrument, Wace, "with a Blade a foot long."' 3' The axe was swung with bothhands. It workedhavoc on manand mount.The housecarls thus armed would form the frontline of Harold's defense, poised to hack down the leading edge of the French attack.

The Frenchare oftenpicturedas advancingin threeseparate columnsat Hastings. Actually,thereis no compellingevidence forthisview. They mightjust as well have advanced ina serried againsttheopposmass inorderto concentrateforbreakthrough ing shield wall. This formationwould have served as well as any, and better than most, for the purpose of staggeredyet focused attack by archersfirst,thenby pikemenand finallyby knights.It is also true that we are uncertainabout the configurationof Harold's shield wall. It may have been, as Round pointsout, "a crescentor semi-circle. . . or even a 'wedge' "', I believe, though,that Harold probably arrayed his forces to forma relativelystraightline. This configurationis logical for three reasons. First, Harold would want to presentthe most concentratedand least exposed defense possible against the more numerousattackers. Concentratinghis forces along the shortestdistance between two points accomplishes this objecdefenseallows the mostefficacious tive. Second, a straight-line closing of ranksto compensate forcasualties and the fallingof defenders.The outnumberedEnglish would be especially conscious of thisfact. Lastly, a straightshield wall would allow for thefreeemploymentof thetwo-handedaxe. That is, theaxe was best employed in formationwhen swung straightahead and MILITARYAFFAIRS

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without impediment.Comrades situated out frontaffectthe fieldof usage, narrowingthe corridorintowhich the housecarl mightmake his lethal swing. Indeed, the defenderout front mightbe inhibitedas well. It is an added distractionwhen one by the approaching must thinknot only about disfigurement enemybutalso about themisdirectedblade of one's associate a pace to the rear. The straight-lineshield wall does not cure anxietiesabout mayhem,but it keeps the problemto the front.

The Englishdefendeda space compatiblewiththeirnumbers. of the shield wall is importantif Determiningthe configuration we are accuratelyto gauge itsfrontageand therebyestimatethe numberof men along its length.If one assumes, as reasoned here, that Harold's army was deployed along a straightline, thenwe may calculate, fromwhat is known of the terrainand Harold's position, that the shield wall was about 800 to 900 yards in length.

The English,girdedin theirshield wall, posed a dense formation. Williamof Poitierssays thattheywere wedged together so tightlythat the dead could scarcely fall and the wounded could notmove.37Some roomformovement,though,was essential if the bipennis was to inflictits punishment.A housecarl defendinga space two to threefeetwide would be able both to swing his axe and to maintain a tight wall. Assuming one housecarlat every two and a halffeetalong an 850-yardline, it seems apparentthatnotmanymorethan 1,000housecarlscould have formed Harold's firstline of defense. This conclusion suggestseitherthat Harold employed housecarls elsewhere in his defenses as well or thatthe initialestimateof 2,000 housecarls was high.

H

AROLD would have chosen his groundcarefully.My own conclusion is that he marched into Sussex planning to attack the invaders,much as he had done at StamfordBridge.

But when confrontedwith the superiornumbersof William's army,Harold prudentlydecided to assume a defensiveposition.

In this posture, Harold would have wanted his most reliable soldiers out frontin order to absorb and then repel the attack.

Maintaininga solid line was essential to the concept of the levies would formthe rear shieldwall. The morenumerousft\rd ranks,in supportand standingin thebreachas required.Seen in this light,and allowingthat I have given Harold the benefitof any doubt in his abilityto raise levies on shortnotice, it may be thatthe Englishformeda thinforceindeed at Hastings. Harold mighthave stood withno more than 5,000 followersand very possibly fewer.

If the English were outnumbered,perhaps by threeto one, theynonethelessofferedstiffresistance."'The traditionalview of the battle is that the English held theirown untilthe inexperienced f'rd levies on Harold's rightbroke formationto pursue fleeingBretons and were cut down. This view is certainlyplausible. As the housecarls sufferedlosses, theywould have closed ranksto thecenter,leavingtheflanksto be manned by the less experienced recruits.

But anotherexplanationis possible, one which suggeststhat the housecarlsthemselvesmay have brokenranks- notof fear butinvalor. We are notto accept unquestionallythattheFrench attacked Harold across the breadthof his half-milefront.They more likely would have massed to suit their own purposes, perhapsin somethinglikea wedge, in orderto shatterthe line of defenders. What would be the reaction of even veteran defendersto see a superiorforce, at a couple of hundredyards to punchthroughthe middle distancedown the line, attempting of the formation?The centerholds, even afterinitialassaults.

The defensive wall too holds all along the line. Yet what of successive attacks against the center - perhaps against the thatthe breakin ranks bannerof Harold himself?It is intriguing apparentlycame fromtheEnglishright.Would notthosthousehave been carls on the right,maybe especially on the right,39 anxious tojoin the melee, to rushforwardand to the leftaftera while in order to assist theircomrades and to strikeforcefully

againstthe enemy?The housecarls were provenas combatants not as spectators.

In the languageof battle,such an attackby the Englishon the French flank mightbe termedan envelopement.But a small force whose strengthis stationarydoes not readilyenvelope a largerforce whose strengthis movement.The resultwas not envelopementbut massacre. The curlingof the English right and its subsequent destruction was the turning point at Hastings.

The above explanation,to be sure, is but a theory,a novel theoryand one that is, as were many of the English levies, untested. However, neithernew notion nor taxingreason nor sleightof hand or foot is necessary to explain the victoryof 15,000well-armedFrenchover fewerthan5,000 English,many of wom carried clubs. Both the numbersand the Fates were decisive is killingHarold and his band.

REFERENCES 1. F. Stenton,Anglo-SaxonEngland, 3rded. (Oxford,1971), 596.

2. Two of the most cogent of recentstudies are C. Gillmor, "Naval Logistics of the Cross-Channel Operation, 1066," in Anglo-Norman Studies, 7 (1984); and B. Bachrach, "Some Observations on the MilitaryAdministrationof the Norman Conquest," in Anglo-NormanStudies, 8 (1985). Gillmorsucceeds in establishingthe unlikelihoodthat the Normans were able to buildfromscratchthe numberof vessels requiredforan exceptionally large-scale invasion with the limited time and resources available to them. Bachrach gives a penetratingand broader analysis of the logistics of the entireinvasion force.

3. Gillmorargues thatNorman laborersrequiredabout 3,500 calories daily (118). But is thisfigurebased on the requirements man or on the needs of considerablysmaller of 20th-century workersof the 11thcentury?WhatNormanforestswere like is, at rootand branch,largelyguesswork.And to quantifyNorman ship-loadingoperations,as does one scholar, is to dock at the pier of pseudo-science. See R. Fumeauz, Invasion, 1066 (Englewood Cliffs,N.J., 1966), 98-99.

4. Quoted in C. Hollister,Anglo-Saxon MilitarvInstitutions (London, 1962), vii.

5. For a digestof thisestimateand of several whichfollowin this paragraph,see R. Brown, The Normans and the Norman Conquest (Woodbridge, Suffolk,1985), 130.

6. A. Malet, ed., The Conquest of England: From Wace's Poem of the Roman de Rou (London, 1860), 81, 151.

7. Brown, 130.

8. JohnBeeler, WarfareinEngland, 1066-1189(Ithaca, N.Y., 1966), 12, 16.

9. C. Brooke,FromAlfredto HenrvIII, 871-1272(New York, 1961), 88.

10. Gillmor, 114.

11. I assume that a horse would occupy the space of about three men. This computationis consistent with excavations from the ship-gravesof Viking Norway, where occasionally "the remainsof as manyas 12 horses are foundin one of these graves." See B. Phillpotts,"Scandinavian Civilization," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11thed., 29 vols. (New York, 1911), XXIV:290. Williamof Malmesburywritesthatin 1142 the Earl of Gloucester used 52 vessels to transport360 knights- or about seven knightswithhorses to each ship- fromCherbourg to Wareham. See W. Corbett,"The Developmentof the Duchy of Normandy and the Norman Conquest of England," in J. Bury,ed., Contestof Empireand Papacy (London, 1964),498.

12. Some 300 Skuldelev vessels mightbe expected to transport from 12,000 to 13,500 men (40 to 45 men per ship x 300 ships). No cavalry was reportedat StamfordBridge.

13. That is, 150 Skuldelev vessels mightcarryroughly6,000 to 6,750 men (40 to 45 x 150), while an equal numberof vessels withhalftheattributedcapacitywould carryfrom3,000 to 3,375 men.

14. G. Garmonsway,ed., The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle (London, 1975), 199.

15. Edward the Confessor is said to have had "fortysmall vessels fittedout" in 1052, while Harold, duringthe previous year, "landed at Porlock withnineships,and thereslew many."

Ibid., 178-179.

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16. Hollister,123, 125.

17. Malet,43, 55, 61.

18. Gillmor,105.

19. Hardradamighthavebeenmorereluctant to use smaller vesselsfromcrossingtheNorthSea, even by way of theinvasionroutethrough the Shetlandand OrkneyIslands,than wouldhave been Williamin crossingtheEnglishChannel.

20. D. Douglasand G. Greenaway, eds., EnglishHistorical Documents,2 vols. (New York, 1953),11:220.

21. Gillmor,109.

22. F. Wormald, "StyleandDesign,"inF. Stenton, ed., The BayeuxTapestry (London,1957),34. The smallestoftheseven "large"Normanships,as depictedinthetapestry, carriesthree horsesandtwomen;thelargestshipcarriestenhorsesandnine men.The five"smaller"craftdepictedin thissequencecarry fromfourmento twohorsesand twomen.

Cambridgeshire, Essex, Hampshire,Hertfordshire, Kent, Middlesex,Suffolk, Surreyand Sussex.Nothing ofcoursesays thatthesewereprecisely orexclusively thecountiesfromwhich Haroldraisedlevies.However,theyare completely representativeof the southerncountiesto whichHarold wouldhave looked mostreadilyforlevies and fromwhichhe probably expectedto receiveassistance.

32. C. Oman,A Historyof theArtof War (New York, 1898), 593-594.

33. Douglasand Greenaway,11:213;Brooke,88.

34. Douglasand Greenaway,11:214.

35. Malet, 175.

23. Lt. Colonel C. Lemmon, The Field of Hastings (St.

Leonard-on-Sea, Sussex, 1956),85.

24. The assumptionthatWilliam'sfleet,once launched, enjoyedsafepassagefindssupportinat leastone ofthechroniclers,who atteststhatWilliamlost only two ships in the EnglishChannel. See D. Howarth,1066: The Year of the Con-

quest(New York, 1978),150.

25. The fleetof 700 shipsis structured in thiscase to carry numbers ofbowmen,infantry andknights.

Recallthata horseis assumedtooccupythespaceofthreemen.In addition, we must add theknight.

But recalltoo thathorsetransports are to be loadedtoonly75percent capacity,whichmeansthat,toachieve equal sizingof the army'scomponents,a givenvessel for bowmenor infantry would be three-quarters full,withthe remaining spaceoccupiedbycavalry.Expressedalgebraically, thenumber ofshipsrequired bycomponent is: .75x[bowmen]+ .75x [infantry] + 4x [knights and horses]= 5.5x. Thus, the portion ofthefleetreservedforcavalrywouldbe fourdivided by 5.5 or about72.7 percent.

26. See Gillmor,108.

27. Gesta Gillelmi,164;see Gillmor,128.

28. Garmonsway, 197,199. See also note 13.

29. Lemmonestimates thenumber ofhuscarlesat something over2,000(p. 20),buthe does notseemto accountfullyforthe cruellyattritive effects of Stamford Bridgeon Harold'sability to fighta secondmajorbattle.

30. See Hollister,46; J. Round,Feudal England(London, 1895),230.

31. These are thecountiesof Berkshire, Buckinghamshire,

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Edd Wheeleris an attorney inAtlantaand an activememberof the StateBarofGeorgia.A 1962graduate oftheU.S. AirForceAcademy, he is a retired AirForcelieutenant colonel.He receivedhis J.D. degree fromThe American University andthePh.D.degreefrom EmoryUniversity.

Hismany published articlesdealwithlaw,public administration, history, and defense policy.This articlewas acceptedfor inJanuary publication 1988.

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36. Round,282.

37. See Brown,143.

38. Theremaybe an intriguing, and as yetunexplored, explanationforpartof the Englishsuccess in theface of such superior numbers.

Theyliterally mayhavebeenabletoputtheir - or at leastto planttheir bestfootforward collectivebestfeet beforewieldingthe axe. The explanationis bothspeculative andphysiological.

The evidencesuggeststhattheFrenchprobablyapproacheddiagonally andfromtheleft,thusenablingthe majority of right-handed (then,as now) Englishto bracethe right footandswingforcefully totheleft.Left-handed defenders wouldhavehad a similaradvantageagainstan attackfromthe rightdiagonal.

39. See note38.

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