Lukban2

Copyright Š 2011 by the author.

All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage or retrieval system, except as may be expressly permitted in writing from the publisher.

Requests for permission should be addressed in writing to: Mr. Emil B. Justimbaste, Ormoc City, Leyte, Philippines.

Cover design: Donal Bryan Angayan

The rout of the American forces in the small town of Balangiga sent shivers in the spine of the American forces in the Philippines, who were asserting their colonial rule on a country that had just overthrown the 400 years of Spanish rule.

Long known as the ‘Balangiga Massacre’, the Americans had to acknowledge that it was the worst defeat they had in their years of colonial conquest.

But little is known of the fact that the Balangiga incident was just one of the many small victories achieved by the people of Samar. Like many others, it was the result of careful planning and execution, not by professional soldiers, but by ordinary folk who resolved to overthrow the oppresssive American regime. In practically all the major towns of Samar, like Calbayog, Catarman, Catbalogan and Basey, the ordinary folk of Samar rose in uprising against the American forces.

At the head of this rebellious enterprise was an interpid general by the name of Vicente Rilles Lukban.

This book is about Lukban and other brave revolutionaries who made Samar a living hell for their enemies.

Lukban

The Philippine - American War in Samar 1898 - 1902

By Emil B. Justimbaste

Table of contents Introduction 9 Chapter I : Enter Lukban 12 Chapter II : Americans invade Samar 28 Chapter III : The Chase Continues 38 Chater IV : War in Catubig 55 Chapter V : The rebellion grows 65 Chapter VI : Consolidation 72 Chapter VII : Balangiga 91 Chapter VIII : ‘Kill and Burn’ 108 Chater IX : Lukban’s Capture 128 Chapter X : Surrender of Lukban’s forces 141 Chapter XI : Epilogue 150 References 159 Glossary 163 Index 166

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Introduction

T

he concept and practice of people’s war is generally attributed to China’s Mao Zedong and Vietnam’s General Vo Nguyen Giap.

Both relied on a people’s army that drew its sustenance from the masses in their respective struggle for independence. Mao wrote his four volumes and Giap his Big Victory, Great Task; People’s Army, People’s War; Ðien Biên Phu and We Will Win based on their own experiences.

Such revolutionary works would become the reference manuals in the waging of revolutions in Latin America, the Philippines and other parts of Asia in the late ‘60s and early ‘70s.

Little is known of the fact that 40 years earlier, such a concept of people’s war was already being tried in the Philippines after the emerging neo-colonial power, the United States of America, seized the Philippines by brute armed force, using the Treaty of Paris to establish the legitimacy of its claim, disregarding the fact that Filipinos were already exercising their sovereign rights after they had decisively defeated colonial Spain, and that legitimate and functional government units were in operation throughout most of Philippine territory. Filipino General Emilio Aguinaldo and his field generals started to wage guerrilla warfare on November 12, 1899 after he was surrounded by three American generals in his Pangasinan holdout. So at a meeting of his council of war in the town of Bayambang, the army was dissolved. “It was formed into guerrilla units that would carry on the war unconventionally, relying on ambush, concealment, and the avoidance of set-piece battles.”1 This book is about one of Aguinaldo’s intrepid generals, Vicente Rilles Lukban, and how he waged guerrilla war in the island of Samar, the country’s third largest island. Neither Aguinaldo nor any of his generals had any theoretical knowledge about waging that kind of war.

Their experience in the anti-colonial struggle against Spain was largely the conventional sort of warfare where troops positioned themselves at designated sites and fired at each other until one or the other surrendered or retreated, although in the early days of the revolution the Katipunan forces used long bladed weapons to seize rifles in pitch battles that

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had no defined rules. In the subsequent struggle against US occupying forces, they had to devise their own tactics in the environment that they operated in, guided by common sense, gut feel and imagination.

And so we find in Samar an abundance of indigenous poisoned traps laid along the way of the unwary white American troopers, traps that the natives used to hunt wild boar and deer, causing anxiety and fear to the invaders. Such devices caused instant deaths or fatal injuries to the victims, so that patrols had to be slowed down, and the forests where the guerrillas took sanctuary became impenetrable fortresses.

These were but few devices among many others.

The more difficult task of Lukban, however, was winning over the largely unschooled and illiterate population to his side. Convincing them to join the revolutionary enterprise was a task often left to his local leaders and lieutenants. The many examples of mass uprisings involving entire pueblos, such as those of Catubig and Balangiga, show they had remarkable successes in their task. From planning to their execution, such uprisings doubtless involved the local population where even children played critical roles. These could have been the offshoots of many discussions, meetings and debates, before the resolve to fight became final and executory. In a sense, the pueblo populations along the coasts as well those in the interior served as Lukban’s support base and sources of vital information on the troop movements of their enemies. Many of them also became members of the guerrilla forces, complementing his officers that originated from the educated classes, the so-called local principalia of the previous Spanish colonial days. Many of them were products of the Cartilla system of education and could understand, read and write in Spanish, inasmuch as they could also communicate in the local language. Some even went through the colegio. They served as important links to Lukban, who could only communicate in Spanish and his native Tagalog, and whose circulars were in Spanish.

The principalia were also most vulnerable to pressures from the Americans. Eventually a good number of them capitulated to the American cause, and with them the unlettered masses, slowly eroding support for Lukban. In fact, one of the early setbacks of Lukban involved his relations with the Catholic hierarchy in Samar which, during the early stage of the war, had soured due to his being a Mason, an avowed enemy of the Catholic Church then. Members of the clergy left their parishes because Lukban had accordingly wanted to assert his authority over them. He had uses for the stone churches other than worship. Months later, one of the members of the clergy issued a statement urging him to surrender to the Americans. It was quite known that the clergy had a lot of influence on the predominantly catholic population, resulting in the

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fragmentation of Lukban’s base that supported the revolutionary cause.

THIS book also tries to present the side of the Americans who were faced with the difficulty of having to sell the idea of American governance amongst a population that was at the onset antagonistic.

After all, the new conquerors were coming to replace their erstwhile Spanish masters, and no amount of using the Treaty of Paris to justify their presence would suffice. It was not a mere guerrilla band that they were up against but a band that enjoyed the support of the people. This was something new to them. Most of their officers were products of the Indian wars at home that used a different set of strategies and tactics.

Even their earlier interventions in Cuba and China’s Boxer Rebellion did not prepare them for the people’s war in Samar.

They had to use all the dirty tricks they knew to subjugate the thousands of unarmed natives living in villages, including food blockade and confiscation, food rationing and all sorts of cajoling, threats, harassment and intimidation to erode the support for Lukban’s guerrillas. People were told to live in ‘protected’ camps, and those found outside were considered enemies and supporters of the guerrillas and, therefore, could be eliminated. Several villages were burned and farm animals killed because presumably they provided support to Lukban’s guerrillas. This ‘kill-all’ policy was implemented by the Americans employing its most notorious general, Jake ‘Howling’ Smith and his faithful officers represented by the ‘butcher of Samar,’ Maj. Littleton Waller. Smith and Waller would later figure in a court martial that was more of a show to appease the irate American public.

Indeed, their dirty tactics would serve the Americans in good stead.

They were finally able to capture the elusive Filipino guerrilla chief Vicente Lukban in his mountain hideout, using native scouts to track him. The lessons learned in Samar would become useful to them some 40 years later in their Vietnam military adventure. But that is a different story altogether. Lukban’s capture ended a segment of the people’s overall struggle for nationhood and independence. Less than a year later, a more vicious war emerged from the unsurrendered elements of Lukban’s forces who had joined with the bolo-wielding cultists called the dios-dios, renamed as the pulajans.

Endnotes 1The Salt Lake Herald, Nov. 14, 1899

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Chapter 1

A

Enter Lukban

guinaldo could not have chosen a more appropriate person for the job of politico-military governor of Leyte and Samar in 1898 when the newly inaugurated Filipino government reorganized provincial governments. Spain was defeated. The Philippines was no longer her colony after more than 300 years. The forces of America were inside Manila, and they seemed to be friendly. For a while, Aguinaldo and the other Filipino leaders thought the Americans would make no attempt to make the new country its colony. Part of the minutes of the meeting of Aguinaldo with his leaders in Hongkong on May 4, 1898, stated: “If Washington proposes to carry out the fundamental principles of its Constitution, it is most improbable that an attempt will be made to colonize the Philippines or annex them.“1 But the Filipino leaders had seen the urgency of consolidating their forces in the provinces. The provincial governments had to be reestablished under the Filipino flag. For Leyte and Samar, two islands south of the Bicol region, Vicente Rilles Lukban was chosen as the politico-military governor. The appointment came on April 27, 1898 from Apolinario Mabini, Aguinaldo’s trusted secretary. This was eight months before the Treaty of Paris was signed. Lukban was supposed to represent the national government in these islands. As civilian chief, he was instructed to organize the municipal governments by appointing from the residents of the province those who were distinguished by their ‘attainment, honesty and prestige.’2 There seemed to be no doubt that Lukban himself exhibited those same qualities that were demanded of local officials. He had the impeccable credentials of a well-schooled illustrado of his generation, finishing his elementary grades at the Escuela Pia Publica in his hometown of Labo, Camarines Sur, then going to the Ateneo Municipal in Manila for his secondary schooling. After that he went straight to law

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Gen. Vicente Rilles Lukban (Source: https://kahimyang.com/kauswagan/articles/january)

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school at the Colegio de San Juan de Letran and, after graduation served at the court of first instance in Quiapo, Manila. This was followed by an appointment as justice of the peace in his own hometown. He was soon recruited into the masonry where he became known as “Luz del Oriente” (light of the orient). It was here where he was recruited into the revolutionary movement.

When the revolution broke out in 1896, at 36 years old, he was engaged in agriculture and had a thriving business. On Sept. 29, that year, while in Manila attending a meeting of the agricultural society, the Spanish authorities arrested him for his involvement with the Katipunan.

Like many prisoners at that time, he was tortured to extract information about his fellow revolutionaries, but he stood his ground. So they kept him at the Carcel de Bilibid. The torture and imprisonment in a flooded cell left him with a permanent limp.

He was released on May 17, 1897 after Governor-General Fernando Primo de Rivera granted amnesty to political prisoners. He immediately joined General Emilio Aguinaldo’s forces. It was most likely here where he learned the art of war. After the Pact of Biak na Bato was forged on December 14, 1897, he went into exile with Aguinaldo in Hongkong and became part of the revolutionary junta.

In May 1898, Lukban returned to the Philippines and resumed his involvement with the revolutionists. He was immediately tasked by Aguinaldo to assist the revolutionary movement in Southern Luzon.

Here he was given the rank of colonel. His next assignment was to assist the movement in Bicol. But there were delays in the mobilization of arms and personnel because of another officer’s refusal to release some of the arms captured from the Spaniards. These were released only after Aguinaldo himself intervened. Finally, Lukban proceeded to Bicol where he again exhibited his skills in war. By mid October, Lukban completed his task. After this, he would be working fulltime on his original assignment in Leyte and Samar. It was only on December 31, 1898 that he was finally able to present himself to the leaders of Samar in Catbalogan.3 Samar in 1900 The ancients used to call Samar island ‘Ibabao.’ It is located in the most eastern part of the Visayas and southeast of the island of Luzon, from which it is separated by the Strait of San Bernardino. Toward the southwest, it is separated from the island of Leyte by the narrow Strait of San Juanico, which runs from north to south, lying between the southwestern coast of Samar and the northeastern coast of Leyte, and

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uniting that arm of the sea called the Western Sea of Samar on the north and the bay of San Pedro and San Pablo on the south.

Towards the end of the 19th century at the beginning of the American pacification campaigns, the coasts of Samar had yet to be explored, especially the eastern coast, which is irregular, mountainous, and bordered with small islands and large rocks.

On the map, Samar looks like an oblong square but is very irregular in the southwestern part. It is about 20 leagues long in a straight line from north to south, and about 20 leagues wide in the northern part from east to west. The interior part is mountainous, “with sheer ravines and swift, rushing rivers. In the rainy season, the floods--the dreaded avenidas--pile the water high in the gorges and sweep everything from their path. It was a place of great snakes and malaria mosquitos and sludgy, oozing swamps on the fringes of the forested mountains. Here and there were the abandoned kaingins (swidden farms) - the clearings of the mountain tribes, grown high with lush cogon grass and tigbao…. there were not five miles of road on the island.”4 The area of Samar and the adjacent islands was estimated to be 13,471 square kilometers. At the turn of the 20th century, its population reached 185,386. Its principal towns were Catbalogan, the capital, with a population of 6,072, Balangiga, with 4, 130, Basey with 12,852, Borongan, with 12,563, Calbayog, with 20,725, Catarman with 9,495, Catubig with 11,517; Gandara with 11,101, and Guiuan with 12,872. Its mountains were said to be populated with about 10,000 natives “who live an independent and almost savage life.”5 Yet parts of Samar were fertile valleys under cultivation producing crops that gave sustenance to its population. It had an abundance of fine lumber that was especially suitable for shipbuilding, many varieties of wild fruits, various kinds of bamboo, roots suitable for food, rattan, game, and fish. Wax and honey, abundant in the extensive forests, were much prized by the inhabitants. Coconuts were also grown in abundance, and many of the inhabitants were engaged in extracting the oil, particularly in the vicinity of Guiuan. At the time of the American pacification campaign, the inhabitants produced rice, coconuts and hemp, the last two being their cash crops that they sold to merchants to trade in the pueblos. Special mention was made of a medicinal plant called “isigud” or the fruit of San Ignacio, known also as Catbalogan seed, because it was grown in the vicinity of that town. It was said to be an antidote for certain kinds of poisons.6 Catbalogan is strategically located at the central point among several coastal towns. This was seen by the early Jesuit missionaries who came in 1596 in their mission of evangelization, although their first

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An 1899 map of Samar island (Source: http://www.davidrumsey.com/luna/servlet/ detail/RUMSEY~8~1~34696~1180309:No--18--Samar-

mission was in Tinago (Tarangnan). But when this was burned down during the moro raid in 1616, the Jesuits transferred their mission center and residencia to Katbalaugan, the ancient name of Catbalogan. From that residencia, they established mission sites or visitas in the villages of Cotay, Cawayan (forerunner of Zumarraga), Canahawan (Canhawan, still a barangay of Catbalogan), out of which a pueblo was created.

Because it was the Jesuit residencia, the political officialdom thought it convenient to make it into the cabecera or capital of the island province of Samar.7

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It was here where the British Warner, Barnes and Co. conducted its business and cornered hemp trading in the island. In the absence of passable roads, bales of hemp were brought in boats of assorted shapes and sizes from the other coastal villages and pueblos, some of them coming from long distances down mountain streams, others from numerous smaller islands which dot the coast.8 The town itself featured a large plaza with its ancient church at the center, complimented by wooden structures like a huge convent, where the priest resided, and the municipal tribunal or town hall (sometimes called casa real) built nearby. Prominent residents belonging to the class of principalia had their houses built nearby of strong materials too, while the rest of the population had houses built of light materials, like nipa and bamboo, scattered all over the place.

It was into this setting that Vicente Rilles Lukban, Aguinaldo’s appointee as politico-military governor, arrived on December 31, 1898. His task: to reorganize the revolutionary government. But like many provinces that had recently been freed of Spanish rule, the local principalia had already reorganized themselves in the traditional ways.

Years earlier, the gobernadorcillos (today’s equivalent of town mayor) were elected only by the principalias of the pueblo, with the priest blessing the affair and serving as the de facto adviser of the gobernadorcillo and often making the important decisions as the unofficial representative of the national government in far Manila. Thus, when Lukban arrived, the important officials were already in place. He was faced with the unpleasant task of reorganizing them in accordance with the dictates of the new revolutionary government. In that initial meeting in Catbalogan, he was accordingly met with enthusiasm, “placing their lives and property at the disposal of the government for the attainment of the peace and independence of the Philippines.”9 After explaining his role as politico-military governor of Samar, Lukban started making appointments: Don Antonio Muñoz, as Jefe de Governacion of the province; Don Honorio Rosales as Jefe de Justicia; and Don Benedicto Sabater as Jefe de Hacienda. These were old prominent families of Catbalogan who had earlier stints as pueblo officials during the Spanish regime. But who else would he appoint? He was a stranger to the place, and knew next to nothing about the people of Catbalogan.

It seemed best to appoint old experienced hands to handle the task of governance. Their major task was to reorganize the pueblo governments.

Muñoz and the other officials organized juntas magnas (conferences) between January 3 to February 25, 1899 in all 40 pueblos of Samar, attended by all the jefes of each pueblo and the cabezas of each barrio. In each pueblo, three delegados were to be elected by majority vote: Delegado

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de Policia y Order Interior, Delegado de Justicia y Registro Civil and Delegado de Rentas y de la Propriedad. These elections, however, still followed the traditional way, which excluded the participation of the majority. In the meantime, on January 4 that same year, Lukban issued an order to the Presidentes of Calbayog and Oquendo, located north of Calbayog, to be vigilant of their coastal areas and rivers and to report any untoward incidents.

Later, on January 25, 1899, local criers known as bandillos informed residents in all sitios and barrios of Calbayog, Oquendo and Weyler of the order of Lukban, that all men and women, 18 years old and above, had to pay a cedula personal of four pesos and a contribucion de guerra of six pesos. This is presumed to have taken place also in the other towns similarly organized by Lukban’s appointees.10 Months later, Lukban would realize that juntas magnas and bandillos would not be enough to create a stable base for the revolutionary government in Samar.

A brief stopover in Leyte Since his appointment included the island province of Leyte, he set sail on January 17, that year, on board the steamer San Nicolas for the neighboring island of Leyte, where his own mean awaited him:: Esteban Aparri, his secretary in Leyte, Francisco Enage, Claro Pimentel, Juan Merchant and Jose Memeige. All of them would benefit in his subsequent appointments. These were some of the principalia of Tacloban, apparently a rival group to the others who took the initiative to reorganize the provincial government in 1898.

Lukban at once proceeded to issue his first proclamation to Leyteños on the necessity of establishing the republic, the importance of unity, and the threat of American domination.11 As in his other issuances, these were written in Spanish which only those belonging to the small educated class could understand. His being a Tagalog in a region that spoke Waray worked against him at the very inception of his revolutionary career in the region.

Unlike his stint in Samar, however, Lukban’s actuations in Leyte were questioned by rivals in the local principalia, who thought he was using his power to appoint his close associates into important positions.

A petition signed by affected parties that was sent to Gen. Aguinaldo on April 6, 1899 says it all: “On the first of January last Brigadier General Vicente Lukban arrived in this port accompanied by Señor Francisco Enage de Jesus and other

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gentlemen; and on the same afternoon Señor Enage was appointed temporary chief (undoubtedly at his own request), while Señor Emeterio Enage was appointed local chief. This was done without the approval of the people of the locality, in fact without even consulting them, notwithstanding that they were represented on this occasion by the principal citizens of the community, which later, however, were so completely surprised by this step that they were not able to protest…

We thought it better to await the day of formal elections and then we would be consulted. But, your Excellency, the day arrived and nothing was done. The Enages, or one of them at the instance of the other, called only on their friends and comrades on the previous night, instructing them on how to vote, and these instructions were carried out on the day set for the election, we, however, not having been called. In this manner, Emeterio Enage, a man whom people disliked on account of his bad character as shown by him during the four years he served as gobernadorcillo during the Spanish Government was elected local chief. In all this time, he did nothing for the people.

“He did, however, claim for himself the benefits of the prestacion personal service, out of which he bought for himself a house, or rather a palace, entirely neglecting the public works of the Province which had to be kept up by utilizing the prisoners from the provincial jail.

This exactly suits the plans of Señor Francisco Enage de Jesus, who, himself, is trying by every means in his power to become Provincial Governor or Chief, and he has made his intentions known to the newly made Local Chiefs of the province. General Lukban defended him with tooth and nail, notwithstanding the protests made to him. This, however, is natural as the Enages are his friends, and he has been staying in Emeterio’s house. Not only did the general pay no heed to our protest, but he even threatened us through his secretary Esteban Aparri, saying he would shoot us for making the complaint. .. This is the only election in which favoritism and injustice have been showing; the same has also occurred in other towns through the machinations of the ever notorious Francisco Enage, now candidate for governor.

He and Lukban are inseparable, and their sole occupation is in organizing factions and working up favoritism….The elections have, with the exception of one, been presided over by Lukban or by means commissioned by him; and he didn’t even notice the Politico-Military Governor appointed by you, namely, Señor Ambrosio Mojica, who is now here in the province.”

The petitioners led by Alejandro de los Reyes of Tacloban and 21

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other signatories, wanted the elections declared null and void.12 In Maasin, the same manipulative tactics of Lukban were noted in a complaint signed by one Braulio Cruz and 21 other signatories. A portion of his letter says: “Shortly before the election of the local chief and other officials commenced, Municipal Captain Flaviano Aguilar, desiring to get the crowd out of the town hall, called on the headmen to come down and gather at the Boys School house where they would await the general, whom he believed, would take part in the elections. No sooner had the headmen left the building than the commissioner proceeded with the election, naming off the persons who could vote and who had been previously cited for that purpose. But these could not express the will of the people for the very good reason that they were inexperienced boys, without any property or social position, some of them being still under the paternal power, and others being outsiders brought here by Francisco Enage, and whom he had coached to vote for Felix Veyra as local president. The elections ended and, of course, Veyra was successful. This was a great surprise to the inhabitants for they had not even thought of him as a candidate for the office as they do not care for him, especially since they were excluded from the election when they would have been the first to be consulted on the matter as they are the representatives of the sovereign will of the people.�

The protest about Lukban’s undue interference reached Luzon on June 2, 1899. In response, the Secretary of War Antonio Luna wrote Lukban, ordering him to confine his work to Samar. Lukban had no choice but to obey orders, albeit with reluctance. He would write that starting July 8, he had ceased to be the military commander in Leyte. 13 Hemp trading Besides reorganising the pueblos, Lukban was instructed to control the hemp trade in Samar. Aguinaldo realized the importance of hemp trading for the revolutionary government especially for Leyte and Samar, which was why he appointed two of his ablest generals to the islands. Lukban paid close attention to the hemp trading. A five percent tariff was imposed and channelled to the revolutionary treasury.

On Feb 7, 1899, Lukban wrote the Customs officers in Samar, directing that a 5 percent ad valorem tax be collected on merchandise imported or exported between provinces, 15 percent ad valorem on

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goods exported or imported directly from foreign countries, 50 cents charged on vessels that carry merchandise, and 1 peso for entry and clearance papers for each set 14 On March 27, he was already sending an agent from Leyte, with 184,915.61 pesos invoiced to the general treasury somewhere in Northern Luzon. But the agent was frozen with fear in Nueva Caceres in May. He could not proceed north for fear of capture. The agent later became a turncoat, and the sum sent by Lukban may not have reached Aguinaldo.15 On March 31, 1899, he reported that from March 28 to that date, he had collected 5,005.46 pesos. From this amount, he spent 92 pesos for the uniforms of his soldiers, the expenses of his arsenal, for headquarters expenses and other small items.

On July 8, 1899, Lukban wrote to the secretary of the treasury of the Philippines that since the first day of April, he had sent him over 78,000 pesos from Leyte and over 100,000 from Samar. He did not know whether these funds had yet been received, but reported that he had on hand 47,597 pesos. These sums must have been largely, if not entirely, received from the sale of abaca taken either as contributions of war or seizures.16 In the words of his enemies: “Lukban is a man of a certain aptitude for commercial affairs and Samar, which exports a large part of the abaca…gave a field for the exercise of these abilities. Whether their employment were absolutely disinterested there is no way of knowing, but during the long period when the American force, elsewhere occupied, gave no attention to Samar, the hemp crop of the island was undoubtedly controlled by Lukban. Some of the returns from it passed into the insurgent treasury through drafts upon business houses in Manila.”17 Blockade But it would not be long before the Americans would take matters into their hands, starting with an economic blockade. The exact date when it was implemented in Leyte and Samar is not clear but the boats assigned to the region - the gunboats Manileño, Mariveles, Helena and the cruiser Charleston - started prowling the seas around Leyte and Samar in the last week of May 1899. From the American point of view, the naval blockade “struck at the crucial necessities of the insurgency.” This was especially true in Samar and Leyte whose population was dependent on other provinces’ supply of rice, salt, sugar, kerosene, tobacco – things

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which they could not do without. By cutting off traffic in the sea, the Americans thought they could weaken the revolutionary forces, isolate each island’s resistance movement, prevent reinforcements and the establishment of sanctuaries.18 While there were conflicting positions among the American generals on the issue of blockade, it was finally decided by the Commander-inchief of the Asiatic Station Admiral Watson on August 19, 1899 that the purpose of cruising was “the annihilation of trade with Philippine ports not in the possession of our own forces”- this, in an instruction for gunboats operating from the Cebu port, the Americans’ base of operation for the Visayas. According to Watson, “illicit trade” meant vessels flying the Filipino flag, trading with closed ports and carrying contraband. Since only three ports were open (meaning, controlled by the Americans) at this time – Cebu, Manila and Iloilo, the rest of the country were considered “illicit” and were therefore to be destroyed or towed to the nearest American port.19 Vessels thus seized were stripped of their papers, the usable cargo taken, and boat destroyed. The crew was taken to the nearest barrio with their personal belongings, unless it was practical to turn over the vessel to the provost guards at Manila or a nearby garrison. 20 Here is a list of the items taken from one of the bancas (Boat No. 15780) seized by the American gunboats in the blockade.

Table 2. Appraisal Report for Banca No. 15780 35 boxes Bread 20 sacks Limes 4 sacks Flour 3 Shovels 5 gallons Linseed oil 7 bottles Vino 5 pounds Onions 10, 000 Cocoanuts 9 boxes Sardines 250 pounds Soap 32 packs Playing cards 4 cases Matches 3 boxes Cigars 1 package Brown linen 4 bottles Varnish 12 Umbrellas

1 box Pepper 4 bags Good tobacco 1 box Cigarette tobacco 17 bags Course cut tobacco 50 pounds Sugar 7 pounds Sweets 1 Lantern 20 Torches 1.5 pounds Linen thread 2500 packages Cigarette papers 120 yards Cotton drilling 30 yards Bleached drilling 1 lot Assorted Cotton cloths 1 lot Yankee rations 2 Glass jars 1000 packages Cigarettes

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The items may appear harmless, but to the Americans, everything looked suspicious. One or two bancas would look insignificant, but ten of these could feed and supply squads and companies. Exactly how many small boats the Americans seized, there are no existing records.21 Two months after the blockade was put up in earnest in the waters around Leyte and Samar, Lukban was already complaining about food shortage early in July - and actual fighting had not even started yet. Beginning July, Lukban said, he and his men had been eating sweet potatoes in the morning, “morisqueta” (boiled rice) at noon and “lugao”(porridge) in the afternoon. When they were lucky, they got harina de palmira (flour from palm trees). Rice was rarely available.

Lukban’s army was not poor because it had money from hemp collections, but there was just nothing to buy because of the blockade.22 This explains why he kept on repeating the order to plant rice, but to many farmers, hemp farming was a more lucrative enterprise. They could trade hemp for rice and other necessities before the blockade started. Food problem would hound Lukban and his troops in the coming months. In fact, many of his leaders went over of the side of the Americans because of hunger.

Preparing his arsenal Lukban was not one to be bogged down by such issues though.

Instead, he put his energies to developing his arsenal in preparation for the coming battles against the technically superior Americans.

The Filipinos’ arsenal of guns was quite diverse. Their main weapons were those that they had seized from the Spaniards: Spanish M93, also the standard infantry arm of the Spanish, and the Remington Spanish rifle. In addition to these were added Krupp, Hontoria, an Ordóñez gun, Hotchkiss, Nordenfelt, Maxim guns and Colt guns, and the Filipino lantakas, originally made of bamboo and later reinforced with steel. Moreover, they had improvised artillery weapons made of water pipes reinforced with bamboo or timber, which could only be fired once or twice.

This merry assortment of weaponry created problems rather than solutions for Lukban because that meant they had to fabricate all sorts of bullets in different shapes, which would dissipate their efforts.

Each model had different cartridge shells to serve as mold to bullets.

Practically each bullet would have to be handmade, indeed.

Their first arsenal was hidden somewhere in the mountains of Catbalogan. It was here that many a church bell was melted and transformed into bullets, while the cartridges were made using old

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A locally-made cannon crafted from bamboo called ‘lantaka’.

sewing machines contributed by private citizens. Because of the difficulties of getting all the necessary ingredients for the manufacture of bullets, their chemist Vito Borromeo learned how to increase the output of nitrate of potash, without the usual ingredients. The chemist had discovered a way to mix various substances using local resources.23 Powder was made from salt peter, sulphur and charcoal, or from salt peter, charcoal and alcohol. The salt peter was obtained from niter beds whose establishment was ordered in all towns. The charcoal was made from the native wood, while sulfur was found in the country. Since the natives consumed large quantities of distilled liquors for drinking, some of these were diverted to the manufacture of gunpowder. When their own cartridge shells were hopelessly worn out, they made substitutes from galvanized iron roofs. Even the copper bands were stripped from shells thrown into the seacoast towns by the US Navy and laboriously beaten out into sheet copper and then used for the manufacture of cartridge shells, while the melted silver ornaments were used for soldering. When shells thrown by the navy had not exploded, they were opened and the powder withdrawn. A fulminate for the cartridges was obtained from the heads of the matches.24 In the later months, when the shooting war erupted, people in the neighbourhood always saved the cartridge shells with great care. Those thrown away by the Americans were collected by the people and sent to the guerrillas. They were too hard pressed to consider any question

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of great accuracy in their projectiles. After all, a few shots fired now and then into a town served to prolong the war almost as well as a sharp attack. They did not hope to be able to drive back the Americans by rifle fire, but they did hope to force to scatter them into small detachments which would increase the expense and difficulty of operations and also the chances of being able to cut off stragglers and render attacks of the people of the towns practicable. Hence, they used anything which would make a lot of noise and send any sort of bullet into the air. 25 They soon learned that such ammunition was not effective unless fired from very close quarters. But even its possession made the guerrillas stronger than the people of the country, which undoubtedly had much to do with securing their cooperation, not only as bolomen but also in the digging of the pits placed in the trails and set about the towns.

The authorities who followed the orders of Lukban had required the construction of pits. At the bottom was a set of sharp spikes of bamboo, sometimes poisoned. The pit was covered with leaves and soil upon a fragile framework, so that if a man stood upon it, he would fall through upon a spike. Bows were set in the jungle with a string set across a trail so that anyone stumbling over it would discharge a sharp bamboo shaft with a poisoned head.

The natives were experts in these contraptions since ancient times. These were done to catch animals. Now they used it against the Americans. But the latter learned fast. Many of the American volunteers had seen similar traps during the Indian wars back home. They knew how to avoid them or disengage them.26 The clergy Lukban’s reputation as a mason and an Aglipayan had preceded him. So months before his arrival, the Franciscan friars in Samar already packed up their things on the orders of their superior and fled to Iloilo and then to Manila, leaving the parishes to be manned by diocesan priests, many of whom were just newly ordained. So most of the parishes were without priests. Late in November 1899, Lukban summoned all the priests to a conference in Catbalogan where he tried to convince them to throw off Rome’s authority and embrace Aglipayanism. After all, the new religion believed in everything that the old Catholic religion preached. But the native priests refused to withdraw their affiliation from Rome.

So when Lukban invited them, the priests refused to heed him. So he confiscated churches, beginning with that of Catbalogan, expelled the priests from their conventos, and converted the buildings into schools.

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Next he told the authorities not to recognize jurisdiction of the priests over their diocese. He went so far as the provincial council to reorder the parishes and reassign priests without reference to ecclesiastical authority.

When the priests protested against this usurpation, Lukban threatened them, and on 6 December forced them to sign their acceptance of his schismatic intervention. Apparently all were threatened into signing, but as soon as they were able to do so, they abandoned the island of Samar and sailed to Tanauan, Leyte. From there, they published a collective protest declaring that their signatures were obtained by coercion. Shortly afterward, the entire clergy protested against the confiscation of church funds in both provinces of Leyte and Samar.27 For a place like Samar whose people had been steeped in Catholicism for hundreds of years, it would not have been easy to change their beliefs overnight and follow the dictates of Lukban and his Aglipayan doctrine. To be sure it would have impacted on their sympathies for the revolutionary undertakings and the war preparations Lukban was making. In this respect, isolating the clergy could have been his worst debacle at this early stage of the war.

Endnotes 1 James H. Blount, The American Occupation of the Philippines, 1898-1912, 97 2 Reynaldo H. Imperial, Leyte (1898-1902): The Philippine-American War, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, 1996, p. 46 3 Ibid 4 Hurley,Victor, Jungle Patrol, The Story of the Philippine Constabulary, (E.P. Dutton, New York, 1938), p.89 5 Philippine Commission Reports 1901 6 Ibid 7 “The Roman Catholic Diocese of Calbayog,” Pagduaw 2012 : http:// pagduaw2012.weebly.com/the-church.html 8 Report of War Commission 1900 9 Philippine Insurgent Records, 1896-1901, with Associated Records of the United States War Department , 1900-1906, (Vibal Publishing House) Exhibit 1242.1 10 Carl J. Bordeos, http://lavezares.webs.com/didyouknow.htm 11 Imperial, pp. 46-47 12 John R.M. Taylor, Exhibit 1371, The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States. Vol. II (Eugenio Lopez Philippine Historical Series, 1968) 13 Exhibit 1321, p. 427 14 Op Cit, Taylor Exhibit.

15 PIR 2019.7

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16 PIR 1242.3 17 Exhibit 1319, p. 630-631 18 Ted W. Carlson, “The Philippine Insurrection: The U.S. Navy in a Military Operation Other than War, 1899-1902”, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 2004, p. 50 19 Op Cit, Carlson, p. 74 20 Ibid 21 Op Cit, Carlson, p. 75 22 Exhibit 1320. 635 23 PIR 122.9 24 Ibid 25 P.I.R. 122.9 26 P.I.R. 502.8 27 Schumacher, John N., “Revolutionary Clergy,” SJ Ateneo de Manila Press, Loyola Heights, Quezon City, Metro Manila, 1981, p. 141

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Chapter 2

T

Americans invade Samar

here was only one reason why the Americans wanted to occupy parts of Southern Luzon, Leyte and Samar and northern Mindanao: hemp. Manila hemp was viewed as the best in the world, and the demand for it was high among American farmers. But the navy’s blockade had severely affected its production and trade. Moreover, they saw that Aguinaldo’s appointed leaders in the provinces were taking advantage of the commodity, to the chagrin of the American traders. The only solution was to have full control of the ports. Failure in his could mean a potential political disaster that would severely affect the reelection bid of McKinley against the Democrat candidate William J. Bryan in the 1900 presidential elections.

Early in January 1900, Gen. Otis received a directive from the War Department to secure and occupy the ports in the hemp growing regions of the Philippine Islands (southeastern Luzon, the Visayas Islands of Leyte and Samar, and northern Mindanao) in order to ensure the hemp, and its cordage exported to the U.S. for critical agricultural usages. This meant if the said ports were occupied by forces not friendly to them, such forces had to be driven away. If they showed resistance, they were going to use the full powers of the mighty US Army and Navy.1 For two days, Otis and the adjutant general debated about launching an expedition to open ports. The initial reaction from Otis was that he was unable to move troops to the hemp districts because of the lack of manpower, lack of coasting vessels which were busy supplying troops, and the U.S. transport ships had too great a draft to be useful. But finally, Washington ordered Otis to occupy the hemp ports in the provinces of southeastern Luzon: Sorsogon, Albay, Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur, the Visayan islands of Leyte and Samar, and northern Mindanao The hemp expedition was mounted with great haste and little preparation.

Its success was due only to the cooperation of the army and navy.

The army was led by recently promoted Brigadier General William A. Kobbé commanding the 43rd and 47th Infantry; the navy was represented by Commodore Raymond P. Rodgers who commanded the

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gunboats Helena, Nashville, and Mariveles. Kobbe was the son on of a German emigrant and a mother who for many years served as consul general of the duchy of Nassau in New York City, herself descended from a Spanish sea captain whose vessel was lost off the coast of New London in 1700. Kobbé was educated in New York City and, from 1854

Brig. Gen. William A. Kobbe to 1857, in Wiesbaden, Germany.

He studied mining engineering in Freiberg and Clausthal until 1862, when he enlisted in the 178th New York volunteers and served until the end of the Civil War, rising to rank of captain. He was brevetted lieutenant colonel of volunteers and major U. S. Army for gallantry at Nashville and at the capture of Fort Blakely, Alabama. He was appointed 2nd lieutenant in the 19th U. S. infantry (regular army) in 1866, serving on the frontier in New Mexico and Kansas during Indian hostilities.2 Brig. Gen. William A. Kobbe was relieved from duty on the south Manila line and ordered to seize the desired points. His

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expeditionary force was composed of the 43rd and 47th Volunteer Infantry Regiments, and Battery G , 3rd Artillery. He sailed on the afternoon of January 18, with the transport Hancock and two coasting vessels, the Castellano and Venus. His command was convoyed by the gunboats Helena and NashviIlle.

The expedition set sail from Manila on January 18, 1900. On January 20, it arrived off Sorsogon, Bicol Peninsula, Luzon. As Kobbé’s troops embarked into their landing boats, he requested that the Helena, Mariveles, and Nashville anchor close to shore to provide support in case of hostilities. Then he and Colonel Howze went aboard the Mariveles, the shallowest draft vessel, to survey and select the landing place. Finding no resistance, the army landed at the port’s wharf and took possession of the town. That same day, the Helena embarked two companies and transported them to Donsol (in Sorsogon) where they effected another peaceful landing of sorts. Upon their arrival, the Helena found trenches in front of the town filled with 200 to 300 insurgents.

Regrouping back at Sorsogon, the expedition set off on January 25, 1900, for Calbayog on the island of Samar, with the Nashville, Helena, and Mariveles escorting the transports Venus, Aeolus, Salvadoro, Castellano, and Mendez Nuñez. The expedition arrived at sunlight the following day off Calbayog, and the Mariveles stood in to shore with Kobbé to reconnoitre, while the Nashville and Helena approached the shore to within 1,000 yards to cover the landing. Finding no signs of resistance, the signal to land was given, and the U.S. ensign was hoisted above the town by 8:30 that morning.3 Hearing of the Americans’ coming, on January 26, 1900 after American gunboats were sighted in Calbayog. General Lukban called for a meeting with prominent men of Catbalogan on what to do should the Americans arrive in Catbalogan. They decided to burn the town and to evacuate the people in order not to give quarters to the invaders.

This town-burning strategy became a standard operating procedure in Lukban’s guerrilla war in Samar to deny the Americans the use of the towns’ resources.

They also decided to disperse the Filipino forces to different outposts surrounding Catbalogan. 2nd Lt. Guillermo Arteche, now in command of the Second Artillery, was posted to the mountains in the northeast of the town. His brother, Leopoldo, also served with the revolutionary army of Lukban.4 At daybreak of January 27, American warships appeared on Maqueda Bay. A gunboat took Colonel Arthur Murray ashore to parley, expecting to see Lukban himself. But that was not to be the case. Instead Lukban sent an artillery officer to face the American, while deploying five other

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soldiers to set fire to the town as soon as the parleying was over. At the onset, Murray demanded the surrender of General Lukban and all his forces, offering Lukban the post of governor of the island.

In the instructions of Kobbe, Murray was to ask for Lukban himself and his interpreter Col. Merchant, and inform him that the entire island of Luzon, except for some parts of Camarines, was in the control of the United States, and that the revolutionary government was already broken up and dispersed and that Aguinaldo himself was on the run. He was likewise to be told that the United States Congress and Government intended to crush the insurrection and retain possession of the archipelago. In which case, it was best for him and his men to surrender. And if they did that and surrender all firearms, Lukban and his officers would be paroled, may remain on the island, or may leave on any of the ships to Manila with their officers and their families.5 Lukban through his emissary countered with a demand that the Americans desist from landing in any of the ports of Samar and leave SamareĂąos to manage their own lives and affairs. Furious, Murray gave Lukban and his troops two hours to surrender and take the oath of allegiance to the American government, or else the town would be shelled and the rebels pursued to their death.6 The boat carrying the flag of truce had no sooner pushed off from shore than men could be seen running in all directions through the town, evidently setting it on fire, and thin columns of smoke rising simultaneously in every quarter. It was ascertained afterwards that many houses especially selected had been partially filled with hemp saturated with coal oil, and these included the church and convent.

Unfortunately, an unusually high wind prevailed.

The English agent of a hemp firm displayed two English flags, and although he was not personally molested, fire was deliberately planted where from the direction of the wind, it would doubtless reach his warehouse and residence. These were among the early buildings destroyed.7 The high wind blowing from the land at right angles to the beach destroyed the central portion of the town, containing about one-tenth of the total number of houses, but these were all of the better class. Very little hemp was destroyed. The convent standing next to the church had been fired separately and was soon totally destroyed. The commanding general, noticing in the afternoon that fire in the fine stone church was making slow headway and was confined almost exclusively to the hardwood supports of the roof, signaled over to the Nashville for a landing party of sailors to ut out the fire. The boat anchored 600 yards from the shore, as a group of sailors led by Maj. Henry T. Allen8 were

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sent to the church, and started removing the church furniture to a safer place. When the church furniture was returned, there were little signs of the fire except for the charred ceiling and part of the rafters. But the edifice was intact. 9 A good number of American soldiers, which Lukban estimated at 2,000, immediately disembarked, and as soon as they had landed, opened fire under the protection of the guns of their vessels, advancing to Lukban’s batteries. The latter answered their fire, engaging them until the next day despite the superiority of numbers of the invaders.10 Hunger soon took its toll on Lukban’s soldiers, forcing them to withdrew to the arsenal which was about two miles from the town.

“We inflicted a loss of about 300 on the enemy, of which fact the natives of Catbalogan are witnesses, as they saw the enemy remove their dead in carts drawn by mules. On our side, we suffered the loss of our artillery man who was shot while trying to set fire to the convent; another was killed by the explosion of one of our guns, an artillery officer had his head grazed by a bullet and a corporal of the same corps was wounded,” said Lukban in his report.11 Leaving a force to put out the fire, Major Allen launched into full scale attack of suspected Lukban’s forces now holed up the nearby mountains, where there were said to be some 120 rifles and 8 field guns.

Unfamiliar with the fighting style of the more experienced Americans, several of Lukban’s men were killed and their guns captured. The emplacement, Allen discovered, was abandoned.12 Later that evening, a party of insurgents attempted to approach the town, but the Nashville fired several rounds of shrapnel and shell from her 4-inch gun and drove the insurgents off. Through the night, the Nashville and Helena used their search lights to sweep the hills, shores, and waters around Catbalogan. During the night, other troops were landed under Col. Arthur Murray, 43rd Infantry, U. S. V., to occupy the hills during Major Allen’s absence who went after Lukban. 13 General Kobbe himself soon landed in Catbalogan to establish his headquarters. The town was garrisoned, parents and relatives of soldiers with the revolutionary forces were held hostage. People suspected of giving aid to insurrectos were arrested, tortured or killed.

Catbaloganons were urged to return to the heavily garrisoned town.

When the Americans learned that Leon Arteche was designated as presidente municipal of Catbalogan by Lukban, he was arrested and brought to Manila where he was imprisoned at Fort Santiago. He was later released and allowed to return to Catbalogan, only to find his son Guillermo Arteche together with Cayetano Sosing and Francisco Conge taken by the Americans to Tinaogan, a barrio of Zumarraga, where they were tortured to get information on Lukban’s forces. Later, the three

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Members of the Philipine Scouts conducting a parade drill near the church of Catbalogan in 1903(Source: http://philippineamericanwar.webs.com/balangigamassacre1901. htm)

together with other Catbaloganons who were earlier arrested by the Americans on suspicion of giving aid to the revolutionaries (Antonio Villanueva, Alejo Maga, Catalino Alcantara, Florencio Briz, Geronimo Bello), were taken to Iloilo for imprisonment. Guillermo was lucky enough to be released but Cayetano Sosing and Francisco Conge were executed by the Americans.14 Retreat When the bombs started to rain in Catbalogan, Lukban faced two major problems: the better-equipped, well-fed Americans and hunger.

He knew he had to run and disperse his troops. He knew he did not have the means or the skills to fight the invaders, not with his homemade weapons and ineffective ammunition. And his troops were plagued with hunger because of the blockade that started 10 months earlier.

In his report, he said: “The day after, I had to retreat because our soldiers have been exhausted due to hunger, having to seek subsistence from hamlet to hamlet, from town to town...There is not one grain of rice in the arsenal to eat.”

Whatever little rice there was had to be given to the people living near the coast.15 Now his troops were dispersed into small bands. His orders were not to engage with the enemy where possible, until sufficient provisions were collected. But “that should not be a cause to worry because the mountains teem with edible roots capable of supporting combatants for many

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years of warfare,” he said. He himself had been eating those roots in the past months during the American blockade.16 The Americans were relentless in their pursuit, knowing he and his men were starving. “They pursued us day and night without cessation, until we were demoralized,” he said. It came to a point that Lukban had to order 50,000 pesos thrown into waterfall of great depth because its couriers were exhausted. Those who still had enough strength tried to carry the remainder of the load, but these had to be abandoned later in the woods.

One of Lukban’s deputies Claro Guevarra, who was then the captain director of the arsenal, took some 9,000 pesos to the former second-in-command Benedicto Sabater in Blanca Aurora, one of the villages in the hills of San Jorge, north of Catbalogan where their group retreated. There Lukban ordered his men to strip themselves of their uniforms and remain incognito, and to hide their firearms, ammunition and powder in the caves or mountains, until they could find a center for their operations similar to that of Biak-na-bato. In this search, he could not take his entire column to avoid a mutiny due to hunger.

Finally, after many days of walking, Lukban found a place called Buan at the foot of Mt. Jurao which was within the jurisdiction of the town of Paranas, an interior pueblo. With him were two small boys and a hunter who served as guide. All this time, they ate nothing but ubod (bamboo pith) and some kind of palms.17 Food would not have been a problem had the people heeded his earlier calls to plant rice and tubers instead of abaca, which was exchanged for rice. But with the blockade, no rice was available to be exchanged with abaca. When the hostilities broke out, there was no rice stored. Luckily, they had sufficient sweet potatoes in Buan, the only food available. In the meantime, some of his key officers were leaving him.

On the 4th of February, Claro Guevarra and a second lieutenant of the infantry Florentino Peñaranda arrived and reported about the dispersion of the company under the command of Calbayog garrison commander Francisco Rafael because of hunger. The next day, he ordered Rafael to report to Buan because they had sufficient sweet potatoes to fend off their hunger. Instead, he received a letter from Captain Abcede that his second-in-command Francisco Lobato and his men had surrendered to the Americans with their arms in Catbalogan and Calbayog.

Lukban was hurt and depressed. His forces were scattered and demoralized because of treachery. There were stories circulating about him fleeing to Camarines, taking with him all the funds of the revolutionary army, and that he was an impostor who only wanted to

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deceive the province. It came to a point that three residents of Tiabong arrived at his present sanctuary in Buan, intending to poison him, decapitate him when he was dead and present his head to the Americans who had offered 5,000 pesos for it.

He had the author of the poisoning arrested, but instead of punishing him, he taught him a lesson about how a good Filipino citizen should act, “the manner of conspiring, attacking and repulsing the enemy, until he became a good pupil.” After the confrontation, the man, who was called Felipe Zuñiga, became one of his active assistants working in their favour. Pleased with the results of his lessons, Lukban presented him with a revolver so that he could assume command of his own town.18 He also learned that the Americans had started to build up a ‘benevolent’ image in an effort to counter that of his own, saying that they were better than the ‘Tagalo’ because they charged only one peseta contribution. The ‘Americanistas’ - or the allies of the Americans in the pueblos of Samar – pinpointed the place where Lukban had hidden the money and his arsenal. Now the Americans were said to be distributing the funds to the inhabitants after finding them. One of the largest beneficiaries of the fund was Vicente Jazmines, the appointee of the Americans as the chief of Catbalogan. He was given 5,000 pesos.

But the ‘benevolent’ image that the Americans were trying to build were easily offset by the actions of many of the soldiers while in their sorties in the hamlets and villages of Samar. Reports of “abuses against women. sacking houses and taking possession of all the wealth and perpetrating other abuses which no history of warfare records, the married women who excite their evil passions are killed by the soldiers’ bayonets if their demands are not met” were recorded by Lukban and dutifully reported.19 In his solitary moments at Buan, Lukban realized that since this was the first time the people had experienced war, fear and demoralization were just the natural results of being invaded by a stronger force with superior armaments. “But as I have always believed that after fear comes reflection, and that reflection is followed by reaction, during the period of reflection of the people,” he said. It was during this period that he started to issue proclamations that he disseminated to his troops and the inhabitants of the pueblos where they were. In his first proclamation, he suspended all citizenship contributions and all imports “to secure something to again raise the moral and material force which had been totally lost.”

Guerrilla memos From his mountain hideout, he taught the inhabitants how to fight

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a stronger enemy. “Each chief of the town shall organize a guerrilla band of the strength he may consider proper, to be maintained by the town itself... The police commissioner (delegado de policia) shall be at the head of this guerrilla band to be armed with bolos, lances and arrows, the tactics of which I leave to the good of the delegado, or in case of necessity, let him come to me to be taught how he must attack the enemy. And in the absence of the commissioner, another patriot shall be at the head of said guerrilla band, who shall report to me.”20 A guerrilla officer shall appoint 2 sergeants and four corporals when his company is 50 men strong; twice the number when it is 100 men strong.

The sergeant who is second in command after the officer shall strictly obey orders, otherwise will be punished according to military regulations.

The guerrilla who captures 25 guns and a great quantity of ammunition shall be promoted to the rank of second lieutenant of the regular army; and if the guns captured amount to 50, 100, 150, 200, etc., he shall be promoted to the rank of first lieutenant, captain, major, etc.

A guerrilla officer shall look after the health of his men and shall do his best in the collection of war contributions. In the event of his men needing food, he shall send notice to the head of the barrio.

A guerrilla officer shall be held responsible for the behavior of his subordinates, and the guilty parties shall be sent up to me to my chiefs of columns for punishment.

A guerrilla officer shall try in every way to make prisoners of our enemies, and in case they make resistance, he is to shoot them.

A guerrilla officer shall prevent any act of abuse of destruction or robbery attempted by his men; those found guilty of these acts shall be sent to the chiefs or inspectors of columns.

A guerrilla officer shall prevent any unlawful collection of war contributions, and those found guilty of such shall be sent up to me or to my chiefs of columns. 21 These issuances came at a time when the revolutionary movement was at its lowest ebb, and the Americans were hot on the heels of Lukban. To add to his growing miseries, news of defections came to his attention after February 4. A captain of Lukban’s infantry and his deputy in Catbalogan also turned themselves in. In addition, some 40 soldiers surrendered with their firearms near Calbayog. But the biggest blow to Lukban was the defection of his second-in-command, Col. Benedicto Sabater, a member of one of Catbalogan’s prominent families and his

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own appointee when the provincial government was reorganized a year earlier. Sabater turned himself in on February 11. He would later figure in the pro-American image building in Samar as a member of the American-inspired Partido Federalista.

The next day, a doctor, chemist and lieutenant surrendered. Then on February 13, Captains Rafael and Miguel Lukban, commanders of troops in Catbalogan, and Capt. Geronimo Abcede, captain of one of the infantry companies of the same place, also surrendered.22 A man of less persistence and shorter vision would have folded up and surrendered to make his own life easier. But not Lukban. He was going to regroup his scattered troops in the next few months and send a strong message to his enemies that he was not done yet.

Endnotes 1 Major Stephen H. Brock, Jr., “U.S. Army Full Spectrum Operations in the Philippine Islands 1898-1941” 2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_August_Kobb%C3%A9 3 Brig. Gen. William A. Kobbe, “Report of an expedition to occupy and open hemp ports in the Philippine Islands,” January 18 to April 8, 1900 4 Charo Nabong-Cabardo, “The Arteches of Catbalogan,” August 29, 2007 5 War Commission Report 1900 6 Exhibit 1333, p 653, PIR 1197.5 7 War Commission Report 1900 8 Maj. Henry T. Allen was 41 years old in 1900. He was a product of Georgetown College and graduated in 1878. Then he went to the United States Military Academy at West Point where he graduated in 1882, was commissioned a second lieutenant in the cavalry and assigned to Alaska in 1884. He worked worked as an instructor at West Point followed by a tour of duty in the old American West at Fort Keogh, Montana Territory where he guarded the Northern Pacific Railroad while it was under construction. After tours of duty as a military attache to Russia and Germany, we was deployed to Cuba where he served in the 2nd Cavalry Regiment and participated in the Battle of El Caney in Cuba. In 1899, he was reassigned to the Philippines where he worked to suppress insurgents.

9 War Commission Report 1900 10 John RM Taylor, “Philippine Insurrection Against the Unite States,” Eugenio Lopez Foundation, Vol V, The Island of Samar, Dec. 1898 to Jul 4, 1902, p. 654 11 Exhibit 1333, p 653, PIR 1197.5 12 War Commission Report 1900 13 Ibid, p. 219 14 Op cit., Cabardo 15 Exhibit 1323, pp. 626-637 16 Ibid

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17 Op cit., p. 655 18 Ibid 19 Op cit., p. 637 20 Op. cit., p. 638 21 Exhibit 1322, pp. 635-636 22 Philippine War Commission 1890

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Chapter 3

A

The Chase Continues

s soon as the fighting erupted in Catbalogan, the American detachment at Calbayog prepared to block the forces of Lukban in case they retreated towards Calbayog. As in most towns that they occupied, the Americans selected the municipal tribunal building as their battalion headquarters, with the lower portion used as the adjutant’s office and commissary storehouse, while the upper storey became the sleeping quarters of the battalion commander Gilmore and his staff. Another large public building served as the guardhouse.

A tip from a local informant about the existence of an arsenal sent a group of soldiers scouring the countryside for it, even if it was located several miles into the interior – only to find out that everything had been removed, save for a can of sulphur. The next day, on January 27, another information sent the detachment hurrying to the town of Sta. Margarita, about five miles southeast on the coast. They came back with a useless homemade cannon. Then on the 28th, another detachment was dispatched to the town of San Jose because, according to reports, that was where the rebel forces had retreated after the fight in Catbalogan.

The detachment returned at nightfall, unable to reach the town because there were no guides. It was impossible to make inquiries since no one in the group spoke the language of the locality. Another detachment sent along the Hibatang River likewise returned frustrated.

But the Americans succeeded in using natives as puppet municipal presidents. They could spot out locals who would toe their garrison policies and faithfully implement them. In Calbayog, they appointed Rufino Pido as the president, while in San Policarpio, they had Luis Villas. These were ordered to police their respective municipalities and provide lighting in the streets. They also informed on the rebels.

Again Gilmore tried to reach San Jose on the 30th. The detachment reached it on nightfall but reported no rebel activity. So their best bet was on Gandara as Lukban’s fallback position from the Catbalogan firefight. Gilmore was determined to cut off his retreat. Securing a sailboat owned by Mr. Scott, the American representative of Warner,

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Barnes & Co. in Calbayog, plus two rowboats, they sailed along with 50 men of the F Company, with Capt. Cooke commanding, with Lt. Stewart as Gilmore’s adjutant, and Scott.

Gilmore wanted to reach Gandara at daylight, hoping to surprise the rebels and to prevent the burning of the town. But the wind and tide worked against them, so they reached the mouth of Gandara river by midnight. Now because of the tide, it became impossible to make headway until 3:00 in the morning. “After that it was difficult to make more than 2 or three miles an hour, as the schooner had to be towed by a rowboat, so that at 8 o’clock I took the two rowboats with 20 men and left the sailboat,” the frustrated Gilmore said in his report.

They reached Gandara at about 12:00 noon on January 30 and found the town in flames. The town was on a peninsula about a mile long, formed by the river branching at this point. There was only one street, the houses being built on the banks of the two river branches. At the head of the street, at the foot of a high hill, was the church. Two-thirds of the town was burned. With a high wind blowing, it was impossible to save any of the houses as these were all nipa shacks and built close together. When the flames had subsided a little, they went around the base of the hill and found the storehouse of Warner, Barnes & Co. still intact. When the residents returned, Gilmore was told that the plan to burn the town was done the night before and that the man who ordered it was said to be the father of Lukban’s mistress.

Major Allen arrived later in the afternoon with a company of his battalion coming up the river in boats towed by a steam launch of the Helena. Hearing that the insurgents had been around, Gilmore continued up the river. At about 12 midnight, five or six rebels fired upon his group, but no one was hit. They did not return the fire.

They arrived at a place called Taiveran, upstream of the Gandara River, at around 8:00 in the morning, but found it deserted, save for two people – a Spaniard and a representative of Warner, Barnes & Co. They told Gilmore that a certain rebel Capt. Rafael with 60 men had been at a town called St. Helene. But they knew nothing of the whereabouts of Lukban. In fact, getting reliable information about the movements of the rebels was a very difficult thing, even for Mr. Scott’s agents. “People were so frightened one could get nothing from them. From what information I could get, I decided my best plan was to return overland to Calbayog,” said Gilmore.

So a fiercely determined Gilmore took his boats back to Calbayog, even if the progress was maddeningly slowly, with few natives as rowers. But they soon exhausted themselves, so the soldiers had to take over until they reached Calbayog. He and his group reached St. Helene at around 2:00 in the afternoon, rested for an hour, then found that indeed

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Rafael was there the day before but had left for Matuginao. However, he resisted the impulse to follow him there, but instead proceeded to Enrique. Along the way, he met some rebels which he tried shooting at.

Two reportedly fell but Gilmore could not confirm it.

Gilmore’s exercise may have been futile but it probably taught him some lessons in geography. Between Taiveran and St. Helene, the greater part of the way was over rice fields, in which one sunk his knees in mud. The rest of the way was in the mountain streams, wading in water anywhere from the ankle to waist deep. Between St. Helene and Enrique the trail was much better, having been cut between these two places by the insurgents.

But between Enrique and Santa Margarita, the trail was either in a river or running over a mountain. Some of the mountains were 400 or 500 feet high, and in climbing them, his men had to sling their rifles and climb up hand over hand by aid of the roots of the trees. In some places the trail went up the almost perpendicular face of the rock, “in which steps had been formed by the wearing away of the rock by the bare feet of the natives passing over it.”

Between Santa Margarita to Calbayog, Gilmore followed an excellent road along the coast and was able to follow the trail of some suspected rebels for a couple of miles. He followed them about five miles into the country over a very mountainous and densely wooded section, capturing 11 cannon and three rifles, reportedly killed about 15, without any casualties on his side. But exhausted, he gave up the pursuit and returned to Calbayog. 1 Occupation of Laguan On Gilmore’s return to Calbayog on February 19th, Brig. Gen. Kobbe told him to occupy Laguan and Catarman with a company of infantry, with at least two other officers and 60 days of ration. He had gone to Oquendo to inspect the road conditions and see whether or not the town could serve as a base of supplies for troops to move to the north coast. In earlier times, when the road was in better condition and the bridges repaired, the distance to Oquendo could be covered in three hours. But at his time, the road was simply in bad shape, with most of the bridges down. While it was passable to foot soldiers, it was unfit for pack animals even without anything on their backs because of the mud in the river bottom. Natives told him, it was impossible to send supplies on pack animals, and the way to Catarman was still a wilderness. They said it was impossible for the troops to live in that situation.

The trip would take three days for them to reach Oquendo, which

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meant a much longer time for the Americans unfamiliar with the terrain.

It even took them around eight hours to reach Oquendo on horseback, Gilmore said in his report. The solution? Order their puppet presidentes to repair the roads and bridges – which they did little by little.

Laguan was easier to get to on a launch. This he did on the afternoon of the next day with a company of soldiers on the boat Santander. They arrived early the following morning at the outer harbour of Laguan.

With 30 men in smaller boats, they landed a mile west of the town, reaching it at around 6:00 in the morning. It was deserted, Gilmore discovered. Reaching the outskirts of the town, he was told that the rebel leader Abuke had left five days earlier.

The town had a population of about 8,000 people, and the houses were larger, though fewer in number, than at Calbayog. Several of the streets were concreted. The public buildings consisted of a tribunal building, where their troops were quartered; a school building, which was used by the presidente for the police, and a small building, whose former use they did not know, but which was now being used as a hospital.

Gilmore, who had become an expert in civil relations, had appointed one Primitivo Acebuche, a prisoner at Catbalogan who had joined him in Calbayog, as temporary presidente municipal of Laguan. Acebuche had 30 policemen to keep the peace and order of the place.

The town was situated on the southern end of an island, and had a very good land-locked harbor, with a wharf running out into it for a hundred yards or so. Ships drawing 13 feet of water could anchor at the end of the wharf and load from it. There was a runway on the wharf, owned by Molleda y Oria, the Spanish-owned firm which did all the hemp and other businesses at this place. The rivers Catubig and Palopa emptied into the harbor opposite the town.

Catubig occupation Gilmore could not stay at one place for a long time. Any news about insurgents operating in the vicinity drove him to scuttling his troops into a hunting party. After learning that Abuke was up the Catubig River at a small town called Bido, he put 50 men on board the steamer Cuco and started up the river at noon on the 20th in pursuit of the rebel.

As the boat was rounding the bend near Bido, a group of rebels fired on the soldiers, who returned the fire, forcing the attackers to retreat up the hill.

Gilmore found it impossible to follow them closely as it took them some time to land ashore. At the first burst, the captain of the ship

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deserted the pilot house and hid in the anchor chain. The wheelman, on the other hand, was outstretched upon the pilot house, paralyzed with fear. The crew deserted the steamer and went into small boats which were farthest from the shore.

At the place where soldiers were expected to disembark, the rebels had placed sharpened canes on the trench covered with wet ditches and hidden by a covering of grass. Several of Gilmore’s men fell into these ditches, but luckily they were not injured. The rice land at the rear of the trench was also planted with sharpened canes at angles varying from 30 to 40 degrees. When Gilmore’s troops finally landed, the rebels were too far to engage in a shooting battle. He learned that Abuke had mobilized 60 men with about 40 guns, and was joined by a number from Mateginan.

Gilmore however said he had no casualties. The rebels on the other hand had reportedly lost one killed and three wounded, one of whom was reportedly Abuke who suffered a slight wound on the shoulder.

When Gilmore returned to Laguan, he was told that one Isidro Medina, formerly a captain of artillery in Catbalogan, had turned himself in.

To the Americans, the occupation of Catubig was more strategic than Catarman. For one, Catubig was the rice granary of the district. If the rebels were to control the town, it would enable them to solve the problem of hunger. If the Americans did, they would hold the key to the rebels’ eventual defeat. At that time, the town already had 10,000 inhabitants. Besides rice, which was estimated to yield 300,000 sacks per year, it had nearly as much hemp as Catarman. The rice harvest was expected to start at the end of March. If Abuke was to succeed in occupying the town, it would serve as a good base of supplies. In addition, occupying it would open up all the towns along the Catubig river.

Gilmore sailed for Catubig on the 22nd of February 1900 at around 10:00 in the morning on board the boat Cuco with 50 men commanded by his deputy Lt. Sweeney. Although it was said to be highly populated, Gilmore found only 56 Chinese traders who were collected by Abuke from Laguan, Catubig and neighboring villages. Everything seemed quiet. So Gilmore sent a small detachment to Pamponton, the first village on the trail from Mateginan after crossing the mountains.

Next he appointed Tomas Tafalla temporary presidente at Catubig.

Earlier, the presidentes of Palapag and Pambujan - Fernando Opinion and Restituto Jazmin – had presented themselves to him. Palapag had a population of 6,000 while Pambujan 5,000. No Chinese or Spaniards were killed in either of the two towns, he learned. Tafalla also informed him that he had received two letters from Lukban, directing that all

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soldiers were to rendezvous near Mateginan with their guns within five days of the date of the letter, which meant February 20. Gilmore suspected that Lukban only wished to collect as many guns but that he had lost the will to fight. These guns would be surrendered with him.

But Gilmore’s speculations did not materialize. He would later realize that the opposite of what he thought was true, and that more than ever, Lukban was gearing up for more battles.

On the 25th, after he was informed that Abuke had stored rice in Palapag mountains. He sent Capt. Dey and some troops the next morning to destroy the supply since he was in that vicinity. The information was genuine as the captain found 70 sacks in the place indicated, but no Abuke was to be found. He had reportedly gone up the mountains with some of his troops, as some of them returned to their villages. Dey burned the rice stocks.

Laguan was in the meantime occupied by Lt. Seaman following Gilmore’s orders. There was no opposition. Seaman had accordingly slipped into town unnoticed on the morning of the 23rd, and was lucky to stop the town from being burned. There was an attempt to start the fire at the outskirts of the town, but the fire was put out before it could spread. The next few days were quiet for Seaman. He was also ordered to extend his patrol to the town of Lavesares everyday since Warner, Barnes & Co. had plenty of hemp in the place. In La Granja, there was more of the commodity.

On Gilmore’s return to Calbayog on February 21, he was told that two Filipinos had been arrested for carrying letters from General Lukban to the presidente of San Policarpo. The communication was a circular letter to presidentes of towns, directing them to send men to Lukban in the mountains and urging them to wage a patriotic war. The two were detained. Gilmore sent out scouting parties to a small town above Oquendo but found things were quiet. 2 Catarman Gilmore continued the cat-and-mouse game with Lukban as he and his troops moved around the vicinity of Catarman and Catubig, north of the island of Samar, while Lukban started to regroup his troops deep in the forests of Paranas, in the heart of the island.

On March 3 that same year, Gilmore learned that one of Lukban’s lieutenants, surnamed Rosario, had gone down from the mountains to the vicinity of Catubig valley apparently to loot and burn the place.

But after learning that American troops were already in place, Rosario went back to the mountains. Gilmore’s arrival at Laguan was said to be

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timely because another of Lukban’s men, Abuke, was intending to burn the place a day after his arrival.

On that same day, Company F under Captain Cooke was dispatched on the steamer San Bernardino and a schooner furnished by Mr. Scott, agent of Warner, Barnes & Co., free of charge, as he was anxious to have Catarman occupied. Major Allen, who arrived here on this date, decided to accompany the expedition. Scott believed that with the American troops in town, his company’s interests would be better protected against the rebels.

The group, which included Gilmore, arrived off Catarman at about 7 a. m., the next day. The town was situated about a mile from the mouth of the river. There was no harbor, and the coast was covered with rocks, which formed reefs extending way out into the sea. The channel leading into the river was not more than 20 yards wide, with a swift current flowing through it, making it very dangerous to enter the river. On the right-hand side going in was a sand beach, while the left was all reef.

The San Bernardino, which had towed the schooner Malabon to Catarman, gave her a start for the mouth of the river, and then anchored about three-quarters of a mile from the shore, as she drew too much water to enter the river. Major Allen, who had arrived separately, and Gilmore with 7 men embarked on a rowboat and landed on the sand beach about a mile from the town. They were met by the presidente as they approached closer. There were some 200 to 300 men in the town, but very few women because they were afraid of the Americans who were rumoured to have abused women. Many of them had gone to the hills.

Catarman had a population of 9,000 and a good number of wooden houses. Its church badly needed repairs as it was in a sorry state of decay, but the convent was in an excellent condition. Hemp was the main product here. Since the troops arrived, it had been reportedly quiet in Catarman.

On their return to the boats, they found out that the schooner had been carried by the current onto the rocks on the left of the river. They anticipated that the boat would be smashed on the rocks or sunk because of them. So they got other small boats to save the ship’s cargo, all the company’s property, and the sacks of rice on board. But only 100 sacks of rice were saved, while 200 sacks went down with the schooner when it capsized.

The next morning, Gilmore and his men sailed for Laguan, leaving the company agent Mr. Gibson behind to see if the boat Malabon could be saved. According to Capt. Dey who headed the detachment at Laguan, the place was quiet. Captain Dey had, following Gilmore’s orders, sent

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Maj. Henry T. Allen (Source: http://alchetron.com/Henry-Tureman-Allen-1200932-W)

scouting parties out to Palapag and Pambujan, and discovered the places to be quiet. Moreover, people were beginning to return to town.

The president of Mondragon was also in town to present himself to Capt. Dey. Located on the north coast about midway between Catarman and Pambujan, Mondragon had about 5,000 inhabitants then.

Meanwhile, everything was quiet at Catubig, according to Lt. Sweeney who was assigned as detachment commander in the place.

Very few people had returned to town. Gilmore suspected that people were out working in the field on weekdays because they were visible on Sundays. So he sent Sweeney to take a patrol to Matuginao via Poponton, and station 10 men at the latter so people would be accustomed to the

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sight of American troops in the area. They also wanted to erase the bad propaganda Lukban had circulated about them in the area.

From Catubig, Gilmore returned to Catarman. Little progress was made in saving the boat Malabon. Then he was off to Calbayog where he ordered Lt. Jones with some 20 men on a patrol to Gandara. From there Jones was to proceed to Mateginan with 10 men, to remain there for five days, then to Taiveran for another five days, and finally to return to Gandara. A number of rebels were said to be around Gandara, and a Chinese was reportedly killed. Chinese often traded in hemp and other commodities while acting as agents for Warner, Barnes & Co. Since the trading firm was known to be actively supporting the Americans, its agents’ lives were in danger.3 Encounter at Matuginao It was in Matuginao that the rebels finally decided to stop playing hide-and-seek with the American forces, and be more aggressive.

It was time to attack the isolated troops of the enemy. After about a month of constant movement to evade his enemies, Lukban had slowly regrouped his forces which had, in the meantime, taken the initiative to wage their own little ambushes to inflict demoralization on the ranks of their enemies.

In his report, Lukban said he had succeeded in collecting eight rifles from short skirmishes, and these he sent to the field where they were most needed. In Paranas, he had formed his own revolutionary detachment (militia), assisted by the sandatahan (regular troops). In the meantime, the Americans had formed 14 detachments in different municipalities, from which patrols were conducted of the surrounding villages. When not fighting, his guerrillas hid their firearms, but when firing broke out in Paranas, they retrieved their arms and were able to gain 30 more rifles. For that feat, Lukban promoted Capt. Guevarra to major and appointed him second in command of the province. He took the place of Benedicto Sabater who had surrendered earlier.4 He sent some of these arms with Guevarra to attack the detachment of Gandara. The rest of the arms were sent to Borongan in the southern part of the island to the detachment under Capt. Serrano. Lukban at this time was still sick and had to remain at the slope of Mt. Jurao, in a place called Tamay.5 On the 13th of March, Capt. Dey reported that Lukban had organized a large force in the mountains near Gumay. But Gilmore waited for more troops before pursuing the rebel force. He did not want to leave Laguan and Catubig without any detachment. So he got more men

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at Catarman. In the meantime, Sweeney was besieged by rebel forces in Matuginao where one soldier was killed and four wounded in his 13-man detachment. Sweeney himself was slightly wounded. The encounter happened when Sweeney was making a sketch of the trail to Matuginao. They did not expect a large force of rebels in the area. He was said to have used a native guide who looked suspicious.

The encounter happened when Sweeney’s detachment was walking on a river bed with steep banks on both sides. He took his troops up one of the banks but instead got one of them killed and two others wounded.

After reaching the top of the hill, Sweeney tried to regroup his forces but found one of his men missing. So they went looking for him. When they located him, he was already dead. They had to retreat when the rebels’ fire intensified. Three of his men were wounded before they reached the top again. For three days and two nights, they were pinned at their positions, unable to move because of the wounded men. Sweeney did not want to reduce his detachment by sending for help. They did not have guides and the place was mountainous, sparsely settled and cut up by numerous trails. They were lost. So they stayed put at their positions.

Meanwhile. Lieutenant Jones, another of Gilmore’s subordinates who was to meet Sweeney in Matuginao, had to find the town himself without maps or guides and did not arrive until Saturday afternoon.

The trail was accordingly very difficult, and it was impossible to get guides. The next two days he spent in exploring the countryside and was preparing to return on Tuesday. As a last resort, he sent a detachment looking for Sweeney. On the merest of accidents, they found Sweeney living on almost nothing in the last four days. So his group helped the remainder of Sweeney’s troops on a baroto back to safety.

Sweeney said there were about 30 rifles and two cannons, and that he was sure of killing three or four insurgents. He thought there were more wounded. They were able to capture one cannon that the rebels left behind.

One of the presidente’s secret police, who lived at some distance from Matuginao, told Gilmore that he was forced by a party of eight men, two of them with guns, to guide them to Matuguinao. Two of these men said they were commissioners from Aguinaldo to Lukban. They had arrived in the area in the latter part of February, and had passes from the authorities m Manila.

The secret police said the party in Matuguinao, which attacked Lieutenant Sweeney’s detachment, consisted of about 50 men under Rosario, with about 20 to 25 rifles and three cannons.

That very day, Gilmore dispatched Captain Spellman, with 40 men and fifteen days’ rations, to Matuguinao to thoroughly scour the

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country and see if they could find any trace of Rosario’s band. He also instructed Captain Dey to draw on Capt. John Cooke at Catarman for 60 men, and to station a force at Poponton. From there, they were to try engaging with the rebels. 6 Attack on Lavezares As in Matuginao, Lukban’s troops started harassing the Americans in the nearby towns of La Granja and Lavesares. Two Spaniards who had businesses in Gandara told the Americans that the countryside was swarming with insurgents. Anticipating an attack, Gilmore reinforced the 12 men left by Capt. Spellman with another 12 led by Lt. Stewart.

Then early morning of the 23rd, the launch Cuco arrived with a wounded man from Seaman’s detachment, bearing a report that La Granja was under threat. When Seaman was at Lavezares, he was told that insurgents were just outside the town. Having with him only four men, and fearing that the remainder of his detachment at La Granja might be surprised, he immediately started for Lavezares. He arrived at about 6:00 in the evening, then prepared for the inevitable attack.

The town was difficult to guard with a small detachment. It was about a mile long, and in its center was the camarin (bodega) and house of the agent of Warner, Barnes & Co. Two hundred yards from these houses were located the church and convent. Lieutenant Seaman’s detachment used the convent as their quarters. The two buildings stood side by side, and just back of them was a hill 50 feet high, covered with underbrush.

An hour later, as the corporal of the guard was returning from visiting the sentinels, he was knocked unconscious as he came opposite the interval between the convent and the church. A party of insurgents had come down the mountain, and under cover of darkness and rain, slipped by the sentinel on the back of the barracks and lay in wait between the two buildings.

The unidentified assailants wanted to carry him off, but two soldiers, who had just started their duty, opened fire even if they could not see in the dark. This caused the assailants to drop the corporal, but they took off with his rifle.

Here at Lavezares the situation remained grave, as Seaman was sure that the presidente was in communication with the insurgents, although he had no proof. There was a Spaniard whose actions have been likewise suspicious. Gilmore wanted to arrest the presidente, but he reconsidered. Leaving him in his town might save it from being burned.

With the overwhelming threat, Gilmore told Seaman on the 25th

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to abandon Lavezares along with 10 men and all those who wanted to come on board the San Bernardino. Seaman returned in the evening with about 25 Chinese and two Spaniards, agents of Warner, Barnes & Co. There were numerous reports brought in by the natives that large bodies of insurgents were in the mountains, some armed with rifles and the remainder with bolos.7 Calbayog attacked This was probably one of the boldest attacks on the American detachments yet considering that the Calbayog outpost had more than 100 troops. Gilmore had just arrived by boat at around 3:00 early morning of the 26th. He decided to wait until daylight before disembarking. But by 5:00, he was awakened by a call to arms and a few minutes later heard heavy firing. He disembarked immediately, and was told the town was attacked by a party of bolomen, one of whom reportedly went up to his quarters apparently to kill the officers there. Fortunately, Gilmore and his adjutant were not there.

In the next room, Lt. Mills and Dr. Welch heard the man go out of the room and through the hall, then heard the thud of a blow as he struck a private who was sleeping in the adjacent room. Unarmed, the doctor rushed out for help and came back with three men. The boloman had in the meantime killed the private, then hid in the room of Gilmore.

When they found him, he did not give up easily. He stabbed one man in the arm, and cut off the finger of another as the latter tried to parry a bolo cut directed at his head, went through the gunsling and half an inch into the stock – before he was slain.

A private who served as sentinel at the hospital, a building located between the headquarters, sounded the alarm. He was likewise hit by a bolo, but was able to get to the headquarters where he sounded the alarm. A patrol from the guard went out immediately and, going up a street from the hospital, encountered 12 or 15 of the assailants and opened fire upon them.

The command, in the meantime, was set up between the church and the head- quarters building, with a troop formation of about 100 men.

They opened fire immediately, killing five or six bolomen.

Gilmore later found out from arrested prisoners that there were only 19 attackers involved. He suspected that this was a different group of fanatics, not members of Lukban’s troops as some of wounded men smelled of alcohol in their breaths. Nine of them were killed, four were treated in the hospital and four were in prison. Two had escaped.8

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Since March 29, Lt. Stewart in Gandara had sent messages to Gilmore that his detachment was under attack by over a hundred rebels, many of them with rifles. It seemed that they were intending to attack at night, but the sentry discovered late in the afternoon that one of their detachments were moving into position, and natives were getting scarce around there. So the sentry called to the corporal of the guard, who immediately went around the hill to the church. Shortly after his arrival there, a group of rebels approached him. The corporal did not hesitate to shoot their leader who was killed. But as they turned to return to the camarin, they saw that they were surrounded.

Luckily, Lt. Stewart arrived on the scene as he was just down in the river. He started up the church as soon as he heard the shot of the corporal. Drawing his revolver, he killed two men and wounded a third.

After an hour of exchange of fire, the rebels withdrew. They counted five killed, but Stewart was certain he had shot more as the rebels were seen carrying their wounded.

The fighting did not stop that day. Two days later, rebels still surrounded the town, so that Gilmore instructed Stewart to retreat.

He wanted to give the same order to Spellman but he could not get a message to him since the natives refused to carry messages. Spellman arrived the next day with 10 men, saying he left 10 men at Taiveran and the rest of his company at Gandara. They had been fired at every night since the attack, he said. Gilmore wanted all his troops out of Taiveran and Gandara as soon as possible. They arrived on April 4. “What made the strain more severe was that we were not fighting civilized beings, but assassins who would murder one in his bed at night,� remarked Gilmore in his report to his superiors. He commended his appointee presidente Rufino Pido and his police and tenientes of the villages who provided them information on developments in the surrounding countryside.9 According to Lukban, it was Capt. Serrano and Claro Guevarra who led the attack and successfully drove away the Americans from Gandara, where 50 of their troops were stationed. Guevarra said the American soldiers patrolled the nearby mountains but when they saw the rebels, they fled and hurried back to the town without engaging them. On the afternoon of the 27th, the rebel troops attacked the town, killing 17 and wounding 11. The losses on the rebels’ side were three killed and seven wounded, all from the Battalion of Territorial Militia.

Lukban heaped praise on the deportment of one of his men, a native of Oras, who boldly dashed through the American line, killing seven

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of the enemy before he was killed. The Americans who were besieged in Gandara escaped at night to their main headquarters in Calbayog.

Terrified, the Americans had to withdraw several of the detachments at Tauiraro, Matuginao, Calbiga and Loquilocon.10 On his return to Matuginao, Guevarra reported that he had repulsed the enemy numbering 150 who had attempted to take the garrison. The Americans accordingly lost more than 50, including one captain and a lieutenant and an infantry lieutenant, while his forces lost 2 soldiers and six bolomen.11 Rebel headquarters at Matuginao Lukban and his leaders finally decided on Matuginao as their center of operations as it was in a mountainous terrain and closer to food supplies. Here they set up their makeshift arsenal that fabricated ammunition and cartridges. Once more, they used shells made of galvanized iron from the roof of churches and convents that were burned. Here they received contributions from all over the province like palay, rice, provisions of all kinds, including meat, salted and fresh, canned goods, wine and money – all of these voluntary. Up to the last week of March, they had collected 3,250 pesos, more than half of which they sent to the national treasury, and the remainder to meet the expenses of his soldiers and their arsenal. But his soldiers refused their salaries. 12 Once more in his solitary moments, Lukban issued his proclamations, and his lessons in guerrilla warfare directed to his troops, and unleashed a barrage of counter arguments against American propaganda. Like the Americans, he understood that he was not just waging tactical battles but that the war for the hearts and minds of the residents of Samar was just a crucial for the ultimate victory.

He divided the province into 6 districts. At the head of each district was a sub-delegate to manage the administrative and military affairs.

Initially, Lukban would not divulge the identity of these men, but these were supposed to be “worthy men, who do not abuse, but work well and are active.� This way, each district commander could conduct his own operations against the enemy independent of the other districts. The overall command was still Lukban.13 But later, he announced that Col. Narciso Abuke was assigned as area commander for northern Samar, Col. Claro Guevara western Samar, and Capt. Eugenio Daza for south eastern Samar.14 His lessons on guerrilla warfare continued in his circulars to his men in the field. He wrote:

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A system of guerrilla warfare should be pursued in groups or sections of 20-25 or less members to harass the enemy and not letting him rest.

Do not fire until you are 40-50 meters, so that you will not miss and the bullets will find their target.

Soldiers in battle must not kneel or lie down on the ground because Americans aim very low. It being a well-known fact that many of our men have died from bullets in the head or chest, while if they stood up, the bullets would pass or hit them in the leg, feet or thighs, which wounds are not mortal or serious.

Take into consideration the topography.

Have large stores of munitions in the mountains, taking into consideration the fact that this war is to be prolonged for a long period, until America or its government grants us our longed-for independence, and our victory lies in the prolongation of the war. 15 Lukban did not miss the opportunity to take a swipe at the declarations of the Americans as they tried to explain their presence in Samar. In a letter addressed to the local presidentes issued on March 17 that year, he answered the edicts and pronouncements issued by his enemies point by point.

According to the Americans, they came to the islands of Leyte and Samar “for the sole purpose of opening all ports and in this way allow commerce to go on as before; they have not come to oppress the inhabitants but to aid and protect them in their lives and property.”

Lukban’s answer: “They established their own government, dictate reforms and collect taxes. Why rob, why sack, why rape, to say nothing of the innumerable abuses committed in the towns they have occupied? In one year, Samar was able to create arsenals producing ammunitions and cartridges with no better equipment than old sewing machines.”

The Americans said they would “not interfere with the religious practices or beliefs of the people.”

Lukban answered: “Why profane images of saints and temples? Why rob and sack sacred edifices? In Gandara, they made kindling wood of the saints they found in the church, and made the church their sleeping place. On the following morning when they left, the church was a veritable privy, and it sickens me to think of it. While sacking in Catbalogan, they took an image of the Virgin Mary which they found and stripped it of its clothes and its gold and silver ornaments and then threw it to the water. In Paranas, they went inside the church when the priest was celebrating the mass and created a disturbance.”

The Americans declared: “Every man who seeks his own welfare will

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return to his home where he will be safe and where the Americans will protect him.”

Lukban replied: “How can the natives return to their homes when they are abused while there with all manner of brutalities?”

Moreover, the Americans had imposed strict regulations in towns that they garrisoned. Curfew was strictly imposed. This was accordingly “to secure peace to the inhabitants of the towns” they occupied. From 8:00 in the evening, no one was allowed to walk in the streets after 8:15 without proper authority. Otherwise, they would be arrested and brought before the commanding officer for questioning. Lukban condemned the practice harshly.16 More small victories Meanwhile, Lukban’s troops continued to score small tactical victories in their areas of operations. In Tiabong on March 24, some troops under a lieutenant attacked the American detachment at Capatagan, a village of Tiabong, armed only with bolos. They killed one officer and two soldiers, seriously wounded five others, and captured some rifles and the revolver of the officer. But four of them were wounded, three of them taken prisoners.17 On the morning of the 29th, a steamer loaded with American troops anchored off Borongan but withdrew after an attempt to land when they saw the hostile attitude of the people. The inhabitants lined the beach, ready to repel them.18 This happened also on March 29. It had become a usual practice of American troopers to disembark from their boats so they could burn and sack coastal settlements. But in Pambujan, the Americans met their misfortune when the natives made numerous pits and set pointed canes, steeped in poison, in the bottom of traps (balatic). When some 150 troops disembarked, many of them fell into those pits, and the rest were reportedly so frightened that they fled to their ships. “The defense made by that town greatly demoralized and terrified the enemy,” said Lukban.19 On the 30th, American troops tried to advance towards San Jose, but they were repulsed by the forces of Lukban. One of them was killed and another one seriously wounded. The rebels also captured a rifle and some ammunition and also some provisions consisting of canned goods and hams. Later the enemy retreated in disorder, and the rebel troops captured four wounded natives who served as spies.20 In his circular, Lukban urged his men to “continue to play tricks on the enemy, be constant in war, and continue to plant rice. Thus can the weak fight the strong. All men and women that cannot serve should go into the interior

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and cultivate rice and other edible plants and attend to the maintenance of those who are fighting in the town and in the center.”21 Due to the harassment of his troops, the American Maj. Allen returned defeated to Tacloban, Lukban reported. Towards the end of March, Samar was under a colonel of the regular army. They had abandoned Sorsogon, Masbate and Surigao to concentrate in Samar.

Thus, Lukban requested Aguinaldo’s supreme military command to order the military commanders of said provinces to contract their respective operations in order to prevent reinforcements. He said his intention was to assist them after he had expelled the Americans from Samar. If they did not contract their operations, they would become the principal target (tanguero) and they would never be able to assist each other.

But Lukban’s biggest tactical victory for that year was yet to come – soon.

Endnotes 1 J. C. Gilmore, Jr., Major, Forty-third Infantry, USV, Commanding Second Battalion. Hqs. Second Battalion , Report of the War Commission 1900 2 Ibid 3 Ibid 4 Exhibit 1333, PIR 1197.5 5 Ibid 6 Op. cit., J. C. Gilmore, Jr. 7 Ibid 8 Ibid 9 Ibid 10 Exhibit 1326, p.657 11 Ibid 12 Exhibit 1326, p. 658 13 Exhibit 1326, p.660 14 PIR 1242.3 15 Taylor, pp. 631-632 16 Exhibit 1324, p. 638-642 17 Exhibit 1326, P 643 18 Ibid 19 Exhibit 1325, p. 642 20 Ibid 21 Ibid

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Chapter 4

War in Catubig

O

ne remarkable feature about this war in Catubig was the involvement of the native population. From the stories gathered from documented as well as oral sources, it was evident that it was the local leaders who took the initiative in its planning and execution, although the guerrillas of Lukban provided assistance.

Catubig used to be a small town some 18 kilometers from the mouth of the deep, navigable Catubig River that empties into Lake Lao-ang in the northern section of the island of Samar. Further inland, in the upper source of the river was another village called Las Navas. Before the last two decades of the Spanish rule in the Philippines, Las Navas was in fact the seat of municipal government in the Catubig Valley.

However, toward the close of the 19th century, Kagninipa (now Catubig) started to outgrow Las Navas. Its strategic location probably explains this best. Kagninipa was located right at the stretches of wide agricultural lands in the vortex of the rich rice-growing Catubig Valley, reputedly the rice granary of Samar. So the ecclesiastical authorities built a strong stone church in Kagninipa in 1886. This edifice was stronger in construction and larger in size than the Church in Las Navas.

Early in February 1900, some Americans started coming in trickles posing as private surveyors. The local church authorities were perceptively more friendly with the visitors than they were with the natives. But the “visitors” were also trying their best to be friendly with the natives.

Then one day the “surveyors” started to wear military uniforms, and men arrived ferried by a gunboat, confirming the suspicions of local leaders. The priest had left for his safety as the Americans used the convent as a garrison. The soldiers belonged to Company H, 43rd Volunteer Infantry Regiment of the U.S. Army. To the Americans, the occupation of Catubig was important because the town served as the rice granary of the district, which supplied food to the forces of Lukban.

It meant denying the rebels such a supply.

This alarmed the local leaders. Soon they were meeting secretly.

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Francisco Fincalero, one of the big land owners of Catubig at that time, told his tenants that if the Americans commandeered his harvest, they were to resist. Homobono Joli-Joli, a young man from Las Navas, forgot the past rivalry of Las Navas and Kagninipa and volunteered with 25 men, with himself at the head, to join the militia. Domingo Rebadulla, the acknowledged leader of Catubig at the time, commanded the militia.

He was assisted by Juan Alaras and Probo Plagata, men who later also became municipal mayors of Catubig. The people responded quickly. A 300-man strong, fighting force was raised.

Catubig’s well-off families like the Orsolinos, the Tafallas, the Mercaders, the Tentativas, the Turbanadas, donated their mausers and revolvers. Local blacksmiths worked overnight to make paltiks (locally manufactured guns) and ba-ids (Samar’s counterpart of the Samurai blade).

Aware that the local militia were not trained to fight, Rebadulla sent a three-man party (actually boy couriers) to Lukban’s headquarters to get help. The group was led by his 14-year-old son Pedro. Lukban responded by dispatching one of his able deputies, Col. Enrique Villareal Dagujob, a college-educated native from Bicol. He was to check the terrain of the possible battleground and to give secret military instructions to the militia. With Dagujob was a chemist from Lukban’s arsenal, who was to make sure that they had adequate and steady supply of gun powder to recycle used cartridges. Lukban also reassured the boys that when fighting broke out, he would immediately reinforce the local militia with 500 regulars.

Dagujob arrived a few days later incognito. He found the morale of the town’s leadership and the fighting men unusually high. Leaving specific instructions on what to do when fighting started, Dagujob returned to Blanca Aurora, in the highlands of the Gandara Valley, the headquarters of General Lukban. From Dagujob’s report, Lukban could sense that the fighting would start soon. So he sent Dagujob back to Catubig with a 600-man raiding party armed with rifles and their sharpened ba-ids.

Lukban was right. The battle of Catubig had begun. The local leaders were informed that the steamer Tonyik, which ferried men and supplies to Catubig, was nowhere to be found in Lao-ang, the nearest port. It was in Calbayog, the west side of the island. This meant that if Catubig was to be reinforced, it would take at least three days. Hence, the timing was just perfect to start the shooting. It was Sunday, the 15th of April.

The longshoremen were piling abaca bale after bale in the street, ready as they appeared to be, for loading to a double-mast parao moored at the pier close by where the American steamer had also been

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anchored. The large out-triggered vessel was unloading earthen wares (pots, jars, etc.), but mostly 20-liter kerosene cans. The kerosene cans were, in the normal course of trade, being readied for delivery to consignees in town. But today, they would have other uses.

The belfry boys got their instructions the night before. Usually they rang one bell for the customary ringing at 6:00 A.M. on a Sunday of ordinary time. But today they were to stay put and wait for a small-arm gunfire, at which instance they were to ring in full blast all three bells, including the giant de ruida. This de ruida bell was rung only on solemn occasions, such as the arrival of dignitaries, or at the inception and completion of a High Mass during town fiestas, or in cases of calamities such as fires beyond control.

Rebadulla however objected to the small-arm gunfire, for it could in fact mean hostilities. Instead, he ordered the dropping on the concrete street of an empty kerosene can to produce the loud, sharp decibels.

That was supposed to mean that the American garrison did not accept the town leaders’ demand to surrender with their guns and military wares and to vacate the convent and the church premises.

At about 7:00 A.M., just before the Americans started their daily morning drills, a courier was dispatched by the town capitan to hand in an envelope to the doorman at the rectory containing the demand. As expected, the garrison turned the demand down. A thumb-down signal from the courier as he emerged from the rectory caused the fall of an empty kerosene can from a husky longshoreman while he was stacking kerosene cans not far from the town square. That sudden fall was the signal that the belfry boys were awaiting. A few bell rings sent the token force of militiamen at the rear of the convent firing to decoy the Americans in that direction. Then the shooting war began. 1 “The garrison was alarmed by shots coming from the rear of the church on the left side of the barracks. The men immediately prepared to resist the attack.

Almost at the same time a heavy fire was opened on them from the hills on the right and left, and also from every available part of the town which could be utilized by the insurgents,” said a report by Capt. Dey, who commanded the detachment. 2 The bells of Catubig, especially the giant de ruida that day, kept spinning in crescendo, as the other two bells were tolling unusually fast. All able-bodied men ran toward the convent even without orders and volunteered to fight. But unarmed, they instead ended up rolling the hemp bales around the convent to serve as shields to the militiamen.

But the Americans were shooting too and in higher volume of fire. After all, they had better guns. Their bullets were proportionately taking higher tolls than those of the native militia.3

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In the report of Capt. Dey, he wrote that the fire was kept up all day long, but the garrison met and returned the fire. “Several insurgents were killed or wounded, the garrison remaining intact. All during the night the firing was kept up, but not quite so heavy as during the day,” he said.

The firing resumed early Monday morning and “as each hour went by became more general,” said Dey. At 8:00, the rebels started using a cannon planted on the hill to the right of the barracks, using cut nails and spikes for projectiles. To neutralize this, Sergeant George, who commanded the garrison, ordered all the fire from the barracks to be concentrated on this cannon. After two volleys, the cannon stopped. But heavy rifle firing was kept up all day and until about 12 p. m., when it lessened up until daylight the next day.

On Tuesday morning, the firing resumed – from the front and across the river, from the cannon which had been transferred to a new position during the night. Again a few well-directed shots from the besieged garrison temporarily silenced it. Up to that time, only one of the Americans was wounded. It was accordingly the rebels who suffered more losses, some from their position in trees, others from trying to charge the barracks.

About this time a large number of insurgents had managed to make their way into the church adjoining the barracks. They caused a lot of trouble and so had to be silenced. Sgt. George called for ten men to charge the church and drive them out. The men immediately responded, and under a heavy fire from all sides they succeeded in getting in, and, finding nearly 100 insurgents there, immediately poured several volleys into them, killing a great number.

By this time all the firing was concentrated on the church, and Sergeant George, finding that to remain longer would be fatal to his little band, retreated back to the barracks. Not a man was lost here, said Dey in his report. “The firing became so heavy and the terrible strain on the men so great from their long and continuous fighting that it required them to put forth their greatest efforts to meet this heavy fire,” he wrote.

Later the insurgents managed to regain the church, and from the windows made several unsuccessful efforts to set fire to the barracks.

Finally they managed to throw some hemp saturated with oil against the building, and succeeded in setting fire to it – which proved too hot for the American troops. There and then, they decided to make a dash for the river and attempt to get across, hoping to entrench themselves on the opposite shore.4 They destroyed everything which would be of value to the insurgents, divided the ammunition between them, cut a hole in the floor and dropped through one at a time to the basement below. When

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all of them had gotten through they made a rush for the river.5 But when they did, they were forced to negotiate their way through the towering inferno of abaca bales, earlier set to fire by the militia, then through their ba-ids and guns. Fifteen of the 36 Americans believed to be in the garrison tried to flee to safety, and 15 were burnt alive, cut down by militia fires, or hacked to their bloody deaths. 6 Corporal Carson, with his remaining 15 men, immediately started to build a trench at the back of the convent, using their bayonets to dig with. The rest of the men attempted to cross the river in a boat, but were all killed while getting in the boat. For two days Carson and his squad held this trench, fighting all the time against great odds, and having 2 men killed and 3 wounded until he was finally rescued on Thursday morning by Lieutenant Sweeney and his detachment. 7 Reinforcement arrives Then early on the third day of the siege, the 600 men promised

by Lukban arrived. Informants also told his officers that an American reinforcement was coming up the Catubig river from Lao-ang. But the steamer Tonyik arrived on the fourth day, the 19th. This gave Lukban’s troops time to prepare an ambush on the river.

The officers in the steamer probably sensed disaster because it was trapped from two open sides of the Catubig River by militiamen in their dugouts. The steamer Tonyik suddenly pulled out, but it was chased by the militiamen and by some of Lukban’s troops who captured two motorized smaller American boats.

Some two kilometers down the river, downstream toward Lao-ang, the steamer ran out of control due to heavy fire by some Lukban men who posted a sentry at the Irawahan tributary river to the left of the main river. The steamer’s crew were so scared because the combined forces of the local militia and Lukban’s troops were chasing them in the main river. The ill-fated Tonyik hit the sharply curving rocky edge of the Catubig River at a hillside called Kalirukan.8 It suddenly capsized and seven soldiers went down their watery graves. 9 Rescue Lt. Sweeney that morning had embarked at Laguan on the same day, en route to Catubig on board the steamer Loo Aug, to assume command of the garrison. With him were two corporals and 15 privates. At about a mile from Catubig, the captain of the boat had to stop because the river was blocked with trees lashed together. To proceed farther would

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surely damage the steamer.

Sweeney’s men gathered all available axes, lowering the small boats, and landed a corporal and four men on each side of the river to stand guard while he took the remainder of the men to the blockade, which they destroyed after much effort. A tree 100 feet high, bordering on the river bank, was cut at the base, so that a strong pull on the ropes that were tied near the top and stretched across the river to the other bank would have formed a second blockade almost as complete as the first. The soldiers cut and destroyed the ropes, freeing themselves of the blockade.

His men found four nipa huts at the river bank which were reportedly used a temporary barracks by Lukban’s men. Inside were over 100 pounds of fresh beef, which he ordered to be thrown in the river, and 150 pounds of rice, which they confiscated. Then they burned the houses, and proceeded down the river in the direction of Catubig.

A quarter of a mile away, they could hear the firing in the beleaguered town. So he ordered the boat captain to proceed full steam ahead, until they run into a hail of bullets from the mausers of the rebels coming from all directions. They returned fire. The small boats were lowered after calling to the men to locate their positions, as the barracks and many of houses were in flames.

Despite the constant fire, Sweeney did not hesitate to land with his men, leaving three of them in the steamer. But before everyone got into the boats, two of his men were hit, and they had to be put back into the steamer. The rest fortunately made the landing and were able to save the men trapped in their trenches at the back of the convent. “We could have taken a position in the grass, where we could not be seen, but by doing so we could not command a view of the enemy’s movements, “ Sweeney reported.10 He had to send two men to bury two of the dead in the trenches, while some acted as guards as the firing from the rebels’ side continued.

As soon as Sweeney was able to bring the survivors, including the wounded, on the boats, they boarded the steamer. There were dead insurgents on the streets and two floated down the river. He estimated 200 dead on the rebels’ side.

From the steamer, Sweeney could see that the town was fortified at every turn, particularly along the river front, where the rebels had accordingly used bags of rice, dirt and hemp for breastworks. At the place where they were earlier blockaded, the rebels had placed another blockade made of long bamboo strips and canes, attached to the highest tree, expecting that the smokestack of the steamer would pull it down on them, but the rope was poorly tied and so was easily removed. Sweeney and the American survivors made it to safety. 11

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The rebels estimated their own dead to have reached 150 due to their exposed position when attacking the well-defended rectory which served as the American garrison. The Americans declared their own casualties to number only 22 - 19 dead and 3 wounded. But Lukban’s forces believed 31 American lives perished here, including the ones who died when the steamer Tonyik capsized. They also lost a large amount of ordnance stores, quartermaster and commissary supplies, said Dey. Carson, later awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor, openly admitted that the Battle of Catubig was a total defeat for the American forces.12 The New York Times on the other hand called the battle of Catubig, “horrifying”.

The Evening Telegram of New York on its June 8, 1900 issue said “perhaps the most thrilling and picturesque incident of the entire Philippine war occurred at Catubig. on the Island or Samar where on April 15, thirty-one enlisted men of Company II, Forty-third -Infantry Volunteers, held at bay a force of six hundred Insurgents.”

The Los Angeles Herald on its May 17, 1900 issue claimed “it was the heaviest loss of life the American army has sustained in any one engagement in the Philippines.”

About three weeks later, on May 8, Gilmore would return with 100 men to Catubig to see how things were going. He noted the entrenchments along the river, and at one place the river was blockaded by a rope made of twisted vines. At another site, a second barricade had been started but it was not enough to prevent navigation. At still another place, several barotos were loaded with stones to block the river.

Catubig was accordingly occupied by rebel forces, but they would not engage and fled on his approach.

He said they had done an immense work in the town since the battle on April 15, having thoroughly policed it. His troops found one cannon in the street. Following their usual practice, Gilmore ordered the town burned and all rice and palay that were found in the houses near the river destroyed. Near the end of his report, Gilmore declared: ”The palay crop has just been harvested, and as a result of having lots to eat and so few troops to contend with, the entire north and east coasts of Samar are in rebellion.” 13 Months later, Lukban formally issued a statement, congratulating the people of Catubig for their victory. He said he entered the incident in the book of operations “so that it may be published in the foreign newspapers and in the pages of our history.”

Lukban noted the use of indigenous poison on mantraps and spears as well as the arrows that rained on the ill-fated Tonyik, causing it to be

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smashed against a rocky portion of the river and eventually sink.14 Punitive measures The major defeat of American forces in Catubig, the first that they suffered in this part of the country, the continued harassment of their troops by the ever-present rebels in the country surrounding the towns, plus the indications that Lukban was getting reinforcements in arms and personnel from Luzon – these were factors that caused the American sub-district commander Maj. Henry Allen to change his strategy and responses to the threats.

His first act was to withdraw the detachment commanded by Capt.

Dey from Catarman which had been depleted to 70. “This will relieve the pressure on both companies and at the same time put the Laoang garrison in position to make bold and forceful reconnaissance whenever it sees lit anywhere along the north coast,” said Allen.15 “Since landing on Samar, it has been my policy to detach not less than a company as a garrison unless easily accessible to reinforcements. I am now persuaded that here (where there are no roads) it is even better to have garrisons larger rather than smaller than that mentioned. In my opinion it is best to occupy comparatively few posts, do it well, so that the effect of example may be thoroughly felt, and be prepared to send out at any time strong detachments wherever any disaffection be reported,” Allen stated.16 Then he instructed Gilmore to undertake punitive actions in Catubig and in the vicinity of Catarman to give the people stern lessons about supporting the rebel forces. Since they could not pursue the rebels without getting killed in the process or falling into their devious traps, it was the native population that bore the brunt of such lessons. ”There is no limit to the cruelties that the insurgents have practiced upon those whom they considered friendly to the American Government; they have spared neither women nor children. Hence, they had to be punished,” declared Allen. 17 Allen also conducted his own propaganda campaign in bid to win the hearts and minds of the populace, starting with the refutation of Lukban’s proclamations which he said, were “believed by a number of these ignorant people.” In an assembly of people in Calbayog, 77 persons signed a protest citing the methods of Lukban and his followers. This was going to be circulated to other large towns for their endorsement, and would hopefully “have the advantage of determining the status of many influential natives, who are now wavering in their allegiance.”18 In Catbalogan, the local officials appointed by the Americans also held a meeting on April 25, to discuss the means that would suppress the insurrection and restore the tranquility of the island for the sake of

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the industry and commerce.

Major Allen said he could do no less “than protest against the savage and barbarous act of burning houses and carrying off and killing the helpless, as directly opposed to morality and civilization, and in a great measure destructive of the political states and conducive to retrogression and odious savagery and barbarism...These acts are committed almost daily by seditious bands under pretext of defending their country and securing their independence. They march through the mountains committing almost every class of crime.”19 Thenceforth, Allen ordered the “vigorous prevention of the sale and importation of rice and other articles of first necessity in all towns that have not submitted.” To implement this, he urged them to exercise “excessive vigilance” to prevent the sending of food to towns that have not submitted them to American rule. He placed detachments of 80 to 100 men in towns along the coasts and the interior. Evidently, this was to put pressure on the native population so that the rebel forces would be denied support, essentially food items.

To show his loyalty to the Americans, the jefe local of Calbayog offered Major Gilmore 100 bolomen to accompany an expedition to Oquendo, “proving that a change for the better is beginning in that locality.”

In the east coast at Borongan, a native company was likewise organized as Allen had recommended, and a boat placed at his disposal.

“Further loss on this island would be insignificant, and the insurgent bands will find their avenues of supply cut off on all sides,” he wrote. Since harvest was just beginning, Allen advised to send troops there at the soonest to prevent the rebels from getting their food. 20 But none of Allen’s changes of strategy seemed to work as subsequent events would show. Lukban’s forces continued marauding the countryside around major as well as smaller towns, indicating that they were alive and well in their rebellious enterprise.

Endnotes 1 Doroquez , Quintin L., “The Battle of Catubig”, August 26, 2006, http:// gugma.samarnews.net/articles/article29.htm 2 “Report of an Engagement with Insurgents at Catubig, Island of Samar, April 15 to 19, 1900,” By Capt. H. M. Dey, Forty-Third Infantry, U.S.V. 3 Op. Cit., Doroquez 4 Op. Cit., Dey 5 Ibid 6 Op. Cit., Doroquez 7 Op. Cit., Dey 8 A local term for maelstrom because the water in that segment of the river is

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violent during high floods 9 Op. Cit., Doroquez 10 Report of First Lieut. J. T. Sweeney to Capt. H. M. Dey, Forty-third Infantry, U.S.V., “Report of the War Commission 1900”) 11 Op. Cit., Sweeney 12 The citation for the award on Carson was: “Assuming command of a detachment of the company which had survived an overwhelming attack of the enemy, and by his bravery and untiring effort and the exercise of good judgment in the handling of his men successfully withstood for 2 days the attacks of a large force of the enemy, thereby saving the lives of the survivors and protecting the wounded until relief came.”

13 Op. Cit., Gilmore 14 Exhibit 1329, p 647 15 Allen, Maj. Henry T., Report of Operations of the Island of Samar, April 16 to April 30, 1900, Forty-Third U.S.V. Infantry, Commanding District of Samar, “Report of War Commission 1900” 16 Ibid 17 Ibid 18 Ibid 19 Ibid 20 Ibid

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Chapter 5

The rebellion grows

F

rom the reports of the American officers in the field, there were strong indications that the rebellion that they desperately wanted to suppress was instead growing and continued to harass their troops in their detachments. Between April 28 to May 17 of that year, their reports were full of encounters or near encounters with rebel troops that patrolled just outside their garrisons. For instance, Capt. Dey’s company at Laguan had been so depleted that Capt. Cooke’s company at Catarman had to be pulled out to reinforce Laguan which had been reduced “because many had been killed or wounded.” Already Gilmore had sent 20 men to Laguan.

Warner, Barnes & Co. likewise had to evacuate Catarman, along with their bales of hemp, four schooners and a tug. Cooke had been told to stay put in Catarman until the hemp was moved to safer places. San Miguel, which was close to La Granja, was said to be the headquarters of the rebels in the area. Lt. Seaman was ordered on his return trip to Calbayog to drive out the rebels there.

Attack on Catarman But even before the detachment at Catarman could move out, the rebels launched an attack on the night of April 30. In the estimate of Cooke, the rebels numbered around 500 to 600, with 100 of them bearing rifles, while the rest were armed with those deadly ba-ids (sharpened long bolos). However, with the trenches they dug, he thought there were many more. On the night of April 30 till the next day, they had dug over 400 yards of trenches, averaging 4 feet deep and 2 feet wide, with nothing but bolos to break the ground and coconut shells to throw out the earth. Cooke withdrew all his sentinels into the convent that was used as their headquarters, and decided to wait until daylight. Sporadic firing could be heard all night.

At daybreak, they discovered trenches built on three sides of the barracks. On the fourth side which had not been dug, the beach could be

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reached passing through a dense underbrush. Afterwards, they found that this path was full of mantraps. The rebels did that on purpose. In the ensuing battle against the rebel forces, Cooke claimed he had succeeded in driving them out, killing 154 of them before the day was over. On the part of the soldiers, they had only one wounded, a private. He thought there could have been more than 200 casualties on the rebels’ side.

Warner, Barnes & Co. had in the meantime gotten out all their hemp and had also loaded in the launches the Chinamen and their goods.

They took all their troops on the Loo Aug, the San Bernardino and the four launches on their return to Calbayog. As they left, a number of insurgents were seen on the beach.

Encounter at Pambujan From Laguan, Gilmore sailed for Pambujan with 100 troops. The town was just along the coast of the northern tip of Samar. A mile away from Laguan, they found shacks occupied by rebels, evidently an outpost. Four miles from Laguan was a river about 60 meters wide, spanned by a good bridge. But 30 feet of the center of this bridge was removed, delaying the march of their column by an hour. Two more similar bridges had to be crossed before reaching Pambujan. Luckily for Gilmore and his men, the bridges were intact.

As they reached the town, no one was in sight. But at the outskirts, they came upon two boys whom they interrogated. From another house, four or five men ran out. One of them they shot at, wounding him. But he succeeded in getting away. In that house, they found an American flag the town had brought some time before. It was being used on the bed.

While the troops rested from the heat of the sun, the captured boys told them that there were no large bands of rebels for a week, when a party of 50 passed from Catubig to Catarman. Pambujan seemed to be deserted, and all the stores were looted. But several rebels could be seen prowling around across the river while they rested. Then they returned on their tracks.

Three miles away, their advance party fired upon two insurgents, killing one and wounding the other. They later learned that these were scouts sent by the main body of rebels nearby. At the first bridge which was partly destroyed, they saw a man hiding in the bush and fired on him. There was a number on the right side of the road which they fired upon too. On each side, they discovered that bolomen were waiting to hack them when they came close by.

Gilmore took a small party and went into the bush at a site where

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they saw blood on the ground, showing that a number had been hit.

At some distance away, they found one dead rebel. But they found the bush too thick to penetrate.

“The greatest care had to be taken in hunting for the bolomen, who were concealed in the high grass along the roadside. They would not move until a soldier was about to step upon them, when they would jump up and attack most fiercely,” wrote Gilmore. In the skirmish on that road, he reported that 12 rebels were killed within five feet of the road, while only one of his men got a bad cut on his leg from the fearsome ba-id.

The planned ambush of the rebels did not succeed because the soldiers discovered it before it could be executed. Rebel riflemen were supposed to have been stationed across the river and to shoot them while they were fixing the bridge, so that their attention would be diverted.

The bolomen waiting at the bush were supposed to attack them from the rear. But the bolomen were discovered too soon. According to Gilmore’s report, 13 rebels were killed as a result of that fiasco.

Burning towns, wasted food In the succeeding days of May that year, Gilmore and his troops continued to lay waste on the villages and towns in the northern coast of Samar, burning them and confiscating and destroying all the rice that they came upon, in order to deny support to the rebel forces of Lukban.

In return, they only earned the ire of the native population, stoking the smouldering fires of rebellion in the countryside.

His trip to Palapag with 75 troops on May 12 was uneventful. But at San Miguel, a village some distance from La Granja, they saw a number of bolomen. The villagers deserted it as they approached. The rebels had erected a new barracks and had three or four houses where they stored rice and palay. Gilmore counted 30 to 40 houses in the village. These he ordered burned with all the palay and rice. Two more villages nearby were similarly destroyed.

All the three villages were said to be full of insurgents. A number of the dead at Catarman were recognized as natives from there. Such villages, they learned, served as stopovers for people coming over from Luzon. At Laguan which now served as a principal garrison in the area, many of the soldiers were suffering from diarrhea and ulcerated feet caused by lack of socks. Since the arrival of the American battalion in the island, it had been accordingly impossible to get socks despite repeated requests.

“I consider that the present situation on this island is rather serious. The whole north and east coasts are in rebellion, and as the palay crop has just been

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harvested in the north, the insurgents are in no need of food,” said Gilmore in his report. He said the insurgency would end if more troops were deployed. With few troops, natives friendly to the Americans dared not say so for fear of being killed, he said.

At the end of his report, he requested for a small gunboat to patrol the northern coast of the island to intercept rebel forces that come from Luzon in support of Lukban. The boat could also be used up the Catubig river, and its “moral effect would be tremendous.” At this time, the Americans had to commandeer commercial ships that happened to be in the harbour at a time when needed. He noted that there were many large rivers in that section of the island that made travel on foot impractical. “By the time any large force succeeds in crossing, the enemy has escaped to the hills…With a boat the force could be carried up several of these rivers or landed at points along the coast, where effective work could be done before notice got around that troops were there,” he said.1 Rebels surround major towns Back in Calbayog, where the Americans’ major detachment was located, rebel troops could be seen on the 21st of May just outside the town. Gilmore had to dispatch Capt. Spellman with 80 men to make a reconnaissance in the direction of the village of Bato. Just a short distance from Calbayog, Spellman encountered a party of rebels armed with bolos and rifles, which prompted them to start shooting in their direction. This made them scamper away, Spellman said. He could not say if any of the rebels were killed. Near Bato, again another party of 30 rebels – with the same results.

Near Catbalogan, in Caroymon on the 25th, a considerable force of insurgents made their presence felt. Spellman sent Lt. Jones to investigate, but found the place deserted. The road between Caroymon and Calbayog was said to be full of mantraps which his men almost fell into.

The information about the presence of rebels in Sta. Margarita sent Spellman hurrying to the town with 50 men on board the gunboat Pampanga on the morning of the 25th. When they were close to the town, they bombarded it using the big guns of Pampanga. Spellman estimated that some 200 rebels were seen leaving when the bombardment began.

The next day, Capt. Fair was sent to Bato once more on a reconnaissance trip. A short distance from Calbayog, he discovered a party of insurgents digging trenches along the roads and trails. The soldiers fired upon them, killing 8 rebels. He also found a great quantity of rice which his troops destroyed. At around 8:00 that evening, the

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rebels fired on the outpost on the bridge for a number of hours. At around midnight, a small group of bolomen made a rush for the stone bridge over the canal, advancing to about 20 yards, until they were driven back.

It was extremely dark as the troops had put out all the lights, hence impossible to find out how many were able to cross the bridge. But Fair knew that some had crossed, so he decided to hold the line than to advance again to the bridge and run the risk of having some slip through to set fire to the town. At daybreak, they found two dead rebels.

They learned from an informant that 10 rebels were killed and another 20 wounded The informant also disclosed that another party led by rebel leader Abuke was scheduled to attack from the northeast, but that did not happen. Fair thought his defensive positioning at the bridge gave Abuke the scare.2 But two nights later, the rebels succeeded in burning a store at the north end of the town. So the next day, Gilmore sent Capt. Spellman to guard a party of men who were supposed to remove the palay and stores from the area. Spellman noticed that the road was full of traps, and that the bridge had all the planking removed from it. Its stringers were likewise so weakened so that any strain would cause it to give way. Spellman remained in the area for two days until all the palay, a quantity of hemp and other goods were removed. Such goods belonged to the town residents, he said.

Four days after that, on June 3, when two troopers and a native police went on a scouting trip to Caroyman, they were waylaid on the way, wounding one of the soldiers, so that one had to carry him to safety. No one was supposed to leave the town without his permission, Gilmore said. The native policeman got killed. The next day, a secret police who lived across the town was also killed.

On June 8, a bigger force of insurgents attacked from three sides, the firing lasting for about an hour before they were finally driven off.

Nobody was hurt on the American side, but a house at the east end of the town was burned. Gilmore could not get the right estimate of the number of the rebel force. But he said one was captured with his rifle and 30 rounds of ammunition. The captive was forced to tell that the force he belonged to was about 150 strong with 25 guns. There two other parties of about the same strength, the captive added. Two days after, the Americans found two dead insurgents, one in the river and the other in the marsh back of the town. A pouch containing 100 Krag cartridges was also found. Gilmore said the rebels were intending to burn the town because they left behind a number of bamboo containers filled with petroleum and rags.

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On June 12, when Gilmore sent out a party to look for beef cattle, the group encountered rebels some two miles down the road to Caroyman.

So he sent two parties out, one to assist and the other to scout around.

About three miles away from the town, in a direction different from the one to Caroyman, Gilmore’s group found insurgents strongly entrenched. A firefight ensued for half an hour. The rebels were accordingly driven off, with two of them killed. But the thickness of the trenches and their position above the hill explained their few casualties.3 Catbalogan besieged In Catbalogan, the rebel forces launched their attack on the town about an hour past midnight on the 18th of June. Spellman who commanded the American troops estimated that there must have been some 100 rifles in the group, but he could not say how many bolomen.

The first to be hit was the north side of the town. They were eventually driven off, but not before they succeeded in firing a building on the outskirts.

Then they attacked the warehouse of Warner, Barnes & Co. across the river where there was an outpost of eight men. Still they were able to drive off the rebels with the help of some men who were on the other side of the river. At the east end of the river, they were also able to scare away the insurgent group. The rebels also tried to burn the town - without success.

The insurgents kept up the harassing fire for more than three hours more, but the Americans kept themselves hidden well enough, that there were no casualties on their side. On the other hand, two dead insurgents were found, although the officers believed there could have been more wounded because of the bloodied tracks coming from the town.

The gunboat Pampanga, which arrived at Catbalogan about June 12, also assisted the Americans with its big guns trained at rebel entrenchments in the surrounding hills. These effectively silenced the latter after a few shots. In addition, Capt. Payne of the gunboat also offered his revolving cannon to be used during nightly attacks. This machine was likewise used by the Americans in Calbayog, after which the nightly attacks stopped. “Besides the killing done by the guns of the boat, the moral effect of its presence has been very great, and during its stay in the harbour, the outposts are not annoyed at night and the men get much needed rest,� said Gilmore.4 At the end of his report, Gilmore reiterated his request for troop reinforcement for Laguan at the earliest possible time. He said for over a month, the insurgents controlled the areas around the town.

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A detachment of 40 to 80 men was no longer sufficient because every time they sent out patrols, on their return, the rebel forces moved their outposts to within a mile of the town, thus preventing the population from entering or leaving the town. As result, the people went to the insurgents “out of fear.”

The insurgents “have been guilty of all kinds of cruelty to those friendly to us, such as burning them alive, cutting on parts of the body, killing them…It is impossible for me to send parties out all the time, as I have to mount a large guard to keep the town from being burned and to protect the people,” wrote Gilmore in exasperation.5 At this stage of the war, the Americans were effectively stalemated.

Their forces were confined to their garrisons, but outside these Lukban’s forces were in control, harassing them from trenches and hilltops, taunting the invaders to pursue them in the dense underbrush where mantraps baited with poisoned canes laid in wait for the unwary white soldier, and bolomen with their sharp blades were poised to strike.

To Lukban and his guerrillas, the bigger battles were still to be fought. The near absence of fire fights in the coming months was just a smokescreen. In the meantime, he had to consolidate his forces.

Endnotes 1 J. C. Gilmore, Jr., Major, Forty-third Infantry, USV, Commanding Second Battalion.

Hqs. Second Battalion , Report of the War Commission 1900 2 Ibid 3 Ibid 4 Ibid 5 Ibid

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Chapter 6

C

Consolidation

onsolidation of forces meant plugging operational weaknesses and coming up with solutions to nagging problems. One of this had to do with natives who wanted to join the revolutionary forces. There was no clear policy about it. These were Lukban’s initial issuances: Any of the enemy who wish to present themselves to me seeking protection for their lives, may do so by making use of a white flag and by previously turning over their arms to the Philippine officer in command of the nearest detachment who will authorize a trustworthy person to receive the arms at a place agreed upon; and once said delivery is made, they shall present themselves to said commanding officer who will afford them such treatment as their rank and character entitle them to, furnishing them good food and other necessaries until they are turned over to these headquarters, whereupon they will be given due protection and assistance, provided they recognize our cause as legitimate and just, as in reality it is. And they shall be entitled to continue their residence in this province after the war has ceased under the same conditions as at present.

Any Filipino soldier or person attached to our cause who sacks, robs, maltreats, or upbraids the nation of any American who presents himself to our forces and surrenders his arms, will be immediately shot to death; hence, post commanders and chiefs and officials of operations will keep a strict watch for such occurrences and will send before me all persons violating this decree.1 Lukban was strict, his penalties stiff. This decree is one such measure, describing the circumstances when one deserved to die.

The following shall be shot to death (pasado por las armas):

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All persons who shall fail to respect the life of an enemy after he shall have surrendered his arms in battle, or shall wound the personal or national dignity of the prisoners of war, which said prisoners shall be given all assistance necessary to reach my headquarters.

Those who shall go over to the enemy’s camp or shall furnish him information regarding the best plan of attack, informing him of the ground.

Those who shall serve the enemy as spies.

Those who shall rape a woman Those who shall violate the laws and proclamation of this government issued on former dates.

Those who shall fail to respect the lives and interests of foreigners, as it is the duty of every Filipino to furnish them all possible assistance to reach their destination, provided they maintain themselves neutral.

Those who shall rob or pillage the goods of any citizen, foreigner or Filipino, or forcibly enter their dwellings.2 Even if his army seemed just like a ragtag band to his enemies, revolutionary discipline had to be steeled in his men.

Lukban continued to admonish his men on the conduct of trench warfare, knowing it was an effective weapon, especially to bolomen armed with bows and arrows as well as short knives. He said that if men armed with knives closed in on the American soldiers in the jungle, the latter would not be able to use their rifles, and any advantage they had would disappear. If the Americans fled through the tropical growth, they would fall into mantraps which had been scattered through it and would be killed.3 Food production While the Americans imposed restrictions on the transport of food and other commodities in Samar, allowing only the barest minimum for people in the villages to survive, Lukban also monitored their movement within the island, setting guidelines on the traffic of goods and putting trusted men in charge over the districts. In one district, which included the pueblos of Oras and Basey, he encouraged the transport of goods.

He wrote that “in case defenceless vessels, laden with these articles, should be pursued by any of the enemy’s warships within the waters of this province, they may take refuge in any pueblo, whose inhabitants are obliged to render aid to them in the way of defense in order to avoid the loss of said articles or prevent personal misfortune.”

Should the Americans intervene, he said, the traffic was to be

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suspended but people in the pueblos should exert efforts “to expel the enemy as has been heretofore been done.”

But he always reminded people to continue planting food crops, like palay, corn, gabi, sweet potatoes and other tubers, stressing on a variety of palay that could be harvested in 100 days, so that in case of war, which will suspend traffic for an indefinite period, they will have no reason to complain because they will have something to eat. He urged the junta popular (municipal council) of any pueblo to try any person for laziness and report this to government.4 Land reform Still consistent with his program to promote food production and self-reliance, Lukban required the persons in-charge of revenues in each pueblo to make a list of all those working on their lands and to report this to the revolutionary government, countersigned by the local chief.

As for those not engaged in warfare and were likewise not involved in agriculture, they were told to look for flat parcels of land in the public forests so these could be cultivated and planted with palay. These they could possess as their own, he said.

“Those who may have worked and ploughed these lands shall be considered as owners thereof and no one can disturb their ownership or possession, which shall be applied for to this government through the respective juntas of each pueblo by the same parties concerned who may have done the ploughing, in order that they may be given provisional title pending the supreme decision,” Lukban stated in his decree, in what may have been the first attempt at land reform in the country. He ordered the local chiefs to strictly comply with his decree, requiring them to submit the names of the persons who complied with his order.5 The continuing economic blockade in both Leyte and Samar caused a sharp decline in trading, affecting the revenues of the government. As a result, Lukban could no longer remit funds to Aguinaldo as he had to use whatever collection they had for the soldiers. The prices of basic commodities also increased. Besides the two-year old blockade, Samar was invaded by a locust plague and typhoons. Money had become generally scarce, so were other resources. Lukban had to devise other means to be able to collect something for his revolutionary army. In one decree, he authorized all the pueblos to open their cockpits, charging an entrance fee of P0.50 and 10 percent additional collection on all debts.

These collections were to defray the expenses of war.6

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Reinforcements Moreover, pressure from the American camp mounted. In the last three months of 1900, they increased troop strength to 3,000 soldiers under Brig. Gen. Robert P. Hughes, accompanied by eight warships.

This gave them more latitude to expand their field operations, leave their barracks and conduct more patrols against Lukban’s forces. So the latter had to adopt more mobile strategies and redouble his operations as well. But somehow the American plans miscarried, and the plan to capture the elusive Lukban also failed.

The Americans assumed that Lukban was also being reinforced from forces coming from Luzon. But that remained unproven. Lukban divided his units into smaller squads to launch sporadic attacks on enemy troops and withdrew without engaging them and giving them a chance to fire back. They had few firearms and little inefficient ammunition. All they could do was take a few shots and scatter the Americans or taunt them to beat the jungle to find the men who shot them. This would give an opportunity to the men armed with knives to attack the soldiers pushing their way through the long grass or to fall upon them when they lost their way.

In order to encourage the towns under American rule to continue paying contributions to the guerrillas for the continuation of the war, every now and then a man was killed as a spy or as a traitor, and information was sent of this killing for the head of the town from which he came. This, of course, was a matter of common talk among the natives, and prevented a great falling off in contributions. Although Lukban had ordered the people to stop cultivating abaca, they continued to do so. When the ports of Samar were opened, a portion was collected as a contribution to the war and sold to the agents of Manila firms trading in this article. The proceeds went to either the support of the insurrection “or to the pockets of the insurrection’s leaders.” This according to the enemies of Lukban.7 Winning the middle class The greater task for Lukban was winning the hearts and minds of the native population, many of which were caught in the crossfire without a clear understanding of the conflict. Guerrilla warfare was not just shooting and hacking the enemy but also building a strong political base among the masses. Apparently, this was one weak spot in Lukban’s arsenal of guerrilla strategies. Earlier, he had expressed his frustrations with the middle class – the local illustrados, the educated class, the merchants, landowners and professionals - which had a growing

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influence on the socially lower segments of the population living in the coastal towns. He had organized the revolutionary governments following Aguinaldo’s instructions, but most of these were holdovers from the previous colonial regime.

“Most of the wealthy and middle class here sacrifice their patriotism in favor of their personal interests and wish to eat when the table is already set, that is to say, they expect us to restore them, but they always offer their lives and lands in word but not by acts…” Lukban wrote in exasperation. Evidently he found them difficult to convince to support the revolutionary cause.

But to a large extent, he depended on them to provide support to the revolution.8 A year earlier, Lukban had tried to win over the local clergy to Aglipayanism, an effort which only isolated him from the priests. After that he would blame the bishop of Cebu since the Samar then reported to the diocese of Cebu, and Luis Flores, the Cebu governor newly appointed by the Americans. Flores used to be a leader of the 1898 revolution against Spain in the island but capitulated to the Americans when the insurrection against the Americans began. Lukban did not hesitate when he lambasted the middleclass here.

“Those clerks, lawyers, writers and pettifoggers during Spanish domination who appear to be under the orders and thumb of that traitor, Luis Flores, the so-called president of Cebu, who turned over the city to the enemy without firing a shot…this gentleman was solicitor of the Audiencia in the island of Cebu. The tendency of all these men is to sow discord and friction between families; and to this is due the division of parties; all of them under the name or pretest of country, wish to feather their own nests,” he wrote.9 One of Lukban’s vocal opponents from the Samar clergy was Fr. Wenceslao Singzon, a native of Calbiga and a younger relative Fr. Pablo Singzon, vicar general of the Cebu Archdiocese under Bishop Alcocer and later appointed the Bishop of Calbayog. The younger Singzon, then a 35-year-old priest of Laoang, issued on June 26, 1901 an open letter to Lukban, telling him to submit himself to American rule since the archipelago, under the Treaty of Paris, was already a property of the United States. The letter, addressed to the leaders of Laoang, Palapag, Catubig and Pambuan, blamed Lukban for the sufferings the revolution was causing the people of Samar because of his refusal to give up.

“Who is to blame for the ruin here among us? On whom rests the responsibility and the blame before God and man? Those wiseacres

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who incite to rebellion against the real chief; those…who while they understood, yet lent a hand to such machinations and dragged in those poor innocent one; those who disseminated lying report merely to terrorize or to sustain vain hopes; who incited men to hide and wander about in roving bands in the woods, for them to be shot and wounded…..What a horrible punishment from God! May the mercy of God descend!”

He challenged Lukban: “If you like to meet the Americans to fight, only decide upon the time and place, as they will go out to fight with you.”

As a postscript, he wrote to the leaders: “Rest assured that unless you surrender to the Americans, you will have no rest; for they will continue to persecute you in these woods, with fires, with loss of your cattle and your crops.”10 Lukban met the same conflict with illustrados in Leyte when for some months he acted as the island’s politico-military governor before the arrival of Gen. Ambrosio Mojica. In the recent months, the surrender of some of his officers, who were of illustrado origins, only reinforced such a bias toward this class.

On July 12, 1900, he wrote one of his many circulars to Samar’s important citizens and political leaders, hoping they would truly understand the cause of the rebellion. This was an address to the town presidentes and other inhabitants of Samar, explaining to them the true character of the Americans. The continuous and relentless attacks by his forces on American garrisons have served to weaken them morally as well as materially. Indeed they have resorted lately to the policy of attraction in order to “retrieve their strength and destroy the Filipino nation.”11 They also made use of parleys to have personal interviews with the officers, and decrees of amnesty so that when they surrender to the Americans, they “become prisoners caught in a trap prepared by them.” Such parleys, Lukban explained, were apt to be deceptive because their real purpose was overlooked. He cautioned against being carried away as what happened to their ancestors. The Americans always tried to paint a beautiful picture of their regime, but the people and their leaders must pay close attention to their deceptive enterprise. He said there is no better future for them than liberty and independence.12 He took a swipe at the outright lies provided by his enemies to the press in Manila and the world, to paint a glorious picture of themselves

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in the battlefields of Samar. In one place where the reports said 76 rebels were killed and buried, he said they did not have casualties. In their raid on Catarman on May 5, 1900, the Americans reported that 100 insurgents were killed, when in fact only 38 lives were lost.13 But whatever his casualties may have been, he had suffered sufficiently to realize the importance of strengthening his defenses. He had already proclaimed that no quarter was to be given, and considerable ingenuity was now needed to use what resources they had.

Refuting MacArthur’s repeated calls to surrender so that they would submit to American sovereignty and authority, he said that would only be equivalent to a change from one master to another, this one more despotic and cruel. “It would be a stupid act, if not one of madness,” Lukban declared.

“Alas, you unfortunate ones! Remember how the Spaniards treated our forefathers – our immortal Makapagal, who was made a brigadier general for his bravery and ability in war, on the condition that he should submit to the Spanish flag. Yet, his sons, later on, were oppressed and ill-treated. This will happen to us under the Americans and perhaps even worse,” he said.

Lukban also severely criticized the Americans’ invitations to conferences because from the very beginning they were aware of the Filipinos’ desire for independence. “Such an appeal is a mere deceitful contrivance,” said Lukban. He added that the whole province – except for a few pro-Americans – is united and firm in their desire for independence. “The enemy is unable to overcome our strength and, by fraudulent and deceitful means, is trying to break the chain, whose links are our union and fraternity, because they know that once broken, our strength will be at an end, and without it we can never attain victory,” Lukban said.

In his closing statement, Lukban reminded them that no country in the world, which had worked out and fought for its independence, has not attained it. He said even America itself fought for 10 consecutive years, until she obtained her independence. ”Therefore the present trials through which we are passing should not discourage you, as the days of our desired aspiration, peace, tranquility and fraternity.”14 Lukban hits the Federalistas Lukban was updated on developments in the capital. He learned about the existence and purposes of the Partido Federalista which he lambasted without reservation, a political party organized by the

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Americans but consisting mainly of pro-American illustrados.

Writing on Feb. 4, 1901, he said: “It is now about two months since what is known as ‘Federal Party’ flashed its program on the Philippine people. Its object, it says is to end the present struggle. It seems to forget, however, that upon putting its seal to that document, the principal aim of which is the recognition of the sovereignty of the enemy. It not only insults both the Philippine army and the Philippine people, but also aims the most unlimited sarcasm at them. The Philippine people do not want to recognize that sovereignty because it is illegitimate, because it constitutes an odious yoke, and because it is a condition of servitude equal to, if not worse than, that which, but yesterday, they destroyed for a similar reason.

The will be under innumerable sufferings and sacrifices, pour out their generous blood, in the midst of desolation and ruin, stand heroically and firmly defending their native soil from the iniquitous ambition of the colossal invader.

“Let us indignantly reject this infamous suggestion addressed to us by a few traitors who have sold themselves who wish to lead us into an abyss of dishonour and make slaves of us.

“The organizers of that contemptible body, while pretending to seek peace, would impose upon us as a condition the forfeiture of our most sacred rights and the renunciation of that nationality which is so justly ours, which is so inalienable, and for the preservation of which any country in the world worthy of the name would sacrifice the last of her children.

“Don’t allow yourselves to be deceived by the lavish display of individual liberties so alluringly set forth in their platform; they are held out to you only as a tempting morsel, while no one guarantees that they shall be lived up to. Their brilliancy is that of a tinsel. Those who make you those promises cannot perform what they promise; they can only ask it of the American government. And the American government – it knows this and makes promises only. It seems to deal on naught save procrastinations – promises always and deeds never.

And for this very reason, these same promises reveal a profound bad faith. It promises while it sees itself at a disadvantage, while promises suit its needs. And afterwards – they promised us independence while the war with Spain was on; they continued to promise it until they could bring the necessary troops to the archipelago; but when they believed themselves strong enough, well, you remember.

“Two years ago today exactly, off went the mask, and our towns were riddled with canister. They also promised us invoking the

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Constitution, that they would not meddle with religious affairs, and there they are in Dagupan, Jaro and elsewhere, forcing us to submit to our ancient tyrants, the Friars, whom we hate and who hate us. And they would make us promise today too, in stacks as high as heaven itself, for the period of volunteer service is about to expire and within a few days they won’t have any troops. And, of course, they’ll go on promising us all sorts of things to see if they can get us to give up our arms, whereupon they would plunge us into the most despotic and brutal subjugation.

“Behold their works and their conduct up to today; at first they treated the prisoners of war well, and respected life and property; later, when they judged us weak, they began first by burning the homes of those taking part in the revolution, and, later, those of their sympathizers; then their sympathizers were taken out from time to time and secretly shot at midnight. And finally their prisoners were taken out and legally hanged until dead in the broad light of day, and upon the merest suspicion, the inhabitants of our fields and cities were tortured and sacked.

“Today, however, they do not seek any pretext for firing and sacking, for torturing and killing; today they do not seek the cover of darkness for the perpetration of their brutal outrages and repulsive crimes. Today, they also do these things for pleasure, with impunity; and all of this the government tolerates, consents to, and if there be any outcry, even orders by terror-inspiring proclamations, giving arbitrary authorities a free hand in the perpetration of their misdeeds.

The government, though it may pay but little heed to these statements, approves and assists the friars – those secular and insatiable vampires of our wealth and hangmen of our race – and carries its despotism to the extent of curbing the individual conscience and annihilating the press, which formerly enjoyed the free expression of opinion.

“Anyone can tell what their treatment of us would be later when no longer a shot is heard in defense of liberty, and we have given ourselves into their hands, submissive and undefended. But, mind you, the spirit of justice so far shown by that government and its agents in their dealings with us, both heretofore and now, is the guarantee brought forward and offered to us by the Federal Party for the realization of their platform, so pregnant with beauteous rights and future concessions. Alas, for fellows, why trouble yourselves to deliver a treasure in the hands of persons, who as everyone can see, are squandering what is within their reach.. Why, none but a simpleton, or one who is blinded by the glitter of gold and desired personal gain, could conceive so monstrous an idea! None but a spirit deep in the

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mire of treachery and villainy could have inspired such thoughts!

“And none could be found to preach them save men as preaching them now whose god is their stomach and whose motto is the requirements of their pocketbooks; whose patriotism consists in invoking the name of the Philippine islands when they wish to cry the loudest and deceive the better . who yesterday, and louder than anyone else, cried out: ‘Viva Independencia!’ when they saw the banner of the revolution triumphant; who, after egging on thousands of our comrades to the struggle, were the first, like the sycophants and cowards that they are, to shout ‘Viva the protection of America!’ and who tomorrow would cry out with equal ardour ‘Viva the sovereignty of African cannibals’ were those same cannibals to invade country with sufficient force.

“Skilful traitors these, who long to return to their former yoke and chains; creatures devoid of dignity and initiative, carried away by the chimeras and visions which send them grovelling at the feet of whomsoever happens to be their master, sweating in the repugnant filth of servility and abjection. Retrace your footsteps on my countrymen who have been unwittingly caught in this trap! Think what you are doing. Can you not see that what these Philippine disciples of Judas offer you is not peace, but rather the surrender of our liberties and our shameful subjugation? And even if they do make all these promises in their proclamations, back of which stands the invader, do you think for a moment that in practice they will be complied with?

“Yes, they shall be fulfilled when their originators want it so, and when they do not interfere with their malignant schemes and interests.

A foreign government looks only to the interests of its own, and your strongest arguments are met, and be met by the powers in Washington.

Only a national government, made up of the citizens on the country, can faithfully protect the interests of the inhabitants of that country; and this end cannot be gained by subjecting ourselves to any foreign power.”15 When the Federalistas arrived in Samar in April 1901, it was likely that people outside the six American garrisons had read Lukban’s pronouncements.

Federalistas campaign in Samar The Americans got their ablest recruits in their policy of attraction from members of the Filipino illustrados who had everything to gain with their affiliation. Two of these, Benito Legarda and Trinidad Pardo de Tavera, actually used to be with Aguinaldo in the leadership of the

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newly established Philippine government but bolted out due to some disagreements with Mabini. Both were wealthy and highly educated, with de Tavera having gone to Paris for his studies in medicine after going through the Ateneo de Manila, San Juan de Letran and the University of Sto. Tomas in Manila. His father, a Spanish lawyer and government official, descended from an aristocratic Portuguese family.

Benito Legarda on the other hand was a wealthy Manila land owner.

At the outset of the Philippine revolution, they were suspicious of the Katipunan and were willing to negotiate with either Spain or the United States. It needed but a small difference of opinion with the ideologue Apolinario Mabini for de Tavera and Legarda to bolt out of Aguinaldo’s camp and join the Americans. Subsequently, they worked closely with the Schurman and Taft commissions, advocating acceptance of United States rule.

In December 1900, de Tavera and Legarda established the Partido Federalista, advocating statehood for the islands. In the following year they were appointed the first Filipino members of the Philippine Commission of the legislature. In that advantageous position, they were able to bring influence to bear to achieve the appointment of Federalistas to provincial governorships, the Supreme Court, and top positions in the civil service. Although the party boasted a membership of 200,000

by May 1901, its proposal to make the islands a state of the United States had limited appeal, both in the islands and in the United States, and the party was widely regarded as being opportunistic.16 The two party stalwarts rode on their influence to expand party membership and exhort peace especially in areas still contested by rebels. On April 5, 1901, Pardo de Tavera arrived in Samar under American protection, the perfect spokesman for American propaganda on a mission to convert more of their kind. These became some of Lukban’s fiercest enemy for they tended to propagate pro-American views and suppress calls for independence.

With de Tavera were Commissioners Worcester, Ide and Moses.

Representing Samar towns were Don Victor Celis, municipal president of Catbalogan; Don Andres Reyes, president Federal party; Hermogenes Zieta and principales of the pueblo of Zumarraga; the local president and principales of the pueblo of Santo Nino; Don Esteban Figueroa, municipal president of the pueblo of Calbiga; Don Pablo Benjamin, president Federal party; Don Ceferino Latorre, municipal president, and the principales of the pueblo of Villareal; Señor Juares, municipal president of the pueblo of Santa Rita; and the president of the municipality and of the Federal party and the principales of the pueblo of Calbayog,.

In addition, a large representation from the town of Catbalogan was

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present. Of the 40 municipalities of Samar, only seven were represented.

In the speech of Pardo de Tavera, president of the Federal Party, he told his audience, who were mostly local officials, that it was futile to continue the struggle as many Filipino generals had already given up.

The insurrection had collapsed, he said. Gen. Trias, Aguinaldo’s second in command, had already surrendered and was busy making the other generals give up. Generals Geronimo, Pablo Tecson and Simon Tecson, the commanders of Zambales and Bataan, had already taken an oath under the American rule.

But De Tavera could not help himself. He had to lie. He said in the same speech that Aguinaldo was already captured, when in fact the general’s capture happened on April 19, that year. He added that Aguinaldo had taken an oath of allegiance to the American flag and had in fact issued a proclamation that “their only change of happiness is peace under American sovereignty.”

Exhorting on peace and the blessings that follow, he said Gen. Fulton of Antique had surrendered with some 200 rifles two weeks earlier. Gen. Diokno of Capiz was wounded and captured, his forces dispersed. Now he was urging his men to surrender. General Capistrano in Mindanao had also surrendered, together with 180 rifles and 80 shotguns. Nobody now remained out but a few ladrones (thieves), he said, evidently referring to Lukban.

General Delgado of Iloilo, who also gave up, was recently appointed by the Commission civil governor of Iloilo. Instead of being an insurrecto general, he was appointed a civil governor under the authority of the United States, insinuating that the same would happen in Samar if Lukban surrendered.

“The insurrection has collapsed. It is not too much to say that the great majority of the Filipino people are deeply rejoiced at the fact.

Three years of war have taught them that peace is absolutely necessary to their prosperity, and their experience with the efforts of the United States to bring about civil government and prosperity, short as it has been, has satisfied them that that is the best solution of the problem,” De Tavera said.

De Tavera then explained the nature of the municipal government and of the provincial government provided by law. It was the purpose of the Commission to establish this in the island of Samar when practicable. The question when this could be done was in the hands of the people. If they united for the purpose of bringing about an end of the insurrection, they could do so.

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The president of Catbalogan Victor Celis, however, said that it was not yet ripe to establish a provincial government for Samar because only seven municipalities were represented in the assembly. What could be done, he explained, was to organize under the municipal code those towns which had acknowledged American sovereignty. There were only six towns in the island garrisoned, and all were represented at the meeting. He thought when civil government is established, an American officer should be placed at its head. This because it will save the province its financial resources. Moreover, an American would better understand how to administer the office according to American ideas. He said the efforts made by those who desired peace to bring about an end of the struggle were without avail, and recommended that more soldiers be sent to the island and that every town be garrisoned.

Asked if the people were ready to help the Americans, he said that some of them were, and that others were only awaiting the arrival of American troops to proclaim themselves in favor of law and order.

Some discussion ensued as to whether the people were really willing to furnish the information necessary to enable American troops to accomplish results.

Andres Reyes, president of the Federal party in Samar, said the Federal party was organized in the island and already had 140 members.

He tried to dispel a rumor that the money collected by voluntary subscription among the members of the Federal party was sent to Manila and used to buy arms to fight the Americans. Because of such a rumor, many who wanted to join the party backed out. The speaker said that the rumor was being circulated by people in Catbalogan whoso names had been brought to the attention of the military authorities, but nothing had been done so far.

Reyes then presented a petition to the Commission, setting forth the obstacles which the Federal party had encountered, which he said could be proven by reference to the military commanders. He asked that reinforcements be sent to the island and divided into small parties among the different pueblos to maintain order and prevent attacks from the outside. He also asked for the organization of the towns under the municipal code.

Benedicto Sabater, a colonel under Lukban in the early days of the war, said that every possible effort to secure the surrender of those in arms had been unavailing, admitting publicly that he had given himself up to the Americans when they came. He agreed with Reyes that a civil government had to be established in the island, backed up by a strong military force “to maintain law and order.� He explained that there were enough persons capable of assuming the functions of government who

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had experience in the former regime.

Sabater also asked for schools, saying that the people were very “uncultured,” but he was later told that a complete system of education for the islands was in project and that Samar would be given a part in it when the situation warranted. He said the establishment of civil government in the islands would be a “great pacificator” and those still in the field would “receive an object lesson and they would see that the great American nation was carrying out its promises to grant civil liberties and individual rights to the people.” He believed the implanting on such a government at this time would wield such an influence that the great majority of those now in the mountains would come in. He was told that the Commission had already established a civil government in Leyte, and the people could get their lesson there.

Another pro-American who was present in the meeting, Vicente Jazmines, tried to explain that the trouble in Samar was different from that in other islands. Speaking about the revolutionists who were still in the hills, he described them as people “who had never done an honest day’s work in their lives.” He said they would not surrender and, therefore, had to be “pursued and exterminated.”

Jazmines also said “nobody could safely deal with them.” He added that the greater part of them were natives of the island, while the officers came from Luzon. But he had a good word about Lukban, saying “he was the only man among them who had any sense.” Like the other local Federalistas, he favoured the establishment of a civil government but headed by an American officer, saying the towns should be garrisoned before any civilian government was set up. Jazmines was the last spokesman for the Federalistas in that meeting.

Finally, it was the president’s (Andres Reyes) turn to address the assembly. His closing statements were final and carried authority. He said the conditions in Samar were such that the putting up of a civilian government could not be justified as yet.

“We do not desire to set up a government which will only be a government in name, reserving to the military authorities the real power. The condition of things in this island is now such that it needs the strong hand of the military to bring about the proper condition of affairs.” He added that with the rebels still in the mountains, with their spies and sympathizers in every town, it would be risky for the Commission to risk the life of putting civilian officers in the towns which are under constant threat, without giving them adequate protection. Instead, what needed to be done was to send more troops to Samar so that “the voice of the majority of the people of Samar may be given free expression.”

If there was any town that desired a government under the municipal

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code, that can be arranged so long as the petition was accompanied by the signatures of 10 citizens of that town.

The president then introduced to the audience Dr. Pardo de Tavera, the president of the Federal party, who addressed them. The session then adjourned.17 Lukban’s response Two weeks later, on April 19, Lukban assembled the representatives of the towns of the island and there formally denounced the Federal party and its ends, demanding that they should be given “liberty or death, independence or extermination.” Nothing much has been recorded of this event, but his enemies opined that he must have come up with something like a manifesto where, as usual, there were no dissenting opinions from the audience.18 In the next two months, calls to surrender were renewed in a bid to end the conflict. As in previous calls, Lukban remained steadfast in his refusal, despite the urging of some of his own people to do so.19 They assured him that the Americans could go anywhere where he could do; that their ability as marksmen had been shown by the casualties of his people, that it was useless to resist, and that the resistance would lead to the complete destruction of the property of the island. It was in vain that the men and members of the Federal party wrote that Aguinaldo had been taken, that Luzon had been pacified, and that the cessation of hostilities elsewhere would permit the concentration of a large force in Samar.

He answered that he was ready to die but not to surrender. If indeed Aguinaldo was a prisoner, he would have informed him of it.

News of the conditions in Luzon should reach him through agents of the government which he represented and not through agents of the Americans. He told them that he believed that they were lying about Luzon and Aguinaldo. It was intended to entrap him into surrendering himself.20 When Gen. Hughes assumed command of the operations in Samar, first in his agenda was Lukban’s surrender. Like the others of similar persuasion, Hughes told Lukban through emissaries that to continue fighting was futile and would only cause further suffering of combatants as well as civilians. But he soon discovered that his adversary was made of sterner stuff because even when he used Lukban’s own brother to persuade him to surrender, he did not have much luck. Instead, it seemed to even harden Lukban’s stance. Now the world’s attention was focused on Samar. The democrats back in the US drew their inspiration

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on the tenacity of the resistance in the island to renew their calls for the independence of the Philippines. This in turn further emboldened the people to offer life and property in Samar and to continue the struggle for independence.21 For one, there were sections of the American public that seemed to have been impressed by his courage and tenacity in defying the might of the American army. In July 1901, a guerrilla in Samar forwarded a letter about “the views of our brothers over there in America.”

His opponents thought that “he now felt that the eyes of the world were upon him, and he determined not to surrender, but to continue his operations.

Whatever may be thought of Lukban’s methods, he is undoubtedly a strong and capable man who had done well with his resources; but it would seem that he should have realized that the cause of Philippine independence was for the time quite dead, and that nothing he could do in Samar could revivify it.”22 In their analysis, Lukban was “one of those obstinate Asiatics who, having once decided to do a thing, find their mind close upon it and from that time – to them – what they have willed to be, is.” Meaning, Lukban was governed by his passion rather than reason. “Lukban, like some other men among the insurgents, held to independence – not ultimate, not immediate independence – with the same rigidity of will which enables a Hindu ascetic to hold his arm in one position until it withers.”23 Taking over Leyte command Indeed, on the first week of August, Lukban wrote that since Mojica, the revolutionary commander of Leyte, had surrendered, he was taking over command in Leyte. For that he sent his trusted secretary Florentino Peñaranda, a Leyteño, to take over the command in his behalf.24 In the ensuing months when the Americans occupied Samar and set up garrisons in several towns,25 support from the residents would be more difficult to obtain as the American soldiers kept a tight watch over the movements of the residents. Some of them would eventually transfer their loyalties and became Lukban’s hated “Americanistas” who supplied information to his enemies or became spies. The rest of the population who tried to remain steadfast became most vulnerable to the enemy’s enticements as well as threats.26 Unwavering But Lukban’s tenacity was shared by many locals as amply shown in several instances where residents bordered on the state of near rebellion in varying degrees of intensity and breadth. In some interior towns

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where American troops were scarce, the revolutionary government exercised absolute control as in the case of Matuginao. Its residents were mobilized to provide provisional quarters for the revolutionary government, including supplying it with its subsistence, arsenal and ammunition, constructing a town hall, church as well as a cockpit.

Residents were also required to rebuild their homes to improve the town since all the houses were reduced to ashes when the Americans tried to occupy it in December of the previous year. In a resolution drafted during the town’s assembly, all were sworn to implement it “without any excuses whatsoever.”27 On January 20, that year, Calbiga chief Feliciano Figueroa was in a fix. The people of Calbiga, a garrisoned town, were eager to rise up against the Americans comprising about 200 officers and men. He wrote Lukban’s headquarters asking if he could organize guerrillas to launch an attack. He was most likely advised against it because no uprising took place in that town.28 The commitment to the revolutionary enterprise took on other forms, in many cases requiring the people to sacrifice their homes and properties. One of the favourite tactic of Lukban to deny sanctuary to the enemy was to burn down the town they were intending to occupy, leaving them nothing but burning embers and ashes. This happened in many towns, but that June 12, 1901, the delegates, heads of barrios, wealthy residents and other private individuals of the town of Mondragon met and decided to burn their own houses, including the municipal house (tribunal) and the hamlets Maquivalo and Bugco of this district, located near the sea, to prevent the Americans from taking possession of them. At 3:00 p.m. that day, the Americans took Catarman. On the morning of the next day, the residents of Mondragon burned down their town.29 Unknown to the Americans, many local officials were loyal to the revolutionary cause even as they pretended friendship with them. One such town was Basey, where the Americans maintained a garrison starting on the 18th of June that year. They arrived with 135 men commanded by a major, assisted by a captain and 2 lieutenants. Two days later, they held an election of local officials. Joaquin Cabañas became the presidente municipal, Felice Tabongar the jefe de justicia and Agapito Punsion jefe de rentas. A day later, Cabañas wrote the revolutionary headquarters to “please tell the soldiers in the field about his true sentiments.” He said he did not recognize the American sovereignty and was still a staunch supporter of the revolutionary cause.30 In another note, local chief Juan Colinares, whose name in the underground was ‘Sergio Robles,’ awaited the instructions on how

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to deal with the newly elected officials. It seemed that Colinares did not know about the real sentiments of Cabañas, the newly elected presidente.31 But the most intriguing and deadly game of deception would be played out some three months later in Balangiga. For the first time, it was going to be garrisoned following the unwritten resolution made during the junta convened by the Federalistas in Catbalogan on April 5, that year. There it was generally agreed that more troops were needed in the different towns in order to install peace. Balangiga’s leaders had anticipated that one day, American troops would come to occupy their town, and when that happened, they had to have a clear policy on how to deal with them. In a letter written by its presidente municipal to the revolutionary headquarters, Pedro Abayan reported that they – he and the principales of the town - agreed “to observe a deceptive policy with them doing whatever they may like, and when a favorable opportunity arises, the people will strategically rise up against them.” The letter was written on May 30, 1901, about four months before the uprising took place.32 Endnotes 1 Exhibit 1331, p. 650 2 Exhibit 1332, p. 651-652, Issued at Buan, Aug 4, 1900 3 PIR 1055.6 4 Exhibit 1334, PIR 973.4, p. 660 5 Ibid, p. 662 6 Exhibit 1346, p 682 7 Op. cit.,, p. 681 8 Exhibit 1321, pp.633 9 Ibid 10 Exhibit 1354, 693 11 Ibid, 648 12 In this statement, Lukban seemed to have been prophetic: ‘The Filipino nation would have its political independence only in 1946, when the leaders had long been dead.’

13 PIR 1141.1 14 Exhibit 1330, PIR 1144.5, 649. Written in Matuginao, July 12, 1900 15 Exhibit, 1344, 675-877. Proclamations like these were usually translated from the original Spanish text into Waray, the language spoken by the natives of Samar, by the Captain-Secretary Florentino Peñaranda, a Manila-educated native of Barugo, Leyte. Here his multi-lingual skills came in handy especially to Lukban who could speak only Spanish and Tagalog.

16 [http://countrystudies.us/philippines/17.htm] 17 Report of the Philippine Commission, Secretary of War, From December

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1, 1900 to October 15, 1901, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1901, United States Philippine Commission, pp.167-172 18 Exhibit 1348 19 Ibid, p. 433 20 PIR 1241 21 PIR 1268 22 PIR 980.1 23 Ibid 24 Ibid 25 Exhibit 1357, 700-701. On Sept 3,1901, Lt. Col. Francisco Rafael reported that the Americans had established garrisons in the following areas: Catbalogan, Quiabong, Motiong, Kalanan. Calbiga, Villareal, Sta. Rita and Basey, the posts being at a distance of 1.5 hours from each other by boat.

26 PIR 980.1 27 Exhibit 1340, PIR 891.2, Matuginao, Jan 3, 1901 Letter by Basilio Diaz, local president 28 Exhibit 1341, 669 29 Exhibit 1351, 690. This report was made by the local chief of Mondragon Fausto Ngalacon.

30 Exhibit 1352, 691. The letter was signed “Patricio Amans,” the alias of Cabañas.

31 Exhibit 1353, 692 32 Exhibit 1350, 689

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Chapter 7

T

Balangiga

he men of Company C of the 9th US Infantry that arrived in the small town of Balangiga in the southern part of Samar was supposed to augment its forces in the campaign against the guerrilla bands of Gen. Lukban, one of the remaining guerrilla leaders fighting against American rule in the archipelago. To the Americans, Lukban’s defeat or surrender meant the end of a war that began in 1898 on the bridge of San Juan. In May 1901, the overall military commander General Arthur MacArthur had issued instructions to take “drastic measures” against Lukban and “to make this an emergency measure and clean up [Samar] as soon as possible.”1 Company C, which had just recently returned from fighting the Boxer Rebellion in China, anchored at dusk on August 10, 1901, the feast day of St. Lawrence Martyr. Evidently, the townsfolk were still in a festive mood. They did not see it fit to come ashore until morning when the festivities would have subsided a bit. In the words of one survivor, Pvt. Henry W. Manire, “When we drew near, the natives threw up their redbanded hats and cheered us with a boisterous welcome.”2 ‘Red-banded hats’ were not the usual getup on ordinary days, especially for a small town like Balangiga.

On the morning of the next day, officials of the town gathered at the edge of the shore, including Mayor Abayan, Police Chief Abanador, and Father Donato Guimbaolot. There was also vice-mayor Andronico Belaez, town cuadricillo Pedro Duran, Mariano Valdemor, and two leaders of the Salazar clan — Custodio and Juan.3 Another Balangiga survivor, Pvt. George Meyer, said they were prepared to meet them in small barotos (outrigger canoes) since Balangiga did not have a port then, and help them carry their supplies ashore.4 At that time, Balangiga had an estimated population of more than 1,000 unevenly dispersed in some 200 thatched nipa huts, with a village market, a church, a convent, a plaza and a tribunal. According to Manire, it was the priest who gave them the tour of the church and convent, which he granted to the commander Capt. Thomas Connell as

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his office. In front of this was a vacant lot which the occupying troops used as drill ground and right across the church compound was the municipal tribunal - a two-storey building with two rooms and a hall between, and two lower or ground rooms. The Americans used these to store their supplies for rifle ammunition and commissaries. Since the ground floor was made of stone, it was very secure. Wooden stairs led to the second storey which served as their main barracks.5

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Since not everyone could be accommodated in the tribunal, two other contingents were to be accommodated in separate houses near the plaza. The families of Belaez and Salazar gave up theirs since these were near the plaza, both visible from the tribunal and within hailing distance. These became the quarters of Sgts. Frank Breton and George Markley and their respective contingents.6 That night, the captain called a meeting of the inhabitants of the town, where the organization of a municipal police force was ordered, leaving to the discretion of the town leaders the selection and appointment of those who were to compose the police body.

The next day, August 12, a meeting was also held in the house of the presidente municipal where Valeriano Abanador, a delegate of police in the revolutionary government, was appointed chief of police with 46 municipal policemen.7 For about a month, the occupation of Balangiga went on without any untoward incident. Then Capt. Connell told the local leaders about the need to clean up the town since the surrounding jungle seemed to be creeping up to the settlement. It was necessary to clear the underbrush that was growing around, he said. The local leaders grudgingly complied and mobilized able-bodied men for the job. The results did not satisfy Connell. He saw that the people did not like what they were told to do. Then something happened that increased the growing animosity between the Americans and the native population.

The mauling incident This happened on September 21. In the account of Pedro Duran, one of the town leaders, two American soldiers, both already drunk, visited a tuba (local wine fermented from coconut) store tended by Catalina Catalogo, a native girl. They talked to her in English, and she responded by laughing, not having understood any word in that language. The soldiers mistook the girl’s laughter for an insult, and they soon started to drag her out of the store (at bayonet point, according to one account.)

The girl cried for help and was rescued by her two brothers, who engaged the two soldiers in a fistfight. The Americans ended up virtually mauled by their local opponents.8 The next day, Connell ordered two Sibley tents put up at the northwest corner of the tribunal facing the plaza, and surround the town and arrest every able-bodied male and put them in the two tents. This was to avenge the mauling of his soldiers.

One of the survivors, William J. Gibbs,9 of Springfield, Massachusetts, described this during a subsequent Senate Committee inquiry:

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“…He had two Sibley tents; and they put the ninety natives in the two Sibley tents, which only held about sixteen soldiers; they could not lie down; they had to stand up. There was not room enough to lie down. They stayed there for two or three days. In the morning Captain Connell would line the natives up, and would issue to them bolos for the purpose of cutting down the underbrush…There were about ninety, aged from forty-five to thirteen. They had these bolos, and they were placed in the line, and had to cut down the underbrush and different stuff, and they stayed there right in the heat of the sun, with about twelve soldiers standing over them; and they were confined in the Sibley tents, about forty-five natives in each tent. The weather was damp, and of course it was the rainy season at that time; and it was very unpleasant all right for the natives, and they started to complain about it. They even wanted a little matting to put on the inside of the tent to keep them from the dampness, but he would not allow that at all.[41] “After about four days of this treatment the men were allowed to go home and appear in the morning; and they did so, though they worked reluctantly all the while. This went on till about a week before the massacre, when the native chief of police brought seventy-five men from the mountains, who were confined for a week in the Sibley tents; and, though “it rained move or less during the day,” “no matting at all was given” to them. They complained to the soldiers; “they were afraid to make complaints to the officers,” but were not relieved.

When asked what kind of man Capt. Connell was, Gibbs answered: He did not seem to treat them right in one respect. While the natives were cleaning up the town, he sent out men from the company to destroy all the rice and fish and everything in the line of food that they possibly could. He thought they were taking them to the insurrectos in the mountains.

This rice was stored in about the same way as we store hay in the barn, perhaps fifteen or twenty bushels in some places. The work of cleaning up the town in the

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Capt. Thomas Connell

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immediate locality was continued consecutively from the time we went there in July until the massacre occurred in September.

The Senate aptly summarized the episode thus: In a word, this Captain Connell came to a quiet village, and forced every man in the place, from forty-five to thirteen years of age, to work for months at cleaning the town with soldiers over them, while he destroyed all their food and confined them at night for the time and in the manner described by the witness. Suppose we had heard that a Spanish officer had done this. Truly, it was a strange way to assure them “that full measure of individual rights which is the heritage of free peoples,” or to prove that the mission of the United States was “one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule.”

On September 23, 60 prisoners were released. These included the old men, sickly ones and those below 18. Duran must have been included too because he was able to attend the meeting that plotted against the Americans. But 80 males remained confined inside the tents.

On Tuesday, 24th, the American soldiers with by 10 prisoners went around to do a house-to-house search to confiscate all deadly weapons, weeding bolos and sundang (long bolos with sharp edge.

The sharp pointed sundang were placed inside sacks, filling seven in all, and brought to headquarters. The blunt bolos were to be used by the prisoners to clear the surroundings of plants that obstructed their view of the surrounding terrain. Thus bananas were cleared, and rice confiscated and burned or thrown away because, in the mind of the Americans, these were being smuggled to the mountains to feed the guerrillas of Lukban. This only further incensed the seething rage of the native population.

The plot is hatched In the meantime, on the night of the 23rd, the leaders of Balangiga met in the barrio of Tarusan, north of Balangiga, to finalize plot to overthrow the garrison. The attack would proceed and be moved from October 6 to September 28. The October date was too distant, and the people were running out of food after the forcible confiscations. The group included Eugenio Daza, the chief of police Abanador and his assistant, Mariano Valdenor, the president municipal Pedro Abayan and his vice-mayor Andronico Balais and Duran who was a sergeant under Daza, and one

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Valeriano Abanador (Photographed by Rolando O. Borrinaga from a museum photograph.)

Eugenio Daza (http://www.fgil.wikipilipinas.org/index. php/File:Eugenio_Daza_y_Salazar.jpeg)

town councilor. According to Duran, it was Balais who brought up the idea of attacking the Americans when they were temporarily away from their weapons.10 Daza in his account said this fateful meeting finished at 2:00 AM. It was evidently held at some place unknown to the enemy. On the next three days, he went around the barrios of Balangiga, instructing their leaders to converge in Amanlara, a forested area near the town, armed with everything that they had – from spears to lances, bolos and clubs.11 Duran in his account said the meeting was likewise attended by heads of clans and village chiefs of Balangiga, Quinapondan, Giporlos and Lawaan. Valeriano Abanador would be the overall commander of the assault, and Valdenor his second-in-command. Daza was designated as military adviser and representative to Lukban.12 Daza also recounted the deployment of their men. They divided themselves into seven companies, each of them with a specific target.

Pedro Abayan and Eugenio Daza would be put in charge of the first company whose role would be to form a defensive perimeter and protect the few non-combatants who would still be in the town and would gather at a designated location. The second company was put under the leadership of tax collector Benito Canillas and Artemio Belaez. The third company was under Pedro Abite, the teniente del barrio of Giporlos and Bartolome Ayjon. The fourth company was under Lope Angorin and Pelagio Acosta. The fifth company was headed by Pedro Avila and

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Andres Hilaria, who were both members of the town police force. The sixth company was made up of the men of Lawaan and was headed by Custodio Salazar and Paul Gacho, the barrio chief. And the seventh company would be under command of Valeriano Abanador. He would initiate the attack.13 The first five groups would remain in the forested area until the signal was given. But the company of the men from Lawaan would already be inside the church dressed as women worshippers at the time of the attack, while the group of Abanador would be made up of his police corps and the prisoners. It was Abanador who was going to give the signal with his cane so that the boys would start ringing the church bells. That would be the sign for those in the forest to rush in. Women, children and old men were to be evacuated earlier.14 The attack September 27th was the 52nd anniversary of the founding of the parish and a cause for a fiesta. Abayan and Abanador had previously advised the Americans of this fact, so there was no surprise as Samareños from nearby towns arrived in town throughout the morning. But in comparison to previous parish anniversaries, the celebration was muted. After all, the town’s able-bodied males continued the cleaning ordeal, and there was little food left for the celebration. Still a carabao was brought to be slaughtered at dawn and cooked in a corner of the square throughout the day. As long as the food was eaten in full view of the Americans and not spirited in the mountains to Lukban and his men, Connell would allow it.

As darkness fell, a procession of as many as 50 people, many of them women, approached and entered the church. Six men bore a wooden box which, on examination by American guards, contained a statue of the interred Christ. Unknown to the Americans, these were the men from Lawaan.

Meanwhile, as darkness fell, Bumpus returned from Tacloban with the first mail that the men had received in fourth months, and confirmation of the news that President McKinley had been shot by an assassin on September 6, and had died on September 14. Theodore Roosevelt, whom many of the men in Company C had ridden with in Cuba, was now the President of the United States. There had been rumors prior to this, but Bumpus brought the first official confirmation.

Adolf Gamlin, who was on guard in the Plaza, could hear the praying in the church and saw women and children leaving town. He thought this was strange and reported it to Sergeant Henry Scharer, who

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was in charge of the guard. But Scharer took no action. After midnight the natives were still inside the Church, and occasionally the sounds of praying could be heard faintly across the plaza. Otherwise all was quiet in the final hours before dawn.15 At 6 AM on the morning of September 28, 1901, Musician George Meyers sounded reveille and the 71 men of Company C. assembled in the Town Plaza, their backs to the municipal hall, facing west, their Krag rifles in hand. To the soldier’s right, at the northwest corner of the municipal hall, were the two conical Sibley tents containing 68 prisoners. Behind the municipal hall was the mess tent and kitchen. In front of them at the opposite end of the plaza, was the church and convento, where a guard was posted and the officers were sleeping.

At the conclusion of roll call Randles called out: “Dismissed!” and the men went back to their barracks. Over 40 went to the municipal hall. Some went to the Betron Barracks at the Salazar home, on the northeast corner of the plaza. Others went to the Markley Barracks at the Belaez home a block west along the plaza’s perimeter road. In all three locations the men stacked their guns and began to go about their business, the most pressing matter being breakfast and mail that Bumpus brought the day before.

Over the next fifteen minutes, virtually all the men made their way to the mess tent for breakfast. One of the first in line for breakfast was Private Adolf Gamlin was one of those who finished breakfast earlier as he had to relieve George Allen at Post 5 near the Sibley tents at 6:30 that morning. He approached Allen, relieved him, and began marching Post 2, an L shaped route that took him from the mess tent north on the perimeter to the Betron Barracks, then a left turn and an equal distance west along the perimeter road to the Markley Barracks — then back.

At that precise moment, a dozen men were at the Betron Barracks mess tent. A half dozen inside the Markley Barracks. Thirty were in the main mess behind the municipal hall. The officers were in their quarters at the convento. Sergeants Markley and Randles were en route from their respective barracks to the Municipal Hall. And seven were on guard duty.

At that moment too, Abanador was leaning casually against a post and chatting with Corporal Burke, assessing the given situation. Then he began walking casually toward the guard, Adolf Gamlin, who was walking Post 2 near the conical tents.

In the Congressional hearings held to investigate the circumstances of the attack, they would be able to determine the precise details from surviving witnesses.

Company Musician Meyers was eating at the table in front of the

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Betron Barracks watching Abanador: “As the sentinel passed him, the Chief of Police suddenly snatched the rifle out of his hands, knocked him senseless with the butt and yelled, firing at the same time into our group and wounding one of the men.”

George Allen wrote in a letter years later to Adolf Gamlin: “I can see the chief of police now as he made the attack upon you and grabbed your gun from your shoulder. Things happened so quickly after, that it is surprising to me that any of us were ever left to tell the tale.”

William Gibbs: “No more than that yell. Some say that the bells were tolled, but I did not hear them; I did not hear anything but that yell.”

John D. Closson: “I was seated at the south end of the mess table. . .I looked out and saw the natives coming towards us, and I jumped and ran to back stairs to barracks, reaching them at the same time with the natives. I ran upstairs and into the annex, pushing my way through natives who did not attempt to bolo me. They were crowding in to get the guns. I got in and seized a gun, but somebody grabbed me from behind and then were crowding so that I couldn’t do anything, and they pulled me down onto the floor…”

Gamlin’s first awareness of the attack was when he saw Samarenos running towards him, yelling. He heard an American voice shout “Fire!” but before he could react, the police Chief Abanador was on him and snatched his Krag from him, smashing the gun butt down on his head, wounding and momentarily stunning him.16 As Abanador attacked Gamlin, the plaza erupted into action. Inside the church, the bell tolled as the men of Lawaan rushed the convent, and the natives rushed simultaneously on the different barracks, the officers’ quarters and those at the breakfast table and kitchen. The sentinel on Post No. 1 was killed, so was the sergeant of the guard. The prisoners and others nearby rushed into the main barracks at the tribunal. From the east of the kitchen, the natives who hid in the forest overpowered the men having breakfast.17 The officers, who were still in their room in the convent, did not have much chance. Inside the officers’ quarters, Bumpus was reading his mail. He looked up but never saw the bolo that smashed down on him from the side, onto the bridge of his nose, severing the lower half of his face and continuing through, to his neck, a mortal blow that ended his life within seconds.

Surgeon Griswold was lying in bed, reading mail. He lept to his feet, reaching for his sidearm, but to no avail as a swarm of determined Lawaanons enveloped him and killed him before he could take a shot.

Captain Connell on the other hand was able to arm himself before the attackers reached him. Thus, he gained precious seconds as the attackers paused, held off by his Krag. Vastly outnumbered, Connell

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jumped from the second floor window to the ground as agile Samareños jumped out of the window behind him in pursuit. He got up and ran past the corner of the convent where the cook Bertholf was standing with his Krag. Bertholf fired, killing one of Connell’s pursuers, but more than a dozen Samarenos quickly drove Connell to the ground under a rain of blows and the Captain died there, beside the convento.18 Pvt. George E. Meyer heard a succession of shouts, the tower bells ringing a deafening appeal, and saw a crowd of natives with Abanador going towards them with the intention of cutting them from their weapons in the barracks. “They were brandishing bolos and clubs and yelling like devils,” said Meyer.19 Pedro Duran in his story said he did not see the tactical adjustments Abanador had to make. While in their original plan Abanador was to signal first, in the account of two American survivors, it would not have been right for him to do so for that would be noticed by the sentries. He had to neutralize the sentry first as he shouted his signal to the boys in the belfry and his men to attack, “Atake, mga Balangigan-on!” (Attack, men of Balangiga!) The cane signal would have wasted a few precious seconds and alerted the guards.20 By his own account, Gamlin, the sentry at Post No. 3, did not become unconscious from the butt of his own rifle. But he fell down. Abanador accordingly followed with a bayonet thrust to his body, which wounded him slightly, and when he rose, he was again struck on the head with a bolo by another native but he managed to remain standing. He followed the rush of prisoners toward the main barracks to get another rifle. But he was met by Mariano Valdenor with a bolo and a knife. He managed to grapple with the Filipino but was hit by the knife. Still he managed to run and find a ladder to climb his barracks using the bamboo ladder brought by the natives. He could not find any rifle there either. So he ran downstairs and rushed to Betron’s quarters. He found a rifle, then turned around to fire at an attacker. From there he started shooting at the natives who were throwing down the rifles from the window.21 Gamlin managed to go back to the main barracks where he found four other soldiers. Here they set up a defensive perimeter and killed some more Filipinos with their rifles. It became the assembly point of the soldiers who were still alive. Sgt. Betron, being the most senior noncommissioned officer, then took command of the depleted company.

The firing from their group caused the natives to retreat and probably provided the Americans the needed respite to regroup.22 Escape According to Pvt. Meyer, for a moment, they considered the chance

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of holding the town against the enemy and sending a team to Basey for help, but their wounded were in such a deplorable condition that surgical aid was imperative. So they decided to embark on getting to Basey where there was an American garrison.23 Pvt. Manire said they took care of the wounded, and gave them the best comfort that could be afforded. These were placed in the shade and given water. As for their dead, they sorted them out and put them together in the shade. At about 10 that morning, four of them secured barotos for the trip.24 Meyer said they tried to burn the main barracks, but without success. Thus the Filipinos were able to secure the rifles, ammunition and other goods left at their commissary on the ground floor. Two of them emptied a can of crude oil in the church and convent and also tried to burn the structures, but the natives must have put out the fire as soon as they left. Then they went to the officers’ quarters and took a case of whisky which Lt. Bumpus brought the day before. He said this must have saved them on their 24-hour sea ordeal.25 Gamlin said they divided themselves among the five boats that they were able to secure in the river west of the town. The smaller the boat, the fewer the soldiers. The largest had 18 riders, the smallest two. As luck would have it, the boats all had outriggers attached, the tide was in, and they had no trouble getting to sea. Pvt. Ernest Ralston added in his account that they had fresh water, a case of hardtack, bacon and coffee, in addition to some 30 guns and ammunition, which they had to throw overboard later when their boats were swamped with water.26 In the account of official historian David Perine, by the time the survivors had assembled at the river to paddle their way to Basey, there were 31 wounded and only five unscathed. The remaining 38 men of company C were killed.

They did not leave Balangiga at the same time. The boat of Markley with only two riders left an hour earlier. It reached Tolosa then proceeded to Tanauan where they reported to the 11th Infantry. Markley Swanson gave the first reports of the attack that reached Washington, claiming 140 Filipinos were dead.27 The second boat with six riders did not have problems with the sea, except that they consumed all their water at dusk. The bottles of whisky was a life saver that helped them reach their destination.28 But the third boat with nine people, including Francisco, Connell’s houseboy, experienced problems with navigation. They mistook the cape west of Balangiga as the Capines point, and were soon swamped with water due to rough seas. So four of their passengers were transferred to the other boats to enable them to float, while the remaining passengers

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continued to bail out the water. They drifted east for several hours when they got stuck in a coral reef. The shore was just 600 yards away. So they walked on the corals and started going to the shore, leaving their baroto.

At night when the tide came in, it drifted to the sea. They had a bad time going ashore because of their wounds.

Two of the men started to look for water on the beach but found the dead body of another soldier from another boat. Then two of their badly wounded companions, whom they left behind on the shore, were found by Filipino fighters and were hacked to death. The remaining two slowly backed to the shore, confiscated a small boat from an old man after killing him, and headed to the sea. They were later rescued by the USS Pittsburg on its relief mission to Balangiga.29 The fifth boat also sank in the rough seas after one of its passengers was transferred to the bigger boat. Its lone passenger sank with the boat.

This left the fourth boat that carried 18 men. Only the persistence of its rowers saved the group after this, too, had a horrible time at sea. By noon that day, they had consumed all their water. Two of their badly wounded companions died while at sea, while two others died in the hospital. The boat arrived in Basey at 4 early the next morning.30 According to official reports released when House Resolution 13005 was filed in the US House of Congress on July 16, 1932, four were declared missing, eight who were wounded died later, 22 were wounded and survived, and only four were not wounded. Total killed were 36 out of 74 soldiers present during the Balangiga raid.31 As for the Filipinos, Daza in his affidavit listed 28 fighters dead and 22 wounded, while Pedro Duran came up with a smaller figure of only 16 dead.

Daza said they were able to gather about 100 rifles left on the battlefield and about 50 in deposit; one shotgun, 3 carbines, 5 revolvers, 3 sabers, two pairs of field glasses, 7 watches and about 300,000 rounds of ammunitions, canned foodstuffs, liquors, medicines, and other things deposited in the Commissary of the Americans.32 Reactions When the first survivors arrived in Basey to relate their horrifying experience, Capt. Edwin V. Bookmiller, commander of Company G of the 9th Inf. at Basey, immediately telegraphed the Visayas command headquarters in Cebu, the station of Gen. Hughes. Bookmiller was directed to proceed immediately to Balangiga in a small gunboat the USS Pittsburg. The boat steamed out of base at 9:00 AM on the 30th and arrived in the Bay of Balangiga at 12:30 PM. It opened fire on the

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American survivors of the Balangiga massacre pose with a Balangiga bell. Photo taken in Calbayog, Samar, in April 1902 (http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Balangiga_bells)

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Two Balangiga bells exhibited at Fort D.A. Russel, now F. E. Warren Air Force Base (http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Balangiga_bells)

town, and the few Filipinos remaining fled hurriedly into the jungle as Bookmiller landed with 60 men.

Bookmiller surveyed the scene of the battle. The dead of Company C were strewn all over the plaza, barracks, convent and some even down a well. All the bodies were stripped and many horribly mutilated; some were covered with flour; others had their stomachs split open and stuffed with codfish. Lt. Edward Bumpus was found in his room with his face half severed by a bolo cut, and jam smeared in the sockets. The dead were buried in a common grave and the town was burned to the ground.33 In the United States, the devastating defeat came with a shock.

“News of disaster to troops causes sensation at Washington,” wrote the Associated Press in Washington in its banner story on September 29, 1901. “It reached the department during the early hours today and Adj. General Corbin realizing its importance, at once made it public after sending a copy to the White House,” the news dispatch said. An unnamed official was cited as having said that the attack was a “consequence of the assassination of Pres. McKinley.” The source added that the shooting appeared to be the result of some popular outbreak against the president, and that the “natives had seized the opportunity in the flickering hope of retrieving some of their losses.”34 Gen. Arthur MacArthur, like the other generals, dismissed the incident as an isolated one that had no effect on the general result of

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the war against the insurgents. “It is a portion of the insurrection which had been conducted by General Lukban , who has never been suppressed. There are plenty of soldiers there to ultimately subdue the rebellion in the island of Samar,” he said. At that time, the occupation forces of Samar were estimated to be 2,000 to 2,500, distributed in its increasing garrisons.35 The same news item reported that according to Gen. Hughes, the Visayas commander to which Samar belonged, the insurgents had only 300 rifles since most of them were armed only with bolos. But “they carried on a guerrilla warfare and operations against these were difficult…. The fact that the Americans were attacked while at breakfast indicates the daring and pluck of the insurgents.”36 That same day in the issue of the Chicago Tribune, Gen. Elwell S. Otis, who was in command of the department of the lakes, also dispelled ideas of a widespread rebellion. He said that the slaughter of members of Company C of the 9th Inf. in Samar did not mean that there was anything like widespread revolt in that province. “The location of the ambuscade is in southern Samar of which the insurgents are ignorant and barbarous. Probably Lukban got a party of bolomen together and surprised the Americans while at breakfast.”37 On the 30th that month in Akron Ohio, the Akron Daily Democrat in its front page wrote that the “massacre shocked the U.S. public.” Many newspaper editors accordingly tagged the event as “the worst disaster suffered by the U.S. Army since Custer’s last stand at Little Big Horn.”

Already, a change of policy regarding the insurgents of Samar was becoming evident in the statements of an infuriated Maj. Gen. Adna R. Chaffee, military governor for the “unpacified” areas of the Philippines.

He told the press that “the situation calls for shot, shells and bayonets as the natives are not to be trusted.”

He advised newspaper correspondent Joseph Ohl, “If you should hear of a few Filipinos more or less being put away don’t grow too sentimental over it.”

Chaffee informed his officers that it was his intention “to give the Filipinos ‘bayonet rule’ for years to come,” an attitude that President Theodore Roosevelt showed when he ordered Chaffee to adopt “in no unmistakable terms…most stern measures to pacify Samar.”38 Chaffee in turn ordered his commanders in the field: “We have lost one hundred rifles and 25,000 rounds of ammunition at Balangiga. You must get them back. You can have $5,000 gold. Capture arms if you can, buy them if you must; whatever course you adopt, get them back.” 39 To absolve himself of the responsibility over the Balangiga disaster, Chaffee was quick to blame his subordinate Gen. Hughes. In a memo, he told the latter, “It comes to my attention that Company C of the 9th Infantry

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was very poorly equipped in the soldierly essentials of discipline, training, organization, and morale. Your statement is awaited.”

To which Colonel Hughes of the 9th Infantry replied, “It may be true, General Chaffee,that Company C of the 9th Infantry, was lax in discipline, training, and morale. I would not be qualified to comment upon the subject as the Company has been under my command for but two weeks. During its previous China service, it was under the direct command of General Adna R. Chaffee, Commanding the Philippine Division!’’40 Chaffee had no answer to this. But he did what he had to. He simply replaced Hughes with a man who would implement his policy of retaliation, a man who would gain notoriety for turning Samar into a ‘howling wilderness’ - Gen. Jacob Smith.

Endnotes 1 Oswald, Mark. A paper entitled “The Howling Wilderness Courts-Martial of 1902,” Department of the Army, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050 2 Borrinaga, Rolando O. “The Balangiga Conflict Revisited”, New Day Publishers, Quezon City, 2013, p. 53 3 Sellers, Michael, “The Warriors of Samar,” The Balangiga Uprising of 1901, (http://warriorsofsamar.thejohncarterfiles.com/the-bells/ 4 Ibid, p. 55 5 Ibid 6 Young, Kenneth Ray, “Guerrilla Warfare: Balangiga Revisited”, Readings in Leyte Samar History, Divine Word University of Tacloban, 1979, 251 7 Daza Affidavit. In 1935, Daza gave his version, in Spanish, of the Balangiga incident in a notarized account, probably in response to James O. Taylor’s “The Massacre at Balangiga”, published in 1931 as part of a campaign to get the Medal of Honor awarded to the American survivors. The original statement was lost in a fire in 1945 but a copy has survived.

Eugenio Daza y Salazar was born on 15 November 1870 in Borongan, Eastern Samar. His parents Juan Cinco Daza of Catbalogan and Magdalena Campomanes Salazar of Borongan were both prominent in the province. He married Carolina Cinco of Catbalogan and was blessed with seven children. In 1884, he was sent by his parents to Manila to pursue his education. He enrolled at the La Congregacion de la Santisima Virgen de San Luis Gonzaga (Escuela Normal de Maestros) Ateneo de Manila. While studying in Manila he met some prominent personalities of the propaganda movement in the likes of Paciano Rizal, brother of Jose Rizal and Apolinario Mabini. In 1888 he graduated with honors with the degree in Education. After graduation he returned to his province and taught at the Borongan Municipal School. In the later years he established, his own school under the supervision of the Spanish government. His teaching profession was interrupted with the outbreak of the 1896 Philippine Revolution. In 1899 during

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the Philippine American War, the young Daza was appointed by General Vicente Lukban, the Polico Militar Governor of Samar as the Commander of the Revolutionary forces in the East Coast of Samar. (by Monaliza H. Quison, National Historical Institute) 8 Borrinaga, 75-76. This was told by Pedro Duran to Nemesio Duran who used the story in his unpublished masters thesis.

9 William J. Gibbs, of Springfield, Mass., was promoted to be a corporal for his bravery in this fight, and was one of five recommended as deserving a medal of honor. He may therefore be regarded as a reliable witness. From his testimony, it appeared that he had served in the Philippines for about three years, that he was one of the detachment sent to Balangiga, -- a village of about 2,000 inhabitants, living in some two hundred houses, who got their living by chopping down coconuts and fishing.

10 Borrinaga, 80 11 Daza affidavit 12 Borrinaga, 81-82 13 Op cit, Sellers 14 Daza affidavit 15 Op cit, Sellers 16 Ibid 17 Borrinaga, 97 18 Op cit, Sellers 19 Borrinaga, 98 20 Borrinaga, 99 21 Borrinaga, 100-101 22 Borrinaga, 102 23 Borrinaga, 124 24 Ibid 25 Ibid 26 Borrinaga, 125 27 Borrinaga, 127 28 Borrinaga,128 29 Borrinaga,131 30 Borrinaga,128-134 31 Borrinaga,114 32 Daza affidavit 33 Young, 254 34 Associated Press, Washington, Sept. 29, 1901 35 Ibid 36 Ibid 37 The Chicago Tribune, September 29, 1901 38 The Akron Daily Democrat, Sept. 30, 1901 39 Hurley, Vic, Jungle Patrol, 17-18 40 Ibid

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Chapter 8

T

‘Kill and Burn’

he atrocities committed by the American troops after Balangiga were not the sole responsibilities of Gen. Jacob H. Smith or his alleged hatchet man Maj. Littleton Waller. Smith’s orders, though excessive, stemmed directly from policies spelled out by his superiors in the war department. The responsibility went all the way to US President Theodore Roosevelt who told Chaffee adopt “in no unmistakable terms…most stern measures to pacify Samar,” and Secretary of War Elihu Root who replaced MacArthur with Major General Adna R. Chaffee on July 4, 1901. Root had picked MacArthur’s replacement in February, realizing that MacArthur opposed implementing civilian rule of the Philippines before the war ended.1 Root could not have chosen a better man for the job. Chaffee began his military career as a private, but he won a battlefield commission at Gettysburg and later served as a cavalryman under General Sheridan.

Chaffee earned a well-deserved reputation as a tough Indian fighter, campaigning against the Cheyenne and the Apaches. Leading his troop in a charge against the Cheyenne, he had inspired his men by yelling, “Forward, if any man is killed, I will make him a corporal!” Before his assignment to the Philippines, Chaffee had served in Cuba and led American forces to Peking during the Boxer Rebellion. Two months after he took over from MacArthur, he would direct the implementation of the most repressive counterinsurgency policies seen in the Philippines.2 Within weeks of the Balangiga attack, four hundred insurgents armed with long, slightly curved knives common in the Philippines assaulted another Army detachment on the Gan­dara River in Samar, killing ten soldiers and wounding six. Additionally, a small garrison at the town of Weyler was be­sieged for nearly two days, and several other minor stations on Samar were also attacked on a smaller scale.

Because of these events, General Chaffee is reported to have metaphorically equated the Army’s tenuous hold on the archipelago with standing on a volcano. On many morn­ings, the general would alarmingly ask his staff, “Has it blown up yet? . . . The volcano, damn it! The volcano we’re

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Brig. Gen. Jacob ‘Jake Howling’ Smith (Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jacob_H._Smith)

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standing on!”

Chaffee’s attitude probably influenced those of his subordinates. He had his apprehensions, and his anger was not muted but felt on the surface. He wanted his soldiers to be ‘stern and inflexible’ so that the masses of Samar who had supported Lukban would be afraid. Every hostile act in Samar’s villages had to be dealt with “quickly and severely”.

America’s honor was hurt in the Balangiga massacre, and it would take more than two battalions to retrieve the lost weapons and ammunition captured by the insurgents. But he promised that the face of Samar would be different when the reinforcements would arrive. Chaffee was heard saying his troops “will start a few cemeteries for hombres in Southern Samar.” This vengeful frame of mind would impact on Gen. Smith, Samar’s new American commander.3 Jake ‘Howling’ Smith Chaffee’s choice to replace Gen. Hughes was just in his mould.

Smith had the right character Chaffee desired of his commander for Samar. Smith’s attitude toward waging the ‘hard war’ was quite well known. He never liked the natives. He even boasted to reporters that fighting the Filipino insurgents was ‘worse than fighting Indians’ back home. He made no secret of his harsh methods. In one article to the newspapers in Manila, he stated that the Balangiga massa­cre was the result of “officers who loved the Little Brown Brother,” evidently referring to the officers of Company ‘C’ who fraternized with the locals in Balangiga.4 Early in his career, Smith already showed tendencies that did not befit an officer and a gentleman. Enlisting in the Union Army in 1861, he quickly acquired a commission as a volunteer officer in the Second Kentucky Regiment. Wounded at Shiloh, he was placed into quasi-retirement and served the remainder of the war as a recruiter. In 1867 he obtained a Regular Army captaincy, and in 1869 Smith tried to convert a temporary major’s appointment as a judge advocate into a permanent one. In the confirmation process, the Judge Advocate General of the Army discovered that Smith had used his position as wartime recruiter to engage in profiteering through recruit bounties and speculation in gold, diamonds, and whiskey.5 Smith’s temporary judge advocate appointment was revoked when it was discovered that he had lied about his wartime conduct. Smith spent the next 27 years as a Captain on the frontier, and his service record reflects three separate general courts-martial for insubordination to his commanding officer, conduct unbecoming an officer arising from

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barroom gambling debts, and finally, his apparent trademark of making false official statements. His service record amply reflects his propensity for making imprudent and intemperate remarks, both written and oral, and a recurring pattern of blatant disregard for veracity. He was dogged by creditors and civil courts for bad debts throughout his entire career, leading to excessive absences from duty for court appearances and culminating in a years’ absence on sick leave for “marked nervous prostration and depression.”6 According to some American historians, the selection of Smith for promotion to Brigadier General and assignment as the military commander of Samar and Leyte must have been one of the gravest blunders of the entire war. But in so far as his superior Gen. Chaffee was concerned, he was most effective for the situation when diplomacy and tact did not work, when the time for leniency was over.

Immediately after his appointment, he gave his subordinates carte blanche authority in the application of Abraham Lincoln’s 1863 General Order 100. This order, in brief, authorized the shooting on sight of all persons not in uniform acting as soldiers and those committing, or seeking to commit, sabotage. Early in the campaign, Smith directed several of his garrison commanders and in particular, Marine Major Littleton Waller who replaced Capt. Bookmiller in Basey, “I want no prisoners....! I wish you to kill and burn. The more you kill and burn, the more you will please me. I want all persons killed who are capable of bearing arms in actual hostilities against the United States....the interior of Samar must be made a howling wilderness.”

When Waller sought clarification of the age limit to respect, Smith quickly tagged every Filipino boy ten years and older as capable of bearing arms and, accordingly, combatants.7 Smith made no secret of his deep dislike and mistrust of the Filipino natives. Even prior to his Samar stint, Smith told his officers to remember that “many [Filipinos] who apparently are friendly to the Americans[’] rule are guilty of the blackest treachery and all officers are warned not to allow their suspicions to be lulled to sleep by friendly association and social inter­ course with the native inhabitants.” That was probably one of the lessons he learned from the Balangiga experience.

General Smith regularly complained about the excessive leniency of Ameri­can officers. For example, following the arrest of several Filipinos suspected of attacking a group of U.S. soldiers with bolos, Smith lamented, “I only wish that I could have been there to have sum­marily dealt with them, but it is difficult to get officers to take prompt measures under G.O. 100. . . . A few killings under G.O. 100 will aid very much in making the enemy stop these assassinations.”8

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Smith’s first priority was to conduct a survey of his assigned territory to acquaint himself with the challenges that he would be facing.

After his inspection tour, he realized that, beyond Samar’s harsh terrain and climate, he would have to overcome many serious obstacles quickly. General Smith immediately went about solving the largest challenges: remedying his lack of troops and cutting the insurgents’ sup­ply chain. The attacks at Balangiga and the Gandara River convinced him that concentrating troops into larger for­mations was required since the “small detachments were not safe at isolated points.” Hence, Smith requested additional troops from the division commander and gladly accepted a Navy offer to supply him with a bat­talion of marines led by Marine Maj. Littleton W. T. Waller. With it was the Navy gunboat support to blockade the coast of Samar and thereby disrupt the smuggling of food and supplies from the nearby island of Leyte.9 In keeping with their strategy of denying food supply to insurgents, Smith also attacked their ties with the underground supply chain, the food stores and hemp, which transited among the small villages of Samar and extended to the neighboring island of Leyte. In his first circular, Gen. Smith required that all barotos, bancas, or boats of any kind in the waters off the coast of the waters of Samar and adjacent islands (except fishing boats, or those in the employ of the United States, or authorized by the military authorities), had to be painted red, with the name of boat and home port. Boat users were told to get passes signed by the commanding officer or adjutant of the military station at their home port.

Boats not following these orders were considered contraband and were to be destroyed or confiscated. Fishing boats by day had to show a white flag and by night a white light, and their passes had to prescribe the limits in which the boat was allowed to fish, and also show the names of the crew. Passes were limited to absolute necessities to stop illicit trade in rice, hemp, and other contraband of war.

Towns, villages, hamlets, etc., in the vicinity of which signal lights or fires were exhibited, would be subject to the fire of gunboats and troops and destroyed.10 Not satisfied with its results, some weeks later, Smith ordered that all traffic by natives and others passing between Samar and Leyte be restricted, and all natives found passing between these two islands, or afloat on either shore, without passes were to be fired upon and killed, whether on the Samar or Leyte side.11 Trading in food items between the two islands were reduced to the minimum and confined to ports where US troops were present. Trading outside these ports was not cleared.

Barter of rice for hemp could go on, but rice thus obtained was limited in quantity to the actual subsistence needs of the parties getting it. Eva-

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sion of this provision would be “dealt with severely.”

War vs local elite Like the pronouncements of commanders that preceded him, Smith made it clear in his circulars that “every native will be regarded and treated as an enemy until he has conclusively shown that he is a friend.” There was no such thing as neutrality. One was either a friend or an enemy. A native’s loyalty was to be “be measured directly and solely by his acts.” Every Samar native was guilty unless he could prove his loyalty to the Americans.

Even the wealthier class among the native population was not spared this deep suspicion. For Smith, they were secretly supporting Lukban and the insurgency, and were not to be trusted.12 This class was in fact the “most dangerous threat to the counterinsurgency effort.” Smith’s circular allowed the arrest and confinement of suspected sympa­thizers as prisoners of war solely on the basis of suspicion, even in the absence of sufficient evidence to convict in a military court. This relaxation of legal protections was designed to prevent contributions and other support from reaching the insurgents.

Smith also continued the practice of hamletting done by his predecessors, using threats and violence to coax the native into withdrawing support for the insurrection. Natives were told that they could be given protection by the American soldiers if they desired so and fully cooperated with their new protectors. But first they had to be placed inside a concentration camp where all their movements were closely monitored.

Any native living outside these camps was considered an insurgent or a sympathizer and could be targeted.

With these policies—the reduction of illicit trade, the intolerance of neutrality, and the provision of security through population concentration—Filipino natives were put in the unenviable position of having to choose sides openly between the insurgency or the Americans. Presented with the option of accepting the protection offered by American concentration camps, natives could no longer claim that they were supporting the insurgents involuntarily.13 A subsequent US Senate investigation of these so-called “concentration camps” offered the American public a glimpse into life inside such camps. The newspaper account, dated Nov. 4, 1901, comes from a correspondent in Catbalogan, Samar where Brig. Gen. Jacob Smith had established his headquarters.

The transport “Lawton” returned yesterday afternoon from a two weeks’ cruise, touching at Catbalogan, Cebu, Perang-Perang, and Davao. On her outward passage she took two hundred Ilocano scouts

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for the Samar service.

On the arrival of the “Lawton” at Catbalogan, Brigadier-general Smith had been in Samar about ten days; and his strong policy was already making itself felt. He had already ordered all natives to present themselves in certain of the coast towns, saying that those who were found outside would be shot and no questions asked. The time limit had expired when the “Lawton” reached Catbalogan, and General Smith was as good as his word. His policy of reconcentration is said to be the most effective thing of the kind ever seen in these islands under any flag. All suspects, including Spaniards and half-breeds, were rounded up in big stockades and kept under guard.

Reporting on the concentration camp instituted by Smith, the correspondent wrote: There are approximately 400 Filipino prisoners confined at Catbalogan, and the churchyard has been made into quarters for them. The yard is surrounded by a high stone wall, against which nipa shacks have been set. In these shacks, devoid of furniture, bedding, and with only the nipa walls and bamboo, the prisoners live, breathe, and have their being. They squat all day about the walls of the shacks, and only vary their attitudes for the purpose of eating or sleeping. They are fed the regulations’ native prisoner ration, which is rather skimpy.

The majority of the prisoners looked far from happy. A large part of them had a pinched, hungry look, and some thirty or forty are suffering from all stages of beriberi. It is the usual thing for them to get this disease after they have been confined any length of time. The disease is prevalent on the island, and under prison conditions it thrives.

A number of the prisoners are suffering from malaria and dysentery.

One of the medical officers at Catbalogan tells me that they die at the rate of from two to four per day. There are not sufficient medical supplies at Catbalogan to care for the prisoners; and, as far as I could see, when they are taken sick, they are liable to die, as far as their health may depend upon proper medical attendance.

General Sanger, learning of these conditions, took the medical officers to task; and they pleaded as an excuse that they had sent many requisitions to Tacloban for supplies, but they were never filled, and, when filled, only partially. For example, carbolic acid in large quantities was asked for, and one-tenth of the amount asked was sent. It is probable that an investigation will be made in Manila as to why these conditions exist. Prisoners of war must have proper food and medical attendance. There are rears dug about the prison which are kept in a perfectly sanitary condition, boxes being used, and the contents

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removed daily. The prisoners also have the use of two large stone tanks filled with water for bathing, and soap is issued to them as part of the ration. It is difficult to ascertain if the rations were always fully issued; but it is supposed that they are, although one hungry and despondent-looking chap of decidedly prepossessing appearance told me that they did not get enough to eat. However, if it is issued - the full ration - it should be enough for their wants, and is probably more than the average native receives outside. There is an offensive smell about the quarters, but this is generally found in jails where large numbers of men are confined.

All of the prisoners had a more or less cowed appearance, and seemed ready to dodge upon the approach of an American. General Chaffee visited every one of the different quarters, and, with the aid of an interpreter, talked with various of the prisoners. The usual response was, “No sabe”; and they did not look as if they did. They are a miserable-looking lot of little brown rats, and were utterly spiritless. All rose from their squatting position whenever an American approached, and stood to “attention,” raising their hands to their heads in a sort of half-salute and half-doffing of an imaginary hat. The great majority of them are in rags, and have hardly enough of them to cover their nakedness. There is no provision for furnishing them clothing. Among all the quarters not a cigarette was to be found; and the lack of these, which is almost as necessary to the Filipino as food or water, seems to wilt them altogether.

Outside the shacks, day after day, the rain falls incessantly. Some of the shacks leak, but the majority are in good condition. One of the party remarked that death would be preferable to him than month after month of such imprisonment, and no one disagreed with him. However, it is possible that the natives have become used to it. Nothing seems to break their apathy. One to whom I spoke kindly and questioned as to his treatment changed for a moment into a gleam of intelligence, but quickly resumed his original stare.14 A daily log of atrocities In the meantime, about the middle of that month, Smith’s field men started a daily log of activities that appear like a record of death and destruction. Reporting from USS Villalobos since it embarked on a voyage from Cavite, the ship’s captain wrote: Starting October 18, 1901 until 10 days later, they arrested suspected insurgent leaders at Malibago near Babatngon, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Almeria and Naval, province of Biliran, overhauled en route

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a banca cleared from Iloilo for Tacloban and a lorcha bound for Tacloban with 750 sacks of rice, confiscated guns, ammunition and money worth over 200,000 Mexican dollars, destroyed three barotos and captured a native making for the Samar coast in a baroto, and made arrests in Zumarraga, burned nipa huts and destroyed three barotos more.

In another ship USS Vicksburg, its commander E.B. Barry reported on October 29, 1901 that nine days earlier a company of Marines destroyed a number of shacks and about 2,500 sacks of rice near Guiuan.

Seven days later, his troops again destroyed a number of shacks and captured three small canoes. That evening, they captured a large banca and two more canoes. The next day, they burned 15 to 20 shacks and captured five canoes.

Maj. Littleton T. Waller (Source: https://www.flickr.com/photos/judgerock/3256905620)

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Major Littleton Waller

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Major Waller of the US Marine Corps came on board Villalobos at about 6.30 PM west of Balangiga, With him were four companies of the First Marine Brigade from Cavite which were hastily assembled into a battalion, numbering 15 officers and 300 men. David D. Porter and Hiking Hiram Bearss were his principal captains. Among his officers who were to prove important later were 1stLt A. S. Williams, 2ndLt Frank Halford, and GySgt John H. Quick. Most of them had served with him in China.15 Although Waller’s post was in Basey, his authority went beyond its boundaries. That morning, he ordered Porter with 75 Marines to land near Guiuan “to operate against the neighbourhood and destroy habitations.”16 The subsequent reports about his exploits in the field would be reported by Waller himself from the garrison in Balangiga starting on October 31, 1901.

On his operations near Balangiga on the 26th that month, he said he sent troops to trenches earlier occupied by insurgents but they were empty. Instead they burned the houses along the way, killed three bolowielding men and destroyed about 3,000 pounds of rice stored in the shacks nearby. But he admitted that “it was impossible to capture natives.”

In all likelihood, the natives fled to the nearby forests when his troops were around. They also found some equipment from the 9th Infantry at the trenches, part of the loot of the victorious raiders of Company C in Balangiga a month earlier.

On the 28th, Waller sent a raiding party eastward which destroyed a small village on the Paglaloanan point. He himself went to Balangiga on board the Villalobos, destroying two villages, killing one man and capturing another. The latter confessed that he was a coast guard, who was ordered to report the approach of gunboats to the teniente commanding the town of Alabas, on Point Capines. He added that there were 30 insurrecto soldiers stationed there, and these were armed with one Krag, two revolvers, and bolos or short, heavy daggers.

On the 29th, Waller took a detachment to the mouth of the river in Quinapundan on the USS Vicksburg. Upon his landing he was fired upon from the trenches on the opposite hill by three rifles (in his estimate), but there could have been more - in intermittent bursts at first, then gradually disappearing until the guns were silent. Then the hill was attacked by a group headed by Capt. Porter, but when he got there, the insurrectos had gone, leaving a Krag bayonet which was deformed.

Waller and his troops then continued to Quinapondan, but they found no crops to destroy. Instead they killed one native in this expedition. On

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their way back, they found the boats being fired at by insurrectos. The Vicksburg subsequently fired its guns on the town near the mouth of the river, destroying it.

The next day, Waller took a detachment to Lawaan to look for the powder factory that was earlier reported to be in the neighborhood, but he could not find it. He then continued to Bulosao, one of the principal barrios of Lawaan which he found to be partially burned by the revolutionary forces. His troops burned the remaining 23 houses. As they embarked on their boat, they were fired upon from the thicket at the beach.

His troops tried going after the shooters but they escaped. Waller noted there were more rebels here and that they were making good shots, but no one was hit on the American side.

Waller’s killing and destruction spree was just about to start. Starting November 1 to the 9th that year, his patrols often led by himself or Captain Porter went up and down the Cadacan River, destroying everything they thought would be useful to the insurrectos, which included all shacks, food, work animals, boats or barotos, and killed or captured all those suspected to be part of the insurgency. Although his patrols were sometimes fired upon, the resistance seemed to be insignificant. In some cases, Waller’s troops found entrenchments with souvenirs from the Balangiga raid.

In one of his trips, the gunboat USS Vicksburg was buffeted by strong waves, which caused it to turn over and sink, along with a 3-inch gun and 15 rifles. Luckily, his men were saved, except from one private who was lost together with the ship. In his report, Waller told Gen. Smith that in the span of nine days, they burned down 255 houses, killed 39 men and captured 18 along with 17 bolos, seized a ton of hemp and a half ton of rice, killed 13 carabaos and destroyed 50 bancas that people used for fishing and transportation.17 Waller in his subsequent investigations found out that the people driven from the towns were falling back on the Sohoton district which were filled with a network of limestone caves. Evidently, these had become a sanctuary of all those suspected to be rebels. He promised in his report that he was going to attack this part of the district as soon as he could get a suitable platform for his 3-inch gun, which was needed for shelling the suspected insurrectos occupying the overhanging cliffs.

In the meantime, he had to fix his garrison in Basey. It was on a hilltop overlooking the town with an old stone fort on top, a church and convent. There were a lot of trees and undergrowth around which he wanted to clear so that he could have an unobstructed view below. This became his signal station and outpost. Here he placed 10 men who were excellent shots. Later, a prisoner disclosed that rebels from Balangiga

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were encamped on the river about five hours away. They were armed with 20 rifles. Waller sent a scouting party to the site, but the soldiers had not returned yet. However, another group that was sent on the trail to Sta. Rita encountered a boloman who was instantly killed.18 Raid on Sohoton The Sohoton cliffs were important to the Americans since its control meant easy access to the Cadacan river, the waterway to villages upstream. Some 700 insurrectos were said to be positioned here under the command of Capitan Juan Colinares of Basey. The insurrectos were said to be armed with bolos, bamboo cannons and some rifles taken from Balangiga. Being masters of the terrain, they dug traps of poisoned bamboo pegs at the bottom of four-foot pits along trail ways. They fortified the 200-foot precipice of the Sohoton cliffs where “ledges and shelves cut in the cliff face were connected by fragile bamboo ladders. Dangling from ropes made of a vine called bejucos were large bamboo cages holding tons of rock, ready to cut loose and crash down on anyone storming the cliffs from below”.

Thus the place became known as panhulugan (means a place to drop).19 Waller’s operation started on the 15th of November when he divided his attacking force into three columns. The first two were the major forces, while the third dispatched a day later provided backup and brought the supplies. He went with this third group, assigning the other two columns to Captains Porter and Bearss. The assault was to begin on the 17th when the three columns had converged at a designated spot on the river banks from which they would rush to the fortified cliffs.

On the march to Liruan, the second column under Capt. Bearss destroyed all the villages and houses they came upon along the way, leaving 165 of them in flames. On the 16th, the columns finally reached the overhanging cliffs in the Sohoton known to be heavily fortified and held as the last rallying point. In the meantime, the flanking column had positioned itself about 200 feet above the column of Waller at the riverbank. They could communicate with each other but they could not be seen. The other column on the river halted and camped for the night because of the impression that “the word from the flanking column reported it impossible to move the boats except to destruction.”20 The next day, the column commanded by Capt. Porter located at the riverbank struck the rebels’ trail on the left bank, and saw from the traps, bows, spears, etc., that it led to one of their camps. They followed the trail and until they came upon a number of bamboo guns. One of these commanding the trail had its fuse burning. Corporal Harry Glenn quickly rushed forward and pulled out the fuse. Coming over the crest

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of the cliffs, Porter’s column rushed the rebels’ cuartel but found it empty. Food was still cooking, and everything showed that the rebels had just left.

They climbed to a higher cliff and discovered two camps on the opposite side of the river, which was about 150 feet wide. The camps were about 150 yards distant, with the people at work preparing food, cutting bamboo, and variously employed, with no clue whatsoever that their enemies were training their guns on them. Slowly Porter brought up his men and a Colt gun, which was carried by native carriers. After ten minutes, the Colt was ready. Then Porter gave the signal to fire the gun. The rebels were completely routed. About 30 of them were slain, while the survivors fled.

The troops destroyed the cuartel and food, went down the cliffs, and, using two very small bancas and a raft, crossed the river. There they scaled the cliffs, destroyed the camps that they found, and scaling the other cliffs on the right side with the bamboo ladders which the rebels had hurriedly left behind, found another camp, which they also destroyed. The rebels could only fire two volleys from seven rifles before they fled. The troops captured and destroyed 40 bamboo guns (lantakas) , rice, food, besides the cuartel.

Old prisoners told Porter that they had been working on the defenses for three years. No white troops had ever penetrated these positions before, and they were held as a final rallying point. In addition to the spears and traps, the Americans discovered innumerable rifle pits and many bamboo guns. The cliffs over the river were honeycombed with caves reachable by bamboo ladders, also by ledges of rock with bamboo hand rails. Tons of rock were suspended in cages held in position by vines, and in readiness to be released on people and boats below. Instant destruction would have been the fate of the boats had they attempted the passage of the river until after the cliffs had been taken.

Waller and his column were less than ten minutes away in point of distance, but they were unable to reach the flanking column. Two attempts were made, but his boats struck. He found it impossible to follow the rebels farther as rations gave out, prompting his troops to return on the 19th.21 Lanang-Basey March Still fresh from his conquest of the Sojoton rebel sanctuary, Waller remembered the order of Gen. Smith to make a march from Basey to Hernani on the east coast of the island to “capture or destroy the remnants of the insurrectos, now scattered in small bands and causing much trouble to

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the other natives.” The distance was about 52 miles across unknown and uncharted jungles. While his earlier victory earned him laurels in the military’s high command, this expedition would leave a black mark on his career for the excesses he and his men would commit and send him later to a court martial that would stir up controversy in his own country.

Waller spent most of December in leading an expedition from Basey to the east coast, during which he fought numerous small and successful skirmishes in Quinapundan, Omagonggong, and Pambujan. But these were unexciting and indecisive. “Unless we meet with something much more serious than we have during this march, I think it safe to say that the southern part of the island of Samar is as quiet as many parts of Luzon, where peace is supposed to reign,” he wrote in his report to Smith.

In late December, Waller reached Hernani on the coast which was garrisoned by the American Army. There, two Army officers, Capt Pickering and Lt Williams, attempted to talk him out of the proposed march but he could not be dissuaded, “remembering the General’s [Smith] several talks on the subject and his evident desire to know the trail and run wires across, coupled with my (Waller) own desire for some further knowledge of the people and the nature of this heretofore impenetrable country.”

The expedition took off from Lanang (now Llorente) on 28 December, on a day that contrasted strongly with earlier, very heavy rains.

Waller took Porter and Bearss, 1st Lt Williams, 2d Lt Halford, and 2d Lt Lyles, an Army officer assigned by Brig. Gen. Smith. In addition, the force comprised 50 enlisted Marines, two native scouts named Slim and Smoke, and 33 native carriers or cargadores.

They travelled by boats as far up river as they could, which was not very far, but the subsequent march at once hit on a terrain which was tortuous. “Gritty soil tore through heavy soles of hobnailed marching boots, heavy vines and thorns ripped clothes from the body and dispensed slimy leeches which homed under lacerated skin to produce painful, festering sores.

The mountainous country dictated constant fording of the river which, in turn, spelled wet clothing with severe chafing. Then the rains returned.”

Movement got slower and slower. Then two days later, Waller reduced rations; the next day he cut them to one-half and the number of meals per day to two. “By 1 January, his maps had been destroyed and he had as yet seen nothing that looked like the alleged Spanish trail. On 2 January the column was reduced to one-third rations; by 3 January many of the men could no longer keep up.”

Waller now decided to take Lt Halford and 13 men in the best condition, push on to a rendezvous with Capt. Dunlap who was waiting with food and clothing on the Sojoton river, then send back a relief party

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to the main column. The group under Porter’s command would move ahead slowly and follow Waller’s trail, which would be clearly marked.

But this plan completely miscarried because of some communication problem. By the morning of 4 January, Waller’s party had made such little progress that he decided to return to Lanang. In a message sent by native carrier to Porter, Waller informed him of his new decision and instructed him to go to the Suribao river and start building rafts until his (Waller’s) party returned. Porter had to abandon the idea later because he discovered that wood was not suitable for rafts. When Waller failed to appear, Porter sent Bearss to find him.

Waller in the meantime pushed on for a few kilometres and found, to his great relief, a small clearing planted with bananas, coconuts and camote, a variety of sweet potato. He also espied another prosperous clearing on the opposite side of the river and a trail that led to still another clearing with a shack about five minutes away.

Bearss now caught up to Waller and reported that Porter’s group was only about an hour and a half away. Waller thereupon sent a second message to Porter instructing him to march to these clearings, feed and rest his troops, then continue the march along Waller’s marked trail.

In short, Waller reverted to his first plan: he would push on, rendezvous with Duncan, and send back a relief party.

After waiting an hour for Porter, Waller crossed the river to a new clearing, messed his troops, and saw to it that their feet “were well washed with soap and bathed in a good strong bichloride solution.” At this point Waller’s native runner returned and reported that the insurrectos were so numerous he had not gotten through to Porter. Capt Bearss told Walter he was sure Porter would come along anyway as “he was considering it when he [Bearss] left.” With that, Waller resumed the march.

Waller’s party soon struck a well-defined trail that eventually led to a native shack where they arrested five persons. Two of them, a man and a 12-year-old boy, knew the way to Basey. After a rugged march of two more days, the small party picked up the Sojoton river and, eventually, Dunlap’s party. They reached Basey on 6 January 1902.

Waller takes off again Although exhausted, Waller immediately organized a relief party which he personally led out on 8 January. Altogether he spent nine days in a fruitless search for Porter’s group. Severe floods had removed traces of his own camp sites, thus making it difficult for Waller to trace him.

His troops giving out, he returned to Basey and collapsed. His ankle was in a bad shape, his body covered with sores. He was feverish and

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delirious. He was rushed to the hospital in Tacloban, with a 105° temperature.

In the meantime, Porter dispatched Capt Bearss and Cpl Murphy to Waller, awaiting new orders. When none came by late afternoon, Porter sent out a native who soon returned and reported that he could not find Waller. Porter and Williams now made an estimate of the situation. The last word received from Waller was to build rafts and stand by. Porter concluded that Waller was delaying up ahead because of the sad condition of his troops. Porter’s own troops were nearly exhausted. His native carriers were becoming increasingly surly, and his supply consisted of a few cans of bacon and one ration of coffee. He decided his column must return to Lanang on foot.

So on the morning of 3 January, Porter, who considered himself stronger and in better physical condition than Lt Williams, took GySgt Quick, six men and six natives and started for Lanang where he would organize a relief party. Williams assumed command of the main column and was to remain where he was, wait for Waller and then follow Porter’s trail.

After a brutal march, the Lanang river had risen 15 feet in one night which prevented crossing and re-crossing, Porter’s small party reached the area where the original column had left the boats. Here he was forced to abandon four of his seven Marines, hoping they could subsist on potatoes until his return. He and the rest of his party finally struggled into Lanang on the evening of 11 January, three days after Waller had started out in search of them from Basey.

At Lanang, Porter organized a relief party under Army Lt Williams, but the flood river prevented its departure until 14 January. Two days later the relief party found the four Marines left behind by Porter, got them safely into Lanang by canoe, then pushed on in search of Williams’ column.

Williams, meanwhile, went through the tortures of the damned.

With no rations and his men barefooted, “one day was like the rest. By day we stumbled painfully forward and by night lay in a stupor, tormented by the most vivid dreams of food and comforts. At the first clearing Pvt Baroni, too sick to move, was left, and from that time until five days before we were rescued, ten men were left scattered along the trail, despairing in mind and so nearly dead from starvation and exposure that they could not crawl, and, in most cases, move.”

Native scouts mutiny In addition to their discomforts, their native couriers, whom they

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expected to help them, had become “mutinous.” They repeatedly disobeyed orders, refused to scout the trail or gather firewood. When they found edible wild food, they hid it from the Marines. Late in the ordeal, when Williams ordered three of them to search for firewood, one jumped him, stabbed him with a bolo, and bit him in the hand while the rest looked on. “Although the attack occurred but a few yards from camp, it was at least two minutes before the men came to my assistance, and then the first to come, Sgt McCaffery, was too weak to work the bolt of his rifle.” Pursuit was out of the question. Williams had to let go of the three natives as they escaped into the bush.

Much as he wanted to execute the other natives in his party, it was impossible for Williams and his men in their condition to carry it out.

He was afraid that the natives would kill them instead.

Finally, at noontime of 18 January, the Army relief party came upon Williams and the other survivors who literally crawled towards the Army troopers. They reached Lanang by nightfall, and on the 20th, all of them were in the hospital in Tacloban. He was able to telephone Waller at Basey and told him of their ordeal. The 11 remaining porters were at once arrested and brought to Basey. After their brief interrogation, Waller ordered their execution, which was carried out in the afternoon of the 20th. The next day, he told Gen. Smith that he had “expended” 11 natives.22 Clouded judgement, needless executions Ironically, the press and military mythology lionized the affair into an epic tale of courage and glory. So the ensuing historical record of the patrol is not one of botched leadership but of epic perseverance and survival under unimaginable hardship. On closer look, however, it was Waller’s poorly planned and executed march across the southern end of the island that led to the loss of 11 Marines to starvation, exhaustion and exposure, not the mutiny or disservice of the native couriers. When the Army patrol came upon them, the survivors emerged from the jungle “starving, barefoot, covered with leeches and water sores, and clothed in rags.”

It was, in fact the Filipino porters, using native ingenuity to forage for roots and fruit, that probably saved the remainder of the Marines from perishing. Except for three who deserted on the fateful journey, the couriers ultimately earned even the soldiers’ weapons and ammunition because the Marines emerged from the march literally helpless and halfcrazed with fever.

Thus, Waller’s decision to execute the 10 porters only made matters worse for him and the Marine survivors, who were convinced that

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“Kill Every One Over Ten – Gen. Jacob H. Smith” Editorial Cartoon from the New York Journal, dated May 5, 1902

their misfortune had been aggravated by the treachery of native porters accompanying the patrol. The Marines suspected the porters of conspiracy to mutiny, believing the porters could have foraged more aggressively for food. But evidence of the porters’ mutiny is contradicted by their performance during the patrol, and by the very fact of the porters’ voluntary return to base bearing the hapless Marines’ rifles and ammunition.23 While Waller and his Marines were running in circles in the uncharted jungles of southern Samar, rumors of a conspiracy to repeat the Balangiga affair in Basey circulated in the town, prompting Major Edwin F. Glenn, the brigade provost marshal and judge advocate responsible for counterintelligence, to arrest several noted town personalities, including the presidente municipal Joaquin Cabañas, parish priest Nicanor Acevedo, tax collector Petronillo Jacosalem, and a prominent businessman Nicolas Acevedo. The three of them - Cabañas, Jacosalem and Nicolas Acevedo – were subjected to torture known as the water cure24 and died on January 5, 1902, while the priest Nicanor Acevedo was thrown into prison.

The water cure however produced nothing. It was Marcelino Apolinar, the replacement of Cabañas as presidente municipal, who turned in a spy to Waller when he arrived from the exhausting march on January

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19, 1902. Since the feverish Waller was pronounced by the camp surgeon as incompetent to command at that time, authority in Basey fell on Lt. John H. Day. A frenzy of executions followed, which even became bloodier the next day until a total of 11 Basaynons were executed in the town plaza – providing a grim arithmetic of eleven victims in exchange for the 11 marines lost on the failed Basey-Lanang march.25 In a report that saw print in the New York Times on March 7, 1902, it said: “Some of the circumstances of the case are peculiar. A native was tied to a tree and publicly shot in the thigh. The next day the man was shot in the arms. The third day he was shot in the body, and the fourth day he was killed.

Friends of the two officers attribute actions to loss of mind due to privations they suffered in Samar.”26 Such executions would later prompt court martial proceedings against Waller, Lt. Day and Gen. Jacob Smith himself.

Endnotes 1 Andrews, Frank L., “The Philippine Insurrection (1899-1902): Development of the US Army’s Counterinsurgency Policy,” A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College in partial fulfilment of the requirements for a degree of Master of Arts in Liberal Arts in the Interdepartmental Program in Liberal Arts. United States Military Academy, August 2002, 1990, 78 2 Ibid, 79 3 Bruno, Thomas A. “The Violent End of Insurgency in Samar, 1901- 1902” Army History, PB 20-11-2 (No. 79) Washington, D.C., p. 35 4 Ibid 5 Op. cit.,Oswald 6 Ibid 7 Ibid 8 Ibid 9 Ibid 10 Smith, Gen. Jacob, Circular No. 1. Catbalogan, Samar, dated October 1, 1901 11 General Orders No. 29, Headquarters First District, Department of the Visayas, Tacloban, issued October 27, 1901 12 Bruno, p. 38 13 Ibid, p. 40 14 http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Secretary_Root’s_Record:%22Marked_Severities%22_in_Philippine_Warfare#endnote_40 15 Asprey, Capt. Robert B., “Waller of Samar – Part I,” Marine Corps Gazette, originally published in May 1961 16 C. H. Fischer, Ensign, War Commission Report 17 Maj. Littleton W. T. Waller, Report to Gen. Smith 18 Ibid 19 Orejola, Dr. Wilmo C., MD. “The History of Basey and its People”, http://

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basaynon.org/history.html 20 Op. Cit, Waller 21 Waller Report to Gen. Smith from Basey, Samar, Nov. 1901 22 Oc cit, Asprey 23 Oswald, 17 24 “Now, this is the way we give them the water cure. Lay them on their backs, a man standing on each hand and each foot, then put a round stick in the mouth and pour a pail of water in the mouth and nose, and if they don’t give up pour in another pail. They swell up like toads. I’ll tell you it is a terrible torture.” (From a letter by A. F. Miller, of the 32nd Volunteer Infantry Regiment, published in the Omaha World-Herald in May, 1900) 25 Op cit, Orejola 26 “Waller Trial,” New York Times, March 7, 1902

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Chapter 9

G

Lukban’s Capture

eneral Emilio Aguinaldo’s capture on March 23, 1901 by American General Frederick Funston started a domino-like effect on the other generals of the Philippine revolution.

On March 29, 1901, General Nicolas Capistrano, commander of Filipino guerrilla forces in northern Mindanao Island, surrendered in Sumilao, Bukidnon province followed by Gen. Licerio Geronimo the next day in San Mateo, Morong, a day after the fall of Geronimo, General Ludovico Arejola gave up in Camarines. On April 17, 1901, Col. Maximo Abad turned himself in to the Americans in Marinduque.

From April 19, 1901 when Aguinaldo issued calls to lay down their arms, 11 more field commanders of the Philippine revolution surrendered, starting with Gen. Isidoro Torres of Bulacan on April 24, 1901 to General Arcadio Maxilom in Cebu on October 27, 1901. That year seems to have been marked in Philippine history as the year of surrender to American rule.1 Hundreds of thousands Filipino lives were lost, most of them civilians who were caught in the crossfire or purposely done in to make the leaders give up. Many of the revolutionary leaders, who belonged to the illustrado class, wanted to retire in peace, finding no purpose in further pursuing war as an instrument to reach their political aims.

But Gen. Vicente Lukban of Samar was too far away and too engrossed in his own guerrilla war to be caught in the whirlwind of surrenders. He too was offered tempting terms of surrender a number of times, such as the governorship of the province and other privileges, none of which made headway in his stubborn skull. According to this enemies, “He may have had another reason for continuing to resist. He had been at Biaknabato, and it is possible that the efforts to make him surrender had made him believe that he was so important that if he held out a little longer and increase his military activity, the Americans would consider it worthwhile to offer him a handsome sum in return for peace in Samar. It is true that no statement to this effect appears in the

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records, but such propositions in all times and places are verbal ones.” 2 Indeed, instead of surrendering, he took over the command in Leyte after Gen. Ambrosio Mojica’s surrender, then issued commands in Spanish which, to the Americans, seemed to have come from “a war department in Madrid rather than in the mountain fastness of Samar”.3 His enemies thought that because of the high-falutin’ language, such orders were not understood by his foot soldiers and so were not obeyed. But they seemed to have overlooked that Lukban had competent lieutenants, like college-educated Florentino Peñaranda, who translated these into Waray-waray before issuing them for mass consumption.4 Besides Lukban probably thought he had the upper hand in the ongoing guerrilla war. On October 16, 1901, less than three weeks after the Balangiga encounter, 400 bolomen attacked Company E, 9th Infantry Regiment United States Infantry, under 1st Lieut. George W. Wallace, in Lower Gandara, Samar, killing 10 and wounding six others.5 This was followed by an attack on the same regiment on December 10 that year in Dapdap, that historic portion of the Gandara river where some of the early Spaniards came to settle. In this encounter, 18 American soldiers were annihilated.6 Then Santa Margarita, a town close of Calbayog which had a strong American detachment, was also attacked by the insurgents on the night of January 2, 1902. This was one of those towns that served as concentration camps for natives allied to the Americans. It had a police force with armed volunteers. When they learned that they were about to be attacked, they lighted up their houses and sounded their drums and talutang (bamboo sounding material), which signalled resistance to the insurgents. But the insurgent commander, Major S. Quioson, ordered an attack with a full force, telling his men that anyone offering resistance was to be shot. Four volunteers were killed thus. The local town chief, Benedicto Culili, was about to strike an acting officer Sr. Norona, but he was prevailed upon by his companions. The insurgents took 18 volunteers as prisoners and two other suspected spies to be tried by the revolutionary court, but many of the suspected traitors were able to escape in the dark. They burned 300 newly built houses, cut the telegraph lines to Calbayog and their posts taken down.7 From the documents captured in the house of suspected traitor Alejo Kastellano, the insurgents learned that the Americans had abandoned the towns of Weyler, Relles, Santa Margarita and Natividad. They were concentrating their forces in Calbayog.8 On January 8, Col. Claro Guevarra reported on an uprising in Guiuan, in the southern tip of the island. This was confirmed by Maj.

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Daza who added that 50 rifles were taken from the dead with as much ammunition, and one gunboat with a rapid firing gun sank. The uprising happened because some residents were about to be deported to Guam.

The entire town sympathized with them.9 In the town of San Julian on that coast. Daza also reported that 1,040 cartridges were taken from the enemy.10 But Lukban may not have seen the overall picture in island and outside of it. With the appointment of Gen. Jacob Smith came some 300 Marines, many of them veterans of the Boxer Rebellion in China who understood how to quell similar mass uprisings. General Chaffee gave Smith substan­tial reinforcements, assigning twelve battalions of regular infantry and seven companies of Filipino scouts, or approximately 4,000 men.11 These were now carrying his orders of mass extermination and of pillage and destruction never before done by previous commanders.

Smith had scoffed at the soft-hearted approach of his predecessors and had resolved to turn things around, regardless of public opinion. He actually basked in the description newspaper reports had of him and couldn’t care less, so long as he was winning his war.

In this Smith was making headway. Food blockade caused suffering to many Samareños, especially those who had not shifted from abaca cultivation. Even if they had money, there was nothing to buy. The Americans were confiscating and destroying boatloads of food supplies to Samar. To survive, unarmed civilians had to submit themselves to the concentration hamlets under American protection where food was more accessible. Slowly but steadily, the insurgents’ important base of support was being eroded as the town centers, erstwhile Lukban’s firm supporters, buckled under pressure.

Then on the first week of December, it was reported in the New York Times that Lukban had sent surrender feelers to Smith, which the latter accordingly rejected, saying the time to negotiate was over.

If this was true, it was a complete turnaround of Lukban’s previous pronouncements never to give up. In the same news article, the NYT reported that some 500 natives of Catbalogan volunteered to fight the insurgents in order to bring peace to Samar. Of these, 100 were accepted but they were not given rifles. Instead they were armed with bolos and spears, and did scouting duty under the command of Lt. Compton.12 Evidently, American propaganda had succeeded. Lukban’s base was being eroded.

Smith also kept on pressuring civilians to be more actively proAmericans. He ordered many male residents of coastal towns to leave for the interior, and they were to return only if they were able to bring guns, prisoners or information on the whereabouts of insurgents.13

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The NYT likewise reported in the same issue on the punitive activities of American troopers in Samar, such as the destruction of 117 boats, many of these carrying essential food items, by the US gunboat Frolic under the command of Lt. Cmdr. James M. Helm; the destruction of a rebel fort by Lt. Baines of the 9th Infantry, inflicting heavy losses on insurgents; and the havoc caused on the insurgent cause by troops under Lt. William B. Fltcher, commanding the gunboat Quiros, which destroyed 12 salt factories, 35 tons of hemp, 12 tons of rice and the burning of several barrios in the southern coasts of the island, suspected to be insurgent lairs.14 Getting closer With his mass base gone, Lukban’s world was getting smaller.

According to American reports, Lukban had to move from one village to another to escape the closing dragnet. His faithful soldiers engaged his enemies in one last final fierce battle before their head’s capture. This story is told by an American historian.15 The soldiers of E Company, who came from Luzon, learned that the insurgents in Samar were younger, shorter, more muscular, tougher yet more primitive than their Luzon counterparts. They had few firearms, and those who did could not shoot straight. But they were most adept with long blades and knives, and used long sticks to put their enemies off balance. They liked to fight in swarms and surround their enemies, jabbing here and sometimes slashing. They seldom attacked unless they had the advantage of surprise over the long Krag rifles of the Americans.

Once the latter were in position to shoot, they scampered into the safety of the jungle and disappeared.

The Americans also learned of the various traps and snares laid by the insurgents in the pathways and trails, employing numerous pitfalls with sharpened stakes in the bottoms. These were frequently smeared with poisonous herbs or putrid meat to cause infections to the unlucky victim. A second device was the spear trap that employed a bow to propel one or more objects to impale the unwary soldier. A third popular device was the release of a heavy log to roll downhill to sweep away soldiers walking along a trail. Many American soldiers, especially those arriving at the scene of the conflict for the first time, became victims of these vicious devices. It was likewise difficult to surprise the insurgents because in the sparse settlements close to the jungles, alarm signals from conch shells or bamboo horns or talutang, announced the arrival of the Americans. By the time the latter arrived at the scene, the insurgents were gone.

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With Chaffee applying pressure on the commanders to bring in Lukban, the commanders in turn pressed the village leaders to assist them by either bringing in the rebels or providing information on their whereabouts. The presidente (mayor) provided Captain Francis H. Schoeffel with guides and workers to assist the Americans. The guides proved to be effective, but the workers could only be depended upon to provide labor and could not be trusted to fight. Occasionally the mayor would pass on information, although the Americans doubted if any of the information was useful.

Likewise, they did not expect Samareños to fight against each other.

Hence, they recruited foot soldiers from neighboring Cebu or Leyte, with an American to command them. This was the start of the Philippine Scouts, pre-cursor of the Philippine Constabulary. These men were trained by discharged American Soldiers who received commissions in the new organization. The native troops were given uniforms and weapons and soon they received high praises for their work throughout the islands. In November a company of Filipino scouts under Lt. Lang was assigned to Tarangnan16 to work under Schoeffel.

The Plan Schoeffel wanted to lead the patrol himself as this would probably be the company’s last operation from Tarangnan. The week before, he was told that the company would soon move to a garrison further inland. He directed Lt. Wallace and the two senior NCOs to start preparing for the transfer of property, so that they were not available for this action. The other NCOs were too inexperienced for an important operation such as this one, leaving Schoeffel who was familiar with the terrain as he had worked over the area around Dapdap at least four times prior to this patrol. He was the logical choice.

The two parties were awakened at 2:00 in the morning on December 24 and fed a quick breakfast. Lang’s boats departed Tarangnan in darkness, and by 5:30, they stepped ashore in Dapdap and built a large fire as ordered. This was the decoy. Schoeffel’s three boats followed at a discreet distance. He was pleased to hear the enemy loudly announcing Lang’s force while his entry appeared to escape detection.

Sometime around 7:00 in the morning, the three crafts quietly arrived at the swamp edge of Talinga, and the men slipped into the jungle away from view. The boats then retraced their route to Dapdap where the rowers reported to Lang. E Company moved inland and started their climb of a hill behind Talinga from where Schoeffel would be able to observe the area and the trail leading into Dapdap. He positioned

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himself with a small advance guard of three men and a trusted guide nicknamed Jocko, an older man with a thorough knowledge of the area and an expert at detecting the deadly traps his men had encountered on more than one occasion.

Hearing the heavy fighting in front of him, Swisher urged his men forward, which they faithfully followed, but at what cost. Swisher, Corporal Gaughan and Pvts Joseph Weippert and Frank McAndrew were cut down and fell by the trail, dead of multiple bolo and dagger wounds. Others were hacked as they ran the gauntlet. Only three men - Pvts Benjamin Antry, Nathan Fisk and Edward Butler - arrived unscathed. A fourth man, Arthur Bonnicastle, an Osage Indian from the famous school at Carlisle, Pa., was slightly wounded. His cartridge belt absorbed the full force of a vicious bolo to his midsection, saving his life. With their magazines empty, they clubbed their way forward, cracking the skulls and limbs of the insurgents who swarmed about the survivors. It was now up to these four and Schoeffel to do the fighting as none of the others were sufficiently strong to carry a weapon. Here they prepared for a second assault they feared would soon come. They stood back-to-back and poured round after round into the grass to discourage their attackers.

Within five minutes the battle was over, their foes having slunk away in the tall grass, leaving their dead behind. Schoeffel was still conscious but was unable to stand and was sick to his stomach. He gave orders to retrieve the dead and wounded and bring them to the front where they could be treated. They were collected and placed within a tight circle. One man, Pvt Clark, was missing.

The natives at the rear of the column were now brought forward.

Only Angel, their leader, and a handful of others had responded to Swisher’s orders to come forward. Angel was dying and two others were wounded and out of action. When the others were asked why they did not rush forward, the natives replied that they had only bolos and feared they would be mistaken as enemies and shot down by the Americans.17 The newpapers in the US would later report that “a sergeant, a corporal and five privates were killed. Captain Schoeffel was wounded, but not dangerously. Five privates were dangerously and one slightly wounded.

No property was lost. The enemy was finally repulsed with heavy loss’.”18 Still Lukban eluded capture. The hunt would continue. He remained the only unsurrendered Filipino guerrilla leader, which became an embarrassment to the American public back home.

Captured

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Months earlier in mid-August, Lukban had narrowly escaped a raid by troops of the U.S. 1st Infantry Regiment against his headquarters in the village of Rosario. By a stroke of luck. Captain Jackson, the apprehending officer, chanced upon the sitio of Rosario, said to be the hideout of Lukban and his family. Not being acquainted with Lukban, he did not realize until one of his native guides pointed to a woman in one of the houses and announced that it was “Mrs. Lukban.” On reflex, his men opened fire on fleeing people, one of whom was Lukban himself. The three who were with him were killed and his two military secretaries were captured, and one of them slightly wounded. Lukban’s wife and child were taken to Calbayog. Jackson also seized important documents.19 After that, Lukban, with a small contingent of men, sought refuge in the remote Yava River Valley, moving around constantly to avoid discovery from Army or Scout patrols. No word on his location was heard for several months. Then, on February 11, 1902, native spies reported to the Army’s Laguan garrison Lukban’s position at the village of Tamay. The garrison’s commander, Captain George Bell, Jr., wanted to act quickly on the intelligence before Lukban shifted his location yet again.

Nominally, Bell possessed enough troops from the two companies based in Laguan, Company B, 1st Infantry and the 39th Philippine Scouts. Unfortunately, the majority of these forces were conducting patrols elsewhere. Only half of the 39th’s strength remained on base.

Command of the remaining Scouts from Leyte and Samar fell to 1st Lieutenant Alphonse Strebler, formerly a soldier in the Prussian army.

Bell ordered Lt. Strebler out into the field to locate and capture Lukban.20 Strebler’s hunting party The next day after receiving the intelligence report on Lukban’s location, Lt. Strebler started from Laguan at 6:30 early morning with 40 men composed of native scouts, a corporal and 8 privates, a medical officer, 4 white scouts and 70 native couriers carrying 15 days’ ration – on a launch, steaming up the Catubig to Tagabiran, where they arrived at 10 p. m. that same day. They disembarked the next day at daybreak and started on a trail leading to a sitio called Sag-od along Sag-od River. After two hours on the trek, one of his privates fell into a trap, incapacitating his left foot, so that he had to be brought back to the launch.

They made camp on the right bank of Jopili River, and resumed their march at daybreak of the 13th, arriving at the right bank of the Sag-

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od River at breakfast time. The river was called Sag-od but was just actually a tributary of Catubig River. From the falls the river changes its course to nearly due west. They had to cross the river on a rope going to the barrio of San Jose or Buan, probably its ancient name.

After marching for about three hours, the guide admitted that they were following the wrong trail. So they had to march back to the Sag-od, where the rest of the day was spent scouting along its banks and mountains in search of a trail. At dusk, Strebler’s trusted noncommissioned officer Sgt. Pedro Lora returned, bearing some good news. He said his guide, who used to be with Lukban the previous month, had found the place from which he had started that month. So that night, they camped on the banks of the Sag-od, and early the next day followed a trail indicated only here and there by a broken twig or leaf. They could not see any trail.

By 12 noon, the advance guard captured three men, seven women, and 10 children living in a mountain cave near the dry bed of the Balasbas River. The odor of deer meat flying over a fire had put the scouts on their track. No shot was fired. They made camp at 5 p. m. on the banks of a small mountain stream with their captives. It was the 15th of August, their fourth day on the trail of Lukban.

The next few days, the trek would be harsher and punishing as the surrounding mountains were of volcanic origin, with their sharppointed honeycombed rocks taking their toll on the white American feet. There was only one stream along their path from which they could drink. On the 16th, the tired troops of Strebler marched over the mountains to the Yava River, whose banks they came to near midday.

They followed this river in a south easterly direction till about 1 p. m., when they arrived at a small clearing with three small huts. Here they surprised a man, four women, and three children, and found a basket containing the clothing, uniform, and insignia of Lt. Pondano Jasmines, one of Lukban’s men. Again, they did not fire a single shot.

His captives told Strebler that many people were living in the visita of Yava. So he halted his column with the intent of surrounding the village and capturing everyone there. This was necessary because they had to pass through this visita on their way to Tamay, where Lukban was believed to be hiding.

Four small teams scouted through the surrounding mountains and ravines in the afternoon. One of these, under the command of Corporal Repasa, did not get back until the afternoon of the 17th. They had gone too far to return the same night in their attempt to capture the teniente of the visita of Yava. Repasa said that upon his return, he captured the outpost of Antonis at about 6 p. m. on the 16th, and made him lead

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the way to the man’s house. In the dusk the scouts were mistaken for insurgent soldiers by the natives, and by the time the teniente and his people, who lived in six small houses in a clearing, recovered from their surprise, they were prisoners of Repasa’s squad. For the third time, Strebler’s scouts did not fire a single shot.

One of the natives attacked Corporal Repasa with a bolo, but the latter, though surprised, dropped his rifle and went at his man in bolero style, with his bare hands. Corporal Briones who was nearby came to his comrade’s aid and killed the bolero by breaking his head with the butt of his rifle. Repasa surrendered to Strebler the teniente of the visita, four men, four women, three children, and the latest reports of insurgent chief to Colonel Guevara, including a few recent letters from Lukban to Antonis and the ordnance stamp of Company C, Ninth U. S. Infantry.

Most of the residents of the visita had fled.

On the afternoon of the 17th, another scouting party brought in four men, who had a basket of rice, a box of clothing, some dried carabao (water buffalo) meat, about three pesos in copper coin, one peso in silver, and two pesetas and a letter from a teniente of a barrio on the upper Yava for Col. Claro Guevara. These four carriers were to deliver these goods to Teniente Antonis, who was to forward them to Guevara.

When grilled, Antonis disclosed that Lukban had left Tamay on the 1st of February and gone to Matarag near Matuguinao where he was then supposed to meet Guevara.

So Strebler decided to proceed at once to Matarag, estimated to be three days’ hike southwest of Yava and try to get Lukban and Guevara together. On the 18th early morning, they started out with 30 scouts of Strebler’s company, a corporal and four men, a medic, a civilian scout, and 30 carriers with eight days’ rations. He left 10 scouts, an American soldier and three civilian scouts, under of Sgt. Tomas Estolero, with the prisoners, carriers, and the rest of the rations in camp near the house of Teniente Antonis.

At around 11 a.m., as the advance guard approached the entrance of a large cave, one of Lukban’s messengers emerged from its depths.

He was quickly seized. Under interrogation, the messenger produced a letter from the guerrilla chief, written two days earlier addressed to the teniente of Yava. He told Strebler that he got the letter that morning from the teniente of Maleju, another village close by. By then Strebler was certain that he was on the right track. So he told his scouts to double their pace lest their quarry escaped. He had to find that teniente.

At around 4 p.m., the advance team espied an outpost about 200 yards ahead. Strebler’s scouts silently surrounded the outpost and captured Teniente Pedro of Maleju, with his Remington and 50 rounds

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Gen. Vicente Lukban is flanked by his captor 1st. Lt. Alphonse Strebler (left) and 1Lt. Ray Hoover (right), officer-in-chargemof the guard over him, February 1902.

of ammunition, but his aide escaped. Strebler knew the teniente was the last link to the elusive Lukban. He was the link between Lukban and the messenger. So Lukban must be nearby, Strebler reasoned. Sure enough, the teniente talked after being grilled by the American that the guerrilla chief was just two hours away from where they stood at that very moment.

Leaving the packers and a small guard behind, Strebler started at once with the rest of the column, as fast as the brush and the rocks permitted, up the mountain, now with the teniente as guide. There were no trails, which meant it was a path less taken. In 45 minutes, Strebler’s men were within 50 yards of Lukban’s hideout. Here he halted the column and sent 10 men, under Sergeant Bayona, over the mountain ridge, with orders to lie down in the brush in front and to the right of the three houses. No one was allowed to fire any shot. As soon as the native scouts were in that position, he advanced at a run with his column towards Lukban’s hut, hoping to surprise the rebel leader.

When Lukban heard the noise of feet running over the coral rocks, he came to the door with his secretary, to whom he had just been dictating a letter addressed to Capt Basilio Diaz, of Matuguinao.

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Seeing that escape was impossible, he descended to the ground, raising his hands up and calling. “Paz (peace).” His secretary and aide did likewise. On seeing his captor, Lukban greeted him: ‘’Good afternoon. Lieutenant, I am General Lukban, and now your prisoner.’’ He then ordered his secretary Lt. Luciano R. Ortiz, to turn over his (Lukban’s) Winchester carbine and the lieutenant’s revolver, with about 25 rounds of ammunition apiece.

Then Strebler entered his house and took from him all his papers, but allowed no one to touch any of his property, of which he had but very little. All he had left were two suits of clothing and a pair of shoes.

Everything else had been captured by Captain Jackson during the August raid of Lukban’s quarters in Sitio Rosario. There was nothing else in the house except about 25 pounds of rice and a few camotes (sweet potatoes).

According to Strebler, it was difficult day especially for the white troopers who were not used to such harsh conditions. It rained hard all day, and the waters and streams were swollen. On dry land, thousands of limatok (small leeches) covered the trails. The men who had no shoes suffered a lot, blood running freely from their feet where the leeches were stuck as they suck the blood of their victims and would not leave until they had their fill. But Lukban’s capture lightened up things. Strebler’s plan to capture Guevara with Lukban did not materialize as the latter was sent to the east coast by Lukban a few days earlier. He arrived at Laguan with his prized captive at around 9:30 p.m. on February 22.

In his report, Strebler noted that his troops marched for about 124 miles to the place of capture and their return, not counting the distance travelled by launch from Tagabiran to Laguan and back, a distance of about 28 miles. He estimated the distance from Laguan to Maleju to be about 90 miles south. He had nothing but praise for his men who endured the wild and mountainous country they had traversed, with hardly any trail to speak of. He wrote that their feet were in “no enviable condition…(but) they never complained.” One shot fired would have brought their work to nothing as Lukban and his allies would have been alerted. ”I especially wish to recommend Sgt Pedro Lora, to whose intelligence and energy is due, more than anyone else, that I found my way across the mountains. On our last ‘hike’ under your command this man has shown his value,” Strebler added.21 Endnotes 1 http://philippineamericanwar.webs.com/collapse1901.htm

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2 PIR 980.1 3 Ibid 4 Ibid, 436 5 Correspondence relating to the war with Spain between the adjutant-general of the army and military commanders in the United States, Cuba, Porto Rico, China, and the Philippines online, http://www.ebooksread.com/authors-eng/ united-states-adjutant-generals-office/correspondence-relating-to-the-warwith-spain-and-conditions-growing-out-of-the--372/page-76-correspondencerelating-to-the-war-with-spain-and-conditions-growing-out-of-the--372.shtml 6http://guides.wikinut.com/General-Vicente-R.-Lukban-the-most-hatedgeneral-of-the-Philippine-Revolution/3238ggd1/ 7 Report by Maj. S. Quioson, Exhibit 1363, pp 709-710 8 Ibid 9 C. Guevarra’s report, Exhibit 1364, pp. 711-712 10 Ibid 11 Bruno, 8 12 New York Times, Dec. 4, 1901 13 Ibid 14 Ibid 15 Perrine, David, “The Philippine Insurrection 1899-1902: A combat patrol on Samar,” Infantry Magazine / Jan-Feb, 2009. David Perrine is a retired lieutenant colonel who served 21 years in the Infantry including combat tours in Laos and Vietnam with the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry (Airborne). Synopsis of the encounter also appeared in an American paper. ”Severe fight in Samar,” Hand-to-hand encounter with a band of bolomen; Seven American soldiers killed and Capt. Schoffel and six men wounded, The Indianopolis Journal, Vol. LI- No. 361, Dec. 27, 1901 16 Tarangnan is situated on the western coast of Samar Island, to the south-east of the ancient town of Bangahon (now Gandara) and to the north of Samar’s capital Catbalogan. Tarangnan is found near the former ancient pueblo Tinago, the first town to be Christianized and was made a center or cabecera. During the earlier part of the 17th century, Tarangnan or Tinago was the first settlement of Jesuit missionaries on the island of Samar. Tinago was the first cabecera on Samar where the first Jesuits have arrived, that is October 15, 1596. When Tinago was devastated by the Moro attack in 1618, the Jesuits decided to transfer the cabecera to Catbalogan. Since that time Tinago had not came back to life as pueblo until 1725. The poblacion was established at Dapdap but for access and sanitation it was moved to tarangnan in 1883-1884. The attempted transfer of the pueblo from Dapdap to Tarangnan in 1882 became highly celebrated case. It was a struggle or a fight between the parish priest of Dapdap, Fr. Angel Pulido, OFM and the governadorcillo of Dapdap. (Source: Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Tarangnan,_Samar) 17 Op cit., Perrine 18 “Soldiers Battle With Bolomen, Seven Americans Fall in a Fight on Island of Samar,” San Francisco Call, Volume 91, Number 27, 27 December 1901 19 “Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army and Department

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Commanders,” Annual Reports. War Department, 1902, Volume 9, Washington, Government Printing Office. 1902 20 Parker, Matthew A., “The Philippine Scouts and the Practice of CounterInsurgency in the Philippine-American War, 1899-1913,” a thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Baylor University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts, Department of History 21 From the account of Lt. Strebler, 1902 Annual Report of the War Department

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Chapter 10

I

Surrender of Lukban’s forces

t took several days before the dailies in the US headlined the capture of Samar’s guerrilla chief Vicente Lukban, and when they finally wrote their stories, they were careful to add color to them. Thus in the New York Times for instance, Lukban was described as “one of the most energetic and ferocious of rebels. He is a half-breed, a mixture of Chinese and Filipino stock, and has been an irreconcilable from the first…” He lived in the fastness of Samar “from which he would descend upon the coast towns, and his reign of terror was so complete that the entire population of the island paid tribute to him as the price of freedom from attack.”1 The other papers wrote with similar bias.

This negative perception of Lukban and the local guerrilla movement reflected the official attitude of the American generals towards the insurgent leader, who gave them a hard time in Samar and dealt them decisive blows in a few local battles that involved entire town populations. The examples of Catubig in April 1900 and Balangiga in September 1901 had put them to disgrace in the eyes of the American public. Hence, the subsequent brutal military operations following Balangiga had become vengeful acts that violated their own rules of war, even as they tried to redeem their tarnished image.

To be sure, many of these officials heaved a sigh of relief. After all, Lukban’s capture was the most important military event next to Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo’s seizure the earlier year.2 But Lukban’s troops had to be subdued as well to install peace in Samar and pave the way for the total subjugation of the rebellious segments of the population. In this Lukban had to be tapped. But he demurred at first. Eventually, however, he wrote letters from his place of confinement, urging surrender after he saw the futility of further fighting. He realized that his base among the towns had become shaky and unreliable as they were occupied and controlled by American troops.

But Col. Claro Guevarra, Abuke and his other leaders had not given up even after they learned of Lukban’s capture. In fact, Guevarra immediately assumed the vacant leadership post, became a general, and

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forbade his men to follow Lukban’s subsequent instructions. Thus the Americans sent envoys to Guevarra’s camp to negotiate his surrender.

Initially, Guevarra agreed, and a general armistice started on March 18, 1902, after which Guevarra said he would assemble his forces on the Gandara River on April 15. The Americans kept communicating with him until Gen. Jacob Smith was relieved and temporarily replaced by Colonel De Russy. For some reasons, the surrender was postponed as Guevarra had made several demands, which to the Americans, were not totally acceptable. So the adjutant-general of the 7th Infantry, Capt.

J. A. Penn, had to make a trip to the insurgents’ camp to clarify matters.

In Calbayog, Penn learned from Lieut. S. T. Ansell, Eleventh Infantry, who had been keeping in touch with the insurgent leader as the representative of the brigade commander, about Guevarra’s complaint to Colonel De Russy that the armistice had not been observed. Penn suspected that Guevarra and his troops were either preparing to go back to the mountains or were forcing them to terms favourable to them.

The situation was volatile. Failure in handling this could lead to a fresh outbreak of hostilities, which the Americans did not want to happen. After all, the insurgents’ leader was captured, which was in itself a great victory to them. In any event, the situation appeared critical. So from Calbayog, Penn took a gunboat and started up the Gandara river, arriving at the American post of Erenas, and proceeded the next day on another launch to Guevarra’s camp. Capt. Peter Traub, an excellent Spanish scholar, accompanied him from Erenas, serving as interpreter in the subsequent talks with Guevarra.

The camp was located several miles above Erenas on the same fork of the Gandara. On arrival there, Penn said they were received with proper honors by the insurgents, “albeit with surly looks.” An interview with Guevarra followed, lasting several hours. As he stated in his complaint, Guevarra said the armistice had not been observed by the Americans, and that a company of his troops in northeastern Samar, on their way to join him on the Gandara, had been fired upon by native police and soldiers from Laguan or Catubig, and several of them were killed.

This, he said, caused restlessness among his people and, since many of them did not like to surrender, it was difficult to control them. Penn assured him that the incident would be investigated at once, and if anyone had violated the armistice, he was going to be punished. He added that suspicion on both sides was a “natural consequence of a long armistice.” Guevarra intimated then that his subordinates were more or less opposed to surrender except under terms giving them political guarantees and the return of money captured or derived from the sale

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Filipino General Claro Guevarra, Col. Francisco Rafael, Col. Narciso Abuke and other officers of Gen. Vicente Lukban during the surrender rites held in Catbalogan on April 26, 1902, some four months after the capture of Lukban. Representing the Americans and accepting the surrender is Gen. Frederick Grant, son of the famous Union General Ulysses Grant (Source: https://www.loc.gov/rr/hispanic/1898/ img/insurrd.jpg).

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Another view of the surrender rites in Catbalogan on February 27, 1902 at the town plaza, with the ancient church of Catbalogan in the background. (Source: https://s-media-cache-ak0.pinimg.com/originals/12/97/61/1297613b4f68161b5553bae43704bdd6.jpg)

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of captured hemp, and various other conditions.

But Penn would not give in to any of Guevarra’s demands, insisting that the surrender would have to be “unconditional.” Moreover, Guevarra had to fix the date - the earlier the better – and those who did not wish to give up would be hunted down like fugitives. Guevarra asked to be allowed to talk things over with his jefes (chiefs). Penn promised him that he would release all prisoners of war who were not convicted of any crime, including those charged without sufficient evidence.

Somehow, the jefes did not pose any objections and the discussion was short. The date was fixed for the 27th of April, 1902, a Sunday. The place – Catbalogan.

Three sets of the terms of surrender in Spanish were signed, with one copy going to Guevarra and two copies to the Americans.

Surrender in Catbalogan From the pictures shown, it appears that the surrendering officers and troops were fitted with brand new uniforms, while Catbalogan was decked with an arch near the pier under which the surrendering troops would pass on April 26, 1902, Saturday. Since Eugenio Daza, who was part of the officers’ corps, was in Calbiga, he too was fetched with his men in small launches. Tents were erected and rations issued to the insurgents. The formal surrender was received at 3:30 in the afternoon of the next day, with the population of Catbalogan witnessing the event.

Since Gen. Jacob Smith was replaced in the first week of April, Gen. Frederick Grant, eldest son of the Union Gen. Ulysses Grant, received the surrender of Gen. Guevarra and his troops.

In the list were the officers and men of the insurgent forces of the island, including Gen. Claro Guevarra; Cols. Francisco Rafael and Sebastian; Lieut. Col. Narciso Abuke and one other lieutenant-colonel; five majors, including Eugenio Daza, who was suspected of leading and planning the Balangiga fight; 14 captains, 12 first and 30 second lieutenants; or a total of 66 officers and 236 riflemen and 443 boleros. A few days later, five more riflemen and 53 boleros also surrendered at Catbalogan.3 The firearms turned over were assorted: 115 Krag rifles, 1 Krag carbine, 79 Remington rifles, 31 Mauser rifles, 14 miscellaneous guns, for a total of 240. As for the ammunition, the surrendered insurgents also turned over 7,500 rounds Krag cartridges and 500 miscellaneous, totalling 8,000.

After the Catbalogan surrenders, 18 more men, with 2 Remington rifles, a shotgun and 18 rounds ammunition, turned themselves in on

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Lukban’s deputies Gen. Claro Guevarra and Col. Francisco Rafael in their uniforms just before the surrender rites in Catbalogan, April 27, 1902 (Source: https://s-mediacache-ak0.pinimg.com/736x/3a/95/f9/3a95f962a7564b76ac224a7a2d814de9.jpg)

May 11. In Tacloban on May 13, a Lieut. Ignacio Alar, with 3 officers and 35 others gave themselves up with 12 Krag rifles, a Springfield rifle, 3 shotguns, and 1,000 rounds ammunition. According to Captain Penn’s official report, this last surrender accounted for every insurgent officer known to them in Samar.4 Restoration of peace in the towns The transition from war to peace in Samar was not going to be easy, the new colonial administrators had to admit. First, the population even in towns garrisoned by the Americans had to be completely won over. Their being ‘timid and primitive’, with little or no understanding of government, and their previous unpleasant experiences with the soldiers and the police, made this task doubly difficult. No doubt, there was much hostility, the same hostility shown by the troops of Guevarra who at first refused to surrender. But the Americans saw it urgent to immediately organize a civilian government in every pueblo and establish a semblance of normality that was deprived of the population in the past few years.

In this task, the services of the surrendered officers, particularly Francisco Rafael, Narciso Abuke and Eugenio Daza, former officers of Lukban, would be useful. The three would not taste prison but were instead utilized for peace keeping functions. Each was given a district

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through which he was sent to persuade the people to return to their pueblos and rebuild their houses, and to urge the principales to report at the nearest military station to take the oath of allegiance before the American officers. But the task of organizing the civilian governments was a function assumed by the American station commanders, who were ‘directed in every case to follow as far as possible the wishes of the people’ under General Orders No. 43.

As far as practicable, the commanding officers were to follow the wishes of the people as regards the selection of cabezas and other town officials. In all likelihood, people selected their officials following the old traditional ways under the previous Spanish regime.

Thus, the principales and local elite, who lorded it over in the past, were back in power. All they had to do was take an oath of loyalty before the American flag, and power was handed to them in a silver platter. Of course, they were required to have an American flag flying over public buildings, establish schools, keep roads and trails in repair, ‘see that all the streets, houses, and surroundings were kept clean and in a sanitary condition; isolate and care for all cases of infectious or contagious disease; report promptly any outbreak of smallpox, cholera, or other serious disease; construct in each town not garrisoned a suitable building for public purpose, which could be used from time to time by detachments of troops to avoid the necessity of using private houses for such purpose; to maintain order, and to show proper respect for the officers in command of districts and their local officials.’ By June 16, 1902, the civil government was established in the province of Samar, and the island transferred to the civil authorities.5 But many of Samar’s important towns remained garrisoned where residents continued to be monitored by American troopers and the newly-organized Philippine Scouts composed of natives under an American commander. Towns like Guiuan, Borongan, Oras with subposts in Dolores and Tubig, Laguan with sub-posts in Pambujan and Palapag, Catubig, Catarman, Bobon, Calbayog, Catbalogan, Paranas, Sta. Rita, Binatac and Basey had garrisons. Each had at least a company of soldiers, but the garrisons at Calbayog and Catbalogan were each augmented by a company of Philippine Scouts. However, this number of garrisoned towns had been greatly reduced from the previous number of 45 towns. 6 In the meantime, all the ports of Samar were opened to coast trade beginning on May 15, and vessels began arriving immediately with food, clothing, and supplies. Competition resulted from the numerous attempts to develop business in hemp and copra. From 8 to 10 pesos a picul, hemp rose to 24 pesos, a price never before reached in the island. This was favorable to the peace efforts of the American colonial

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administrators who saw in it the prospects of getting people more contented and less disposed to creating trouble again. With the port opening came the provisional appointment of customs inspectors who were to hold office until they were relieved by civilian officials.7 Yet while Guevarra’s surrender accounted for practically all his armed troops, there remained in the hinterlands of Samar several discontented elements that had not joined Lukban, preferring to operate independently. Initially, these were known as ‘dios-dios’ because of their religious beliefs that purportedly made them invulnerable to bullets.

A band of them raided one of the barrios of Paranas shortly after the surrender of Guevarra’s troops, but they were repulsed by the Philippine Scouts under Lt. Allen Walker, resulting in the surrender of 25 boleros.

A few months after the surrender, a new surge of rebellion emerged, this time led by indigenous leaders of the dios-dios now renamed as ‘pulajanes.’8 This would last longer than the Lukban-led insurrection – and would be a lot bloodier.

Endnotes 1 Feb. 27, 1902, The New York Times 2 1902 War Department Report 3 The list of surrenderees on April 27, 1902, at Catbalogan, Samar as reported by the brigade commander: Gen. Claro Guevarra, Col. Francisco Rafael, Lieut. Cols. Narciso Abuke, Agapito Sebastian, Majs. Leonio Guioson, Eugenio Daza, Andres Lobrio, Jose Hermosilla, Teodoro Garfin, Capts. Ramon Serrano, Gemimo Abcede, Corme Antonio, Victor Maurino, Luiano Limo, Meliton Almanton, Benito Azanza, Peregrin Albano, Clodoaldo Linero, Severino Linero, Julian Cabseang, Alejandro Mendeniola, Valeriano Abanador, Eulogio Barretto, First Lieuts. Hilarion Enriano, Lazaro Giray, Cesario Ortez, Nazario Dimaquileng, Leonio de Platino, Andres Barandino, Poeniano Mankol, Matias Fajardo, Jose Cultura, Peligio Acosta, Tuciano Ortez, Cirilo Epriltano, Second Lients. V’icente Roxas, Francisco Limo, Hipolito Rino, Manuel Rasell, Lino Cruz, Poniano Jazenines, Leopoldo Artecha, Mariano, Cueva, Pio Cazalla, Lacarias Base, Esperidion Farrayo, Jose Permosa, Mato Narona, Naruso Roales, Julian Bautista, Benedicto Merillo, Hilaro Nunez, Pilarion Laturre, Eliseo Latarre, Santiago Donesa, Juaquin Obao, Hermogenes Rosales, Eleuterio Neyra, Gregorio de los Reyes, Marelto Mira, Pasenalcena Patricia Comando, Gavino Buenaventura, Balbino Reyes, Miguel de la Sala Valentin Abelgasa, Ubaldo Llanr, with 236 riflemen, 444 bolomen, 112 Krag rifles, 1 Krag carbine, 78 Remington, 31 Mauser rifles, 14 miscellaneous guns; total, 236 rifles, practically all serviceable, about 8,000 rounds of ammunition, 7,500 of which was Krag. Since the 27th, 5 riflemen and 53 bolomen, with 3 Krags and 1 Remington, have presented themselves at Catbalogan. (From the report of J. A. Penn, Captain, Seventh Infantry , Adjutant-General, May 6, 1902, Annual

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Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 1902, Vol 9) 4 Op. cit., J. A. Penn report 5 Ibid 6 Frederick D. Grant. Brig. General, Department of South Philippines, Annual Reports of the War Department, FY June 30, 1902, Vol. IX 7 Adjutant General’s Report 8 Ibid

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Chapter 11

Epilogue

Vicente Rilles Lukban did not fade into obscurity after his guerrilla days in Samar. He was brought by his captors to Manila, then imprisoned in Talim Island in Laguna de Bay until July 15, 1902. He lived in Manila with his family after his release, but in 1904, he and his brothers were charged with sedition by the Manila police. However, these charges would be dismissed by the Supreme Court. He returned to the public eye when he ran for governor of Tayabas in 1912 and won.

He ran again in 1916 but did not complete his term due to illness. He died on November 16, 1916.

In later historical accounts, his name would be scarcely mentioned because of his critical role in Samar where the biggest number of American soldiers had paid with the ultimate sacrifice. In the history of the Philippine-American war, it was in Samar where Americans suffered the greatest number of casualties. It was also in Samar where they were put to shame in the well-documented Balangiga affair and in a number of other smaller encounters. The American press, which sensationalized the encounter in Balangiga, expressed the opinion that during the war, the Philippines meant Samar and Samar meant the Philippines.1 Lukban’s nemesis, the Philippine Scout Sgt. Pedro Lora, who was largely responsible for his capture along with other Filipino collaborators in the Philippine Scouts, did not fare so well in his short life. Although that single exploit earned him the highest rank given to a native, that of a second lieutenant, cholera took his life a year afterwards. He was only 32.

Lora’s commanding officer, Lt. Alphonse Strebler, who was credited by superior officers for Lukban’s capture, suffered a worse fate.

After his commendation for a job well done in Samar, he was given a regular Army commission and assigned to an Artillery Corps in Fort Hunt, Virginia, in May 1903. Months later, he figured in an embezzling scandal, using government funds to pay off his debts. He was fingered by his own subordinate, arrested but broke arrest and fled the fort.

Three months later, he was dropped from the Army roster as a deserter.2

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Two other controversial figures in the war in Samar, Brig. Gen. Jacob Smith and Maj. Littleton Waller, did not go unscathed. Waller was accused of murdering 11 native porters after his failed march across the jungles of Samar in pursuit of suspected rebels. While he admitted to giving the execution orders, he would not accept that he was a murderer “in violation of the 58th article of war.”

The court martial would not have taken place if word of the execution of the natives did not reach Maj. Gen Chaffee in Manila.

Already in trouble with Governor Taft for his military policy, Chaffee at once queried Brig. Gen. Smith, who started the official investigation that led to Waller’s arrest and court-martial. This on March 17, 1902, barely a month after Lukban’s capture.

Waller was defended by Cdr Adolf Marix, USN, Maj Edwin F. Glenn, 5th US Infantry, and one Mr. Oscar Sutro, of whom nothing is found in the records. Senior Member of the Court was BGen William H. Bisbee, USA. In addition to seven Army officers ranging from colonel to captain, the Court comprised six Marines, including Maj. William P. Biddle and Capt. Eli C. Cole.

Waller’s defense maintained that he was not only acting completely within his authority as area commander in time of war and under martial law (as opposed to military law) within the terms of General Order Number 100, but his act was fully justified by the circumstances and was defended by national and international precedents.

But now an Army major named Kingsbury, who was Judge Advocate prosecuting, called Smith as a witness for the prosecution.

At the witness stand, Smith was his usual irrepressible self. After Kingsbury was able to establish that Smith had not seen Waller’s original operations order, particularly, the last paragraph that stated: “We have also to avenge our late comrades in North China-the murdered men of the Ninth United States Infantry,” Smith could not help himself. He added that that the massacre at Balangiga was actually ‘defensible’ under international laws of warfare.

This was too much for defense. Calling Waller to the stand, his counsel asked him to describe the original conference with Gen Smith, the one that had inspired the now questionable operations order. Waller told the Court that in front of witnesses that Smith had stated to him, “I want no prisoners,” and “I want you to kill and burn. The more you kill and burn, the better you will please me.”

Waller then testified that Smith wanted all persons killed “who

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were capable of bearing arms.” When Waller asked him what age limit he should respect, he was told ten years! Further, before Waller’s final assault against the Sohoton stronghold, he had received a message from Smith ordering, “You will make the interior of Samar a howling wilderness!”

The evidence was terribly damning to Smith, the more so because Waller obviously had employed great restraint throughout the campaign in carrying out such desired retribution. As Porter testified - and he was witness to the conference - Waller later told him in reference to the order to kill ten-year-old insurgents, “. . . we are not making war against women and children, Porter; we are making war against men capable of bearing arms.”

And when in Court the Major was asked, “Why did you take prisoners . . . when you had specific orders not to take them?” he replied, “I have been twenty-three years in the service; I have served with almost every army in the world; and I know the laws of war, sir.”

The subsequent statement of Waller seemed to have swayed the court in his favour. “As the representative officer responsible for the safety and welfare of my men, after investigation and from the information I had, considering the situation from all points I ordered the eleven men shot. I honestly thought I was right then, I believe now that I was right. Whatever may happen to me I have the sure knowledge that my people know, and I believe the world knows that I am not a murderer.”

After lengthy deliberation the Court agreed: Major Littleton W. T. Waller, USMC, was acquitted. So was his co-accused, Lt. John Day. Although the Court’s decision was denounced by the local reviewing authority, it was upheld by the Judge Advocate General of the War Department, who also ironically concluded that Waller’s original plea “in bar of jurisdiction” was valid. Therefore, he ruled, “the court-martial acted without jurisdiction and . . . its proceedings are, for that reason, null and void…”

But that was not the end of the affair. Under fire by important civilians for his Philippine policy, a thoroughly alarmed President Roosevelt immediately ordered “a most thorough, searching and exhaustive investigation” into Army policy in America’s newest possession. Less than a month after Waller’s trial, Chaffee was forced to court-martial five regular Army officers, one of whom was Brig. Gen Jacob Smith.

Found guilty of the charge, “conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline” -specifically, his retributive orders to Waller Smith was sentenced “to be admonished by the reviewing authority.” Elihu Root, however, in forwarding the case to the President, concluded that, despite Smith’s excellent military record, his action was inexcusable.

Since he was going on 62 years of age, Root recommended Smith be retired. Roosevelt agreed.

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But for a political coincidence, the episode probably would have left Waller otherwise unscathed. But the Governor of the Philippines at the time, William Howard Taft, was a mortal enemy of Maj. Gen. Chaffee and his military policy with which Waller was inextricably involved.

In 1911, when Waller became eligible for Commandant of the Marine Corps, Taft was President and chose instead William P. Biddle who, as a major, had sat on Waller’s court-martial.3 But was Waller truly innocent of the charges as the military court had declared? In his arguments, Waller said the porters were conspiring to mutiny. Hence, their execution. But the facts contradicted him as the porters voluntarily returned to camp after the tragic march, carrying the hapless Marines’ rifles and ammunition. No one however told the military court about this or spoke in behalf of the porters. It had simply relied on the statements of military men who testified in behalf of Waller and Day. Perhaps, in closing, the US had made a convenient scapegoat of the retiring Brig. Gen. Jacob Smith as the person responsible for the excesses committed by their soldiers in the hinterlands of Samar.

But as the records would show, Smith was only the last in the long list of commanders implementing American colonial policy and its harsh, brutal and repressive measures, ranging from food blockade, the establishment of garrisoned towns, the use of torture to exact information from suspected rebels, burning, pillaging and destruction of villages, food items, and killing of work animals…acts admitted in their official reports. Smith became the impersonation of an American officer gone haywire, the favorite poster boy of critical American press. His statements were echoed in cartoon editorials in many of these newspapers of the period, encapsulating and dramatizing some elements of American neo-colonial policy.

Casualties of War By the time American President Theodore Roosevelt formally declared the end of Philippine-American War on July 4, 1902, the casualties numbered 4,200 Americans dead and 2,800 wounded. Those of suspected insurgents reached 20,000 killed, while Filipino noncombatants numbered 200,000 dying from disease, famine and other effects of war.

The overall cost in human lives of American actions in the Philippines was horrific. One scholar has concluded concerning the American occupation that “…in the fifteen years that followed the defeat of the Spanish in Manila Bay in 1898, more Filipinos were killed by U.S. forces

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than by the Spanish in 300 years of colonization. Over 1.5 million died out of a total population of 6 million.”4 A detailed estimate of both civilian and American military dead is offered by historian John Gates, who sums up the subject as follows: “Of some 125,000 Americans who fought in the Islands at one time or another, almost 4,000 died there. Of the non-Muslim Filipino population, which numbered approximately 6,700,000, at least 34,000 lost their lives as a direct result of the war, and as many as 200,000 may have died as a result of the cholera epidemic at the war’s end…. “5 Yet another estimate states, “Philippine military deaths are estimated at 20,000 with 16,000 actually counted, while civilian deaths numbered between 250,000 and 1,000,000 Filipinos. These numbers take into account those killed by war, malnutrition, and a cholera epidemic that raged during the war.”6 That U.S. troops slaughtered Filipino civilians out of proportion to the conventions of so-called “formal” warfare was remarked upon during the Senate investigation of the war’s conduct. As one official from the War Department estimated, “The comparative figures of killed and wounded -- nearly five killed to one wounded if we take only the official returns -- are absolutely convincing. When we examine them in detail and find the returns quoted of many killed and often no wounded, only one conclusion is possible. In no war where the usages of civilized warfare have been respected has the number of killed approached the number of wounded more nearly than these figures. The rule is generally about five wounded to one killed. What shall we say of a war where the proportions are reversed?”7 As for Samar, the Philippine Commission reported in 1903 that of the 40 pueblos in the island, 23 have been reduced and burned completely to ashes by the American forces. Four were partly destroyed (Catbalogan, Capul, Catarman and Basey). Only a total of 13 pueblos were “respected”: Tarangnan, Sto. Niño, Calbayog, Bobon, Laoang, Palapag, Mercedes, Guiuan, Santa Rita, Villareal, Calbiga, Jiabong and Zumarraga. There are no estimates on the number of natives killed or wounded.

But in a report by one of its field commanders, we read: “I find that while the insurgents destroyed many of the principal pueblos and barrios of the island to prevent the Americans finding

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shelter therein, our troops destroyed very little, and this destruction was generally confined to isolated shacks which sheltered the enemy in the hills, though in a few cases the American troops did destroy towns. “8 Gen. Frederick Grant was, of course, speaking for himself. Grant took over from Gen. Smith and was the one who formally accepted the surrender of Guevarra and the remaining insurgent troops after the capture of Lukban. He was no doubt trying to downplay the excesses committed by American troops in Samar.

No matter. For a nation who had just thrown off the yoke of more than 300 years of Spanish rule, American intervention and the subsequent use of force to enforce a questionable and unjust treaty can never be justified or adequately explained – except as an act of imperialist greed.

The next 40 years of American rule in the country could not salvage the backward economies of Samar and other conquered provinces. For one, Samar had remained in the backwaters, with many of its villages listed as the poorest in the entire country. Its current politics harken back to the old colonial days when the local illustrados governed the masses and kept them dependent on political largesse. American rule had not changed that but was in fact foisted on that structure, and to this day the politics in the island is a grim reminder of colonial politics. Sadly, Lukban’s brief stint was not able to change that. The elite leaders could not be persuaded to give body and soul to support the anti-American enterprise. Capitulation to the American cause became the order of the day especially in the last days of Lukban when he was on the run. In most cases, the presidentes municipal and their appointees were the first to capitulate to the enemy.

Could Lukban have won against the American juggernaut if the local illustrados supported him and his cause? Considering the conditions, it was highly improbable for them to give him that support because of their vulnerability to pressure. There was too much at stake to lose. These illustrados were the propertied classes who had some land and probably engaged in some business. To be identified with Lukban meant to be persecuted and probably killed or tortured. The best they could do was to support Lukban in secret and double as officials of the American regime in the towns. To the credit of a few of such heroic souls, some illustrados juggled their lives on such dangerous games and still lived to tell their horror stories. But many were tortured and killed.

The most effective strategy the Americans had used against the natives of Samar was hamletting. Earlier they instituted food blockade so that goods from the neighboring provinces could not get in. Later they

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re-organized the towns into concentration camps where the movement of the residents became closely monitored and restricted. It became impossible for the insurgents to draw support from ordinary farmers who could barely produce enough for their own families’ sustenance.

The waters where the forces of Lukban were swimming became increasingly shallow, that they were forced to retreat farther into the forests where food was not available, where even non-combatants were easy targets of American patrols.

It would thus be a mistake to put the blame on the illustrados for Lukban’s defeat. Under the situation, there was no way Lukban could have won in his enterprise. He himself did not believe he could do it, given the enemy’s military and technical superiority. But he hoped to delay the fight so that American public opinion could be swayed in favour of the call for Philippine independence and an end to American militarist intervention. However, that too did not happen even when a new American president was elected.

To my mind, the greatest act of Lukban was his stubborn refusal to surrender despite the adverse conditions. His subsequent call to his remaining forces to give up after his capture was an act to save further loss of lives in Samar because to continue fighting would only increase casualties in both guerrilla and civilian lives. The American General Jacob Smith had promised to turn Samar into a “howling wilderness” where even children above 10 years old were not spared. The slogan had become a sordid reality in the months after Balangiga. To stop the massive depopulation measures of the mad general, the insurgents had to surrender. I think it was the most honourable thing to do under the circumstances.

More than 40 years later when the country finally gained its political independence, Lukban’s guerrilla war was largely forgotten. Only memories of Balangiga, Catubig and a few other victorious encounters remained in the aging minds of survivors and their descendants. Vicente Rilles Lukban and his men had become mere footnotes of historical accounts known only to a few students of history. # Endnotes

1 http://museobulawan.com/Vicente%20Lukban%202.html 2 Lt. Alphonse Strebler arrived for duty at Fort Hunt in May 1903, just a few months before Captain Curtis took command. Strebler’s brief tenure at Fort Hunt was unexceptional, until an enlisted man fingered him for embezzlement and fraud.

In an affidavit sworn in Fairfax County Court, Pvt. Thomas Bradley claimed that in July 1904, Strebler had called him into his office and asked him to falsely endorse a government check made out to an Alexandria contractor who had recently painted

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the quarters at Fort Hunt. At the officer’s request, Bradley cashed the check in Washington with a liquor merchant and paid Strebler’s bill there, then used the remaining funds to settle Strebler’s personal accounts at various other businesses in Washington and Alexandria. Bradley claimed…that he was only following orders and was aware of no wrong doing. He thought nothing of the episode until he later overheard the Quartermaster Sergeant and clerk mention that the contractor had been demanding payment for the painting job, but the check had somehow disappeared. At this point Bradley reported the incident to acting post commander First Lt. Willis C. Metcalf.

Digging though Strebler’s confiscated files, an Army investigator found that the lieutenant had been using his position as Quartermaster, Commissary and even Athletics Officer to skim money from various post accounts. Strebler was placed under arrest in his quarters on Feb. 9, leaving Metcalf the only post officer not under suspicion of theft. The following day he broke arrest and fled Fort Hunt. Searching his quarters, Metcalf discovered that Strebler had destroyed all photographs of himself before escaping. Three months later, the errant officer had still not been apprehended, and was dropped from the rolls of the Army as a deserter. (Matthew D. Laird, PhD, “By the River Potomac,” An historic resource study of Fort Hunt Park, George Washington Memorial Parkway, Mount Vernon, Virginia, Cultural Resources, Inc., 2000, pp 65-66) 3 Capt. Robert B. Asprey , “Waller of Samar ,“ Marine Corps Gazette, May 1961 4 Gates, John, “The Pacification of the Philippines,” The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare 5 Ibid 6 Ibid 7 Ibid 8 Frederick D. Grant, Department of South Philippines, War Department Report 1902, Vol. 9, p. 417

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References A. Newspapers 1. The Salt Lake Herald, Nov. 14, 1899 2. Associated Press, Washington, Sept. 29, 1901 3. The Chicago Tribune, September 29, 1901 4. The Akron Daily Democrat, Sept. 30, 1901 5. “Waller Trial,” New York Times, March 7, 1902 6. The Indianopolis Journal, Vol. LI- No. 361, Dec. 27, 1901 7. New York Times, Dec. 4, 1901 8. The New York Times, Feb. 27, 1902 9. “Soldiers Battle With Bolomen, Seven Americans Fall in a Fight on Island of Samar,” San Francisco Call, Volume 91, Number 27, 27 December 1901 B. Internet 1. “The Roman Catholic Diocese of Calbayog,” Pagduaw 2012 : http:// pagduaw2012.weebly.com/the-church.html 2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_August_Kobb%C3%A9 3. Doroquez , Quintin L., “The Battle of Catubig”, August 26, 2006, http://gugma.samarnews.net/articles/article29.htm 4. http://countrystudies.us/philippines/17.htm 5. Sellers, Michael, “The Warriors of Samar,” The Balangiga Uprising of 1901, http://warriorsofsamar.thejohncarterfiles.com/the-bells/ 6. http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Secretary_Root’s_ Record:%22Marked_Severities%22_in_Philippine_ Warfare#endnote_40 7. Orejola, Dr. Wilmo C., MD. “The History of Basey and its People”, http://basaynon.org/history.html 8. http://www.ebooksread.com/authors-eng/united-states-adjutantgenerals-office/correspondence-relating-to-the-war-with-spain-andconditions-growing-out-of-the--372/page-76-correspondence-relating-

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to-the-war-with-spain-and-conditions-growing-out-of-the--372.shtml 9. http://guides.wikinut.com/General-Vicente-R.-Lukban-the-mosthated-general-of-the-Philippine-Revolution/3238ggd1/ 10. http://philippineamericanwar.webs.com/collapse1901.htm 11. http://museobulawan.com/Vicente%20Lukban%202.html10 12. Carl J. Bordeos, http://lavezares.webs.com/didyouknow.htm 13. Charo Nabong-Cabardo, “The Arteches of Catbalogan,” August 29, 2007, http://www.samarnews.com/news2007/aug/f1304.htm 14. Gates, John, “The Pacification of the Philippines,” The U.S. Army and Irregular Warfare, http://discover.wooster.edu/jgates/files/2011/11/ fullbook.pdf B. Books

1. James H. Blount, The American Occupation of the Philippines, 18981912 2. Reynaldo H. Imperial, Leyte (1898-1902): The Philippine-American War, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, 1996 3. Hurley,Victor, Jungle Patrol, The Story of the Philippine Constabulary, (E.P. Dutton, New York, 1938) 4. Philippine Commission Reports 1901 5. Report of War Commission 1900 6. Philippine Insurgent Records, 1896-1901, with Associated Records of the United States War Department , 1900-1906, (Vibal Publishing House) 7. John R.M. Taylor, The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States.

Vol. II (Eugenio Lopez Philippine Historical Series, 1968) 8. Schumacher, John N., Revolutionary Clergy, SJ Ateneo de Manila Press, Loyola Heights, Quezon City, Metro Manila, 1981 9. Borrinaga, Rolando O. The Balangiga Conflict Revisited, New Day Publishers, Quezon City, 2013 10. Young, Kenneth Ray, “Guerrilla Warfare: Balangiga Revisited”, Readings in Leyte Samar History, Divine Word University of Tacloban, 1979 C. Papers/ Journals 1. Carson, Ted W. “The Philippine Insurrection: The U.S. Navy in a Military Operation Other than War, 1899-1902”, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 2004 2. Oswald, Mark. “The Howling Wilderness Courts-Martial of 1902,” Department of the Army, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,

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PA 17013-5050 3. Major Stephen H. Brock, Jr., “U.S. Army Full Spectrum Operations in the Philippine Islands 1898-1941” 4. Andrews, Frank L., “The Philippine Insurrection (1899-1902): Development of the US Army’s Counterinsurgency Policy,” 5. Bruno, Thomas A. The Violent End of Insurgency in Samar, 1901- 1902, Army History, PB 20-11-2 (No. 79) Washington, D.C. 6. Perrine, David, The Philippine Insurrection 1899-1902: A combat patrol on Samar, Infantry Magazine / Jan-Feb, 2009.

7. Asprey, Capt. Robert B., Waller of Samar – Part I, Marine Corps Gazette, originally published in May 1961 8. Parker, Matthew A., “The Philippine Scouts and the Practice of Counter-Insurgency in the Philippine-American War, 1899-1913,” a thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Baylor University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts, Department of History 9. Laird, Matthew D. Laird, PhD, “By the River Potomac,” An historic resource study of Fort Hunt Park, George Washington Memorial Parkway, Mount Vernon, Virginia, Cultural Resources, Inc., 2000 D. US Government Reports, Circulars, Orders

1. Brig. Gen. William A. Kobbe, “Report of an expedition to occupy and open hemp ports in the Philippine Islands,” January 18 to April 8, 1900 2. J. C. Gilmore, Jr., Major, Forty-third Infantry, USV, Commanding Second Battalion. Hqs. Second Battalion , Report of the War Commission 1900 3. “Report of an Engagement with Insurgents at Catubig, Island of Samar, April 15 to 19, 1900,” By Capt. H. M. Dey, Forty-Third Infantry, U.S.V. 4. War Commission Report 1900 5. Report of First Lieut. J. T. Sweeney to Capt. H. M. Dey, Forty-third Infantry, U.S.V., Report of the War Commission 1900 6. Allen, Maj. Henry T., “Report of Operations of the Island of Samar, April 16 to April 30, 1900,” Forty-Third U.S.V. Infantry, Commanding District of Samar, Report of War Commission 1900 7. Report of the Philippine Commission, Secretary of War, From December 1, 1900 to October 15, 1901, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1901, United States Philippine Commission 8. Smith, Gen. Jacob, Circular No. 1. Catbalogan, Samar, dated October 1, 1901

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9. General Orders No. 29, Headquarters First District, Department of the Visayas, Tacloban, issued October 27, 1901 10. C. H. Fischer, Ensign, War Commission Report 11. Maj. Littleton W. T. Waller, Report to Gen. Smith, Nov. 1901 12. “Report of the Lieutenant-General Commanding the Army and Department Commanders,� Annual Reports. War Department, 1902, Volume 9, Washington, Government Printing Office. 1902 13. Account of Lt. Alphonse Strebler, 1902 Annual Report of the War Department 14. J. A. Penn, Captain, Seventh Infantry , Adjutant-General, May 6, 1902, Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 1902, Vol 9 15. Grant, Brig. General Frederick D., Department of South Philippines, Annual Reports of the War Department, FY June 30, 1902, Vol. IX

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Glossary Avenidas, the term for certain weather patterns in Samar Ba-id, the name given to long sharp blades used in Samar for fighting.

Bandillo, the system of making oral public announcements on important events or policies, that starts by creating a noise to catch people’s attention, before the announcements are read.

Baroto, a small wooden boat with an outrigger Bejuco, the term used to describe a climbing vine, sometimes made into walking canes Bolomen, fighting men using long blades as their weapons Cabecera, the capital town, usually the biggest or oldest and serving as the commercial center surrounded by smaller towns. These also served as centers of the Christian faith Cabezas, village head, the present equivalent of the barangay captain Camarin, an open bodega used to store bales of abaca traded by the mountain folk Capitan, can either refer to the head of the town or the military official commanding a company of soldiers Carcel de Bilibid, was the term used to described the place where prisoners were kept Cargadores, porters used by soldiers to carry their supplies especially on long marches Cartilla, the system of early education practiced during the Spanish regime run by the local priests or their appointed native teachers. This centered on religious instruction and some Spanish grammar.

Cedula personal, Â a kind of tax collection scheme that replaced the system of tribute implemented in 1884. A piece of paper indicated that the citizen having it was a subject of Spain and was a legitimate resident of a particular town. At the start, only Filipinos and Chinese had this paper, but it was eventually revised to include all citizens.

Colegio, the system of secondary education that had a standard classical curriculum Contribucion de Guerra, the contributions given by the residents to the

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war against American occupation Cuartel, official quarters of the troops during the Spanish regime. The name stuck in the early days of American occupation De ruida, the largest bell in the church rung only during special events like a fiesta or emergencies, like fires Delegado de Justicia y Registro Civil, the town official in charge of dispensing justice and census of residents Delegado de policia – the person in charge of police matters and peace and order in the town Delegado de Policia y Order Interior, same as above Delegado de Rentas y de la Propriedad, the person in charge of public lands and buildings Delegados, representatives in assemblies Dios-dios, the quasi-religious groups that emerged during the last two decades of the Spanish colonial regime in Leyte and Samar that became popular among the mountain folk Gobernadorcillos, the equivalent of the municipal mayor. In the earlier days, the position was called capitan municipal.

Harina de Palmira, the flour made from the fruit of a kind of palm tree found abundant in mountainous areas of Samar. The flour was either baked or steamed.

Illustrado, the social class of Filipinos during the Spanish regime who had money, properties and obtained schooling in colegios.

Insurrecto, the term sometimes given to rebellious segments of the population. Years later, the recalcitrant elements were named ladrones, associating them with common criminals.

Jefe de Governacion, literally the person in charge of governing. Mostly appointees.

Jefe de Hacienda, in charge of public properties.

Jefe de Justicia, often interchanged with the term delegado de justicia.

Later they were also called juez de paz.

Jefe de rentas, the same as delegado de rentas. The person in charge of tax collection.

Jefe local, local chief.

Jefes, chiefs.

Juntas magnas, the general assembly constituting the entire population.

Kaingin, slash-and-burn farming system where the farmer burns the forest first before planting on the burnt area.

Ladrones, thieves or common criminals. The term used to describe the unsurrendered rebels after the surrender of Lukban’s leaders.

Lantaka, homemade cannon built of bamboo and reinforced by steel plates

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Limatok, tiny leeches found in wet tropical forests thriving on the blood of humans and animals. They stick on one’s skin until they are full.

Lugao, porridge cooked using rice cereals. Very popular among segments of the population with little access to rice grain.

Morisqueta, cooked rice.

Nipa, the plant of the palm family that provides abundant materials for native houses. The house made of nipa is often called the ‘nipa hut.’

Pact of Biak-na-Bato, a truce between Spanish colonial GovernorGeneral Fernando Primo de Rivera and the revolutionary leader Emilio Aguinaldo to end the Philippine Revolution. Aguinaldo and his fellow revolutionaries were given amnesty and monetary indemnity by the Spanish Government, in return for which the revolutionary government would go into exile in Hong Kong Palay, the unshelled grain of rice Paltiks, homemade guns often made of steel pipes but exploding real bullets Parao, a small wooden boat Pasado por las armas, the term used for prisoners sentenced to death by a firing squad Presidente municipal, the term for ’mayor’ in the early days of the American occupation Prestacion personal, obligatory work rendered by all citizens during the Spanish regime Principales, members of the principalia Principalia, the class of citizens who had certain amounts of property and often selected to become local officials Pueblos, the Spanish word for town Pulajans, the resurgent rebels who came after the Lukban-led rebellion in Samar and Leyte with dios-dios origins Residencia, the convent where members of a religious order doing mission work in a particularly area converge, the equivalent of a vicariate Sandatahan, the regular troops of Lukban Sitios, the smallest settlement that is part of a barrio or village Sundang, the long blade used by the native population to clear underbrush or cut branches. Sometimes they were used for fighting.

Talutang, a bamboo contraption that emit sounds when blown. Used to sound alarms.

Tanguero, someone who is fond of dancing the tango Tenientes, lieutenants. At one time, the cabeza de barangay was also called teniente del barrio Visitas, a mission site for Catholics visited by priests from other towns who administered the sacraments and said the Holy Mass

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Index A.S. Williams, 118, 122, 124, 125 Adna R. Chaffee, 106,107, 109, 111, 112, 116, 131, 133, 152, 153, 154 Adolf Gamlin , 98, 99, 100, 101, 102 Adolf Marix, 152 Agapito Punsion, 89 Alejandro de los Reyes, 19 Alejo Kastellano, 130 Alejo Maga, 33 Alphonse Strebler, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 141, 157, 158, 162 Ambrosio Mojica, 19, 78, 88, 130 Andronico Balais, 96, 97 Antonio Villanueva, 33 Apolinario Mabini, 12, 83, 107 Arcadio Maxilom, 129 Arthur Bonnicastle, 134 Arthur MacArthur, 92, 109 Arthur Murray, 30, 31, 32 Basilio Diaz, 91, 138 Benedicto Culili, 130 Benito Legarda, 82, 83 Benjamin Antry, 134 Braulio Cruz, 20 Capt. J. A. Penn, 143, 146, 147, 149, 150, 162 Catalina Catalogo, 94 Catalino Alcantara, 33 Cayetano Sosing, 32, 33 Claro Guevarra, 34, 47, 51, 52, 130, 140, 142, 143, 146, 147, 149, 150, 156 Claro Pimentel, 18 Colonel De Russy, 143 David D. Porter, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 153 David Perine, 102 Domingo Rebadulla, 57, 58

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Don Andres Reyes, 83, 85, 86 Don Antonio Muñoz, 17 Don Benedicto Sabater, 17, 34, 36, 47 Don Ceferino Latorre, 83 Don Esteban Figueroa, 83 Don Honorio Rosales, 17 Don Pablo Benjamin, 83 Don Victor Celis, 83, 85 Edward Bumpus, 98, 99, 100, 102, 105 Edward Butler, 134 Edwin F. Glenn, 126, 152 Edwin V. Bookmiller, 103, 105, 112 Eli C. Cole., 152 Elihu Root , 109 Elwell S. Otis, 38, 108 Emeterio Enage, 19 Enrique Villareal Dagujob, 57 Ernest Ralston, 102 Esteban Aparri, 18, 19 Eugenio Daza, 52, 96, 97, 103, 107, 108, 131, 146, 147, 149 Felice Tabongar, 89 Feliciano Figueroa, 89 Felipe Zuñiga, 35 Felix Veyra, 20 Fernando Opinion, 43 Flaviano Aguilar, 20 Florencio Briz, 33 Florentino Peñaranda, 34, 88, 90, 130 Fr. Pablo Singzon, 77 Fr. Wenceslao Singzon, 77 Francis H. Schoeffel, 133, 134 Francisco Conge, 32, 33 Francisco Enage, 18, 19, 20 Francisco Lobato, 34 Francisco Rafael, 34, 37, 40, 41, 91, 144, 146, 147, 149 Frank Breton, 94 Frank Halford, 118 Frank McAndrew, 134 Frederick Grant, 144, 146, 156 Gen. Jacob Smith, 11, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 119, 121, 122, 125, 126, 127, 128, 1.31, 143, 146, 152, 153, 154, 156, 157, 161, 162 General Emilio Aguinaldo, 9, 12, 14, 17, 18, 20, 21, 28, 31, 48, 55, 77, 82,

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83, 84, 87, 129, 142, 165 General Fernando Primo de Rivera, 14, 165 George Bell, Jr., 135 George Markley, 94, 99, 102 George Meyer, 92, 101, 102 George W. Wallace, 130, 133 Geronimo Abcede, 34, 37, 144 Geronimo Bello, 33 Guillermo Arteche, 30, 32 Harry Glenn, 120 Henry T. Allen, 31, 32, 37, 40, 45, 46, 55, 63, 64, 65, 161 Henry W. Manire, 92, 102 Hermogenes Zieta, 83 Hiking Hiram Bearss, 118, 120, 122, 124 Homobono Joli-Joli, 57 Isidoro Torres, 129 James M. Helm, 132 Joaquin Cabaùas, 89, 90, 91, 125 John Cooke, 49 John H. Day, 127 John H. Quick, 118 Jose Memeige, 18 Joseph Ohl, 106 Joseph Weippert, 134 Juan Alaras, 57 Juan Colinares, 89, 90, 120 Juan Merchant, 18 Littleton Waller, 11, 112, 118, 152 Luciano R. Ortiz, 139 Ludovico Arejola , 129 Maj. Griswold, 100 Major S. Quioson, 130, 140 Mao Zedong, 9 Marcelino Apolinar, 126 Mariano Valdenor, 98, 101 Markley Swanson , 102 Maximo Abad, 129 Narciso Abuke, 42, 43, 44, 45, 52, 70, 142, 144, 146, 147, 149 Nathan Fisk, 144 Nicanor Acevedo, 126 Nicolas Acevedo, 126 Oscar Sutro, 152

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Pablo Tecson, 84 Pedro Abayan, 90, 92, 96, 97, 98 Pedro Duran, 92, 94, 96, 97, 101, 103, 108 Pedro Lora, 136, 139, 151 Peter Traub, 143 Petronillo Jacosalem, 126 Pondano Jasmines, 136 Primitivo Acebuche, 42 Probo Plagata, 57 Raymond P. Rodgers, 28 Restitudo Jazmin, 43 Robert P. Hughes, 76, 87, 103, 106, 107, 111 Rufino Pido, 39, 51 S. T. Ansell, 143 Simon Tecson, 84 Theodore Roosevelt , 98, 106, 109, 153, 154 Thomas Connell, 92, 94, 95, 96, 98, 100, 101, 102 Tomas Estolero, 137 Trinidad Pardo de Tavera, 82, 83, 84, 87 Valeriano Abanador, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 104 Vicente Jazmines, 35, 86 Vicente Rilles Lukban, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 68, 69, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 96, 97, 98, 106, 108,111,114, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 147, 149, 151, 152, 156, 157, 160, 164, 165 Vito Borromeo, 24 Vo Nguyen Giap, 9 William A. KobbĂŠ, 28, 29, 30 William B. Fltcher, 132 William H. Bisbee, 169 William J. Bryan, 28 William J. Gibbs, 94, 95, 100, 108 William P. Biddle, 152, 154

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The author’s interest in writing historical accounts came rather late - after he was tasked with writing the 50-year history of his alma mater. Only then did he take to it like fish to water. To him, the past is like a large jigsaw puzzle where events and the persons involved had to be assembled until they made sense, until one saw their logic. In 1998 during the centennial of the Philippine Independence, he wrote a series of articles in The Freeman, a Cebu daily, about the struggle of Cebuanos against the Spanish colonial forces. This was entitled Leon Kilat and Cebu’s Revolution.

In 1999, The Freeman was awarded “Best in Historical and Cultural Reporting” by the prestigious Philippine Press Institute and the Frederick Ebert Stiftung because of that series.

On April 3, this year, it was published by the Tres de Abril General Services and the Palm Grass Hotel in Cebu.

A second book on history, entitled Heroes, Brigands, Spies was launched in mid-June, this year. This is about the guerrillas in Leyte and their deadly internal wars during the Japanese occupation of the island in the 1940s.

Lukban is his third book published so far. This is probably the most comprehensive account of the Philippine-American war in Samar island.