BArch Architecture Dissertation: Politics of Space by Emily Chan

POLITICS OF SPACE: UNSPOKEN CONSENT AND FACILITATED COEXISTENCE

LEARNING THROUGH AN ANALYSIS OF KELANTAN

Name: Emily Chan Yi May Student Number: 160010882 Course: ARC 3060 Dissertation

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YI MAY EMILY CHAN

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... 3 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 4 CHAPTER 2(A): BOTH ORDINARY AND UNIQUE ......................................................... 7 CHAPTER 2(B): LEGAL ILLEGAL PORK ...................................................................... 15 CHAPTER 3(A): CINEMA ................................................................................................... 19 CHAPTER 3(B): ACROSS BORDERS ................................................................................ 26 CONCLUSION: AN ISLAMIC STATE? ............................................................................. 27 APPENDICES ............................................................................................................................ 29 BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 30

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YI MAY EMILY CHAN

POLITICS OF SPACE: UNSPOKEN CONSENT AND FACILITATED COEXISTENCE LEARNING THROUGH AN ANALYSIS OF KELANTAN

ABSTRACT This dissertation examines the formal strategies used by the ruling Islamist-centric political party of the hegemonic Malay-majority state of Kelantan and its ethnic minorities; the former attempting the creation of an “Islamic state” within the context of a diverse ethno-religious populace and the latter trying to coexist within the highly politicized and Islamist-influenced state. The nature of the politics in Kelantan and its significant population disparity between its ethno-religious majority and minorities (specifically the Chinese), have led to the introduction and implementation of Islamized social policies and regulations within the code of law as well as the built environment. Contrary to the widespread expectation of ethnic minority dissatisfaction and polarization (mine included), Kelantan’s ethnic minorities, appear to have accepted their status quo, all whilst maintaining amicable close ties with the Malay-Muslims. The central argument of this paper is that the appearance of harmony within Kelantan’s society is partially the result of the existence of hidden landscapes and formal strategies employed by the non-Muslim minorities that continue to exist within the politicized spaces. This paper focuses on the concept of the built environment as a vessel for political-religious agendas and tactics of circumventing the enforced regulations, thus reflecting into and shaping Kelantan’s built form and way of life.

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INTRODUCTION In October 1990, the triumphant re-election of the far-right Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) as state government ushered in an era of Islamist-centric governance – and with it, the beginning of its yet undefeated reign in the Malay-Muslim hegemony state of Kelantan known for being the least ethnically heterogeneous in multi-ethnic and multi-cultural Malaysia. 1 In relentless pursuit of its longstanding goal of creating an Islamic state in Malaysia, PAS initiated its plans to reform Kelantan through the process of Islamicization. But what exactly was ‘Islamicization’ to be in the multi-ethnic and multi-religious country of Malaysia? In order to make Kelantan an Islamic state that aligned with the party’s fundamentalist ideology, PAS sought to implement Islamist social policies and regulations within the code of law and its built environment. As such, the party had to ensure that these Islamist policies were accepted by not only the Malay-Muslims but also its non-Muslim populace. The introduction of Islamist legislation over the years has proven controversial and are seen by many in the mainstream media to be infringing on the rights of the non-Muslim citizens of Kelantan. 2 The Chinese minorities have had to adapt to an array of these state policies, such as restrictions on the sale and consumption of pork and alcohol, gender segregation rules in the shopping malls and salons, and blanket bans on lottery and gambling activities. Hence, when I heard about these strict regulations as a young child who grew up in the more multicultural, multiracial and progressive environment of the Malaysian west-coast state of Selangor, I distinctly remember making a mental note to myself to never step foot in the state of Kelantan, albeit it being part of my home country. It was a view very much shaped by the media and the comments I had heard from grown-ups discussing the topic around me. Thus, when given the opportunity to write this dissertation, I decided that it was of importance for me to finally answer some of questions I have for the state of Kelantan, most jarringly: what was it like to live in the Islamic State of Kelantan as a fellow ethnic Chinese? However, contrary to this widespread expectation of ethnic minority dissatisfaction and polarization (mine included), research and visits to Kelantan revealed Kelantan’s ethnic minorities have seemed to have accepted their status quo, all whilst maintaining amicable close ties with the MalayMuslims. Whilst various studies have been done to understand the living situation of the non-Muslim minorities in Kelantan through the years, none have investigated the issue in depth through space – a less explicit yet powerful tool that has been used and manipulated to regulate and

Department of Statistics Malaysia. Population Distribution And Basic Demographic Characteristics 2010. 2010, p. 24. Available at http://www.statistics.gov.my/portal/download_Population/files/census2010/Taburan_Penduduk_dan_Ciriciri_Asas_Demografi.pdf, accessed 15 November 2018. 2 Sathian, Mala Rajo. and Yeok Meng, Ngeow. “Essentialising Ethnic and State Identities: Strategic Adaptations of Ethnic Chinese in Kelantan, Malaysia.” Asian Studies Review, vol. 38, no. 3, 2014, pp. 386.

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constrain the human behaviour through history by ruling bodies all over the world. 3 This dissertation will examine the formal strategies used by the long-running Islamist-centric political party of the hegemonic Malay-majority state of Kelantan and its ethnic minorities; the former attempting the creation of an “Islamic state” against the backdrop of a diverse ethno-religious populace and the latter trying to coexist within the highly politicized Islamistinfluenced state. The two main spaces that I will focus on are just a few of the many places where these issues converge – a pork shop and the cinema in the capital city of Kelantan, Kota Bharu, – providing the invaluable opportunity to interrogate the spatiality of these formal tactics and strategies undertaken by both parties. By further connecting the discussion and analysis of these spaces to the Islamic State’s agenda, this dissertation will argue that the appearance of harmony within Kelantan’s society is partly a result of the facilitated coexistence of both parties within these politically charged spaces, thus reflecting into and shaping Kelantan’s built form and way of life.

CHAPTER 1: THE MALAYSIAN POLITY To recognize and fully appreciate the distinctiveness and discrepancy of the various situations that will be discussed in this dissertation, it is important to firstly understand the sociopolitical context within which Kelantan sits – Malaysia. Malaysia is comprised of three main ethno-religious groups: The Malay Muslims (also known as Bumiputeras or ‘Princes of the soil’), the Chinese who mostly identify with Buddhism and the Indians who are largely Hindu. 4 A brief read into Malaysia would quickly reveal how race, ethnicity and religion play a substantial role in its socio-political scene where the government and other political parties have the daunting task of explicitly contending with the needs and aspirations of its multi-ethno-religious populace and the long-running racial tensions instigated by its colonial history. 5 Having been ruled by a Malay-dominated government since its independence, it then comes as no surprise that there is unbalanced representation

Sathian, Mala Rajo. and Yeok Meng, Ngeow. “Essentialising Ethnic and State Identities: Strategic Adaptations of Ethnic Chinese in Kelantan, Malaysia.” Asian Studies Review, vol. 38, no. 3, 2014, pp. 385–402; Jones, Paul. “Putting Architecture in Its Social Place: A Cultural Political Economy of Architecture.” Urban Studies, vol. 46, no. 12, 2009, pp. 2519–2536. 4

Rodan, Garry. “Civil Society Activism and Political Parties in Malaysia: Differences over Local Representation.” Democratization, vol. 21, no. 5, 2014, pp. 827.

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with the basic notion behind the Malaysian polity being the division of Malaysian citizenship along the lines of Bumiputeras and non-Bumiputeras (no indigenous claim on Malaysia). 6 Many experts in the field describes the Malaysian society to be a plural one: different groups or communities in a society which they meet but not mix. 7 This has been evident throughout Malaysia’s entire history as an independent nation. Prompted by the British colonial administration’s approach of ‘divide and rule’, whereby the Chinese and Indian immigrants brought in by the British for economic purposes were left to maintain their own culture and identity, perpetuating racial hierarchy and racial ideology which continue to affect Malaysia today. 8 A commentator of the topic perfectly illustrates this: “At that time (British colonial period), the stereotyping and social distance were already spatial: in the design of their settlements, the British had their ‘padangs’ (village greens), residencies, churches, clubs and bungalows; behind them would be the shophouses of the Chinese; then further beyond, the 9

‘kampungs’ [villages] of the Malays.”

Years after the British leaves, Malaysia’s (now once) dominant coalition party Barisan National, which was led by the Malay Nationalist party, UMNO (United Malays National Organization), embarks on a process of ‘ethnic restructuring’ to allow the Malays who were economically behind to compete with the other races. 10 Various legislations such as the New Economic Policy (NEP) which was initiated in 1971 that gave the Malays special privileges in the form of cheaper housing and the allotment of quotas in attaining business license, government contracts, shares of listed companies and tertiary education. 11 The basic contention was to provide the ‘Bumiputeras’ a better standing against the immigrant Chinese and Indian “outsiders”. These real and ‘perceived’ ethnic differences continue to be seized upon and politically mobilized by Malaysia’s various ethnocentric political parties today. Hence, to say that there are constant overarching racial tensions between the Malays and non-Malays in Malaysia would be an understatement. The Malaysian society is thus

Fujita, Mari Anna. “Forays into Building Identity.” Journal of Architectural Education, vol. 63, no. 2, 2010, p. 8; Koh Sin Yee. “How and Why Race Matters: Malaysian-Chinese Transnational Migrants Interpreting and Practising BumiputeraDifferentiated Citizenship.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 41, no. 3, 2014, pp. 532. 7 Tommy Thomas, article 04, article 9 8 A government verified Malaysian Studies text book: Mardiana, Nordin and Hussiin, Hasnah. Malaysian Studies. Second ed., Oxford Fajar, 2014; Hirschman, 1986 as quoted in Koh Sin Yee. “How and Why Race Matters: Malaysian-Chinese Transnational Migrants Interpreting and Practising Bumiputera-Differentiated Citizenship.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 41, no. 3, 2014, pp. 531–550. 9 King, Ross. “Re-Writing the City: Putrajaya as Representation.” Journal of Urban Design, vol. 12, no. 1, 2007, pp. 117–138. 10 Ibid. 11 Mardiana, Nordin and Hussiin, Hasnah. Malaysian Studies. Second ed., Oxford Fajar, 2014; The Straits Time. “KL to Review Race-Based New Economic Policy”. 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/kl-to-review-race-based-neweconomic-policy; King, Ross. “Re-Writing the City: Putrajaya as Representation.” Journal of Urban Design, vol. 12, no. 1, 2007, pp. 117–138., doi:10.1080/13574800601071337.

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accurately described by several scholars of the Malaysian landscape as being “in constant stable tension with fault lines along thick racial borders”. 12 As a result, when approached with a hegemonic Malay-majority state such as Kelantan, governed for the last 28 years by the PAS political party which pushes forward for an Islamic State, the idea of racial and religious harmony would understandably be rather hard to believe. An ethnic Chinese resident of Kelantan, as recorded by a commentator of the topic, endorses this by claiming that solidarity irrespective of ethnic and religious identification can only be found among Kelantanese.13 The Kelantan-born ethnic Chinese are known to not only have “a strong sense of belonging to their state of birth/residence, but also political loyalty towards the (PAS Islamic) state despite the constant imposition of Islamist social policies and regulations.” 14 Consider too this statement from an ethnic Chinese resident of Kelantan: “Once you have experienced and visited Kelantan, you will know that it is different from what has been reported (in the media). The PAS government has taken good care of all the races living in the state”. 15

Thus, in an effort to understand how the ethnic Chinese minorities in Kelantan live within the boundaries of the strict Islamic regulations and social policies and to observe the various ways the PAS state government implements its Islamic agenda, I saw it fit to visit Kelantan for myself (despite earlier promises not to). These visits eventually gave way to intriguing discoveries centered around and within the public realm of Kelantan, two of which I will attempt to examine and analyse in depth in the following sections. CHAPTER 2(A): BOTH ORDINARY AND UNIQUE A few months ago in mid-September, I was at a morning market in the heart of Kota Bharu, the capital city of Kelantan, Malaysia. Up a small makeshift wooden platform at the main entrance of the market was a Chinese butcher shop with its island tops fully covered with fresh heaps of pork cuts. Ladders of ribs and tenderloins dangling from hooks, rolls of pork shoulders and trotters propped on the tiled counters in the open. This pork shop stood right beside an alley with both sides crowded with Malay, Chinese and Indian street vendors alike, leaving only a narrow path for local Kelantanese sweating buyers to weave their way through the crowd (fig.

Noor (2012), Shamsul (2006a) as cited in Pue Giok Hun. “'Our Chinese'.” Mixed Race in Asia: Past, Present and Future, edited by Zarine L. Rocha and Farida Fozdar, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. 13

Sathian, Mala Rajo. and Yeok Meng, Ngeow. “Essentialising Ethnic and State Identities: Strategic Adaptations of Ethnic Chinese in Kelantan, Malaysia.” Asian Studies Review, vol. 38, no. 3, 2014, pp. 385–402. 14 Ibid. 15 Koi Kye Lee. “Kelantan's Non-Muslims Happy with PAS Rule, but Worried about Slow Economy, Hudud.” TODAYonline, 2016, www.todayonline.com/world/asia/kelantans-non-muslims-happy-pas-rule-worried-about-slow-economy-hudud. Accessed 28 Dec 2018.

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1). As the butchers and street vendors worked, banters were thrown back and forth with some even vacating their own stall to chat with their neighbours for a short while. Without any apprehension, a Malay aunty with her bags of vegetables and fruits wandered into the pork shop to converse with the Chinese uncles before leaving the market.16 I then observed as a Chinese aunty fumbled up the wooden platform into the busy pork shop. She carefully scanned the counters for quality pork cuts before finally signaling to one of the butchers to bag the cuts she had chosen. The aunty, happy with her buy, paid for her bag of pork and wandered down the market alley amongst some surprisingly nonchalant Malay vendors to continue her weekly shopping despite having her bag of pork in hand. The Pokok Pinang market indeed captures the harmonious multi-racial character of Kelantan and Malaysia for the everyday tourists, however, unbeknownst to most is its many layers of peculiarity and political intent embedded within its contradicting existence – its seemingly unremarkable and everyday interaction caught me off guard and left me dumbfounded. Now, let me attempt to explain why.

1: Sheltered alley and pork meat market making up the Pasar Pokok Pinang; Source: Own photo. Figure This ordinary, yet unique, pork shop in the Pokok Pinang market, is known for being the only legitimate shop with a license to sell raw pork in the entire state of Kelantan (fig.2). 17 It is 16

In Malaysian culture, the term “aunty” and “uncle” is commonly used regardless if one is related to the other or not, for as long as they are significantly older than you. 17 Through accompanied visits to Kelantan by a local Kelantanese woman, the author was told by the her and several other locals as well as the butchers at the Pasar Pokok Pinang pork shop that this shop was the only licensed pork shop in the whole of Kelantan. A blog journal by Norfahazidah, My Life (2013), “Pasar Pokok Pinang”, http://fahzahida.blogspot.com/2013/05/pasar-pokok-pinang.html (Accessed 23 October 2018) states the same “…pasar ni adalah kat sini adalah satu satunya tempat di Kelantan dibenarkan daging babi dijual” which translates to “...this market is

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now considered by some a tourist destination because of its unusual nature; its existence a contradictory one. Of the many Islamist regulations put in place and enforced by PAS when it came to power, one of the few that garnered national controversy was its decision to place a ban, or rather the stark deprivation of licenses, on the sale of pork and pork products in the public realm. 18 This is because, pork is perceived as ‘haram’ (sinful and forbidden) by the Muslims under the Islamic religion.

2: Pasar Pokok Pinang, Source: Own photo. Figure The problem lies in the fact that the use of pork is prevalent in Malaysian Chinese cuisine and thus strongly associated with the Chinese identity and culture. 19 As indicated and supported by this quote from Massimo Montanari, an Italian scholar in food studies, “Like spoken language, the food system contains and conveys the culture of its practitioner; it is the repository of traditions and of collective identity.” 20 I will not dwell in too much depth on the sociocultural and political studies relating the power of food as a symbol of cultural identity the one and only place in Kelantan that is allowed to sell pork” when referring to Pokok Pinang market. Translation is done by me. 18 From the MCA political party news portal: Malaysian Chinese Association. “PAS debunked! Rigid conditions prevent nonMuslims from selling food at eateries shared with Muslim operators in Kelantan.” 2017, http://www.mca.org.my/2/Content/SinglePage?_param1=21-102017-155176-10-201721&_param2=TS. 19 Tan Yao Sua, Kamarudin Ngah, and Lim Abdullah. “Negotiation of Identity and Internal Contradictions: the Terengganu and Kelantan Peranakan Chinese Foodways Compared.” Asian Ethnicity, vol. 16, no. 4, 2014, p. 417; The physical activity that revolves around food provides both solidarity, such as the sharing of food and participation in meals, and separation, by marking the differences between groups and in the case of multiethnic Malaysia, marks ethnicity. 20 Montanari, M., & Sonnenfeld, “A. Identity, Exchange, Traditions, and “Origins” In Food Is Culture”, 2006, pp. 133-138. Columbia University Press. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7312/mont13790.26.

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but it is through these abundant resource of literature that I find it safe to say, in imposing this restriction, the PAS state government inadvertently scrapes part of the Chinese minority identity away that sets itself apart and created communities of belonging. 21 The ban affected most public places such as shopping malls, supermarkets, shop houses and street stalls, albeit the few surviving pork-serving Chinese restaurants in Kota Bharu’s Chinatown, Dataran Cheng Ho. It is important to note, however, that they do not sell raw pork like the market but they too have restrictions of their own. 22 On the other hand, my visit revealed a slight change in their operations since 2013. 23 Instead of having its island tops separated into 3 main stalls where operators rotate weekly, the shop’s finite island tops are now separated into 6 stalls whose operators rotate every alternate day with another batch of operators. While the total number of operators working at this time is unknown, it has most definitely increased. Several conclusions can be drawn from this situation. Firstly, the pork business is a profitable one. With restrictions on the sale of pork, the butchers operating these stalls in Pokok Pinang market have a shared monopoly over the market, thus possibly explaining the increase in operators. Secondly, in terms of having to share their stalls with others through a system of rotation, be it weekly or daily, this pork shop could be understood as a highly coveted place which has to be shared due to it being in high demand and clearly limited. Nevertheless, this is unlike most other states in Malaysia - including my home state of Selangor, and the touristic capital city of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur - where a pork ban has never been implemented and can be seen to be sold openly everywhere albeit being labeled ‘non-halal’ and occasionally located a separate section.24 It should be pointed out, however, that Kelantan is a provincial state bordering the southern boundary of Thailand and has a history of insularity as an agricultural state located North of the peninsula (fig. 3). Its lack of migration from other ethnic communities into the state goes all the way back to the British colonial period, with Malay Muslims (all ethnic Malays must be Muslim under the Federal constitution) comprising of 94.7% and Chinese comprising 3.4% of Kelantan’s total

Raman, Parvathi. “Me in Place, and the Place in Me”: A Migrant's Tale of Food, Home and Belonging. Food, Culture and Society: An International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research, 2011, 14. 165-18., 2011; Tan Yao Sua, Kamarudin Ngah, and Lim Abdullah. “Negotiation of Identity and Internal Contradictions: the Terengganu and Kelantan Peranakan Chinese Foodways Compared.” Asian Ethnicity, vol. 16, no. 4, 2014, 411-427; Tan Yao Sua et. al, “Maintenance and propagation of Chinese culture in a Malay state: the roles of the Chinese associations in Kuala Terengganu,” Asian Ethnicity, 2012, 13:4, 441-467; Floyd, Virginia Davis. “Food, Culture and Politics, Journal of the Association for the Study of Food and Society,” 1996, 1:1, 5-8; Montanari, M., & Sonnenfeld, A, "Food Is Culture,” 2006, Columbia University Press. 22 According to the local Chinese resident who took me around Kelantan, these shops could only open in the evening as to ensure these ‘haram’ restaurants do not disturb the morning routines of the Malay-Muslim population. 23 The Rocket. “Kelantan - Myths and Realities,” 2013, https://www.therocket.com.my/en/kelantan-not-what-itseems/. Accessed on 28 December 2018. 24 Halal means permissible or allowed in Islamic law.

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population. 25 In comparison, of the more than 26 million Malaysians, 54.6% are Malays Muslims and 24.6% are Chinese. 26

Figure 3: Map of Malaysia; Source: James C. Scott in Weapons of the Weak, pp. 60

It is a constitutional requirement under Article 160 of the Malaysian constitution for all Malays to be Muslims; Department of Statistics Malaysia. Population Distribution And Basic Demographic Characteristics 2010. 2010, p. 24. Available at http://www.statistics.gov.my/portal/download_Population/files/census2010/Taburan_Penduduk_dan_Ciriciri_Asas_Demografi.pdf, Accessed 15 November 2018. 26 ibid.

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Meanwhile, the notably tolerant attitudes demonstrated towards the pork shop by the Malays in the Pokok Pinang Market should not be taken for granted. It is not unheard of in the rest of Malaysia for a Muslim to rarely (in some cases never) dine in a non-Muslim restaurant because of the fear of pork ‘contamination’. On a more personal note, I once had my friends over at my house back in Malaysia to hang out for lunch and while the rest went at the fried vegetables and fried chicken provided, I distinctly remember my Muslim friend politely refusing to eat, hinting that she’s not supposed to as she was in a non-Muslim house, even when presented meals without pork. The palpable sense of taboo when it came to the matter of pork is hugely evident and experienced daily by both Muslims and non-Muslims citizens of Malaysia. Non-Muslims are constantly reminded to “respect the sensitivities of Islam”, which is recognized as the established religion of Malaysia and is professed by all Malay Muslims representing more than half of the population of the country.27 An article on Harakahdaily, the official news portal of PAS, written by a member of the PAS Central Working Committee (PAS’s principal decision-making body) illustrates this perfectly when it appealed for public events and ceremonies to prevent serving pork unless those in attendance were 100 percent non-Muslims. 28 Thus, to see Malay street vendors and buyers in the vicinity of a pork shop in the Islamic state of Kelantan, is certainly bizarre and unusual. Despite prohibitions on the open display and sale of pork everywhere else in the state, the existence of this specific establishment goes unchallenged. The state government of Kelantan did not, by and large, speak out against this surviving pork shop from the 1950s (already in operation before they came to power), nor against the mingling of Malay-Muslims in the only market awash with the taboo and prohibited pork, as befitted the party’s Islamic state ideology. In an article written in 2013 by a Malaysian centre-left political party, Democratic Action Party (DAP), on their official news portal surmising the ‘Myths and Realities’ of Kelantan, it briefly reported on the same pork shop and how it was a testament to Kelantan’s tolerance of its ethnic minorities. In the article, a pork seller divulged on his experience whilst selling pork in the Pokok Pinang market: “I have been selling pork here without harassment or being encumbered by the state government for over 30 years.”29 27

Department of Statistics Malaysia. Population Distribution and Basic Demographic Characteristics 2010. 2010, p. 82, Available at http://www.statistics.gov.my/portal/download_Population/files/census2010/Taburan_Penduduk_dan_Ciriciri_Asas_Demografi.pdf, Accessed 15 November 2018. 28 Harakahdaily, “Hidang Babi: Hormati Sensitiviti Islam”, 2018, http://www.harakahdaily.net/index.php/berita/15-tanah-air/7347-hidang-babi-hormati-sensitiviti-islam (Accessed on 17 November 2018). Harakahdaily is the official website for the governing political party in Kelantan, PAS. The title translates to “Serving Pork: Respect Sensitivities of Islam”; Joseph Chinyong, Liow. Piety and Politics: Islamism in Contemporary Malaysia. Oxford University Press, 2009. 29

The Rocket. “Kelantan - Myths and Realities,” 2013, https://www.therocket.com.my/en/kelantan-not-what-it-seems/. Accessed on 28 December 2018.DAP is a multi-racial centre-left political party that advocates for secularism and liberal progress for Malaysia. Although DAP and PAS have contradicting political ideologies, they have collaborated in the past to

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My quick exchange with one of the pork sellers whilst visiting the pork shop last September revealed a similar story.

Figure 4: Map of the area around the Pork Shop; Source: Own photo.

It is also ironically located just around the corner from PAS Headquarters and Kelantan’s administration and cultural centre – an area with a cluster of governmental buildings like the High Court and Sessions, Municipal Council, Land and District office, Office of the Malaysian Haji Pilgrims Fund Board (Lembaga Tabung Haji) and the District Health Office and several museums – as illustrated in the map above (fig. 4). Being located adjacent to the authorities suggests the PAS state government’s tolerance for the ‘haram’ activity and could also be understood as an endorsement of the market. That the state endorses Pokok Pinang market’s un-Islamic sale of pork and mingling of the Muslims in the market area is not only suggested but confirmed by the state’s sponsoring of a roof over the alley beside the pork shop, which together makes up Pokok Pinang market. An article written on PAS’s Harakahdaily news portal reports on this with a clear emphasis on the multi-racial community within the market that sells pork and how the roof supplementation has helped improve the market for both the Muslim and non-Muslim gain political traction against the once all-dominating Barisan National political party, who recently lost their first election since the independence of Malaysia in 1957.

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vendors. 30 Ergo, the question that arise is if PAS is truly genuine towards reconciling its Islamic state aims with non-Muslim concerns in the matter of culture and food, why is this the only store with a license to sell pork in the fifth largest state of Malaysia with more than 15,000 square kilometers of territory? 31 This marketplace, I would argue, may be the testament to Kelantan’s tolerance of its minorities, but it is also ostensibly a spatial manifestation of the state government’s politically-driven agenda – a showroom staging a daily performance of tolerance – and for two reasons. Firstly, burdened with the need to gain and maintain political traction in Kelantan in order to be able to rule Kelantan and pursue their greater goal of an Islamic state, PAS had to gain both the support of the Malay-Muslim Kelantanese and the disenchanted ethnic minorities who had experienced ethnic discrimination under United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), a Malay-nationalist political party who was also their biggest competitor and the dominant party of the ruling coalition from 1978 to 1990. 32 Consider this blog post by an ethnic Chinese resident of Kelantan, as quoted by Liow in his well detailed book on Islamism in contemporary Malaysia: “During BN’s (Barisan National’s) tenure [in Kelantan], pork sellers in the Chinese market were harassed daily. They were confined to a small inconspicuous space where pork could be sold hidden from public view. When PAS took over the government in 1990, they improved the Chinese market and pork was sold without any restrictions. In short, they were not harassed.” 33 Thus, by improving the situations of the ‘oppressed’ minorities through methods such as the pork shop, PAS was able to win and maintain the support of Kelantan’s ethnic minorities whose votes, when placed in the context of the highly competitive political battle between BN and PAS in Kelantan, serves to be of high importance and weightage. Secondly, there are obvious political advantages to be gained if PAS is able to prove that nonMuslims are happy and satisfied under Islamic rule. It is of no surprise that the welfare and needs of the Chinese minorities in Kelantan gain special interest from the Chinese in other states and the media, especially when Islamic policies are proposed. 34 This enables the Chinese minority to serve as an influential watchdog and thus prove disconcerting for PAS if word were to spread in the nation that they were being oppressed and mistreated – a concern exacerbated with the backdrop of Malaysia’s long-running racial tensions instigated 30

Harakahdaily, “Rezeki berganda di pagi Jumaat – peniaga”, 2017, http://www.harakahdaily.net/index.php/berita/2011rezeki-berganda-di-pagi-jumaat-peniaga (Accessed on 15 November 2018). 31 Department of Statistics Malaysia. Kelantan @ a Glance. 2018, Available at https://www.dosm.gov.my/v1/index.php?r=column/cone&menu_id=RU84WGQxYkVPeVpodUZtTkpPdnBmZz09, accessed 15 November 2018); See also: Ghazali, Amer Saifude, et al. “The Practice of Asian Democracy in Kelantan State, Malaysia, 1959– 2013.” Japanese Journal of Political Science, vol. 19, no. 02, 2018, pp. 105–121. 32 Liow, Joseph Chinyong. Piety and Politics: Islamism in Contemporary Malaysia. Oxford University Press, 2009, p.72-78. 33 Ibid.; Koi Kye Lee. “Kelantan's Non-Muslims Happy with PAS Rule, but Worried about Slow Economy, Hudud.” TODAYonline, 2016, www.todayonline.com/world/asia/kelantans-non-muslims-happy-pas-rule-worried-about-sloweconomy-hudud. Accessed 28 Dec 2018. 34 Sathian, Mala Rajo. and Yeok Meng, Ngeow. “Essentialising Ethnic and State Identities: Strategic Adaptations of Ethnic Chinese in Kelantan, Malaysia.” Asian Studies Review, vol. 38, no. 3, 2014, pp. 385–402.

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by its colonial history and today’s political power play amongst ethno-centric parties. 35 Because while the PAS state government wants their citizens to live an Islamic lifestyle, they did not want the non-Muslim community to be politically active against them, only politically compliant under them given that they have become instrumental in deciding electoral outcome due to the competitiveness between BN and PAS. 36 This provided the minorities, who accounted for only 5% of the population of Kelantan, some bargaining power with the state and thus, this pork shop might have been the outcome of that. The endorsement of selling and eating pork conveniently detracted from the party’s Islamist ideologies and as Chief Minister of Kelantan Nik Abdul Aziz’s political secretary Annual Bakri had said, they are to “curb undesirable activities which are not accepted within the Muslim society”. 37 Altogether, the Islamist government’s support of the pork shop can be understood as what Michel de Certeau conceptualized as ‘strategy’ – “the imposition of power through the disciplining and organization of space”. 38 There the state government allowed its Chinese minorities a modicum of the staple meat of their cuisine, as compensation for the various Islamist restrictions it had already imposed on them. CHAPTER 2(B): LEGAL ILLEGAL PORK Tucked away in the corner of an alley in the sombre town centre of Kuala Krai is an unimposing white van parked with its booth curiously wide open. Despite the glaring afternoon sun shining down on his tanned sweaty form, the Chinese uncle stood at the back of his van with his back pressed up against it, waiting patiently for his next customer. The streets laid empty with its only movements tracked from a drifting plastic bag and the occasional shopkeepers walking back to their shop after lunch. A vehicle comes into view and turned into his alley, eventually coming to rest as it parked right next to his van. He perked up as he recognized the familiar face of the driver and started sharpening his knives as he waited for them to emerge from the car. A woman and a girl stepped out of the car to greet him cheerfully before carefully inspecting the contents at the back of his van. The woman tells him to get her today’s fresh batch of ribs and belly cuts. As he cleared the top of his wooden chopping block, he assured her that they were all brought in from the neighbouring state just this morning. He then sifts through the heaps of meat that were propped on the newspaper 35

Ibid.; See also: Rodan, Garry. “Civil Society Activism and Political Parties in Malaysia: Differences over Local Representation.” Democratization, vol. 21, no. 5, 2014, pp. 824–845. 36

Tan Yao Sua et. al, “Maintenance and propagation of Chinese culture in a Malay state: the roles of the Chinese associations in Kuala Terengganu,” Asian Ethnicity, 2012, 13:4, 441-467. 37

The Star Online. “Kelantan Defends Council.” 2003, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2003/08/24/kelantandefends-council/#UZFC7xl53QQCVTES.99 38 As quoted by Certeau, M. The practice of everyday life. 1998. Berkeley, California: University of California Press in Bren, Paulina. “Weekend Getaways: The Chata, the Tramp and the Politics of Private Life in Post-1968 Czechoslovakia.” Socialist Spaces: Sites of Everyday Life in the Eastern Bloc, edited by David Crowley and Susan Emily. Reid, Berg, 2002, pp. 123–141.

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5: Pork Van; Source: Own Photo. Figure

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Figure 6: The Alley; Source: Own Photo.

Figure 7: The Transaction at the Back of the Pork Van; Source: Own Photos.

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and cardboard-layered floor of his van with his hands, picking out the cuts she wanted. Once chopped up and bagged in a plastic bag, he weighs them on the weighing scale he conveniently has beside the chopping block. Happy with the price and the fresh purchase, she pays for it before returning to her car and driving off home. He moves back to the corner of the van and now waits for another car to drive by. This is my account of my casual encounter with a pork shop that was being run from the back of a van during my visit to Kelantan (Fig. 5–7). It offers the opportunity to discover layers of discrepancies and reasoning within its built environment that could aid with the comprehension of the situation of the Chinese minorities in Kelantan and thus, will be the subject of examination in this section. Kuala Krai is an hour’s drive from Kota Bharu, the capital city of Kelantan. While the state government hopes its sole licensed pork shop in Kota Bharu is able to supply demands from the entire non-Muslim population of Kelantan, it is not without reason (hint: above) that I presume that it is quite the contrary. However, despite the introduction and enforcement or various other Islamist legislations such as the discussed restriction on the sale of pork, Kelantan Chinese residents have expressed an overarching sentiment of satisfaction and good relations for the PAS state government. 39 This, I would suggest, is partly due to the ‘tactics’ – as Michel de Certeau explains to be a counterpoint to ‘strategy’; opportunistic calculated actions taken by those without power to manipulate and divert spaces imposed by a subject of authority – employed by its resourceful Chinese minorities. 40 They are the formal acts of subterfuge hidden within the undocumented everyday practices employed by the ethnic Chinese to allow for their continued facilitated coexistence within the highly politicized spaces of Kelantan. As such, it is to no surprise that a community restricted from the sale and purchase of (raw) pork would have relied on such tactics, such as the hush-hush sale of pork from a van described and depicted (in fig. 8), to circumvent the imposed regulation. What is more, these allegedly normal transactions of pork, as explained to me by the woman who nonchalantly and casually drove me to the pork van for her grocery purchase, seem to have made themselves significant to the daily lives and routines of many of the local non-Muslim residents of Kuala Krai. This could be categorized as what James C. Scott refers to a ‘passive resistance’. As he explains, “where institutionalized politics is formal, overt, concerned with systematic, de jure change, everyday resistance is informal, and concerned largely with immediate, de facto gains” that “often takes the form of passive noncompliance, subtle sabotage, evasion and 39

Throughout my visit in Kelantan, the ethnic Chinese residents I’ve spoken to only had a positive or neutral stance on the state government whenever it was brought up in conversation. This is further supported and confirmed by many other research on Kelantan such as: Liow, Joseph Chinyong. Piety and Politics: Islamism in Contemporary Malaysia. Oxford University Press, 2009; Sathian, Mala Rajo. and Yeok Meng, Ngeow. “Essentialising Ethnic and State Identities: Strategic Adaptations of Ethnic Chinese in Kelantan, Malaysia.” Asian Studies Review, vol. 38, no. 3, 2014, pp. 385–402. 40 Certeau, Michel de. The Practice of Everyday Life. Translated by Steven F. Rendall, University of California Press, 1984.

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deception.” 41 A perfect example to illustrate this is the ‘Chata culture’: a popular Czech weekend past-time in 1969 that entailed the purchase and use of recreational countryside homes by citizens of a then communist Czechoslovakia. 42 The practitioners of the weekend exodus used this ‘tactic’ to escape from the communist pressures and ideologies, viewing it as their “defiant gesture” of the communal life. 43 A ‘tactic’ like such, and the pork van, is a maneuver “within the enemy’s field of vision, “as quoted by von Billow in Michel de Certeau, but they are aimed “at self-help and withdrawal rather than institutional confrontation” as James C. Scott explains. 44 This brings me to my next case in point. As a ‘tactic’ is employed within enemy territory, it is not a planned strategy but an opportunistic manipulation of isolated spaces and therefore, it could be said that it operates “nowhere”. 45 This “nowhere”, as suggested by Michel de Certeau, provides a tactic the “mobility” that can be exploited to seize its chances within the “cracks that particular conjunctions open in the surveillance of the proprietary powers”. 46 When this is used as a comparison to the identifiable characteristics of the pork van such as the lack of a label or a guidepost and the evident fleetingness and impermanence of a vehicle, as well as its method of operation: a vehicle bringing in pork from a neighbouring state such as Perak, settling down in an alley where customers are familiar with you, driving off and leaving no physical trace within the built environment when the day is over; its informality and impermanence within the landscapes of Kelantan is thus, aiding its survival. Just like how the Czech government did not discourage ‘Chata culture’ and did little to stop it for the benefit of their own political agenda, the PAS state government may or may not have known about illegal pork businesses like the pork van. 47 If they do not know about this, it could suggest several conclusions such as: a discovery of a legal loophole within the legislation that keeps them safe from prosecution, lenient enforcement of the regulation or the lack of control over these illegal set-ups; all of these rendering the ‘tactic’ successful. On the other hand, if PAS was aware of such practices but allows for it to happen, it would be as Michel de Certeau explains, “knowledge of practices is thus the result of a twofold 41

Scott, James C. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. Yale University Press, 2008, p. 31 & 33. 42 Bren, Paulina. “Weekend Getaways: The Chata, the Tramp and the Politics of Private Life in Post-1968 Czechoslovakia.” Socialist Spaces: Sites of Everyday Life in the Eastern Bloc, edited by David Crowley and Susan Emily. Reid, Berg, 2002, pp. 123–141. 43 ibid. 44 Certeau, Michel de. The Practice of Everyday Life. Translated by Steven F. Rendall, University of California Press, 1984, p. 37; Scott, James C. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. Yale University Press, 2008, p. 32. 45 Certeau, Michel de. The Practice of Everyday Life. Translated by Steven F. Rendall, University of California Press, 1984. 46 Ibid. 47 To read more on the Chata culture, refer to: Bren, Paulina. “Weekend Getaways: The Chata, the Tramp and the Politics of Private Life in Post-1968 Czechoslovakia.” Socialist Spaces: Sites of Everyday Life in the Eastern Bloc, edited by David Crowley and Susan Emily. Reid, Berg, 2002, pp. 123–141.

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deception.” 48 By providing the ethnic minorities the illusion of freedom from the grasps of the political ideologies of the state government, they are able to keep them contented and satisfied, facilitating their coexistence. While these are deductions are highly hypothetical, it cannot be overlooked that illegal sale of pork like such that is centred on a decidedly Islamistinfluence escape, gives leverage to the government in maintaining its support from the nonMuslims and as a consequence the enhance its chances of maintaining Kelantan as the ‘Islamic State’ of Malaysia. Nevertheless, irregardless of whether its operations are known to the state government or not, the pork van and other similarly discreet operations around Kelantan would be considered a public secret due to its inherently inconspicuous nature of operation. Consider this statement from an out-of-state student in the fourth year of her university in Kelantan during our conversation, “It’s really hard to get pork here. I’ve been here for so long but I still don’t know where to get it”.49 For these operations are to be discreet, this pork van thereby becomes part of the hidden landscape of Kelantan within which only insiders are privy to. It is, as Michael Foucault writes in ‘Of Other Spaces’, a space of ‘heterotopia’ – spaces that have more layers of meaning or connections to other places than what initially meets the eye – and especially the heterotopia of illusionary exclusion since they are “spaces that seem to be pure and simple openings, but that generally hide curious exclusions.” 50 “Everyone can enter into the heterotopia but this is only an illusion, as by the fact that we enter, excluded”, he added. 51 An example he gives of this heterotopia is a guest room at a family farm house, where it never has access to family quarters; guests are absolutely in transit and are not exactly an invited guest. 52 Similarly, as an “outsider” of Kelantan despite being a Malaysian citizen myself, my inaccessibility to these hidden landscapes (without the help of a local), makes Kelantan unapproachable and distant. While I can confidently say that this sentiment is a shared one amongst my social circle back home in Malaysia and many others outside of Kelantan, the difference between them and I, as I have realized through the examination of the pork shop and the van, is that I have just started to better understand the reasons behind these once disputable qualms and apprehension. CHAPTER 3(A): CINEMA The pork shop and pork van are not the only spaces where formal ‘strategies’ employed by PAS to propagate their Islamist political agendas and informal ‘tactics’ used by ethnic minorities to circumvent them appear. In order to provide a more comprehensive view of the 48

Certeau, Michel de. The Practice of Everyday Life. Translated by Steven F. Rendall, University of California Press, 1984, p. 53. 49 personal conversation, 2018. 50 Foucault, Michael and Miskowiec, Jay. “Of Other Spaces.” Diacritics, vol. 16, no. 1, 1 Apr. 1986, pp. 22–27. 51 ibid. 52 ibid.

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situation of the ethnic Chinese minorities in the Islamist State of Malaysia, this dissertation will further examine another everyday space where these issues intersect – entertainment facilities…... or to be exact, the intriguing lack thereof entertainment facilities. Since coming to power in 1990, the PAS state government in Kelantan have swiftly introduced and enforced Islam-influenced bans or strict restrictions on entertainment centers and leisure facilities such as bars, clubs, brothels, karaoke, massage parlours, gambling establishments, casinos and tattoo parlours and even cinemas to name a few. These were facilitated and expedited under the Sharia Law of Entertainment Control and Entertainment Places Enactment 1998 (Enakmen Kawalan Hiburan dan Tempat-tempat Hiburan) in order to ensure the sanctity of Islam is not tarnished. 53 The basis of a few of these Islamist social policies and regulations are the gender segregation of men and women and the prevention of anti-social activities from taking place. To get a good grasp of how life in Kelantan is amongst these entertainment bans, consider this excerpt from an opinion column on the New Straits Time by Sulaiman Jaafar: “One glaring thing that is lacking, though, is recreational facilities — to such an extent that some families bring their children to the airport to watch planes touching down and taking off. There are many beaches, but most of them are unsafe, especially during the monsoon season and reports of drowning are not uncommon. Taman Tengku Anis is the sole public park in Kota Bharu and during weekends, it is bursting at the seams as almost everybody in the state capital seems to rush there with their family members for various activities. So, when the people of Kelantan heard about a cinema opening up in neighbouring [state of] Terengganu recently after a dearth of nearly 20 years, they were literally green with envy.” 54

In the quote above, Sulaiman Jaafar was writing in relation to the absence of cinemas and the general lack of entertainment facilities in the entire state of Kelantan. However, it is important to note that there has not been any ban put in place on cinematic leisure. Instead, the “blame” goes to the array of codified Islamist restrictions put in place to ensure that they will not tarnish and respect the rules of Islam and consequently, the Islamic state. As Kelantan’s Housing, Youth and Sports committee chairman Datuk Abdul Fattah reportedly said, cinemas are allowed to operate in Kelantan for as long as they follow the ‘Entertainment Control and Places of Entertainment Enactment 1998’ which includes the strict “gender segregation of audience seating, as well as no screenings during the evening ‘Maghrib’ prayer time, on Thursday nights and during the Muslim fasting month of 53

Malaysia runs on a dual system of law as provided in Article 121(A) of the Constitution of Malaysia, hence the two courts in Malaysia: the civil court and syariah court. Malaysia’s interpretation of the syariah or Islamic law is, however, only implemented on and affects Muslims. Refer to: Daniels, Timothy. Living Sharia: Law and Practice in Malaysia. University of Washington Press, 2017, p. 43. 54 Written by a columnist, Sulaiman, Jaafar. "A Cinema, Please". New Straits Time, 2017, http://www.nst.com.my/opinion/columnists/2017/05/241402/cinema-please. Accessed 25 Dec 2018.

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Ramadan.” 55 Spouses, siblings and even parents and their children would have to be seated according to gender. 56 Also, lights have to be switched on at all times in the cinema and screening choices have to be regulated and censored to be within the conservative rules of Islam. 57 Thus, it is not a surprise that when PAS took over Kelantan in 1990, several cinema outlets such as Rex, Odeon and Lido had to close its doors on Kelantan as not only did they not (or rather, could not) adhere to the enactment, the cinematic business in PAS’s Islamic state may no longer be profitable. 58 This disinterest from investors becomes more evident when both TGV cinemas and Malaysia’s largest cinema chain, Golden Screen Cinemas (GSC), announced their major expansion plans in 2015, none included Kelantan in its list. 59 Therefore, when news hit the media that Kelantan was expecting its first cinema in Kota Bharu’s KB Mall, it came as a huge surprise and sent shockwaves nationwide. Paragon Cinema, as announced by KB Mall on its official Facebook page via a post with several proposed design renders, was going to house eight screens and be ready for its audience by July 2016 (fig. 8 & 9). 60 This would be the first opening of a cinema in Kelantan since 1990. Kelantan’s Youth Chief Ahmad Fadhli Shaari, who led a protest against the cinema, revealed that he was afraid the opening of cinemas would cause the Islamic state to deviate from its rules with which might lead to future problems. 61 Hence, it is to no surprise that Paragon Cinema, which was supposed to open in July 2016, has been put on hold till this day despite it being seemingly constructed and built. They were without a license that needed to be given from the local municipal council and the Kelantan state government. 55

Malay Mail, 2016, www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2016/01/31/tgv-confirms-exploring-kelantan-marketbut-says-no-kota-baru-cinema-plans-y/1051347. Accessed on 9 Jan 2019. 56 The Star Online. "Going To The Cinema In Kelantan Remains Just A Dream". 2016, http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2016/06/01/going-to-the-cinema-in-kelantan-remains-just-a-dream/. Accessed 28 Dec 2018. 57 TODAYonline. "Proposed Kelantan Cinema, Its First In 26 Years, Sparks Protests, Excitement". 2016, https://www.todayonline.com/world/asia/kelantans-first-cinema-launch-more-20-years-still-limbo. Accessed 22 Dec 2018. 58 Ibid. 59 Malay Mail, “Cinema Chains Continue to Expand as Blockbusters Keep Packing Them in,” 2015, https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2015/12/14/cinema-chains-continue-to-expand-as-blockbusterskeep-packing-them-in/1022927. 60 The Star Online. "Going To The Cinema In Kelantan Remains Just A Dream". 2016, http://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2016/06/01/going-to-the-cinema-in-kelantan-remains-just-a-dream/. Accessed 28 Dec 2018.; Facebook page of KB Mall announcing Paragon Cinemas: https://www.facebook.com/KotaBharuMall/posts/994957000587464?comment_tracking=%7B%22tn%22%3A% 22O%22%7D. 61 TODAYonline. "Proposed Kelantan Cinema, Its First In 26 Years, Sparks Protests, Excitement". 2016, https://www.todayonline.com/world/asia/kelantans-first-cinema-launch-more-20-years-still-limbo. Accessed 22 Dec 2018.

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Figure 8: Paragon Cinema Render; Source: KB Mall Official Facebook Page.

Figure 9: Paragon Cinema Render; Source: KB Mall Official Facebook Page

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Just as Lawrence Lessig’s regulatory theory asserts, behaviour may be regulated or restricted, to some extent, by architecture… I would like to suggest that the absence of one may paradoxically provide a similar function. 62 As suggested in the previous chapter, the built environment is a tool to exercise power. This is because not only does the physical existence of the built form allows the declaration and the enactment of political intentions, both codified and uncodified, ruling bodies “greatly rely on the symbols in the form of architecture, rituals, ceremonies and displays to project the idea of legitimization.” 63 When these symbols such as architecture are produced and tabulated with intentions, they are “able to consolidate a society’s self-identification and loyalty to a particular state or government” and in the cases of a post-colonial states, usually occur along religious lines. 64 In this case, with Kelantan void of an “un-Islamic” cinema from the public sphere as an inevitable consequence of the strict implementation of various Islamic rules in regards to it operational methods, the PAS state government is able to maintain its image as an Islamic state (the way they interpret an Islamic state to be). Thus, the absence of cinemas can henceforth be interpreted as the state government’s spatial ‘strategy’, “the imposition of power through the disciplining and organization of space”, to promote the image and identity of an Islamic state within its state and population, henceforth pushing forward its Islamist state agenda within and beyond Kelantan. 65 It is important to note, however, that is not the introduction of rules itself but, the consequential absence of cinemas through the strict enforcement of legislations that is the ‘strategy’ to regulate the behaviour that occurs in those architected systems or “that utilizes those resources”. 66 In this instance, Kelantan void of a cinema is the setting. As Lessig puts it: "think of the constraints blocking your access to the air-conditioned home of a neighbour who is gone for the weekend. Law constrains you - if you break in, you will be trespassing. Norms constrain you as well - it is unneighbourly to break into your neighbour’s house. Both of these constrains, however, would be imposed on you after you broke into the house. They are the prices you might have to pay later. The architectural constraint is the lock on the door - it blocks you as you are trying to enter the house." 67 Consequently, in the case of Kelantan, it was the entire removal of the house. 62

Schindler, Sarah B. “Architectural Exclusion: Discrimination and Segregation through Physical Design of the Built Environment.” The Yale Law Journal, 2015, pp. 1934–2024. 63 Ismail, Alice Sabrina and Mohd Rasdi, Mohd Tajuddin. “Mosque Architecture and Political Agenda in Twentieth-Century Malaysia.” The Journal of Architecture, vol. 15, no. 2, 2010, pp. 137–152. 64 ibid. 65 As quoted by Certeau, M. (1998). The practice of everyday life. Berkeley, California: University of California Press in Bren, Paulina. “Weekend Getaways: The Chata, the Tramp and the Politics of Private Life in Post-1968 Czechoslovakia.” Socialist Spaces: Sites of Everyday Life in the Eastern Bloc, edited by David Crowley and Susan Emily. Reid, Berg, 2002, pp. 123–141. 66 Lee Tien. “Architectural Regulation And The Evolution Of Social Norms.” Yale Journal of Law and Technology, vol. 7, no. 1, 1 Jan. 2005, pp. 2–22. 67 Lawrence Lessig as quoted in Lee Tien. “Architectural Regulation And The Evolution Of Social Norms.” Yale Journal of Law and Technology, vol. 7, no. 1, 1 Jan. 2005, pp. 2–22.

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Figure 10: Paragon Cinema at KB Mall; Source: Own Photos.

Figure 11: Renders advertised on the panels; Source: Own Photos.

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Today, the retail space housing Paragon Cinema in KB Mall remains closed off with pink Paragon Cinema panels and has been that way for the past three years (fig. 10 & 11). Whilst it stays boarded up with the words ‘Paragon Cinema’ and its wishful architectural renders stays advertised to the public, it remains a hope for eager cinema fans. Paragon Cinema thus appears to have transformed into a constant reminder of the PAS state governments array of Islamist rulings that have hindered the population from entertainment. Just as removing the payphones in a drug-infested neighbourhood which is used for untraceable drug deal-making “affect(s) everyone (and) not just the drug dealers of the neighbourhood”, the absence of cinemas, similarly, affects everyone in Kelantan, not just the Malay Muslims of Kelantan. 68 Architectural regulation, therefore, is just as Lee Tien puts it: “can be a quite blunt enforcement instrument, lacking a mitigating feedback loop”. 69 For the non-Muslims in Kelantan, this was and still is one of the few real losses in entertainment facilities experienced under the Islamic State government; real in the sense that there are none available in Kelantan at all. Because while night clubs are not available in Kelantan, there still are a few surviving bars and pubs within the Chinese frequented areas of Kota Bharu. In general, while the PAS state government have said that they have “stopped issuing ALL entertainment centre licenses over twenty years ago” in the hopes of keeping the image of the Islamic state clean, it is lesser known amongst the general public that they still exist within the Islamist fabric of Kelantan (though purely on the survival of existing licenses given to them prior to the electoral revival of PAS). 70 Hence, with this information, it is not as difficult to rationalise that despite the imposed ban and restrictions on entertainment facilities under the Entertainment Control and Entertainment Places Enactment 1998, the overall sentiment of the ethnic Chinese minorities towards the PAS state government remains positive and satisfactory (for now). 71 The President of the Federation of Chinese Associations of Kelantan and fellow ethnic Chinese resident, Mr. Oie Poh Choon, relayed his opinion on the PAS state government in an interview explaining that “he does not feel restricted living under the PAS state government even though there are some restrictions when it comes to entertainment”. 72 However, for

ibid. Lee Tien. “Architectural Regulation And The Evolution Of Social Norms.” Yale Journal of Law and Technology, vol. 7, no. 1, 1 Jan. 2005, pp. 2–22. 70 Abdullah, Sharifah Mahsinah. “‘We Stopped Issuing Entertainment Centre Licences over 20 Years Ago’: Kelantan Gov't.”New Straits Time, 2017, www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2017/05/243804/we-stopped-issuingentertainment-centre-licences-over-20-years-ago. 71 Sathian, Mala Rajo. and Yeok Meng, Ngeow. “Essentialising Ethnic and State Identities: Strategic Adaptations of Ethnic Chinese in Kelantan, Malaysia.” Asian Studies Review, vol. 38, no. 3, 2014, pp. 385–402. 72 Koi Kye Lee. “Kelantan's Non-Muslims Happy with PAS Rule, but Worried about Slow Economy, Hudud.” TODAYonline, 2016, www.todayonline.com/world/asia/kelantans-non-muslims-happy-pas-rule-worried-about-slow-economyhudud. Accessed 28 Dec 2018. 69

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those who wish to experience or visit the cinema, they have to find other means of achieving their goal. CHAPTER 3(B): ACROSS BORDERS During my trip to Kelantan, spontaneous conversations with the local ethnic Chinese residents intended to widen my understanding of Kelantan and the purportedly miserable situation of its ethnic Chinese population confirmed the views of Mr. Oie, the President of the Chinese Associations of Kelantan. This being said, these exact conversations also gave way to the reveal of how there were “many ways and places to get what you want in Kelantan”, as a Chinese uncle in his 60s told me. 73 This was how I eventually learnt about the locals’ way of getting about the lack of cinemas in Kelantan.

12: Map of travel from Kota Bharu to the closest cinema located in Kuala Terengganu; Source: Google Figure Earth. Unlike the discreet operations of the pork van - whether known to the PAS state government or not – which involved being hidden within the landscapes of Kelantan, the ‘tactic’ used by 73

personal communication, 2018.

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Kelantan’s ethnic minorities (and its Malay-Muslim population) to circumvent the architected cinema-less landscape of Kelantan that will be examined in this section goes beyond borders. Whilst the pork van can be read as a maneuver within enemy’s (PAS’s) territory, the evasion of this Islamist legislation involved the total exit from the constraints of the ‘architected system’ of Kelantan: driving out to the cinema in a neighbouring state. Just as James C. Scott had conceptualized in his seminal book ‘Weapons of the Weak’, this maneuver can be categorized as a ‘passive resistance’ of the people, which “often represent a form of individual self-help (as) they typically avoid any direct, symbolic confrontation with authority.” 74 Through the voluntary two-and-a-half-hour drive (about 165 km) out of Kelantan to the neighbouring state of Terengganu, where the closest cinema is, Kelantanese residents are able to escape the realities of the Islamic state, both metaphorically (through the world of movies) and literally (by crossing over the borders and jurisdiction of Kelantan’s legislations) as shown in Figure 12. Whilst I personally cannot imagine traveling the 165 km for a movie screening at the cinema, the ethnic Chinese residents (as well as the MalayMuslims) have managed to find a fine balance with its state authorities through this ‘tactic’, facilitating their coexistence in the cinema-less Islamic state of Kelantan. It is indeed intriguing to see how ingenious or the extent to which people get to circumvent these imposed rules, many of these masking within the seemingly regular, everyday routine of the ethnic Chinese minorities of Kelantan. CONCLUSION: AN ISLAMIC STATE? Before my visit to Kelantan, my impressions of the Islamic State were one filled with oppression and resentment. While my visits to Kelantan were able to change my perceptions of Kelantan, I personally will still hold PAS at arm’s length. While PAS has been able to maintain Kelantan under its rule for almost three decades and subsequently enforcing its identity as the Islamic State of Malaysia, many doubt that they are satisfied with the current affairs of Kelantan. Take for example the wishes of the late Chief Minister of Kelantan Nik Abdul Aziz, who had gained the respect and support of both Muslims and non-Muslims alike. He was adamant about ensuring the implementation of the Islamic ‘Hudud’ laws in Kelantan but the proposal eventually fell through due to the overwhelming opposition received nationwide; the Chinese minorities in Kelantan reacted disapprovingly and thought the law was “pre-modern, subversive and incomprehensible”. 75 Kelantan’s PAS leaders were then left to come to terms with the realities of Kelantan as a state in the multi74

Scott, James C. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. Yale University Press, 2008, pp. xvi 75 Sathian, Mala Rajo. and Yeok Meng, Ngeow. “Essentialising Ethnic and State Identities: Strategic Adaptations of Ethnic Chinese in Kelantan, Malaysia.” Asian Studies Review, vol. 38, no. 3, 2014, pp. 385–402.

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ethnic and multi-cultural Malaysia. It can be thus said that though significant Islamisation has went through in Kelantan, the state still remains a dilute version of what PAS wants it to be. If we were to imagine PAS’s ideal Islamic State where its Islamic social policies and regulations are enforced entirely throughout, it will most probably not have a place for the ethnic Chinese culture. However, with Kelantan’s five percent of non-Muslim minorities constantly being under the watchful eyes of other non-Muslims and the media nationwide, any case of a breach of the constitutional rights of the ethnic minorities would result in either the protest from oppositions and the federal government, or the loss of crucial votes and support from the same non-Muslim community (could vote for BN in the next election), both with the ability to kick PAS out of Kelantan’s leadership. 76 This rendered PAS’s dependence on its non-Muslim minorities. On the opposite end of the situation, ethnic minorities faced a similar diabolical situation. The very same reasons which rendered the lack of control over their way of life as they are strongly impacted and controlled by the choices and judgements of the majority MalayMuslim populace, also provided them the negotiating power with the PAS state government. Thus, the reasons for which the non-Muslim populace have to conform and adapt to certain rules and regulations of the Islamic State (like the absence of cinemas) is also the reason that allowed them to negotiate the maintenance of their culture and identity within the Islamic State of Kelantan (pork van). I will also argue that the survival of existing un-Islamic establishments such as the pork shop, bars and pubs are one of PAS’s ways of facilitating their coexistence. However, in the case that the non-ethnic minorities choose not to stay within the boundaries of the enforced Islamic social policies and regulations, the state government may give them unspoken consent to continue to do so, for as long as they are satisfied and supportive of PAS and that these stay within the hidden landscapes of Kelantan, thus keeping to its agenda of protecting the projected image of Kelantan as an ‘Islamic State’. This is because, as James C. Scott explains: “(A tactic’s) safety lies in anonymity. It is also extremely rarely that officials of the state wish to publicize the insubordination. To do so would be to admit that their policy is unpopular, and above all, to expose the tenuousness of their authority in the countryside – neither of which the sovereign state finds in its interest.” 77 This further supports and explains the discreet nature of the ‘tactics’ employed by the ethnic Chinese minorities discussed in the previous chapters. 76

as mentioned before, the political competition between the two Malay/Islam parties, BN and PAS, made the votes and support from its 5% ethnic minorities significant to PAS’s maintenance of power and authority in Kelantan. 77 Scott, James C. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. Yale

University Press, 2008, p. 36. 28

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In this respect, while this dissertation does not claim to provide a complete overview of the situation between PAS and its minorities, it argues that both the continuous survival of the Islamic state and the well-being of the minorities are dependent on the facilitated coexistence of both parties within these politically charged spaces of Kelantan, influencing and reflecting into Kelantanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s built form and way of life. The appearance of harmony within the ethnic Chinese minorities of Kelantan thus comes as a result of this underlying understanding between both parties. APPENDICES Figure 1: Sheltered alley and pork meat market making up the Pasar Pokok Pinang; Source: Own photo. September 2018. Figure 2: Pasar Pokok Pinang, Source: Own photo. September 2018. Figure 3: Map of Malaysia; Source: Scott, James C. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. Yale University Press, 2008, pp. 60. Figure 4: Map of the area around the Pork Shop; Source: Own photo. Figure 5: Pork Van; Source: Own Photo. Figure 6: The Alley; Source: Own Photo. Figure 7: The Transaction at the Back of the Pork Van; Source: Own Photos. Figure 8: Paragon Cinema Render; Source: KB Mall Official Facebook Page, Retrieved on: https://www.facebook.com/KotaBharuMall/posts/994957000587464?comment_tracking=% 7B%22tn%22%3A%22O%22%7D Figure 9: Paragon Cinema Render; Source: KB Mall Official Facebook Page, Retrieved on: https://www.facebook.com/KotaBharuMall/posts/994957000587464?comment_tracking=% 7B%22tn%22%3A%22O%22%7D Figure 10: Paragon Cinema at KB Mall; Source: Own Photos. Figure 11: Renders advertised on the panels; Source: Own Photos. Figure 12: Map of travel from Kota Bharu to the closest cinema located in Kuala Terengganu; Source: Google Earth.

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