Oxygen N. 20 - MEDITERRANEAN. A sea in the center of the world by Enel Spa

editorial board Enrico Alleva (president) Giulio Ballio Roberto Cingolani Paolo Andrea Colombo Fulvio Conti Derrick De Kerckhove Niles Eldredge Paola Girdinio Helga Nowotny Telmo Pievani Francesco Profumo Carlo Rizzuto Robert Stavins Umberto Veronesi

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editor in chief Gianluca Comin editorial director Vittorio Bo publishing coordination Pino Buongiorno Luca Di Nardo Giorgio Gianotto Paolo Iammatteo Dina Zanieri managing editor Stefano Milano

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editing Cecilia Toso editorial team Simone Arcagni Davide Coero Borga Cristina Gallotti Vera Mantengoli Luca Salvioli Donato Speroni translations Monica Belmondo Susanna Bourlot Laura Culver Gail McDowell

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summary

MEDITERRANEAN The rich and complex Mediterranean region, a meeting place of cultures, religions, and societies, has always been strategic for communication between Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Today, as a result of the Arab Spring, there is a growing need for global energy resources and new media opportunities, and the centrality of this region has become strengthened and is taking on an important role in the world’s geopolitical balance. Current events are telling us what t he “wealth” of the Mediterranean consists of, with the rise of new social demands, and likewise, the expanding economies, policy changes, and cultural agitation. This issue of Oxygen recounts a territory of growth, with an enormous potential that will find expression only if the Mediterranean countries, that are so very different from one another, can establish a lasting bridge of communication and collaboration.

10˜ editorial A more Mediterranean Europe by Antonio Tajani

12˜ scenarios New bearings for Mediterranean governance by Nathalie Tocci The Mediterranean governed by the West, that we have known since the end of the Cold War, is disappearing. New economies are emerging, other countries are appearing on the global stage, and new social and political orders are shaping the Mediterranean region. A look at the future of governance as it evolves.

18˜ contexts The legacy of the Arab Spring by Gian Paolo Calchi Novati The movements that gave rise to the acclaimed Arab Spring have created considerable expectations in the West, with concerns over the Islamic parties and great attention to the first free elections. The change in the Arab-Islamic world is not only driven by religious and cultural issues, but by new and binding social needs.

22˜ contexts Italy and Spain look to the Mediterranean by Javier Moreno and Alessandro Barbano

× A sea in the center of the new world ×

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Only 15 kilometers of water separate Spain from North Africa, and there are only about 70 kilometers between Pantelleria and Tunisia. Spain and Italy are so close to Africa, and yet so little “Mediterranean.” Both are still fairly reticent about belonging to an area that is so strategic for Europe’s economy. The opinion of two well-known newspaper directors.

28˜ opinions

46˜ opinions

A surge of opportunity by Emiliano Alessandri

The future of energy, twixt “oceans” and “mountains” by Wim Thomas

“The twin crises of the Eurozone and the Arab Spring have intersected.” European economic stagnation has reduced the growth prospects of the Arab countries, and the political and social instability caused by revolutions creates tensions in neighboring Europe. But these difficulties could bring a gust of positive changes.

34˜ interview with franco bassanini Investments to knock down the borders by Paolo Valentino InfraMed, the equity investment fund for the south and east of the Mediterranean, is of vital importance as an operational tool for Europe, both from an economic and a political standpoint. But in order to make the most of its potential, Europe needs to recognize this region’s strategic value.

38˜ focus At the center of the world by Donato Speroni

40˜ contexts Infrastructures that broaden horizons by Andrea De Benedetti Mediterranean countries communicate by sea, by land, by pipeline, and with “information superhighways.” Or at least they could. A lot can be improved regarding lines of communication, so that the Mediterranean no longer resembles a pond.

44˜ passepartout A sea of crossroads

In this article for Oxygen, Wim Thomas, Chief Energy Advisor of Shell, tries to explore the future, so that when it arrives it will not be completely unknown. The future of energy holds two scenarios in store: the victory of gas, and the victory of the sun.

52˜ in-depth It is time to renew by Houda Ben Jannet Allal In view of changes, and political and economic crises, the need to promote energy-saving measures and plans to develop renewable energy has arisen in the countries to the south and east of the Mediterranean. If until now biomass, solar thermal, and water were the sources used the most, now solar photovoltaic and wind power are taking over.

56˜ contexts The gas route by Marco Arcelli Past, and future, relationships between the countries of North Africa and Europe are based on gas, a precious resource that, however, risks seeing a collapse in demand. Europe’s crises, the growth of renewable energy sources, and the evolution of the global markets are putting North Africa’s leadership position in gas exports to the test. A rundown of the strategies that must be implemented.

60˜ enel foundation Energy puts Europe and Africa online by Vera Mantengoli A strategic energy basin, which possesses continuous and discontinuous sources, which is home to 7% of the world’s population, and which acts as a corridor for global energy markets. The Mediterranean is a place where important relationships can be created. These are the visions El-Salmawy, Boutarfa, and Adam Brown presented at the meeting of the Enel Foundation.

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64˜ contexts

78˜ focus

Making the desert bloom by Luca Salvioli

Croatia: Europe’s 28th by Mara Gergolet

Too late for some, at an inopportune time for others, Croatia has become the twenty-eighth member state of the European Union. But the country that many believe to be yet another problematic area which might make the Union more unstable, may instead be a resource and a good communication bridge with the Balkans.

68˜ future tech Compasses of modern navigation by Cecilia Toso

70˜ in-depth Return to growth after Erdogan by Pino Buongiorno The political sunset of Erdogan following the riots in Taksim Square is a signal of the significant change in Turkish society, composed of young people and women well aware of their own vitality. It is crucial that the Islamic party understand this new force in order for Turkey to overcome the crisis and record further growth.

74˜ contexts Hellenic revival? by Antonio Ferrari The protagonist of Europe’s greatest fears in recent years, Greece is experiencing a timid but partially reassuring economic recovery. Despite very high unemployment and salaries cut to the bone, after the 2012 elections the Hellenic Republic is experiencing the revival of tourism, financial speculation in its favor, and above all, important international relations.

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80˜ contexts The long Libyan autumn by Gerardo Pelosi After the death of Gaddafi, Libya has been going through a long season of transition and reconstruction of roles, in which local communities, the various parties, and even dangerous militias are trying to find their place. This phase could conclude successfully if the international community and, above all, Libya’s main commercial partners offer their support.

84˜ contexts Morocco’s illuminated monarchy by Giovanni Porzio Human rights, transport, infrastructures, constitutional reforms, and health are pivot points of the young King of Morocco’s reforms: measures promptly implemented that warded off a revolutionary spring in the country. Different conditions, albeit not particularly good, that depict the other face of the Arab world.

88˜ scenarios Africa: the next economic miracle? by Vittorio Da Rold Despite political instability, popular uprisings, and the reduction of trade with foreign countries, the African continent is awakening from its long hibernation. In the more advanced countries, as in the less advanced ones, the IMF paints an overall picture of growth which is awakening European, Chinese, and American interest.

94˜ in-depth

114˜ contexts

So much science on the other side of the sea by Davide Coero Borga

The simple power of the Mediterranean diet by Gabriele Riccardi

Our knowledge is based on the system of Arabic numbers, but we often ignore the real importance this part of the world has held with regard to some of the discoveries that have shaped science: from the sanity test to the refraction of light, from astronomy to medicine. An overview of the discoveries and innovations we inherited and, on a few occasions, plagiarized.

The long-standing dietary habits of the Mediterranean people are now considered the most consistent with the dietary guidelines produced by institutions and scientific researchers.

100˜ scenarios One identity, many identities by Matteo Vegetti

118˜ in-depth Fishing: a renewable resource of the Mediterranean Sea by Silvio Greco

Traditionally a metaphor for public space, the shores of the Mediterranean harbor a cultural, political, and economic pluralism which many have tried to unite. Despite the many attempts and proposals to create unity, the question remains unresolved still today.

To talk about fishing in the Mediterranean involves many aspects, from the dispute between EU and non-EU countries, to the ongoing changes in North Africa, to the different regulations, fleets, and fishing techniques. But underlying these evaluations must be the awareness that the sea is a limited resource and that it belongs to everyone.

106˜ contexts

122˜ contexts

Meetings or conflicts? Artists speak out by Ludovico Pratesi

The Arab world is open to everyone by Simone Arcagni

The recent protests in Arab countries have brought social networks to the fore as creators of active communities, able to raise the awareness of the media, overcome news barriers, and become a place of interest for new artistic forms, as well.

110˜ in-depth

126˜science at the toy store Engineering of a sand castle by Davide Coero Borga

Sounds from the shores by Paolo Ferrari The melodic vocation that brings together the Mediterranean’s music has created hybrid sounds and cross-references, forming a universe of sound that dialogs from shore to shore. The most representative musicians in a musical voyage across three continents.

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OUR JOURNEY IN ENERGY KEEPS US MOVING AHEAD.

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SO WE’RE READY TO SHARE MILLIONS MORE MOMENTS WITH YOU. enel.com

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contributors

Contributors to this number

01˜ Emiliano

02˜ Houda Ben

03˜ Marco

04˜ Alessandro

05˜ Franco

Alessandri

Jannet Allal

Arcelli

Barbano

Bassanini

As a Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Washington, D.C., he has investigated the Mediterranean, in particular. He currently serves on the board of the Institute for International Affairs (IAI) in Rome.

In 2013, she became Director General of the OME, where she had previously served as head of the Department of Renewable Energy. She has been a consultant for the European Commission for Sustainable Development.

Director of the Upstream Gas division of the Enel Group, he is in charge of investments in gas production. He was assistant to the CEO of the Group, and President and CEO of Enel North America Inc.

A journalist and professor, he is the Director of the newspaper Il Mattino. He was Deputy Director of the newspapers Il Messaggero and Nuovo Quotidiano di Puglia. He is co-author of The Journalism Handbook (Laterza, 2012).

Professor of Constitutional Law, he was a member of the Italian Parliament from 1979 to 2006, and also served as Minister. He is President of the Deposits and Loans Fund and of the Investment Board of the Inframed Fund.

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06˜ Gian Paolo

07˜ Andrea

08˜ Vittorio

09˜ Antonio

10˜ Paolo

Calchi Novati

De Benedetti

Da Rold

Ferrari

Professor of History and Institutions of Afro-Asian Countries at the University of Pavia, he was director of the IPALMO Institute and editor of the journal International Politics. Since 2009, he has been a Senior Research Fellow at the ISPI.

A journalist, teacher, and essayist, he writes about sports, society, and culture for GQ, Il Manifesto, and Guerin Sportivo. With Luca Rastello, he co-authored Binario Morto, reporting on the Pan-European Lisbon-Kiev Corridor 5.

A journalist and correspondent for Il Sole 24 Ore, he has dealt with many countries and types of transitions: Poland, France, the problems of the euro. He followed the crises in Greece and Slovenia.

A columnist for the Corriere della Sera, he first began working as a special correspondent in Italy and then in the Middle East and the Southern Balkans. He is the author of several books, including Sami, a Lebanese Story and Yes Islam, No Islam.

A music critic, he writes for La Stampa, Torino Sette, Rumore, and Il Manifesto. He has been the author and presenter of various programs for Radio Rai 2, including Planet Rock, Stereo Night, Sound and Ultrasound, and Boogie Nights.

11˜ Mara

12˜ Silvio

13˜ Javier

14˜ Gerardo

15˜ Giovanni

Gergolet

Greco

Moreno

Pelosi

Porzio

A journalist, since the Kosovo war in 1999 she has worked for the Corriere della Sera, where she concentrated on the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. She is currently working at the Foreign Affairs desk in Milan.

A marine biologist, he has participated in numerous research campaigns in Antarctica. He has taught at the Federico II University of Naples and now teaches at the University of Gastronomic Science in Pollenzo. He is chairman of the Slow Fish Scientific Committee.

Since 2006, he has been Director of El País, where he began by working on the economic editorial staff before becoming the Managing Editor of the Mexican version. He was a correspondent in Berlin and has been involved in the paper’s famous Sunday edition.

A correspondent for Il Sole 24 Ore concerning politics and the international economy, he has worked for the newspaper Gazzettino and for the Italy News Agency. He is co-author of the book After Gaddafi. Oil and Democracy in the New Libya.

A reporter, he has been working as a special correspondent for Panorama magazine for more than thirty years, dealing with major topical conflicts in Africa, the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and South America. He has received the Max David Prize in 2001.

16˜ Ludovico

17˜ Gabriele

18˜ Antonio

19˜ Wim

20˜ Nathalie

Pratesi

Riccardi

Tajani

Thomas

Tocci

A curator and art critic for the newspaper La Repubblica, he is the Artistic Director of the Pescheria Visual Arts Center in Pesaro and of the Guastalla Foundation for Contemporary Art. His latest book is New Italian Art. Italian Art of the Last Generations.

A nutritional physician and Professor of Endocrinology and Metabolic Diseases at the Federico II University of Naples, he is also Chairman of the university’s Master of Science in Human Nutrition course. He is an advisor of the BCFN.

Since 2010, Vice President of the European Commission and the Commissioner for Industry and Entrepreneurship, from 2008 to 2010 he was Vice President of the European Commission and the Commissioner for Transport. He has worked for Il Giornale, Il Settimanale, Rai1 radio news

Chief Energy Advisor of Shell, he heads the analysts dedicated to studying the global energy scenario for Shell. Representing the United Kingdom, he is a member of the World Petroleum Council and a consultant to the World Energy Council.

Deputy Director of the Institute of International Affairs, Director of the EU Area and Neighbourhood for the IAI, and editor of the magazine The International Spectator, she deals with European Neighbourhood foreign policy.

21˜ Paolo

22˜ Matteo

Valentino

Vegetti

A foreign policy correspondent and columnist for Corriere della Sera, he has been the newspaper’s correspondent from Brussels, Moscow, Berlin, and Washington. He interviewed President Barack Obama in the Oval Office.

He teaches Aesthetics at the Polytechnic of Milan and Culture of the Territory at the Academy of Architecture in Mendrisio. He is the author of Hegel and the Boundaries of the West, and Philosophies of the Metropolis.

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editorial

A more Mediterranean Europe by Antonio Tajani Vice President of the European Commission

he Mediterranean has always been an area of vital importance to the stability of the world and global trade: the cradle of Western civilization through the Greek and Latin civilizations, but at the same time, of the East and the expansion of its civilization. It is also the crossroads of religions, of different trade routes that already a long time ago led to Africa, Asia (the Silk Road), or to the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal. Not to mention the navigators who sailed from the Mediterranean to discover â&#x20AC;&#x153;the New World.â&#x20AC;? This region of immense cultural and economic wealth can only be of essential importance. As an Italian, I obviously cannot remain indifferent to the fate of this region. As Vice

President of the European Commission responsible for business and industrial policy, one of my goals has been to strengthen relationships and cooperation with the Mediterranean region. Undoubtedly there were already strong ties uniting the Mediterranean with the European Union through the European Neighbourhood Policy, and prior to my arrival, we had a policy of Euro-Mediterranean industrial cooperation. The region is in constant evolution and change. With the Arab Spring, the political systems of these countries and their economic priorities have to be redefined. These changes are still going on, and that is why I think Europe should be more present than ever and respond to requests from our Me-

diterranean partners. If we show ourselves to be friends in difficult times, we will be able to build strong relationships with them. If we evolve the partnership in the right direction, our Mediterranean partners will hopefully be grateful to Europe. That is why, in addition to our existing industrial cooperation, I still want to make further progress. While Europe itself is going through an unprecedented crisis and profound changes are still shaking up our partners, the idea has blossomed of organizing European economic missions in the Mediterranean. The goal is to revitalize the bilateral trade ties and develop growth on the two shores of the Mediterranean. In 2012, these ideas came to fruition, much to my great joy, and economic missions called “Missions for Growth” were conducted in three countries of North Africa: in Egypt in May 2012, and in Morocco and Tunisia in November 2012. These missions have brought together highlevel European entrepreneurs from small, medium, and large enterprises, as well as representatives of organizations active in the development of international business. The objective is to open the doors of the world of policy-makers to these delegations of entrepreneurs. Especially in the Mediterranean, it is important that businessmen, politicians, and high-ranking decision-makers (ministers) be able to communicate with each other, seated around the same table. Partnerships and investments arise through business contacts, but also through the support and the guarantees offered by the politicians of these countries. In Europe, the success of these missions was immediate and we were able to put together a large number of delegations of entrepreneurs seeking to expand their activities in the Mediterranean. The message was received very positively by our Egyptian, Moroccan, and Tunisian counterparts, and for their part, great expectations have been created in order to continue our missions for growth with the same enthusiasm. For example, with the Tunisians, we have established an EU-Tunisia Council for Entrepreneurship that will be responsible for conducting the mission of monitoring and for agreements signed with partners in areas such as small and medium-sized enterprises, raw materials, tourism, and standardization or cooperation in the space sector. My vision for the coming years will be to

maintain the momentum of these missions for European economic growth on both sides of the Mediterranean. The organization of other missions in Mediterranean countries has been taken into account, while a mission in Russia was just accomplished and another is expected very soon in China. Furthermore, beyond the numerous action plans that have already been signed between the EU and its Mediterranean partners, the European Commission services have also started negotiations to reach free trade agreements between the EU and Morocco and Tunisia. I also hope that the discussions that are in a very advanced stage with Jordan and Egypt will lead to similar negotiations very soon. Little by little, a large pan-European- Mediterranean market will be created and gradually put into operation: a market that will include the EU, the EFTA, the Western Balkans, Turkey, and the Mediterranean countries. I believe that the program for the growth of the European Union is essential for restoring the ability of European industry to access new markets, and at the same time, to renew and innovate in order to adapt to the new realities of an increasingly global and changing world. These missions for growth, these free trade agreements, and the progressive implementation of the next big “panEuro-Mediterranean” market clearly fall into this agenda for growth, the agreement to which is the highest priority. The goal is not only to put Europe back on the path of prosperity, but also to stabilize the economic environment in its neighborhood and develop strong relationships with our partners so we become closer. Let us not forget that since ancient times, trade and commerce have been the best way to bring the peoples of the Mediterranean together. We need to bring trade to the center of the debate and do our best to encourage entrepreneurs who wish to be launched on the international scene, because it is they who will form new social ties and help our economies recover. Moreover, this is another challenge that we want to meet through the initiative of the “Internationalization of SMEs.” Today, we are living in a global and interconnected world, and political and decision-making structures must adapt to meet the aspirations of their people in order to bring more prosperity and democracy to the greatest number of people.

While Europe is going through an unprecedented crisis, the idea has blossomed of organizing European economic missions in the Mediterranean

scenarios

New bearings for Mediterranean governance by Nathalie Tocci Deputy Director of the IAI

The Mediterranean governed by the West, that we have known since the end of the Cold War, is disappearing. New economies are emerging, other countries are appearing on the global stage, and new social and political orders are shaping the Mediterranean region. A look at the future of governance as it evolves.

America’s hegemonic role in the region may be slowly coming to an end, and the same can be said for Europe

The Mediterranean and the Middle East are undergoing a profound transformation. While the destination of the region’s troubled journey into the 21st century cannot be deciphered today with any degree of clarity, far clearer is the point of departure that it irrevocably leaves behind. Put bluntly, the proverbial “West” led the 20 th-century Mediterranean and Middle East. As the Ottoman empire crumbled at the dawn of the last century, European powers took the lead, externally – and artificially – designing the Sykes-Picot state order. With European colonialism on the wane in the aftermath of World War II, the bat was passed on to the United States, in competition with the Soviet Union in the emerging Cold War global architecture. By 1978, with the Camp David I accords, Western – and notably American – leadership of the region was reaffirmed. The region was politically divided between the “moderate” (read pro-Western) and radical or resistance (read anti-Western) camps, with the former generally

winning the upper hand. As the Cold War came to a close, American involvement in the region deepened, first and foremost through two wars in Iraq and an extensive investment in the Middle East peace process. The Middle East just depicted is fast fading. Domestically and regionally, the Mediterranean and Middle East are gripped by what is optimistically dubbed an Arab Spring. Most visibly, the Arab uprisings have led to regime changes in three countries – Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya – two of which had been staunch Western allies, and the third – Gaddafi’s Libya – in rapid rekindling with the West. Yet the underlying transformation is far deeper, stretching across the region from Mecca to Marrakech. It is a process driven by deep societal, economic, and technological transformations, leading to an enhanced role of individual agency which is mobilized to seek greater empowerment. It is at the same time a process in which communal – and sectarian – identities are (re)awakened.

oxygen | 20 — 07.2013

Individual agency and communal affiliations are in turn presenting a formidable challenge to the state system. In many respects, it can be viewed as a race against time. The “state” has had an initial edge, equipped with the institutions to continue ensuring a Weberian monopoly over the use of force. Yet, in the medium-to-long term, individual empowerment and communal dynamics may well take the upper hand. Some states will resist longer – the Gulf monarchies, Iran, Morocco. Others are crumbling before our eyes – Syria. Yet the risk of centrifugal forces gripping the wider Middle East and casting into question the state system and its alignments as we have known them over the last decades cannot be underplayed. Within this regional system in flux, the “West” is gradually retreating. Barack Obama’s euphemistic call for “leadership from behind” in Libya may not have been technically correct – it is difficult to imagine how NATO could have toppled the Gaddafi regime, going well beyond its mandate for the implementation of a no fly zone, without the U.S. firmly in the driver’s seat alongside France and the United King-

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dom. But politically, Obama’s call signaled the U.S.’s intention to gradually downscale its presence in the region, first and foremost in North Africa but also more broadly in the Middle East as a whole. Add to this the gradually declining American dependence on Gulf oil resources in light of the “shale revolution.” All this does not entail an American wholesale retreat from the Middle East. Iran and Israel will continue to preoccupy Washington for years to come. What it does mean is that America’s hegemonic role in the region may be slowly coming to an end. The same can be said for Europe. In retrospect, the EU’s golden days in the Mediterranean were those of the Barcelona process, when it embedded in a broad multilateral framework the promise of peace brought about by the Oslo peace process. Within the broader international context marked by the end of the Cold War and U.S. hegemony in the region, the EU stepped in as second fiddle, intent on fostering a common Euro-Mediterranean home. Today, with Oslo over and no credible peace effort to replace it, the region in flux, and the EU mired in its deepest existential crisis yet, European influence

new bearings for mediterranean governance |

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It is a process driven by deep societal, economic, and technological transformations, leading to an enhanced role of individual agency which is mobilized to seek greater empowerment

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on the region is also on the decline. The decline of Western hegemony in the Mediterranean is not to be replaced, anytime soon, with other external powers. For all the talk about the decline of the “West” and the rise of the “rest,” the so-called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) are not making a bombastic entry into the Middle East. True, their presence is being increasingly felt. Chinese and Indian economic ties with North Africa and the Middle East are on the rise. With energy prices low in crisis-gripped Europe and energy-hungry emerging economies elsewhere, energy flows are shifting eastward. Security dynamics are also increasingly influenced by emerging countries. The United Nations Security Council’s Responsibility to Protect mandate in Libya was possible thanks to the support or abstention of the BRICS. To the contrary, a military intervention in Syria is – for the time being – ruled out due to the stark opposition of the Russians and the Chinese (and U.S. reluctance, of course). But while the BRICS play a greater role in the region, their

Yet the risk of centrifugal forces gripping the wider Middle East and casting into question the state system and its alignments as we have known them over the last decades cannot be underplayed 016

replacement of Western hegemony is not in the offing. So who is to lead the Mediterranean? The bottom line answer to the question is that regional actors will increasingly be the masters of their own destiny, at least for the foreseeable future. The increasing influence of Turkey, Iran, and the Gulf Cooperation Council states (notably Qatar and Saudi Arabia) is evident to all. These countries are increasingly actors “in” and not simply “of” the Mediterranean and the Middle East. But it would be mistaken to view the evolution of the region simply through this Westphalian prism. As mentioned at the outset, the transformation underway is profound, giving rise to a rich variety of non-state, sub-regional, and transnational actors whose actions and interactions will increasingly call the shots in tomorrow’s Mediterranean and Middle East. The picture that emerges is far messier than the black-and white “with us or against us” Middle East we have known for years. Yet we had better come to grips with it soon, lest our declining influence be magnified further.

new bearings for mediterranean governance |

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contexts

The legacy of the Arab Spring by Gian Paolo Calchi Novati Professor of History and Institutions of Afro-Asian Countries

The movements that gave rise to the acclaimed Arab Spring have created considerable expectations in the West, with concerns over the Islamic parties and great attention to the first free elections. The change in the Arab-Islamic world is not only driven by religious and cultural issues, but by new and binding social needs.

Many believe that the Arab Spring reflected a new updated edition of events that date back to the history of the Old Continent: the Bastille in 1789, the liberal-national movements in many European states in 1848, and the dissolution of the Soviet “empire” in 1989. Perhaps it is one last reckoning to be paid by Eurocentrism. Others have focused more attention on the “local” but in their interpretations have overused Orientalist clichés already stigmatized by Edward Said with his characteristic polemic force. Culture and religion (and philology, for analysis) are not the only factors of relevance for the ArabIslamic world. In this case, the themes that have emerged from an upheaval intended to mark a watershed between the “before” and “after” are, in a nutshell: the position of the classes and the placement of individuals in society, with reference to the level of education, employment, disparities between town and country (religious affiliation counts but is marked by crossings and overlapping, and is always at risk of exploitation, either for or against); the regional context, which has contributed variously to provoke crises and then has had an impact on the outcomes and

the resulting adjustments (still in progress); and the reorganization of the relationship between North and South, which, for the occasion, has returned to a Mediterranean centrality that had been partly lost with the shift of focus of tensions toward the Eurasian landmass. If it is a “third wave,” after the transitions to democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe in the Seventies, and in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the Eighties, priority is always given to the events in North Africa with its own specificities of individual states. And it is here that the Islamic component burst onto the scene: not only a reading of the facts but their actual evolution will have to judge whether Islam is the solution or the problem. The Arab Spring has seen the resurgence of societies that are apparently immobile, in spite of an accelerated population growth (with young people and children “overtaking” the adults), and a steady expansion of access to education and technological means of communication. The uprisings for freedom and justice have played a key role for many classes of age, vocational training, and expectations of social growth, who felt

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to be in credit with regard to an obsolete and repressive system of power. What in Tunisia and Egypt could be resolved by “grumbling” has emerged into the open. The demonstrations and riots in the major cities, largely without recourse to violence by demonstrators, represented this explosion of anger and hope quite well. Among Libya’s many “diversities,” not at all secondary, is the fact that there is no physical or metaphorical location in Libya comparable to Cairo’s Tahrir Square. Moreover, protest against the Gaddafi regime came from Derna and Benghazi, and it was easy to pretend to mistake it for the usual semi-secessionist phobias of the eastern province, which, after the fall of Idris, the ruler of Libya but in fact Emir of Cyrenaica, considers itself discriminated against. When the armies in Tunis and Cairo showed they wanted to dissociate themselves from their indefensible presidents, the change was clear. The unusual coalition between the young people and the armed forces had won. In the past, the regimes had resisted the social protest in rural areas or in factories fairly easily. This time, however, the dispute did not concern the economic conditions but the exercise of power. Arguably, the exits of Ben Ali and Mubarak, after the initial impasse, had been authorized and probably encouraged by the United States and France. The army – and even before that, the state – in Egypt and Tunisia is strong enough to ensure a reliable endurance of the institutions in conjunction with a similar upheaval. Again, Libya was an exception. Gaddafi was not sufficiently “dependent” on a great power (in theory, Italy would have been entitled) to be forced to give up without a fight and, on the other hand, Libya, and even Gaddafi, lacked a “national” army. The fusion between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica has always been precarious. It is no coincidence that after the collapse of the regimes, the army is more present than ever (albeit in the background) in Tunisia and Egypt, and Libya domineers with clan-based or sectarian militias. Islamic movements had not figured in the front row in the first days of the uprising. However, when they entered the field, they also brought their greater organization. And when the transition took the route of electoral monitoring, the Muslim Brotherhood asserted itself both in Tunisia and in Egypt, thanks to its establishment, the merits acquired with its long-standing opposition to the regimes in charge, and the work of Islamic charities. Maxime Rodinson had predicted back in 2004 that in every Arab country, the first free elections would have been won by Islamic parties: a victory that has been more difficult to replicate in subsequent elections. This is why 020

the legacy of the arab spring |

the pessimists fear that the slogan “One man, one vote” might become “One man, one vote, one time.” The Islamist parties have had too much power and too much responsibility. All together, they should have been reforming the state with a new constitution, restarting development, and satisfying the desire for social advancement and equality. Beyond the mistakes, the governments – monochrome Islamic in Cairo, the tripartite coalition in Tunis – have met with two formidable obstacles: on the one hand, their vulnerability to liberal or radical secularizing instances of the less advanced (in Egypt, there is talk of a “Cairo-centric” opposition), unable to establish itself in the ballot box but crucial to exercising the functions in cities and high levels of society (votes are counted but even more so, weighed), and on the other hand, the tendency of all opposition to indulge in what Olivier Roy calls the “culture of protest,” collaborating little with the government, or not at all, because they are waiting, who knows whether consciously or not, for its failure instead. The Islamist parties have a transversal representation, with peaks at both the top and the bottom. An aphorism states: “for the rich there are barracks, for the poor there is a mosque.” They do not have any magic formula to solve the weaknesses of the countries dependent on capitalism. In Tunisia more than in Egypt, Islamists have a managerial vocation but overall, a market policy to encourage investment and aid is lacking. International financial institutions have set conditions for loans that Morsi, for example, hesitates to accept in order not to penalize the poor and urban dwellers too much. Aid to Qatar seems to get there without too much difficulty, even though it conveys pressure oriented to the Islamization of society. Developments in North Africa have scored more points in favor of the Sunni bloc, in the dispute between the two currents of Islam now close to the breaking point (also due to the war in Syria). As expected, to the more or less disinterested West, the democratization processes must adapt to the spirit of movements, of the square or the palace, aspiring to regain their autonomy and traditional values. In this perspective, the Arab Spring seems to be a bit of a second decolonization and a bit of a counter-decolonization, because it has been moving more from below than from above. However, it would be out of place to expect a sacralization of secularism in these countries, in imitation of a modernity which does not even convince the West.

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The Arab Spring seems to be a bit of a second decolonization and a bit of a counterdecolonization, because it has been moving more from below than from above 021

contexts

Italy and Spain look to the Mediterranean

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Europe turns a deaf ear by Javier Moreno Director of “El País”

Daily events and our fears are strongly influenced by the lack of a true and unequivocal strategy for the Mediterranean. Spain and Europe, involved with other problems which compromise their participation on the Mediterranean front, are unable to foresee, listen, and intervene.

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It is difficult to get a concrete idea of Spain’s strategy for the Mediterranean. And even more difficult to clearly understand whether Spain has any strategy at all concerning the Mediterranean, an area whose importance is so obviously manifest that it is not worth engaging in long arguments. Suffice it to mention the most elevated matters – such as peace or shared prosperity – and the most pragmatic ones, which undoubtedly include energy security, illegal immigration, and the threat of Islamic terrorism. I realize that the previous statement would raise a vigorous protest on the part of any officer of Spanish diplomacy, or even of the European Union, who would bring up testimony of their work and an endless list of programs, organizations, meetings, and conferences they have dealt with over the last twenty years, resorting to increasingly high-sounding titles of what was eventually called the Mediterranean Strategy in the European Union. None of these, taken individually or altogether, have served to identify, prevent, or even attenuate the main event of recent years: the outbreak of the Arab Spring and the political fragmentation, the instability, and the explosion of political Islamism which resulted. It should not seem strange. Spain and the main European countries of the Mediterranean – such as Italy, but also France – have been trapped for years in a spiral that is engulfing the “rich” part of the coast: the European crisis, the acceleration of globalization resulting in a loss of power, wealth, and well-being, and the displacement of the center of gravity toward Asia. Spain also has an Ibero-American appendix to deal with, and which lately has not been taken care of as it should. When Spain accumulates foreign policy tasks, its officers run to protect themselves in Europe,

and only in this case does the European solution prove to be the correct one (but not in the case of Latin America, where Spain’s vocation must be deeper than Europe’s). Many a time these countries have believed that the construction of a European foreign policy would allow for articulating and developing a joint program for the Mediterranean; well, that has not worked – or has not begun to work yet – and we have seen that each European country has taken a different position, depending on the problem being faced: from military intervention in Libya to the admission of Palestine to UNESCO, to mention only two cases. But still, the “rich coast” of the Mediterranean, aside from the declarations of good intentions for daily use and consumption by self-righteous souls, does not seem to have a plan to ensure a joint future – their own, and with the poorer coast – in order to stimulate and support economic growth, the reduction of inequality, the deepening of democracy, and the defense of human rights and freedoms. In return, Europe could achieve security of energy supplies, a more consistent control of migration flows, and a committed and united struggle against the Islamic terrorist threat. For years, Spain (and Europe) has been trying to get these benefits without committing to and investing in these efforts. Failure is now before everyone’s eyes, and its arrival was unfailingly predicted. But on this side of the coast, nobody wanted to listen to the warnings that intellectuals and politicians have addressed to Europe’s deaf ears. As the Chinese saying goes, there are two good moments for planting a tree: 30 years ago and today. To do all this, we need political will, intelligence, perseverance, and, undoubtedly, economic resources. But that, I am afraid, is where the strategies always fail. 025

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The chance for integration by Alessandro Barbano Director of “Il Mattino”

Economic growth, emancipation following the Arab Spring, and the proximity of Italy and North Africa are elements that contribute to making the Mediterranean an opportunity. But in order for Italy to be prepared for this historic event, a political solution to the challenge of integration must be found. So that the country can find a way to give an adequate welcome to immigrants, protecting their identity and overcoming their fears.

There is an issue that is likely to transform the relationship with the Mediterranean into an eternally unfinished matter. It concerns the lack of an integration model. It has become more serious after twenty years of diverse but equally inconclusive policies that have made Italy a country as permeable as it is inadequate with regard to immigration. With the effect today that the country has an immigrant population in excess of 4 million people, of which between 15 and 20 percent are living in clandestine conditions. There are two numbers that photograph our incompleteness. 44% of immigrant children leave school before the term prescribed by law, inflating the area of dispersion and the potential recruitment pool of organized crime. At the same time, there are almost 500,000 companies controlled by immigrants and they now represent 7.4% of the country’s total corporate assets, with peaks close to 20% in regions such as Lombardy. There is immigration that we can absorb and which is the bearer of wealth, and there is immigration which can worsen the delicate social cohesion of the country. To favor the first, anchoring it to full citizenship made up of rights and duties, and suppress the second, through the use of 026

national legality and international relations, means having an idea of the good governance of immigration. So far, the opposite has occurred. But the urgent need to overcome this impasse in immigration policies is growing, along with the strategic importance of the Mediterranean: the democratic emancipation that started with the Arab Spring has liberalized the market, and the relaunching of renewable energy, along with the marine economy, have implemented the prospects for the economic differentiation of those countries previously considered as merely hydrocarbon reserves. Despite ongoing revolutionary unrest and political uncertainties that still weigh on central realities such as Egypt and Tunisia, almost all exchanges are on the rise. Italy, which plays the role of a corridor between Europe and North Africa, remains the number one trading partner of the Mediterranean area, recording an exchange in 2012 that amounted to 57.7 billion euros (higher than Germany’s 56.6 billion and France’s 46.8 billion). And the forecast for 2014 predicts a 50% increase by the end of 2014 (for a total of 74 billion euros). Nevertheless, it will not be diplomacy (which, in any case, has remained in the shadow during the

italia, interlocutore “speciale” dell’europa |

last decade), energy, and economic interests, nor the cultural proximity between Italy and the countries of North Africa that will turn the Mediterranean into an opportunity, if the encounter between the different populations and cultures that inhabit the two shores of this great sea occurs without rules and driven by the harsh necessity of history, as has been the case so far. The Pope’s recent visit to Lampedusa has brought this political and civil contradiction to light, calling for the government and the parties to take responsibility. The idea that the relationship between Italy and immigration can now be resolved by the so-called Bossi-Fini law, that since 2002 has regulated the access of foreigners to our country, is the equivalent of a repression of the problem. Yet no executive nor political force has taken on the creation of a model of integration as a fundamental axis of a government policy. Meanwhile, society equips itself with the means at its disposal. From being the basin of ports and transit, the South has become a point of arrival and the laboratory of new societies: the urban structure and social regeneration of cities and small towns of the Southern Mediterranean have favored a natural integration based on a pluralist modal, which first of all admits and tolerates otherness, so as to accept the coexistence of different cultures within the same society. Yet, at the same time, it activates processes of gradual inclusion of different ethnic groups that can still maintain their own mores and customs, provided they do not contradict or undermine the general values that hold the entire society together. But because of the lack of a legislative framework capable of recognizing and ensuring their rights and duties, the relationship of unequal forces between guest and host produces a social balance that is not always satisfactory. Thus, immigrants have replaced Italians in the most menial jobs in industry and agriculture, occupying the underground economy where the protection of the most basic rights is compromised. There is a growing frustration in immigrant populations caused by the imbalance between the culture that defines the goals and the established society regarding the actual distribution of opportunities. Second-generation immigrants have espoused the aims of the country where they were born without, however, being given any chance to achieve them. Will the widening gap in the distribution of wealth in the West make this discrimination more dramatic? Is integration that disregards greater social justice even conceivable? These two questions go to the heart of the problem that the Pope’s message brought to the attention of Europe. Where, in the meantime, the concept of identity is being redefined on the basis of two factors, concomitant and yet differing as to characteristics and genesis, modifying the social and cognitive framework underpinning Western communities, and, at the same time, interacting with each other; namely, the increase of migration flows to Europe and the processes of breaking down the old sense of belonging that is inher-

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ent to Western culture, from which the crisis of the state and the intermediary bodies derives. By 2025, there will be many millions of African immigrants in Europe. The nature of this emigration is completely unprecedented in human history, at least in similar proportions. This is not only emigration by demand, caused by factors of attraction and the absorption capacity of the European labor market, such as that which led millions of Italians and Europeans to America in the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries. Instead, it is also an emigration of supply, caused by driving factors present in the countries of origin. Therefore, the conditions of mutual benefit on which migration exchange are established are not entirely balanced. The history of modern societies of the past two centuries has been written in the contrast between a model of civic identity derived from the Enlightenment, based on a sense of belonging with regard to shared values, and another romantic derivation, based on birth and an alleged identity ethnically attributable to the individual. Then, at the end of the last century, identity in the West began to be perceived not as something “given once and for all,” but as the construction of an entire lifetime. In that it is based on multiple senses of belonging, some linked to ethnic history and some not, some linked to a religious tradition and others that are not, and it is always the result of relations of direct socialization among individuals, and between individuals and institutions. In the past decade, in the climate of fear over a clash of civilizations following the massacre of the Twin Towers, the West has begun to question the limit of tolerance as an exercise of civic virtue, for, once this limit has been crossed, the respect for alternative cultures appears to trample on the respect for the individual person. Then, with the specter of a clash of civilizations averted, or maybe just removed, the difficulty of finding a balance between the necessity of integration and the tolerance for fundamentalism that it may entail remains yet today. This is a challenge that Europe is facing and that touches the core of its identity. In each country, the population is made up of a sum of diasporas. The protagonists of miscegenation are the heirs and bearers of traditions that are deeply rooted and sometimes radical. How will Europe relate to them? Will they put their own identity in parentheses, in the name of some abstract and universal principles of freedom? Will an indifferent neutrality to values transform it into a “nonplace” inhabited by enclaves that are constantly suspicious of one another? A clear model for integration, projected into the demographic and social future of the Italy that will be, will have to use the leverage of citizenship, choosing between the coordinates of ius sanguinis and ius soli, the meeting point of two civilizations. This is an indispensable challenge. One that is being played out in the Mediterranean. Just like it has so many times over the centuries. 027

opinions

A surge of opportunity by Emiliano Alessandri Consultant for the IAI

The twin crises of the Eurozone and the Arab Spring have intersected. European economic stagnation has reduced the growth prospects of the Arab countries, and the political and social instability caused by revolutions creates tensions in neighboring Europe. But these difficulties could bring a gust of positive changes, and in part they already have, above all if we recognize the power of shared strategies and the exchange of resources, as well as the failure of Mediterranean fragmentation.

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Traditionally portrayed as the cradle of ancient civilizations or, alternatively, as the fault line cutting across the global North-South divide, in recent years the Mediterranean basin seems to have rather become a vortex bringing all surrounding societies to their knees. With their adverse impacts on Mediterranean Europe and the Arab Mediterranean, the Eurozone and post-Arab Spring crises risk plunging the whole region into deep instability. While Arab societies have embarked on uncertain political transitions and face dire economic challenges after the 2011-2012 uprisings (projected MENA region growth rates of 3.6% are hardly enough to contain already very high levels of unemployment), Southern members of the European Union have for their part tested how the explosion of economic imbalances threaten to reverse decades of “Europeanization.” The twin Eurozone and post-Arab Spring crises have intersected. European economic stagnation has depressed growth prospects of Arab neighbors through diminished demand. Difficult transitions in the Arab world may create failed states just steps away from Europe. While European tourists remain hesitant about spending their summers on the North African shores, Arab immigrants to Europe are seen even more as an intrusive presence by the underemployed local workforce. Lately, mass protests sweeping across Turkey – until recently depicted as the region’s new economic powerhouse, or a “Mediterranean China” – have closed the arc of crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean, as one more element of fluidity was added to a subregion that already had plenty thanks to the Syrian civil war. Indeed, demonstrations of popular discontent have underpinned developments across the whole Mediterranean region, from the Indignados in Spain to the youth movements in the Arab world, all the way to the recent Turkish upheaval which seems to bridge demands for social justice and sustainable development with fears about re-emerging authoritarian tendencies in that country. Although there can be no denying the ongoing “Mediterranean crisis,” present challenges should not be taken as synonymous with doom. The region’s prospects are currently bleak but the Mediter-

ranean predicament may still not be one of inexorable decline. As opportunities always arise together with adversities, the region’s trajectory will hinge on its societies’ ability to correctly identify the former while minimizing the latter. Seen this way, current Mediterranean fluidity may be the flip side of the necessary dynamism which is crucial to finding a way out of the crisis. Indeed, much of the recent instability is due to processes that will have to be managed. In the Southern Mediterranean, societal change toward more modern societies (an indicator among all is the sharp and rapid decline of fertility rates among Arab women – the average number of children dropping from about seven in 1960 to three in 2006) has yet to find the necessary institutions and political culture for its energies to be channeled toward desirable results. By contrast, in the European Mediterranean, aging and largely stagnant societies have abused or distorted institutional incentives that came with being part of the developed nations’ club of the European Union. As the Southern Mediterranean will need stronger institutions at all levels – from more representative governments to better economic governance (in 2012, the MENA region spent over USD 200 billion in food and energy subsidies, half the world’s total) –, and the European Mediterranean will need younger, more dynamic societies, complementarities can be found across the region. The question is, therefore, whether necessary reform processes in the North and in the South can be effectively synchronized or if sub-regional tensions will only create negative spillovers, deepening a divide that is already present in terms of socio-economic development and prejudice about religion and culture. To counter unfavorable demographic patterns with an adverse impact on growth and public finances, countries like Italy could see a resource in the youth-dominated Arab world. But as Southern Europe’s own youth has become largely unemployed and is fighting its own battle against older generations, an even more divided Mediterranean youth may be the outcome. Although the number of immigrants coming from destabilized Arab societies has not increased dramatically after the Arab Spring, public opinion in Europe seems to resent immigration even more in the

present austerity context. Local politicians will keep waving specters of an “Arab invasion of Europe.” Solutions, however, are not lacking. EUsponsored training programs tailored to local needs could help with the development of Arab societies while creating the conditions for more selective migration to Europe. Student exchange programs such as Erasmus Mundus are already being expanded to build bridges among Mediterranean societies. More can be done by leveraging on civil society organizations that are already active across the region. If consistently and carefully implemented, “mobility partnerships” such as the one recently signed between the EU and Morocco could lead over time to a more unconstrained movement of workers in the Mediterranean area. Moving from people to goods, a gradual opening of European markets to Arab ones could spur that economic transition away from traditional sectors and agriculture which Southern European countries will need to undergo in one form or another if they want to preserve their status as developed economies in today’s global competitive environment. It is, therefore, notable that the EU was able to agree to an agricultural trade deal with Morocco in 2012, covering over half of Moroccan products. Although not fully digested yet by European stakeholders, this deal will stand as a test for the potential liberalization of other sensitive areas of trade in the larger region. Despite regional instability and fears of unfair competition, European countries are still deepening their ties with

In the Southern Mediterranean, societal change toward more modern societies has yet to find the necessary institutions and political culture for its energies to be channeled toward desirable results

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Mediterranean countries. As available studies show, Italy has expanded its Mediterranean interchange in recent years – total trade with the area rising from 37.2 billion in 2001 to 65.7 in 2012. Even though Germany’s Mediterranean trade only covers about 3% of the country’s total, its presence in the region is growing (Germany holds the second largest share of total trade with the Mediterranean area in value terms). And with a weaker Europe, but only if Germany will develop some interest in the Mediterranean economy, enough resources may be mobilized toward Mediterranean stabilization. In fact, worried as Germany is about laxity and underperformance in Europe’s South, it should be in its interest that the European Mediterranean not drift further. At the very least as an insurance policy, German political and business leaders should therefore aim at playing a more active role in creating conditions for a Mediterranean buffer, if not a Mediterranean platform, for European recovery. The question of German engagement underlines another new key Mediterranean reality, which is both a challenge and an element of opportunity: the growing plurality of actors in an increasingly globalized Mediterranean space whose dynamics no longer fit those of a regional basin. With extra regional powers gaining stakes in the region, contributors to Mediterranean prosperity have become many, from China to the Gulf countries, and in a not so distant future, emerging economies from the “Glob-

Although there can be no denying the ongoing “Mediterranean crisis,” present challenges should not be taken as synonymous with doom

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a surge of opportunity |

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al South.â&#x20AC;? By the same token, competitors of Western regional influence will also have more say, from Russia to others. It will therefore be in the interest of European countries to leverage their remaining regional influence. While capital will flow to MENA countries from other areas of the world, strategic relationships could still be capitalized with the help of the United States. A stronger market for energy could be explored in this context. Recent Eastern Mediterranean gas finds are providing unprecedented opportunities for the region and offer prospects to politically re-align Cyprus, Turkey, and Israel. In the Western Mediterranean, traditional flows of oil and gas have resumed after the war in Libya. They will be complemented by greater availability of renewables in oil-importing countries that are closely integrated with the West, such as Morocco and Tunisia. In this evolving context, medium-term triangulations could see Europe helping MENA countries with infrastructure, innovation, and energy efficiency, while energy security is improved not only by strengthening fossil-fuel flows but by investing in projects such as a unified Mediterranean solar energy grid. It is with a constant awareness of the intolerable costs of Mediterranean fragmentation that the region may be able to find ways out of the current predicament of decline. In its present state, the Mediterranean basin faces highly challenging prospects, but its trajectory may not be a downward one if opportunities arising from still untapped complementarities and greater access to global connections are presciently seized.

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interview

Investments to knock down the borders interview with Franco Bassanini

President of the CDP and vice-president of InfraMed by Paolo Valentino Columnist for “Corriere della Sera”

InfraMed, the equity investment fund for the south and east of the Mediterranean, is of vital importance as an operational tool for Europe, both from an economic and a political standpoint. But in order to make the most of its potential, Europe needs to recognize this region’s strategic value.

“In the era of global competition, Europe is, in fact, a small continent. The new geo-political and economic scenarios of the world now see countries competing with each other that generally represent production and consumption markets numbering a billion people, with a purchasing power and technology that are increasingly comparable to those of our countries. Even the EU-28 is of insufficient size to stand up to this competition unless it acquires a critical mass, becoming the core of a wider regional system, open to countries in the Southern Mediterranean and the Near East on the one hand, and Eastern Europe and west-central Asia, on the other.” The Mediterranean dream of Franco Bassanini resists winds and tides. Even now that the Arab Spring is a distant and confused memory, and even Turkey, which has always appeared to be a model of moderate Islam, is showing signs of instability amid protests, and authoritarian inclinations, the President of the Deposits and Loans Fund still indicates development and integration of the southern countries of the Mediterranean as “the key challenge for sustainable economic growth, competitiveness, and its political role in the new global scenario.” Moreover, Bassanini is convinced that the current crisis situation in the Mediterranean basin is also the consequence of inadequate European projection: “Over the past 15 years, the Union prevailed in the belief that the first frontier of the enlargement of economic policy was the one to the East. Even though mentioning the matter now may seem trivial, the truth is that we need both an expansion to the East and another one, not necessarily political, toward the Mediterranean. And I remain of the opinion that it was a serious mistake not to confer Turkey with full membership when asked to do so. I think we would have been able to deal with a process of integration: today, that country is the area with the largest growth rate and it would have been a decisive factor in this period of crisis.” Well, President, it is not as if the Turks actually did all their assignments... That is true. But in cases of enlargement, the EU negotiates with the idea of using their application for membership to push for reforms. If the person who is on the European side shows skepticism about the final outcome and offers

biblical time spans, Europe’s force of attraction will decrease. Furthermore, I should mention that, at the time of starting the negotiations, not all the countries welcomed were models of democracy. What dowry would the Mediterranean countries bring? The Southern Mediterranean countries have great demographic dynamism, young populations, high economic growth potential, and adequate conditions of political stability, but there is a lack of technologies, knowledge, and organizational capacity. In short, there are all the conditions for a virtuous integration, where our weaknesses are their wealth and vice versa. There is every reason to aim for the creation of a large economic-trade area. And I insist on saying that this does not mean they necessarily have to enter into a political union. But shouldn’t the current situation of instability in Egypt, Libya, and in Turkey itself, prompt us to be a bit more cautious toward the Mediterranean option? Let me ask you a question: at the outbreak of the Arab Spring, they spoke of the need for a Marshall Plan for those countries which demanded democracy. Resources and tools that could consolidate the democratic processes. What has been done? Little or nothing. But the Marshall Plan had clearly identified contact points. Here there was a problem of reliable partners. Would the Plan have been able to keep Egypt from falling to the Muslim Brotherhood? With strong Western intervention of support and assistance, it would have been possible to support the evolution and strengthening of moderate Islam. That is almost history by now. However, you seem convinced that, despite the uncertain evolution, the need for strong projection and action throughout the European Union for the Mediterranean still stands … It remains because it is our need. It is clear that we need to incentivize those countries and institutions that can then stimulate others: Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan are nations where it still makes sense to make investments of a European nature. I stress European because, for example, in Tunisia, the French who, like us and even more so, had some re-

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sponsibility in supporting the previous regime, immediately tried to exploit the situation after the Arab Spring, intervening massively with the sole purpose of removing space and opportunities for other European countries. However, you think that tools like InfraMed are languishing after the initial enthusiasm. Three years after its launch, what is the budget and what are its prospects? InfraMed was the first operational tool made by the EU for the Mediterranean, which, as we know, is now in a stalemate. Its ambition was to become the largest structural fund in the area, involving Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey. The great novelty consisted in associating European financial institutions with at least two similar institutions of countries in the area, Morocco and Egypt. But it is clear that today a tool like this has come up against a period of great difficulty in the international market for raising funds for investments in infrastructures, particularly in politically unstable areas. The result is that InfraMed started up and began to make investments, some of these high profile: the privatization of the port of Iskenderun, the third largest in Turkey; a large wind power plant in Jordan with a very high rate of return; a refinery in Egypt; and we are closing an agreement for the launching of a geo-stationary TV satellite from Morocco. The size of the fund remains small, however, and InfraMed does not currently have a great capacity for fundraising, which we have had to postpone several times. We are still operating with the funds provided by the promoters, which were about 400 million euros, a significant part of which has already been spent. How do you see the future of InfraMed? I am quite concerned. The conjunction of various circumstances are likely to prove crippling. There is great market liquidity, but it is directed for the most part to short-term and financial investments: the financing of infrastructures or the industrial sector in the medium and long term is very difficult. Moreover, global competition is tough concerning that part of capital which is still available: China, India, and Brazil are very aggressive. Finally, there is the political instability of the Mediterranean countries that you mentioned. 036

Is there any chance of a revival and what path might it take? That is hard to say. I do not see any political change yet, leading Europe to take note of the strategic importance of the Mediterranean and its necessary integration, and thus, to equip itself with the tools and resources that promote effective strengthened cooperation. For example, today InfraMed would have many investment opportunities in Turkey, but we cannot make them, in part because of internal rules that prevent concentrating too many resources in a single country. I believe in the validity of its approach, because InfraMed is not only an economic opportunity, with return rates of around 12%, but it also has great political significance. And I am still convinced that the parallel hypothesis of a large European bank also for the Mediterranean countries would have been important. However, it is difficult to be optimistic at this time. Too many questions remain unanswered. Of course, sooner or later we will emerge from the crisis, but today it is not possible to predict whether Europe will be able to reinvent itself in a Mediterranean light. And finally, it will be necessary to see what the final political outcome of the process initiated by the Arab Spring will be.

The Southern Mediterranean countries have great demographic dynamism, young populations, high economic growth potential, and adequate conditions of political stability, but there is a lack of technologies, knowledge, and organizational capacity

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focus

At the center of the world by Donato Speroni Journalist and Professor of Economics and Statistics

Privileged by a time zone that puts them in the center of the world, those who live in the Mediterranean enjoy the possibility of communicating with all the continents and traveling without difficulty. A resource for businesses, for the flow of goods, and tourism, its geo-strategic location is to be valued.

What is the best location for the central management of a multi-national group from a geographical point of view? We should not think that one city is as good as another just because we are in the era of globalization, of 24-hour-a-day connections, and financial transactions without time constraints. Direct contact between the executives who are at the center and those working on the outskirts is often necessary. E-mails are not enough, we want to teleconference or to travel. From this point of view, the globe is not all the same, because the land is distributed asymmetrically: its center is located in Europe from the point of view of longitude and the Mediterranean from the point of view of latitude. In their book The economic trends of the future (2011), Herman Simon Danilo Zatta wrote: “The long-term consequences of globalization are beginning to crystallize. Production sites and markets will be outsourced more and more, and the flow of goods, capital and people will go along with them. Sites and entire regions should be reassessed in geo-strategic terms; by this we do not mean the current regulations or fiscal policies, but the immutable geographical features of the Earth. Europe, especially Western Europe, has an exceptional geo-strategic position: from a global perspective, China is not the ‘Middle Kingdom,’ but Western Europe is.” This analysis can be extended to the Mediterranean. Take Rome, for example, but a similar story with a maximum deviation of one hour could be applicable to the southern coast of the Mediterranean, from Cairo to Algiers. As

part of normal business hours, say between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m., anyone working in the Italian capital can be in communication virtually all over the world. In the morning, they can talk to their Asian colleagues without any problem: when it is 9 a.m. in Italy (in the summer), it is 3 p.m. in Singapore, 4 p.m. in Tokyo, and 5 p.m. in Sydney. There are some problems only in Auckland, New Zealand, where their colleague would have to stay at the office until 7 p.m. In the afternoon, we can talk with America: when it is 6 p.m. in Italy (in the summer), it is noon in New York, 1 p.m. in São Paulo, Brazil, and 9 a.m. in Los Angeles. The other major cities of the world do not have an equally privileged situation. For example, from Singapore or Tokyo, it is impossible to reach São Paulo between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m. or New York during office hours. The entire Far East is off limits from New York. And from Los Angeles or San Francisco, it is not possible to reach Moscow, Dubai, Tehran, or New Delhi without staying overtime at the office. Besides the advantage of its time zone, the Mediterranean can also add its centrality between the North and the South of the world, particularly important for air travel. From Rome, it takes a little more than ten hours to reach Johannesburg, and you can get to São Paulo in 12 hours, the same amount of time it takes to get to Singapore. In comparison, a flight from New York to Singapore takes 18 hours (at triple the cost, at the least), while flying to Johannesburg takes 15 hours. The centrality of the Mediterranean is also

important for tourism flows, as can be seen by comparing the two most attractive seaside vacation areas in the world: the Mediterranean and the Caribbean. From Hong Kong, Tunis is reached in 14 hours of actual flight, Havana in more than 20, and the cost of flights to Cuba is at least three times those for Tunisia. Therefore, it is most likely that the large flow of future Chinese or Indian tourism will head to the Mediterranean. A similar argument can be made for freight transport by ship. The Mediterranean lost its centrality in the 16th century, with the development of great ocean voyages. The discovery of America and routes around Africa led Venice to lose its role as a major maritime power, to the benefit of Spain, Portugal, and Great Britain. However, the situation changed after 1869 when the opening of the Suez Canal made routes through the Mediterranean both convenient and affordable once again. The age of oil has greatly intensified the traffic passing through this sea, to the refineries located in every part of Europe. The great development of the port of Gioia Tauro, inaugurated in the ’90s, is a demonstration of the potential freight traffic in the Mediterranean, where there are adequate infrastructures. Obviously, geography is not everything. Taking full advantage of the favorable position of the Mediterranean requires efficient connections: broadband networks, fast and frequent airport service, and favorable conditions for investments. But the geo-strategic position is nevertheless a great advantage and it would be a shame not to take advantage of it.

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Infrastructures that broaden horizons by Andrea De Benedetti Journalist and essayist photographic project by White through Bing Maps

Mediterranean countries communicate by sea, by land, by pipeline, and with â&#x20AC;&#x153;information superhighways.â&#x20AC;? Or at least they could. A lot can be improved regarding lines of communication, so that the Mediterranean no longer resembles a pond.

“We live around a sea like ants or frogs around a pond.” Thus, in Phaedo, Socrates described the human condition in the face of the almost insurmountable vastness of the Mediterranean Sea, beyond whose boundaries loomed the even more hostile and ineffable vastness of the ocean. Socrates would never have suspected that, twenty-five centuries later, the Mediterranean would have effectively become a pond, in

the sense of being a body of water that is, all in all, small compared to the technological capacity developed in the meantime to tame it, but also in the sense of a slew of stagnated economies that are gradually engulfing most of the southern margins of Europe. Naturally, the ants have not disappeared, and they are the thousands of desperate people who risk their life every day defying the waves of the Mediterranean on boats as rickety and crowded as the one that ferried the damned across the river Styx in Dante’s Inferno. And yet in this beginning of the third millennium, it is clear that the real priority of the countries bordering the Mediterranean is no longer that of the ants – to travel – but rather, to move goods, energy, and an intangible asset destined to become one of the most precious of all: information. All this within a geopolitical context that is extremely complex, and here and there openly confrontational when even the Mediterranean countries of the EU are struggling to pull together and think collectively. As for the railway infrastructure, Mediterranean Europe – borrowing the effective dichotomy used by the Alliance for European Logistic Commission – is a patchwork that is still a far cry from becoming a network. The railway system is ex-

tensive and complex, but it is not, in fact, a network. The project of the ten pan-European corridors defined in the Crete Conference of 1994 has had difficulty getting underway, and particularly languishing is the so-called Mediterranean corridor for freight, which was originally intended to link the Iberian peninsula with Eastern Europe and instead, at present, is a collage of projects that are not all consistent and not all compatible with each other. An emblematic case is Spain, which in recent years, despite having invested more than anyone in railways, especially in high-speed passenger trains (in fact, with over 2,000 miles of track, it rates second in the world after China), has ended up with a system that is not integrated because of the different types of gauge between old and new tracks, the latter used only for the transportation of passengers, but not for that of goods. Many countries have also given up the project (Portugal) or have greatly reduced the scope (Slovenia), while the French Court of Auditors has rejected the economic sustainability of the project and Slovenia has erected a new Iron Curtain on its border with Italy, so that since December 2011, it has become necessary to take the

As for the railway infrastructure, Mediterranean Europe is a patchwork that is a still far cry from becoming a network

bus to reach the country. In all this, there are still those fantasizing about a rail link between Europe and North Africa via an underground tunnel between Algeciras and Tangier, which would join the European network with the Moroccan one (where the first stretch of high-speed railway between Tangier and Casablanca is expected to be inaugurated in 2015). But we are in that vast territory of dreams and long-term promises without commitments for which, in fifty or 041

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a hundred years’ time, no one will be called to account. According to the 2007-2013 Regional Transport Action Plan, among the various projects of trans-European transport networks, the axis of southern-western Europe (Spain-Morocco) remains the most advanced in terms of the fruition of an effective integration between European and African networks, while the axis of southern-eastern Europe, which should connect EU countries with Egypt by land (via Turkey, Syria, and Jordan) is at present little more than a hypothesis. For the rest, in the non-European portion of the Mediterranean, road transport covers between 90 and 95% of the total land traffic, and the rail network – except in Turkey and, in part, Egypt – is obsolete, defective, and ramshackle, with mostly non-electrified tracks. Entire countries are completely 042

devoid of infrastructures (Lebanon, Syria, and Libya in particular, where the few kilometers of existing railways are still those dating back to colonial times and unused since ’65) and, in general, long discontinuous sections overlap geo-political situations that are already rather critical. There is a broader and more comprehensive system of naval transport, with 57 ports and 25 maritime corridors, moving about 50 million tons of cargo a year and which accounts for 75% of the volume of traffic between the South and the North of the Mediterranean. To this picture, we have to add the so-called “motorways of the sea,” inserted in 2005 among the projects of transEuropean transport alternatives to land routes and designed to reduce air pollution and connect the EU more closely with its more peripheral areas, and with neighboring countries. With regard to air transport, far from the prospect of the creation of a “single sky” extended to all the countries of the Mediterranean area, the severe economic crisis has created a model based mainly on tourism coming from EU countries and directed to the southern areas of the Mediterranean, tourism which in 2008 accounted for about 75% of the air traffic in the countries of the Maghreb and the Mashriq, before registering a significant decline after 2010. Energy. Regarding oil, the transport of which does not require specific infrastructures, a broader discussion should be dedicated to the pipelines from the North African countries supplying Southern Europe and freeing it, at least in part, from the Russian monopoly in the sector. There are currently four in operation – Transmed, MaghrebEurope, Megdaz, and GreenStream – while a fifth – Galsi – is

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expected to enter into service next year, linking Algeria with Tuscany and Sardinia, where the project has also raised a number of protests by local committees because of its strong environmental impact and little or no economic benefits to the island. Another pipeline – Nabucco – is instead the most ambitious project of the South East European Energy Corridor, with its length of more than 3,000 km and a capacity of more than 31 billion cubic meters of gas per year. The purpose of the pipeline, connecting the main European hub (in Baumgarten, Austria) to the gas fields of Azerbaijan through Turkey and the Balkans (but a variation of the project could pass through Greece and Italy), is to ease the EU’s dependence on Russian gas and prevent the recurrence of a crisis like the one in early 2006, caused by a dispute over gas prices between Russia and

The “motorways of the sea” were inserted in 2005 among the projects of trans-European transport alternatives to land routes, designed to reduce air pollution and connect the EU more closely with its more peripheral areas

Ukraine, and which threatened to leave half of Europe in the cold. Equally ambitious, but definitely in high seas, is the program for the integration of all Mediterranean electrical networks through the Mediterranean Electric Ring, that should surround the entire Mediterranean by connecting the shores into one large cross-border network. With regard to the information highway, for now we have to settle for a handful of submarine cables, nevertheless enough to meet the low needs for the Internet of the countries of North Africa and the Middle East. Although these countries are beginning to invest large sums to mitigate the digital divide with regard to Europe, they are investing at least as much in censorship technologies designed to prevent user access to pages and services that are politically “inconvenient.” 043

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A sea of crossroads edited by Oxygen infographic by Undesign

The Mediterranean – a crossroads of routes, infrastructures, and paths of communication – shows that the sea separates and unites. In fact, when you share such an important space, there are many means and channels through which to make contact, and also, many reasons for doing so. For traveling and trading, there are trains that unite neighboring European countries with each other, as well as with those in North Africa. Where the railway ends and the sea begins, the “motorways of the sea” come to make up the missing link, touching on the

major ports and minor ports, carrying goods and people beyond the land borders, around the Mediterranean and beyond. But it also communicates by seeking and exchanging energy, transporting it through pipelines that mark an independent and very important path from North Africa to Europe, and from North Africa to the Middle East, before returning to Europe. The Mediterranean is a crossroads of routes, infrastructures, and paths of communication. A dense and articulated network, but one with gaps that signal where there is still a need to establish dialog.

Main paths of communication Internet cables Pipelines Shipping routes Railways built in 2008/2009

Crucial points of conjunction or departure of a plant or a route

The thickness of the line represents the importance of the system or route

opinions

The future of energy, twixt “oceans” and “mountains”

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by Wim Thomas Shell Chief Energy Advisor

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Shell has a 40-year history of using scenario planning to explore possible future landscapes and aid strategic decisionmaking by contributing to the public debate about possible ways to tackle some of society’s long-term challenges. Our scenarios always start from the present with plausible, multiple pathways into the future. They take into account various trends and expert views, and use quantification to paint a picture of how the energy future may evolve. To do this, we use an inhouse “world energy model” that covers 80 countries and regions and is rooted in history and econometrics – but it also has many forward-looking policy levers capable of shaping alternative futures, rather than simply extrapolating the past. This is contrary to other models around. Once you have the scenario story, you can explore how policy changes can impact the energy system. Our team has recently released two different scenarios of how the world will develop in the 21st century. The New Lens Scenarios look at trends in the economy, geopolitics, social change, and energy as far ahead as 2100, underscoring the critical role that government policies could play in shaping the future by actions now. One scenario (“mountains”) sees cleaner-burning natural gas becoming the most important energy source globally by the 2030s and early action to limit carbon dioxide emissions by widespread employment of carbon capture and storage. The other (“oceans”) sees solar power becoming the top source by the 2070s, but with slower results in addressing the threat of climate change. The “mountains” scenario imagines a world of more moderate economic development in which policy plays an important role in shaping the world’s energy system and environmental pathway. Cleaner-burning natural gas becomes the backbone of the world’s energy system, in many places replacing coal as a fuel for power generation and seeing wider use in transport. A profound shift in the transportation sector sees global demand for oil peaking in about 2035. By the end of the century, cars and trucks powered by electricity and hydrogen could dominate the roads. Technology to capture carbon dioxide emissions from power stations, refineries, and other industrial installations becomes widely used, helping to reduce CO2 emissions from the power sector to zero by 2060. Another factor is the growth of nuclear power in global electricity generation. Its market share increases by around 25% in the period to 2060. With these changes to the energy system, greenhouse gas emissions begin to fall after 2030. Nevertheless, emissions remain on a trajectory to overshoot the target of limiting glob048

The “mountains” scenario imagines a world of more moderate economic development in which policy plays an important role in shaping the world’s energy system and environmental pathway

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al temperatures rise to 2 degrees Celsius. In contrast, the “oceans” scenario predicts a more prosperous, volatile world with an energy landscape shaped mostly by market forces and civil society, with government policy playing a less prominent role. Public resistance and the slow adoption of both policies and technology limit the development of nuclear power and restrict the growth of natural gas. Coal remains widely used in power generation until at least the middle of the century. Without strong support from policymakers, carbon capture and storage struggles to gain momentum. This slow uptake is the main reason electricity generation becomes carbon-neutral some 30 years later in the “oceans” scenario than in the “mountains” scenario. Higher energy prices encourage the development of hardto-reach oil resources, as well as the expansion of biofuel production. Oil demand continues to grow through the 2020s and 2030s, reaching a plateau after 2040. Liquid fuels still account for about 70% of road passenger travel by mid-century. High prices also spur strong efficiency gains and the development of solar power. By 2070, solar photovoltaic panels become the world’s largest primary source of energy. Wind energy expands at a slower pace, due to public opposition to large installations of wind turbines. All this contributes to about 25% higher total cumulative greenhouse gas emissions compared to the “mountains” scenario. “These scenarios show how the choices made by governments, businesses, and individuals in the next few years will have a major impact on the way the future unfolds,” says Peter Voser, Shell’s Chief Executive Officer. “They highlight the need for business and government to find new ways to collaborate, fostering policies that promote the development and use of cleaner energy, and improve energy efficiency.” The scenarios look much further into the future than most other outlooks and highlight some surprising possible developments. Both see global emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) dropping to near zero by 2100. One factor is increasing use of technology that takes CO2 out of the atmosphere, for instance by burning biomass to produce electricity, and then storing emissions underground. Although the “oceans” scenario sees a dramatic increase in solar power, it also envisions greater fossil fuel use and higher total CO2 emissions over the century than the “mountains” scenario, which will likely have more impact on the world’s climate. The scenario planning team also looks at how the markets and policy can change the energy mix. For example, if governments decide to bring in a carbon price, that will 049

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suppress coal use, and raise the relative attractiveness of gas and renewables. However, the price of coal may come down in response, and then other countries without carbon pricing could limit the use of gas and renewables, negating the Climate Change gains made elsewhere. This illustrates the requirement of a coherent worldwide action. This happened last year, gas became cheaper in the U.S. so people used less coal in the U.S. and shipped it to Europe instead and CO2 emissions rose. The recent shale gas revolution in the United States put natural gas at the center of the current energy debate: the U.S. is enjoying a massive economic stimulus in the form of lower energy prices; this is luring manufacturing and chemical companies back to the U.S., reversing the trend of the past two decades. On the other hand, Europeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s old coal-fired power stations are running harder than ever before, while brand new super-efficient gas-fired power stations are being considered for mothballing or closure. Many countries in Europe, crippled with debt, offer subsidies for renewable energy costing well over $100/ton while current CO2 prices languish below $10/ ton. Energy prices

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the future of energy, twixt “oceans” and “mountains” |

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The New Lens Scenarios look at trends in the economy, geopolitics, social change, and energy as far ahead as 2100, underscoring the critical role that government policies could play in shaping the future by actions now

are not competitive. Europe has to address the complexity of some of its policy initiatives providing clear and supportive ones; it must decide how to reinvigorate its own industrial base to ensure that it is a vital engine of technical expertise, innovation, and employment. It is clear that shale gas won’t provide Europe with the same cheap energy dividend in the near future; however, indigenous hydrocarbons development and natural gas, particularly for power generation, can contribute immense value. This is the case of Italy in the Mediterranean area: it enjoys a favorable position compared to most of the other European countries, having the unique opportunity to increase indigenous hydrocarbon production, reduce dependence on imports, and cut energy costs. “The development of hydrocarbons can play a strategic role for Italy, with benefits in terms of growth, investments, employment, and simplification,” says Marco Brun, Country Manager for Shell in Italy and the Adriatic. “To realize these benefits, it is necessary to promptly intervene with simplified, clear, and stable polices, to invert the trend of shrinking investments in this sector.” 051

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It is time to renew by Houda Ben Jannet Allal General Director of Observatoire MĂŠditerranĂŠen de lâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Energie

In view of changes, and political and economic crises, the need to promote energy-saving measures and plans to develop renewable energy has arisen in the countries to the south and east of the Mediterranean. If until now biomass, solar thermal, and water were the sources used the most, now solar photovoltaic and wind power are taking over.

On the energy front, an increase in demand, inequitable distribution of resources, and growing environmental problems are presenting the countries of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMC) with many challenges. According to the MEO (Mediterranean Energy Observatory), in the absence of interventions, energy consumption will double in the SEMC countries and the demand for electricity generation will triple by 2030 (about 200 GW more capacity). These projections highlight the need for a turnaround to avoid this difficult, expensive, and risky energy model. Moreover, the upheavals taking place in some countries in the region, combined with the economic and financial crisis, testify to just how legitimate the aspiration for socio-economic development is and that it is the fulcrum on which 052

policies to be implemented should be focused. To this end, energy is crucial, as is the promotion of energy-saving measures and appropriate, highperformance, technological solutions in energy and environmental terms that are reliable and at acceptable socio-economic costs. It is clear that something is already being done, particularly in the field of renewable energy, a sector that has great potential in this geographical area. Despite strong growth in recent years, renewable energy accounts for only a fraction of the primary energy consumption (5.3% in 2009 including water, and 2.3% excluding water) and electricity production (Figure 1). Biomass, solar thermal, and water (and geothermal energy in Turkey)

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Breakdown of electricity production in the SEMC - 2010 (Source: MEO)

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figure 02 Breakdown of the mix of electricity produced from renewable sources in 2010 (Source: MEO)

were the most widely used sources of renewable energy in the SEMC. In recent years, wind and solar photovoltaics for electricity production have made their appearance in the electricity mix, although they are still marginal technologies: in 2010, renewable energy accounted for 12% of total electricity production in the region, of which 11% was generated by water power. In 2008, the Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) was launched with the goal of installing 20 GW of new generation capacity from renewable sources and creating electricity grids and north/south and south/south interconnections by 2020. The plan will not only help develop industrial capacities in the wind and solar energy sectors, but also research centers to support technological development. The launching of the MSP and other initiatives, and projects such as DII, Medgrid, RES4MED, and Med-TSOE coincide with the profound socio-economic and political changes occurring in many countries, the surge in oil prices, questions about the security of supply, and environmental and climate problems. In this context, many governments have prepared ambitious national plans. Morocco has adopted a plan for 2 GW of wind farms by 2020 and a 2 GW solar plan; it is already taking advantage of wind for 280 MW and 2 MW of solar energy, while an additional 750 MW of wind power and another 160 MW of solar power are under construction. In 2011, Algeria adopted a specific program with the goal of becoming one of the leading players in the sector of renewable energy and to develop 12 GW by 2030 to meet its own needs (7.2 GW of CSP, Concentrating Solar Power; 2.8 GW of PV, photovoltaic; and 2 GW from wind), bringing the share of production from renewable sources to 40%. Another 10 GW of renewable products will be exported. The project will construct the equipment and facilities required, and by 2020 aims to achieve at least 50% of the industrial integration on the whole value chain of solar technologies (PV, CSP) and wind power. The Tunisian Solar Plan (PST) was drafted in Tunisia in 2009, 053

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stage Pilot stage Program development Industrial development Wide-scale development

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figure 03 The main stages of the Algerian development program for 12 GW from RE projects (Source: Sonelgaz, Comelec 2012)

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revised in 2012, and is currently being validated. The plan calls for an installed capacity of 4,100 MW by 2030. A breakdown over time per chain is illustrated in Figure 5. The PST will be equipped with a specific regulatory framework, and local supply chains of building components and equipment will be developed. In 2008, Egypt defined a strategy for renewable energy development which aims to achieve 20% of electricity produced from renewable sources by 2020: according to a breakdown, 12% is from wind, 8% from water, and 2% from solar energy, which brings wind power to 7.2 GW. In July 2012, the government approved an Egyptian Solar Plan providing for the installation of 3.5 GW from solar energy by 2027 (2.8 GW from CSP, and 0.7 GW from PV).The participation rate of private investment is 67%. The Plan also provides for the strengthening of local industrial capacity. Turkey intends to install 20 GW from renewable sources by 2023, which will cover 30% of its electricity production. In July 2012, a new law redefined the tariffs of repurchase depending on the use of components manufactured on-site. Therefore, local raw materials must represent at least 55% of the entire system; on the other hand, equipment has to be made entirely on-site. With the development of renewable energy, operators of networks and electrical installations are facing many new kinds of problems. The influx of the means of intermittent production, both as to the number of plants and in terms of capacity, in the energy mix of countries that have minimal, if not absent, interconnections with other fixed electrical networks could affect the balance between the production and consumption of these networks. It will be necessary to create northsouth linkages to stabilize the network and also to encourage the export of green electricity from the south to the north, in accordance with Article 9 of the European Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources. Currently, MedGrid is exploring the feasibility of some of the land

it is time to renew |

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In recent years, wind and solar photovoltaics for electricity production have made their appearance in the electricity mix, although they are still marginal technologies

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and submarine corridors: the latter present several possible paths and one of the critical issues will be precisely that of laying cables on the seabed at great depths. The strong penetration of renewable energies is changing the habits and the work itself of the distribution networks. Nevertheless, experience gained mainly in Spain shows that it is possible to properly manage the input of a massive amount of energy from renewables in a network, provided that one prepares a follow-up and a real-time centralized control of the installed renewables, draws up estimates of production, and operates a dynamic adjustment of reserves. Energy storage in the Mediterranean will be crucial to the development of renewable energy, to compensate for its intermittent nature and adapt to the load curve of the energy demand. Where in recent years the countries of the South have made strides in managing the integration of renewable energies in their respective energy systems, the management of large-scale penetration of renewables and the adoption of a coordinated approach between countries have yet to be fully achieved.

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figure 04 Electricity from renewable energy installed in Tunisia broken down by chain (source: PST, 2012)

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The gas route by Marco Arcelli Director of the Upstream Gas division, Enel

Past, and future, relationships between the countries of North Africa and Europe are based on gas, a precious resource that, however, risks seeing a collapse in demand. Europeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s crises, the growth of renewable energy sources, and the evolution of the global markets are putting North Africaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s leadership position in gas exports to the test. A rundown of the strategies that must be implemented.

North Africa has been a historic and trusted partner of Europe for the supply of gas, thanks to its substantial reserves (more than 8,000 billion cubic meters), geographical proximity, and direct transport infrastructures (gas pipelines from Algeria and Libya to Italy and Spain, and LNG [liquefied natural gas] plants in Algeria and Egypt) that normally reduce geo-political risks. Today, roughly a third of the gas to Europe comes from North Africa, and more than 90% of North African exports goes to Europe. However, developments over the past 4-5 years have created a new environment that could have a significant impact on this consolidated relationship. In Europe, the demand for gas has changed substantially, with a sharp decline in absolute terms and increased volatility in volume, 056

due to the economic crisis and the increase in electricity production from renewable sources, plus energy efficiency. In addition, the new rules of the functioning of markets has led to a gradual alignment of prices all over Europe, and the competition between different indexing formulas are not always consistent with each other. However, in this context, because of the decline of European gas production, imports will have to increase by 100-150 billion cubic meters in the next two decades. Consumers need a more flexible and more competitive supply, both in absolute terms (with gas prices of $13-14/mmbtu, production from renewable sources is already competitive without subsidies in different regions, and with relatively short times of fruition, the gas demand could be permanently destroyed) and in relative

Today, roughly a third of the gas to Europe comes from North Africa, and more than 90% of North African exports goes to Europe

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If the appropriate corrections, already under discussion in several countries, are not adopted, it is expected that the proportion of gas earmarked for export and produced on the southern shores of the Mediterranean will go from 26% today to 5% within 20 years

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terms (long-term supply contracts, indexed to oil, are too expensive compared to gas prices on stock equivalents for the high price of oil and for the excess gas that is sold on these markets to meet the constraints of Take or Pay contents in the same long-term contracts). By contrast, demand in the markets of the southern shores of the Mediterranean continues to grow at a rate of 4-5% because of subsidies provided to final consumers that, on the one hand, support economic growth, and on the other hand, lead to inefficient energy consumption. 85% of global subsidies in the energy sector regards fossil fuels, not renewable sources, with a distortion in demand that for years has led countries such as Egypt, where these incentives account for more than 20% of the state budget, to become net oil importers and to terminate gas exports in 2012 and enlist the help of Qatar, which will provide five shiploads of LNG for free. If the appropriate corrections, already under discussion in several countries, are not adopted, it is expected that the proportion of gas earmarked for export and produced on the southern shores of the Mediterranean will go from 26% today to 5% within 20 years. This could lead to energy crises in Europe and social crises in countries of the South, with dramatic repercussions throughout the region. In parallel, the cost of gas production continues to increase. On the one hand, this is due to technological reasons, since the new resources are found in increasingly remote basins, such as Reggane in Algeria, or in deep and complex formations, such as in the Nile Delta. On the other hand, it is also due to the dependence of these countries on the production of hydrocarbons, which require selling prices higher than $100 a barrel to maintain a fiscal balance. Given the increased uncertainty of the gas market in Europe and the impossibility of reducing the taxation of oil and gas production, investment in these countries has slowed, and as a result, so has the ability to export these commodities compared to the optimistic forecasts of 4-5 years ago. The result is reduced security of supply for Europe and higher economic

risk for the producing countries. Although the instability caused by the Arab Spring has not had a significant impact on the production of gas, the attack on the production site in Amenas, Algeria, was a reminder that each country should remain vigilant to possible terrorist attacks. All the more so because in 2011, liquefied gas exceeded oil in terms of traffic through the Suez Canal, one of the most important choke points in the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s maritime traffic, through which about 50% of the gas demand of the United Kingdom and 90% of that of Belgium travels today. For this reason, some European countries have taken direct initiatives for the stabilization of the Sahel region. In the face of these challenges, in the last 4-5 years, a new potential production area has developed in the eastern part of the Mediterranean. More than 1,000 billion cubic meters of gas have been discovered offshore Cyprus and Israel, and new tenders for the allocation of exploration permits are in progress in Cyprus and Lebanon. These findings have increased the rating of Israel and were the subject of political discussion in the debate on the Cypriot banking bail out. The development of this new region will contribute to a productive relationship with Europe if three conditions are fulfilled. The first is Israelâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s approval of a policy of exporting gas. The second, since the reserves discovered in Israel and Cyprus are not sufficient on an individual basis to develop an LNG plant, is an agreement for the joint development of such a facility. The third concerns the evolution of global markets for LNG. Today, countries of the Far East pay about 30% more for LNG than Europe. In this context, the East Mediterranean gas could be marketed in these countries and not in Europe, unless, as some predict, the export of shale gas in the form of LNG from the U.S. does not lead to a reduction in prices in the Far East. There is yet another opportunity in the Mediterranean basin. Italy actually has sufficient gas reserves to cover 20% of its demand for the next twenty years at costs that

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are 20-30% lower than the import prices, resulting in a non-taxable revenue of two billion euros per year, reducing the trade balance by six billion euros and creating more than 25,000 jobs. This is not only in mature geological provinces such as the Po Valley and off the Adriatic coast, but also in new offshore basins such as the Ionian region which, like a region in Spain, present geological similarities with the eastern Mediterranean. However, Italian administrative impassivity today prevents this treasure from being fully exploited. In conclusion, five aspects need to be addressed in order to consolidate relations among the Mediterranean countries. The first is the identification of new contractual relations between producers and customers to address a structurally new market situation with a weak demand, volatility on the rise, and new forms of competition between gas and other energy sources, including the direct participation of customers in the development of new production fields. The second is the gradual removal of energy subsidies in the countries along the southern shores, possibly promoting the development of energy efficiency and renewable energy production. The third is paying constant attention to the social stability in the countries on the southern shores and the prevention of potential terrorist attacks, even through a possible direct involvement of countries of the North. The fourth is the development of reserves discovered in the eastern Mediterranean basin. Finally, the fifth is the rediscovery of the spirit that was at the basis of the Italian economic miracle of the Fifties and Sixties, to promote the sustainable production of hydrocarbons in Italy.

Italy has sufficient gas reserves to cover 20% of its demand for the next twenty years at costs that are 20-30% lower than the import prices 059

enel foundation

Energy puts Europe and Africa online by Vera Mantengoli Journalist for the Espresso Group

A strategic energy basin, which possesses continuous and discontinuous sources, which is home to 7% of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s population, and which acts as a corridor for global energy markets. The Mediterranean is a place where important relationships can be created. These are the visions ElSalmawy, Boutarfa, and Adam Brown presented at the meeting of the Enel Foundation.

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The tools for success are all there, but to reconfigure the energy landscape of the countries bordering on the Mediterranean, there is a need for a farsighted political strategy. On the island of San Servolo in Venice, last May a closed-door meeting took place that was organized by the Enel Foundation, in collaboration with the IEA (International Energy Agency), and was attended by the greatest energy experts from 14 countries of the Mediterranean, including Hafez El-Salmawy (Vice President of MEDREG), Noureddine Boutarfa (President of Med Tso), and Adam Brown of the IEA. The purpose of the four days of brainstorming was to analyze the current energy situation and see if there were grounds for a collaboration that could combine the skills achieved in Europe with the provision of raw material present in North Africa. Thanks to continuous sources (solar thermal and geo-thermal energy) and discontinuous ones (solar, wind), the Mediterranean area could, in fact, become self-sufficient and meet the need for energy without having to buy it; but above all, it could meet the parameters set by the EU for the “Plan 20 20 20” and its “Road Map.” According to data provided by the OME (Observatoire Méditerranéen de l’Energie), the area involved is home to 500 million people, or 7% of the world population, and produces 10% of the world’s GDP (7.5

trillion dollars). In addition, the Mediterranean has 8% of the primary energy requirements (sun, wind, and water in abundance) and is considered a strategic corridor for global energy markets. The OME has tried to picture the Mediterranean with and without investments in renewables, giving interpretations that start from the ascertainment that the current market situation is not sustainable. To date, the forecasts suggest that, by 2030, throughout the Mediterranean area there will be a 40% increase in the demand for energy, CO2 emissions will rise from the current 2,200 million tons to 3,000 million, and the market of fossil fuels will continue to dominate over other energies (gas will take the place of oil). In addition, it has been estimated that the need for energy will grow by 2.8% a year, 5% for North Africa, where the expected changes will quickly alter the current scenario. Consider that, regarding North Africa alone, in 2030, the population will have increased by 80 million, resulting in a 75% surge in the GDP, and a doubling of the energy demand and CO2 emissions. The alternative scenario, based on policy inter-

Thanks to continuous sources and discontinuous ones, the Mediterranean area could, in fact, become selfsufficient and meet the need for energy without having to buy it

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ventions aimed at increasing energy efficiency and renewable energy potential, could lead to a 10% energy savings, a reduction of 20% of CO2 emissions, and a 50% decrease in the need to import fossil fuel in favor of regional cooperation in renewable energy. At this time, the world situation is, in fact, changing. America is using a new method, shale gas, which could make it not only self-sufficient for years to come, but also an exporter, thus transforming the existing balance of trade. This technique consists in digging into the ground, as deep as 1,000 meters, where shale rock formed from organic material is typically found. Once detonated, the shale emits a gas that is captured for energy. By investing in renewable sources, Europe would not have to look to the foreign market, but would effectively be independent. “The issue is very delicate,” Boutarfa states, in agreement with the other speakers, “in that the gas currently comes from Russia, Asia, and the United States, but Europe must ask itself if it wants to continue to invest in gas and depend on other countries, or if it wants to start an exchange that is satisfactory for both players in the game: you offer your technology and we offer our raw materials.” Cooperation between the two shores of

the Mediterranean would also lead to many advantages in the societies of the North African countries, as well as in those of Southern Europe, as Boutarfa perceptively observes. “There is migration not only to Europe but also within Africa. The benefits of renewables would also be felt in this sense, as it would give more regional stability to our countries.” But who should take the first step? “We need the countries of Southern Europe to lend us professional experts, who are very expensive here and do not stimulate the businesses. For example, a trainer can cost me up to 1,000 euros per day, the same figure that a dozen workers cost. Who can afford it?” In short, the project is large and involves all areas of life, including the citizens who have no idea how much energy concerns them. “If I had to explain to somebody what energy is, I would say that it is the oxygen in the air because it moves communication, which has become a basic need for everyone today. Someone gets to the top of a mountain and what do they want to do? Communicate it, by using their phone or internet! And for this, we need energy. Energy moves everything, but technology is needed for this. It is invisible to the eyes of all, but it is a process that requires the creation of a structure, as

Formerly, the idea of a network of renewable energy that would link all the countries of Europe was a dream. Today, however, it is becoming a project

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we who transport it know very well.” Formerly, the idea of a network of renewable energy that would link all the countries of Europe was a dream. Today, however, it is becoming a project thanks to the work of the IEA, which in Paris is mapping all the policies that are being implemented in the field of renewable energy in order to study how they could connect. “Every country,” says Adam Brown, “has its own natural resource that it could lend to a neighboring country when it is not active. In these years, renewables have grown a lot, but in the coming years, we expect the peak to decrease because we have to think about how to integrate them and to finally become competitive, as they begin to be present everywhere.” With regard to coal and gas, Brown argues that, according to projections, even if the countries continue to produce and use it, a time will come, around 2035, when it will no longer be cheaper to buy gas, in comparison to the renewables. In short, the forecasts are pushing in this direction, but in recent years policies have been influenced by the crisis that has spread across Europe and shaken the Arab world. Everyone agrees that this has definitely slowed down investments in this sector. The problem is that, lacking money, the businesses that are surviving want to see results right away and are afraid to invest in a new front. This is why much

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depends on the political choices that should be thought of in the long-term and convey the message that, although there are initial costs, they will eventually allow for stability. “To educate people,” says the Egyptian Hafez ElSalmawy, “we are activating an information campaign in our country, starting with the schools and public opinion, because we realize that we have a great asset, the sun, as demonstrated by the Desertec project. Initially, the first investors were Germans, but now the idea is to involve local businesses.” A $400 billion project that could revive the economy of the whole of Europe and North Africa, but which needs a revision that takes into account the fact that energy is a tool that could benefit both shores and lay the foundation for a territory that breaks down geographical boundaries in the name of collective cooperation.

“If I had to explain to somebody what energy is, I would say that it is the oxygen in the air because it moves communication”

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Making the desert

bloom by Luca Salvioli Journalist and editor of “Il Sole 24 Ore”

Universities, incubators, and funding for technology are the forces that have created start-ups in Israel and then exported them all over the world. Energy resources are the objective of most of the Israeli companies that have made their way abroad, and in particular, water management, in which this country is a world leader. A green desert with industry and energy as its flagships. In the Middle East, Israel is also distinctive from an energy and industrial standpoint. With the end of the Fifth Energy Bill for photovoltaics, within the panorama of incentives toward renewable energy in Europe – and Italy, in particular – the focus has shifted to companies outside the national borders and the Arab countries are among its goals: the demand for energy, abundant sunshine, and incentive policies can all be found there. The case of Jerusalem is different. There are photovoltaic systems, some with advanced technology, and others have been planned for the coming years, but for the time being, solar energy (solar thermal) is above all what can be found on the roofs of houses and there is a lack of incentive policies. “It is a small country, there is no space for large plants,” said the Israeli Eran Efrat, area manager for Europe of VerDiesel, a company specializing in the production of 064

biodiesel. “The state provides incentives for what is needed, and that is water.” Therefore, Israel stands out for two capacities: the production of start-ups on the one hand, and the development of technologies for the management and rationalization of water, on the other. On the first front, the country is known worldwide for its ability to give birth to innovative companies that then expand abroad. Nowhere else is there such a concentration of startups per number of inhabitants, without forgetting that on NASDAQ, Wall Street’s technological stock exchange, after the American companies, the most companies represented numerically are Israeli. International technology news is full of examples of this presence. The first is bitter: Better Place, the company founded by the Israeli Shai Agassi, who has had a lot of resonance around the world thanks to his idea of encouraging the development

Israel stands out for two capacities: the production of startups on the one hand, and the development of technologies for the management and rationalization of water, on the other

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Dead Sea The Dead Sea is located in the deepest depression of the Earth, between Jordan and Israel, and has a significant concentration of salt that increases with the depth (332 g per kg of water at a depth of 100 m). Its name comes from the fact that it is inhospitable to life, except for bacteria and microorganisms.

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The Israelis know that to be successful, the patents that are born in Tel Aviv, thanks to the ecosystem of universities, incubators, and funding for technology transfer, must leave the confines of the country of an electric car with an automated infrastructure and easy battery replacement. A few weeks ago, he brought the books to the court in Lod for its judicial liquidation and dissolution. As stated in the Better Place press release: “The decision was made due to the impossibility of obtaining additional funds and the lack of resources needed to continue activity.” The ambitious program of an infrastructure network, which also foresaw a partnership with Renault, has resulted in “only” 20 fast-charging stations in Israel and 12 in Denmark. However, the Israelis know that to be successful, the patents that are born in Tel Aviv, thanks to the ecosystem of universities, incubators, and funding for technology transfer, must leave the confines of the country. Another recent virtuous example: Waze, an application for smartphones that functions as a social satellite map by exploiting users’ reports, was created in Israel and bought for over a billion dollars a few weeks ago by Google, which beat out the other interested party and rival, Facebook. The ability to innovate has also come to the energy sector. Eran Efrat travels around Europe to enter into agreements and make Transbiodiesel known: “The world market for biodiesel collapsed in 2008-2009 because the raw material cost too much. Companies were buying vegetable oils, thus competing with edible oils. We only use acid oils from waste. We have collaborations in Italy and the business is growing very well, so it is a shame about all the bureaucracy.” However, the true gold of the Israeli deserts is water: just travel across the country, about the size of an Italian region, and observe the contrasts between the arid areas and the tufts of green grass, generally corresponding to the kibbutzim. There are hundreds of companies operating in the sector of water treatment and safety, then there are the software programs for the management and the monitoring of the water supply, desalination, and intelligent irrigation. The water crisis has been a reality for decades and water management has

a long tradition that follows the ambition of “making the desert bloom.” This was the birthplace of one of the most efficient irrigation systems in the world, drip irrigation, which reduces waste by reaching the single plant. It is being used all over the world thanks to Netafim, which has been marketing its products since 1965 and is now a multinational corporation based in Kibbutz Hatzerim. The country recycles 75% of its water, reusing it for agriculture. “Israel is a world leader in irrigation, so at the next Watec in October 2013 (the annual meeting of the sector in the country) we will present Alba: a stand-alone system, which also works in areas not connected to the network and works as an accumulation system,” says Angelo Pennacchi, the area manager of Cadoppi srl, the historic company that produces pumps in Montecavolo, in the province of Reggio Emilia. The irrigation systems are powered by electricity and Alba enables the supply with photovoltaic panels, concentrated solar panels, and micro-wind turbines. “In Israel, for now we have put out a demonstration machine in collaboration with Metzerplas, and after this phase is finished, we will enter the market,” he concludes. Cadoppi also exports its solution to Central and South America. When it relates to domestic demand, photovoltaic and wind energy present a frontier that still has plenty of room for experimentation and will depend on energy policies, which for now, are very cautious. Instead, Israeli capital has already arrived: at the beginning of 2013, Ellomay Capital took over two 12-megawatt photovoltaic plants in the region of Veneto, while in the Marche region, Energy Resource recently formed an important financial partnership with the Israeli fund Helios: their agreement provides for the entry of the fund in the redevelopment of the port of Ancona and the new headquarters of the Florentine Arva. Inversely, the Israeli company Friendly Energy was purchased two years ago by Italy’s Enerpoint, becoming Enerpoint Israel. 067

future tech

Compasses of modern navigation by Cecilia Toso “Oxygen” editorial staff

When navigation arises not only from a romantic urge but also for trade, tourism, a means of exchange, and business, maps and compasses are no longer enough. To ensure the success of all operations carried out at sea, starting in the Nineties and borrowed from oceanography, new kinds of technology have come into being concerning mapping, glocalization, safety, and pollution control.

It would be downright redundant to inconvenience writers and thinkers from antiquity to explain and help us understand the central role the Mediterranean Sea played, and still plays, in areas of Southern Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. The Mediterranean has meant, and continues to mean, communication and trade, business but also wars, commercial navigation as well as that for tourism, fishing, and migration. In this sense, the practices of “research and development” technology for the control and safety of the sea have proved to be fundamental. Technology developed for navigation, for pollution control (and analysis of the evident effects on the flora and fish fauna), and also for safety. Technology that can address the complexity of the movements and balance of the ecosystem of this sea. Technology that has been borrowed from the established scientific discipline of oceanography. The science of oceanography began to be applied to the Mediterranean Sea in the early Nine-

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ties, and it is not hard to imagine what urgencies were stressed: the “ships of shame” that arrived in Europe from North Africa, and those from Albania that landed on the coast of Puglia; wars, not least, that of the former Yugoslavia, the Libyan and Egyptian conflicts, as well as Israeli “issues,” up to the presentday Arab Spring. In 1998, the oceanographic research community began to plan the Mediterranean Ocean Forecasting System (MFS), after which it set up a new consortium, the Mediterranean Operational Oceanography Network (MOON), for coordinating the MFS and its applications. One of the most interesting projects in this area is definitely TESSA (Technology for Situational Sea Awareness) which, citing the project’s mission, is mainly engaged in the “creation of a forecasting model that provides high resolution geo-spatial information for marine and coastal areas and the open sea in Puglia, Calabria, Sicily, and Campania.” “It offers IT platforms for the provision of geo-spatial informa-

Tessa × Tessa is engaged in the creation of a forecast model that provides high resolution geo-spatial information for marine and coastal areas and the open sea in Puglia, Calabria, Sicily and Campania.

tion in real time, and with the best spatial and temporal resolution obtainable on the Internet, mobile devices, and navigators.” And, finally, the “creation of tools that are able to help users in the management of emergency situations and in addressing relative intervention actions in contexts such as the choice of the route of ships, monitoring the state of health of the marine environment and pollution from oil spills, and search and rescue missions at sea.” TESSA is part of PARFAMAR (Strengthening of research and training on the Marine Environment in the South of Italy), a constellation of five projects of technological and scientific research for the sea financed by the NOP Program “Research and Competitiveness 2007-2013,” aimed at businesses and scientific bodies located in the four Convergence Regions (Calabria, Campania, Puglia, Sicily). Other projects in the context of the development of technologies for the sea include: PITAM, which is the innovative technology platform for measurements of environmental parameters at sea and support knowledge; STIGEAC, systems and integrated technology for the detection and monitoring of advanced geo-physical and environmental parameters in coastal marine areas; AMICUS, Study of the reduction of pollution and the protection of the coastal environment in selected areas of Calabria; and SIGIEC, Integrated management system for coastal erosion. With TESSA and several PARFAMAR projects, information technology, new media, Internet, and geo-location services are used for mapping and data processing for forecasts and communications, in order to offer those who navigate or those who have to control the Mediterranean Sea a packet of up-to-date information, prediction patterns, and a rapid communication system with very high resolution … all of which are of vital importance in both the management and the planning of the Mediterranean’s resources.

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Return to growth after Erdogan by Pino Buongiorno Professional journalist photographs by Mauro Guglielminotti

The political sunset of Erdogan following the riots in Taksim Square is a signal of the significant change in Turkish society, composed of young people and women well aware of their own vitality. It is crucial that the Islamic party understand this new force in order for Turkey to overcome the crisis and record further growth. In Kayseri, the ancient Caesarea in Cappadocia, a metropolis of 1.1 million inhabitants, people have been talking about nothing else, after the riots erupted in Taksim Square in Istanbul against urban speculation to turn Gezi park into a shopping center, with even a mosque and neo-Ottoman barracks. Here in the heart of central Anatolia, where almost all the women wear a veil and most restaurants do not serve wine, a sure pool of votes for the Islamic party in power since 2002 (the AK Party), the imperative now is: “Save the party, even at the cost of sacrificing our prime minister.” You could say that this is the typical reasoning of the Calvinist work ethic that is in the DNA of Cappadocia, regardless of the fate of some troublesome men. In this case, it is the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, 59, the politician who created the “Turkish phenomenon” precisely through the miracle of the Anatolian tigers: the rise of a new class of small and medium entrepreneurs, the offspring of the Muslim bourgeoisie who imposed themselves on the Turkish scene for the first time, at the expense of the usual rich people in Istanbul. Thanks to them, from 2001 to 2011, 070

the Turkish GDP grew on average by 5.3% per year in real terms. Now Erdogan appears besieged in his ivory tower, surrounded by a clique of collaborators and yes-men and by a caste of hungry contractors who consider the police, tear gas, water cannons, and billy clubs as their only hope for survival and increasing affluence. His obtuse reaction to the protests, his contempt for the protesters (“thugs and thieves”), his cries of “international conspiracy,” for which foreign journalists and social networks such as Twitter and Facebook were held responsible, have turned Erdogan into the most illustrious victim of his own success. Some of his old acquaintances justify him, claiming that his constant wrath is due to the heavy treatment to which he has been subjected for a long time to combat a serious illness. There are those who compare him to an Ottoman prince, unable to listen to criticism, determined only to reform Turkey in a presidential sense, in order to run for the presidency of the country and to be in charge in 2023, when the centenary of Turkey will be celebrated. The headquarters of the Musiad, the Association of Muslim entrepreneurs, reasons that

Now the middle class has realized that democracy does not end merely with the election results, but requires respect for the minorities and listening to public opinion in its entirety President Abdullah Gül, 62, who, among other things, was born in Kayseri, is better, much better than him. If Erdogan also appears to be undergoing a “political sunset” in Cappadocia, Gül is seen as the leader of the future, if only because he seemed to distance himself from his old party comrade in the incendiary days of street riots by advocating dialog with the youth in revolt. Is this how Turkey will resume the triumphal march that brought it to 16th place in the world ranking of the 20 largest economies, with a GDP per capita, in nominal terms, that went from $3,000 in 2001 to $10,000 in 2011? The leaders of the AK Party, the major industrial and banking groups, such as KOC and Sabanci, the generals themselves, but also the foreign powers (the United States, Russia, China, and the EU) are wondering which path this country, one of the most strategic in the world, is going to take, placing its bet for the future on the Mediterranean, poised between a European and an Asian vocation, a bastion of NATO and a global energy hub. What seems certain is that Taksim Square in Istanbul did not produce a revolution, as occurred in Tahrir Square in Cairo, which

dethroned the “pharaoh” Hosni Mubarak. It was more of a movement that rejected an aspiring Sultan, who has become more and more authoritarian, arrogant, and pushy over the years, laying down the law on lifestyle, freedom of speech and writing, and on the marriage bed in Turkish families. “Pray and get rich” has been his motto in this decade of economic and even geo-political boom, with the Turkish model as an example to the countries of the Arab Spring. Now, the middle class in particular has realized that all this is not enough, that democracy does not end merely with the election results, but requires respect for minorities and listening to public opinion in its entirety. “Civil society has demonstrated, not only in Istanbul but also in fifty other Turkish cities, that it does not need you to know what to eat and drink,” one of the most famous Turkish writers, Nedim Gürsel, author of the novel The Devil, the Angel and the Communist, which won the Prix Méditérranée, wrote in a heartfelt open letter to Erdogan. “I want to sip my glass of raki on the shores of the Bosporus, and if possible, at sunset. You have no right to deprive me of that pleasure, even if you were elected with 50% of the votes. Nor can 071

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His obtuse reaction to the protests, his contempt for the protesters, his cries of “international conspiracy,” for which foreign journalists and social networks such as Twitter and Facebook were held responsible, have turned Erdogan into the most illustrious victim of his own success

you build your Ottoman barracks in Taksim Square, one of the symbols of the Republic, even if it were to be transformed into a shopping mall. Because Istanbul is not Dubai, and its population wants its historical sites and the environment to be protected.” If this is how things stand, and if the challenge to Erdogan by the vibrant portion, also Muslim, of the country will win, then the Turkish crisis will only be a step to further growth in Turkey. This time, not only economic and commercial growth, not only as a regional power in the Middle East crossroads of the Syria-Iraq-Iran triangle, but above all, social growth. High school and college students, women, many of whom belong to the lower middle class, environmentalists, ultra-nationalists, groups for gay rights, members of the Alevi community, Kurdish separatists, and liberal professionals: all those who took to the streets are the lifeblood of contemporary Turkey. This explosive force rejects the dictates of the omnipresent and omniscient State, once secular and today Muslim. The rulers and the opposition forces cannot be separated from the given demographic characteristic of this extraordinary country. The 12 million young people between 15 and 24 072

years of age equal 18% of the total population. They have access to the Internet, use social networks, and are living a digital life even more intense than that of their peers in Europe. Women are also more educated than in the past; they get married and have children at a later age. A substantial number of women are working in prestigious areas, such as the academic (39%), medical (34%), financial (32%), and legaljuridical (28%) sectors. “The true engine of social development of the country consists of the optimism energizing the young and the modern female condition,” states Valeria Giannotta, an Italian researcher who works at the Middle East Technical University in Ankara. These new social actors do not feel represented by the current government of Erdogan nor by the main opposition party, the very rigid CHP of Kemalist mold. Until now, they have been “invisible” to the public sphere. Now they have shown themselves in all their vitality. It is up to the more enlightened political and entrepreneurial classes to grasp its potential. The alternative is a tug of war that could cause Turkey to slip back into the darkest years of the Republic’s history.

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Hellenic revival? by Antonio Ferrari Columnist for â&#x20AC;&#x153;Corriere della Seraâ&#x20AC;?

The protagonist of Europeâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s greatest fears in recent years, Greece is experiencing a timid but partially reassuring economic recovery. Despite very high unemployment and salaries cut to the bone, after the 2012 elections the Hellenic Republic is experiencing the revival of tourism, financial speculation in its favor, and above all, important international relations.

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After five years of living in the darkness of a crisis that had become so severe it seemed to be the prologue of a certain failure, it is always difficult to see the stars. Granted, stars that are not very bright, but which are still capable of shining a little light – perhaps dim, but still light – on the future of Greece. A year after the decisive political election on June 17, 2012, the country has regained a semblance of governmental stability, forming a government led by the center-right New Democracy and supported by the Socialists of Pasok, who have become very scarce, and the radical and moderate left (it almost seems like an oxymoron) of DIMAR. Now it can truly begin to undertake some revival projects. The first step was taken with China, and you could say that the lucrative contract has turned Piraeus, the historic port of Athens, into the bridgehead to Europe and its markets. An important investment: 3.3 billion for a rental period of 35 years. And a breath of healthy efficiency in the makeup of the seaport, where the second largest merchant fleet in the world is anchored. Then, all it took was to pull Greece from the headlines of the hard news in the media and on the Internet in order to achieve the very first important psychological effect: convincing people, at least the majority, that the heavy sacrifices imposed by the

troika (ECB, European Union, and International Monetary Fund) to obtain the necessary aid had not been, are not, and will not be useless. These sacrifices might allow for a real reboot already in the second half of the coming year. In this summer season fraught with expectations, tourism is experiencing a boom, not only in the islands (politically peripheral and therefore protected from the hammer blows of the crisis) but also in Athens and other cities. However, a clamor has arisen about the purchase – between private parties – of the island of Skorpios, the jewel of the Ionian which belonged to the Onassis family, by the controversial and opaque Russian oligarch Dmitri Rybolovlev, who wanted give a “little gift” worth 117 million to his daughter. It is clear that the state, too, intends to sell some of the family jewels. Many now consider it inevitable. As is a cursory glance at the Greek Stock Exchange, which has grown by 140% in one year. But here we must make a distinction. The interest in Greece as a financial parking lot has come mainly from large international speculators who, until a few years ago, had decidedly wagered on Greek bankruptcy and bet against the country. But now, with an 180° about-face, they are betting on the rebirth of Greece, and apparently are earning very well.

In the past years, gripped in the savage jaws of the crisis, many Italian companies decided to reduce their staff but not to leave Greece

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The overall unemployment rate is not far from 30%, and youth unemployment is almost 60%. Thousands of young people are looking for alternatives abroad, even an internship that is unpaid but which would be valuable for enriching their curriculum But if Finance laughs, the average Greek suffers and sobs. The overall unemployment rate is not far from 30%, and youth unemployment is almost 60%. The salaries of civil servants, or better yet, those who have managed to preserve their jobs, have been reduced by 35%. Thousands of young people are looking for alternatives abroad, even an internship that is unpaid but which would be valuable for enriching their curriculum, in the hope that one day it might be used for opening a door into the work world. Looking at the Mediterranean, we can say that the crisis has not substantially changed the strategies of Greece. Only a reduced movementism is noticeable, especially in the Arab Middle East and the North African world, the traditional shores of Athenian diplomacy. However, there are stronger economic ties with Israel (also in view of the exploitation of gas fields in the sea around Cyprus), but above all, Greece aims to strengthen ties with the European Mediterranean countries. Italy, of course, has always been the preferred partner. Not even the wretched and unfortunate war in the ’40s, when Mussolini and Ciano sought to “break Greece’s back,” left resentful residues. The two populations have always mirrored each other. Intellectuals explain it with the legacy of a common civilization, the fantastic Greek-Roman relay. More prosaically, people find in the one the strengths but also the defects of the other, and vice versa. Moreover, as another popular saying states: “Love is not for the merits but for the defects.” In the past years, gripped in the savage jaws of the crisis and with exchanges stagnating dangerously, forcing drastic cuts and restructuring, many Italian companies – the very large but also medium and small ones – decided to reduce their staff but not to leave Greece: in order to be there when the conditions improve, and when they might also be able to cash in their dividend of loyalty. France has always represented a mixed blessing for the Greeks. But rather than eyeing the temptations of Paris, Greece is looking with greater interest to London. It would be hard to make a reliable estimate of the number of wealthy Greeks who, in the midst of the crisis, diverted part of their assets in Britain and redirected them to purchase expensive villas and luxury apartments. In the Hellenic Republic, the Anglophile current is very substantial: favored by history, by a love of Byron, and the financial adventures (and more recently, misadventures) of the Greek-Cypriot Republic. As we know, the island was formerly a British colony. 076

Outside Europe, Egypt has always been the Mediterranean Uncle that is dearest to Greece. There are many reasons for this affection: historic gratitude toward what was once the cradle of knowledge, the library of Alexandria; gratitude toward the great Arab scholars who first saved the works of Plato and Aristotle from destruction and oblivion, and then lovingly imparted them once again; gratitude also for the hospitality that Egypt has always offered to the Greeks in the most difficult and delicate times in their history. Today, there is an added value, which, however, has an unintentionally cynical implication. Athens is experiencing the abovementioned tourism boom because many visitors who usually aim for a low-cost holiday in Sharm el Sheikh have now chosen the Aegean and the Ionian Seas. Fear of Egyptian instability, the repercussions of an unresolved “Spring,” the ambiguous leadership of President Morsi, and the excessive power of the Muslim Brotherhood are, in fact, exacerbating the already devastating economic crisis of the largest Arab country. Instead, something unexpected is happening on the Adriatic shore of the Mediterranean Sea, in Albania. Since the ’90s, the current migration to Greece had been continuous and steady. It seemed as if all the immigrant laborers in the Hellenic Republic were Albanian. Today, we are witnessing the big homecoming. In Albania, the living conditions have improved, the economy is growing, and job opportunities are numerous. This is also because many small and medium businesses from many countries, including Italy, have decided to relocate their production in the former communist country of Chinese-like obedience. Finally, Turkey. No one should forget that, when the crisis reached its peak, the first leader who went to Athens was Recep Tayyip Erdogan, accompanied by ministers and businessmen, ready to give a helping hand. That is why the economic relations of Greece with their powerful neighbor have become very close: much stronger than the widespread popular resentment against the Ottoman Empire, which occupied the country for 400 years. Athens was the first to support the right, but also the need, to accept Turkey as a member of the European Union. If Ankara were part of the club in Brussels, the huge Greek military expenses (which account for almost 7% of its greatly suffering GDP) would no longer be necessary and could be drastically reduced.

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Croatia: th Europe’s 28 by Mara Gergolet Journalist for RCS

If it had still been possible to decide the date, no one would have chosen July 1, 2013. Not the Croats, who had wanted to celebrate their entry into Europe years earlier. And not even the Europeans, many of whom would have preferred to move the date forward, so far forward as to make it seem unreal. As the newspaper “Bild” wrote, in this impoverished Europe suffering an identity crisis, what need is there for another “Land of the South, in debt and full of unemployment, and whose main industry is tourism?” Instead, to do justice to Croatia, all one has to do is reflect. Think of Vukovar in 1991, when the city still had barges moored on the Danube, and then, to the incredulity of all, came the maelstrom of war that swept the Balkans, leaving 20,000 victims in Croatia alone. Just listen to Vesna Bosanac, who was the director of the city hospital, when she tells how the Serbs took 200 patients and shot them (she herself is a survivor). It would be enough to keep in mind the war, memories the Croats have managed to repress, to recognize how much of the European ideal of peace has been achieved here. Instead, today no one judges Croatia with the criteria of memory. For years, Brussels has measured Croatia with a single yardstick: that of Bulgaria and Romania. The more the entry date was postponed

(from 2005 to 2007, and then to 2009 and 2013), the more the old members of Europe asked Zagreb to prove one thing: that it was “mature,” not a replica of Budapest (“corrupt”) or Bucharest (“exporter of immigrants”), as if communism had necessarily deformed all of the East with a single mold. True, the limbo has in part given them time to reflect. Zagreb enters the EU – a unique case – after having put its former prime minister, Ivo Sanader, a giant in national policy, in prison for corruption (10 years); it reformed justice, put some managers on trial, and accepted the idea of having to change. But it is equally true that Europe’s stringency made Croatia lose the beneficial wind of enlargement. The Slovak miracle, its growth of 10.4% in 2005 (thanks to its automobile district), will not be repeated. Croatia enters the EU feeling the full effects of the crisis in continental Europe; it is in its fourth year of recession (GDP down by 12 compared to 2008), its salaries grew by 20% in the same period, and the salaries of state employees by 60%. A problematic country, a troublemaker with bonds reduced to the “junk” level. And if it will not have to ask for rescue, as the Prime Minister Milanovic noted, it will be because “we will not be in the euro system.” Therefore, Croatia has simply made a longterm bet. Yes, they should get the Struc-

tural Funds (up to $14 billion by 2020), as long as the government is able to spend them. Yes, their electricity and energy markets have been liberalized: but will it be able to adapt? In this country, the partially state-owned oil company INA controlled prices to the point of reselling gas to its citizens at prices lower than those paid abroad (in one of the few EU countries with significant domestic energy resources). And also, how much will the new duties and the loss of its privileged access to the Balkan exchange, which is worth 21% of national exports, weigh upon it? These are questions that will be answered in the coming years. As of now, however, it is clear that Croatia is not playing only for itself. It must avoid being a “new Bulgaria,” the bad example that precludes the others – as it experienced first hand – from the enlargement it obtained for itself. Or it will be the last new star on the EU flag. If, instead, the integration succeeds, the European common market will finally expand to Serbia, Bosnia, and Macedonia. Paradoxically, Croatia will pave the way for the “others,” the Muslims and the Orthodox that it has tried keep its distance from in every way. It will cease to be the bulwark of Christianity, on which the last two decades of nationalist ardor have re-forged its identity. In short, it will have united the Balkans with Europe.

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The long Libyan autumn by Gerardo Pelosi Correspondent for “Il Sole 24 Ore”

After the death of Gaddafi, Libya has been going through a long season of transition and reconstruction of roles, in which local communities, the various parties, and even dangerous militias are trying to find their place. This phase could conclude successfully if the international community and, above all, Libya’s main commercial partners offer their support.

There is one fact, more than any other, that indicates how little confidence Italy, Europe, and the Western world place in the possibility that, two years after the elimination of Gaddafi and his 42 years of dictatorship, the Libyan revolution will be able to produce the first effects of stability and civil renewal. Two months ago, Eni, the largest Italian oil group, publicly announced that its strategies plan on reducing Italy’s dependence on Libyan energy sources from 24% to 16% in five years. In short, Eni (also in line with other large French and American companies, victims, like the Italians, of small and large extortions by militants) has demonstrated it does not believe in a normalization of the country, especially in the short term. The picture becomes more complete if you add to this the fact that, in order to finance the cost of layoffs in derogation, the government headed by Enrico Letta has decided, among

other things, to use the annual installment ($250 million) that Italy is committed to paying for twenty years to the Libyan government, according to the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in Benghazi in August 2008 by Silvio Berlusconi and Muammar Gaddafi. The executive branch, in addition to the business world, believes that Libya is no longer a strategic partnership and a priority in relations between Italy and the southern shores of the Mediterranean. There are simply statements of good intent, or little more, such as those made by the former secretary of the Democratic Party, Pierluigi Bersani, who flew to Tripoli shortly before the elections at the suggestion of the party’s Director of Foreign Affairs, Lapo Pistelli, while the “Tripoli declaration” signed by former Prime Minister Mario Monti in January 2012, remained an isolated act of good will. Everyone, from businessmen to

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security managers, agrees that the normalization of the country will take a long time. “Besides,” says a senior Intelligence officer, “what is happening in Libya is what we have seen in the Balkans and in Kosovo, where it took a long time to turn the cutthroats of the ethnic cleansing into some kind of keepers of Civil Protection.” The climate of total insecurity is evidenced by the latest bomb that exploded under a car belonging to the Italian embassy in Tripoli a few weeks ago, and by the shooting incident involving the car of the Italian consul in Benghazi, De Sanctis, at the beginning of the year. But those who come to Tripoli in this period will be surprised to find apparent normality in the Libyan capital, although there is some chaos and a lack of clarity about who exercises the monopoly of force. However, it does not take long to realize that Libya will not be liberated anytime soon from the militias that have won the war, with the decisive contribution provided by their Allies (Americans, Europeans, or Arabs). These militia represent the current element of greater destabilization in the country. As the ISPI researcher Arturo Varvelli explained well in his analysis of the country, the central government “does not have the necessary strength to disarm, nor even the political will. Instead, it aims at their assimilation, as has historically occurred after similar situations.” The hypothesis of their dissolution and of an enlistment of individual tuwwars (“revolutionaries”) into the army has resulted in a more simple “change of team” of the militias. In short, two years after the uprising against Gaddafi, Libya is going through a complex transition destined to last months, if not years. The central government is trying to avoid new conflicts and embark on the path of reconciliation, even though the law on purging is likely to exclude the better educated and more technically prepared ruling class from positions of greater responsibility. Basically, it is a case of extensive “de-Baathification” that would benefit the party of the Brethren, would cast shadows on the ability to govern the public machine, and would exclude Jibril, but also the former chairman of the National 082

Transitional Council, Abdel Jalil, or the current President of the Congress, Mohammed Magarief. From the political point of view, Prime Minister Ali Zeidan, who has managed to establish himself as a non-partisan among the personalities and emerging rivalries and his government, governed by a cross-party majority that includes the party of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Alliance of Mahmud Jibril, seems to gather the consensus of a large part of the population and local communities. As Varvelli writes, Libya seems far from the sectarianism that is typical of other countries, such as Iraq. The government is caught between two fires. On the one hand, there are the militias engaged in a kind of blackmail against it: continued demands for funds and means for them to perform the tasks assigned (control of areas, institutions, and infrastructures), in addition to requests for benefits and pensions for ex-combatants (the number of which, as at the end of every civil

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war, has soared compared to the actual participation). On the other hand, there is pressure from the U.S. Within the galaxy of the militias, there are Salafist groups composed of Al-Qaeda elements who have fought in Afghanistan, Iraq, and now, Syria. Not just Answar al-Sharia, the militia charged with the attack against U.S. ambassador Chris Stevens and three other Americans in Benghazi on September 11th, but also other brigades that have been shown to act independently yet are inter-connected and, above all, share the same vision (Rafallah al-Sahati militia, Abu Salim brigade, etc.). Some radical groups in Cyrenaica have already become part of the Libyan security forces that the government is trying to reorganize. In addition, three undesirable training camps for militants have clearly been identified in Cyrenaica and would be an easy target for U.S. drones. But, unlike what happened in ’86 in the war of Sirte, despite the direct hit from the attack on Stevens, Washington intends to stay away from Tripoli, but without precluding careful monitoring of possible connections with the Al-Qaeda formations in the Maghreb (AQIM). While Europe timidly carries out its traditional work of institution building, the problem of the Constitution remains unresolved. The most important point is related to the disposition of Sharia as a founding principle of the law in Libya. The discussion is not so much on the imposition of Islamic law, widely recognized as fundamental in the country, but on who will be in

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charge of deciding if a law passed by Congress is in contradiction with it. The worst mistake in this situation would be to abandon the country to its fate. As Giulio Andreotti, who in the Seventies negotiated everything from terrorism to military supplies with Colonel Gaddafi, once said, “You cannot choose your neighbors.” Also because once the uncertainty of Tripoli’s long fall has dissipated, the first signs of change in the country will be perceived by Italy, for better or for worse. But for once the optimism does not seem out of place, because after the G8 summit in Northern Ireland and the formal request of U.S. President Barack Obama for Italy to play an active role in the rebirth of Libya, Prime Minister Enrico Letta met with Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan and several of his ministers in Rome on July 4th. Thus, Italy will guide the action of the main EU countries (France, Germany, and the UK) and the United States on the issue of institution building, i.e., the training of security forces in Libya and in Italy, surrender of weapons by the militias, and reform of public administrations. Italy will also manage the international team that must ensure the safety of the oil wells. U.S. military forces will control the territory with drones from their base in Nigeria and from the one in Sigonella. At that point, perhaps even Eni will decide to revise their plans and once again invest in the country, just as it has until now, with significant results in economic terms and important geo-political implications for the stability of the entire region.

Prime Minister Ali Zeidan, who has managed to establish himself as a non-partisan among the personalities and emerging rivalries and his government, seems to gather the consensus of a large part of the population and local communities 083

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Morocco’s illuminated monarchy Human rights, transport, infrastructures, by Giovanni Porzio Reporter

King Mohamed VI can be satisfied: even though the elderly Saudi monarch Abdullah has decided to spend the summer holidays at his villa in Morocco, it means that the level of security in the Cherifian Kingdom does not cause undue concern. The wave of protests that swept over the regimes in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Yemen, and triggered bloodshed in Syria, have only skimmed the extreme western land of the Arab world. The seeds of crisis are also very present in Morocco: rampant youth unemployment, an illiteracy rate higher than that of Egypt and Tunisia, increasing activity of jihadist cells (between 1994 and 2011, a series of terrorist attacks killed more than 60 people, including several foreigners). Yet the country has not been plunged into chaos: merit that should largely be attributed to the foresight of its fifty-year-old sovereign. Soon after his accession to the throne in July 1999, the king initiated a substantial program of reform. The new Family Code (Mudawana) launched in 2004, however imperfect, represented a decisive step 084

constitutional reforms, and health are pivot points of the young King of Morocco’s reforms: measures promptly implemented that warded off a revolutionary spring in the country. Different conditions, albeit not particularly good, that depict the other face of the Arab world.

forward on the road to the full recognition of women’s rights. The commission that was created to investigate human rights violations during the reign of Mohamed VI’s father, Hassan II, analyzed 29,000 files and most of the victims were compensated. The fight against poverty has been undertaken with vigorous investments in public works and has boosted the tourism sector. Despite the decrease in visitors caused by the international recession, six 5-star hotels and four golf courses are being built in Marrakech, and there is a new highway that now allows you to reach Agadir in less than two hours. In sleepy Tangier, the medina was restored and residential complexes and resorts are popping up within a radius of a few kilometers, built with Arab, Spanish, and Italian capital. On the Mediterranean coast, strategically located on the Strait of Gibraltar, the doubling in size of the mega Tanger-Med port, the largest in Africa, has almost been completed: by 2015, it will be able to handle 8 million containers, 7 million passengers, 3 million vehicles, and 10 million tons of petroleum products.

At the dawning of the Arab Spring in March 2011, the king moved ahead by announcing the reform of the Constitution, approved by a referendum in July. Mohamed VI, a descendant of the Prophet, is still the Amir al-Muminin, the Commander of the Faithful, and remains the head of the armed forces and security services. But for the first time, the Prime Minister of Morocco is no longer chosen by the king, but is appointed by the majority party; the judiciary power is independent from the executive power; and Tamazight, Berber, has become an official language along with Arabic. It is not yet a constitutional monarchy, but it is certainly the beginning of a process of devolution that the Alaouite dynasty seems determined to carry forward. “The Arab world is changing,” says Wahid Khouja, a member of the Authenticity and Modernity Party. “We want to demonstrate to the West that Morocco can arrive at a true democracy with a peaceful revolution: a journey that could be followed by other countries in the area.” The replacement of the ruling classes has opened up encourag-

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The reforms, which many describe as institutional cosmetics aimed solely at preserving the dynasty, may prove to be insufficient in the long run in a country where the social imbalances are alarming 086

morocco’s illuminated monarchy |

ing prospects on an international scale. One of the consequences of the Arab Spring and the collapse of the old regimes is the revival, after years of stalemate, of the AMU, the Arab Maghreb Union, the project of economic integration among the countries of the region, of which Morocco is one of the essential cornerstones. And a thawing between Algiers and Rabat on the question of Western Sahara, not easy but now less improbable, would give impetus to cooperation in the field of strategic security in the Sahelian-Saharan region, allowing new developments in the areas of trade, transport, and the exploitation of natural resources, from shale gas to photovoltaic sites. With Hosni Mubarak’s departure from the scene in Egypt, Morocco has become the main ally of Washington in North Africa: an element of stability and a bulwark against fundamentalist Islam that threatens to spread to large areas of the continent, from Nigeria to Algeria, from Mali to Libya. While Europe needs the collaboration of Rabat on the fronts of drug trafficking and illegal immigration. The “soft transition” underway in the kingdom is the result of Mohamed VI’s desire to legitimize the party of moderate Islamists (PJD, the Party of Justice and Develop-

ment) which, in turn, instead of claiming a radical change of regime in the streets, welcomed the reformist attempt of the sovereign and went on to win the legislative elections in November 2011. The secretary of the PJD, Abdelilah Benkirane, was appointed prime minister. The cautious opening to democracy has come to displace fundamentalist groups such as the outlaw movement Justice and Charity which, despite opposing the monarchy, has renounced the use of violence as an instrument of political struggle. This does not mean that Morocco is permanently protected from the repercussions of the Arab uprisings. The reforms, which many describe as institutional cosmetics aimed solely at preserving the dynasty, may prove to be insufficient in the long run in a country where the social imbalances are alarming. Although the infant mortality rate has dropped by 30% in five years, at least 15,000 elementary schools – or so the opposition press claims – are still without safe water and sanitation. At the same time, the personal fortune of the king, who controls banks, industries, and phosphate mines, has increased fivefold in ten years: with $2.5 billion, according to “Forbes,” Mohamed VI is wealthier than Queen Elizabeth. The reins of power are still in the

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hands of the makzhen, the royal establishment, and the sovereign, to whom Article 41 of the new constitution grants the right to repeal any laws passed in parliament by a simple decree (Dahir). Old habits such as censorship, arbitrary arrests, and widespread corruption are diehard. And also, modernization and plans for infrastructure development, while generating jobs, do not seem able in the short term to fill the economic and social gap that plagues the country. Many projects seem disproportionate and only for the benefit of foreign investors, tourists, and the Moroccan financial elite. Such as the contested high-speed Casablanca-Tangier rail line at a cost of $2.8 billion, a figure equal to 10% of the national budget, more than ten times the annual agricultural fund earmarked for farmers, who account for 40% of the workforce in the kingdom. While the police have begun to dismantle the more than 50,000 illegal buildings inhabited by the poorest people. Such as in Jorf Lasfar, an Atlantic port, where a phosphate refinery and deposit are being built and sheep graze in the rubble of demolished houses. “They told us we occupied an industrial area,” says Tahar, 29, unemployed. “They build factories on our land. And then they destroy our homes.”

A great mosque The Mosque of Hassan II in Casablanca is the largest religious building in the Islamic world, after Mecca, and its minaret is the highest in the world. The mosque, which can accommodate up to 25,000 worshipers, was designed by the French architect Michel Pinseau and its construction was completed in 1993.

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Africa:

the next economic miracle? by Vittorio Da Rold Correspondent for â&#x20AC;&#x153;Il Sole 24 Oreâ&#x20AC;?

Despite political instability, popular uprisings, and the reduction of trade with foreign countries, the African continent is awakening from its long hibernation. In the more advanced countries, as in the less advanced ones, the IMF paints an overall picture of growth which is awakening European, Chinese, and American interest.

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Development in Africa The desert and big African cities. Previous page: Pretoria. On this page: Durban and Cape Town. On the next page: the skyscrapers of Johannesburg.

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Le economie dei Paesi del Nord Africa dovrebbero beneficiare nel 2013 di una cauta ripresa rispetto alla brusca frenata del 2012

“Will the African ‘lions’ surpass the ‘tigers’ of Asia?,” the British weekly “The Economist” defiantly asked some time ago, looking at the growth estimates of the International Monetary Fund. Maybe it will take more time before this prophecy comes true, but in the meantime, the economies of the countries of North Africa should benefit from a cautious recovery in 2013, compared to the sharp slowdown in 2012. This is what the International Monetary Fund pointed out in its report on the forecasts of the world economy, released in April. “The oil-importing MEMA countries” – it stressed in the report – “should enjoy an average growth of 2.7% in 2013, compared with 1.9% in 2012, although they remain burdened by political uncertainty, the reduction of trade with Europe, and the high prices of raw materials.” Tunisia is expected to grow by 4% compared to 3.6% last year, thanks to a recovery in the tourism sector. In Egypt, economic growth is expected to slow from 2.2% to 2%. The IMF report points out that the rise in the prices of food and fuel could have an adverse effect on production in the nonoil producing countries and “worsen their already high fiscal and foreign deficits.” The EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) is focusing on North Africa with a settlement in the

countries where it has opened offices operating in Cairo, Tunis, and Casablanca, offices that actually do something and are not just representational. The bank has begun financial transactions with a credit for a total of 300 million euros, including a private equity fund for the whole area of the Maghreb, and loans to companies in the manufacturing sector in Egypt and to agri-food businesses in Morocco. It has also prepared a list of projects totaling approximately 1.2 billion euros that the Bank will finance in six to ten months from now. North Africa is not the only area which will do fine. The economy of sub-Saharan Africa will grow again in 2013, driven by domestic demand. The positive forecast in these times of global crisis is once again contained in the latest economic report of the International Monetary Fund. “Guided by private consumption and investments as well as by exports,” – the economists of the IMF wrote – SubSaharan Africa, “on the basis of the substantial growth in 2012, will continue along the trend of expansion interrupted only in 2009.” Economists of the Fund estimate that growth in its GDP in 2013 will be up 5.5%, unimaginable figures for Europeans accustomed to situations of recession. “Overall growth” – the report says – “is based on the significant growth of massive investments in infrastructures 091

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and productive capacity, in sustaining consumption, and the launch of new extractive capabilities.” In 2014, it will be even greater, equal to 6%. To eliminate the confusion, it would be better to take a look at the past so as to understand what is happening. Ghana recorded over 8.3% in 2012, and is expected to grow by 7.7% in 2013. Ethiopia will increase from 7% to 7.7%; Tanzania will accelerate from 6.8% to 7.3%, and Mozambique from 7.5% to 7.9%. An excellent performance has also been recorded by Rwanda, called the “Singapore of the Dark Continent,” which grew by 8.6% in 2011, while Ghana has seen its GDP grow by 14%, an African record, thanks to its recent oil production. But beware, there are no free lunches in economics and risks are always on the horizon. According to the report, one of the main risks for Africa comes from the eurozone. “There are at least two risks that should not be underestimated,” – writes the IMF – “one is the negative scenario of the eurozone that could involve low-income countries, not to mention the reduction in investments in emerging markets that could bring down the prices of raw materials, thus damaging the mining manufacturers.” What are the secrets of this boom? What has given a boost to this region’s economies, that are still lagging far behind, is the rise in commodity prices – which are not lacking here, but which in the past had turned into the “curse of resources” – and recent oil production in some states. This has helped offset the decline in the global demand coming from developed markets, held back by austerity policies to counter the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone and the subprime mortgages in the United States. Furthermore, for the first time, what is driving the growth of this area are mainly domestic consumption and exports. While Europe is on the decline, these are growing at a fast pace and the urban middle class is becoming more and more affluent. In the past, these countries have had to face obstacles to their development such as population growth, low levels of initial education, poor governance due to instability, civil wars and corruption, and vulnerability to external shocks such as the volatility of the prices of exports. “Development depends on good governance. This is the ingredient that has been missing in far too many places for too long. This is the change that can unlock Africa’s potential” (Barack Obama, speech in Accra, July 2009). But the infrastructures remains inadequate and the 092

production of electricity is poor (the total production in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, is equal to that of Great Britain) and, above all, costly. Finally, China, currently the leading trading partner with $160 billion of interchange, eager to challenge the United States, France, and Turkey and “hungry” for raw materials, is investing many billions of dollars in the Dark Continent, as many as 18 billion in 2011, almost double the powerful World Bank. The rest could be done with Quantitative easing by the Fed (Federal Reserve System) and the Bank of Japan (BOJ) and the LTRO of the European Bank, that is to say, the accommodative monetary policies that could put into circulation billions in capital, which, for once, could be routed more toward Africa than to the BRICS.

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in-depth

So much science on the other side of the sea by Davide Coero Borga Scientific popularizer

We know about Arabic numbers, but we often ignore the real importance this part of the world has held with regard to some of the discoveries that have shaped science: from the litmus test to the refraction of light, from astronomy to medicine. An overview of the contributions we are unaware of today, but which, at one time, might have even been plagiarized through the substitution of our European signature.

During what, in school, they used to call the European Middle Ages, the scientific curiosity and naturalistic attention of Arab scholars produced acute knowledge that laid the foundation for the Renaissance and the scientific revolution. Under the lucky star of the Abbasid caliphate, starting in the eighth century, the sciences experienced a period of recovery and enthusiastic development of Greek thought. During that time, scientific texts and Hellenic philosophical literature were translated accurately to readers of the Arabic language. This is a fact that cannot be attributed to the isolated initiatives of a few scholars, but rather, to a widespread desire in the thriving Islamic world that knew how to become heir to a cultural patrimony by translating, sharing principles, and developing the open issues. In this golden age of Islamic science, important results in scientific knowledge were achieved. The first steps of this scientific and technological progress were taken during the second half of the seventh century in Damascus, under the last Umayyads, and then developed with the early Abbasids in Baghdad. Just as the Romans had done in previous centuries, the Abbasids were able to take over the cultural thought of the subjugated populations. Thus, the relatively poor Arab world absorbed and understood the Coptic, Hebrew, Persian, Greek, Indian, and Chinese cultures. If Europe has its scribes to thank for their tireless work of careful custody of the Greek and Latin cultures, beyond the sea, it was thanks to the translators, who protected the classical works of antiquity. In the field of physics, as much as in those of mathematics and astronomy. In medicine, as in the natural sciences (geography, botany, zoology, and mineralogy). A new library, completely accessible in Arabic, contributed to the emergence of a shared Muslim culture upon which Arabic science was grafted. Research work was undertaken that produced famous scholars known world-wide. And who were to lay the foundation for Renaissance science, indebted to â&#x20AC;&#x2039;â&#x20AC;&#x2039; the Arab world not only for their preservation of knowledge, but often for increasing it. Just like today, even then, scientists were trying to learn about the most advanced results available. And these were found in the writings of Muslim thinkers. In the writings of Copernicus, there is a difficult mathematical construct that serves to explain the movements of the planet Mercury. The level of complexity is such that it is unlikely it could have

been conceived twice in the same way. Well, this sequence of calculations also appeared in the writings of Ibn al-Shatir, an Arab scientist who lived in the fourteenth century. The difference was that Copernicus stumbled into small errors, possibly due to his lack of understanding of the original idea of Ibn al-Shatir. This and other information confirms an important link between science and the Arab world. On the other hand, an empire that then stretched from Samarqand to Portugal needed good mathematicians to manage their complex economy or, more simply, to coin money wisely. Religion, instead, demanded accurate methods to locate the exact direction of Mecca in a new, round world: a complex trigonometry problem. When we say practical science â&#x20AC;Ś

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10th century A.D. Jabir ibn Hayyan, alchemist and apprentice scientist. He clearly described the processes of reduction and distillation. He identified different chemicals, including sulfuric and nitric acids.

Abu Ja’far Muhammad ibn Musa ibn Shakir, Ahmad ibn Musa ibn Shakir and Al-Hasan ibn Musa ibn Shakir, three brothers with an inclination for geometry. They were interested in cones and ellipses, performing complex astronomical calculations.

Al-Kindi, translator of texts from the ancient Greek into Arabic. A thousand years before Hedy Lamarr (an actress of rare beauty and – few people know this – a scientist), he was passionate about encryption and wrote a text about space, time, and relative motion.

Hunayn ibn Ishaq, scholar of medicine. He was the author of an important treatise on the eye.

Abbas ibn Firnas, Berber scientist and inventor. He developed a particular method for the production of transparent glass, used in containers for beverages, for the manufacture of magnifying lenses, and also for optical purposes. He is known for a brave attempt at controlled flight, which he survived.

Abu al-Qasim al-Zahrawi, is considered the father of modern surgery. His life was spent in experimentation and in the treatise Al-Tasrif, which literally means “The conduct for he who cannot compose,” he described surgical instruments and procedures.

Ibn al-Haytham, physician, philosopher, mathematician, physicist, and astronomer. He contributed to research on astronomy and optics, studying the effects of light refraction.

Al-Zarqali, skilled craftsman in metal processing. He succeeded in building sophisticated and complex machinery, such as astrolabes and water clocks. He also worked in astronomy and mathematics, carrying out detailed studies on the movement of the sun.

Ibn Khalaf alMuradi, scientist and engineer. He was the author of a treatise on mechanical engineering (Book of Secrets resulting from thoughts), dedicated to the description of ingenious mechanical automatons.

11th century A.D. Ibrahim ibn Sina, better known as Avicenna. Physicist, astronomer, and mathematician, he was the author of the treatise The Canon of Medicine. He devoted much of his study to investigating the properties of light and contributed to the development of various mathematical techniques, including the litmus test.

Thabit ibn Qurra, mathematician, astronomer, and lover of chess. He found the solution to a game problem that involved an exponential series.

Al-Khwarizmi, mathematician, geographer, and astronomer. He was one of those responsible for the adoption of the Arabic numbering system, a derivation of the Indian numbering system. He made an interesting contribution to the development of algebra and the introduction of methods of simplification in equations.

12th century A.D. Omar Khayyam, mathematician and poet. He calculated the length of the solar year with accuracy up to the fifth decimal place. He was even an expert in geometry, finding geometric solutions to all thirteen forms of cubic equations.

Al-Battani, mathematician and astronomer. He accurately calculated the duration of a solar year, contributing to the writing of astronomical tables useful for predicting the position of the stars in the sky. He also prepared a series of numerical tables for calculating the direction of Mecca from different regions of Islam.

Abu Bakr Zakariya al-Razi, Persian scientist. He provided great contributions in philosophy, chemistry, and medicine by identifying smallpox and measles. He realized fever was a defense mechanism of the immune system.

13th century A.D. Al-Idrisi, explorer, cartographer, and geographer. He was invited by King Roger II of Sicily to Palermo, where he made a collection of maps known as Tabula Rogeriana, in which he described the cultures, climatic conditions, and resources of the entire known world.

Ibn al-Nafis, physicist and physician. He worked at the alMansuri hospital in Cairo. In his commentary, he described pulmonary circulation in detail.

Al-Farabi, mathematician and philosopher. He described the decorative motifs that characterize Islamic architecture in geometric terms: strict order and a taste for fractals!

14th century A.D. Nasir al-Din alTusi, Persian mathematician and astronomer. He made a fundamental contribution to the study of trigonometry with his work, and compiled perhaps the most accurate astronomical table of the time.

Ibn al-Shatir, a cause célèbre. He was the author of Intellection of the Orbits, a scientificphilosophical treatise that preceded some fundamental insights of Galileo and Copernicus. Virtually ignored in the Muslim world, his theories may have been reworked in the heliocentric form by Copernicus.

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Magellanic Clouds These two irregular galaxies orbiting the Milky Way like satellites are visible to the naked eye, and were spotted and described by the navigator Ferdinand Magellan, for whom they were named. A second stream of matter flowing between them is called the Magellanic Bridge.

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so much science on the other side of the sea |

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If Europe has its scribes to thank for their tireless work of careful custody of the Greek and Latin cultures, beyond the sea, it was thanks to the translators, who protected the classical works of antiquity

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One identity,

many identities by Matteo Vegetti Professor of Aesthetics and Culture of the Territory

A sea between lands but which also includes these lands. This is the Mediterranean, a geographic, political, economic, and cultural area that distills all its variety into a single word. A territory that is “un-appropriable,” that many have tried to unite in different ways, and whose plurality could perhaps be recognized only in a “Mediterranean Union” that would make the absence of clear boundaries its strength.

Due to the complicity of nature and history, the Mediterranean contemporaneously refers to a sea and a region, to a surface of water and the civilization of the three continents whose shores are bathed by it. The word “Mediterranean” alone – literally, the sea between the lands – suggests a certain communion with the sea compared to the territories, civilizations, different cultures, and ethnic groups that share its waters. It is not surprising, then, that this “communion,” stratified into a pluri-millennial interweaving of historical relations, influences, and conflicts, has always prevented it from being reducible to any dimension of community and identity, to any political representation, i.e., ultimately to a nomos. In the jargon of the great jurist Carl Schmitt, the concept of nomos means a space upon which a given community erects a legal system, a religious orientation, a political form of its own. For that to happen, there needs to be an original act that consists of drawing a limit,

a boundary, a frontier: an enclosed space and sovereign state whose boundaries coincide with the legitimacy of the nomos itself. Now, what is common to the Mediterranean region, the maritime element, is clearly not subject to this logic. By definition, the sea restricts the terrestrial right: waves cannot have defined boundaries, thresholds, or memberships. Here, the logic that separates “mine” from “yours” fails: offshore, a space opens up that is politically neutral, free, common, contestable, and anomic. In other words, the water dissolves the constraints that apply on the mainland; no one can impose their own law on others, no one can claim the exclusive possession of the water rights. Partly as a result of these characteristics, the sea has always been the ideal element for trade, exchange, communication and hybridization, and conquest. If I draw attention to Schmitt’s idea of nomos, this is because it helps us understand the Mediterranean identity as the flip side of that territorial logic, based

on the ownership and division of land, on the homogeneity of shared values and on the jus soli, in which we are forcibly brought to look for the source of identity of a political community. While the sea-between-lands unites civilizations, it also divides them; while bringing the distances closer, it separates them, leaving each auto-nomous. Moreover, if the Mediterranean has often been traditionally thought of as the metaphor of public space, such as a forum, an amphitheater, a vast agora, this is due to a spatial homology (given its circular shape), to which, however, structural homology is added: even in the case of public space, it is a matter of considering it as a void, rather than full, a space that by definition is un-appropriable, able to articulate the plurality, the dynamics of relations and exchange, without suppressing the freedom of those who take part in it. Not by chance, it was Mussolini who denied this idea, reviving the ancient expression mare nostrum (our sea) with a modern co101

lonial and imperialist twist. On several occasions, Mussolini declared his sinister intention of making the Mediterranean an “Italian Lake” and in April 1941, he began to use the expression Our Italian Sea. The temptation to assimilate the Mediterranean into a “uni-verse”, thus suppressing its essence (which is that of existing as a “multi-verse”), is actually typical of modern thought, which, beyond the particular political and economic interests, remains linked to the paradigm of state policy (often nationalist), to the inherent need to create cultural homogeneity within the borders, and the neutralization of political, religious, and ethnic differences. However, here the big problem of access (which is also a real geopolitical need) also arises, to conceive of the Mediterranean area as an autonomous entity that is politically representative, and economically interconnected, in spite of the differences and distances alluded to. Therefore, what kind of political and economic unity can the Mediterranean aspire to without suppressing its “multi-verse” character, i.e., without taking a governmental and Eurocentric point of view (which identifies it alternately with the Greek, Latin, Roman, romance, or Christian traditions)? In one way or another, the attempts in this direction stem from two great theories. The first is that of “Pan-ideas/Pan-regions,” articulated by the leading exponent of German geo-politics, Karl Haushofer. In his vision, the pan-regions are made up of geo-political macrosystems that go beyond the apportionment between states on the Earth’s surface, while the Pan-ideas embody the unifying and consolidating principles of a social, economic, and cultural nature, which agglomerate these political entities in ordered sets that are bound together by internal relations of various kinds. The second is that of the regional iconography theorized by Jean Gottmann, one of the precursors of human geography, but also one of the best interpreters of the French tradition of géopolitique. The concept of “regional iconography” is used to introduce a heuristic paradigm which has the merit of emphasizing the spatial factor. We recognize an iconogra102

phy in an area that encompasses the “historical memories, sagas, myths and legends, symbols and taboos, abbreviations and signs of feeling, thought, and language” of a specific region. At the same time, for Gottmann, the iconography of a territory is not a defined and immutable matter. Rather, it is a mobile and versatile factor, able to overlap or replace the existing iconography. Heir of both traditions (not without the mediation of Schmitt’s theory of large spaces), the philosopher Alexandre Kojève attempted to outline a regional iconography of the Mediterranean as a prerequisite to a true political and economic unification. Despite its name, his idea of a Latin Empire – formulated in 1945 – should have united not only the Mediterranean countries of Europe (particularly France, Italy, and Spain) due to affinity of language, culture, mentality, and climate, as well as strong economic interests in common, but also, in a postcolonial perspective, Islam and the Arabic Muslim world of northern Africa. Kojève wrote with extraordinary foresight, “Within a real empire, nothing prevents this synthesis of opposites from being freed from its internal contradictions, irreducible only as long as they concern purely national interests.” The proposal, of course, was destined to only remain on paper, like the one put forward by Sarkozy (perhaps a tacit evolution of Kojève’s intuition) to create a “Union for the Mediterranean”: neither a state nor an empire, nor iconography, but, more modestly, an international body, similar to the European Union, designated to solve the problems common to the Mediterranean Sea (immigration, economic flows, energy, etc.). Considering these and other failures to provide a political status for the Mediterranean, one wonders if Herman Sörgel, the architect-philosopher and visionary genius who considered the question of political and cultural unity of the Mediterranean subordinate to the energy

By definition, the sea restricts the terrestrial right: waves cannot have defined boundaries, thresholds, or memberships. Here, the logic that separates “mine” from “yours” fails

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question, had not been right. His geo-political project, called “Atlantropa” (dated 1932, but revised and pursued until after World War II), is a great utopia that fascinated his contemporaries, finding many supporters and followers. To solve the energy problem in Europe, and also implement the African economy, Sörgel imagined closing the Strait of Gibraltar (and that of the Dardanelles) with an immense dam, which, in addition to providing a quantity of hydro-electricity (110,000 megawatts), enough to make the atlantropic continent self-sufficient from the rest of the world, would have greatly lowered the sea level, rendering immense tracts of lands fertile for agriculture. In this vision, the Mediterranean Union becomes something literal: with the partial drying of the Mediterranean – reduced to an artificial lake – Sörgel intended to restore a situation similar to that of 50,000 years ago, when Africa and Europe had not yet been separated by the sea. Of course, what is striking is not so much the technicalindustrial utopia, as the authentic and basically emblematic paradox according to which, in order to create a community of interest and a meeting between the civilizations of the Mediterranean, the sea should be eliminated, that is to say, the Mediterranean itself. But if it is true that utopias always contain hidden energies, it is worthwhile to reflect on both aspects: on the one hand, the centrality of the issue of energy; on the other, the erosion of the sea. Sörgel was perhaps the first to perceive the physiognomy that Europe could take on by choosing energy sustainability as a driver for an integration process that projected beyond it, in a geopolitical perspective centered on the entire Mediterranean area, freed from worn-out arguments of “roots,” as well as the particular interests of nations. Moreover, to get around the issue of territorial identities and state divisions, he uses the segmental logic of networks and technical support for exchange, a paradigm that anticipates the contemporary geography of flows and which helps to overcome the obsolete political cartography of the Mediterranean. On the other hand, however, to contradict the relevance of this vi-

sion, there is precisely the matter of the sea, the Mediterranean as a fluid and free space. The sea has not dried up, in the direction indicated by Sörgel, but it is quite solidified. Solid Sea is the title of an effective multi-disciplinary research on the state of the Mediterranean conducted by the group “Multiplicity.” A “solid” sea is a sea crossed by predetermined routes and inviolable confines, divided into specialized bands of water and rigidly standardized conditions through security systems, protected areas, and buffer zones. Those who venture on its waters must accept its preestablished identity: whether they be fishermen, tourists, or military or technical platforms. Or illegal immigrants. Such as the men and women who risk their lives every day to reach Italian territory, and to whom, often, no country provides help in the open sea. In the tragic game of intersecting rejections, denial of responsibility, awareness of omission, and programmed oblivion, the Mediterranean is a “nothing in common” that swallows lives and identities. Such as those of 283 male victims who died when a clandestine boat bound for Partopalo sank on Christmas night back in 1996, and who still lie nameless on the bottom of the Mediterranean. The geo-political issue of flows (of capital, information, and energy) cannot evade the question of the mobility of bodies. The challenge is supremely political.

With the partial drying of the Mediterranean – reduced to an artificial lake – Sörgel intended to restore a situation similar to that of 50,000 years ago, when Africa and Europe had not yet been separated by the sea 105

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Meetings or conflicts? Artists speak out by Ludovico Pratesi Art critic

Documenting developments, changes, and revolutions through contemporary art. This is the task that the new generations of artists of the Mediterranean area have given themselves, filming frenzied crowds, reflecting on the ruins, on immigration, on the relationship between the different religions present in this territory of meetings. A passion for growth through access to technology, and a new and profound channel for exploring the Mediterranean reality. A crowd in delirium, young men dancing, performances by artists following one after the other in a square that is full of life. The video installation by Ahmed Basiony, presented in the Egyptian pavilion at the Venice Biennale of 2011, was a live documentation of the febrile atmosphere of Tahrir Square in the heart of Cairo during the Arab Spring, captured in its most chaotic and festive aspects by Basiony’s camera. In those incandescent days in late January of 2011 – when Egypt was freed from a repressive and stifling regime that had lasted thirty years – the artist decided to take to the streets and document his people’s cry of freedom in its most joyous manifestations. Hours of dancing and the dances of young people who were fighting to defend a freedom regained after decades, bravely resisting the police charges, including the firing of tear gas and stray bullets. After four days of filming, on January 28, 2011, one of these bullets killed the thirty-year-old artist, revealing the dangers and weak106

nesses of a movement that would change the face of the Mediterranean forever. “From this point of view, the experience of Basiony has been exemplary,” stated Shady El Noshokaty, curator of the pavilion and his great friend. “He brought the ambitions of an artist in revolt to the forefront, ambitions that led him to fight and clash day after day, to live in his country with dignity, to the point of being deprived of everything, even his life.” Ahmed Basiony is a good example of the role that international artists have taken on in the last generations, interpreting the dramatic changes that are transforming the face of the Mediterranean, from the Balkans to North Africa, and up to the Middle East. Starting in the twenty-first century, the development of new technologies has allowed us to document these evolutions in the “making,” paving the way for deep reflection, capable of detecting the risks and contradictions of rapid processes that are not always completely positive. A case in point in

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this regard is the Algerian artist Kader Attia, who spent his childhood in France, where he was born in 1970, and Algeria, suspended between the Catholic West and Islam: his installations reflect on the cultural and political impact of capitalism in the Arab world, expressed in all its violence. Works such as The Repair from Occident to Extra-Occident (2012), presented at Documenta (13), show the complex web of formal, conceptual, and semantic relations linking the damage of ancient masks and busts with the scars of human bodies wounded in war, in a sort of restoration workshop suspended between history and war reportage. A survey that combines anthropology, sociology, and semiotics can be found in the research undertaken by Adrian Paci (Scutari, 1969), an Albanian artist who has been living in Milan since 2000. Paci’s video reflects on the loss of identity and the deep meaning of the condition of immigrants, in relation to the symbolic value of their traditions and the ability to convey them through the language of art to make them universal. One of his most recent works, The Encounter, shot August 23, 2011 in the Baroque square of Scicli, in the heart of Sicily, shows the artist dressed in formal wear shaking hands with a line of hundreds of people, focusing on a ritual gesture that, behind its apparent banality, is invested with deep ancestral meanings, related to both public and private hierarchical relationships. Sislej Xhafa, from Kosovo (Pec, 1970), has also pointed his finger at the condition of illegal immigrants in an 108

ironic and often irreverent manner: to emphasize the precariousness of his native country, which became independent only in 2008, he proposed himself for the Clandestine Pavilion at the Venice Biennale in 1997 when, dressed as an Albanian soccer player, he invited visitors to play with him. In a more recent video, Theatre who knows everything (2009), Xhafa has taken a concert of traditional music played in the dark by an orchestra of nomadic Sudanese musicians in Cairo: a metaphor of a repressive society that then prevented artists from spreading their own voice openly. With Letter to a refusing pilot (2013), the installation created for the Lebanese pavilion at the Venice Biennale, the Lebanese artist Akram Zaatari (Sidon, 1966) tells the story of the Israeli pilot Hagai Tamir, who was ordered in 1982 to bomb the city of Saida in southern Lebanon and refused to do so because he realized that it was a school, at that time directed by Zaatari’s father. What are the consequences of an act of this kind? Why did the pilot changed his mind? In posing these burning questions, the work is an implicit gesture of denunciation of the useless cruelty of wars in the Middle East. Not even the economic policy of the European Union in the Mediterranean area has been spared by the artists: the work Perfect Lovers (2008), by the Turkish artist Ahmed Ogut (Dyarbakir, 1981), consists of a bulletin board which contains two almost identical coins: the 2 euro coin and 1 Turkish lira, which is worth exactly half of the former. Also in this case, the metaphor of perfect love refers to the complex relations between Europe and Turkey, fundamental for the balance of the entire Mediterranean area. And in Italy? A work that is representative of the position of our country in relation to the Mediterranean is the video Italy is a republic founded on work (2004) by Rossella Biscotti (Molfetta 1978), inspired by the propaganda documentaries of the Thirties and which refers to the idea of work as a reconstruction of the new post-war Italian society, through images that reproduce various primary activities in a tale suspended between reality and utopia. In conclusion, we can repeat the words of Predrag Matvejevic, “The Mediterranean has long been awaiting a great work on its destiny.” In their own way, today’s artists invite us to reflect on the present through denunciations, metaphors, symbols, stories, and utopias, seeking a new vision that will be able to unite all the countries bordering the Mediterranean in a common project.

Ahmed Basiony is a good example of the role that international artists have taken on in the last generations, interpreting the dramatic changes that are transforming the face of the Mediterranean. 109

in-depth

Sounds from the shores by Paolo Ferrari Music critic

The melodic vocation that brings together the Mediterraneanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s music has created hybrid sounds and cross-references, forming a universe of sound that dialogs from shore to shore. The most representative musicians in a musical voyage across three continents.

If the â&#x20AC;&#x2122;80s gave rise to the circulation of the Arabic sound and the following decade was overwhelmed by the Balkans, then the frontier of the new millennium has been crossed with Istanbul heading the platoon of Mediterranean renewal

The popular music that mingles, bounces, submerges, and rises from one shore of the Mediterranean to another is not just the offspring of the operations of addition, subtraction, division, and, especially, multiplication in the countries bordering the sea. It is nothing less than a door leading into a home that three continents have in common. Three continents of sounds that overlook the Mediterranean: Europe, which is now more attentive than ever to its linguistic and cultural minorities; Africa, torn by conflict and corruption which finds its status of great power precisely in music; Asia, suspended between development and taboos, where the rural and the digital interact with widespread naturalness. This is a map that is taking shape through events of global magnitude. Events such as the annual Babel Med in Marseille, a festival of hybrid sounds and daring productions; Womex, the World Music Export conference, which not coincidentally has held its editions on the shores of the Mediterranean (Seville for three years, Thessaloniki in 2012, and Santiago de Compostela in 2014), an added value recognized by the operators and artists; and the Fira Mediterrània de Manresa, Catalan crossroads of music and theater, where the ear and the spirit are touched by emotions as fresh as the dew drops on Provencal lavender. The first element at play in the interaction between forms of Mediterranean music is its melodic vocation. The map comes from afar, from the Arabic-Andalusian influence in the Iberian Peninsula to the arrival of gypsies from the East, from the singing in the Christian religion to that of the Yemeni tradition. Until the most recent waves of uprisings. Just think of the explosion in the mid-Eighties of Algerian raï music in European pop. The voices, colors, and behavior of the Khaled generation not only marked a generation of alternative groups such as Almamegretta and Mau Mau, but also flowed into the mainstream through Pino Daniele, Massimo Ranieri with Mauro Pagani, and, under certain aspects, Nino D’Angelo. Everything came to pass in Orano, Algeria, a key city for the mixture of Oriental and Western cultures: Arabic music, Iberian strains, American bases, and a large Jewish community. No one has equaled Maurice El Médioni in making such an aphrodisiacal cocktail of music. Few have been able to elevate “shaker” music better than Rachid Taha, whose recipe includes a little Tarantino, the Clash, and ‘O Sole mio. This wave would proceed to a new exploit ten years later, when the raï hurricane was followed by the cyclone of music from the Balkans, triggered by two figures, Emir Kusturica

– Goran Bregovic. There, under the blows from the dilapidated fanfares of the potatofed Carpathians, the music of the “post-Berlin Wall” era really began. In this case, what made the difference were the mighty horn sections and rhythms that were already the result of previous composites, like using Formula 1 tires in the art of getting by. And once again, everything bounced around all over the place, until the most recent applications: the Fanfara Tirana group arrived in Italy, and was plunged into the chaos of “Balkan beat” evenings that show projections of them in the London studios of Transglobal Underground, who, in turn, are an Asian collective. It sounds like the beginning of an old joke: there was an Albanian, an Italian, and an Indian ... But it is all true, and pulsates on records, on stages, and on the Internet. If the ’80s gave rise to the circulation of the Arabic sound and the following decade was overwhelmed by the Balkans, then the frontier of the new millennium has been crossed with Istanbul heading the platoon of Mediterranean renewal. Thanks to a lively and brilliant scene, above all, Baba Zula and Taksim Trio, that has been able to turn the bridge over the Bosporus into the metaphor for dialog between Europe and Asia. It is a reality told with great effect by Fatih Akin in Crossing The Bridge, a film blending rap, dance, rock, and traditional music of the Turkish metropolis, which not surprisingly has become the new Mecca of the “club crowd,” after Berlin and Barcelona. Meanwhile, other waves have triggered chain reactions. Italy has represented the South, with its epicenter being the Taranta Night, by now a cult event for thousands of tourists, which also includes many hybrid collaborations. Headed by pizzicato dazzlers – Roma from Masarimirì and Rosapaeda, heirs of the crucial experience of the group from Bari, Different Style – who were the first to realize that “dub” is a Mediterranean glue that is as powerful as the melody. Greece has put its rebetiko into the pot, a solid libertarian landing for Vinicio Capossela. Occitania, a boundless slice of the Mediterranean that goes from Italian Alpine valleys to Basque country, has spilled punk folk fuel onto the plate of Lou Dalfin; then there is the sensitive reggae of the Massilia Sound System, a Moussu T heir with Lei Jovents by Vincent Scotto. In Marseille, a city founded by the Greeks, the Watcha Clan

The waves did not only travel from the South to the North. Indeed. Until the Seventies, Western models, dissolute descendants of colonialism, laid down the law everywhere

italia, interlocutore “speciale” dell’europa |

sails between dub (once again), Balkan, and Arab sounds, tastefully citing the myth of the Israeli-Yemenite, Ofra Haza. For its part, Israel has projected the shadow of Idan Raichel onto the sea, the ambassador of Tel Aviv’s underground of mixed sounds, including Yiddish, tango and gypsy, and (once again) dub. An ingredient that is also at play in the renewal of Catalan rumba proposed by Ojos de Brujo and Sergent Garcia, in a Europe that is in the techno grips of a Moroccan Gnawa trance. The waves did not only travel from the South to the North. Indeed. Until the Seventies, Western models, dissolute descendants of colonialism, laid down the law everywhere. When he was young, Khaled also wore out his records of the Rolling Stones; Baloji, who is Afro-Belgian, grew up listening to Marvin Gaye, and so on. What matters is how those models came to be absorbed, challenged, and revolutionized as weapons in their favor. This is the secret of rap. The 2012 edition of Babel Med was held in March in Marseille, the European Capital of Culture, in search of tailor-made productions assigned to persons of international appeal. The most exciting of these saw Imhotep – the

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producer of the local group IAM and fundamental in the history of hip hop in Europe – rally some of the most important rappers in the Maghreb. Boys whose rhymes narrated and fomented the so-called Arab Spring. After a workshop that lasted several days, the “Kheper Watt” project went onstage with Dock Des Suds. Where the various Souths are plural and their voices, blending wonderfully in the evening, confirmed what immense potential lies along the shores of the Mediterranean. The Algerian Meryem Saci performed a union of Arabic melody with soul music from America; Yassin Alsalman, known to all as The Narcicyst, seasoned the beat of the local DJs with groove and MiddleEastern influences; a Palestinian born in England, Shadia Mansour, chose the traditional route for bestowing bursts of rhymes in Arabic, English, and French, furthering the cause of her people. Those attitudinal spins on the Mediterranean foam are often feminine: Natacha Atlas singing Edith Piaf, and the Berber singer Hindi Zara, who entrusted the gypsy director Tony Gatlif to make her video of a song called Beautiful Tango, are the stateless sirens of a sea that rejects the concept of territorial waters.

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the simple power of the Mediterranean diet by Gabriele Riccardi President of the SID

The long-standing dietary habits of the Mediterranean people are now considered the most consistent with the dietary guidelines produced by institutions and scientific researchers. Olive oil, grains, vegetables, fruits, fish, wine: these are the ingredients of the Mediterranean diet, an Intangible Cultural Heritage of UNESCO, and the one which comes closest to perfecting our diet and our health.

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There is no such thing as an ideal diet – because there cannot be one. The world is too full of customs, traditions, tastes, and biodiversity to restrict them within the confines of one “perfect” food style. But in the last seventy years – ever since the American nutritionist Ancel Keys, who landed in southern Italy with the Allied troops during the Second World War, realized the close connections between diet and cardiovascular diseases – there has been a lot of scientific research studying the Mediterranean diet, showing that it closely approximates the ingredients and composition of an ideal diet. In particular, in the Fifties – starting with Keys and his study of seven countries, and then in the Nineties with Trichopoulou and the study by the EPIC (European Prospective Investigation into Cancer and Nutrition) – the clinical and epidemiological research intensified, showing that the Mediterranean diet produces measurable benefits in terms of improved health. The long-standing dietary habits of the Mediterranean people - who, often, are less well-off, as Keys noted - are now considered the most consistent with the dietary guidelines produced by institutions and scientific researchers: a high consumption of vegetables, legumes, fruits and nuts, olive oil, and grains; a moderate consumption of fish, dairy products, and wine; and a low consumption of red meat and sausages. In nutritional components, among other things, this translates into the intake of mono-unsaturated fat in place of saturated fat of animal origin, complex carbohydrates, sometimes whole grains, and proper protein intake, with a predominance of those of plant origin. This type of diet is beneficial to health in many ways: protection against the most widespread chronic diseases and, in particular, a decrease in cases of hypertension, diabetes, and obesity, lowering of the rate of cholesterol, less cardiovascular disease (10%), lower risk of heart attack (72% less) and thrombosis. In addition, several studies show the contribution of the Mediterranean diet in the prevention 116

of neuro-degenerative diseases, such as Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s, decreasing them by 13% and managing to significantly delay their manifestation. These results are very important, especially when you consider that the life expectancy in the world is getting longer and that the increase in the number of the elderly in the population has a great impact on healthcare costs. Reducing the gap between life expectancy and healthy life expectancy is therefore of paramount importance, for individuals and for society. The Mediterranean diet is an answer to many problems of contemporary society and preserving it is now more urgent than ever, because the younger gen-

erations – and not only them – are slowly letting themselves go (especially in Spain, Greece, and Italy), with serious consequences for the health of the population. That is why, not only in the countries bordering on the Mediterranean, but also in Northern Europe and North America, people should recognize the true nutritional value of the Mediterranean diet (Intangible Cultural Heritage of UNESCO since 2010), which is the result of centuries of experience and the knowledge produced by hundreds of scientific papers, and now, also reinforced by proof that it can help preserve the planet’s resources, thanks to its documented low environmental impact.

In particular, in the Fifties the research intensified, showing that the Mediterranean diet produces measurable benefits in terms of improved health

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Fishing:

a renewable resource of the Mediterranean Sea by Silvio Greco Chairman of the Slow Fish Scientific Committee photographs by White

To talk about fishing in the Mediterranean, it is necessary to deal with EU and non-EU countries, with a North Africa that is changing, and different regulations, fleets, fishing techniques, and management methods. But alarm concerning the depletion of fish stocks reminds us that fishing is a commercial activity that must be managed in accordance with the species and their habitat, and for this reason, it is crucial that countries agree to a common and balanced management of marine resources.

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Fishery products in the Mediterranean are suffering. And there are essentially two signs: the data coming from the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee on Fisheries of the EU, which in its 2012 report verified that 32 of the 36 fish stocks in the Mediterranean are now overfished, and the presence of species of fish and shellfish on the market that, until a few years ago, had been thrown back into the sea. But in terms of numbers, what are we speaking of when referring to all the fishing activities in the Mediterranean and what is the geo-political scenario of reference? There are currently only seven EU countries operating in the Mediterranean: Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Slovenia, Malta, and Cyprus. This industry employs about 105,000 fishermen (40% of all EU fishermen) embarking on 47,000 fishing vessels (48.5% of EU fleets). Historically, Italy (which in 2008 recorded a production of 3,552 tons) has always had the most numerous of the EU fishing fleets in the Mediterranean, from vessels using purse seine nets for catching tuna to gillnets for mullet and cuttlefish, as well as bottom trawling, the most important system of national fishing. Instead, France and Spain have a modest Mediterranean fleet and a large fleet in the Atlantic, and Greece, Slovenia, Cyprus, and Malta each have a small flotilla essentially devoted to local coastal fishing. The novelty is represented by the countries bordering on the North African shores, and especially by Egypt (90,000 employees for a production of 237,572 tons), Algeria (160,000 tons with approximately 1,000 vessels, of which 750 are in operation), followed by Turkey, with a production of 41,011 tons, Morocco with 4,440 tons, and Syria with 3,784 tons. Tunisia, in particular, has grown from a small flotilla of boats engaged in small-scale coastal fisheries to a large and well-equipped fleet of offshore vessels; in 2008, an estimated 85,000 people were involved in its supply chain, with a production of 1,096 tons. For now, fishing activities of the Palestinian Autonomous Territories, Israel, and Lebanon have been underdeveloped. Recently, a phantasm has also been hovering over this basin: the EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone). In 1970, the UN General Assembly decided to convene an international conference on the Law of the Sea. It began in 1972 and ended in 1982, in Montego Bay, Jamaica, with the signing of an international convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that, in fact, â&#x20AC;&#x153;abrogatedâ&#x20AC;? the old principle of the freedom of fishing, attributing to the coastal state, in addition to sovereignty over the 12 miles of territorial waters, the sovereign right to exploit its economic resources

up to 200 miles from the coast. However, in the EEZ, the coastal state must also ensure the conservation and rational management of biological resources. The Convention also sanctioned the obligation of all states to cooperate together for the conservation and management of living resources in the high seas (beyond the 200 miles). The Convention legislation has been enforced since November 1994. In the Mediterranean, the Montego Bay Convention merely made suggestions to the coastal countries to cooperate with each other to coordinate the management of biological resources. In fact, it is the only sea in the world where, in the almost total absence of national EEZs and international regulations (except for some species), on the one hand, the principle of the freedom of fishing on the high seas beyond the 12 mile radius is still maintained, and on the other hand, there is no agreed policy for the protection of its resources. A few years ago, Spain set up a fishing protection zone of 49 miles, whereas Malta has had an exclusive 25 mile fishing zone since 1971. France and Italy have declared territorial waters up to 12 miles, while Greece has 6 miles of territorial waters. Algeria has formally introduced the concept, with an extension of less than 200 miles, and Libya has about 50 miles. This is a complex regional basin where fishing is conducted in different ways and with different rules, although in most cases the stocks of fish are the same. The artisan structure of Mediterranean fisheries, the multi-specificity of resources, and the context in which production is organized require a different approach, in which the socio-economic dimension has to be taken into consideration. In particular, there is a need to recognize the ownership of fishing rights in favor of those engaged in the activity along the coast, possibly through the formation of consortia to manage the coastal districts or of fishing districts within which to pursue investment programs, repopulation, improved production of fishing through the definition of Fishing Plans, and the establishment of stable commercial, industrial, and social connections with the different realities of Mediterranean fisheries. This approach has proven on several occasions to be better able to meet the need for equilibrium between the activity and the catch through the systematic involvement in the decision-making process of those operating in the sector. But it is necessary to define the management objectives related to fishing for each Mediterranean country. They must follow the guidelines for responsible fisheries established by the FAO: fishing must be sustainable and, to achieve this objective, it is necessary to continuously monitor and learn about the dynamic 119

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fishing: a renewable resource of the mediterranean sea |

processes that characterize the fishery resources. Fishing is a business, but it must be considered in a manner that is compatible with the conservation of all species and their habitats. And environmental issues, such as the level of pollution in the marine environment, play a significant role in the management of renewable resources. The evolution of the main pollutants (metals, PCBs, hydrocarbons, dioxins, and the like) in food webs (or food cycles), in the water column, and in sediments, intervenes, on the one hand, by increasing the mortality of the eggs and larvae of fish, crustaceans and mollusks, and, on the other hand, regarding dioxins, by modifying either the sexual structure of marine organisms (imposex, hermaphroditism) or their reproductive time windows. There is unanimous consensus on the fact that, given the very nature of demersal fishing in the Mediterranean and given the real problems of quantification of the total catch, the limitation of fishing constitutes the best way to manage these activities in order to optimize the use of resources. However, this does not exclude that, for some resources and areas, it is possible to experiment with and successfully use other management measures, for example, the management of fishing regarding both capacity and the activity itself (through the management of fishing days and their suspension), the establishment of buffer areas (nurseries) and protected marine areas; conversion plans for “sensitive” systems (hydraulic dredges, small trawlers); diversification of the activities of fishing enterprises toward forms that have less impact on the ecosystem; and development of the sea’s control system through satellite technology. Nonetheless, it is necessary that each zone clearly define exactly which techniques and systems can promote fishing to maximize profits within a con-

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text of caution. Finally, the managers must divide the fishing activities according to the area, season, and instrumentation. It is necessary to overcome the present lack of essential knowledge (critical mass) and production of reliable data for all sectors of fishing, with the contribution of experts in the field of stock assessment, of the fisheries’ administrations, and, finally, of the fishermen. And it is necessary to encourage the strengthening of research activities, especially regarding areas and resources of which we do not yet have a thorough understanding. An important role should be attributed to the GFCM (General Council of Mediterranean Fisheries ) of the FAO, which is responsible for strengthening the activities of its Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC), for the promotion of the participation of delegates and researchers from all Mediterranean countries, and for the development of scientific research and data collection.

Fishing is a business, but it must be considered in a manner that is compatible with the conservation of all species and their habitats

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#In countries with limited democracy, social networks have become remarkable and easily accessible vehicles for getting information and communications, and for organizing 122

contexts

world

The arab # is open to everyone by Simone Arcagni Journalist

The media have recently begun to deal once again with the Arab Spring: a local protest that arose in Istanbul has in fact become gigantic, and is now shaking down all of Turkey, which has always been in precarious balance between the Middle East and Europe. There has often been talk of the central role played by young people, especially university students, the new technologies, and the Internet, more specifically, the social networks, and most notably, Twitter. Social networks showed that they can play a major role, not only for communication but also for the creation of community. But another key role was also that of acting as a news agency, raising the awareness of the international media, giving interviews, reports, visual evidence, and more. In countries with limited democracy, social networks have become remarkable and easily accessible vehicles for getting information and communications, and for organizing. To a certain extent, we can even say that the social platforms organized by the various protests of the Arab Spring, as well as those of the Spanish Indignados (to name one in the Mediterranean area), and movements such as the Italian 5-star party, the German Pirate Party or Occupy Wall Street in the USA, have also proven to be a new media channel, an open and actively involved independent newspaper, a web TV able to escape strict censorship. These areas of the

Mediterranean now seem to be able to oppose the “heavy” communication models, that are sometimes outdated and often controlled, with cost-effective platforms that are light, participatory, and inclusive. New technologies for new systems of communication: it is no coincidence that emerging countries (China, India, and Brazil), or others which are experiencing more or less underground crises, are working on new technologies, experimenting with forms, practices, and methods, through training schools, academies, and festivals, organizing conferences and workshops. And so a country like Morocco, very interested in the development of the media (and with an important film tradition), promotes the Digital Marrakech Festival (the last edition, the second, was held December 6-8, 2012). The Digital Marrakech Festival promotes film and digital videos, multimedia performances, video installations, digital mapping, net art, etc. Its fundamental purpose is to develop local professionals, comparing them with international figures, and to construct a training model through master classes and workshops. In Turkey (as Ekmel Ertan tells us in his Brief History of New Media Art in Turkey published in the “Rozenberg Quarterly”), the turning point came in 2005 at the Istanbul Technical University, when he started a Master’s degree in Information Technologies in Design. Before 123

then, there had been the publication of the magazine “HAT” – Hybrid Arrested Translation (one issue published in 1998), and in 2002, an independent group founded NOMAD, which became an association in 2006. That same year, Ekmel Ertan and Aylin Kalem, colleagues at Bilgi University, organized TECHNE – Digital Performance Platform, a festival with events, meetings, conferences, and workshops, an experience which then turned into BIS (Beden-lemsel Sanatlar Dernegi/Body-Process Arts Association) and the now famous AMBER – Art and Technology Festival (created in 2007). The E_Fest in Tunisia promotes multimedia as an art form, but also as a model of communication and information, and above all, as a language. To do so, not only were screenings and performances organized, but also workshops and technical training for young Tunisians. In this case, the idea was to bring together professionals and artists from all over the world with the young “novices” to create a virtuous system. The new media are combined with the local culture and society, and so the latest edition of the E_Fest has proposed a kind of artistic triangle between Tunisia, Egypt, and Lebanon. And precisely Egypt – again, like Morocco, with its history and significant film culture – looks to new media, not only as a viable economic model, but also as a new frontier of communication and information. To understand what is happening in these countries, Sabine, a journalist, and Ophelia, a photographer and video-maker, are making a web-documentary entitled Les hackers dans la cité arabe. The web-doc will be ready in June but in the meantime, the two directors are collecting material on a blog that works with the Creative Commons license. It regards a series of meetings, interviews, and statements with young, open source programmers in Arab countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Lebanon, and Iraq. Here, creativity, new technologies, and young people are making hackerlabs and makerspaces thrive. As the two directors explained to the World Social Forum in Tunis (March 26-30), “hacking on the other side of the Mediterranean is seen as a product of the revolution, a boost to collaborative practices and innovations, a space that is open to everyone.” Among the protagonists of the documentary, there is also an Egyptian engineer, Mahmoud El-Safty, who is interested in the practice of tinkering, of DIY (Do It Yourself) and digital fabrication, and who promotes free software and hardware. Mahmoud El-Safty is co-founder of Giza Hackerspace and Fab Lab Egypt, and he is one of those creative young people who look to the California dream of Silicon Valley. According to Mahmoud El124

the arab world is open to everyone |

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Safty interviewed in Les hackers dans la cité arabe, the digital revolution of the Arab countries means “thinking of a new society and a new educational system.” Not to mention the economy and the market. “Probably, over time, many of the projects that come out from these spaces will be transformed into products or start-ups. In fact, there already are open source software and hardware products on the market that have come from hackerspace and makerspace.”

#It is no coincidence that emerging countries or others which are experiencing more or less underground crises are working on new technologies, experimenting with forms, practices, and methods, through training schools, academies, and festivals

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The water content of a sand castle – impressive! – does not exceed 1% of the volume of the structure; as to the maximum height that can be reached without collapsing, the calculation is equal to the cube root of the square of the radius of its base

science at the toy store

Engineering of a sand castle by Davide Coero Borga Scientific popularizer

Nothing can be built with dry sand, nor with sand that is too wet. For this reason, and thanks to the need to absorb oil spilled in the open sea, research has led to a new toy, “magic sand”: when wet, it becomes a pliable jelly, and when removed from the water, it dries immediately. The dream of the builders of summer castles.

Summertime. Science under the beach umbrella. Toys on the beach. Is it any wonder? Pails, rakes, and shovels are fundamental tools for those to whom beach architecture is a serious ... and scientific matter. Underlying these innocent playthings of the sea and the fine sand are secret formulas of physics and chemistry. In the words of a scientist: “the water content of a sand castle – impressive! – does not exceed 1% of the volume of the structure; as to the maximum height that can be reached without collapsing, the calculation is equal to the cube root of the square of the radius of its base.” This was published in the Nature Scientific Report by a team of researchers at the University of Amsterdam. Is this a joke brought on by heat stroke? Far from it: research on the topic has important implications in the fields of civil engineering and soil mechanics. It is estimated that the movement and the flow of granular materials is responsible for almost 10% of world energy consumption. Nevertheless, little is known to date about the mechanical properties of wet sand. And if dry sand is not going to be worth much (as children in bathing suits are well aware, while combing Italian beaches in search of stones and wooden sticks with which to reinforce the ephemeral concrete of their constructions), sand that is too wet will also end up destabilizing a construction site, only to swallow up the labors of an after-

noon under the blazing sun. Scientists explain that the strength of a sand castle is the result of capillary bridges of liquid that oscillates between the grains. The chemical structure of water creates an attraction between the grains, often enough to support complex structures. But when the water rises above the famous 1% threshold, the curvature of the liquid bridges and their oscillation is compromised, threatening to make the structure collapse (and detonating anger in the child). To build seismic castles, if we may call them that, the actual density of the sand must be diminished. And to do so, just change toys: submerge the entire structure in water and use magic sand. Relax, it is not some kind of alchemy, just magic sand: sand from the Moon, sand from Mars, sand from outer space, aquatic sand, in short, the famous toy sand that does not get wet. Apparently as simple and trivial as the grains that compose the beach, but sold in small plastic bottles, with a measuring cap, brief instructions for use, and available in many colors: yellow, red, pink, green, and blue. Hydrophobic. Waterproof. Coated with a hydrophobic compound. Do you remember magic sand? Which gathered into a malleable jelly when poured into water and, when collected from the bottom of the bowl, went back to being perfectly dry as soon as it was out of the water. Composed of common silicon dioxide, colored, mixed with pieces of pure silica, and chemically

treated to make it hydrophobic, magic sand is a chemical substance that is, in fact, afraid of water. Like petroleum or vegetable oil, it tends to not combine with water but its weight makes it fall to the bottom. The hydrophobic coating of each grain repels water molecules and as soon as it is out of the water, it is completely dry. In water, the sand tends to compact itself into a silvery gelatin. The grains adhere to each other to minimize the surface area – becoming good construction material for a daring underwater castle. The first reference to hydrophobic sand is found in a book from 1915: The Boy Mechanic Book, published by the folks at “Popular Mechanics,” obvious precursors of toymaker science. Today, the sand is rendered hydrophobic industrially via vaporization of trimethylsilane, an organic silicon compound. This innovation of chemistry is originally due to research carried out on systems of oil precipitation. The waterproof sand was meant to serve as a flocculant to be used in the event of oil spills at sea: it is sprayed on patches of floating fuel which mixes with the oil particles that, becoming heavier, are dragged to the bottom. The prohibitive production costs forced the project to be abandoned. Later, since magic sand does not freeze, it was tested in arctic areas as ground platforms. And it has been used as a means of aeration in potted plants. And then they say that toys are only playthings …!

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Testata registrata presso il tribunale di Torino Autorizzazione n. 76 del 16 luglio 2007 Iscrizione al Roc n. 16116