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Ilkka Laitinen, Warsaw
Frontex has significantly developed and proven its added value to the EU’s humanitarian objectives Frontex and the crisis in the Mediterranean
Frontex is no stranger to the Mediterranean. Since the Agency became operational in 2005, the southern maritime border has been one of the most important theatres for its operational activities. Today the EU’s southern neighbourhood is undergoing unprecedented changes. Nevertheless, from an EU bordermanagement perspective the situation can be described very much as “business as usual.” Frontex is the largest European search and rescue organisation Socio-political events in North Africa and the Middle East − the so-called “Arab Spring” of popular uprisings − have focused public and media attention on the plight of irregular migrants and the dangers of migrants at sea. The public has been rightly shocked by media footage of horrifically over-crowded and unseaworthy vessels, dramatic search-and-rescue operations, and deaths at sea. But for the border-control authorities of the Member States affected, and for the crews involved in Frontexcoordinated operations at sea, such scenes are all too familiar. Frontex is Europe’s largest search-and-rescue organisation, and saving lives at sea has always been one of the central pillars of the Agency’s operational focus. The large numbers of people (tens of thousands) attempting the perilous and often fatal journey from West Africa to the Canary islands before 2006 were what sparked Hera, the first-ever Frontex Joint Operation. This operation, which is still running and has been supplemented by Hera II, was largely responsible for closing down the West African route and pre venting not only illegal migration into the EU, but also countless unnecessary deaths on the high seas. Criminal networks The facilitators and criminal networks responsible for people smuggling are not easily deterred, however. As one route is shut down another emerges, and the pattern of migration changes rather than stops. The routes change, the numbers change, but the phenomenon itself remains remarkably stable. Since the closure of the West African route, the channels have progressively shifted east, first to the Central Mediterranean (Libya-Italy) then to the Aegean (Turkey-Greece), and then to the Greek-Turkish land border in the Evros river region, where Frontex conducted its first-ever Rapid Border Intervention Team (RABIT) deployment. The Central Mediterranean route − once effectively closed through a bilateral agreement between the governments of Italy and Libya − has now re-opened. But due to the political context of this reopening, the situation − and Frontex’s operational response to it − is very different. The Arab Spring and the new state of migration With the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the situation on the EU’s southern maritime border started to significantly change. That there would be an increase in both for irregular economic migrants and refugees was to a large degree predictable. Just what form and direction it would take was not. Frontex’s Risk Analysis Unit, Situation Centre and Joint Operations Unit were stretched like never before to create a comprehensive range of possible future scenarios and appropriate operational responses for short-, medium- and longterm bor der management needs. Although many of these have since been discarded, the challenge of predicting likely future patterns is an ongoing one. Indeed, it is an important part of Frontex’s founding mandate to provide such a situational pic - ture to Member States and other stakeholders. This is one of the ways in which, behind the scenes, the Agency is supporting its partners and adding value to Member States’ acti vities. Although Frontex is most visible to the public through operational activities such as last year’s RABIT Operation, what we as an agency provide behind the scenes is of vital importance. Intelligence versus efficiency Any operation is only as good as the intelligence on which it is based. It is for this reason that the Agency has invested a great deal of money and effort into creating a state-of-the-art Situation Centre where all aspects of the current situation are Brig Gen Ilkka Laitinen is Executive Director, FRONTEX, Warsaw He was born in Nurmes, Finland, on August 22, 1962. He became promoted Brigadier General Boarder Guard in 2006. Deputy Head of Division, Frontier Guard HQ (Direc - tor of International Affairs) 2002 − 2005; Counsellor (Justice and Home Affairs), Permanent Representation of Finland to the European Union 2000 – 2002; Coordinator of the Frontier Guard Headquarters on Schengen and EU affairs 1998 − 2000; National representative at the Council WP Schengen Evalu ation 1999 − 2005; Director of the EU Risk Analysis Centre (RAC) 2003 − 2005 “Prevention is always better than a cure.”
Migrants from Arab countries in the harbour of Lampedusa
photo: FRONTEX
monitored around the clock to provide as close to a real-time intelligence picture as possible for Frontex and external stakeholders. This is one of the most important ways in which Frontex is currently adding value to the efforts of Member States and other partners. Another is through experts on the ground: Italy is a very well-equipped country when it comes to border control.
Nations come to Frontex for expertise, not for assets When nations request operational assistance at their sea borders in response to concrete situations, it is not a call for assets, but rather for expertise. The mix of migrants is very fluid, i.e. the nationalities of the migrants and the languages and dialects they speak changes with the flows. For this reason, screeners (to assist local authorities in determining the nationalities of migrants) and de-briefers (to conduct interviews with a view to intelligence gathering on the networks responsible and the routes used) are of vital importance to the ongoing operational efforts of Member State authorities. We are also providing experience and expertise in the area of return operations to enable swift and effective repatriation of illegally staying third-country nationals. As always, each Member State remains responsible for and in charge of its own portion of the external border − the role of Frontex is to provide whatever operational or informational assistance is required. For obvious reasons, the details of such provisions are closely guarded.
At an operational level, Frontex has long been active in the Mediterranean through both the European Patrols Network, which coordinates the routine surveillance activities of Member Sates in the region, and through Joint Operations Indalo, Aeneas, Poseidon and − in response to a request by the Italian authorities in February − Hermes.
Joint Operation Hermes In early February, following the socio-political turmoil in Tunisia, the migratory flow from Tunisia to Italy increased sharply, reaching dramatically high levels February 11-13, with 36 incidents on the island of Lampedusa and the arrival of 2,750 irregular migrants. The exponential increase in the num ber of migrants leaving Tunisia was chiefly opportunity-driven. The main contributing factors were a critical mass of migrants willing to emigrate and a lack of controls along Tunisia’s shores due to a temporary law enfor cement deficit and military re-distribution to important urban centres for security reasons. The good weather and sea conditions, and the geogra phic proximity to Lampedusa, made attempting the crossing an attractive option. On February 15, Frontex received a formal request for assistance from the Italian Ministry of Interior in light of the extraordinary sea borne migratory pressure from Tunisia to the Italian Pelagic Islands. The requested assistance was in the form of a joint operation to strengthen surveillance at the EU’s external borders.
In response to the Italian request, Frontex launched Joint Ope - ration Hermes on February 20 along the Pelagic Islands. The Member States provided aerial assets and experts for debriefing migrants in support of activities carried out by Italian authorities. The operational area of Hermes was later extended to cover possible migratory flows towards Sardinia. During the first part of Joint Operation Hermes, the main mi - gra tory flow towards Italy originated from Tunisia and comprised Tunisian nationals. These were mostly young men
