Oliver Bruzek, Aachen

European Union With Lisbon, the EU has made a step forward. Might the solidarity clause create more confidence between the nations and promote progress?

Oliver Bruzek.......................................................................... 8 Simon Busuttil MEP................................................................ 11 Ilkka Laitinen ....................................................................... 14 Ioan Dasca˘lu ......................................................................... 16

Lisbon was a step in the evolution of the EU − what are the objectives and how to proceed? How to make Europe a nation?

by Oliver Bruzek, Director, Aachen

“Nations are not something eternal. They have their beginnings and they will end. A European confederation will very probably replace them”. The French writer and scholar, Ernest Renan, ventured this statement in his speech at the Sorbonne on 11th March 1882. However, he did not do this without emphasising in the same speech that nations were therefore not an insignificant phenomenon but were necessary in that epoch; indeed, “…their existence is the guarantee of liberty which would be lost if the world had only one law and only one master”.

Europe needs a big picture When we look at things from today’s perspective and as the question of the future of Europe remains unresolved, one thing above all appears to be missing: the big picture − the vision of the future. Our debates are limited to overcoming day-to-day economic, social and political problems, in which we pretend our nations (or states) in Europe enjoy an autono - mous freedom of action in a globalized world that has not exis ted for a long time. The issue of the aim of European poli - tics must finally come back onto the agenda, and we can scar - cely afford to shirk it. After all, setting a clear objective has a decisive impact on social developments on our continent as

Oliver Bruzek Director, International Markets, CAE (Stolberg) since 2008. He was born in 1968. 2007 − 2008: Director General, Brain-World (Ulm); 2002 − 2007: Director Government Relations, EADS Defense and Security (Ulm); 1999 − 2002: Marketing Consultant, Euromissile (Paris); 1997 − 1999: Advisor on Defense and Security Politics, German Parliament (Bonn); 1992 − 1997: Eurocorps, (Strasbourg). Author and Co-author of various publications, e.g. “Wörterbuch zur Sicherheitspolitik” with Bühl and Kujat (Hamburg, 2001) well. The strengthening of an extreme right-wing nationalist mentality in large parts of Europe, which is now also gripping a core country such as France to an ominous degree, is a product of the people looking to adopt a pseudo-nationalist posture. It reflects the absurd notion that the states of Europe would be capable themselves of providing answers to global challenges. Fears are also freely stoked by pointing out the gap in prosperity which still exists in Europe in an attempt to pull the political rug out from underneath solidarity which is genuinely nee - ded. The fact that there are gaps in prosperity within our nation states is also omitted. Each year 13 million marriages in Europe are registered between couples of different nationalities and every third child born in Germany today is from a migration background.

There are no longer national solutions in the future In this age of mobility and communication, our nations (which in any case have never been homogeneous since the time they were formed) have begun to change. Keystones such as ethnic origin, language and religion are losing their dominance in relation to the states of Europe. In reality, today we live neither in nations which are firm strongholds of society nor in con ditions where our states are capable of acting and surviving alone − but they are at least competitive. None of the current discussions going on these days about a possible transfer society in Europe, the issue of how we deal with refugees at various European borders, the reckless gambling with treaty issues, such as the Schengen Agreement, serve to resolve a single problem, let alone set the new directions we need for the future. They only serve to abet destructive forces: the die-hards who are jeopardising the legacy of the last 65 years and want to catapult Europe back into the first half of the 20th century.

The principle of subsidiarity We do of course have strong regions with strong identities in Europe, and no-one wants to dilute this artificially. On the contrary − it is specifically for this reason that we have quite rightly introduced the principle of subsidiarity as the supreme maxim and fundamental restriction governing European admi - nistration. This principle cannot however be seen as a one-way street. Whenever the actual possibility of fulfilling their duties proves to be too overwhelming for regions or even for states, it must be possible − indeed, it must be entirely desirable − for a transfer of sovereignty to take place.

Security in Europe is indivisible This statement is one of the natural keystones of European society. This is why it has to be in the fundamental interest of all nations within the Union that the Union functions. That might sound banal, but in reality this banality is put to the test time and again. How far have we managed to turn our respective national interests into a truly common interest and how great is the danger of fragmentation? Let’s look at the area of foreign, security and defence policy: As I see it, three basic questions should be answered:

Misleading debates How are the security interests of Europe defined today, and to what extent is there a common − and let me emphasise this - common perception of risk? Some examples: Does France want to restrict itself to the Mediterranean region or will the Poles keep a unilateral eye on Russia because this corresponds best to their respective national situations? In Germany’s discussion on energy dependency, is it really a question of Germany’s dependency or that of the whole of Europe? How misleading are the debates on integration that are held in various countries of the Union and during which the term “Europe” is virtually never mentioned? The list can be supplemented in any way you like and sometimes appears to drop off the political agenda altogether.

Differing views on the menaces to Europe To what extent does there actually exist within the Union − and this question is directly related to the first − consensus over the priority of the threats which encompass our Union? In debates up until now, it has seemed as if terrorism, nonproliferation and climate change are right at the top of the list of threats. For many years, we have been debating − entirely properly − about asymmetric conflicts and conflict scenarios. However, when we look closely at our neighbouring regions, we see that the potential conflicts that were suspended after 1990 have not by any means been resolved but could become a real threat at any time to Europe as well − and demand co - ordinated action across Europe at the very least (for example, Georgia or Belarus). It seems to me that we are not well prepared for the future if we continue to neglect these risks.

10 How to ensure strategic security objectives? If we do not have conclusive answers to the first two questions, in the current situation we will continue to run the risk that although we call it a common European interest we do not implement it as an active policy. We will stay at the level where at best national strategies are drafted and then set into the European context as a more or less cosmetic operation. There will be no chance of planning and above all providing the necessary resources at the level of complexity required which would make it possible in the first place to prepare ef - fec tively and efficiently for the feasibility and achievement of strategic aims − in other words, through joint planning and preparation for the deployment of armed forces in the widest variety of scenarios.

Strengthening Europe in the world Anyone today who answers these questions by stating that security is the supreme duty of the nation state and therefore is a mark of inalienable sovereignty is simply not taking account of the reality. The definition of European interests and their protection − not through a coherent and coordinated policy but through a truly common and therefore single foreign, security and defence policy − also generate a sense of identity internally as well. Ernest Renan was right to ask the question: “A community of interest is assuredly a powerful bond between men. Do interests, however, suffice to make a nation?” And he provided his own answer: “I do not think so. Community of interest brings about trade agreements, but nationality has a sentimental side to it; it is both soul and body at once; a customs union is not a homeland.”

Europe has to define and to find its destination Nevertheless, I am sure that ultimately this path will lead to a positive “demarcation” of Europe in relation to other parts of the world which will be based on values and which should not by any means be misunderstood as isolation. Souls can also develop in what Europe “becomes”. And ultimately in what Europe “is”, it will have other and more effective global options for action and increase its diplomatic influence. But − and this should equally be recognised unreservedly as a natu - ral duty of Europe − it will also be better able to safeguard its own prosperity in competition. To do this, there is an urgent need not only to create the ins - truments but also to grant them the necessary power and to devolve sovereignty. This is precisely what must ultimately be achieved through the elements of the agenda agreed by the Council of Europe (e.g. the Ghent Process, Franco-British Agree ment, European Defence Agency and Permanent Structured Cooperation) or they will remain ineffective in the long term. In the case of the latter, the European External Action Service (EEAS) will also turn out to be a bad investment. Anyone on the global stage who wishes not only to be heard but also to be taken seriously must not be vulnerable to divi - sion in the event of a crisis as we have been in almost all the crises of the past two decades, whether in the Balkans, in Iraq or recently in respect of the Libyan issue. There is an urgent need to strengthen the European Parliament with regard to these questions and for it to obtain con siderably more expertise in foreign and security policy issues but equally in defence policy issues.

Scrutiny This will also inci dentally require con siderably greater cooperation between the European and natio nal parliaments. Inviting elected representati ves from Brussels regularly to meetings of national parliamentary defence committees would be one conceivable approach, not only to pro mote direct dialogue but also to allow the interdependencies to become clearer on both sides. A further specific measure might be the gradual harmonisation of the terms of office of the legislatures and election dates in Europe. This should be possible 12-15 years in advance and would support better joint formulation of foreign and security policy objectives specifically and remove the temptation to engage in domestic tactics. A statement by Renan to end with, which describes the natural development of Europe and its citizens: “The modern nation is therefore a historical result brought about by a series of convergent facts”.

Documentation

Declaration of Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950:

“World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. The contribution which an organised and living Europe can bring to civilisation is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations. (…). A united Europe was not achieved and we had war. Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity”