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Françoise Hostalier MP and Jean-Pierre Kucheida MP, Paris

The multitude of missions and budget constraints risk overstretching the EU’s military capabilities The CSDP − the way ahead

by Françoise Hostalier MP, Paris and Jean-Pierre Kucheida MP, Paris

(Edit.) The so-called “legacy report” is the ninth in a series of documents on European security and defence policy to be pro - duced by the European Security and Defence Assembly was its last report before the final closure of WEU at the end of June 2011. These highly appreciated reports of delegated members from national parliaments, brought together in the Defence Committees of the Assembly, had a certain influence on decisions of the national parliaments and in the different Institution of the Euro pean Union however they couldn’t help to make a real breakthrough either in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) nor in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) toward to more coherent decision making, adapted to the needs.

Europe is not willing to take coherent decisions on security and defence Today, unfortunately, events seemed to have proved us right: Europe is unable to take a coherent decision on political, hu - ma nitarian and military action in response to the bloody battles for freedom being waged by peoples of the Maghreb and Middle East. We seem to have learned nothing from our recent and painful history: the Balkan wars, Sarajevo, Srebre nica … Today, 15 years on, when the going gets tough, we still take refuge be hind the NATO banner. Our report describes the current structures and procedures that exist under the CSDP and proposes ambitions for a Euro pean defence. It suggests certain improvements in terms of institutions and defence capabilities and reviews those areas of the CSDP where European cooperation needs to be stepped up.

There is no director to conduct the European “orchestra” in CSDP As far as institutions are concerned, the structures and procedures exist already: the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the EU Military Staff (EU-MS, the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European External Action Service (EEAS). But there is no-one to conduct the orchestra: there is, in other words, no operational headquarters to provide the coordination that is essential in order to guarantee the necessary responsiveness in the event of a crisis. We describe the permanent operational cooperation that gives Europe access to military capabilities that directly match its requirements or can be adapted as necessary: the Euroforces and the battlegroups 1500, as well as bilateral cooperation initiatives among European states (e.g. the recent FrancoBritish Treaty and the German-Swedish agreement).

Françoise Hostalier MP Françoise Hostalier was born in Beauvais. She holds a master’s degree in mathematics 1993 to 1995 Member of the French Parliament. 1995 Secretary of State to the Minister of National Education. Formerly head of the Popular Party for French Democracy (PPDF) and Vice-President of the Liberal Democracy (DL) party, she is now a member of the National Bureau of the Radical Party and the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP). 2007 elected under UMP as a Member of Parliament. Member of the National Defence and Armed Forces Committee. Rapporteur on behalf of the Defence Committee of ESDA. 2009 Vice President of the French-Afghan Friendship Group of the National Assembly.

Jean Pierre Kucheida MP Jean-Pierre Kucheida was born in Lievin on 24 February 1943. A specialist in geography, he taught at the Lycee Henri Darras Liévin. Since 1981 continuously elected as Member of Parliament of the 12th District of Pas-de-Calais. 1981 to 2001 Mayor of Lievin and a Member of the General Council of Pas-de-Calais (1981 to 1988), 1995 to 1997 Questeur of the National Assembly. A Member of the Finance Committee, Mr. Kucheida is Vice President of the study group on the development of social and healthy living, and Rapporteur on budget appropriations for fisheries. He is Chairman of the Defence Committee of the ESDA.

As regards defence equipment and the armaments industry, we describe the difficulties of cooperation among European states and the role of the European Defence Agency, which remains too limited. The EDA, which has a too small operating budget, should become a tool for harmonising and rationalising efforts in the field of defence equipment at European level, in order to enable Europe to assert itself against the United States’ dominance in the field of future technologies and dumping by countries with emerging defence industries. The European states are sovereign, of course, but they must understand the urgency of reaching agreement among themselves on these issues, for the threats are very real.

How to prepare for the future? Our report suggests a number of avenues to be explored in order to define the aims and ambitions of the CSDP. The most legitimate of its ambitions is to guarantee peace for

28 future generations in Europe, which, let us not forget, was the fundamental aim of Europe’s founding fathers. This requires a common political resolve, unfailing solidarity on the part of states, a pooling and sharing of competences and capabilities in order to serve that common cause, not just within Europe’s borders but also beyond them, when our security or interests are under threat. Intervention requirements may vary. Depending on the type of threat or crisis, there may be a need for humanitarian assistance, crisis management in the wake of a natural disaster, measures to establish or consolidate the structures of a constitutional state or military intervention.

The CSDP has to become a true “protector” The CSDP must therefore be ambitious in scope. It must first and foremost be a tool for protecting the EU’s interests. The report sets out a number of measures that are essential for that purpose. In the institutional area, what is lacking, essentially, is a capability for the planning and conduct of military operations analogous to that which exists for civilian missions. From the financial standpoint, the common effort is not shared sufficiently equally among member states. Looking at the euro zone, it is very unfair to point the finger of blame at certain countries which have trouble complying with the Maastricht public deficit criteria when they are fully assuming their share of the common defence.

Nobody “wants” to engage the structured cooperation The permanent structured cooperation foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty must be organised and quickly put in place, as must the EU Interparliamentary Conference for the CFSP and CSDP. In the field of capabilities, the main aspect in need of improvement is the EU’s operational credibility. The EU must be recognised as a reliable and effective player on the international stage. Its member states must therefore show themselves to be united and resolved. For that they need the support of their public opinion, which to a large extent depends on the Union’s capacity to handle information. The EU must do more to publi - cise its action under the CSDP and make the functioning of the European External Action Service transparent.

The EU needs performing civil capabilities In terms of civilian missions, in order to deal with crises like those currently affecting the countries of the Maghreb, the EU must be able to mobilise extensive civilian capabilities in order to make experts and trainers available for long periods. In response to disasters like the quake in Haiti, and as stressed by Herman Van Rompuy in February 2010, it is necessary to create a European intervention force that can be rapidly mobilised in the event of a natural disaster. More generally speaking, the Member States have vital security interests on their own territory: internal security against the threats of terrorism and organised crime, as well as in terms of security of supplies of energy and raw materials, the evacuation of a country’s nationals, etc. The CSDP must be able not only to respond to outside requests for assistance but also be organised so as to defend the Member States “civilian” interests.

Military capabilities: Still the same shortfalls As regards improving purely military capabilities, a glance at the proceedings of the different force generation conferences suffices to show that it is always the same capability shortfalls that are deplored: helicopters, strategic lift, UAVs, land units, etc. Those shortfalls are the direct result of the Member States’ limited defence budgets, which represent on average only 1.4% of GDP. As regards the use of forces dedicated to EU operations − the battlegroups 1500 and Euroforces − the main area in need of improvement is that of rapid operational availability, which is decisive for responsiveness. Finally, the report identifies areas in which the CSDP needs developing (see box):

Conclusion To conclude, it might have been hoped that an instrument that was so difficult to put together, namely the Lisbon Treaty, should provide a political dimension capable of harmonising and channelling the individual contributions of the Member States towards a common European goal. It might have been hoped that Europe, with the necessary material and institutional resources (which of course can still be improved), should at last be capable of taking action if our interests were threatened or if, in the name of values, it seemed essential to intervene. The recommendations in our report are a strong appeal to that effect.

Recommendations

Military advice and assistance, in order to Europeanise what is currently being done bilaterally, in particular in Africa; Action at sea (particularly surveillance), to improve coordination of the civil (FRONTEX) and military action of the different states involved; The space sector, to carry out ambitious programmes such as Galileo, Kopernikus and MUSIS, by giving the EDA a role in coordinating military needs; Cyberspace, an area of potential conflict and risk for the security of states and their citizens; “Crisis” intelligence, which could be extended to security intelligence and put under the responsibility of a European agency, yet to be created.

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