Bernd Kreienbaum, Brussels

A European BMD architecture must be transparent and take the issue of Russia on board The role of Europe in NATO’s Ballistic Missile Defence

by Bernd Kreienbaum, Execrutive Advisor IABG for Defence and Security, Brussels

In March 1983, US President Ronald Reagan launched the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Initiative called the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), which became known as “Star Wars”. 30 years and about US$ 200 billion later, BMD has reached Europe as a NATO programme. Since 2002 the US Missile Defence Agency (MDA) alone has spent US$ 90 billion on BMD and is continuing to spend more than $8 billion per year for the development of land-, sea-, and space-based sensors to track missiles, as well as ballistic missile interceptors and a battle management system. Now, the overarching questions for Europe are: what is the price Europe has to pay for building a European BMD capability in the next two decades and will it become a “buy American” solution only, or is there a chance for European technologies and true participation?

At the 2010 Lisbon Summit the NATO Heads of State and Government (HOSG) agreed on a risk perception focused on Iran, without naming that Islamic state, and defining BMD in a “top down” process as an “essential military mission” 1 and as a new Alliance focus. The NATO Secretary General even declared BMD to be a “game changer” in the relations and cooperation with Russia. The objective of the NATO BMD programme is to defend Europe indivisibly by intercepting missiles of all ranges at all stages of flight.

At the 2012 Chicago Summit a first operational BMD Interim Capability was declared and praised. Certainly more a political manifestation than one of operational relevance, it shows that a BMD capability for Europe is under way. This is underlined by the fact that NATO has just started the process for releasing, in autumn 2013, some €68 million for a contract award to BMD System Engineering and Integration (SE&I).

NATO’s objective is to defend Europe indivisibly Before Lisbon the political argumentation was based on the assumption that the lion’s share of BMD would be paid for by the US through its Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA), building in four steps on sea- and land-based AEGIS systems with SM-3 interceptors of different types as a national contribution to the European BMD System. This US contribution would provide, in steps, full “upper layer” coverage (exo-atmospheric interceptors) indivisibly for all European populations, territory and forces. NATO would pay a common amount of no more than €200 million in addition to the ongoing Theatre BMD Pro

Bernd Kreienbaum Mr Kreienbaum is the Brussels-based representative of IABG, the German Technology Think Tank and Simulation & Integration Company. He studied Electronic, Radar & Communication Engineering. He served previously in various positions in the German Air Force and Ministry of Defence. Since 2010, alongside his US counterpart, BG (ret) Bob Dehnert (Raytheon), he has been the European coChair of the NATO Industrial Advisory Study Groups (SG-151/172) on industrial and technology BMD aspects. He served for nine years, up to January 2007, in the NATO International Staff, Defence Investment Division, as Deputy Head Joint Armaments Section and Special Programme Coordinator, covering also NATO’s major Missile Defence and Theatre Missile Defence activities. At the AIAA Multinational Missile Defence Conference in September 2007 he received the prestigious David R. Israel Award for his meritorious achievements in Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence during his tenure at NATO.

gramme, while the European partners may contribute with some “lower layer” (Patriot/MEADS) and gap-filling capabilities on a voluntary basis, and that’s it.

Reality and consequences This strategy worked well to get the programme launched, but in the meantime there is clearly a change of awareness and some political and military illusions are fading away. The US PAA will certainly remain a key element and a welcome contribution to the European BMD capability, but it does not provide indivisible protection for the whole of Europe and is limited against longer-range and faster missiles, as well as being far from robust in military terms. The recent cancellation of PAA Phase IV – addressing some longer-range intercept capabilities – was evidence that an “adaptive approach” is not a commitment and that it is vulnerable to political changes and budget constraints. The argument that dropping this phase would make no difference for Europe is factitious. If North Korea’s ICBM 2 are a threat for the US, then the same is true for Europe. If we assume that PAA IV would have included some kind of ICBM defence capability, then its termination is taking this capability away from Europe. What are the key issues? 1. For the moment the architecture of the future European BMD system with the US PAA and beyond is undefined and consequently the costs are unknown, not only for Europe but also

The exo-atmosphere: artist's impression

Source: NIAG

for the US. What BMD and PAA III will finally look like and how the gaps, not only as regards longer-range threats, may be closed is a matter of speculation regardless of volatile political statements. The system’s full cost is unknown because there was no agreed definition of its elements, or in other words of the architecture. And this is the key problem of the NATO BMD Programme: the lack of a NATO Staff Requirement (NSR) beyond the Command & Control (C2) Functions defining a BMD system of systems embedded in European geography and also mapping European elements in a flexible architecture. It is obvious that BMD is becoming a multi-billion exercise for Europe as well, and that Germany and France in particular will have to bear a significant portion of the costs. The US is no longer ready to pay for Europe; as the Chairman of the House of Representatives Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee (Michael Turner) stated last spring: “the United States can no longer afford, if it ever could, to pay for Europe’s missile defence all by itself, especially not if it means neglecting the missile defence of the American people”. Concerns are being raised about the Command & Control (C2) cycle, the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and the NATO European influence on the Concept of Operations. Many of the assumed intercepts may occur over Russian territory, but in a European security environment BMD cross-border operations need to be coordinated and agreed with all nations that may be affected: it is not a NATO Article V issue only. In this regard the role and involvement of the Russian Federation is still fuzzy. As yet there has been no visible progress with respect to the Lisbon Summit promises of NATO-Russia cooperation on BMD.

A European influence on the BMD architecture? It will be imperative to understand what the European BMD capability should look like and what needs to be built in the coming decades, depending on the evolving risks. It will be essential to define one or more target architectures for a robust European BMD System that clearly goes beyond the US PAA in substance. To do so, the players must agree on a comprehensive requirement for all necessary elements, comprising sensors, Command & Control, interceptors, and support assets including European contributions. Finally they need to agree on an implementation roadmap clearly beyond the assumed timelines of PAA and defining the architecture evolution plan, the transatlantic balance and the European contributions. At the same time they must clarify the role and contributions of Russia. This will only be feasible if “Burden and Benefit” sharing in terms of technical and industrial participation is taken seriously.

Can Europe’s CSDP 3

continue to ignore BMD? This question has been explored in depth by several European nations 4 and further analysis is ongoing. In parallel a NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) Study delivered in the run-up to the 2012 Chicago Summit also gave a good picture of European industrial capabilities. This study performed by about 40 transatlantic industries from 12 nations was pretty impressive, showing that Europe too has a significant range of BMD capabilities and technologies to offer. It provides a compendium of some 50 national, European and transatlantic projects that can be used as toolbox for the development of a robust BMD architecture, covering the main fields of Sensors, Command and Control and Interceptors. Here are just a few examples: - shared European deployment of a synergetic Space Situation Awareness (SSA) and BMD Radar network serving interagency (civil/military) requirements, which would even be more profitable if done together with Russia; - shared development of a European space-based Early Warn

56 ing and Tracking (EW&T) capability putting an to end Europe’s full dependence on foreign sources; - sharing of the new Dutch sea-based long range Radar

(SMART-ELR) amongst European Navies as a provision for a forward-based BMD sensor; - shared development of a European exo-atmospheric interceptor to cover BMD territorial requirements beyond the limited SM-3 performance. The reasons why the EU must inevitably formally engage in BMD are its overarching goal of a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and its growing responsibility for space matters. The EU mandate for the development of a European Space Policy and Strategy, the tasking of the European Commission (EC) with developing a Space Situational Awareness (SSA) Capability and ensuring space infrastructure safety already constitute BMD-relevant elements. Furthermore, the EU initiative for the development of an “International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities” has an indirect link with BMD, prompting US officials to participate in and monitor this activity closely. It has to be assumed that European Space capabilities in the security and defence domain have the same strategic relevance, which has forced Europe to invest in the Galileo independent Navigation System, ensuring that its contributions make Europe a relevant partner for NATO and Washington. A role for Russia? NATO and national BMD architecture and performance studies came to the conclusion that the use of Russian territory and radars and interoperability with Russia’s capabilities would make a huge difference, offering a better defence (in terms of depth and performance), less strain on architectures and, in particular, lower costs. Taking into account that many intercepts in the defence of Europe would occur over Russian territory and that boosters and debris would fall on its territory, the NIAG BMD Study Group recommended follow-on efforts to determine the impact of Russian territory and technology on the European BMD design, as well as the continuation of a NATO-Russia Council (NRC) TMD interoperability study, which should be expanded to investigate industrial cooperation opportunities with Russia. It must be realised that if NATO and Europe – including Russia – are not able to agree on a stepped approach towards an interoperable and cooperative BMD System, this could become a birth defect with fatal consequences for the NATO BMD programme. If no solution to the Russian issue is found, political hurdles are likely to be placed not only by Russia but also other European nations in the way of a smooth and successful programme planning and management process. Moreover this would have an overall negative impact on the development of a European security identity involving Russia. In conclusion The Lisbon NATO decision in favour of a European BMD capability is now a fact that can scarcely be reversed without damaging NATO, whereas the US PAA’s performance is limited and European contributions will be essential to provide indivisible security for Europe. A NATO/European BMD Roadmap timeline is needed, matching European contributions until 2030 and beyond, while taking the current US PAA scope as an important building block in the start-up phase. But it is an absolute prerequisite for European BMD architecture to take the issue of Russia on board and to provide operational transparency as a baseline for a cooperative and interoperable approach. European industries are getting ready to play a role in BMD on the basis of available technologies and focused developments; they seem open to multinational and transatlantic cooperation efforts that include Russian industries. They have to acknowledge that BMD and related fields will become one of the very few growing investment areas for NATO and the European Defence Community. They face demanding challenges along the way ahead towards BMD in Europe. The alternatives are “to provide budgets or to lose sovereignty”. Either Europe plays the role of “gap-filler” for the US PAA, which is insufficient for the indivisible defence of Europe, gives it a very limited say in the architecture design and means buying US Systems, or else Europe engages as a NATO partner and strives for an “open & indivisible” architecture with European contributions and Russian cooperation. European agencies like the European Defence Agency (EDA) and OCCAR 5 are well suited for the acquisition and management of BMD “pooling & sharing” efforts in support of relevant NATO activities. 1 Lisbon Declaration No. 36: “...we have decided that the Alliance will develop a missile defence capability to pursue its task of collective defence.” 2 ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. 3 The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is a major component of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and was formerly known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). 4 Example: Report by Hubert Védrine to the French President, 14.Nov.2013. 5 OCCAR: Organisation conjointe de coopération en matière d’armement (Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation) European industries have to acknowledge that BMD and related fields will become one of the very few growing investment areas for NATO and the European Defence Community.

B. Kreienbaum

9th European Congress on Civil Protection Visit us at Europe’s leading event on Civil Protection!

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Klaus-Dieter Fritsche, State Secretary, Federal Ministry of the Interior

Mag. Mag. (FH) Harald Kogler, Director General for Public Security, Ministry of the Interior, Austria

Dr. Florika Fink-Hooijer, DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO), European Commission

18 th – 19 th September 2013

Maritim Hotel Bonn

The European Congress on Civil Protection This specialized congress for disaster-management and civil protection as well as civil-military cooperation focuses on national and European topics. Since 2005 these topics are discussed at the two-days main programme as well as in the several panel sessions.

The Federal Ministry of the Interior, the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance, as well as the Federal Agency for Technical Relief have an advisory role in the programme design. Fire Brigades and Relief Organizations support this congress as well. This congress welcomes about 700 participants from more than 20 countries every year.

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» 1 st day: Education and Training in national and international Civil Protection