Marcus DuBois King, Washington, D.C. Violent extremism and the weaponization of water in a changing climate The footprint of water stress is expanding

Climate change is steadily expanding the footprint of water stress

Violent extremism and the weaponization of water in a changing climate

26 by Dr Marcus DuBois King, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.

In the Middle East and East Africa, increasing water stress is an underlying factor increasing existing security threats. To be sure, these areas have historically experienced chronically arid conditions. However, regional climate predictions anticipate even higher temperatures, more frequent droughts, and greater variability in precipitation in the coming decades. Indeed, these changes will be felt more broadly.

Growing water scarcity and water stress The United Nations estimates that by 2025, 1.8 billion people will be living in areas of absolute water scarcity, and two-thirds of the world’s population could be subject to water stress. These conditions, as discussed below, have enabled Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) to use water as a weapon in an increasing variety of destabilizing ways. A 2012 U.S. intelligence community assessment cautioned that as water becomes more scarce, states may begin employing water as a weapon—even in regions where cooperative solutions have previously prevailed. While examples to date of water’s usage as a weapon amongst nation states are scant; at the subnational level, non-state actors including VEOs are already using water across a spectrum of terrorist activities, insurgencies, and civil wars. According to the Oxford Dictionary, a weapon is “a means of gaining advantage or defending oneself in a conflict or contest.” Wielded by a group, a weapon can take the form of a medium, action, or offensive capability used to coerce, injure, or kill. Prominent extremist organizations utilizing this asymmetrical approach include: the so-called Islamic State (IS), Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and an additional Al-Qaeda branch in Syria, the Al-Nusrah Front.

Examples of water weaponization incidents Syria and Iraq IS has weaponized water in all of these respects in Syria and Iraq, a region afflicted by acute drought, in a comprehensive manner that is unprecedented in recent conflict. Our research finds that IS and Al-Nusrah were responsible for at least 24 water weaponization incidents between 2012 and 2015. IS has used the water weapon on a strategic level to achieve implied territorial control. An infamous example is IS’s seizure and brief control of the Mosul Dam on the Tigris River upstream from Baghdad in 2014. This action provided at least the potential capability of unleashing a powerful torrent of water, able to destroy the so-called Green Zone where allied forces were based. The U.S. initiated an airpower campaign, largely in response to this threat. IS also used water as a strategic asset in administrative and financial activities within controlled areas to support weapons procurement. In Raqqa, the de facto capital

of IS in Syria, the organization collected taxes in exchange for water access. Water has also been deployed as a tactical weapon in the conflict. On several occasions, IS used water in immediate support of operations against targets of military value. For example, in 2014, IS militants intentionally diverted water from nearby rivers in Iraq’s Diyala Province halting the advance of Iraqi security forces. Here it is clear: as access to water falls due to climate change, the power of those who wield it and its access, grows.

Dr Marcus DuBois King

is Associate Professor and Director of the

Master of Arts Program in International

Affairs at George Washington Universi

ty’s Elliott School. Previously, he directed

studies on climate change security and

Photo: www.elliott.gwu.edu/ marcus-king

the implications for military missions at CNA’s Center for Naval Analyses. He was

also Project Director for the CNA Military Advisory Board. He is a Senior Fellow and Advisory Board member

according to the United Nations’ Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. While there is little evidence that Boko Haram applied deliberate weaponization, the resulting water stress significantly weakened the resilience of rural individuals against attacks and provided much more fertile grounds for recruitment, as suggested above. Further south, in Nigeria’s Middle Belt – an increasingly arid transition zone between the lush Niger River Delta in the south and the arid northeast – an intense and protracted conflict pits militant semi-nomadic Muslim Fulani herdsmen against predominantly Christian farmers. The primary driver of the conflict is the contested access to shrinking grazing lands and the waters they harbor. When Fulani cattle consume or trample crops, retaliation by the herdsman may involve the killing of livestock or even the direct poisoning of an adversary’s water sources. According to several sources, these herder-pastoral conflicts in the Middle Belt have accounted for more deaths than attacks by Boko Haram since 2016. Climate change increases the risk of conflicts The weaponization of water grows in tandem with a litany of accelerating global impacts including higher temperatures, changes in precipitation, extreme weather events, the rise of the sea level (leading to saltwater intrusion into fresh water resources), and depletion of glaciers. As this happens, the potential conflict theatre where water can be weaponized grows. Normalization of water’s use as a weapon by VEOs and insurgents is a grave danger as they metastasize and expand to new regions outside of the Middle East and East Africa. Consequently, the community of nations combatting violent extremism should incorporate assessments of water stress and mitigation measures into their strategies in numerous fragile states where deteriorating ecological and social conditions are creating instability. Somalia Our research also suggests that social coercion, or efforts to gain legitimacy among subjugated populations, is an additional motivation for the use of the water weapon by VEOs. Events that unfolded in Somalia demonstrate this trend. Throughout the ongoing civil war, Somali government forces have made inroads against the Islamist insurgent group Al-Shabaab, eventually retaking most major cities in 2014. Utilizing a historic drought, Al-Shabaab shifted from traditional hit and run guerilla tactics and started to demonstrate power and presence by cutting off government liberated cities from their water sources. The direct targeting by Al-Shabaab of humanitarian agencies has contributed in part to their limited access and has led to the quarter of a million deaths and hundreds of thousands of displaced. The Somali Government’s inability to provide water and many other services has eroded its authority and legitimacy. Despite Al-Shabaab’s ultimately unsuccessful attempts to exploit this deficit by providing water access in exchange for loyalty, the deployment of the water weapon has created a food crisis and left enormous misery in its wake. In such a harsh environment, it is tenuous at best to suggest local populations will continue to remain so resilient to extremist support or recruitment. Nigeria Elsewhere in Africa, water stress compounds with internal displacement of populations, effectively enhancing the lethality of terrorist attacks. In the Nigerian northeastern Lake Chad region, drought conditions and fighting displaced 2.3 million people by 2017 at the Center for Climate and Security. “ The community of nations combatting violent extremism should incorporate assessments of water stress and mitigation measures into their strategies in numerous fragile states where deteriorating ecological and social conditions are creating instability.” Marcus D. King