Tama Potaka. National MP Maori Activist

A TREATY AGENDUM FOR LOCAL

GOVERNMENT

TamaPotaka*

There is a vast literature on the Treaty of Waitangi However, a large number of constitutionalissues such as who owes Treaty obligations andthe nature andextent of theseobligations are not clear.1  Instead,such issues are often obscured by the media  sensationalising  Treaty­settlement  processes,  Máori fisheries, and Pákeha  political assumptions about what Máori want.2  Amidst talk of fish, cash settlements and development,little Treaty jurisprudentialthinking addresses the complex legal,culturaland economic issues surrounding localgovernment andMáori Itis the purpose ofthis paper  to expand Treaty jurisprudential thinking in the area of local government, 3  and to  advocate a direction for localgovernment Treaty obligations.

I INTRODUCTION

Two centuries agoMáoriweretheundisputed managers andadministrators ofnatural resources in Aotearoa. Máoriself­governmentoccurred atiwi,hapú,whánau and individuallevels.4  Tíkanga Máorievolved fromtheresourcebaseitself,anddictated

*  TamaPotakaisofNgátiHauiti, Whanganui, NgátiWhitikaupeka, Ngáruahinerangi, NgátiRaukawa andNgátiToarangatiradescent.Thisisaneditedversionofthepaper hesubmittedtofulfiltheLegal Research and Writing component of the LLB(Hons) degree at the Victoria University of Wellington

1  TheTreatyisusedtorepresent Te Tiriti o Waitangi 1840 (Máori text) and the Treaty of Waitangi 1840 (English text).The First Schedule of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 contains the texts of the Treaty

2  See"Máori callfor republicdebate" Sunday Star Times, Auckland, 2August 1998, A2 Prime Minister Shipleycontendsthat Máoriaremoreinterestedinsettlinggrievancesthanrepublicanism andwider constitutionalissues Seealso"Let fisheriesassetsflow, HenareurgesMáoridom"The Dominion, Wellington, 5 August 1998, 1

3  Localgovernment isusedtorepresent alltypesofsub­nationalbodiesincludingterritorialauthorities andregionalauthoritiesandspecialprovider boards NodistinctionismadebetweenLocalAuthority TradingEnterprises, CommunityBoards, CommunityTrusts, regionalauthoritiesandterritorial authorities

4  SeeA Ballara Iwi: The Dynamics of Máori Tribal Organisation from c1769 to c1945 (Victoria UniversityPress, Wellington, 1998) for aPákeháanalysisofMáoriself­governance structures ["Iwi"].  SeeWaitangiTribunal Muriwhenua Fishing Report ­ Wai22 (Department ofJustice, Wellington,

governanceandmanagement Strategic planning was determined by theforeseeable  needs offuturegenerations andtheimmediateneeds ofresourceuse5 Representation  ofthecollectivesocialstructures demanded responsibility andwas subjectto regular  assessmentby thecollectives.

Today, Pákehá localgovernmentandcentralgovernmentdictatetheoperation of Máori self­government Clarity in therelationship between Pákehá localgovernment andMáori is particularly important considering that Máori developmentandcultural survivaloccurs primarily atthelocallevels.6 Centralgovernment's rolein guiding this  relationship is paramountgiven thepowers ithas in negotiating Treaty settlements,and dictating localgovernmentbehaviour through legislation.

This paperconsiders localgovernmentTreaty obligations and responsibilities.7 PartII outlines therecentreformoflocalgovernment PartIIIassesses whetheritis appropriate  to conceptualiselocalgovernmentas theCrown,andwhetherlocalgovernmenthas  Treaty obligations independentoftheCrown label PartIVcomments on recentlocal governmentinitiatives with Máori in areas ofplanning andrepresentation. PartV identifies theadvantages anddisadvantages oflocalgovernmenthaving Treaty  obligations. PartVIconcludes by suggesting possibleimprovements to thepresent constitutionalframework.

1988) 187["MuriwhenuaFishingReport"]. AccordingtotheWaitangiTribunal, self­government (tino rangatiratanga) wasconceptuallysimilar tothenotionoflocalgovernment.Itissubmittedthat this comparisonisbasedonanincorrect assertion, popularisedintheCourt ofAppealdecisionofNew  ZealandMáori CouncilvAttorney­General[1987] 1NZLR 641[Landscase] that Máoriintentionally cededsovereigntyunder theTreaty Contrast theManukau Report ­ Wai 8 (2ed, Government Printer,  Wellington, 1989) 67["ManukauReport"]. Prior totheLandscasetheWaitangiTribunalwasmore liberalindescribingself­government (tinorangatiratanga), comparingit tosovereignty Pakehalocal government iscontinuallysubject tocontrolbyamoreauthoritativebody (suchastheCrown/central government). Máori self­government at aniwilevelwasnot controlledbyamoreauthoritative temporalbody Thissuggeststhat theManukauReportanalysismoreappropriatelyillustratedMáori self­governancestructures Máoriself­government couldbeinthenatureofsovereignty, henceof  greater consequence than local government.

5  SeeP NuttallandJRitchieMáori ParticipationintheResourceManagement Act(Universityof  Waikato Occasional Paper No 37, Hamilton, 1995) 1

6  See"B Mahuta" inH MelbourneMáori Sovereignty: TheMáori Perspective(Hodder MoaBeckett,  Wellington, 1995) 143­152

7  Itisconsideredthat therearethreebasicTreaty­constitutionalrelationsthat needclarifying These arerelationsbetweentheCrownandMáori, relations between Máoriand Máori(for example between iwiandhapú, andiwiandiwi), andrelationsbetweennon­CrownbodiesandMáori Thispaper  focuses on Crown­Máorirelations, and non­Crown bodies­Máorirelations

Onemajor themeunderlies this essay. Treaty obligations followtheexerciseof powers ofKáwanatanga. Treaty obligations attach to thebody exercising powers of Káwanatanga,andarenot dependenton labels such as 'theCrown'8 TherecentCrown  devolution ofresponsibilities to localgovernmenthas meant that localgovernment exercises powers ofKáwanatanga. This demands Treaty responsiveness fromlocal government In simpleterms,when localgovernmentexercises powers ofKáwanatanga, ithas Treaty obligations.

Itis submitted that thecentralgovernmentmonitors localgovernmentby encouraging  a 'relational' approachbetween localgovernmentandMáori 9 This approachneeds to  focus on building betterrelations between localgovernmentandMáori,andrequires  centralgovernmentto formulatelegislation to enforcetheTreaty in alllocalgovernment operations. Further,localgovernmentconsultation with Máorioverenvironmentalissues  is only an interimmeasurein this relationship building. 10 Máoriareentitled,anddesire, to

8  Kotetuatahi(Article 1) of the Treaty (Máoritext) states: "Ko nga Rangatira o te wakaminenga me nga RangatirakatoahokiiurukitauawakaminengakatukurawaatukiteKuinioIngaraniaketonuatute Kawanatangakatoaooratouwenua". Thistranslatestomeanthat theMáori signatoriesceded KáwanatangatotheCrownTherearedifferent perspectivesontheproper meaningofKáwanatanga SeeIH Kawharu Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives on the Treaty of Waitangi (Oxford UniversityPress, Auckland, 1989). TheEnglishtext oftheTreatyuses'sovereignty'totranslate Káwanatanga Itiscontendedthat thisEnglishtermisaninadequaterepresentationofwhat  Káwanatangaentails Itissuggestedthat KáwanatangawasinitiallyintendedbyMáorisignatoriesto represent governanceover non­Máori(inrelationswithnon­Máori), andtofacilitaterelationsbetween non­MáoriandMáori However, it hasbeenassumedtomeangovernanceover Máori(inrelations withMáoriandnon­Máori) andnon­Máori (in relations with Máori and non­Máori).  For the purposes of  this essay Káwanatanga means any governance that affects Máori , that is not exercised by Máori

9  SeegenerallyP McHugh"AboriginalIdentityandRelations­ ModelsofStatePracticeandLawin NorthAmericaandAustralasia" (1997). McHughsuggeststhat thereshouldbeashift instate­  indigenousaffairsfromclaims­centredideologytoplacinggreater emphasisontherelationships between the parties

10 SeeMDurie"ManaMáoriMotuhake: TheStateoftheMáoriNation" inR Miller (ed)New Zealand PoliticsinTransition(OxfordUniversityPress, Auckland, 1997) 372­385, 383 Duriecommentsthat  evenat anationalleveladvisorypositionsareonlyinterimmeasurestoachieveMáori self­  determination (self­government/tino rangatiratanga).

sharepowerin localgovernance11 Guaranteed Máoriparticipation and representation in  localgovernmentaffairs,andmorelocalgovernmentsupportoflocalMáoriaffairs,are  advocated.

II REFORMOFLOCALGOVERNMENT

Localgovernmentin NewZealandis based on theEnglish modeloflocalgovernment Controloflocalgovernmentin Englandwas historically exercised by theCrown.12 By the  nineteenth century centralgovernmentpolicies expressed in legislation dictated its  operation. 13  Thesepolicies helped to createthefirstlocalgovernmentstructures in  Aotearoa.14 Theselocalgovernmentstructures in Aotearoa weretransformed in thelate  nineteenth century,andthelaterstructures remained in substantially thesameformuntil the1984­1990 reformperiod. 15  Prior to thereformlocalgovernmentin Aotearoa was  broadly divided into territorialauthorities andspecialpurposeauthorities.By 1988,there

11 Self­government andsharingpower inlocalgovernment accordmorewiththeTreatyguaranteesand rightsofindigenouspeoplesasassertedbyTheDraft DeclarationontheRightsofIndigenous Peoples ('the Draft Declaration').  The rights in the Draft Declaration include:

Article19: Indigenouspeopleshavetheright toparticipatefully, iftheysochoose, at alllevelsof  decision­makinginmatterswhichmayaffect their rights, livesanddestiniesthroughrepresentatives chosenbythemselvesinaccordancewiththeir ownprocedures, aswellastomaintainanddevelop their own indigenous decision­making institutions

Article20: Indigenouspeopleshavethe right to participate fully, if they so choose, through procedures determinedbythem, indevisinglegislativeor administrativemeasuresthat mayaffect them States shallobtainthefreeandinformedconsent ofthepeoplesconcernedbeforeadoptingand implementing such measures

SeeTePuniKokiri Mana Tangata: Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples:  backgroundanddiscussiononkeyissues(TePuniKókiri, Wellington, 1993) for moreinformationon theDraft Declaration SeealsoETJDurie"TheTreatyinMáori History" inWRenwick(ed) Sovereignty and Indigenous Rights (VictoriaUniversityPress, Wellington, 1990) 156, 158 ("SovereigntyandIndigenous Rights").  Durie comments that the Treaty was the harbinger of some of  the rights enunciated in the Draft Declaration

12 W Holdsworth A History of the English Law Vol 4 (3ed, Methuen, London, 1966) 164

13 WHoldsworthA Historyof theEnglishLaw Vol2(3ed, Methuen, London, 1966) 405 SeeHWR  WadeandCF Forsyth Administrative Law (7ed, ClarendonPress, NewYork, 1994) 110 ["Administrative Law"].

14 TheMunicipalCorporationsOrdinance1842(5Vict No6) establishedprovisionsfor boroughsin Aotearoa ItwasbasedontheMunicipalCorporationsAct 1835(UK). Other earlylegislation affectingthefirst PakehalocalgovernmentsinAotearoaincludedthePublicRoadsandWorks Ordinance 1845 (8 Vict No 6) and the Constitution Act 1846 (9 & 10 Vict c 103 UK).

15 Counties Act 1876, Municipal Corporations Act 1876 and the Town Districts Act 1881 (No 35).

wereover800such authorities in Aotearoa.Financewas obtained through rates levied  on realproperty,andfromcentralgovernmentassistance

Between 1984­1990 theFourth Labour governmentinitiated localgovernmentreform founded on increased autonomy andimproved accountability ofdecision­makers to the  public.16 This reformfollowed changes madeto localgovernmentin Britain.Devolution  ofresources andresponsibilities to territorialauthorities andregionalcouncils was driven  primarily by efficiency motives.17 Reformemphasised environmentalmanagementand corporatisation oftrading activities. Thelegislativeoutcomes fromthis reformwere  massive Thenumberoflocalgovernmentauthorities was reduced to fewerthan90.  TheLocalGovernmentAct1974 ('theLGA') was substantially amended between 1988­  1989 (especially giving increased financialindependencefor localgovernment),18 anda  new environmental management statutory framework based on the Resource  ManagementAct1991 ('theRMA') emerged.19 Functions formerly performed exclusively  by theCrown,andtheresponsibilities for thosefunctions, werethus transferred to local government

Máoriconsensus haddemanded a Treaty­driven systemoflocalgovernment throughouttheprocess ofreform20  Beforethereform,localgovernmenthadminimal legislativeor practicalTreaty responsiveness. However,asidefromenvironmental management,reformdid not improveTreaty outcomes ata locallevel TheLGAandits  1988­1989 amendments werenot used to bring theTreaty into localgovernmentdespite

16 (22March1988) 487NZPD 2883 SeealsoGBush"TheHistoricReorganisationofLocal Government" inJBostonandMHolland(ed)TheFourthLabour Government: Politics and Policies in New Zealand(2ed, OxfordUniversityPress, Auckland, 1990) 233 See also D Ponter "Accountability ofRegionalCouncils: ananalysisoftheaccountabilityofRegionalCouncils" (ResearchPaper for the Degree of Master of Public Policy, Victoria University of Wellington, 1995) 31

17 (28June1988) 489NZPD 4739 SeealsoJKelsey A Questionof Honour?Labour andtheTreaty 1984­1989 (Allen & Urwin, Wellington, 1990) 162­186 ["A Question of Honour"].

18 TheLocalGovernment Amendment Act (No3) 1988andtheLocalGovernment Amendment Act (No  2) 1989providedthe major reforming provisions Local government is involved in the administration of  several other statutes including the Reserves Act 1977 and the Biosecurity Act 1993

19 Thispaper doesnot includedetaileddiscussionoftheimpact ofthe Resource Management Act 1991 onlocalgovernment­Máori relationships SeeOfficeoftheParliamentaryCommissioner for the EnvironmentProposedGuidelinesfor LocalAuthorityConsultationwithTangataWhenua(Officeof  theParliamentaryCommissioner for theEnvironment,Wellington, 1992) for asimpleanalysisoflocal government'senvironmentalmanagement Treatyobligationsunder theResourceManagement Act  1991

20 "Report oftheHuionMáoriParticipation in Local Government" (1­3 March 1989).  SeeA Question of  Honour?aboven17, 186 SeealsoJHaywardInSearchof aTreatyPartner: who, or what is, the Crown? (PhD thesis, Victoria University of Wellington, 1995) 202 ["In Search of"].

attempts by someofficials to do so.21 Parliamenthadconferred substantialpowers of Káwanatanga on thenewlocalgovernmentstructurewith no obligation to comply with the  Treaty.22  Máorias tangata whenua,wereeffectively excluded fromthis structureand treated as anotherinterestgroup. This is ofmajor culturalandeconomic significance Localgovernmentpresently constitutes a major sector oftheeconomy with an annual operating incomeof$3 billion, infrastructureassets worth about$22billion anda  ratepayerequity of$275 billion. Itcontributes around 3.5% oftheGross Domestic  ProductofNewZealand23

III DOESLOCALGOVERNMENTHAVETREATYOBLIGATIONS?

A Introduction

Itis clear that theCrown is a Treaty partnerandhas Treaty obligations, but what the  Crown constitutes for Treaty purposes remains elusive24 TheCrown was identified in the  Treaty ofWaitangias 'HerMajesty theQueen ofEngland'. 25 However,NewZealand's  constitutionaldevelopmenttransferred authority for Káwanatanga fromtheEnglish  Monarch to thesettlergovernment26 Theevolutionary natureoftheCrown has meant  societalgroups havedefined itdifferently.27 This is especially problematic for groups that

21 MáoriLocalGovernment ReformConsultativeGroup(MCG) "MinutesoftheSecondMeetingofthe MCG" (StateInsuranceBuilding, Wellington, 9June1988) 4 TheMCGrecommendedthat the Treaty principles be incorporated in the local government reform legislation

22 SeeA Question of Honour? above n 17, 178 See alsoIn Search of above n 20, 202

23 LocalGovernment NewZealand Local Government Says (LocalGovernment NewZealand,  Wellington, 1996) 2 ["Local Government Says"].

24 SeeHalsbury'sLawsof England(4ed, Butterworths, London, 1996) vol8(2), "ConstitutionalLaw",  para353, 229 Theterm'Crown'isconsideredtohaveanumber ofmeanings CompareNew  ZealandLawCommissionCrownLiabilityandImmunity: A ResponsetoBaigent'scase andHarveyv Derrick(NewZealandLawCommissionReport No37, Wellington, 1997) 3["CrownLiability"]. The NewZealandLawCommissionstatesthat it issometimesdifficult toidentifytheCrownfor the purposesoftheNewZealandBillofRightsAct 1990 Itisarguablethat theTreatywasanact ofthe stateinallitsmanifestations Thisargument suggeststhat it doesnot matter what formthestate takes, Treaty obligations will attach to that form (local government for example).

25 SeethePreambleofboththeEnglishandMáori texts Bothtextsstart withreferencetoQueen Victoria EachTreatyarticle(inbothtexts) acknowledgesQueenVictoria ThePrivyCouncilhas expresslyaffirmedthat thoseobligationsarenowpossessedbytheCrowninright ofNewZealand SeeNew Zealand Máori Council v Attorney­General[1994] 1 NZLR 513, 517 (PC).

26 SeeP Joseph Constitutionaland Administrative Law in New Zealand (TheLawBookCompany,  Sydney, 1993) 82["ConstitutionalandAdministrativeLaw"]. Josephprovidesasuccinct discussion on the early Pakeha governmental system in New Zealand

27 SeeTown InvestmentsvDepartment of Environment[1978] AC 359, 393 SeealsoConstitutional and Administrative Law above n 26, 490

havetried to isolatetheCrown for Treaty purposes.28  Máori havebeen particularly  disadvantaged through exclusion, as a Treaty partner,fromtheprocess ofredefinition of Káwanatanga structures. This Partaddresses theappropriateness ofconceptualising  localgovernmentas theCrown or a Crown agent,andwhetheritreally matters for Treaty  discourse

B ISLOCALGOVERNMENTTHECROWN?

1 Redefinition

Conceptualising localgovernmentas theCrown,thereby acquiring Crown immunities  andTreaty obligations, involves redefinition ofTreaty relationships.Redefinition ofTreaty  relationships is not abhorrentto Treaty jurisprudence29  Máori self­government structures havechanged sincetheTreaty andso far havenot been subjectto serious  mainstreamconstitutionaldiscourse30 This is in contradistinction to theattention given  to thechanges in thedefinition oftheCrown andtheauthorities exercising Káwanatanga. WhiletheCrown is thesymbolic Treaty partner,thecentralgovernment(despiteinitial opposition from Máori ) has powers of Káwanatanga andtheCrown's Treaty  obligations. 31 Localgovernmenttheoretically could takeon a similar role

28 In Search of above n 20, 202

29 Itissubmittedthat themost graphicexampleofredefinitioninrecent timesistheuseof'Treaty principles'todepict Treatyrelationshipsrather thantheactualwordsofthedocuments Thishas emergedfromtheinclusionofthephrase 'Treaty principles' in statutes such as the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975andtheState­OwnedEnterprisesAct 1986, andsubsequent interpretationbytheWaitangi Tribunal and the Court of Appeal Lands case above n 3, 663 and 673

30 Máoridevelopment hastakenonagreater iwiandpan­Máoriimage Thiscontrastswiththehapu paradigminwhichMáori livedbeforetheTreatywassigned Iwiaboven2 SeealsoJBelich Making Peoples: a history of the New Zealanders fromPolynesiansettlement totheendof the nineteenthcentury(AllenLane/Penguin, Auckland, 1996). Perhapsthecentralgovernment should consider havingopendiscussionwithMáorionwhoeachpartyconsiderstheTreatypartners­parties are, especiallyconsideringtheMáorifisheriesdebateswhichhaveresultedinprolongedintra­Máori litigationover what constitutes an 'iwi' SeeTe Rúnanganui o Te Upoko o te Ika Association (Inc) and orsvTheTreatyof WaitangiFisheriesCommissionand ors (4 August 1998) unreported, High Court, Auckland, CP 122/95 for the most recent decision in this litigation

31 SeeC OrangeTheTreaty of Waitangi(Allen& Unwin, Wellington, 1987) 141 Orangeidentifies occasionsinthenineteenthcenturywhenMáoriappealeddirectlytoQueenVictoriaover government  activitiespurportingtohavetheauthorityoftheCrown InSearchofaboven20, 283 Hayward makesthepertinent comment that centralgovernment hastheabilityone moment to assert its powers astheCrown, andthenext moment todistanceitselffromTreatyresponsibilitiesasthegovernment. Itissubmittedthat despiteambiguitiesinself­definition, centralgovernment exercisespowersof  Káwanatanga and therefore has Treaty obligations

2 LocalGovernmentAct1974

Theauthority oflocalgovernmentis not sourced in any constitutionaldocument,but  is referableto ordinary statutes.32 Thenatureoflocalgovernmentis thereforedictated by  therelationship ithas with theCrown,as expressed in legislation. TheLGAdefines the  currentrelationship between theCrown andlocalgovernment Thestatutedistinguishes  localgovernmentfromtheCrown.33 Section 37KoftheLGAoutlines thepurposes of localgovernment:

Thepurposes oflocalgovernmentin NewZealandareto provide,attheappropriate  levels oflocalgovernment,

(a)  Recognition oftheexistenceofdifferentcommunities in NewZealand;

(b)  Recognition oftheidentities andvalues ofthosecommunities;

(c) Definition and enforcementofappropriaterights within thosecommunities;

(d)  Scopefor communities to makechoices between differentkinds oflocalpublic  facilities andservices;

(e) Fortheoperation oftrading undertakings oflocalauthorities on a competitively  neutralbasis;

(f) Forthedelivery ofappropriatefacilities andservices on behalfofcentral government;

(g)  Recognition ofcommunities ofinterest;

(h)  Fortheefficientandeffectiveexerciseofthefunctions, duties,andpowers ofthe  components oflocalgovernment;and

(i) Fortheeffectiveparticipation oflocalpersons in localgovernment Thereareseveralminor references to Maoriin theLGA34 However,theLGAdoes  not imposestatutory Treaty obligations. 35 Therecentdevolution ofresponsibilities and powers ofKáwanatanga is not mirrored by devolution ofTreaty obligations.

32 SeeHalsbury'sLawsof England(4ed, Butterworths, London, 1980) vol28, LocalGovernment,para 1001, 424 SeealsoKA Palmer LocalGovernment inNew Zealand(2ed, LawBookCompany,  Sydney, 1993) 23 ["Local Government"].

33 LocalGovernment Act 1974, s37K(f). Localgovernment mayact asacontractualagent for the Crown

34 Local Government Act 1974, s 119F(2).  Local Government Act 1974, s 37zo

35 Local Government above n 32, 29

TheabsenceofTreaty references in theLGAcontrasts with otherLabour reforms  between 1984­1990. 36  Environmentalmanagementreformin theRMArequires local governmenttohaveparticular regard toor totake into account sometíkanga Máoriwhen  operating pursuant to that legislation. 37  Corporatisation reformin theState­Owned  Enterprises Act1986 includes:"Nothing in this Actpermits theCrown toactin a manner  that is inconsistentwith theprinciples oftheTreaty ofWaitangi"38 Education reformalso  resulted in greaterTreaty responsiveness. TheEducation Act1989 requires schools, when proposing a charter,to consider theviews ofMáori39  University Councils are  required toacknowledgetheTreaty principles in exercising theirstatutory duties.40 These  reforms indicatethat theLabour governmentattempted to creategreaterTreaty  responsiveness within thestate However,this responsiveness is not reflected in the  localgovernmentlegislation.

3 Statute

No statuteidentifies localgovernmentas theCrown or partoftheCrown. The  Constitution Act1986 offers no definition oftheCrown.TheCrown Proceedings Act 1950  ('theCPA') defines theCrown as 'HerMajesty in right ofHerGovernmentin New Zealand'. ThePublic FinanceAct1989 ('thePFA') definition oftheCrown is more  expansivethantheCPAdefinition, but thePFAdefinition does not includelocal governmenteither41 ThePFAgives a separatedefinition for 'localauthority', suggesting  that localgovernmentis not theCrown.

36 In this paragraph emphasis is added to words used in provisions requiring Treaty responsiveness

37 TheResourceManagement Act 1991requireslocalgovernment torecogniseandprovidefor the ancestralrelationshipofMáoriandour culturewithnaturalresourcesandother taonga(s6(e)), to haveparticular regardtokaitiakitanga(s7(a)), andtotakeintoaccounttheTreatyprinciples(s8)  [emphasisadded]. Therearemanyuncertaintiessurroundingtheoperationoftheseprovisions,  especiallyinregardstohowandwhenconsultationwithMáorishouldoccur. Itiscontendedthat  these provisions redefine Treaty relationships between local government and Máori

38 State­OwnedEnterprisesAct 1986, s9 Thissectionwasthemajor issueofinterpretationinthe Lands case above n 3

39 Education Act 1989, s 62

40 Education Act 1989, s 181(b).

41 Section 2 of the Public Finance Act 1989 defines the Crown as:

(a) Her Majesty the Queen in right of New Zealand;

(b) Including all Ministers of the Crown and all Departments;

(c) Does not include:

An office of Parliament;

TheTreaty ofWaitangiAct1975 ('theTOWA') suggests that localgovernmentcould  betheCrown.42  This suggestion arises fromanalysis ofthedefinition ofprivateland Section 2 oftheTOWAdefines privatelandas:

Privatelandmeans any land,or interestin landheld by a person otherthan(a) TheCrown;or

(b) ACrown entity within themeaning ofthePublic FinanceAct1989.

Itis arguableon grounds ofstatutory interpretation that for thepurposes oftheTOWA localgovernmentcould beconceptualised as theCrown. Thelack ofreferenceto the  PFAin section 2 (a) oftheTOWAsuggests that thedefinition oftheCrown for the  purposes oftheTOWAis not limited to thePFAdefinition oftheCrown (unlikeCrown  entity),hencecould includelocalgovernment.However,two extrinsic aids counterthis  argument Parliamentary debates which led to theinclusion ofthis definition specifically  referto localgovernmentlandas constituting privateland,hencebeing excluded from  recommendation by theWaitangiTribunal43 This contrasts with Crown lands which are  open to recommendation. Second,andmoreimportantly,theWaitangiTribunalhas  stated that theCrown for thepurposes oftheTOWAhas thesamemeaning as theCrown  for thepurposes oftheCrown Proceedings Act1950.44 Themeaning oftheCrown is not  extended to includebodies which haveCrown­delegated responsibilities.

Itis helpfulto considerstatutes that focus on therelations between theexerciseof executivepowerandcitizens. This may pointto localgovernmentbeing perceived as  partoftheCrown,or atleastexercising powers ofKáwanatanga. Aotearoa has a  statutory framework designed to encourageprinciples ofopen government The  Ombudsmen Act1975,theOfficialInformation Act1982,theLocalGovernmentOfficial

ACrown entity; or

AState Enterprise in Schedule I of the State­Owned Enterprise Act 1986

42 TheTreatyofWaitangiAct 1975establishedtheWaitangi Tribunal Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s 6 empowerstheWaitangiTribunaltoinvestigateclaimsmadebyMáorithat Treaty principles have been breached

43 (23 June 1993) 536 NZPD 16167 Section 6(4)A of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 states:

Subject to sections 8A­8I the Tribunal shall not recommend under subsection (3) of section 6:

(a) The return to Maoriownership of any private land; or

(b) The acquisition by the Crown of any private land

44 ManukauReportaboven3, 73 Seealso Orákei Report ­ Wai 9 (Department of Justice, Wellington,  1987) 136

Information andMeetings Act1987 andthePrivacy Act1993 indicatetheemphasis now placed on theaccountability ofexecutivepower Thesestatutes do not treatlocal governmentas partoftheCrown. However,theOmbudsmen Act1975,theLocal GovernmentOfficialInformation andMeetings Act1987 andthePrivacy Act1993 do  apply to localgovernment,45 andthesestatutes treatlocalgovernmentsimilarily to  centralgovernmentandtheCrown. This suggests that localgovernmentexercises  powers ofKáwanatanga.

4 Caselaw

a TreatmentofLocalGovernmentastheCrown

Judicialtreatmentoftheidea oflocalgovernmentbeing conceptualised as theCrown  for Treaty purposes is sparse In Hanton v Auckland City Council46 ('Hanton') the  Planning Tribunal(nowknown as theEnvironmentCourt)addressed theissueofwhether theAucklandCity Counciloperating as a consentauthority pursuant to theRMA, possessed theTreaty obligations oftheCrown.TheTribunalstated:47

But wheretheconsent authorityisnot aMinister oftheCrown, but isalocalauthorityor some other person, wedonot findauthorityins8(RMA) for thepropositionthat byexercisingfunctions andpowersunder theAct it is subject to the obligations of the Crown under the Treaty Rather the consent authority is to take those principles into account in reaching its decision

Section 8 oftheRMAstates:"In achieving thepurposeofthis Act,allpersons  exercising functions andpowers under [theAct] shalltakeinto accounttheprinciples of theTreaty ofWaitangi(TeTiritio Waitangi)" Hantonstates that localgovernmentis not  theCrown for Treaty purposes,although theRMArequires localgovernmentto takeinto  accounttheTreaty principles.On this basis itis difficultto contend that localgovernment is theCrown for Treaty purposes in theabsenceofstatutory provisions explicitly stating  that.Thejudicialviewexpressed inHantonhas been criticised froma constitutionallaw perspective:48

TheKáwanatangacededintheMáoriversionofarticle1oftheTreaty.isexercisednot onlyby theCrownanditsMinistersandofficersbut byallauthorities, officersandother persons

45 OmbudsmenAct 1975, s13 PrivacyAct 1993, s2 TheLocalGovernment Official Information And MeetingsAct 1987providesastatutoryframework(separatefromtheOfficalInformationAct 1982)  for official information held by local government.

46 HantonvAucklandCityCouncil [1994] NZRMA 289(Hanton). But seeGreensill v Waikato Regional Council(6 March 1995) unreported, Planning Tribunal, Treadwell J, WO 17/95

47 Hanton above n 46, 301

48 F Brookfield "Constitutional Issues" [1994] NZ Recent Law Review 376, 379 ["Constitutional Issues"].

exercisingstatutorypowersor functionsthat dependultimatelyonwhat wascededor takenin 1840 IfthepowersofKáwanatangaarequalifiedbyobligations, eveniffaintlythroughthe concept ofTreaty"principles" tobe"takenintoaccount" thereis.nobasisfor thedistinction suggested.between Ministers of the Crown and other consent authorities (local government).

Brookfield considers that treatmentoftheTreaty in Hanton is wrong Brookfield's  approachconcentrates on theexerciseofpowers ofKáwanatanga as having obligations.  Localgovernmentis considered to beexercising powers ofKáwanatanga that havebeen  qualified by statutory Treaty obligations. Thelabel,"localgovernment",that is now attached to thebody which exercises thosepowers is unimportant.This suggests that  anything oncein thepurviewoftheCrown as a resultofwhat was ceded in 1840,is  qualified by Treaty obligations ifthereis a statutory basis for that qualification.

b TreatmentoftheTreaty

Although thejudiciary has been unwilling to conceptualiselocalgovernmentas the  Crown for Treaty purposes,judicialtreatmentoftheTreaty suggests localgovernment may need to actpursuant to theTreaty or to its principles.Judicialtreatmentofthelegal status oftheTreaty is unclear.49 ThePrivy CouncilcaseofHoaniTeHeuheu Tukino v  Aotea DistrictMáoriLand Board50 ('TeHeuheu') enunciated theorthodoxlegalposition  regarding useoftheTreaty as a means to seek redress.ThePrivy Councilstated that  theTreaty is partofNewZealandlawonly to theextentthat itis expressly recognised by  statute51

However,recentcases havesuggested that theTeHeuheu ruleis outdated. The  Treaty can beused as an extrinsic aid when interpreting legislation. 52 In theabsenceof clear statutory provisions to thecontrary,theCrown/centralgovernmentwillhave ascribed to ita fiduciary duty to givedueweight to Treaty principles when decision­  making. 53  Therefore,theTreaty willhaverelevancein theinterpretation ofstatutes

49 This reflects the unclear constitutional position of the Treaty

50 Hoani Te Heuheu Túkino v Aotea District Máori Land Board [1941] AC 308

51 Landscaseaboven3, 655and691;New Zealand Máori Council v Attorney­General[1994] 1 NZLR  513, 515(PC);New ZealandMáori CouncilvAttorney­General [1996] 3NZLR 140, 168 (CA).  New  Zealand courts maintain formal acceptance of theTe Heuheu rule

52 Consider Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority [1987] 2NZLR 188 Justice ChilwellconsideredtheTreatypart ofthefabricofNewZealandsociety Máoriconcernswerea relevant considerationininterpretingtheWater andSoilConservationAct 1967, eventhoughthat  legislation made no reference to the Treaty

53 New ZealandMáoriCouncilvAttorney­General [1991] 2NZLR 129, 135;TeRúnanga o Wharekauri RékohuIncvAttorney­General[1993] 2NZLR 301, 305;NgaiTahuMaoriTrust BoardvDirector­  General of Conservation [1995] 3 NZLR 553, 561

whetheror not thereis a referenceto theTreaty in thestatute54  Thesejudicial statements haverecently been strengthened by theHigh Courtstating that theTreaty  impacts on theinterpretation oflaweven ifitis not incorporated in statute;thevery  antithesis oftheTeHeuheurule55

This affects localgovernmentdecision­making. TheLGAandotherstatutes which  empowerlocalgovernmentcan beinterpreted in light ofTreaty principles.Máorimay  basean action in public lawagainsttheauthority ifa localgovernmentauthority breaches  Treaty principles whileacting pursuantto thosestatutes.56

5 SelectCommittees

Two Parliamentary selectcommittees haveinvestigated localgovernment57 These  committees wereconvened beforethereformperiod andcan only betaken as giving a  historic viewoflocalgovernment Both selectcommittees treated localgovernmentas  partofa unitary governing structure'forwhich Parliamentaloneis responsible'. 58 Whilst not asserting that localgovernmentis theCrown (for Treaty purposes or otherwise), thesecomments suggestthat theselectcommittees considered localgovernment,atthe  very least,to beexercising powers ofKáwanatanga.Neitherreportmentions Máorior  theTreaty.

6 Agency

Whetherlocalgovernmentis a Crown agent(as opposed to theCrown) is unclear.59  TheHigh Courthas adopted a 'control' testin determining Crown agency.60 Iftheentity

54 BartonvDirector­Generalof SocalWelfare[1997] 3NZLR 179 Thecourt refusedtofollowR vR (1990) 6FRNZ 232whichsuggestedacceptanceoftheTeHeuheurule SeealsoTeWeehiv Regional Fisheries Officer [1986] 1 NZLR 680, 692

55 Academicdebateonthe TeHeuheurulehasoccurred Some commentators assert that the orthodox legalpositionhasbeenmaintainedbyrecent litigation­ SeeA Mikaere"Máori Issues" [1994] NZ  Recent LawReview265, 279 Othersmaintainthat thelitigationchallengestheorthodoxy "ConstitutionalIssues" aboven48, 377 SeealsoD Kalderimis"RevolutionbyStealth: TheImplied ReversaloftheRuleinTeHeuheuTúkino" (UnpublishedLLB (Hons) paper, VictoriaUniversityof  Wellington, 2 October 1997).

56 Thispotentiallygivesrisetopubliclawdamagesunder theTreatyofWaitangicomparabletopublic lawdamagesunder theNewZealandBillofRightsAct 1990basedonSimpsonvAttorney­General [1994] 3 NZLR 667 [Baigent's case].

57 Report ofLocalGovernment Committee[1945],I15["Select Committee1945"]. Report ofLocalBills CommitteeInqury into the Structure of Local Government [1960], I18 ["Select Committee 1960"].

58 Select Committee 1945 above n 57, 1 Select Committee 1960 above n 57, 7

59 SeeD Crengle TakingIntoAccount thePrinciples of the Treaty of Waitangi: Ideas for Implementation of Section8of theResourceManagement Act 1991(Ministryfor the Environment, Wellington, 1993)

is substantively controlled by centralgovernmentthen itconstitutes a Crown agent61  Central government has little control over the functions management of local government62 This suggests that localgovernments arenot Crown agents andtherefore  haveno Treaty responsibilities,unless specified in statute

Somecommentators suggestthat a 'functional' testis moreappropriate63 Ifthebody  is exercising what is traditionally perceived as partofthegeneralexecutiveauthority of government,then itis a Crown agent.64 This reinforces thethemeofthis paperthat the  natureofthebody exercising powers ofKáwanatanga is irrelevant.Itis thefactthat the  body is exercising Káwanatanga that is important. IfKáwanatanga is involved,then  Treaty obligations areimposed.65  Localgovernmentauthorities in Aotearoa perform

10 SeeLocalGovernment NewZealandLiaisonandConsultationwithTangataWhenua: A survey of local government practice December 1997 (Local Government, New Zealand, Wellington, 1997) 16 ["TangataWhenuaConsultation"]. LocalGovernment NewZealandconsidersthat localgovernment  is sometimes a licensee, rather than an agent for the Crown

60 Miller vNewZealandRailwayCorporation(18 February1993) unreported,High Court, Wellington, AP 61/92 ThisfollowsthetestsadoptedintheEnglishjurisdictionfor Crownagency See TamlinvHannaford [1950] 1KB 18 SeealsoBritishBroadcastingCorporationvJohns[1965] Ch 32 TheEnglish casessuggest that thecourtsareinterestedinaskingwhether theentityactsonitsownbehalf, and whether it isabodyexercisingfunctionsofthegovernment insuchamanner that it isentitledto Crownimmunities There is a strong inference that if the entity has commercial functions then it is not  part oftheCrown, evenwhenthefunctionisapublicdutyor service SeeWaitákereCityCouncilv HousingCorporationof New Zealand [1992] 3NZLR 591for NewZealandauthorityonthisissue SeeKinross v GIO Australia Holdings Ltd [1995] 129 ALR 283 for Australian authority

61 SeeP HoggLiabilityof theCrown(2ed, Carswell, Toronto, 1989) 250 Seealso Halsbury'sLawsof  England (4ed, Butterworths, London, 1974) vol 9, "Corporations", paras 1203/1210, 717/721

62 LocalGovernment Saysaboven23, 1 CompareAudit OfficeReport onStatementsof Corporate Intent(Audit Office, Wellington, 1990) 8 TheAudit Officereviewstheaccountabilitystructuresof  State­OwnedEnterprisesandstatesthat thesestructuresaresimilar tolocalgovernment authorities and public companies

63 SeeHalsbury'sLawsof England(4ed, Butterworths, London, 1974) vol9, "Corporations", para1210,  721 Whenfunctionsofanentityareconnectedwithmatterswhichareessentiallytheprovinceof  government then an inference is more readily drawn that the entity acts on behalf of the Crown See A  E CurrieCrownandSubject:atreatiseontherightsandlegalrelationshipof thepeopleof New  Zealandasset out intheCrownProceedingsAct 1950(NewZealandLegalPublisher, Wellington,  1953) 41 Personalcomment byChrisKoroheke(CulturalLiaisonOfficer) at theAucklandRegional Council, Auckland, 2 August 1998

64 ConstitutionalandAdministrativeLawaboven26, 504 Josephstatesthat theCrowncouldinclude any public body administering a service within the province of government.

65 ThisisanalogoustotheprinciplesunderlyingtheOmbudsmanAct 1975andofficalinformation legislation If executive power is being exercised then the principles of open government encapsulated in legislation are more likely to apply

tasks recently devolved fromcentralgovernmentcontrol66  In performing thosetasks  they could readily beconsidered Crown agents underthefunctionaltest Hence  environmentalmanagementactivities (pursuant to theRMA)requirefulfilmentofTreaty  obligations, as do activities such as theprovision ofelectricity.

7 Conclusion

Theauthorities suggestthat itis inappropriateto conceptualiselocalgovernmentas  theCrown for Treaty purposes. Thestatutory schemedoes not supporta definition of localgovernmentas theCrown. TheavailablecaselawandParliamentary select committeereports suggestthat localgovernmentis not theCrown,but does exercise  powers ofKáwanatanga. However,referenceto theseauthorities does not mean that  localgovernmenthas no Treaty obligations.

C WhereDoesLocalGovernmentFitUndertheTreaty?

1 Commentary

Mostmainstreamformulations ofTreaty relationships invokenotions ofpartnership  between Máoriand'theCrown'67 This notion has informed thepaper's discussion ofthe  appropriateness ofconceptualising localgovernmentas theCrown or as a Crown agent Itis submitted that theTreaty is essentially a redistribution ofpower Máoriredistributed  exerciseofpowers ofKáwanatanga to theCrown whilstpreserving rangatiratanga.68 It was theexerciseofpowers ofKáwanatanga that carried Treaty responsibilities,not the  Crown label

Itis submitted that theTreaty is not aboutlabels,but is primarily aboutroles and obligations. Concentration on labels has restricted Treaty jurisprudentialthinking. The  functions ofKáwanatanga were,andare,important. Ifany Pákehá body which is  exercising Káwanatanga affects Máori,then Treaty obligations operate Itshould not  matterwhetherthebody is centralgovernment,localgovernmentor a privatebody. Extension ofTreaty relationships beyondtheCrown­Máorirelationship creates greater accountability atlocallevels for actions impinging on Treaty rights.

Localgovernmentdoes not need to beartificially conceptualised as theCrown in  orderto possess Treaty responsibilities. Localgovernmentis exercising powers that

66 Localgovernment couldbeconsideredaCrowndelegate SeeHalsbury'sLawsof England(4ed,  Butterworths, London, 1996) Vol8(2), "ConstitutionalLaw", para365, 242 Thisseminaltext states that adelegateismachinerythroughwhichfunctionsofthe principal are performed It may be argued that local government performs functions of an executive nature ordinarily performed by the Crown

67 Lands case above n 3, 667 Muriwhenua Fishing Report above n 3, 192

68 See J Williams "Not Ceded but Redistributed" in Sovereignty and Indigenous Rights above n 11, 193

havebeen assumed by theCrown,rightly or wrongly,on a Treaty basis.Theseinclude defining Máorienvironmentalmanagementstructures andcontrolling transportsystems  (such as theroads andrivers) Iflocalgovernmentdid not exercisethesepowers,then  centralgovernmentwould exercisethem,or atleastcontroltheirperformance

Itis contended that localgovernmentexercises powers ofKáwanatanga that regulate  andaffectMáori Ithas theability to taxits citizenry.69 Ithas lawmaking powers.70 It can compulsorily acquireproperty pursuant to thePublic Works Act1981.71  Private  bodies areunableto exercisethesepowers. Furthermore,section 37K(f)oftheLGA states that onelocalgovernmentpurposeis thedelivery ofappropriate facilities and services on behalfofcentralgovernment This supports thecontention that local governmenthas powers ofKáwanatanga.

Itis arguablethat localgovernmentexercises powers ofKáwanatanga but only the  Crown has Treaty obligations. This argumentassumes that devolution ofpowerdoes not  carry with itdevolution ofobligations. Hence,theCrown retains allTreaty obligations  unless thereis specific devolution ofthoseobligations. 72 Thelogicalconclusion ofthis is  that iftheCrown devolves allpowers ofKáwanatanga withoutsimultaneous devolution of Treaty obligations, itstillretains thoseobligations, even though itmay not beexercising  powers ofKáwanatanga anymoreandhas basically no existence This is a strange  conclusion that is not acceptable In theeventthat theCrown disappears altogether,for  exampleifAotearoa becamea republic,then Treaty obligations mustfallsomewhere This papercontends that thoseobligations fallupon theentities which areexercising  powers ofKáwanatanga,whetheror not therearestatutory guidelines for such  responsibility.

69 RatingPowersAct 1988 SeealsoTBennionMáori andRatingLaw(RangahauaWhánuiNational ThemeI,WaitangiTribunal, Wellington, 1997) 1 Bennionmakesthepertinent comment that rating issuesarestillaconcerntoMáorieventhoughlocalgovernment bodies can no longer threaten Máori landownerswithsaleofMáorilandasafinalresort.TheRatingsPowersAct 1988preventsthe power ofsaleofMáorilandon the basis of rates arrears It was considered that the local government  power ofsaleofMáorilandcontravenedtheTreatyprincipleofactiveprotection Personalcomment  by Kenneth Palmer (Lecturer) at Auckland University Law School, Auckland, 17 August 1998

70 LocalGovernment Act 1974, ss680­684 Operativeplanningschemesor resourcemanagement  planshavetheforceofaregulation Localgovernment canenact bylawspursuant tostatutory authority Local Government above n 32, 423

71 PublicWorksAct 1981, s16 ThePublicWorksAct 1981containsnospecificrequirementstotake Treatyconsiderationsintoaccount whenMáorilandisbeingconsideredfor publicworkspurposes SeeC MarrPublicWorksTakingsof Máori Land1840­1981(RangahauaWhánuiNationalTheme G, Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington, 1997) 13

72 SeeJMartin"DevolutionandDecentralisation" inJBoston(ed)ReshapingtheState: New Zealand's Bureaucratic Revolution (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1991) 268

2 WaitangiTribunal

TheWaitangiTribunalhas addressed issues surrounding theCrown devolution of responsibilities to otherbodies.73 Ithas consistently maintained that theCrown cannot avoid Treaty obligations by conferring an inconsistentjurisdiction on others.74  This  perspective considers that the Crown retains Treaty obligations if executive  responsibilities aretransferred to localgovernment Such an arrangementmeans that  theCrown is a necessary backstop for Máoriiflocalgovernmentauthorities do not abide  by Treaty principles.75

TheWaitangiTribunalhas thereforeinterpreted its mandateto includelocal governmentactivities on thebasis that theCrown is responsiblefor localgovernment acts or omissions by virtueoftheCrown prescribed delegation ofpowers.76 Thenature  ofthelegislativebackdrop means that any localgovernmentactor omission reliant on  statuteor regulation can bemadethesubjectofa WaitangiTribunalclaim77  This  situation is problematic for severalreasons. First,thebacklog ofWaitangiTribunal claims andtherateatwhich claims arebeing processed suggests that any presentlocal governmentbreach ofTreaty principles would not attractquick investigation and recommendations. 78 Second,itwill(underthepresentframework)lead to inefficiencies  with Máoricontinually returning to theCrown overfailureto ensureTreaty principles are  upheld by localgovernmenteven though reformhas lessened Crown controloverlocal government Third,ithinders thedevelopmentofTreaty relations when parties otherthan theCrown (centralgovernment)andMáoriareinvolved.

Presently theTOWAprevents theWaitangiTribunalfromrecommending thereturn of localgovernmentland79  SomeMáoriclaimthat this provision enables theCrown to

73 Orákei Report above n 44, 136

74 Manukau Report aboven3, 73 SeeWaitangiTribunal Motunui­Waitara Report ­ Wai6 (2ed,  Government Printer, Wellington, 1985) 55

75 SeeIn Search of above n 20, 197

76 SeeLocal Government above n 32, 97

77 Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s 6

78 TheWaitangiTribunalhasbeenreportingonclaimsat arateofapproximately3per year. Thereare over 300claimsawaitingresearchandreporting However, becauseofthe'casebook'methodby whichanumber ofrelatedclaimsareanalysedtogether, it isestimatedthat thepresent claimscould beresearchedandreportedonwithinthenext decade PersonalComment by Ian Shearer (Manager)  at theWaitangiTribunal, 4August 1998 SeealsoLTheron"HealingthePast:A Comparative AnalysisoftheWaitangiTribunalandtheSouthAfricanLandClaimsSystem" (1998) 28VUWLR  311, 317

79 See above n 43

distanceitselffurtherfromits ability to performits Treaty obligations by removing vast tracts ofphysicalresources frompotentialrecommendation. TheWaitangiTribunalcould  recommend compensation for resources nowcontrolled by localgovernment80

IV INITIATIVES ­ WHAT HAS LOCAL GOVERNMENT DONE TO UPHOLD THETREATY?

A Introduction

Localgovernmenthas been instrumentalin thedispossession ofMáoriresources and thesubordination ofMáoriself­government This culturalarrogancehas provoked  inherentMáorisuspicion oflocalgovernment,has contributed to diminished regional growth,andhas created limited opportunities for harmonious relations between Máori andlocalgovernment This Partconsiders recentlocalgovernmentresponsiveness to  Treaty issues in relation to planning and representation.

B Planning

Máoriability to beactiveparticipants in localgovernmentplanning beyondresource  management has been minimal Participation is often reduced to Pákehá  mainstreaming in theformofvoting atlocalgovernmentelections andas employees. Minimalparticipation by Máorias Máorihas lessened localgovernmentTreaty  responsiveness andensured Máoriarenot accorded a differentposition fromother interestgroups in planning processes andtheoutcomes ofsuch processes.Thereis no  nationalstrategy for ensuring Máori participation in localgovernmentactivities apart fromenvironmentalmanagement.

Fewlocalgovernmentauthorities haveeven skeletalreferences to Máorias tangata  whenuain such planning. 81 This may flowfromthelack ofclarity in theconstitutional relationship between Máoriandlocalgovernment Wherethereis a largepercentageof Máoriin theregion, therelations between Máoriandlocalgovernmentaredeveloping as  a matterofneed.82  However,such arrangements arenot noticeablein thelarger metropolitan areas whereMáoripopulation ratios aremuch smaller,andcorporation  activities far greater Wellington City Councilfor examplehas two Memoranda of

80 Lands caseaboven3, 693 TheTreatyprincipleof'redress'suggeststhat iftheCrownfailsto protect rangatiratangait isobligedtomakeredress This could be through monetary compensation or  the return of resources

81 Tangata Whenua Consultation above n59, 22­38

82 For example, theOpotikiDistrict Council has acknowledged Treaty principles in a draft "Memorandum ofUnderstanding", outliningbasicprinciplesfor aworkingrelationshipbetweentheCouncilandiwi TheWairoaDistrict CouncilhasaMáoriPolicyDocument settingout anintent toensurefullMáori participation in decisions that concern Máoriand the Council

Understanding with localiwi,but has no referenceto guaranteed Máoriparticipation in  theCouncil's massivecorporateactivities.83

C Representation

Historically Máorihavenot obtained guaranteed Máorirepresentation in local government84 Theeffectiveness oftheMáorivotehas been weakened by thelowMáori voterturnout in localelections. 85 Thesefactors andthelack ofMáoricandidates,have produced relativeinvisibility ofMáorion localgovernmentauthorities. Máoriare  inevitably forced into lobbying individualPákehá councillors for theirsupport86 This has  complicated relations between localgovernmentandMáoriby forcing Máoriinto lobbying  as an interestgroup withoutdistinctrights as tangata whenua,andthereforeincreased  thecosts ofMáoriparticipation in localgovernmentdecision­making.

Somelocalgovernments haveadopted consultativestrategies in a bid to improve  Treaty responsiveness, forgetting that Máori demandrepresentation as well as  consultation. 87  This approach often concentrates on local government in its  environmentalmanagementcapacities ratherthanin its administrativeandcorporate  capacities.This excludes Máori fromeffectiveMáori representation in alllocal governmentaffairs.

TheLocalGovernmentAmendment(No 8) Billwas mooted near theend oftheperiod  oftheLabour Governmentreformoflocalgovernment Itrequired localgovernment authorities to establish MáoriAdvisory Committees as sub­committees oftheauthority. TheBillwas not passed. Somelocalgovernmentauthorities haveestablished bodies  similar to theMáori Advisory Committees suggested by theBill88  However,these  committees haveoften been consultativeratherthandecision­making bodies. The

83 Privatisationoflocalgovernment corporateactivitiesmakesit evenmoredifficult for Máorieffectively to participate in local governance and the local economy

84 Thereare39MáoriCouncillorsout of1123councillorsnationwide: LocalGovernment NewZealand Poll1995(LocalGovernment NewZealandDatabase). Thismaychangewiththe October 1998 local government elections

85 PersonalComment byDonRiezebos(ChiefExecutiveOfficer) at the Local Government Commission,  Wellington, 15 September 1997

86 Personalcomment byAnakeGoodall(NgaiTahu) at NgaiTahuGroupManagement Ltd,  Christchurch, 18 September 1997

87 Uruamov Carter Holt Harvey (24May1996) unreported, PlanningTribunal, A 43/96 Thiscase illustrates the differences between representation and consultation

88 SeetheNapier CityCouncil, SouthWairarapaDistrict CouncilandRangitikeiDistrict Councilfor  example

WaitangiTribunalwarned that token representation effectively provides a Máorirubberstamping mechanismandis not a completesolution to Máorirepresentation. 89

Amoreappropriatestrategy is currently being advocated for EnvironmentBay of Plenty.TheMáoriconstituency comprises 29 percentofthepopulation. However,there  areno Máorirepresentatives on the11 memberBay ofPlenty Council FormerJudge, PeterTrapski,(acting as an IndependentCommissioner)has recently recommended that  a Máori constituency beestablished.90  Underthis modelMáorias tangata whenua would haveguaranteed representation on theCouncil,ensuring Máoriparticipation in all Councildecision­making. Trapskirecommends that 3 out of12 seats befor Máori representatives. However,for implementation theproposal requires legislativechange, andmembers ofParliamenthavealready strongly opposed such changes.91

V POLICY ­ ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTHAVINGTREATYOBLIGATIONS

A Introduction

This Partoutlines thebasic advantages anddisadvantages oflocalgovernment having Treaty obligations. This encourages an informed discussion andconclusion on  therecommendations which followthis Part

B Advantages

Expanding Treaty relations to includenon­Crown bodies such as localgovernment counters thereduction in theactivitiesoftheCrown through privatisation anddevolution.  Ensuring localgovernmenthas Treaty obligations acknowledges therealities ofchangein  theexerciseofpowers ofKáwanatanga,andtheredefinition oftheCrown.This nullifies  theeffectoftheCrown disappearing and rendering its Treaty obligations unfulfilled.

Criticismoftheconceptualisation as derogating fromtheTreaty Crown­Máori relationship can (in theory atleast)becountered with thesuggestion that theCrown

89 Manukau Report above n 3, 80

90 JudgeP Trapski"TheProposaltoEstablishaMáoriConstitutency" (Rotorua, 1998) 1["Environment  BOP"]. Contrast WWiniata"TheTreatyofWaitangi: Máori Political Representation" (MáoriPolitical RepresentationConference, Wellington, 1­2May1997) Appendix2 Winiataproposeslocalbody governancebasedonthreecouncils­ aTikangaPakehaCouncil, aTikangaMáoriCouncil, anda Joint Council TheJoint Councilwouldhaveresponsibilitytopassproposalsagreedtobytheother  twoCouncils ThisformofMáorirepresentation is independent from tikanga Pakeha, unlike Trapski's proposal which envisages guaranteed Máorirepresentation in a tikanga Pakeha setting

91 "MPs attackMáoriseatsproposal"RotoruaDailyPost, Rotorua, 9July1998, 1 Section3ofthe LocalGovernment Amendment Act (No2) 1986providedfor similar guaranteedMáori representation on the Auckland Regional Authority However, this provision was repealed in 1992

retains primary responsibility for actively protecting Máoriinterests.This is comparable  to theNewZealandLawCommission recommendations on theliability oftheCrown for  breaches oftheNewZealandBillofRights Act1990 ('theNZBORA').TheNewZealand LawCommission stated that theCrown is primarily liablefor breaches oftheNZBORA, although making public bodies such as localgovernmentliablewillhaveincentiveeffects  on such bodies to comply with theNZBORA92 Thesuggested expansion oftheCrown is  motivated by theprinciplethat greaterTreaty responsibility needs to betaken by  authorities atlocallevels apartfromcentralgovernmentas theCrown.

Localgovernmenthaving Treaty obligations beyondenvironmentalmanagement increases thepotentialfor greaterequity for Máori TheRMApresently operates in a  vacuumwith regards to Treaty responsiveness. Itis contended that localgovernment has no incentiveoutsidetheRMAto treatMáoridifferently fromotherinterestgroups.  Treaty obligations willencouragelocalgovernmentto ensureMáoriparticipation, as  tangata whenua,in localgovernmentactivities. Localgovernmentwillbecomemore  accountable to Máorioutsideoftheregular sanction ofelectoralretribution.

Itis efficientfor theCrown andMáoriiflocalgovernmenthas Treaty obligations.  Máori would beableto takeclaims to theWaitangiTribunalagainstlocalgovernment breaches ofTreaty principles.This would mean that theCrown would not beused as a  backstop for Treaty claims.Máoridevelopmentwould not focussed initially on theability  to communicateto localgovernmentthrough Crown officials based in Wellington. Instead, Treaty discoursewilloccur atthelocallevel,whereMáoridevelopmentoccurs. Thedisadvantageofthis situation is that themajor costs for activeprotection ofMáori interests would betransferred to localgovernment

C Disadvantages

Iflocalgovernmenthas Treaty obligations, thefinancialcostoflocalgovernment decision­making would increase.93  Depending on thestrength oftheobligations, local governmentmay berequired to guaranteeMáoriparticipation in alldecision­making  processes or consultation in allprocesses.94  Thepotentialfor increased costs is  emphasised with thecontention that thereis no guaranteeofcertainty with local

92 Crown Liability above n24, 30

93 Anyactionshouldbeprecededbyafinancialandnon­financialcost­benefit analysisofpresent local government­Máori relations Thisanalysiswouldinformthedebateover localgovernment­Máori relationsandmayalter theextent ofthispaper's recommendations Thisdoesnot makethepaper's  recommendationssuperfluousuntiltheanalysisiscompleted; therecommendationsaresubmittedas a useful starting point for further development of local government­Máori Treaty relations

94 The differences in strength of Treaty obligations are noted in Part III B of this paper.

governmenthaving Treaty obligations. Treaty provisions in theRMAhavenot increased  thecertainty overTreaty responsiveness in environmentalmanagementissues.Instead,  they havecontributed to greaterlitigation in theEnvironmentCourt

Treating Máoridifferently fromothersegments ofthepopulation willattractthe  argumentthat thedecision­making processes areundemocratic andcontributeto  separatism/apartheid.Máoriareableto participatein thepresentsystemas voters and employees oflocalgovernmentauthorities. Máori can standfor election. 95  To differentiateon thebasis ofraceis discriminatory andtantamountto racism Hence,itis  inappropriateto giveMáoridifferenttreatmenton a Treaty basis.

Conceptualising localgovernmentas theCrown,or as a Crown agenthaving Treaty  obligations concerns both Máori and local government Some criticise the  conceptualisation as diminishing thesignificanceofCrown­Máorirelations. SomeMáori considerthat thereis no distinction between localgovernmentandcentralgovernment, andareunwilling to confusethesituation further96 Others rejectthesuggestion on the  basis that centralgovernmentdoes not even havelegalTreaty obligations (in a nonCrown capacity)thereforelocalgovernmentcannoteither TheCrown has refused to  takeresponsibility for theactions oflocalauthorities.97  AprominentCabinetMinister recently madethecommentthat localgovernmentis neithercentralgovernmentnor a  privatebody,suggesting that theCrown does not consideritselfresponsiblefor  developmentoflocalgovernment­Máorirelations. 98

ThemovementofTreaty obligations to localgovernmentis arguably contradictory. Treaty obligations should evolveas theCrown evolves. As theCrown's powers of Káwanatanga increased,so did Treaty obligations.  As theCrown's powers of Káwanatanga decrease,itis questionablewhetherTreaty obligations remain atthe  highpointoftheCrown's powers.Topin theobligations atthehighpointoftheCrown's  powers,andthen movethoseobligations to localgovernmentauthorities exercising  devolved powers,disregards theevolutionary natureofCrown­Máorirelations. Perhaps  Treaty obligations riseandfalldepending on theroleoftheCrown.This papersuggests

95 D Ponter Proceedings of a Seminar on Resource Management and the Treaty of Waitangi (Resource Planning Publication No 7 prepared for the Bay of Plenty Regional Council, 1992) 5­7

96 SeeTTutua­Nathan "Iwi­Local Government Partnership/Consultation" Enviroinment BOP above n 95,  62 SeeR Mahuta"ReformofLocalandRegionalGovernment:A TainuiPerspective"New Zealand Geographer (1989) 44 (1), 84

97 SeeNewZealandOfficeofTreatySettlementsCrownPolicyProposalsonTreatyClaimsInvolving Public Works Acquisitions (New Zealand Office of Treaty Settlements, Wellington, 1996) 3

98 Rt HonD Graham"Speech" (LocalGovernment NewZealandConference, Dunedin, 30June1998)  5

that powers ofKáwanatanga aredistinctfromtheCrown. Thesepowers arenot  necessarily exercised only by theCrown. Itis submitted that Treaty obligations are  applicableto allexerciseofpowers ofKáwanatanga,whetheror not thosepowers were  actually exercised by theCrown in 1840. This suggests that thepost­1840 Crown  assumption ofpowers ofKáwanatanga,which havesubsequently been devolved,are  qualified by Treaty obligations regardless ofwhereandby whomthey arebeing  exercised.

D Conclusion

Thepotentialfor localgovernmentto haveTreaty obligations (outsidetheRMA)is a  tradeoffbetween policy arguments.Attheheartofthis policy debateis greaterTreaty  responsiveness atlocallevels versus increased costs in localgovernmentdecision­  making.  It is contended that with appropriate statutory guidance on Treaty  responsiveness,problems ofcostencountered with Treaty obligations can beminimised. Hence,itis considered that localgovernmenthaving Treaty obligations is appropriate VI RECOMMENDATIONS­WHATSHOULDHAPPENNOW?

A Introduction

Theresponsibility to clarify localgovernmentTreaty obligations rests primarily with  centralgovernmentandMáori99  Localgovernmentparticipation in this process is  important. However,withoutlegislativechange,localgovernmentgoodwillpresently  relied on by Máori (exceptwheretherearestatutory provisions) willnot amountto  greaterfulfilmentofTreaty obligations andrights. Itwillinstead relegateMáorito the  status ofan interestgroup. This paperadvocates changein theattitudes andactions of centralgovernment,localgovernmentandMáori

B CentralGovernment

Itis recommended that centralgovernmentshould makelegislativechanges to ensure  a Treaty­driven systemoflocalgovernment100This suggestion envisages greaterCrown

99 AnychangeinthenatureoftheCrown­Máorirelationshipneedstobediscussedfirst betweenthe partiestotherelationship Thispreservesthemanaofthepartiesandallowsfor acceptable(rather  than imposed) development of Treaty relations

100SeeTheBridgeport GroupReformof LocalandRegionalGovernment,Synopsisof Submissionson Billfor the Establishment of Máori Advisory Committees in LocalGovernment and Explanatory Statement(Report totheOfficialsCo­ordinatingCommitteeonLocalGovernment,1990) 16 These recommendationsincorporategreater CrownparticipationinthefacilitationofMáori­localgovernment  relationshipswithout derogatingfromthehistoricalsignificanceoftheCrown­Máorirelationship The participationcouldincludetheestablishment ofaMáoriLocalGovernment Commissionwhich revises localgovernment Treatyresponsiveness SeeH MatungaLocalGovernment:A Máori Perspective (A Report for the Máori Consultative Group on Local Government Reform, 1989) 13

monitoring oflocalgovernmentin relation to Treaty issues andincreased responsiveness  oflocalgovernmentto Máori 101 Statutory guidelines for localgovernmenton howto  meetobligations would ensureMáoriarenot forced to depend on Pákehá goodwillfor  Treaty rights to beupheld.Guidelines for localgovernmentwould also encouragegreater efficiency,as Máoriwould beless likely to approachtheCrown overlocalgovernment omissions to ensureTreaty obligations aremet Theexistenceofguidelines may lessen  theroomfor localgovernmentandMáori to develop relations. 102 However,itis  submitted that this is a necessary trade­offfor greatercertainty in thedevelopmentof theserelations.

Treaty settlementnegotiations may requirelocalgovernmentparticipation when the  Crown andMáori finalisesettlementdetails. During this process centralgovernment needs to address themanagementoftheongoing relationship between stateapparatus  (including localgovernment)andMáori This mirrors theCanadian experiencewhere  provincialgovernmentis included in thenegotiations process.103 Italso suggests less  emphasis on finality between theCrown andMáori,andencourages supportby local governmentofMáoriaffairs.

GreaterempowermentofMáoriatlocalgovernmentlevels needs consideration. This  empowermentmustoccur simultaneously with constitutionalchangerecognising and clarifying theTreaty relationships identified earlierin this paper Legislation has  previously provided for Máori self­government Forexamplesection 71 ofthe  Constitution Act1852 acknowledged Máoriself­governmentin Máoriareas.104 It provided for the,"[s]etting apartofdistricts in which thelaws,customs andusages ofthe  Aboriginalor Máoriinhabitants ofNewZealandshould for thepresentbemaintained for  thegovernmentofthemselves,in alltheirrelations to anddealings with each other"

101TheresultsofimplementationoftheRMA highlightstheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofrequiring local government to consider Treaty principles in decision­making

102Personalcomment byChrisKoroheke(CulturalLiaisonOfficer) at theAucklandRegionalCouncil,  Auckland, 2 August 1998

103TheAgreement BetweentheInuit of theNunavut Settlement AreaandHer MajestytheQueenin right of Canada(TheTungavikandtheMinister ofIndianAffairsandNorthernDevelopment,1993)  191 Article23for exampleplacesemployment obligationsontheFederalandProvincial Governments

104SeegenerallyC Wickliffe"IndigenousPolities, self­government,law, citizenshipandpropertyrights:  insideout, outside in: a comparative study of the United States of America, Canada and New Zealand"  (LLMThesis, VictoriaUniversityofWellington, 1997). Wickliffearguesthat theBritishcommonlaw  protectedanaboriginalright toself­government. Section71wasnot repealeduntil1986 See generallyLCoxKótahitanga: TheSearch for Máori Political Unity (Oxford University Press, Auckland,  1993) 28

However,its forcewas nevertested;itwas neverused. Therehavebeen numerous  statutes accommodating limited Máoriself­government105 Themajor recentattemptby  theCrown to giveMáorilimited self­governmentcamewith theRánangaIwiAct1990. However,itwas repealed soonafterenactmentOnepossibility for centralgovernment consideration in thepresentstatutory framework is a redrafting ofsection 33 oftheRMA to makeiteasierfor localgovernmentto transferpowers to iwito control(andnot only to  manage)areas ofsignificanceto iwi106

C LocalGovernment

Localgovernmentauthorities need to address Treaty relations moreseriously.107 Initially this requires localgovernmentauthorities to identify wherethey standin relation  to Treaty issues. Second,itrequires localgovernmentauthorities to approachTreaty  discussion with an open mind. 108 Immediatemeasures includelocalgovernment investing resources in educating itselfon Treaty issues,andestablishing clear channels  ofcommunication with Máori LocalGovernmentNewZealandhas encouraged this  approachby stating that Máoriarenot justanotherinterestgroup. 109

Localgovernmentshould develop options for guaranteed Máorirepresentation. Such  representation may bedifferentfor differentparts ofthecountry. MáoriAdvisory  Committees,formalguaranteed representation andSpecialWorking Parties areseveral ofthemany options availableto localgovernment.110 This representation also needs to

105See for example the MáoriCouncils Act 1900

106Section33oftheResourceManagement Act 1991allowslocalgovernment authoritiestodevolve limitedfunctionstoMáori PersonalComment by D Ponter (Manager) at Te Puni Kókiri, Wellington, 6 August 1998 Ponter considersthat thepresent statutoryframeworkdoesnot empower Máoritobe responsiblefor resourcesthat aretransferredtoMáori management under s33oftheResource Management Act 1991 Ultimateresponsibilityisleft tolocalgovernment,whilemanagement is transferredtoMáori SeeRNFraser "Section33oftheResourceManagement Act 1991"  (UnpublishedLLB (Hons) paper, VictoriaUniversityofWellington, 1997). Fraser commentsonthe statutoryandnon­statutoryconstraintsofdevolutionofauthorityunder s33oftheResource Management Act 1991, andsuggeststhat therearestatutoryinconsistenciesfor suchdevolution compared to devolution to Máoriunder the Fisheries Act 1996

107Personalcomment byMikeRead(Adviser) at LocalGovernment NewZealand, Wellington, 18 September 1997

108ManukauReportaboven3, 84 Personalcomment alsobyV Payne(Whakatohea) at BecaCarter  Hollings Ferner Ltd, Tauranga­Moana, 2 August 1998

109Tangata Whenua Consultation above n 59, 19

110Representationcouldbeofasimilar naturetoMáorirepresentationinParliament.Section45ofthe ElectoralAct 1993guaranteesseparateMáorirepresentationinParliament. Thenumber ofMáori seats is dictated by the number of electors on theMáori roll

acknowledgetheimplicitdifferences between tangata whenuaandthegeneralMáori populacein each region.

Meaningfulinvolvementby Máoriin allplanning is necessary for localgovernmentto  becommitted to theTreaty. Researching ofMáori initiatives is an important way for  localgovernmentto respond to Máori Instead ofadopting a negativeapproachto  notions oftino rangatiratanga,localgovernmentmay considerhowlocalgovernmentcan  affirmatively encourageMáoriaspirations for Máoriself­government.This may require  greateruseofthedevolution provisions in theRMAandtheFisheries Act1996.111

Co­managementstrategies adopted in Canada providefurtheralternatives for greater Máori self­government Co­management synthesises negotiation and mutual accommodation ofMáori andlocalgovernmentin thegovernanceoftheenvironment andresources.112 Boards or committees which areresponsiblefor watermanagement, landuse,planning andenvironmentalmanagementcould havea 50:50 Máoriandlocal governmentrepresentation. Although this framework does not provideself­government for Máori,itwould constituteexplicitlocalgovernmentimplementation oftheprincipleof activeprotection and develop relations further

D Máori

Paramountto thereinvigoration ofMáoriself­governmentis education. Máorihave to investresources (maybein conjunction with localgovernmentandcentralgovernment) in researching anddeveloping Máori frameworks ofresourcemanagementandMáori self­government.Investmentin learning Pákehá techniques is also important in orderfor  Máorito participatefully in environmentalaffairs.

Máori need to considertheability oflocalgovernmentto assistMáori selfgovernment This involves rallying around iwimanagementplans andcontributing to  Máori serviceprovision to Máori andthegeneralcommunity.113 Itrequires greater participation in localgovernmentelections andopen communication with (albeitPákehá  dominated) existing localgovernmentauthorities. Máorimustnecessarily considerthe  developmentoftheTreaty relations to apply to alllocalgovernmentactivities.Ifthis does  not happen,MáoriandtheCrown willbelocked in a time­warp that does not recognise

111Fisheries Act 1996, ss 174­185

112SeeP Usher "CommonPropertyandRegionalSovereignty" Seminar onCommonPropertyIssues (NationalCenter for Development Studies, AustralianNationalUniversity, 1996) 5 Usher supports thenotionofacontinuingandevolvingrelationshipbetweenpartners, similar toMcHugh'srelational approach

113Consider TeRúnangaoNgátiHauitiNgáti HauitiKaupapaTaiaoEnvironmentalPolicyStatement (Te Rúnanga o NgátiHauiti, Rangitíkei, 1996).

thepracticalreality that activeprotection ofMáori interests bettertakes placeatlocal levels.

VII CONCLUSION

Itis submitted that conceptualising localgovernmentas theCrown is inappropriate  andonly a shorttermissueofdefinition which obscures the notion that Treaty obligations  fallupon bodies exercising powers ofKáwanatanga. Moreimportant to Treaty  jurisprudenceis thedevelopmentofrelations between Máoriandlocalgovernment,and greatercontrolandpoweroverresources for Máori. Thead hoc andpiecemeal developmentoflocalgovernmentTreaty responsibilities to date,coupled with theextent oflocalgovernmentpowers,demandaction fromtheCrown andMáori Itis submitted  that action means a Treaty­driven legislativeagendumfocussed on requiring local governmentauthorities to comply with theTreaty in alltheiractivities.This agendumis  partofa widerconstitutionalagendarequired to address state­Máorirelations in thenext millenia. Any devolution ofpowers ofKáwanatanga to localgovernmentdoes not  absolvetheCrown ofits Treaty responsibilities to Máori However,itgives theCrown a  monitoring responsibility in thedevelopmentoflocalgovernment­Máorirelations.

Centralgovernmentandlocalgovernmentneed to considersharing powerwith Máori, instead ofhoping that Máorientitlements anddemands willbesatisfied with policies that  effectively mainstreamMáoriinto Pákehá society. Anything less thanan increasein  powerfor Máoriwould signalyetanotherfailurein respecting theTreaty andtherights  enunciated by theDraftDeclaration.