Russian aggressiveness and Western far right (II)

That the Kremlin’s foreign policy goals and European extreme right aspirations converge is obvious even to the most casual, unconcerned observer. But the relationship boldly surpasses just the meetings of like minds.

Some weeks before the European parliamentary elections in 2019, European authorities were able to uncover numerous Russian and local far right websites and social media accounts supporting political divisiveness, advancing disinformation and fomenting distrust in centrist parties in power.

Intelligence agencies state that the targets were NATO, the European Union, immigrants and other public issues. Networks of Twitter accounts, Facebook profiles, WhatsApp groups and websites were used to disseminate false stories to promote distrust and enmity among long-term allies. Much of the content can be directly traced to Russian news media, then enhanced and repeated through other carriers.

Russia was identified as the primary initiator and driving engine. However numerous actors mimicking Russia’s messages have joined in, making it difficult to untangle what’s the Kremlin’s propaganda, Western far right misinformation and authentic political discourse.

Online monitoring and sanitizing efforts have failed despite sophisticated technology and Russia continues its program unfazed. It’s clear that spreading false information is a much simpler assignment than blockading it.

Conspiracy theories are one area where Western far right web sites and Russian media reinforce each other. Both Russian and Western far right sources claimed that the Notre-Dame fire of 2019 was an act of a spy agency, Islamic terrorists or the work of an elite cabal which is secretly in charge of world developments. The latter is a decades old conspiracy that insists that a devious collusion between Zionists, the Rothchilds, Gorge Soros, Satanists, Free Masonry, the Tri-Lateral Commission and other players have an international chokehold not only on ‘mainstream’ media but also the events that produce the news.

How do investigators conclude that the narratives of Moscow and the Western far right oftentimes not only dovetail but also use the same cyber messaging routes? Previous Russian attacks were analyzed and it’s been concluded that many of the new disinformation initiatives share the same digital fingerprint as previous assaults.

Servers used by Russian hackers in 2016 to attack the Democratic National Committee in the US, were also used by at least two German political groups. In Italy it was evident that fringe right websites carry the same electronic signature as pro-Kremlin websites. Also in Italy an ‘I’m for Putin’ website carrying Russian news and advancing anti-Western positions shared a Google tracking account with the official campaign website of far-right candidate Matteo Salvini and in addition is associated with the ‘StopEuro’ website which handles stories from Russian media and Kremlin-connected websites.

While some searches into the source of message come up against a dead end, it’s agreed that definite pro-Kremlin ‘finger prints’ are visible.

It’s been a long term goal of the Kremlin to subvert the unity of the European Union, and it has thus joined with the European far right who have vowed to weaken the bloc from within. Arguments have centred on the level of effectiveness of the efforts to change votes or behaviour.

While many have insisted that it’s impossible to establish a definitive answer, one still has to admit that the Russian/far right efforts have, at the very least, been able to cause confusion in public discourse. They have made people uncertain of the the veracity of information and are continuing to germinate distrust within Western partners.

In Germany, Russia doesn’t limit its anti-EU assaults by joining with just the German far right, the Alternative for Germany party. The Kremlin is known to augment its messages with ultra-left anti-fascist groups. Ideology doesn’t seem to be any barrier when boosting political discord. Antifa West Berlin and Antifa Nord Ost are suitable consorts in Russia’s campaign. They have also shared a server with Russian hackers who penetrated the US Democrats’ computer system in 2016.

Not just identical messaging but also actual coordinated campaigns of the Western far right and Russia have also been confirmed in Spain, France and Poland. Many are yet to be detected.

Technology companies have now tightened policies to eliminate fake accounts. Facebook alone, with its operational hub in Dublin had by 2019 removed approximately 2.8 billion fake accounts from its system and blockaded networks that spread misinformation. But the EU still presents a formidable challenge. It stretches across 28 countries and must cope with 24 different languages.

Investigating the depth and extent of the Russia/Western far-right co-operation is challenging since message content can be obviously biased, exaggerated and inflammatory but not necessarily fake. Banning this material, which is not considered to be disinformation, is tantamount to censorship and a violation of free speech.

The West would be naive to expect any significant change in Russia’s efforts if battling their social media onslaught, through monitoring has any measurable success. Western allies simply have limited options for changing the Kremlin’s behaviour. But humiliating and shaming them and their Western partners through exposure still merits doing.

LAAS LEIVAT