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EESTI ELU reedel, 11. septembril 2020 — Friday, September 11, 2020
Nr. 36
English-language supplement to the Estonian weekly “EESTI ELU” Tartu College Publications Founding Chairman: Elmar Tampõld Editor: Laas Leivat 3 Madison Avenue, Toronto, ON M5R 2S2 T: 416-733-4550 • F: 416-733-0944 • E-mail: editor@eestielu.ca Digital: www.eestielu.ca
Russian aggressiveness and Western far right (II) That the Kremlin’s foreign policy goals and European extreme right aspirations con verge is obvious even to the most casual, unconcerned observer. But the relationship boldly surpasses just the meetings of like minds. Some weeks before the European parliamentary elections in 2019, European authorities were able to uncover numerous Russian and local far right websites and social media accounts supporting political divisiveness, advancing disin formation and fomenting distrust in centrist parties in power. Intelligence agencies state that the targets were NATO, the European Union, immigrants and other public issues. Net works of Twitter accounts, Facebook profiles, WhatsApp groups and websites were used to disseminate false stories to promote distrust and enmity among long-term allies. Much of the content can be directly traced to Russian news media, then enhanced and repeated through other carriers. Russia was identified as the primary initiator and driving engine. However numerous actors mimicking Russia’s messages have joined in, making it difficult to untangle what’s the Kremlin’s propaganda, Western far right misinformation and authentic political discourse. Online monitoring and sanitizing efforts have failed despite sophisticated technology and Russia continues its program unfazed. It’s clear that spreading false information is a much simpler assignment than block ading it. Conspiracy theories are one area where Western far right web sites and Russian media reinforce each other. Both Russian and Western far right sources claimed that the NotreDame fire of 2019 was an act of a spy agency, Islamic terrorists or the work of an elite cabal which is secretly in charge of world developments. The latter is a decades old conspiracy that insists that a devious collusion between Zionists, the Roth childs, Gorge Soros, Satanists, Free Masonry, the Tri-Lateral Commission and other players have an international chokehold not only on ‘mainstream’ media
but also the events that produce the news. How do investigators conclude that the narratives of Moscow and the Western far right oftentimes not only dovetail but also use the same cyber messaging routes? Previous Russian attacks were analyzed and it’s been concluded that many of the new disinformation initiatives share the same digital fingerprint as previous assaults. Servers used by Russian hackers in 2016 to attack the Democratic National Com mit tee in the US, were also used by at least two German political groups. In Italy it was evident that fringe right websites carry the same electronic signature as pro-Kremlin websites. Also in Italy an ‘I’m for Putin’ website carrying Russian news and advancing anti-Western posi tions shared a Google tracking account with the official campaign website of far-right candidate Matteo Salvini and in addition is associated with the ‘StopEuro’ website which handles stories from Russian media and Kremlin-connected websites. While some searches into the source of message come up against a dead end, it’s agreed that definite pro-Kremlin ‘fingerprints’ are visible. It’s been a long term goal of the Kremlin to subvert the unity of the European Union, and it has thus joined with the Euro pean far right who have vowed to weaken the bloc from within. Arguments have centred on the level of effectiveness of the efforts to change votes or behaviour. While many have insisted that it’s impossible to establish a definitive answer, one still has to admit that the Russian/far right efforts have, at the very least, been able to cause confusion in public discourse. They have made people uncertain of the the veracity of information and are continuing to germinate distrust within Western partners. In Germany, Russia doesn’t limit its anti-EU assaults by joining with just the German far right, the Alternative for Ger many party. The Kremlin is known to augment its messages with ultra-left anti-fascist groups. Ideology doesn’t seem to be
Photo: Barlova’s Facebook page
Building Estonia’s cultural scene with an awareness of gentrification and community preservation In March, the City Govern ment of Tallinn proposed a regulation that would prohibit the retail sale of alcoholic beverages for on-site con sumption “on the nights be fore Monday, Tuesday, Wed nesday, Thursday and Friday from 2AM through 6AM and in the nights before Saturday and Sunday, from 3AM through 7AM.” Casinos and night clubs would have a similar regulation, with timing shifted one hour later. According to the City Government website, “Restric tions would not apply on the night before January 1st, February 25th and June 24th.” Originally, the regulation was due to start on October 1st. Now, it is reported to be potentially postponed until 2021. The motivations behind the regulation are “to improve public order, well-being and public health, values of young people, ensure the integrity of the home, balance the rights and interests of stakeholders and preserve the value of Tallinn as a tourist destination.” Having been a point of discussion with the city’s government for two years, this change was part of a conversation at Tallinn Music Week on August 28th, at the event titled “Gentrification and urban planning: how to develop and sus-
tain a diverse live music scene.” During this virtual event, the concept of gentrification was first mentioned with regard to New York’s Lower East Side, as inhabited by punk rock figures such as Patti Smith. Gent ri fi cation is typically characterized by the “creative class” seeking low rent housing in neigh bourhoods with predominately working-class residents, eventually being followed by investors and developers who buy property, renovate/rebuild, and raise the cost of living as a result. It’s a sensitive issue because, although from one angle it would seem that neighbourhoods are becoming more affluent, the long-term process prompts low-income residents to leave. Gentrification in Estonia has at least external similarities to other parts of the world. In the early 19th century, the demand for housing was met with the construction of tenement districts, in the form of wooden residential buildings, which can be found in neighbourhoods such as Karlova in Tartu and Kalamaja in Tallinn. Along with former industrial buildings, they withstood the neglect of the Soviet era and have become popular with small businesses, trendy bars, creative firms, and restaurants. These amenities are even more accessible if you live in one of the nearby charming wooden properties; and cheap rental prices compared to the
centre of town (for example, the Old Town) drew people in. Amid the excitement over an affordable, new place to live, there are still community issues that need work, such as helping those without housing or who struggle with substance abuse. After decades of enduring through a stagnant economy and stifled entrepreneurship, the eagerness for change in Esto nian cities makes a lot of sense. It isn’t fair to vilify anyone who jumped on the investment opportunities of Estonia’s up-andcoming neighbourhoods. Equally, in the upcoming years of urban planning and action, long-term residents and cultural anchors of urban communities need to be heard at the meeting table. Henri Roosipõld, the head of Live Music Estonia and a figure on the panel, described how, at first, casinos and bars were part of the dialogue about the regulation, but live music venues weren’t. They had to push for their chance to be there. What can be done to address the past and future of Estonia’s urban areas? And what does gentrification and this new regulation have to do with live music? In principle, reduced alcohol consumption would benefit pub lic health. Beyond this, though, one of the overarching
any barrier when boosting po litical discord. Antifa West Berlin and Antifa Nord Ost are suitable consorts in Russia’s campaign. They have also shared a server with Russian hackers who penetrated the US Democrats’ computer system in 2016. Not just identical messaging but also actual coordinated campaigns of the Western far right and Russia have also been confirmed in Spain, France and Poland. Many are yet to be detected. Technology companies have now tightened policies to elimi-
nate fake accounts. Facebook alone, with its operational hub in Dublin had by 2019 removed approximately 2.8 billion fake accounts from its system and blockaded networks that spread misinformation. But the EU still presents a formidable challenge. It stretches across 28 countries and must cope with 24 different languages. Investigating the depth and extent of the Russia/Western far-right co-operation is challenging since message content can be obviously biased, exaggerated and inflammatory but not necessarily fake. Banning
this material, which is not considered to be disinformation, is tantamount to censorship and a violation of free speech.
Vincent Teetsov
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The West would be naive to expect any significant change in Russia’s efforts if battling their social media onslaught, through monitoring has any measurable success. Western allies simply have limited options for changing the Kremlin’s behaviour. But humiliating and shaming them and their Western partners through exposure still merits doing. LAAS LEIVAT
