A study of Front National
Alexandre Loubet
Europe Deserves Better A study of Front National
www.europeansunitedfordemocracy.org
ŠEuropeans United for Democracy 2014 Author: Alexandre Loubet Editor: Richard Byfält Proofreading: Aleksander Pruitt Cover: 1Aspect Design Printed in Romania ISBN 978-87-997937-0-9 The activities of the EUD are financially supported by the European Parliament. The liability of any communication or publication by the EUD, in any form and any medium rests solely with the EUD. The European Parliament is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information contained therein. The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EUD, its members or member organisations. This book is available for free and can be copied for non-commercial purposes as long as the author and publisher are mentioned by name.
Europe Deserves Better A study of Front National
Abbreviations and terms Front National The French name for the National Front which is used throughout this book. UMP
The main French centre-right party Union pour un Mouvement Populaire.
PS
The main French centre-left party Parti Socialiste.
UMPS
Common term referring to the UMP and PS as one and the same.
OAS
The Organisation of the Secret Army which favoured Algeria remaining part of France
MEP
Member of the European Parliament
MP
Member of Parliament
First party
The expression premier parti de France refers to the party that won the last elections
CEVIPOF
Political Science research centre at Institut d'ĂŠtudes politiques de Paris
Enarque
École nationale d'administration (ENA) alumni.
Table of contents Foreword Introduction
Part I - The disreputable foundations of Front National A) The origins of Front National 1. 2. 3.
The anti-Semitic and violent extreme-right origins of Front National The paradoxical evolution of FN under Jean-Marie Le Pen’s leadership Front National’s early political programme was contrary to its actual positions
B) General political disillusion in France 1. 2. 3.
Did Front National really want to be in a position of power? Constant reminders of its origins limit Front National's ability to succeed Front National’s marginal role in French institutions
C) The roots and reasons of Front National’s euroscepticism 1. 2. 3.
The French extreme-right’s historical affinity for Europe Principled opposition to the EU as a supranational entity Blaming the EU for the crises
Part II - A radical change A) New leadership: new approach 1. 2. 3.
What is dédiabolisation? The arrival of Marine Le Pen at the head of Front National The professionalisation of the party
B) Constructing a new identity by trying to reject extreme-right elements 1.
Moderation and denial of Front National’s origins
2. 3.
A disturbed political landscape which benefits Front National Beyond the traditional right-left split
C) The confused political identity of Front National 1. 2. 3.
Conservative values and leftist economics Front National’s policies correspond to the extreme-right tradition An increasingly schizophrenic party
Part III - Le premier parti de France A) Conquering the ballot box - becoming the largest French party 1. 2. 3. 4.
Sudden electoral growth stimulated by Marine Le Pen Attracting diverse types of voters Reaching out to new sections of the electorate The conquest of the working class voter
B) The rising prevalence of Front National’s ideas among the French electorate 1. 2.
The main reasons people vote for Front National A dual method of persuading voters
C) The proliferation and normalisation of Front National’s ideas in French society -
Protectionism in a time of crisis Criticism of elites and of parliament Rejection of immigration and feelings of insecurity Rejection of the European Union
Part IV - The future of Front National 1. 2. 3.
A party very alone, too alone The existence of a possibly unsurmountable threshold Despite limitations, Front National's future looks bright
Conclusion
Foreword Across Europe new political forces are gathering strength in the wake of the failed European Monetary Union (euro) experiment. By publishing the Europe Deserves Better series examining extreme political parties the EUD tries to contribute to the discussion about how to meet the arguments of these parties. To brush off their criticisms as simply populism or racism is not a viable long-term solution, on the contrary, ignoring and dismissing the views of a share of the electorate will only further alienate these voters and increase support for extreme parties. Instead establishment parties and politicians should take the debate on the issues head on. This does not mean puff-pieces by establishment apologists justifying failing policies, but challenging consensual truths and myths such as the necessity of the euro currency and further power-shifts to unaccountable EU institutions. The euro and its attached diktats from Brussels have become a focal point of political debate in France, Italy, Greece, Spain and many other European countries. Since establishment parties from left to right agree on these issues voters feel they cannot change the political course of their country and resentment of the perceived political class grows stronger.
1
In this study of Front National we examine a party that has existed for 50 years and has grown from irrelevance to seemingly threaten the established left-right power structure in France. Singing the blues of government impotence and state failures to live up to the expectations of French citizens, Front National offers a political alternative to voters that feel disenfranchised by the current state of affairs. They also offer policies that have broad support among some parts of the electorate. To ignore, belittle or disregard discussion of contentious issues in society leaves room for extreme movements to monopolise debate on issues that many voters feel are of outmost importance.
2
Introduction The French Prime Minister, Manuel Valls, declared on September 7th 2014 that "In France, the extreme-right and Marine Le Pen are at the gates of power". In opinion poll after opinion poll, election after election, the traditional political parties seem to weaken compared with one movement which is becoming stronger and stronger. In the last elections to the European Parliament in May 2014, Front National became the largest political party in France gathering 24.86 percent of the vote. Today Front National claims 1 to have "75.000 members and sympathisers [...] from all socio-economic and professional groups, from all parts of society". Front National has twenty-four Members of the European Parliament, around ten mayors (some official members, some affiliated to organisations or parties close to Front National), two members of the National Assembly, and following the indirect September 2014 elections to the Senate they for the first time in history have two senators. Without a doubt Front National constitutes an unavoidable political force which is threatening the system that is embodied by the traditional governing parties Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (UMP, centreright) and Parti Socialiste (PS, centre-left).
1
http://www.frontnational.com/les-adherents/
3
Front National sends the largest French delegation to the European Parliament but its weight in French political institutions is non-existent. The last European elections did however show that Front National can hope to achieve better results in future elections. A climate of crisis, with constant political scandals and a widespread feeling of decline in French society are some reasons why Front National is attractive to a relative majority of voters. Even if Marine Le Pen actually rejects the term extreme-right when journalists want to describe the party, and even if this description is very subjective and relative, it is undeniable that Front National for a long time and still to this day uses themes closely related to the traditional extreme-right. Created in 1973, Front National kept Le Pen's family at the centre of its history. The family name Le Pen, which means leader in the traditional Celtic language spoken in Brittany, seems to have destined the family “dynasty� to be in positions of leadership. But was the family destined to eventually lead a political party or even France itself? While Front National used to be a small group focused on provoking and uniting far-right groups in France, after 40 years of existence in politics it has become the largest political party in a French national election, claiming a position as the first political party in France (premier parti de France) after winning the European Parliament 4
elections in 2014. Despite its dark origins, its toxic past and its controversial leader, Front National has never been so close to the gates of power, as Manuel Valls pointed out. The exceptional development of Front National into becoming the first French party is impressive, but above all it has revealed some amazing paradoxes. This analysis of the complex evolution and the actual positions of Front National will demonstrate the surprising changes of positions adopted by Front National and their inconsistency with earlier Front National opinion. The book examines a party that presents itself as a movement that is currently trying to achieve a position of power in one of the largest EUcountries and analyses the change of Front National’s essential features provoked by the dÊdiabolisation process.
5
Part I The disreputable foundations of Front National A. The origins of Front National
1. The anti-Semitic and violent extreme-right origins of Front National During the end of the 60's and the 70's in France, street fights between small groups of extreme-left and extreme-right students regularly place. Generally they gathered Parisian students. These violent militants often came from Occident, an organization claiming the heritage and values of notorious Marshal Petain; the fight against communist expansion and the struggle to maintain Algeria as part of France. This group, numbering up to 1500 students, accepted the description as fascist referencing
extreme-right
Ferdinand Céline
2
writers
such
and Robert Brasillach.
as 3
Louis-
Occident
supported the coup d'état in Greece in 1967, and were known to express their views by means of violence. It 2
Céline has been accused of anti-Semitism and racism because he wants to protect the “white race.” He is recognized across the board as an important author in France for his books Voyage au bout de la nuit (1932), Mort à crédit (1936) and D’un châteu à l’autre (1957). 3
Brasillach himself claimed to be an anti-Semite and used to manage the collaborationist newspaper Je suis partout during WWII. Following the liberation of France he was executed for collaborating with the Nazis.
6
attached importance to civilisational and religious issues and highlighted in a very positive way the similarities and connections between European people’s. The term Occident refers to western civilisation in French meaning that the vision of the organisation stretches beyond the French nation. However, following several attacks on extreme-left militants Occident was dissolved by decree in October 1968. In the wake of the dissolution Occident militants created new structures under the banner Groupe Union DÊfense (GUD) for revolutionary and nationalist students in the famous Parisian law university known as Assas. The Ordre Nouveau movement (New Order) whose name expresses the traditional wish for the extreme-right to remodel the world and put it under an authoritarian order,
was
created
in
November
1969.
Like
its
predecessor Occident, Ordre Nouveau had its own militias and fought extreme-left militias in the streets. But primitive street fights were not enough for Ordre Nouveau which had higher ambitions. It was decided to develop Ordre Nouveau into a real political force. In order to achieve this Ordre Noveau portrayed itself as a new movement gathering nationalists, which contrary to its predecessors, would participate in the democratic process. A new entity was created at the second Congress of Ordre Nouveau in October of 1972 to put 7
forward candidates for the next legislative elections in March of 1973. This new entity was called the "Front National" and represented a step into the electoral system with the aim of achieving the "nationalist revolution" 4, a reference to the "National revolution" initiated by Marshal Pétain during the German occupation of France. In essence the role of Front National was to bring the extreme right into the democratic process and develop a better public image of it in. Ordre Nouveau was dissolved by decree after violent clashes with Communist league militants at a private meeting organized to denounce mass immigration. Although Ordre Nouveau was dissolved Front National tried to survive. Alain Robert and François Duprat, former members of Ordre Nouveau, made efforts to retain their militant supporters, who were often tired of the repression, in order to develop the then marginal party. The role of Front National was to unify the parties of the national right in the political process, including standing for elections. Front National at the time included former members of the Poujadist movement, a party based on conservative values and supported by storekeepers and artisans. Front National at the time also had links to extreme-right networks with views closely associated 4
Alexandre Dézé, Le Front national : à la conquête du pouvoir?, Armand Colin, 2012, p. 21.
8
with Nazism. Alexandre Dézé, a researcher specialising in the extreme right and populism in Europe, asserts that Front National was the means to conquer the open political landscape of the extreme-right in what he calls the "logic of competition." 5
2. The paradoxical evolution of Front National under Jean-Marie Le Pen’s leadership Jean-Yves Camus, a specialist on political extremism, claims that Front National begun as a means for Ordre Nouveau to unite all the national right symphatisers behind one banner and to gain respectability. According to historian Nicolas Lebourg, who has published multiple works on the French far-right, Jean-Marie Le Pen was not destined to lead Front National, but "it was only after the refusal of several personalities such as Dominique Venner 6, that Jean-Marie Le Pen was contacted." While Front National encompassed a wide range of ideologies, from ultra-protectionism to ultra-liberalism, its leader Jean-Marie Le Pen favoured neo-classical theories. Claims that Front National was founded solely around
5
Alexandre Deze, Le Front national: à la conquête du pouvoir?, Armand Colin, 2012, p. 37 6
An important extreme-right essayist and a member of OAS, the Organisation of the Secret Army which favoured Algeria remaining part of France.
9
Jean-Marie Le Pen are false. He contributed to the party’s development and he led it, but far-right networks were mainly united by Alain Robert and François Duprat. In 1956, a 27 year-old Jean-Marie Le Pen was among the 52 Poujadist members elected to the National Assembly offering him the platform to launch his real political career. Six month after his election he left the National Assembly in order to return to the army and was later elected in 1959. Having close links to extreme-right groups he became the Campaign Director of nationalist Jean-Louis
Tixier-Vignancour
during
the
presidential
elections of 1965. When Ordre Nouveau created Front National Jean-Marie Le Pen became and remained its leading public figure. Throughout the Algerian-French war and in its aftermath Jean-Marie Le Pen publicly opposed Charles de Gaulle’s policy on Algeria. Founded by OAS7 paramilitary veterans, among others, who disapproved of Algerian independence, Front National continued to reject de Gaulle's legacy. From the creation of the party in October 1972 until the middle of the 1980's, Front National was a marginal political movement, not invited to participate in TV broadcasts, and not successful in being seen as a viable
7
The Organisation of the Secret Army wanted Algeria to remain part of France.
10
alternative on the political scene. Its national election results were below one percent. Front National percentage of the vote nationally 1973 National Assembly election
0.5%
1974 Presidential election
0.8%
1978 National Assembly election
0.3%
1981 National Assembly election
0.2%
In 1982 Jean-Marie Le Pen protested in writing against the media boycott of his party and President Mitterrand instructed heads of media channels to give equitable coverage to Front National. Thus the trend of low election results was broken in 1983 when Jean-Marie Le Pen and Front National formed alliances with the mainstream right parties in several towns and Radio Europe 1 and public TV channel Antenne 2 regularly invited Jean-Marie Le Pen to appear on their programmes. French establishment journalist, Franz-Olivier Giesbert, claims that President Mitterrand intentionally helped Jean-Marie Le Pen become famous in order to destabilize the parliamentary right during a period of weak leftist representation. 8 Jean-Marie Le Pen himself recognized
8
Franz-Olivier Giesbert, La fin d'une ĂŠpoque, Le Seuil, 1994.
11
that "the silence was broken thanks to Mitterrand." 9 Le Pen also declared that he was aware that the changes to the electoral system implemented leading up to the 1986 elections had the intention of undermining Front National, but ended up helping it. Following the socialist defeat in the 1985 cantonal elections President Mitterrand was weakened and decided to change the electoral system, which is organic and not constitutionally defined in France. The change to the proportional election system intended to soften the socialist loss at the forthcoming 1986 National Assembly elections.
Le Pen benefitted from the change which
reduced the weight of the right-wing vote and divided it, so that Front National scored 9.65 percentage and 35 seats in the National Assembly, their largest delegation to date. Front National portrayed itself as a serious parliamentary party and began to grow and be more known to the French public. In the following elections to the National Assembly Jacques Chirac reinstated the previous system of two-round majority voting which meant that the 9.8% vote for Front National only gave the party one single seat in the National Assembly. By 1995 Front National had changed its policies so that they were more in line with the electorate. Under the 9
http://www.lepoint.fr/politique/le-pen-raconte-mitterrand-28-04-20111326986_20.php
12
influence of Le Pen’s son-in-law, Samuel Maréchal, an ideological shift towards economic patriotism and defence of public services took place. As we will show later, in reality Front National supported policies contrary to what they publicly proclaimed. These economic policies helped Front National obtain 30% of the traditional blue collar working vote, 18% non-blue-collar workers and 25% of those unemployed. While Jean-Marie Le Pen never clearly laid out his feeling towards the French “Republican” system of government, his affiliations with extreme-right movements and their values created a lot of suspicion. His nickname le diable de république [the devil of the Republic] insinuated that he was considered as a potential threat to it. In September of 2006, Jean-Marie Le Pen gave a speech in Valmy written by the very controversial essayist Alain Soral 10, and Marine Le Pen. The battle of Valmy is a symbolic moment in the history of the French Republic. On the 20th of September 1792 French troops, mainly peasants and ordinary citizens, won their first major victory of the Revolutionary Wars that followed the French Revolution. Both the Prussian Kingdom and the Holy Roman Empire defended monarchist government and fought against the revolutionary claims in order to restore the monarchy in 10
Soral is controversial because of his recurring online videos and speeches against Jews.
13
France. One day after the battle the French Republic was proclaimed. Therefore the battle and Valmy have a firm place in the subconscious of the French people as the place where the French Republic was born. When Jean-Marie Le Pen spoke in Valmy he turned Front National’s vision of French politics on its head: he praised the Republic, and in some way did not deny the principles of the French revolution. He declared "we will implement the French Republic's motto: of the people, by the people, for the people." This of course is not the real motto "Liberté, Equalité, Fraternité," but a part of the prologue to the first English translation of the Bible made famous by Abraham Lincoln in his Gettysburg Address.
3. Front National’s early political programmes were contrary to their actual positions The ideas defended by Jean-Marie Le Pen as the leader of Front National always related to the struggle against immigration
and
the
promotion
of
“the
national
preference”, meaning policies that favour French people regardless of policy area. Beside its origins this is one of the reasons Front National is considered to be an extreme-right party, however, even on immigration related issues, tremendous differences exist between their programme and public statements. For example Jean-Marie Le Pen had fought as a Partisan of French 14
Algeria and argued in 1958, before Front National was created, in the National Assembly: "We have to offer to Muslims from Algeria [...] entry and integration in a dynamic France, in a conquering France. Instead of saying as they do now 'you cost much for us, you are a burden', we have to say 'we need you; you are the youth of the Nation'." 11 Some commentators at the time interpreted his comments as proof that the party was not racist, others saw them as a sign of anti-Semitism. Whichever interpretation is correct, the statement stands in stark contrast with the very real opposition from Marine Le Pen’s Front National to for example Halal meat in canteens or statements such as the one denouncing Islamist
killer
Muhammed
Merah
that
sparked
controversy during the French Presidential campaign of 2012. She stated: "how many Merah’s in boats are arriving in France?" 12 Until the middle of the 90's, Jean-Marie Le Pen strongly defended neo-classical economic theories. A Front National programme named "Pour La France", published in 1986 with a preface by Jean-Marie Le Pen, announced the party’s goal: becoming the precursor of a "liberal 11
th
Excerpt from a speech by Jean-Marie Le Pen, MP, given January 28 1958 in the National Assembly, Official Journal, January-February 1958, p. 310. 12 http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/election-presidentielle2012/20120325.OBS4544/le-pen-combien-de-merah-dans-les-bateaux-quiarrivent-en-france.html
15
revolution". This programme lays out the global economic vision of a Front National that initially focused on the struggle against Communism, a reason for the party to be close to the Americans. In fact “national liberals” such as those of the Club de l'Horloge were very influential, particularly due to the presence of Bruno Mégret who had joined this circle of reflection in 1975 before joining Front National in 1984. In the legislative elections of 1986, Front National wanted "to lay the foundations of a real popular capitalism". It is written in the programme that "it is necessary to bring the state back to its role, reduce the state's involvement in the Economy and get rid of bureaucratic rigidities. We have to emphasize individual initiative, business and profit. [...] the state is not an institution destined to bring happiness to men but destined to ensure the Nation's survival. It must only intervene in the public sector and leave
the
private
sphere
to
individual
initiative".
Moreover, the programme proposed to abolish "legal monopolies which protect some big businesses or public services" and to apply "a progressive policy reducing the number of functionaries.” Front National promoted "freedom to employ and to dismiss" workers, and "to open the social security system to competition" 13. In the 13
Summary of the 1986 programme: http://discours.viepublique.fr/notices/863116600.html
16
beginning of the 80’s Jean-Marie Le Pen was told by a journalist 14 "people say you are the French Ronald Reagan, what do you think about that?" he responded "It is a great honour". In 1993 Bruno Mégret, an influential civil servant and one of Front National’s few intellectuals, inserted aspects of the Chicago school of economics into Front National programme which now promoted policies by which “state companies were returned to French citizens”. Looking at Front National in existence today it might be surprising that the party twenty years ago adopted economic policies influenced by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. While Jean-Marie Le Pen asserted that economic “dirigisme” 15 weakens the state and that "it is not the state's role to manage our economy", Marine Le Pen on the other hand defends a vision that is in stark contrast with the views of her father. This latest change of policy goals started to emerge during the end of the 90's. On economic issues the change of policy was clearly on display during the 1995 presidential election when Jean-Marie Le Pen started to denounce ultra liberalism. 16 14
http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2011/11/01/le-fn-de-ladmiration-pour-reagan-a-la-denonciation-de-la-toute-puissanceamericaine_1596710_823448.html
15
French term implying widespread state intervention in the economy. http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xed3ux_jean-marie-le-pen-leronald-reagan_news?start=5
16
17
It was most likely this change of ideology in combination with personal tensions which led to a division of the party in 1998. Bruno Mégret, an elder figurehead of the Gaullist party Rassemblement pour la République, formed an alliance with Front National in 1986. In Mégret Front National lost one of its historical leaders who represented a liberal line within the party and who had been an early advocate
of
"dédiabolisation." 17
He
started
to
professionalize the party by opposing Jean-Marie Le Pen’s provocations and misconduct while promoting a local presence for the party. Mégret asserts that many important political operators and professionals left Front National with him. The split in 1999 hindered the development of the party in the short term but constitutes one of the most important failures that allowed it to succeed later on. Under Jean-Marie Le Pen’s leadership Front National progressed from a marginal player to a real political force in France. The party had a clear anti-Gaullist stance and supported the United States in the struggle against communism. It also saw the United States as a model of how to limit state intervention. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Front National faced new challenges and competitors from ‘liberal’ Prime Minister Jacques Chirac 17
http://www.parismatch.com/Actu/Politique/Bruno-Megret-Le-projet-duFN-manque-de-credibilite-559556
18
to growing public opposition to globalization, previously supported by the right. Faced with this situation Front National changed its rhetoric so that its critique of the system would fit the expectations of disgruntled bluecollar workers. A complete U-turn took place as Front National’s leader changed from considering himself something akin to an honorary spokesperson for President Reagan to a defender of the social and “strategic” state. 18 B. Political disillusionment
1. Did Front National really want to be in a position of power? The purpose of a political party is obviously to reach a position of power by fielding candidates in elections. However, when Jean-Marie Le Pen managed to shock pundits and experts by making it to the second round of the 2002 presidential election he showed signs of not wanting to be in a position of power. In the 2002 elections the French left was completely divided. The odds-on favourite, Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, thought he was comfortably going to make the second round but the vote of the left was split 18
L'État-Stratège is a French term meaning a long-term strategy initiated by the state to reach a certain goal considered of national interest.
19
among
seven
other
candidates.
Presumably
the
electorate also expected Jospin to easily make it to the second round; after all, this was what all the opinion polls showed. In the last days leading up to the first round of the election Jean-Marie Le Pen was polling 13.5% against Chirac’s 19.5% and Jospin’s 17%. 19 Jean-Marie Le Pen managed
to
outperform
the
polls
while
Jospin
underperformed only gaining 16.18% support. This was the first time Front National had been anywhere close to a position of real political power in France. Jean-Marie Le Pen commented on his remarkable 2002 result during an election debate for the 2014 European elections on TV channel LCP by saying "we did not stand ready to take power; somebody can be the President of the Republic without standing ready to take the power". While watching archive footage from April 21st 2002, he confessed on that day that he thought that "in fifteen days I could be obliged to appoint civil servants, a Prime Minister, etc." 20 Normally, the main role for a political party consists in presenting candidates at elections in order to gain power, defending a set of common ideas and ideals. Jean-Marie
19
Opinion poll conducted by LCI/Sofres 17th and 18th of April 2002. http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2014/04/17/9700120140417FILWWW00355-j-m-le-pen-en-2002-nous-n-etions-pas-prets.php
20
20
Le Pen revealed the real intention of Front National was not be in a position of power, by not being prepared. However, with the arrival of Marine Le Pen, the role of Front National changed. In her autobiography A ContreFlots published in 2006, she confesses "It is true that we were not prepared enough for the second round. We were not prepared at all, because we never experienced this situation". She asserted that Front National "cannot, even if it irritates certain people, settle for being the pebble in the system's shoe, but when the people call for Front National we must be ready to apply our ideas." Her statement exemplifies a real change of the political goals of Front National, its intention is now clearly to hold positions of political power. It is hard to assess or predict how Front National would act if the party was in a position of power. One way of drawing some conclusions is to examine cities that have mayors from the party. In 1995, Front National representatives were elected to city councils in 119 of the 120 French cities that have a population over thirty thousand residents 21. But Front National only won local elections in four cities in the South-east of France: Toulon, Marignane, Orange and Vitrolles. These cities have faced immigration related issues and feelings of 21
http://www.bfmtv.com/politique/municipales-bilan-mairies-fn-1995742877.html
21
insecurity. Marine Le Pen recently described these early mayors from Front National saying that "there were inept mayors" and that "contrary to the socialists and the UMP who keep the incompetent, we sacked them". What observations can be made about Front National based on their record in these cities? Generally local priorities were emphasized in contrast to the “national preference” advocated by Jean-Marie Le Pen. Grants were withheld from “disadvantaged” towns (meaning where immigrant populations lived) and were increased for veteran's associations. Symbolism was important, in Toulon to highlight one example, a crossroad was named Salan, paying homage to the general who led an attempted coup d'état in 1958 and a second attempt against de Gaulle in April 1961. A controversial association was created under the name Toulonnaise youth in order to indoctrinate youth on cultural and civic issues. The mayor, Jean-Marie Chevallier, received a suspended jail sentence and had to pay a fine of 100.000 francs (approximately €20.000) in an embezzlement case during his term in office. In Vitrolles, Bruno Mégret was not allowed to enter into office due to shady campaign accounts but his wife replaced him and was elected. They implemented a policy of "national preference" that offered 5.000 francs (approximately €1000) to couples who had a child while the city was heavily indebted. The 22
mayor of Marignane, Daniel Simonpieri, was elected to two terms and introduced no specific Front National policies. Jacques Bompard, who left the party in 2005 because of the rising influence of Marine Le Pen, is still mayor of Orange and even managed to be elected to the National Assembly in 2012 after a short mandate between 1986 and 1988. The general assessment of Bompard was positive because he managed to maintain usual spending levels while lowering taxes. All of these cities often employed city officials from Front National and at times people were fired for not being obedient. At times these Front National staffers took charge of security policies and favoured regional cultures. In 1996, a report issued by the General Inspector of Libraries announced that some authors and books were to be removed or not purchased because they promoted values opposing Front National’s vision. According to LibÊration books and authors favouring globalization, promoting opposing political views or foreign cultures such as Rap music or denouncing racism etc. were not tolerated in city libraries run by Front National mayors. In Marignane for instance subscriptions of leftist newspapers were discontinued and extreme-right magazines like Minute and Rivarol were promoted. The wish to impact citizens through a carefully chosen culture demonstrates Front National's ambition to promote its ideas while limiting access to opposed 23
visions,
thus
censorship.
Front
National
mayors
often
used
22
Following municipal elections in March 2014, Front National retains the mayoral office in approximately ten cities. 23 These Front National mayors have among other things increased the prices of canteens, in Pontet mayor Joris Hébrard got rid of the free canteen for children from the poorest families. They have cut grants destined to associations considered left-wing such as local human rights
organisations,
or
support
organisations
for
migrants. In Hénin-Beaumont the mayor Steeve Briois expelled the Ligue des droits de l’homme (Human Rights League) often considered a branch of the left. Front National policy initiatives often reflect the party’s past. Measures implemented today are a continuation of Front National ideas mainly in the area of security and law and order 24. Robert Ménard, who is not a member of Front National but receives support from the party, established a curfew for non-accompanied children under the age of thirteen, promised to increase the number of policemen, enacted a decree against spitting, loitering 22
http://www.liberation.fr/politiques/2014/03/28/les-mairies-fn-et-leslivres-la-memoire-a-trou-de-marine-le-pen_991116
23
The exact number of Front National mayors is hard to assess since not all publicly affiliate themselves with the party. 24 http://rue89.nouvelobs.com/2014/09/30/appli-six-mois-mairies-fn-a-etefait-defait-255162
24
and baggy clothes on front porches and organised regular conferences featuring personalities such as Philippe de Villiers and Eric Zemmour in order to "turn off the tap of viscous water of unique thought," 25 an expression of Robert Menard who wanted to end political correctness in discussions of identity, immigration and national sovereignty. In the seventh arrondissement26 of Marseille, the Front National mayor prohibited municipal officials from use of foreign languages during work, to be fair this measure was also implemented in other cities, even by socialists in the tenth arrondissement of Paris. At times the EU flag has been removed from the city hall in places such as Fréjus and Hénin-Beaumont, a symbolic gesture also introduced by Gaullist mayors. Mosques continue to be built and approved in cities controlled by Front National such as Fréjus where the Mayor (now Senator for Front National) David Rachline promised to stop the construction. In Mantes-La-Ville, the Front National mayor stopped construction and wants to expel the Muslim association from its prayer room. In VillersCotterêts, the Front National ran city council refused to
25
http://rue89.nouvelobs.com/2014/09/26/zemmour-villiers-a-beziersmenard-veut-fermer-robinet-deau-gluante-pensee-unique-255096
26
Arrondissement is a term for various administrative divisions of France, Belgium and some other countries.
25
organize and participate in commemorative events relating to the abolition of slavery. Generally
Front
National
does
not
succeed
in
implementing its programme and promises because of legal barriers. One example of this was the anti-begging decree in HĂŠnin-Beaumont which the administrative tribunal got rid of. Under Front National control, some cities
were
managed
better
and
some
worse.
Unfortunately the studied sample is not large enough to clearly show how Front National would act in a position of power nationally, but it does show that the party often lacks
skills
and
experience
required
to
secure
compromises and to establish fruitful dialogue and cooperation with civil society. What is not in question is the fact that since the arrival of Marine Le Pen at the head of Front National, the party has been transformed into an electoral machine with the main goal being to win elections, even if winning elections means denying the history and origins of Front National and renouncing part of its original convictions and principles.
2. Constant reminders of its origins limit Front National's ability to succeed When pollsters try to examine the French people’s views of Jean-Marie Le Pen or Marine Le Pen, the most common description chosen by respondents is still 26
"racist". Indeed, several declarations by Front National leaders attest to the fact that the party is still very much aligned with its origins. These recurring statements have consolidated the image of Front National as extremist. In fact, Jean-Marie Le Pen is well known in part due to his racial and anti-Semitic statements. But his career is rife with incidents which led to serious impact on his electoral results and popularity. For example Jean-Marie Le Pen is proud of his military career, justifying among other things the torture of prisoners in Algeria, a constant reminder of the close traditional links between the extreme-right and veterans. Perhaps his most famous statement, which definitively killed any hopes of him being elected as President, was his denial of the Holocaust during the Second World War. On September 13th 1987, Jean-Marie Le Pen declared on radio when discussing gas chambers: "I never studied precisely the issue but I think it is a detail in the history of the Second World War". Jean-Marie Le Pen often provoked by among other things making jokes which were clearly anti-Semitic. In addition to racist and antiSemitic statements Jean-Marie Le Pen has made multiple homophobic declarations such as the one he made in March of 1995, stating that: "France is governed by pederasts: Sartre, Camus, Mauriac." 27 27
L'Express, 18 March 1995
27
Even if Front National tries to become cleaner, its old leader still continues to feed the media controversial statements. During the 2014 elections to the European Parliament he stated that “there is a demographic explosion in the world and a risk of submersion. A replacement [of the national population] is under way,â€? adding that "Monseigneur Ebola can solve the problem in three months." 28 In general previous heads of Front National have been implicated in many racist scandals. Looking at the evolution of the party it seems like provocations have been its best selling point, raising its profile and creating buzz. Provocations are a way for Front National to talk about subjects in simple ways while making a grand impact. Because of statements like these, few people want to publicly associate themselves with Front National, therefore the party has spent most of its time of existence alone in the political wilderness. Even in the second round of the 1988 presidential election when Jacques Chirac needed Le Pen's supporters to vote for him in the run-off against François Mitterrand, Chirac stated to Le Pen that he would never make concessions to Front National in his programme.
28
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/21/jean-marie-le-penebola-population-explosion-europe-immigration
28
3. Front National’s marginal role in French political institutions There are few who would dispute that Front National is a party unlike any other, however, there are several reasons for this perception. The party’s statements and political acts have solidified its provocative role in French political life. Since their entry into Parliament in 1984, proposals supported by Front National leaders do not really echo what the party has tried to do, namely to impose itself as the third political force. During the 90's Front National exploited the general EU-sceptic public sentiment following the Maastricht Treaty that divided French society, especially the centre-right, and created the foundation for future debates on further EU-integration. The EU-sceptic sentiment was wide-spread among the lower class. Initially Front National was considered to be an instrument of the left trying to reduce the political weight of the right. Indeed, the emergence of Front National as a real electoral force began when Jean-Marie Le Pen received real broadcast media coverage. Relying only on parliamentary support from a reduced left President Mitterrand intended to reduce the political weight of the French right. To do so, among other measures previously discussed such as reforming the
29
electoral system, he maintained cordial relations with and displayed mutual respect towards Jean-Marie Le Pen. Thus, it was François Mitterrand, President of the Republic, who demanded that the public TV channel Antenne 2 regularly invite the extreme-right leader. President Mitterrand was indeed very famous for his cynicism exemplified in 1983 when the left did a U-turn on economic policy. After nationalizations and a huge presence of the state in the economy, the left started to privatise state companies and made labour rules more flexible, removing some of the worst rigidities. The emergence
of
Front
National
reduced
right-wing
influence in Parliament but not sufficiently. This led to the first instance of cohabition, a President of the left nominated a Prime Minister from the right according to the National Assembly's majority. Without the aid of Mitterrand and in particular the changes to the electoral system he implemented it is difficult to see how JeanMarie Le Pen and Front National could have emerged on the national political scene in the way they did. Front National’s sudden success during the Mitterrand years has led many people to accuse Mitterrand of having helped initiate the expansion of Front National during the 80's. Today Front National is sometimes described as "the best ally of the system" by political outsiders on both the centre-left and centre-right such as Jean-Luc 30
Mélenchon 29 or Nicolas Dupont-Aignan. 30 The UMP has continuously criticised Front National for aiding the left, stating in a recent campaign leaflet that “a vote for FN = a vote for PS”. Based on electoral results, Front National is indeed the third or fourth political force in France and its electorate exerts a non-negligible influence on issues which have to be addressed in political discourse. Due to its frankness and ability to provoke, Front National has functioned as a taboo breaker, initiating debates and adding political themes to political discourse that perhaps never would have been talked about such as halal meat or immigration related issues which politicians from all mainstream parties do their best to try to avoid and if the established parties, PS and UMP, debate such issues they usually are of the same opinion. Front National remains a threat to the French centreright for two reasons. First the party siphons off rightwing voters from the main centre-right party. Second the possibility that French electoral law again changes to a proportional system exists. In such a repeat-scenario of the Mitterrand presidency’s change to a proportional 29
http://lemediascope.fr/video-melenchon-le-ps-et-lump-utilisent-le-frontnational/
30
http://nanterre.ville.orange.fr/actu/region/dupont-aignan-le-fn-est-lemeilleur-allie-du-systeme-ps-ump-91965.html
31
electoral system Front National would again split the parliamentary right in the National Assembly. From a leftwing perspective the growth of Front National can be seen as “a necessary evil” which reduces the political strength
of
the
centre-right,
providing
endless
opportunities for establishment politicians to present themselves
as
professional,
caring
and
altruistic,
contrasting themselves to Front National representatives. Over time, as Front National grew it became more of a political threat to the centre-left, and a paradoxical development took place. An alliance of sorts emerged between the UMP and PS to limit the possibility of Front National to reach positions of political power. For the purpose of protecting the Republic from the extremists, Front républicain emerged in 2002 after Jean-Marie Le Pen advanced to the second round of the presidential election. Because of the many left-wing candidates in presidential field, pre-election centre-left favourite Lionel Jospin unexpectedly failed to reach the second round. In the runoff Le Pen lost, but almost all other French parties worked together in order to limit the Front National vote. In the second round 17.79% voted for Le Pen against President Chirac, their best result under Jean-Marie Le Pen’s leadership.
32
During the 2012 Presidential campaign Marine Le Pen asserted that Front National is the "centre of gravity" 31 in French political life due to its electoral weight, its ability to attract different segments of the electorate regardless of voters’ political preferences, and its role as the defender of the "silent majority." 32 C.
The
roots and
reasons
of Front
National’s
euroscepticism
1. The French extreme-right’s historical affinity for Europe If we want to consider and study Front National’s vision for European cooperation and their EU views in particular it is first of interest to briefly examine extreme-right visions about Europe in general. The contemporary farright in France does not have a homogeneous vision about the European integration project (European Union), which is often inaccurately equated with Europe. In his 1984 book entitled Les Français d'abord! (French people first!), Jean-Marie Le Pen pays homage to extreme-right writer and holocaust denier Maurice Bardèche writing that he was "the prophet of a rebirth 31
http://www.lemonde.fr/election-presidentielle2012/breve/2012/04/28/marine-le-pen-juge-que-le-fn-est-devenu-lecentre-de-gravite-politique-de-la-campagne_1692744_1471069.html
32
http://www.metronews.fr/info/marine-le-pen-la-majorite-silencieuse-etla-revolution/mklk!p3hLZ8IYyGCDs/
33
that he hoped for during a long time." 33 Occident also claimed to represent the heritage of Bardèche during the Cold war. They called for a Western Bloc united against the Marxist and Internationalist Eastern Bloc. Their wish was to present an image or idea of Europe united against an enemy, standing side-by-side with the United States in order to defend Western civilisation. Because of the shared culture, and common Christian founding principles in Europe (in this context the focus is on Western Europe), there exists a fringe of the extreme-right that views a united Europe positively. Even though Occident promoted the superiority of the “French ethnic group,” one WWII collaborator, Robert Brasillach wrote that there exists a “common blood of all European people’s" which he refers to as the "mystic blood of Christ". 34 The Occident newspaper, Occident Université, wrote that there is a “common blood shared by all the people of Europe” and that a religious imperative justifies the creation of a Christian Europe for so called integrists (opponents of modernists who want to merge Christian theology with the liberal philosophy of secular modernity). Parallels can be drawn to some regionalists who at times highlight the importance of, and promote, the European integration project because it could represent a way for 33
34
Jean-Marie Le Pen, Les Français d'abord, Carrère Lafon, 1984 Occident université, No. 6, March 1965
34
their regions to be released from the yoke of the State which
currently
prevents
regional
self-rule
or
independence. The very pro-EU separatist parties in Catalonia, Scotland and Padania are just a few of many examples. Since the extreme-right is divided in several - and sometimes opposite – factions and trends, it is difficult to define a common extreme-right vision of Europe. The emergence of Front National was destined to unite these factions and therefore it is difficult to define a coherent Front National position on Europe. However one core tenant or principle of the extreme-right is to identify themselves as attached to a specific territory, it seems that views on Europe differ depending on which territory the group identifies itself as part of. In 1989, Front National proposed to create a Europe founded on a confederal model, inspired by the Swiss confederation which respects particularities of each region or canton.35 It is a vision which is supported by a part of Front National and that corresponds to the vision of a Europe united around traditional values. As Bruno MÊgret, former Front National member said: "Beyond their differences, there is a culture specific to Europeans,
35
Balent Magali, Le monde selon Marine. La politique internationale du Front national entre rupture et continuitĂŠ, Armand Colin, 2012, p. 109.
35
which separates them of the rest of the world" 36. JeanMarie Le Pen claims that "Europe [...] succeeded to establish, in diversity, a relatively homogenous world concerning its fundamental choices" 37. Indeed, a united Europe was the way to counteract “international communism” and after the fall of the USSR (he still considered an "anarchic upheaval" possible in Russia and Ukraine) resist the emergence of "third world" countries.
2. A Principled opposition to the EU as a supranational entity Contrary to EU integration advocates who claim the existence of a “European people”, Front National denies the existence of such a concept. If we define a people as a group with a common past and future, i.e. the same culture, history etc. it is difficult to argue convincingly in favour of the existence of a European people. However, Front National’s vision is that if we define a people as a population
in
its
own
territory
managed
by
an
institutional framework, then we can define it as a people. Contrary to some other countries in the French Republic communautarism, meaning the co-existence of separate ethnic communities within the state is not recognised. On the contrary this term is broadly rejected by French 36 37
Bruno Mégret, ‘L’Europe : identité et puissance’, Identité, no 1, 1989. Jean-Marie Le Pen, Les Français d’abord, Carrière-Lafon, 1984, p. 155.
36
society and the French state which does not really distinguish between nationality and citizenship. They are the same in the mind of a great majority of the French people, who hold the view that assimilation into the concept of a homogeneous nation is positive. Even if Marine Le Pen used to proclaim "Oui à l'Europe" (“Yes to Europe”), the Front National slogan during the last European elections distinguished between what Le Pen calls Europe and the EU. Indeed, the new slogan "Non à Bruxelles, oui à la France" (“No to Brussels, yes to France”) played up Front National’s resistance to the EU, and especially its intervention into economic and political life in many European countries. Front National declares itself in favour of a Europe of Nations. Nations are of importance to Front National because the party has adopted an organic vision of the nation, as if the French nation was an individual. This view was shared by Ernest Renan, a 19th century philosopher who wrote that: "The Nation, as an individual is the accomplishment of a long history of effort, sacrifice and devotion". 38 According to Marine Le Pen two opposing Europe’s are colliding: the first vision which she supports "the Europe of nations and of their people, of freedoms and identities", and the second that she denounces "the neototalitarian Europe", built against the will of the people 38
Ernest Renan, Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation?, Calmann Lévy, 1882
37
and against national sovereignty in order to favour international financial interests and globalization. Front National justifies its change of views concerning the creation of a European structure by the fact that a European construction was necessary to shield against the Communist block and as such it safeguarded the national cause. During the Cold War, the existential struggle against Communism justified Front National’s position. The very existence of a supranational entity which rules the French Republic is bound to clash with the preservation of a French national identity. Therefore Front National considers European federalism a threat to French identity. With the Maastricht Treaty, the concept of “EU-citizenship” was born. This was a symbolic affront to the French nation which marked the beginning of real opposition to the European integration project by Front National. Today they criticise the EU for two main reasons. First the risk of cosmopolitanism which Front National claims is triggered by the loss of reference points for the nation. The fear of losing French identity is particularly prevalent in speeches on immigration, often including harsh language. For the radical factions of the extremeright, cosmopolitanism represents a real risk of "racial mix", but in the actual language of Front National, what is 38
more often denounced are the difficulties of integration and problems immigrants are seen to have assimilating and accepting the French model. This reasoning of Front National defends an idea of a distinct French identity. The Schengen agreements are often criticised and so is the proposed theory of a "big replacement." This racialist theory brought forward by extreme-right writer Renaud Camus, is based on the idea that "visible minorities" are growing more and more, at a faster pace than “natives� who trend towards stagnation. Consequently, Camus claims (with a special aim at North African populations) that the French people are being replaced by foreigners within its own territory.
Front National regularly
denounces the fact that France has ceded control over its borders under the Schengen Agreement and that it is forbidden for a State to regulate its migration flows freely. The second main reason is the threat of weakening the EU Member-States and their powers. The growing power of EU and European institutions is seen as a threat to the very existence of the nation state. Indeed as former Front National MEP Jean-Yves Le Gallou put it, "the European construction is the way to erase nations in favour of a supranational State, which is a step towards a worldwide government". Using the argument that policies are an instrument and not a constraint, Front National argues 39
that policy imperatives have to be kept at the State's level in order to be adapted to the specific needs of the people of this State. Front National rejects the EU because it took over a lot of the French State's competences, and it sees the EU as an instrument of elite’s intent on applying their vision of a world controlled by economic considerations, regardless of the will of the French people. It is fair to assert that Front National today is opposed to the EU because in their view it totally disrupts the multisecular construction of Nation-States in Europe. This multi-secular
model
mixes
cultural,
historical,
and
educational aspects inside the nation where public authority is wielded by the state. The EU today is seen as renouncing these aspects that are fundamental to the French model.
3. Blaming the EU for the crises Front National perceives the EU as a threat to French identity because it seeks to harmonize and make uniform cultural, social and economic models in Europe. Marine Le Pen's programme for the Presidential elections in 2012 reads "The European Union is a Trojan Horse of ultraliberal globalization" and asserts that "European treaties since Maastricht order the dogma of free and non-distorted competition and, based on ideology, 40
forbids State aid for our enterprises, as well as prohibiting all forms of border protection in the EU and around the EU. European treaties forbid all forms of economic patriotism." 39 The construction of the European Union has been characterised by two underpinning ideological and strategic visions: a liberal free trade vision and a vision of centralised state-building. Many perceive the EU as being orientated towards more liberal policies and this is true to a large extent, however, the cost of EU overregulation and micro management is often neglected or ignored, likewise the redistributive aspects of the EU’s subsidy system and the Eurosystem are not widely discussed. In the early years the EU integration project was focused on trade and standing united against communism and in this
way
the
organisations
preceding
the
EU
corresponded to Front National’s ideology. Today the EU is something totally different and Front National nowadays opposes liberalism not only to further its electoral gains but because they interpret liberalism as meaning less political influence over the economy risking to dissolve the nation. Thus, in the thinking of Front National if the state is intervening less in the economy it means French interests cannot be defended as well and that workers are not sufficiently protected. Front 39
Programme for the Presidential elections in 2012, p. 5
41
National criticises the anarchy of globalisation by denouncing the free movement of goods and workers, especially so called “posted workers” who are employed in one EU Member State but sent by his employer on a temporary basis to carry out his work in another Member State. 40 Front National denounces privatizations of parts of the French economy saying such policies are not in line with French tradition and that the main burden is carried by the common man. Following the most recent financial, economic and debt crisis, Front National’s narrative was focused on globalisation, big finance and Europe as the guilty parties. They present France as threatened by outside forces and by co-conspiring elites. To solve the French economic crisis Front National calls for economic patriotism and limiting economic liberalism. Therefore the EU’s economic plans, including debt and deficit rules, must be abolished to make the vision of Front National possible. As a supranational entity managing the French state, Front National believes the EU does not and will not apply policies that favour the French people. The political programme of Front National always features an orientation towards the concept of 40
http://www.lemonde.fr/europeennes-2014/article/2014/04/16/europemarine-le-pen-et-le-texte-criminel-sur-les-travailleursdetaches_4402325_4350146.html
42
"national preference" and regardless of policy proposal Front National always adopts a view based around this concept. In the case of the EU Front National considers it responsible for the current crisis and the French political elite is accused of having supported the loss of state powers which could have solved the crisis. The practical effect of the EU controlling policies concerning migration flows, including rising insecurity has also led Front National to denounce the state's "loss of control". Front National asserts that the EU promotes immigration in order to push down wages and to dissolve national culture and cohesion. When Front National was in its liberal phase these arguments were used by the French far-left. Thus, beyond the principal opposition to a supranational institution's existence above the French state, Front National tries to present a more rational critique of the EU by asserting that it is at the origins of French problems today. This rational and down to earth rhetoric lends credibility to Front National’s opposition to the EU beyond its struggle for French independence and the survival of the nation. During their early years of existence Front National was rather positive towards the construction of European structures, mainly because they represented a civilizational claim – a union between European Nations. But after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the risk of progressive disappearance of 43
the French nation and the observation that the EU did not adopt policies favouring the common man led to the adoption of eurosceptic rhetoric.
44
Part II A radical change A. New leadership initiates the dédiabolisation process
1. What is dédiabolisation? In
French
diabolisation
means
demonisation
and
dédiabolisation is the opposite phenomenon. Opponents of Jean-Marie Le Pen often labelled him and Front National as Le diable [the devil]. Jean-Marie Le Pen's nickname even became le diable de la République [the devil of the republic]. With this background in mind dédiabolisation can be described as a process intended to change the public image of the party and steer it towards more respectable ground. If dédiabolisation is indeed taking place, it signals Front National's will to change strategy expanding its role from mainly agitators, in order to make electoral gains. The process of dédiabolisation indeed marks the starting point in Front National’s strive to convince the electorate and to reach the pinnacles of political power. Dédiabolisation is an on-going process in Front National combining a moderation of rhetoric, avoidance of verbal outbursts and incidents (which Jean-Marie Le Pen remains famous for) and a cleansing of troublemakers within the party including dismissals of managers that 45
were perceived to be too extreme. Steps have also been taken to distance the party from extremist groups such as Oeuvre française (French Work) who claim the heritage of Marshall Petain or Jeunesses nationalistes (Nationalist Youth) led by Alexandre Gabriac who once was a manager in Front National. Because of the distancing Front National lost the support of Oeuvre française during the last presidential elections. Instead the organisation accused the dédiabolised party under Marine Le Pen of "subscribing to Democracy which is at the root of all the problems" 41. Even Jean-Marie Le Pen, who remains Front National's Honorary President, and his entourage were dismissed from important party functions as part of the dédiabolisation process. The name of the political party is considered to be tainted to some extent by the origins of the party and its evolution over the years. Thus, it would be logical if the "dédiabolisation" process was accompanied by a change of name. Such moves have been fiercely opposed by Jean-Marie Le Pen who has called such discussion "idiotic", "indecent" and "unthinkable" 42. No name change has yet been tabled to a Front National Congress, however, Marine Le Pen has raised the possibility to have 41 42
Oeuvre française press release, 19th April 2012
http://www.leparisien.fr/politique/jean-marie-le-pen-changer-le-nomdu-fn-serait-debile-et-indecent-28-12-2013-3445903.php
46
a vote on whether or not party members want to debate such a proposal. This could be a first step towards changing the name. Instead of changing the name of the party, Marine Le Pen created the political coalition Rassemblement Bleu Marine (RBM) in order to gather all the sovereignist movements under one banner in the 2012 legislative elections. Rassemblement Bleu Marine united small parties such as Souveraineté, Indépendance Et Liberté the party of PaulMarie Coûteaux an Enarque (ENA, École nationale d'administration, alumni) who used to recruit key people for Front National and RBM. Since Jean-Marie Le Pen opposes changing the name of Front National, Marine Le Pen tried to hide Front National’s name and its bad connotations behind this new name calling all the patriots to gather around her. It seemed to be a new way of detaching old baggage from Front National’s name. The five main traits of the dédiabolisation process can be summarised as: - Denying Front National’s extreme-right origins. - An internal cleansing of the party. - Moderation of the party programme and the rhetoric. - Professionalising the party in order to be seen as more credible.
47
- Adapt a younger message, look and ideas, bringing a dynamic vision to the party. The last point includes featuring elected young people prominently, mainly in municipal elections.
2. The arrival of Marine Le Pen at the head of Front National On May 5th 2002 Marine Le Pen appeared on TV for the first time. She was a last minute replacement for Front National’s Communications Director Alain Vizier and she was not prepared. Since then a lot has changed. Front National has never been as close to power as it is today under her leadership. Her personal stature overcame the lack of single ideology within Front National. A large majority of Front National's supporters and activists (militants) are united behind Marine Le Pen’s quest for political power, even if they differ from views as we will show later. Without a doubt she is the person that launched the process of dÊdiabolisation. Her image as a woman and mother of three children brings forth a more favourable opinion of her party when she represents it. In stark contrast to her provocative father, Jean-Marie, she has adopted a more moderated rhetoric. She began her career as a regional councillor in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, a northern region bordering Belgium. In 2004 she was 48
elected to the European Parliament on top of Front National’s list in Ile-de-France which includes Paris and the surrounding region. In 2005 she led Front National’s campaign against the European Constitution. The phenomenon of dédiabolisation can be said to have started in earnest with dismissals of people who held important roles within the party that had criticised Marine Le Pen and her modernising methods. For example MarieFrance Stirbois, the only Front National MP between 1989 and 1993, was removed from the national board and the mayor of Orange, Jacques Bompard, left the national board. Marine Le Pen led her father’s presidential campaign in 2007 and created tensions within the party because she adopted a more republican line including accepting migrants if they have assimilated into French society. She was also heavily criticised inside the party for a poster of a North African woman who accused the left and right of having abandoned, destroyed and broken the principles of "nationality, assimilation, social mobility and secularism". 43 The weak result, 10.44% of votes, JeanMarie Le Pen received stood in stark contrast with his shocking result in 2002. Many managers within Front National attributed the bad result to Marine Le Pen having steered the party off its original ideological course. 43
http://www.slate.fr/story/52465/photos-campagne-2007-le-pen-affiche
49
In 2007 Front National did not manage to win a single seat in the National Assembly, but Marine Le Pen in the Lens constituency (Nord-Pas-de-Calais) came closest, gathering 24.24% of votes in the first round and then losing in the runoff with 32% to a socialist candidate. She was re-elected to the European Parliament in 2009, this time standing in the North-West electoral district, a Front National stronghold. It is noteworthy that the vote share for Front National in this region was down 2.68 percentage points from the 2004 European Parliament elections despite the candidacy of Marine Le Pen. The image of Front National being led by a paternal figure died during their Congress in January of 2011. Marine Le Pen was elected President of Front National. Her challenger for the leadership was Dr. Bruno Gollnisch, long time MEP who represented a more extremist political line. Indeed, Gollnisch has close links to Parti de la France and Oeuvre Franรงaise, small but explicitly xenophobic groups. Marine Le Pen won the leadership election with 75.76% of the votes. The arrival of Marine Le Pen, a young woman and divorced mother who looks dynamic and has a modern look, started an internal upheaval in a political party that for more than three decades had been led by a patriarch, her own father. The fact that a traditional right-wing party, often considered as the main extreme-right party of France, is 50
led by a woman and supported this woman as presidential candidate has done a lot to better the image of Front National, taking on many of the prejudices associated with the name Front National. After taking over as leader she has continuously developed the party in her direction. In April 2011, Time magazine published its annual Time 100 list of the most influential people in the world. Four French citizens were on the list, President Nicolas Sarkozy, European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet, MIT Economist Esther Duflo and Marine Le Pen at only 42 years old was ranked 71st.Her success continued in 2012 when she received the best result, 17.90%, for Front National in a presidential election. Like her father she personalized the party around her persona. During the 2012 presidential campaign Vague Bleu Marine (Navy/Marine blue wave) was an attempt to present a narrative of a phenomenon surrounding Marine Le Pen’s presidential campaign. She tried to portray this wave as a phenomenon which flowed over and drowned the old left and right as if a new consensus existed among the French population. The suggestion was (and remains) that a dynamic victory of the people against the political elites of France is coming and that this voluntary outpouring of popular support is a wave that nothing can resist, destroying the establishment standing in its way. 51
In order to increase her credibility she successfully portrayed an image of having an important international agenda. Among other PR stunts of little political meaning she was received (together with her niece Marion MarÊchal Le Pen) in the Duma, the Russian parliament, by the president of the Duma, Sergueï Narychkine, on the 12th of April 2014 in order to explain her position on Ukraine and to support the Russian position in the conflict. In late 2014, relations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and the French government remain obstructed, but Marine Le Pen continues to be close to the Russian authorities and demands that France establishes a "road between Washington and Moscow". She claims that the President of Russia "is aware that we defend common values", such as the "Christian heritage of European civilization" 44. Marine Le Pen’s advisor on foreign policy, Aymeric Chauprade, MEP, and other prominent Front National politicians visited Crimea as monitors of its independence referendum, lending the process credibility in the eyes of Russian state media viewers. Likewise the elections in the proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk republics were monitored by extreme-right politicians
from
Europe,
including
Front
National
representatives. In late November 2014 reports that Front 44
http://www.courrierinternational.com/article/2014/05/27/marine-lepen-l-alliee-revee-de-poutine
52
National borrowed 9 million euros from a Russian bank with ties to the Kremlin emerged. Front National claims that French and European banks refused loans to the party, calling it “scandalous”. Front National has previously struggled to obtain financing for its activities. In France parties often take loans to fund election campaigns. Campaign expenses are reimbursed by the state after the election has taken place. A BVA survey published in June 2014 found that 81% of French respondents and 74% of self-expressed Front National sympathisers considered Jean-Marie Le Pen a "handicap" to the party45. His daughters wish is to limit his public appearances. One example of how he is damaging to the party was when he commented on a French-Jewish artist’s, Patrick Bruel, critique during the European Parliament election campaign 2014 by making a suttle reference to the Holocaust saying Bruel and other critics can be dealt with at once, using a baking and cooking reference. 46 Mass media started an immediate attack, denouncing his statements as anti-Semitism. Marine Le Pen condemned her father’s words and the video on Front National’s website was removed. At the
45
http://www.lepoint.fr/politique/sondage-jean-marie-le-pen-trahi-par-lessiens-14-06-2014-1836133_20.php
46
http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x1yucfg_le-pen-attaque-bedosmadonna-noah-et-bruel-on-fera-une-fournee-la-prochaine-fois_tv
53
same time Jean-Marie Le Pen’s weekly updated blog published on the party website was discontinued. JeanMarie Le Pen wrote a letter to contest the decision but his daughter who decides on issues of importance to the party and is in charge of the development of its communication strategy refused to change her decision. According to the above mentioned survey 47, 91% of the French population have a negative opinion of Jean-Marie Le Pen, and this view is shared by a stunning 52% of Front National sympathisers. Comparing Jean-Marie to his daughter it is clear that she has a reputation as a good orator, while 77% consider her to be extreme right-wing, 71%
provocative/aggressive,
demagogic . 48
At
the
same
58% time
racist 68%
and
62%
of
these
respondents considered her brave. Perhaps a sign of the deep resentment of the French political class she is claiming to be taking on. The same opinion poll showed that 72% prefer Marine Le Pen over her father, and this view is shared by 97% of Front National sympathisers. Clearly her attempts to modernise the party have been welcomed by party sympathisers and the public at large. While she
47
http://www.bva.fr/fr/sondages/_la_personnalite_de_la_semaine/la_pers onnalite_au_crible_jean-marie_le_pen.html 48 http://www.leparisien.fr/politique/sondage-65-des-francais-ont-unemauvaise-opinion-de-marine-le-pen-15-09-2013-3138381.php
54
modernised the party the past still has not been eliminated. 70% of respondents in the BVA poll thought that Marine Le Pen shares ideas close to her father, a drop from 86% in 2011. Considering this drop and the diabolisation of Front National under Jean-Marie Le Pen the perceived growing distance between father and daughter can be seen as concrete proof that the "dĂŠdiabolisation" strategy is succeeding in changing the perception of Front National.
3. The professionalisation of the party The policy programme Front National published during the 2012 Presidential elections was the most detailed programme ever presented by the party totalling over one hundred pages. 49
A risk of sorts as all proposed
programmes can be criticised based on methodology of cost calculations alone. 50 This proposal of written down policies shows that Front National is trying to become more credible by showing that its policies are possible to implement, that policies were crafted by experts and that they can be positive for the French economy. Florian Philippot’s arrival to the party in 2010 acted as a stimulant. This young Enarque and graduate from École des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) used to be a 49 50
http://www.frontnational.com/pdf/Programme.pdf http://www.frontnational.com/chiffrage-du-projet-presidentiel/
55
member of the Mouvement républicain et citoyen (Citizen & Republican Movement), a left-wing eurosceptic party founded by former Minister and Socialist party founder Jean-Pierre Chevènement. Florian Philippot follows the social-gaullist
heritage
of
Philippe
Séguin
also
represented by the sovereignist movement headed by Charles Pasqua & Philippe de Villiers, Rassemblement pour la France et l'Indépendance de l'Europe, that received 13% of the vote in the 1999 European elections. An opponent of the proposed European Constitution in 2005, he even participated in meetings with far-left leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon who at the time was still a member of the PS. Philippot claims to have submitted a blank ballot in the 2002 presidential elections when Jean-Marie Le Pen participated in the second round. He considered JeanMarie Le Pen's programme to be incomplete and lacking perspective. 51 After graduating from the prestigious École nationale d'administration, France’s top school for prospective bureaucrats, Philippot met Marine Le Pen thanks to Paul-Marie Coûteaux, an Enarque and former MEP from Rassemblement Pour la France who is very close to Marine Le Pen and very well known in sovereignist circles in France. Philippot rapidly became the right hand
51
http://leplus.nouvelobs.com/contribution/567212-florian-philippotemmene-le-fn-au-2nd-tour-je-l-ai-rencontre.html
56
man and advisor to Marine Le Pen and she made him strategic director of her Presidential campaign. The emergence of Philippot alongside Le Pen at the head of Front National signalled that the party was able to gather people from both the political left and right, and that it could promote to important positions people from the left-wing of the party. Philippot, a convinced republican, influenced and promoted the process of dÊdiabolisation and began to professionalise the party. Following his and Marine Le Pen’s arrival Front National is actively pursuing ways of reaching political power. As it becomes more professional its credibility increases and it consequently tries to reach new voters. Front National portrays itself as an alternative to the system, which it denounces as being controlled by the UMPS a play on the abbreviations of UMP and PS, the two largest right- and left-wing parties. The party has tried to come up with more credible ideas and policy proposals that Marine Le Pen can propose and defend. The professionalization of the party is essential to this process and Marine Le Pen has used the creation of collectives in charge of several issues to effectivise this process. In an effort to make its programme for the upcoming presidential elections as credible as possible Front National has launched several collectives or working 57
groups of professionals tasked with studying issues relating to their own profession or sector. These collectives attempt to stimulate intellectual discussion and debate ideas with the goal of trying to reach universities and civil servants with the message and policies of Front National. Collectif Racine 52 for example consists of teachers that are close to Rassemblement Bleu Marine. The group lobbies and proposes education related policies closely linked to RBM and by extension Front National, acting as a sort of single issue think-tank. Along similar lines, Front National has launched a collective that gathers young students under the name Collectif Marianne 53. The collective reaches and recruits young people that are studying, trying to counter the prejudice that people have about Front National and its supporters. The name Collectif Marianne and the use of the symbol of the French Republic, Marianne, is an indication that Front National wants to be considered as republican. Like the other collectives, people who participate have to be useful to Front National as the party prepares its programme for 2017. The programme intends to propose solutions that the members of the multiple collectives are confronted with 52 53
in
their
http://www.collectifracine.fr/ http://www.collectifmarianne.fr/
58
daily
life.
By
including
participants from civil society and professionals from various fields the goal is no doubt to offer every group what they want while trying to reach all segments of the population. The last collective to be launched, in the beginning of September 2014, was named the Collectif Audace. It gathers young working people and strives to promote entrepreneurship and economic activity to young people. Front National makes efforts to surround the party with specialists from the political world like the former principal private secretary of Alain JuppĂŠ, Philippe Martel 54, a prominent Enarque. The party also tries to attract specialists from academia and the professional world such as Philippe Murer (finance) and Aymeric Chauprade (geopolitics). Aymeric Chauprade joined Front National ahead of the European elections in 2014 and was elected to the European
Parliament.
An
academic
specialising
in
geopolitics, his influence, reputation and opposition to recent EU-sanctions against Russia gave him a meeting with the President of the Russian Duma together with ten French MP’s. 55 Chauprade is often consulted on 54
http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/fn/philippe-martel-l-hommede-juppe-passe-chez-le-pen_1296854.html 55 http://www.la-croix.com/Actualite/Monde/Quand-une-dizaine-deparlementaires-francais-affichent-leur-Poutinophilie-a-Paris-2014-09-041201162
59
issues relating to the Middle East, having experience serving as advisor to the King of Morocco, Mohamed VI. Front National is also preparing to take power locally. Previously Front National mayors usually had a bad reputation and faced a lot of criticism. Therefore one of the main strategies implemented as part of the professionalization drive has been to create a structure intended to help, frame and supervise the actions of Front National mayors. Advice will be given to Front National mayors on specific subjects such as town planning, adjudications, their right to comment in the press and questions of jurisdiction. The party’s lack of experienced and skilled local politicians is a danger because they will be responsible for the only assessment available to judge Front National’s capability to govern. Competence is what the leadership under Marine Le Pen strives for, they know these mayors actions will come under
close
scrutiny.
Since
Front
National
lacks
competent high-profile politicians, it wants to avoid misconduct, gaffe’s, and mistakes from its more prominent members who have responsibilities within the party and represent its policies. Interestingly
Front
National
highlights
how
the
professionalization drive is proceeding, trying not to hide its past but instead focusing on how tomorrow’s Front National will look and sound. 60
This process could take a long time, as an executive from the party stated to Le Nouvel Obs, "Front National will not be ready before 2022" and that "Marine does not count on winning in 2017. A very good result, yes, but not winning. For her, the real chance is in 2022. Until then, Front National will not be ready and the conditions for victory will not be in place: the decomposition of the right and the left". 56 Indeed it is true that Front National lacks great minds and skilled politicians necessary to develop the party and hold positions of responsibility within it. They would also be valuable candidates for the party’s list. The wish to professionalise the party goes hand in hand with the wish to expand its electoral territory beyond its current strongholds. B. Constructing a new identity by trying to reject extreme-right elements
1. Moderation and denial of Front National’s origins Using Front National’s own rhetoric it would be correct to state that the construction of a new identity for the party, a fundamental part of the dédiabolisation process, is a denial of its own origins. Marine Le Pen claims that her party was founded by people who resisted Nazi 56
http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/politique/20140919.OBS9779/enpanne-de-cerveaux-marine-le-pen-vise-plus-2022-que-2017.html
61
occupation and that it promotes resistance 57, in fact Front
National
had
close
links
to
networks
of
collaborators. For instance, Georges Bidault, resistance fighter and former President of the National Council of Resistance, founded Front National but left it a few weeks later. There were also collaborators like former Waffen-SS member Pierre Bousquet among the ranks. Paradoxically, Jean-Marie Le Pen and many of the key people in the early years of Front National had been members of or were close to OAS whereas today some leaders such as Florian Philippot claim a Gaullist heritage. But as Jean-Yves Camus pointed out, the memoirs of the former Secretary-General of Front National Victor BarthĂŠlĂŠmy, entitled Du communisme au fascisme (From Communism to Fascism) are a confession. The political change which occurred in Front National during the 1990's displayed the weak ideological base of the party and above all its willingness to alter rhetoric so that it could be perceived as defending the people against the elites. A political party functions in many ways as an enterprise. If the party is ready to compromise on its convictions it can adjust what it offers to the electorate to more or less correspond to voters wishes. This type of poll-based 57
http://www.liberation.fr/politiques/2013/10/07/marine-le-pen-tente-denettoyer-le-fn-a-la-racine_937677
62
policy proposals are without a doubt a main-stay of modern politics. Almost all mainstream parties use trackpolling and focus groups to test the popularity of policies before announcing them. Extreme-right parties such as Front National have likewise adjusted their rhetoric to promote a “national preference” and opposition to immigration. One Jean-Marie Le Pen slogan in the campaign of 2007 exemplified this rhetoric: "Le Pen in the Élysée, jobs for all the French!" On February 17th 2014, Marine Le Pen was confronted by a listener during a radio interview who reminded her that Front National was economically more liberal under JeanMarie Le Pen. She responded "We were never in favour of massive privatisations, it is nonsense, we favour a strategic state" 58. As previously showed, Front National was especially proud of its liberal past under Jean-Marie Le Pen who in 1974 wanted "to privatise all that can be privatised" and opposed the system of taxation. According to Jean-Yves Camus, a specialist on the French extreme-right, the "difficulty for Front National was always to conciliate the economic and social expectations of its supporters and voters because the factions of the classe populaire (working class) and liberal professionals oppose each other". The French journalist Dominique 58
http://www.liberation.fr/politiques/2013/02/19/marine-le-pen-enterrele-liberalisme-a-papa_883001
63
Albertini at Liberation who wrote The History of the Front National asserted in an interview that "In reality, the creation of Front National in 1972 can be considered as an attempt of dĂŠdiabolisation by its promoters, the small right-wing group Ordre Nouveau that wanted to enter the political arena but was hindered by its bad reputation." 59 Even if regular statements and actions can be used to show the contrary, it seems the political life of Front National since its inception has centred on a search of respectability. The qualification as extreme-right clearly is an obstacle to a national breakthrough for Front National. Therefore it is a crucial objective of Front National to rid itself of this baggage. In fact, Marine Le Pen has threatened to sue journalists and politicians who qualify her or her party as extreme-right.
2. A disturbed political landscape which benefits Front National Since Pompidou's presidency in 1969, Front National considers UMP and PS as a permanent government that has not shared power with others. Therefore they also bare responsibility for the crisis in France. Change without alternative could be a way to briefly define how 59
http://www.liberation.fr/politiques/2013/09/20/front-national-jusqu-ouira-t-il_933368
64
Front National sees changes of parliamentary majorities and presidential posts between these two parties. They consider these two parties as one and the same and have branded them as UMPS combining the two names in order to communicate that there is no difference between the traditional left and right, at least in the form of the UMP and the PS. When the policies of the two traditional parties are similar and constantly moving towards the centre it creates room for a new movement which can incorporate values abandoned by these parties. In 1992 Richard Katz and Peter Mair presented their so called Cartel theory arguing that political “parties in Western Europe have adapted themselves to declining levels of participation and involvement in party activities by not only turning to resources provided by the state but by doing so in a collusive manner.â€? In their view the "convergence of social-democrats and moderate conservatives‌entails the electoral breakthrough of the authoritarian right, encouraging
voters
to
abandon
their
established moderate conservative parties".
loyalty 60
to
During his
2007 campaign Nicolas Sarkozy attracted Front National votes by pushing themes of law and order and migration, an assessment of his actual term as President of Republic 60
Herbert Kitschelt, The Radical Right in Western Europe, Ann Arbor - MI, University of Michigan Press, 1995, p. 17.
65
showed that this was mainly a political tactic with little substance. For instance, Sarkozy promised to clean up in ghettos saying the karcher [high-pressure washer] would be deployed against delinquents, but insecurity only increased during his mandate. In 2012 Marine Le Pen received 17.90% of votes in contrast to 2007 when JeanMarie Le Pen only obtained 10.44%. This indicates that Katz and Mair's theory is confirmed since Nicolas Sarkozy could not really stop Front National with the same promises he made and broke previously. With only a few exceptions the leaders of UMP (François Fillon, Alain JuppÊ etc.) have adopted an increasingly centrist political orientation. This has given Front National an opportunity to emerge as the new party of the right on the political landscape even if it is difficult to claim this status while at the same time claiming that the party stands above the traditional left-right divide in politics. But by highlighting areas where the UMP has failed Front National tries to pick up the support of these voters.
3. Beyond the traditional right-left split Since the 90's Front National has refused to accept classifications as a left or right-wing party, however, its social conservative values and economic principles mean that on the French political landscape they are mostly identified as right-wing. Today the will to overcome the 66
old left-right paradigm has led them to a confusing position. Front National’s new economic programme promotes left-wing principles while defending "national interests.” Like in previous decades the party leans right on value issues. This makes Front National hard to place on the traditional left-right scale, even if general definitions of right and left are very imprecise. In its 2012 Presidential Programme, Front National defines the goal of the French state as: The "emergence of the French nation over centuries is characterised by a central role for the state, a strong state which unified the nation, contained feudalism and communitarianism, destroyed tribalism, organised and developed
our
territory and progressively offered everyone education, care, security and public services of quality". 61 Even if certain statements, increasingly avoided, can divide the French public, nowadays Front National officially wants to gather the French people regardless of religion, origin, or identification on the left-right scale etc. Ideologically Front National does not hesitate to refer to figures from the extreme-right such as Robert Brasillach 62 or the left’s Jean Jaurès. 63 For example Louis Aliot, the
61
Programme for the Presidential elections 2012, page 5, 106. http://www.lepoint.fr/politique/election-presidentielle-2012/quand-lepen-cite-brasillach-18-02-2012-1432808_324.php 63 http://www.lejdd.fr/Politique/Actualite/Le-FN-affiche-Jaures-75586 62
67
partner of Marine Le Pen, used the portrait of Jean Jaurès, a socialist leader and founder of SFIO 64 in 1905, the predecessor of the PS, during his campaign for the European Parliament elections in 2009. On his posters he quoted Jaurès saying "to those who have nothing, the fatherland is their single good” adding that "Jaurès would have voted Front National". Against the backdrop of constant failures of the rightand left-wing parties in power for the last decades, the strategy of Front National consists of picking up disappointed voters in order to reverse the trend of constant failures in France. Front National rhetoric claims the party’s priority is to redress France and this ambition requires the
rhetoric of a national gathering, a
rassemblement. For example one of the slogans used during the 2012 presidential elections by Marine Le Pen was "La voix du peuple, l'esprit de la France" (The voice of the People, the spirit of France). In this way she tries to frame herself as the representative of a popular revolution that will culminate in Front National gaining power. Another of the new Front National slogans intended to appeal to French citizens from all camps since Marine Le Pen took over as leader has been "Ni droite, ni gauche: Front National!" (Neither right, nor left: Front National!). 64
French section of the Workers’ International
68
However in France the split between left and right is still very prominent in political discourse and an important reason people vote in elections. The French electoral system has two rounds of voting and single-seat constituencies that favour and entrench the two main right-wing and left-wing parties PS and UMP. The strategy of branding Front National beyond the left-right scale is limited because voters are used to alternate between PS and UMP. At times a strong third political force has emerged in the centre but this has always been followed by them allying with the main right-wing party. Cohabitation, meaning the parliamentary majority is not formed by the same political party that elected the president, has become less likely as opposing views on major issues have emerged between and within these parties. For example cohabitation during the 1980’s revealed too many views held by the UMP that could be represented by Front National. Since an alliance between the centrist forces and the UMP looks impossible at this moment it is highly likely that if Front National continues to be the biggest political force in France the UMP will implode.
69
C. The confused political identity of Front National
1. Conservative values and leftist economics The main themes raised in political discourse by Front National concern national identity and security. Many other related issues are tied to these. Traditional rightwing values can be found in relation to Front National policies on immigration which the party wants to see radically reduced. Front National wants to introduce a system of selective immigration and make it harder to obtain citizenship. A punitive justice system with emphasis on security and national priorities is also promoted. These views are strongly held by party supporters, however, Front National under Marine Le Pen has tried to moderate its programme. The moderation is mainly noticeable in the way the party presents its policies and the arguments it uses. For instance, Marine Le Pen abandoned the expression national preference in favour of national priority because the first expression could be considered as too overtly nationalist. Front National also proposes to reduce the duration of residence permits from ten to three years and to abandon the principle of Jus soli (right of the soil) whereby anyone born on French territory automatically obtains French citizenship. The party also wants to limit the
possibility
for
illegal
70
immigrants
to
become
naturalised citizens. 65 While the above themes can be described as tougher takes on traditional right-wing policies, Front National’s economic policies are clearly left-wing, statist and influenced by a conventional French focus on national priorities. One example of the leftist economic policies aspoused by Front National is the programme presented during the presidential elections in 2012. Marine Le Pen called for a net increase of €200 for all incomes up to €1500, she proposed
to
nationalise
strategic
companies
and
presented the protection of public services as one of the main tasks of Front National. Protectionism is the main solution offered by Front National to improve the French economy. In addition Front National presents itself as the alternative for those who want a more inclusive and direct democratic system. Their many references to the lack
of
democracy
and
support
for
proportional
representation and referendums have attracted many voters that feel disenfranchised by the current political system. The party denounces European treaties that threaten the French social model, demand restrictive budget policies, and give up French sovereignty – a critique that mixes economic and democratic arguments. 65
http://www.frontnational.com/le-projet-de-marine-le-pen/autorite-deletat/immigration/
71
Marine Le Pen often argues that 80% of French laws voted on in the National Assembly stems from the EU thus circumventing the traditional method of legislation in France. The party also calls for more transparency in politics in order to defend democratic imperatives. Front National also attacks the influence of media and journalists. “In order to assure freedom of the press” Marine Le Pen proposes to forbid "big groups dependent on public funds controlling the media".
2. Front National’s policies correspond to the extremeright tradition Despite dédiabolisation and the sudden ideological bend adopted by Front National it can still be defined as an extreme-right party. For instance, the logo of Front National has remained the same despite an explicit reference to the flame that represented the Movimiento sociale italiano (MSI), founded after the Second World War when fascism was banned. In the beginning, it was a real symbol for how Front National tried to unite the national right, today in the wake of dédiabolisation there is a real wish to change the logo and to modify the name of the party which often is caricatured. For instance, the abbreviation FN is pronounced the same way as "F-haine", and "haine"
72
means "hate". It is used because Front National‘s rhetoric is considered to be xenophobic. The
extreme-right
qualification
is
admittedly
very
subjective. French historian Michel Winock, a specialist in the
history
of
the
French
Republic,
intellectual
movements, anti-Semitism, nationalism and the far-right movements of France has stated that many conditions need to be fulfilled in order to consider a movement as extreme-right. Among these are a perceived hate of the present
status-quo,
which
today’s
Front
National
denounces, albeit in moderated form compared to JeanMarie Le Pen, the evolution of society and references to ancient figures like Jeanne d'Arc, a nostalgic image of a France that used to be better and nostalgia for a golden age. Today’s Front National often refers to the French economy after the Second World War and celebrates the French heritage. Front National presents candidates for elections and today does not try to incite violence in the streets. In this way it differs from fascist parties like the ones in Europe during the first part of the 20th century. Without a doubt,
even
if
Front
National
tries
to
become
respectable, it can be classified as an extreme-right organisation. Hannah Arendt, who studied totalitarianism and extreme-right movements, considers the feeling of a “crisis of modernity” as central to far-right parties. This 73
modernity is the arrival of a consumption based society and a society of the masses. She asserts that modernity carries more and more importance in an economical sense and a substitution of the public sector by the private sector, a development which she claims has contributed to an individualization of society 66. Therefore the growth of extreme-right parties builds on a reaction against changes caused by modernity as she defines it. If we consider modernity as some flashes of liberalism in France combined with the development of a supranational framework of treaties and institutions, they entail an upheaval of traditional structures and we can indisputably assert that the European Union represents these developments. In addition, Front National denounces the oligarchy, the elites who dominate the country economically and politically while not act in favouring the general public. Front National’s rhetoric of opposing the elite and claiming to stand up for the oppressed people have lead to charges of populist rhetoric. Front National criticises the parliamentary system for not being representative and proposes proportional representation in the elections to the National Assembly. Their proclaimed defence of the national preference and the 66
choice
of
prioritising
the
French
Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Calmann-LĂŠvy, 1961
74
people
in
combination with denouncing too lax immigration policies and linking insecurity to immigration led the party to be considered an extreme-right party. Indeed, the rejection of certain people is a part of the extreme-right tradition, and despite the moderated stance on immigration recently, Jean-Marie Le Pen's statements and party activists’ declarations such as the one comparing the Minister of Justice to a monkey are objectively racist and xenophobic. In the thirties French extreme-right movements such as Croix de Feu [Cross of Fire] used to be more socialist. They considered the link between the nation and the state of utmost importance and saw liberalism as a threat to the Nation State. Occident université, the newpaper of Occident, described liberalism as "perverse and damaging in every shape and form, liberalism is the most dangerous enemy of nationalism". 67 The extreme-right’s position on liberalism is logical, liberalism seeks to empower the individual at the expense of accumulated state power thus undermining the traditional totalitarian vision of nationhood as tied to the state. Front National’s programme makes references to socialist ideas and contains a moderated nationalism that corresponds to the traditional ideology of extreme-right movements in Europe. Pierre-André Taguieff, author of a 67
Occident université, No. 6, March 1965
75
number of books and papers on racism and antiSemitism, classifies this kind of political movement as national-populism 68. It is reminiscent of the collectivist politics of Mussolini’s fascism or Hitler’s Nazism that combined state control of enterprise and industry with an idea of the nation as something unifying on a grand scale. But it is not only Front National’s economic programme and recurring themes that have earned them the label extreme-right. The party also embraces the classical totalitarian Führerprinzip favouring a strong leader to guide the nation. Pascal Perrineau 69 asserts that Front National "remains characterised by values of order and authority [...], without forgetting the cult of the leader". 70 Front National has also shown that it can be less conservative and reactionary when it comes to some political issues such as gay marriage. Front National did not take an official position during this heated debate that led to mass demonstrations in France in 2013. Marine Le Pen could have judged opposition to gay marriage to be a vote-loser and therefore only claimed to be against it in a personal capacity. The extreme-right newspaper Minute did write that a "gay lobby" around Marine Le Pen
68
Taguieff Pierre-André, Le nouveau national-populisme, 2012 Director at CEVIPOF and a specialist on the French extreme-right. 70 http://www.lopinion.fr/6-octobre-2013/fn-l-extreme-droite-nationalpopulisme-4785 69
76
manages Front National, an accusation she denied. 71 The gay vote actually constituted a somewhat important electorate for Front National with 19% voting for Marine Le Pen in 2012 compared to 14% in 2007 under JeanMarie Le Pen. She tried to attract this electorate, mainly by talking about gays as victims of "religious laws that replace the laws of the Republic" 72, an explicit reference to Muslim communautarism. It seems like Front National, while trying to rid itself of its image as an extreme-right party, still embodies many traits that make it possible to continue classifying the party as extreme-right. Extreme-right is without a doubt a subjective description with negative connotations that frightens and leads to suspicion. However, the bleak reality in France today has made views that stem from the extreme-right and that previously would have been taboo more common. Marine Le Pen is often accused of being a populist because she is seen as proposing simple solutions presented in brief as magic remedies to real problems. There is no doubt that the modern media landscape focused on short, high-impact stories, generalises and takes
shortcuts
when
reporting
71
on
extreme-right
http://www.leparisien.fr/politique/lobby-gay-au-fn-philippot-accuseminute-de-propager-des-rumeurs-08-01-2013-2463145.php 72 Speech in Lyon, December 2010
77
movements such as Front National. However, attacks and accusations from the media help promote a victim role that Front National strives in. For example during the presidential elections 2012 when Marine Le Pen needed the signatures of 500 mayors to be eligible as a presidential candidate she claimed people were being pressured by journalists and establishment parties not to sign in support of her candidacy for President.
3. An increasingly schizophrenic party Florian Philippot caused uproar and controversy within the party when he announced on the 9th of November 2012 he would pay his respects to Charles de Gaulle at his modest tomb in Colombey-Les-Deux-Eglises on the anniversary of de Gaulle’s death. 73 This announcement exemplifies the duality within Front National. There are real opposing factions when it comes to values and historical interpretation. Party executives reacted by criticising the Vice-president of the party’s initiative publicly. Bruno Gollnisch for instance asserted that "For sure I will never do it, it is a personal position. I will be shocked if he participates in the name of Front National". Gollnisch asserted that de Gaulle "contributed to the division of the French people for a long period of time". 73
http://lelab.europe1.fr/florian-philippot-sur-la-tombe-du-general-degaulle-revolution-au-front-national-5659
78
Marine Le Pen also distanced herself by stating that "it is a personal imitative, I was informed but it does not involve Front National". In this instance Marine Le Pen confirmed that Front National did not claim a Gaullist heritage. Front National used to be almost proud of the misconduct of its radical elements and its extreme-right past, however, Marine Le Pen has tried to remove these links and minimise bad behaviour. Despite her efforts executives from the old days remain in the party and still retain some responsibilities and continue to express themselves publicly. The arrival of Florian Philippot did bring in a new more moderated vision calling for unity of the French people around Republican values and the freedom of France. His role model is without a doubt de Gaulle, as he calls himself a "social Gaullist". During the municipal elections of 2014, he did not hesitate to cause another controversy within Front National by adding a "Lorraine cross" 74, a symbol of General de Gaulle and Free France during WWII, to Front National’s logo. Previously on the 11th of December 2013, Philippot had publicly stated that "Front National is a gaullist party". Marine Le Pen responded in a 74
http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2013/12/16/0101620131216ARTFIG00553-municipales-le-logo-de-campagne-de-philippotdeplait-aux-jeunes-gaullistes.php
79
letter rejecting this description. She wrote: "even if one of forty members of Front National's Political board, one of the eight members of its executive board, and one of its vice-presidents claims it [a Gaullist heritage] based on their own feelings and personal history, they do not represent the movement." 75 She specifically rejected Philippot’s claim by stating that: "Front National is not Gaullist even though it does not forbid references to certain Gaullist ideas such as the strategic State, referenda or the defence of national self-determination or defence of sovereignty. In this sense we are and remain the only movement defending this political tradition". She concluded that "we are for the gathering of patriots and each person is free to honour their own memory". Although it has some prominent adherents within Front National the Gaullist tradition is not the most important tradition in the party, and Marine Le Pen rejects the reference. The niece of Marine Le Pen, Marion MarÊchal Le Pen, MP, declared "I will not go put flowers on de Gaulle's tomb". 76 Front National gathers a variety of ideas and ideologies but lacks an ideological base and ideological coherence. 75
http://www.atlantico.fr/pepites/front-national-marine-pen-contreditflorian-philippot-racines-gaullistes-parti-951717.html 76 http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2013/06/20/0100220130620ARTFIG00529-marion-marechal-le-pen-je-n-irai-pas-fleurir-latombe-de-de-gaulle.php
80
Its ideological base is vague because party positions reflect its extreme-right past and the difficulty of removing this image, especially since many activists and party officials remain attached to these origins. Incoherent historical references to de Gaulle have led to awkwardness about Front National’s essence. The important bend of values and ideology has contributed to claims that the party suffers of schizophrenia. There is also a gap between old party executives who generally stem from the extreme-right and followed JeanMarie Le Pen, and newly arrived followers often charmed by the new clean trend of Florian Philippot. The 1st of May each year when Front National parades through Paris paying their respect to Jeanne d'Arc, who liberated France from English invaders, this split between old and new is clearly visible: while some are integrist Catholics, others have tattoo’s of swastikas etc. The majority, however, increasingly looks like a representative sample of the population lacking references or links to extremeright groups. Perhaps the most important question to ask is: are these internal differences a threat to the party’s success? Are they able to provoke an implosion? This question is difficult to answer because it depends on too many external variables such as monopolization of Gaullism by some people or rejection of it by others, nostalgia of the 81
party’s extreme-right origins or total opposition to its past, extremist ideas or moderated policy proposals. Supporters and even the party leader seem to share this division about which view to support. Despite emerging as the main driver of new recruitment and support, As she has attempted to moderate the party Marine Le Pen has faced increasing criticism from supporters of the party on the extreme-right. This trend is expected to change as on one side old supporters continue to be attached to the controversial personality of Jean-Marie Le Pen and his more virulent ideas, while on the other, the majority of new supporters seem to have adopted the vision of Marine Le Pen, approving more of her personal than that of her father. Without a doubt Marine Le Pen is the unifying link between the different factions of today’s Front National.
82
Part III Le premier parti de France A. Conquering the ballot box - becoming the largest French party
1. Sudden electoral growth stimulated by Marine Le Pen The growth of Front National’s share of the vote is a testament to the increasing ability of Front National to be in a position of power. The mere presence of Front National candidates in the majority of elections is another sign that the party is able to impose itself as a real and unavoidable force in French political life. Since its inception Front National’s electoral success or failure can be divided into two phases. From its inception until 1986, Front National remained a marginal political party lacking media exposure. During its first ten years in existence support declined and Front National was very not far ahead of other small far-right groups. The party was not a real political force with popular policy proposals and election victories. However, during its second phase it enjoyed increased electoral success and as previously explained this success was mainly driven by Jean-Marie Le Pen and his many famous and controversial statements. Front National also owes gratitude to François Mitterrand who used the rise 83
of Front National as a means of limiting the parliamentary strength of the French right. When thirty-five Front National members were elected to the National Assembly in 1986 due to the proportional system the party for the first time became a real political force in France. Ever since 1986 Front National’s election successes (the exception being the failed campaign of 2007), have been considered and portrayed by mass media as a new political earthquake. Indeed, if we only focus on election results, Front National obtained between 14 and 16% of the vote at legislative elections, and perhaps more remarkable the results are similar in Presidential elections. In the second round of the 2002 presidential election, Jean-Marie Le Pen only obtained 0.93 percentage points more votes (+ 720.300) compared to his result in the first round. This result exposed how weak the electoral reserve is for Front National since Bruno MÊgret, also a candidate, represented 667.000 voters in the first round and it is a reasonable assumption that his voters supported Le Pen in the second round. In 2007 the amount of potential Front National voters was diminished by the right-wing campaign rhetoric of Nicolas Sarkozy who promised to clean up in the ghettos. Jean-Marie Le Pen lost a large part of his voters receiving only 10.44% in the first round. The 2002 runner-up was relegated to fourth place. 84
The arrival of Marine Le Pen as leader of Front National created a new dynamic mainly due to the implied change and the backdrop of an economic crisis which caused a rejection of Nicolas Sarkozy. With 17.9% of votes in the first round of the 2012 presidential elections she managed to obtain the same vote share that supported her father in the second round ten years earlier. In the 2014 European elections Front National reached a tremendous vote share it never obtained before, 24.85 percent of the vote. Of course one needs to keep in mind that the low turnout in European Parliament elections distorts the weight of the party. Regardless 4.712.000 voters supported Front National lists making the party the national winner. The conquest of the ballot box can be tracked through the evolution of the party’s election results. Without a doubt the dÊdiabolisation process was the key to increase support. But only looking at national election results does
Results in legislative elections since the founding of Front National 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 1973 1978 1981 1986 1988 1993 1997 2002 2007 2012 85
not tell the full story of the complexity behind votes for Front National.
Results in Presidential elections since the founding of Front National 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 1974
1988
1995
2002 2002 (1st (2nd round) round)
2007
2012
Results in European Parliament elections since the founding of Front National 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% 1984
1989
1994
1999 86
2004
2009
2014
2. Attracting diverse types of voters During the 2012 Presidential elections, Marine Le Pen obtained 17.9% of the votes, according to researchers at CEVIPOF Marine Le Pen’s coalition of support consisted of five main types of voters. First the most important group of voters, 38% of her supporters in 2012 had voted for Jean-Marie Le Pen in 2007. We consider this to be the base of support for the party, unlikely to abandon it from election to election. But one important difference is noticeable between Jean-Marie Le Pen's electorate and his daughter's. The second largest group of supporters were the 21% of Le Pen voters who in 2007 had voted for Nicolas Sarkozy and were disappointed by his term, especially on issues relating to feelings of insecurity (for instance not cleaning up the ghettos as promised), losses of sovereignty (ratification
of
the
Lisbon
Treaty,
re-joining
the
integrated command of NATO, a perceived "submission" to Angela Merkel) and a rejection of Sarkozy’s "blingbling" image. These voters were mainly persuaded to vote for Front National on the backs of their rhetoric speaking out
against
immigration,
communitarianism
and
insecurity. The third largest group of Front National supporters, perhaps surprising to those without knowledge of Front National's programme and rhetoric, represents 13.5% who 87
voted for extreme-left or left-wing candidates in 2007. These voters were disappointed by the perceived liberal trend adopted by PS and captivated by the social dimension
of
Front
National’s
rhetoric,
economic
protectionism etc. Jean-Luc MĂŠlenchon lost a large part of his voters (mainly blue-collar workers) to Front National because of his internationalism and positive view of migrant populations in France. The
fourth
group
composing
the
Front National
electorate in 2012 were voters who in 2007 had submitted a blank ballot, implying that they perceived a lack of choice, an opposition to the established system, or serious disappointment with the electoral system. Front National tries to attract protest voters, 16,22% in 2007 and 20,52% in 2012 because they are likely lacking trust in the political class, and consider UMP and PS as one and the same party. Finally, 4,5% of Front National's electorate in 2012 voted for François Bayrou, a centrist candidate with close links to rural and traditional French values even if he is very pro-EU and was the single candidate in 2012 to push for the popular election of a European President. In 2012, the vote against perceived austerity imposed by the Sarkozy government was channelled into Marine Le Pen and left-wing candidates. When asked how they can
88
identify themselves on the political scale, a survey 77 found that people who considered themselves neither right nor left mainly voted Front National (36%) in 2012. The rhetoric rejecting the traditional left-right split seems to benefit Front National. If we limit the study to electoral trends, it looks like Front National can gather votes from several opposite factions, based on different themes and rhetoric. The majority of these Front National voters cannot without bias be classified as extreme-right.
3. Reaching out to new sections of the electorate Pascal Perrineau, a specialist in sociological studies of the French electorate has stated that the new Front National voter after Marine Le Pen took over the leadership is "younger, includes more women, and is less Christian." 78 A sociological analysis of Front National’s electorate published in November 2013 79 found that voters with less formal education (fewer years of studies) vote more 77
Survey conducted by Ipsos Logica Business Consulting for France Télévision, Radio France, Le Monde and Le Point, 1st round of the Presidential elections, Comprendre le vote des Français, April 2012. 78 PERRINEAU (Pascal), ‘L’électorat de Marine Le Pen: ni tout à fait le même ni tout à fait un autre’, Le vote normal, Les élections présidentielle et législatives d’avril-mai-juin 2012, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, Chroniques électorales, 2013, p. 227-247. 79 http://www.cevipof.com/rtefiles/File/ELECTIONS%20MUNICIPALES/noteL ucROUBAN2.pdf
89
often for Front National. In the 2012 elections 38% of traditional blue-collar workers voted for Marine Le Pen, 37% of the unemployed and 30% of low income voters. In fact 37% of voters without a Bachelor’s degree voted for Front National, 30% of those with a Bachelor’s degree, 22% of those with two years of studies after obtaining a Bachelor’s degree, and only 11% of voters that had completed more than three years of studies following their Bachelor’s degree. 80 This has led some to claim voters with less education are more likely to vote for shortcuts and simple propositions, while others assert that less educated voters due to their socio-economical situation more often face issues raised and highlighted by Front National. A reasonable assumption is a combination of both. Front National, the traditional third party, became the first French party with 24,86 percent of votes in the European elections 2014. An exceptional moment for the party, for the first time it won a national election ahead of UMP and PS. Only eight percent of blue-collar workers and 11% of low income voters voted for PS in 2014, contrast this to 43% of blue-collar workers who voted for Front National. Indeed, the left seems to have lost its base, and stated 80
http://fr.scribd.com/doc/226037674/Europeennes-Ipsos-ComprendreLe-Vote-Des-Francais
90
purpose, to be the spokesperson of the oppressed and weak against the perceived oppressors. Front National managed to gather the support of this type of voter who traditionally voted for the left. The strong support for Front National from the working class can be explained by the party’s vehement anti-globalization rhetoric in combination with protectionist proposals, in contrast to far-left Front de Gauche which uses more internationalist rhetoric and the PS which proposes "social-democracy" 81, a qualification assumed with difficulty in the PS party ranks. A survey82 of small businesses managers (1-19 employees) in July 2014, found that 49% considered Front National “most in tune with today’s concerns of the French.” Only 32% found the UMP to be closest, while 17% responded PS. However, the same surveyed managers did not think that Front National would be able to set the country right. 83 Likewise polls indicate that voter’s opinion on whether or not Front National is able to govern correlate with their socio-economic situation. Only 30% of high 81
http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2014/01/18/le-compromis-socialdemocrate-de-francois-hollande_4350373_3232.html 82 http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-eco/2014/09/15/9700220140915FILWWW00142-pres-d-1-dirigeant-de-tpe-sur-2-proche-dufn.php?pagination=1 83
Only 15 percent of managers surveyed think FN is able to redress the country while 41% think UMP is, UDI 33%, PS 19%.
91
executives and professionals in liberalised sectors think Front National can govern while 53% of blue-collar workers think that Front National is able to govern 84. Some surveys have shown support for Front National to be high among those more often confronted with issues linked to globalization and immigration. 85 Front National speaks out in favour of law enforcement, police officers, the military and security. A 2012 poll found that 37% of military and law enforcement officers 86 intended to vote for Front National in the Presidential elections the same year. Also voters traditionally less inclined to vote for Front National are showing increased support for the party. Compare the 4.4% support among Jewish voters for Jean-Marie Le Pen in 2007 (vote share 10.6%) with 13.5% support among Jewish voters for Marine Le Pen in 2012 87 (vote share 17.9%). The IFOP institute which published the survey stated that "the growth of the Front National vote among the Jewish electorate is explained by the 84
http://www.leparisien.fr/politique/plongee-dans-cette-france-seduitepar-le-fn-14-09-2014-4134025.php
85
http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-eco/2014/09/15/9700220140915FILWWW00142-pres-d-1-dirigeant-de-tpe-sur-2-proche-dufn.php?pagination=1 86 http://www.marianne.net/fredericploquin/Flics-et-militaires-en-pincentpour-Le-Pen-dixit-un-sondage_a60.html 87 http://www.lepoint.fr/politique/le-vote-fn-progresse-fortement-dans-lelectorat-juif-03-09-2014-1859833_20.php
92
strategy of dÊdiabolisation led by the party, the absence of outrageous references to the Holocaust, and above all the rising anxiety from a part of the Jewish community towards the rise of l'antisÊmitisme islamique [Islamic antiSemitism].� Beyond socio-economic data the support for parties based on the age of the voters is interesting to observe. Analysis by Ipsos found that in the 2014 European Parliament elections (70% of the French 18-24 year-old did not vote) Front National became the largest party among the young with the support of one in three voters under 35. In contrast during the 2012 Presidential elections Marine Le Pen was third among the 18-24 yearold (15%) and second among those between 25 and 35. 88 The increase lead to Front National claims of being the "first party of the youth". A survey89 in November 2013 found that 55% of youth did not rule out voting for Front National in the upcoming municipal elections. 90 Thus Front National is expected to target the young electorate which represents a real potential for future growth. Front 88
http://www.franceinfo.fr/emission/le-vrai-du-faux/2014-2015/florianphilippot-le-front-national-premier-parti-de-france-chez-les-jeunes-02-122014-08-39 89 http://www.studyrama.com/vie-etudiante/s-informer-toute-l-actualiteetudiante/sondage-55-des-18-24-ans-prets-a-voter-fn-aux-92605 90 http://www.leparisien.fr/flash-actualite-politique/le-fn-se-reve-enpremier-parti-des-jeunes-17-12-2013-3417747.php
93
National claims 25.000 youth members compared with 25-30.000 for the UMP youth organisation and 6.5007.500 for the PS youth. When Front National elected their first two Senators on the 28th of September 2014, Marine Le Pen insisted on the fact that her party represented youth as the two new senators were 45 (StĂŠphane Ravier) and 26 (David Rachline) years old. Average age in the French Senate is 66 years old. By promoting this perceived success and warmth towards youth and their future, Front National tries to show a will to replace the old abusive political class and with young people and dynamism. JoĂŤl Gomblin at Institut d'ĂŠtudes politiques de Paris (Sciences Po), asserts that "older people started their political life in a political field where the extreme-right still was very stigmatised, mainly due to the memories of [WWII] collaboration. These historical references do not have the same meaning today to younger generations. Therefore, voting for Front National becomes more likely, and today Front National has comprehensive rhetoric aimed at working young people and those who study in school and at university". Looking at geographic trends the vote at the last presidential elections for Front National was larger in rural areas (20%) than in cities with over 100.000 residents (16%). 94
The results of the European Parliament elections are less representative
as
fewer
voters
participated,
and
therefore the results are perhaps not as representative of the populations opinion. The next real test for Front National is the 2017 Presidential elections.
4. The conquest of the working class voter The working class vote is traditionally associated with the left, and often the far-left. But on the 21st of April 2002, when the favoured left-wing candidate, then Prime Minister Alain Juppé, was eliminated in the first round of the presidential elections by Jean-Marie Le Pen a sudden change was obvious. Only 43% of workers voted for a left-wing candidate while 24% voted for Le Pen, 7% above the French average. Dr. Florent Gougou91 claims that
the
working
"revolutionary
ideal,
class
vote
often
sometimes
a
expresses
protest
and
a is
consequently dangerous, sometimes on the way of disappearing." 92 More recently he states that "the decline of the industrial sector and the expansion of the service sector transformed workplaces and jobs". The traditional worker
has
radically
changed.
Moreover,
high
unemployment means fewer workers. Still almost 7 91
Institut d'études politiques de Paris Florent Gougou, Les mutations du vote ouvrier sous la 5ème République, Fond. G. Péri, Nouvelles Fondations, 2007/1 – no 5, p. 15-20.
92
95
millions blue-collar workers remain in France, but the reference in political debate to the "working class" has increasingly
disappeared.
Today’s
working
class
electorate is quite heterogeneous, an important part of the electorate and increasingly supportive of Front National. Jean-Luc Mélenchon, leader of Front de Gauche, the largest French far-left party, stated in Marseille during the 2012 Presidential elections that North Africans were "our brothers and sisters", and that "there is no future for France without them". He went on to say that "the melting pot is our chance." Such statements may be appreciated among the left-liberal intellectuals but generally, blue-collar workers are more likely to oppose globalization or immigration as the changes to society such policies entail threaten their way of life by downward wage pressure or outright declining incomes, potential job losses or increased competition. Working class voters perhaps felt abandoned by Front de Gauche. The far-left party focused on many struggles distant to ordinary working class voters– as a result confusing or diluting its core message. These voters were supportive of Marine Le Pen’s rhetoric defending a strong "strategic state." 93 Like the far-left and almost all French political parties, Front National, in its rhetoric, defends 93
The term "Welfare State" is never employed by Marine Le Pen.
96
the French social model and French public services. Like the left it claims to defend the people oppressed by political elites of the traditional parties. Front National gathered 43% of working-class votes during the European elections – these voters cannot all be extreme-right types. We can say that Front National voters are people who are more often confronted by harsh economic realities or decline due to globalization or faced with immigration related issues, who generally have less formal education and lower incomes, and who hail from worse socio-economic conditions. B. The rising prevalence of Front National’s ideas among the French electorate
1. The main reasons people vote Front National The growth of support for Front National’s ideas is obviously both the consequences of the failure of PS, in power after Sarkozy's failure, and of the process of dédiabolisation which has made Front National a more credible potential alternative than ever before. The European Parliament election results seem to confirm this observation, more support for its ideas leads to more votes.
97
After the 2012 Presidential elections, a survey by IFOP 94 examined the Front National electorate focusing on geography. The conclusion was that southern voters and northern voters did not vote for the same reasons and were not attracted by the same arguments. This conclusion led Le Monde, who commissioned the survey, to depict a Front National of “many faces". The survey was based on a very representative sample: 6000 people from two regions, one North-Eastern and one South-Eastern - where Front National received a higher share of the vote. The survey shows that the main difference between these two electorates is the attachment to the economic arguments. Even if there is no real difference when it comes to views on immigration, insecurities and protection-related issues, the electorates are divided on economic issues, mainly fiscal questions. People from the South-East were more in line with a traditional vision of sound economics promoting the fight against high tax pressure in defence of storekeepers and craftspersons. However, people from the North-East were more in line with the “social� arguments of Marine Le Pen. "A true difference of nature between the two electorates has been revealed" asserts the survey. But we also have to consider the differences between people 94
http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2013/08/07/face-nord-et-facesud-les-deux-electorats-du-fn_3458468_823448.html
98
who reside in each studied region. People do not vote for Front National for the same reasons and they vote for many reasons sometimes contradicting ones based to their geographical or socio-economic situations. A
post-election
survey 95
following
the
European
Parliament elections found the two main reasons people voted for Front National were immigration (64%) and declining purchasing power (35%). Moreover, 48% of the overall French public in the same poll think the actual government heads in the wrong direction while 71% of Front National voters think it does. Thus, Front National voters are less likely to trust the government and other political parties. A survey found that 98% of Front National voters in the 2014 European Parliament elections voted against Hollande and against the government of Manuel Valls. 96 The CEVIPOF report about Marine Le Pen's voters states that "the hardcore Front National electorate which remained loyal from 2007 until 2012 stands out because it rejects immigration and criticises the transformation of French society – ”We do not feel at home”". 97 95
http://fr.scribd.com/doc/226037674/Europeennes-Ipsos-ComprendreLe-Vote-Des-Francais 96 http://www.france24.com/fr/20140526-europeennes-front-nationalelecteurs-marine-le-pen/ 97 http://www.cevipof.com/rtefiles/File/ELECTIONS%20MUNICIPALES/noteL ucROUBAN2.pdf
99
The main reason for the growth of the Front National vote is a rejection of the parties that have governed France for the last 40 years, and a wish among a part of the public to tackle immigration-related issues. The strong rhetoric about immigration from Front National meets the needs of French voters that are motivated by this issue. The Front National vote has often been qualified by political commentators as a vote to punish the establishment, and while during the 2014 European Parliament elections only half the people 98 who voted for Marine Le Pen in 2012 went to vote, the high vote score of Marine Le Pen and the spread of Front National’s ideas suggest that her programme is gaining followers among the French electorate.
2. A dual method of persuading voters Front National is often accused of being a demagogic and populist party. Indeed, in its methods of persuasion these are applied in a favourable context. We can observe a dual voice of Front National in its rhetoric aimed at potential electorates. Front National uses passionate rhetoric and increased criticism of elites in a period when the mistrust of politics is the worst in the history of the fifth French Republic. 98
http://www.ipsos.fr/ipsos-public-affairs/actualites/2014-05-25europeennes-2014-comprendre-vote-francais
100
The President of the Republic nowadays enjoys between 13% 99 and 15% approval ratings, and the Prime Minister gets a likewise abysmal 30% approval rating (he enjoyed 63% 100 in August 2013 when he was Minister of the Interior). Political parties lack credibility among the French public because they have not proven their worth while in a position of power. As we previously observed, the rejection of the political class constitutes an important reason people vote for Front National. Front National leaders often repeat that UMP and PS have been in power for 40 years and therefore they are totally responsible for the current crisis. Front National claims UMP and PS apply the same policies, when they should be alternatives. Front National benefits from the distrust and the political venalities of elites who govern and are perceived to impose austerity. For example, around ten affairs or scandals implicating Nicolas Sarkozy are currently in the courts. These are cases of favouritism, illegal campaign financing, insider deals etc. Many ministers such as Jérôme Cahuzac (PS), former Junior Minister for the Budget – who admitted having had a secret Swiss bank account for 20 years, or key UMP
99
https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chromeinstant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=sondage+hollande 100 http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/topnews/20140302.REU1788/laurentfabius-plus-populaire-que-manuel-valls-selon-un-sondage.html
101
politicians such as Jean-François Coppé are being targeted by legal proceedings 101. An endless supply of scandals surrounding the French political class of all colours and the economic crisis further increased the rejection of this well-off political class. CEVIPOF showed in 2014 that only 11% of the French trust in political parties, supposed wielders of democratic power and legitimacy. This criticism of what Front National calls the system, supported by an elite which conserves and does not share power and which is unqualified to handle the current crisis. The respective failures of UMP and PS are attributed to a same entity. The system, composed of UMP, PS and their allies, the traditional parties in French political life, is nicknamed UMPS, a fusion of the parties' names suggesting that they are the same despite presenting superficial differences with regards to the EU, economic policies, the issue of immigration etc. Front National’s criticism of immigration often implies shortcuts which do not take into account the socioeconomic complexity of the affected populations. The process of globalization is associated with the danger of it dissolving French identity according to Front National rhetoric. 101
http://www.lepoint.fr/politique/exclusif-8-millions-regles-par-l-ump-ades-amis-de-cope-27-02-2014-1796074_20.php
102
The party tries to portray itself as an advocate of more democracy by proposing proportional representation in the
National
Assembly
(obviously
self-serving),
denouncing the EU’s hijacking of French democracy, promoting the use of referendums and by claiming that policies are implemented against the wish of the people. These types of proposals are sometimes considered populist, but Front National is nonetheless framing its rhetoric so that it will appear paradoxically as the best defender of direct democracy. In an effort to attract the vote of the common man, Front National opposes the disproportional strength of the Presidential executive power in relation to the parliament, allowing them to claim there is a lack of democracy in France that the party wants to address. Front National often campaigns for the use of referendums in order to give the power back to the French people: for instance during its campaign against the Fiscal Treaty, 102 Front National accused the traditional parties of not consulting the French people by way of referendum and for giving away the power to decide over the French state’s budget. These elements in combination form a passionate pitch to the voters, heavy on rhetoric, which arouses interest, emotions
and
feelings.
However,
102
this
type
of
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union
103
electioneering has always been considered simplistic focusing on negatives and distress, instead of positive visions and solutions. This type of rhetoric can often outline harsh realities in simple ways. Consequently, the objective of dĂŠdiabolisation consisted of proposing a more moderated message and rhetoric which can compete with the other parties and professionalize the image of Front National. The second voice of Front National is the more recently adopted rational and pragmatic approach. Part of the dĂŠdiabolisation process its toned-down rhetoric reveals a wish to fight politically with objective ideas in order to break off the traditional clichĂŠs of the party. Front National denounces the EU for concrete things such as the Posting of Workers Directive which it claims has destroyed many French jobs and for the dismantling of borders. This push to change the popular image of Front National also aims to polish and render the image of Marine Le Pen as a potential President in the French mind. For instance, the attempt to give an international status to Marine Le Pen forms part of this strategy. She tries to portray that she wields international influence, aided by her new advisor Aymeric Chauprade, and supported by Russiafunded media outlets and authorities. In 2014 she was
104
received in the
Duma by its
President, Sergueï
Narychkine . 103
Front National presents democracy as a way to avoid the dissolution of European nations and the disappearance of States. It also denounces the other traditional parties and elites in general. The anti-parliamentarianism rhetoric has evolved from traditional Front National critique of the system as not being representative. Consequently, Front National
advocates
a
system
of
proportional
representation, which evidently should help the party and would open the way to hinder the UMP and PS forming a majority in the National Assembly. C. The proliferation and normalisation of Front National’s ideas in French society The fact that Front National can claim to be the first party in France means that a significant part of the French population approves to at least some extent of the party’s message. But the party’s polemic past makes the question of how the French people perceive its victory in the European Parliament elections 2014 interesting. One poll found that 51% of the respondents did not consider the victory of Front National negative
103
http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2014/04/14/marine-lepen-recue-a-bras-ouverts-par-la-douma_4400754_3210.html
105
while 27% claimed to be satisfied with it, 24% are "indifferent", and 49% say they feel "discontent." 104 This emergence of Front National seems indisputably to correlate with a climate of political disillusionment and crises. Opinion polls have confirmed a growth of support for some of Front National's ideas in French society. Even if a majority of the French people were to hold views similar with the programme of Front National, polls show that only 35% think the party is able to govern. 105 It reveals the problems such as lacking in professionalism, trust and that the extreme-right label are rooted in the public’s perception of Front National. The "Barometer of political confidence" survey published annually by CEVIPOF can help identify reasons for the large Front National vote at the last European Parliament elections. Its survey published in January 2014 shows an evolution towards a growth of support for some ideas defended by Front National that are generally not supported by the other political parties.
104
http://www.ipsos.fr/ipsos-public-affairs/actualites/2014-05-25europeennes-2014-comprendre-vote-francais 105 http://www.lesechos.fr/politique-societe/politique/0203773085410-lefn-na-pas-la-capacite-de-gouverner-pour-65-des-francais1042071.php#Xtor=AD-6000
106
- Protectionism in a time of crisis The French have somewhat paradoxical opinions on economics, especially state control vs. liberalism and the market economy. Of those surveyed by CEVIPOF in 2014 47% (compared to 30% in 2010) wanted to protect France more from the world economy and only 23% wanted to be more open. At the same time 59% wanted the state to empower businesses and give them more freedom (compared to 43% in 2010), only 38% want more regulation and state control. CEVIPOF is not the only research institute to find these types of seemingly conflicting results. These surveys show the complex economic vision of the French people, which perhaps is moving closer to a Gaullist vision of the economy, even if the reference to Gaullism is not mentioned and perhaps would be rejected if it was. It seems that the French people are in favour of liberalism at the micro-level 106 whereas they favour protectionism against competition stemming from globalization at the national level, and state control of strategic big companies. In contrast to the UMP and PS who defend similar versions of EU-ruleconforming social-liberalism, Front National takes a position in favour of a strong strategic state, popular in a
106
In favour of small and medium sized enterprises
107
time when official data counts 8.5 million French living beneath the poverty threshold in 2012. 107 - Criticism of elites and of parliament The same CEVIPOF survey published in January 2014 showed that 60% of the respondents did not trust in either the left or right to govern France, compared to 52% one year earlier. Meanwhile 69% said (December 2013) that democracy did not work well or not at all compared to 54% one year earlier. The lack of confidence in the future also plays a role with 72% holding the view that their children will have less chance to succeed in society than they did. There clearly is a public sense of disillusionment with politics. Traditionally the extremeright rides on waves of global distrust of politics. Today, when they think to politics, 36% of French respondents first thought of "distrust", 31% "disgust", 11% "boredom", and 4% "fear". So, all-in-all 82% instinctively think about something bad if we ask them their feelings of politics. Despite of this despair with regard to politics, 63% of those surveyed think the best way to influence decisionmaking is voting in elections. Consequently, the rational French society encourages political parties such as Front
107
http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/tableau.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=NATCCF04 406
108
National to participate even though they profit on general disappointment. - Rejection of immigration and feelings of insecurity Whereas only 49% of people surveyed thought there were too many immigrants in France when surveyed in January 2010, in 2014 67% thought so. Together with a growing feeling that border controls are lax this feeling is rising in French society because communautarism is indisputably being established which can be considered as a threat to French identity and the French way of life. A survey found that 68% of the French surveyed want to abolish the right to family reunification proposed by Front National and Marine Le Pen. 108 Surveys show that many in French society feel that the social model is threatened by immigration. The national preference, social-aid and family subsidies for French people only, the main principle of Front National since its creation is supported by two thirds. 109 A radicalization of society can be observed. The feeling of rising insecurity has led to wishes of stronger punishments and repressive measures. For instance support for the re-introduction of the death penalty used to be around 30%, today it is around 50%. Marine Le Pen 108
Odoxa poll conducted for Le Parisien and I-TĂŠlĂŠ, 11-12 September 2014. http://www.leparisien.fr/politique/plongee-dans-cette-france-seduitepar-le-fn-14-09-2014-4134025.php
109
109
is the only nationally recognised political leader in favour of it. - Rejection of the European Union The national political framework is preferred by the French when it comes to implementing or applying policies. For example, if we compare the 65% who want to control borders with the 29% 110 who want to have better control of common external EU borders, we can make the assumption that people want this issue addressed by national border control measures. The EU itself is obviously not a main issue in French elections although it of course has direct implications on almost all policy issues debated, but it is interesting to note that 47% said in October 2011 that EU-membership was a good thing while today only 35% hold this view. Those thinking EU-membership is a bad thing have increased from 23% to 32% today. According to an IPSOS survey of the European elections, the EU lost its image as a “shield of protection� 111 in the eyes of a majority of the French people. A majority of respondents asserted that "the French EU-membership aggravated the impact of the crisis on themselves" compared with only 27% who 110 111
Ipsos
Common term used by euro-apologists when discussing the 2008-> economic crisis
110
thought the EU had protected France from the economic crisis. The fact that Front National does not succeed in attracting all the voters that support proposals or ideas advocated only by them shows there are limits to its growth. Without a doubt these surveys show that Front National has succeeded in promoting its ideas to French society, at least to some extent. The left asserts that one reason Front National’s rhetoric is becoming more commonplace in French society is because of UMP's strong rhetoric on security, Islam, foreigners etc. They mainly refer to speeches of Nicolas Sarkozy which divided French society during his 2012 presidential campaign when he tried to highlight right-wing issues. Patrick Buisson, a historian and director of the TV channel Histoire who aided Sarkozy during his 2012 campaign, is pointed out as the person responsible for the increasingly right-wing rhetoric. Front National is challenged by the task of finding a market opportunity in the political landscape where the party consists of different kinds of voters. Jean-Yves Camus states that the "difficulty for Front National always was to conciliate the opposing economic and social expectations within its electorate, mainly the working class and liberal professionals“. To some extent Front National continues to get protest votes but will they increase in the future? 111
Part IV The future of Front National 1. Isolation by choice Front National is a very lonely party. Self-branded enemy of all of the system, its credibility is based on not being allied in local elections with other parties, because its stock in trade consists of denouncing them and their actions. On the other hand other French political parties totally reject Front National mainly due to its history and categorization as an extreme-right party. When Front National made it to the second round of the presidential elections, the other parties formed a Front RÊpublicain [Republican Front], calling on voters to support Jacques Chirac against Jean-Marie Le Pen. It is very likely that this unity would be seen again regardless of whether it is a right, left or centrist candidate that makes it to the second round with a Front National candidate. This widely held assumption also serves Front National’s interests as they can denounce the system for uniting against Front National in order to protect itself and its interests. The loneliness of Front National goes beyond local and national level, Front National is equally shunned in international politics. The Russian regime may be the 112
party’s only reliable international ally, others have abandoned the party as cleaner allies became available. 112 Following its election victory, acquiring twenty-three MEP’s, Front National tried to form a group in the European Parliament but failed because it did not manage to meet the threshold of Members from seven countries. Even though Marine Le Pen claimed she would succeed later, it seems rather difficult because she is stuck between the advantages that leading a group in the European Parliament could bring her (increased visibility in the European Parliament and access to public funds) and the drawbacks it would entail by creating formal ties with other controversial and in some cases extremist parties. Front National cannot join with parties such as Greek Golden Dawn because this would be a big and visible step away from the dédiabolisation process. Indeed the bad image of Front National internationally has hindered Marine Le Pen from convincing other EUcritics that Front National has sufficiently distanced itself from the past to cooperate with formally when it comes to the EU. The UK Independence Party, (UKIP) the EUcritical winners of the 2014 European Parliament elections
112
For example the Sweden Democrats cooperated with Front National at EU-level through the EAF organisation until SD severed ties and formed a group with UKIP (excluding Front National participation) in the European Parliament.
113
in the United Kingdom refused to be allied with Front National citing the history of the party. Nigel Farage, stated that "Whatever Marine Le Pen is trying to do with Front National, anti-Semitism, is still deeply embedded in that party, and for that principled political reason, we are not going to work with them now, or at any point in the future." 113 Farage even preferred to support the French Gaullist eurosceptic political party Debout La République which gathered 3.9% of votes in the European Parliament elections. Rejecting alliances with Hungarian Jobbik or Greek Golden Dawn, Front National remains allied with the Dutch Party for Freedom of Geert Wilders, Austrian FPÖ, Italian Lega Nord, and the Flemish Vlaams Belang party. These parties would constitute the core of the Front National lead group in the European Parliament. They are not nationalist movements like Bulgarian ATAKA or Jobbik, and are not considered the worst of the worst in the European Union since they at least try to become somewhat legitimate and seek change through the political system. That does not mean they are nice or tolerant in any way. For a deeper study of Geert Wilders PVV and Hungarian Jobbik and the differences between two such parties see Europe Deserves Better – A study of 113
http://lelab.europe1.fr/L-independantiste-britannique-Nigel-Faragerepousse-les-avances-de-Marine-Le-Pen-en-vue-des-europeennes-14165
114
extremist Denmark.
parties 114
in
Hungary,
the
Netherlands
and
Isolated at all levels the "dédiabolisation"
process might be its only hope of increased legitimacy for Front National that would allow it to win over more voters and allies, locally, nationally and internationally.
2. The existence of a possibly unsurmountable threshold Even if the objective propositions in Front National’s programme were to correspond with the expectations and views of a majority of French voters we have to ask if an
unsurmountable
threshold
has
been
reached.
According to opinion polls a majority of the French do not want Marine Le Pen be President, this is true even among their own voters. Perhaps Front National voters are less supportive of their policies and vote Front National mainly to disrupt and protest. When Front National became the first French party during the last European Parliament elections, it gathered 24.86%, and represented 4.712.461 voters. In fact due to the low turnout in the European Parliament elections all the lists got worst results (number of votes) than in the Presidential elections of 2012 (except the Greens lead by Eva Joly and Cécile Duflot and the Gaullists (Debout La République
of
impressive vote 114
Nicolas
Dupont-Aignan)).
So,
the
for Front National may not be
Available for free at www.europedeservesbetter.com
115
representative of the national electorate's wish (the same observation applies to the other lists). We have to point out that Front National was the largest party according to polls during two months of the presidential campaign 2011-12, just after Marine Le Pen had been elected president. 115 This survey claimed that Marine Le Pen would win the first round of the 2012 presidential elections (even if the
left candidate
forecasted in the survey was not Hollande but Martine Aubry), with 23% of the votes. Marine Le Pen did not make it to the second round with her result of 17.9% of the votes. A September 2013 survey found that two thirds of the French would never vote for Marine Le Pen but opinion polls for the Presidential election of 2017 show that Marine Le Pen can win against François Hollande in the second round (54% against 46% for Hollande) or lose against Nicolas Sarkozy (40% Le Pen 60% for Sarkozy), Alain Juppé (36% Le Pen 64% Juppé) and François Fillon (43% Le Pen 57% Fillon). Of course, surveys years before elections are unreliable and at most a snapshot in time. They can however often assert several conclusions. An
115
http://www.lefigaro.fr/politique/2011/03/05/0100220110305ARTFIG00385-2012-un-sondage-donne-le-pen-en-tete-du-1ertour.php
116
October 4th 2014 survey 116 found that 43% of the surveyed French had a favourable opinion of Marine Le Pen, 67% among right-wing voters, meanwhile 44% responded she has the stature of a statesman. Asked to judge her skills, 48% (+7% from May 2014) think she is competent, 58% say she is persuasive, implying a rising approval of her persona and ideas in French society. One of the main strengths of Front National, according to Jean-Louis Levet, is that "the circle of ideological influence
of
themes
close
to
the
extreme-right
(immigration, anti-globalization, security concerns etc.) extends beyond the six millions French who voted for Jean-Marie Le Pen in 2002." 117 For example, the last survey of confidence in politics published by CEVIPOF 118 in January of 2014 shows that only 32% of the French people trust the EU (compared to 42% in 2009). These and other surveys show that Front National has a tremendous potential electorate that it currently is not successful in mobilizing at the polls. Front National risks losing ownership of right-wing issues if UMP tries to 116
http://www.leparisien.fr/politique/avec-43-de-bonnes-opinions-marinele-pen-plus-populaire-que-jamais-04-10-2014-4187889.php 117 Levet Jean-Louis (dir.), Front National, le parti de l’anti-France. Anatomie d’un programme contre la nation, Publibook, 2001. 118 http://www.cevipof.com/fr/le-barometre-de-la-confiance-politique-ducevipof/les-resultats-vague-5-janvier-2014/
117
claim them again. So, a threshold continues to exist but the situation is evolving, it is becoming less and less important as a psychological barrier. Favourable approval ratings for Marine Le Pen show that the threshold can indeed be overcome depending on the circumstances at election time. Of crucial importance are her opponent’s ideological stance (left or right) and the perception of Marine Le Pen herself. The "dÊdiabolisation" process is central. It increases the party’s respectability and enables makes their ideas more favourable to voters. The change of the party must be seen in the context that surrounds it. Changes in other political parties such as the UMP and the evolution of the economic crisis will constitute some of the elements that will decide whether Front National has a chance to reach the pinnacles of power or not.
3. Despite limitations, Front National's future looks bright Surveys indicate that Front National has become the main opposition party in France following the election of Socialist President Hollande. A CEVIPOF survey published in January 2014 found that 36% of the French consider Front National the party which best represents the opposition today: 36% said it was the UMP. At the same time 73% of the French said the left-right split does not mean anything, it was at 49% in December 2009.
118
Moreover, despite the fact that a barrier to election victory exists, a large majority of right-wing sympathisers think that Marine Le Pen is able to govern: the risk for the UMP if it tries to gather in the centre is that Front National replaces UMP as the main French right-wing party. Indeed, the wish expressed by Nicolas Sarkozy was to unite the centrist and the right-wing parties forming a federation between UDI and UMP. Surveys indicate that Marine Le Pen will make the second round regardless of whoever leads the UMP in 2017. In a climate where support for ideas close to Front National continues to grow, the ascension of Marine Le Pen becomes
very
probable.
In
this
context
political
positioning of the UMP will determine Front National’s ability to attract more votes. If Sarkozy adopts rhetoric similar to his 2012 campaign, very right-wing - including critique of the Schengen-agreement, he will lure voters away from Marine Le Pen, whereas if he wants to tailor his message to gather centrist voters with a more proEU, less authoritarian rhetoric, Marine Le Pen could attract disappointed Sarkozy voters and those with strong traditional right-wing views. Confronting an emergence of sovereignist and identity based politics from the UMP is a danger for Front National. The UMP is a conglomeration of several ideological strains, sometimes opposed, with some 119
internal circles defending this kind of right-wing vision. La Droite Forte for example, lead by Geoffroy Didier and Guillaume Peltier, supported Nicolas Sarkozy in 2012. La Droite Sociale lead by Laurent Wauquiez, and La Droite Populaire lead by Thierry Mariani, represent movements inside the UMP whose ideas are close to the French electorate's and stronger in tone. Even if La Droite Forte and La droite sociale are more moderated than La Droite Populaire, which advocates a programme close to that of Front National, around forty MP’s signed an opinion piece 119 in Le Figaro denouncing European political leaders for encouraging "thirty years of renouncements which has provoked a deep identity crisis, has jeopardized the cohesion of society, dug a gap between the people and those politically responsible and fuelled the rise of populism and extremism." The initiative to publish this joint article was taken by Henri Guaino, former adviser to President Sarkozy, and Laurent Wauquiez. It goes on to denounce "excessive free movement"
and "social
dumping inside Europe" a "policy of competition which
119
http://www.lefigaro.fr/vox/politique/2014/04/25/3100120140425ARTFIG00081-henri-guainolaurent-wauquiez-il-est-temps-detout-changer-en-europe.php?cmtpage=0#comments20140425ARTFIG00081
120
forbids all industrial policies" 120, a "deflationist monetary policy" and demanded less EU. This admittedly modest rebellion revealed the important split between federalists such as Alain Lamassoure (MEP),
and
UMP
defenders
of
French
national
sovereignty within the movements previously mentioned. The internal party-elections to choose the next UMP candidate will show which trend is strongest in the party. Perhaps the race will give an almost outright mandate to assume patriotic values and rhetoric that could attract a large part of the Front National electorate. Even if Front National
attracts
voters
with
different
political
preferences, it above all takes votes from the UMP. The loss of the UMP is the benefit of Le Pen's party, the future of Front National depends heavily on the orientation of the UMP. By embarking on the dĂŠdiabolisation path, Front National shows a willingness to moderate the party. Imagine a scenario where tomorrow Marine Le Pen became President. She would most likely not have a majority in Parliament due to the general distrust towards Front National and the current electoral system. Having the Presidential power she would seek to change the electoral system into a proportional one. She would 120
Central-planning at national level replaced by central-planning at EUlevel.
121
probably require an alliance, most likely with the UMP, to succeed with the formation of a government. This government would probably include UMP personalities with ideas close to her own, willing to accept the risk of being on her team. Furthermore Marine Le Pen would make many concessions: for example European issues are not considered essential by the French electorate (except the effects of the Schengen-agreement), it is highly likely that she will abandon the euro and EU exit demands in exchange for UMP support for her government and its other policies. This moderation can already be seen by her advocating a referendum to decide on the euro instead of outright exit, her previous policy. Marine Le Pen is moderating her programme to improve her public perception and gather broader political support. The circumstances at the time will ultimately determine if Marine Le Pen has a chance of becoming President and if she will be able to govern. The evolution of the dÊdiabolisation process is therefore more important than ever to observe, the stains on Front National’s brand are removed slowly, against the wish of Jean-Marie Le Pen and other older party operators still representing a trend within the party which existence is denied by the current leaders of Front National.
122
Conclusions There is no doubt that demagogical behaviour is embedded in Front National's history. Meanwhile the wish of establishment parties to stay in power allows Front National to continue growing. This dangerous gamble worked under President Mitterrand, but has become uncontrollable since the elections of 2012. Marine Le Pen transformed her party into a vehicle for reaching power and Front National's vote became a vote of approval – no longer only a vote of protest. It is obvious that the consequences of EU-policies are in part responsible for the growth of Front National. The French are not willing to accept second rate status in the world and the people are suspicious of the governing elite and view further European integration and more austerity negatively. Polls show there is a wish in France to repatriate powers from the EU to the nation state. In the past, crises and political distrust has led to the rise of extreme-right movements. These movements generally have expressed themselves through violent protests and acts and have traditionally had links to military networks. Today’s extreme-right has adopted a new image and rejects the description outright. Front National has become the first political force in France because of democracy. Seeking power, the new leadership of Front 123
National initiated the dédiabolisation process which without a doubt helped the party achieve its recent success. Despite the public’s traditional rejection of the party, Front National has succeeded in attracting increasing support due to a very favourable economical, social and political climate in France. The demagogical essence of Front National is exposed by its constant changing of its programme to meet the current wishes of the average voter. Sometimes the party opposes something it supported a decade ago. These confusions and paradoxes in the party’s political line obviously entail aftermaths on the position defended by adherents. Since its founding in the early 70’s, three key developments can be identified in the evolution of Front National. The sudden growth of Front National stems from the decisions of President Mitterrand during the 80's. The party seemed permanently relegated to the fringes, but it was paradoxically helped by the left. The growth during the 80’s was followed by an ideological Uturn in 1995, which established the confused political line ever since present in Front National’s economic and social policy. Finally, Marine Le Pen becoming leader led to a real change of the controversial party’s ambitions. The perception changed at the same time because of her relatively moderated rhetoric. The credibility of Front 124
National is increasing in part due to the dÊdiabolisation process and the influence of her new entourage, of which Florian Philippot forms an integral part. Whatever direction Front National’s ideological evolution takes, it seems that "French preference" or "French priority" will remain the central theme of Front National’s ideological thinking. Today issues traditionally associated with extreme-right rhetoric such as anti-elitism and anti-system positions, opposing globalization which is seen as undermining French identity, opposition to transfers of sovereign powers to the EU and immigration are increasing their appeal to the French public. These traditional extremeright issues are still defended by Front National but using moderated language and imposing self-restraint when it comes to communication in order to avoid misconduct which partly is responsible for the demonisation of the party. Against the backdrop of failure by the PS and UMP who are responsible for France current decline, Front National's programme is increasingly corresponding to the expectations of the French public. The party is increasingly seen as an alternative to the UMPS. The electorate that potentially could vote for Front National is growing in a climate of crisis following the
125
failed PS presidency and an UMP that is riddled with internal problems and scandals. Even if Front National continues to attract most of its support from the middle and working class, the party is taking its message to all parts of society and is without a doubt spreading its message further and wider than before. The failure of Front de Gauche has led many middle and vote working class voters to vote for Front National. The new Front National electorate is not an extreme-right electorate. While themes that Front National are focusing on become increasingly appealing to a majority of French voters the party does not succeed in obtaining a majority of votes at election time. A barrier continues to exist as support for the party’s positions is higher than support for the party itself. This barrier is disappearing slowly as a result of the dÊdiabolisation process. The process itself implies a denial of Front National’s origins and caused real confusion over what the essence of Front National is. It has also led to internal struggles and opposition to important parts of the process. It revealed that the party does not have a sound ideological footing and that it adapts by opposing the status-quo in order to persuade voters who feel discontent and disillusion. Front National can thank the mistakes of the system for its survival and growth. The acceleration of EU 126
integration allowed Front National to denounce a system which does not respect the wish of the people and hijacks its decision making power. Its proximity to the people, in language, and its perceived defence of French democracy allows Front National to grow. While EU-institutions are monopolising more and more powers that previously were in national hands, France is in an unstable situation. The disappearance of the leftright split, the ideological alignment of the UMP and PS on many issues and their similar overall governing philosophy, makes it difficult to classify a party as extreme-right: the political landscape is totally disturbed. Often the threat of Front National gaining power is evoked in a catastrophic, apocalyptic manner after the party has had success in an election. The reaction by the political class is passionate and often not rationally presented. As such it indisputably contributes to the perception that Front National represents a real change, a break with the present. Le Pen's movement paradoxically seems to be the main beneficiary of the system. The "devil of the Republic" is becoming the guardian angel of its relics. The real potential Front National vote has not yet been exploited maximally, and voters still have to be convinced in order for Marine Le Pen to gather a majority. Front National has never been closer to political power. Perhaps 127
the paradoxical evolution of the first political party will bring Marine Le Pen the Élysée, but the 2017 presidential election will probably pit Marine Le Pen against an UMP candidate. If UMP wins and the existing EU-France relationship is not denounced during that UMP term in office, and austerity continues to tie the hands of the French government, the following decline will have a profound effect on the population. Current policies will most likely remain in place until the next important election comes around: the presidential election in 2022. Following another failed UMP term in office (post 2017) the traditional parties, if they still exist in their current form would have to radically change their programmes, or they will leave the door to power wide-open for their common political enemy. Those who fervently governed against the will of the people and who submitted France to the domination of the EU, which imposes policies that are perceived to be contrary to the French model, are responsible for the future success of Front National. Even if wielding power seems difficult for Front National today, Marine Le Pen arriving in the Élysée one day is now conceivable and the consequences of that scenario are impossible to predict.
128
The second book published in the Europe Deserves Better series takes a closer look at Front National, the party that won the French elections to the European Parliament in May 2014. By describing Front National’s sordid history, past setbacks and recent achievements, the author hopes to contribute to better knowledge of the party and its sympathisers that in turn may facilitate an understanding of why this movement is gaining ground and how it should be met. Over a period of 50 years Front National has grown from irrelevance to seemingly threaten the established left-right power structure in France. Singing the blues of government impotence, loss of sovereignty and state failures to live up to the expectations of French citizens, Front National offers a political alternative to voters that feel disenfranchised by the current state of affairs. They also offer policies that have broad support among some parts of the electorate. To ignore, belittle or disregard discussion of contentious issues in society leaves room for extreme movements to monopolise debate on issues that many voters feel are of outmost importance. Published in early 2014 part one of the Europe Deserves Better series examines the Hungarian Jobbik party, the Dutch Party for Freedom and the Danish People’s Party. It is available for free at:
www.europedeservesbetter.com Â
www.europeansunitedfordemocracy.org