Nº3 FEBRUARY 1
2020
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LONG READ
Apportioning the Blame By J.H.H. Weiler PAGE
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LONG READ
Notes From An Even Smaller Island: Brexit and Ireland By Gavin Barrett PAGE
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Brexit – Apportioning the Blame By J.H.H. Weiler
The immediate prevailing emotion on the eve of Brexit is a form of relief. It is understandable and benign. The three year farce has taken its toll. Closure, at last. There is another sense of relief, felt by many, understandable too, though less benign. It is the ‘good riddance’ form of relief. It is easily detected and openly declared by the British Brexiteers: Good riddance of Europe. (Yes, we are back to speaking of Great Britain and Europe). But it also is quite widely shared in Europe, though spoken quietly and behind closed doors: Good riddance of Britain, often accompanied by “de Gaulle was right after all;’ ‘they (the Brits) never really embraced the European Construct; never really believed in ‘An ever closer
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Union;’ never shed their Island mentality, their pathetic Battle of Britain ethos’, and similar sentiments. What underlies this sentiment is treating Britain as a Special Case, an ab initio error that has nally been corrected.
No one should cheer this day. Europe is the poorer in so many ways for the UK having left. Britain might well be the poorer in even more ways. Time will tell. I speak of ‘Apportioning the Blame’. Blame for what?
There is, rst, the blame for what has been a disastrous process – farce, tragicomedy, the ultimate refutation of ‘rational choice’ – all come to mind. There is an acerbic Jewish saying that there is nothing that is so bad that cannot be worse. Every passing month in the unfolding Brexit saga was living conrmation of such. But there is a deeper ‘blame’ (for want of a better word). The question is not who is to blame for the UK leaving but the much more poignant question: why did so many citizens of the UK both in the referendum and in the recent elections come to the conclusion that they wanted out. For many it was not the result of a serious cost/benet analysis but speaking from the gut.
1. Joseph H.H. Weiler is a Professor at NYU School of Law, Senior Fellow at the Harvard Centre for European Studies, and former President of the European University Institute, Florence (2013-2016).
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It is, in my view, the real question to ask, for Brexit was but the terminal stage of a malaise that is affecting large segments of European populations in various Member States. The ‘Battle of Britain’ ethos might explain why the Brits actually took the plunge. Other Member States are ‘smarter’. Why leave? But some appreciable degree of Euroscepticism is a staple of what we have come to call Populists, and these are no longer marginal voices on the lunatic fringe of European politics, but in relatively short order have become part of mainstream politics in too many Member States for comfort. When I say mainstream I do not necessarily mean a majority, though Ms Le Pen did win, by a signicant margin, the last European elections. I mean that they are part of the message of large parties which have moved from the fringe to the centre. And, of even greater alarm, the European strain of the virus has a virulent streak which was not largely present in the UK case: The Euroscepticism is accompanied by a strong sense of disillusionment with the fundamentals of liberal democracy, which in some ways is an even more malignant pathology than ‘straightforward’ Euroscepticism. By explaining Brexit under the British exceptionalism umbrella, and feeling condent, rightly so, that there are no other candidates ready to jump ship, we alibi ourselves from some serious soul searching about that other strain of the virus which may not be terminal, but is no less and perhaps even more inimical to the future of the EU and the wellbeing of democracy in Europe.
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In this brief essay I will address the issue of the process. In a future post I will address the more fundamental question of widespread citizen alienation from Europe and liberal democracy. So who is to blame for the tragicomedy we have experienced in the last three years or so? It is useless to spend too many words on those ‘Magnicent Brits in their Flying Machines’ taking ight from any semblance of responsible governance in the 21st Century. Nota Bene – this is not judgement on the actual decision to leave but on the process by which it was brought about and then managed. It started with the reckless David Cameron. (See my ‘There is Chutzpah and then there is David Cameron’ blog post of October 2016). The breathtaking superciality and irresponsibility with which he was willing to gamble the future of his country in order to solve a Tory party dilemma. It became rapidly clear that there had been no serious (probably none at all) preparatory work as regards process or what the
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reality of Brexit would actually mean. Do you recall the difculties and subsequent interminable delays he had in actually drafting the ‘conditions’ the EU had to full in order for him to recommend to vote Remain? It was clear that when calling the referendum he had not even thought of that? Do you recall the rubbing of the eyes with disbelief when nally his thin gruel was presented? For these demands he was calling a referendum? And then the brazenness with which he suddenly shifted and adopted as his refrain for the referendum campaign ‘Brits Don’t Quit’! If Brits don’t quit, why had he called a referendum? And fast forward to the decent but inept Theresa
The UK were certainly the Seven Dwarfs but the EU was no Snow White. May. All I will say is that I am convinced that when the infamous Backstop was negotiated she simply did not understand its ramications. Were her advisors and the accompanying civil ser-
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vants equally inept, or, if you are inclined to Deep State theories, did they conceal from her the meaning of what she had signed on to in the hope that when the naked truth would come to light it would bury Brexit? Be that as it may, it was clear that the UK negotiators were outclassed and continue to be outclassed by their EU counterparts at every turn and twist along that Long and Winding Road. I would just add that May’s incomprehension dwarfs in comparison to that of the self contradictory and confused Corbyn. To this day I do not believe he truly understands the meaning for the UK of remaining in a Customs and Regulatory Union for the very policies he was advocating in his own Election Campaign. One could go on and on (and on) but for what purpose? Far more interesting is some introspection about the role of the EU and its ‘blame’. The UK were certainly the Seven Dwarfs but the EU was no Snow White. A quick mention should be made of those who drafted Article 50. It is clear that
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responsibility on the Rottweiler. From my maternal grandfather, a rags-to-riches selfmade millionaire (decorated by the King of Belgium) I learnt at an early age an obvious piece of wisdom. Even if you have more business leverage, do not push your advantage to the full. In any negotiation, both parties have to walk away feeling they had concluded a good deal. And not only feeling such, but if you want the deal to endure, they actually have to walk away with a good deal. (I wish Mr Trump had met my grandfather. He would have avoided many of his own bankruptcies and would avoid bankrupting the international trading system and much more).
they had the correct idea that the process of leaving the European Union should be claried and regulated by law. It is equally clear that they gave little thought (it seemed a theoretical possibility, no?) to the practicality of what they had drafted with the laughable time frame, the irrationality of the rules regarding unanimity and majority and the ambiguity as regards revocation which had to be resolved by the CJEU. I would not argue that the CJEU was ‘wrong’ in its decision; it is one of these cases where the law would allow both interpretations – as evidence by the fact that both Legal Services of the Commission and Council adopted a different position from that adopted by the Court. As a matter of policy I think the Com-
Even if you have more business leverage, do not push your advantage to the full
Juncker, a historic President in my view, followed this to the full in responding to the hapless Cameron’s ‘conditions’. He bent over backwards, even agreeing on migrant worker issues to a resolution which was doubtful under EU law. But once the referendum went south, the posture of the EU changed and the grandparental wisdom was abandoned.
mission and Council were right and in any future renegotiation of the Treaties (a Pandora’s Box which should not be opened lightly) the Article should be amended. This was a negotiation of non-equals, though on occasion I was reminded of the erce little toy poodles who bark ferociously at our Rottweiler when out on a walk. Such inequalities pose a particular
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Here is a partial list – guaranteed to raise many hackles.
The Peoples of Europe should remain wedded to the idea of an Ever Closer Union out of conviction and not fear.
Though denied again and again, there is sufcient Google evidence from countless politicians in several Member States, to the effect that the meta-posture of the EU was to Play it Tough in order to deter other Exiteers. I think this was misguided for two reasons. First, I do not believe in Catholic Marriages. The Peoples of Europe should remain wedded to the idea of an Ever Closer Union out of conviction and not fear. As mentioned above, a recalcitrant and truculent partner within can wreak more damage on the future of the EU than a friendly Associate Member. (For more on this see ‘The Case for a Kinder Gentler Brexit’ ) And, second, if, as should be the case, one understands that even post-exit, for economic and geo-strategic reasons, an alienated UK is not in the interests of the EU, that metaposture often turns out to be counterproductive.
and then the Blame Game would have started in earnest) the Brits would have respected the Divorce Settlement? That this would be the case became clear in the march towards the cliff in the nal months of last year. (And this is not Monday morning hindsight reading of the Sunday football match – if you take the trouble to read the ‘Kinder Gentler’ piece above). The Backstop would guarantee the integrity of the EU’s customs and regulatory territory but at the expense of the integrity of the UK’s customs and regulatory territory and de facto and de jure force the UK into a permanent customs and regulatory union. Chapeau to the EU negotiators for having the UK swallow that frog without even noticing. Do you recall the British dismay (including May herself) when the UK Attorney General nally made it clear to all and sundry? But was it in the interest of the EU to push for this solution – a solution which a
The tough Divorce Terms First, and only then Withdrawal Agreement negotiations was, in my view, sheer folly. Given the Article 50 time constraints it was a painful and unnecessary waste of precious time. Could anyone seriously believe that had the Withdrawal negotiations failed resulting in a Hard Brexit (as was a distinct possibility –
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country like, say, France would never ever accept for itself? A forced de facto Customs and Regulatory Union. Full disclosure. Sir Jonathan Faull, Daniel Sarmiento and myself, put forward a much discussed and much contested alternative approach (the Financial Times called it the Win-Win Solution – we continue to believe that there were answers to all the objections that were raised, but the Commission team seemed to be locked into their repeated assurance that there were no alternatives to the Backstop). Be that as it may, (or May) eventually the original Backstop had to be modied though at the price of a huge concession by Boris: the introduction, however disguised, of a customs frontier within the UK. But does anyone believe that is a stable solution?
These two one time spouses do not have the luxury of just walking away and never seeing each other again if they so wish
As we enter into the Post-Brexit phase of the saga, the imbalance of power is even more transparent. It may be worth repeating again, that unlike a real life divorce, these two one time spouses do not have the luxury of just walking away and never seeing each other again if they so wish. They will need each other economically and geo-strategically in the future. The rhetoric is not promising.
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Notes From An Even Smaller Island: Brexit and Ireland By Gavin Barrett
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small trading nation (although one that trades far more with other EU states than the UK) on many accounts, Ireland is economically more at risk from Brexit than the UK itself (which is rendered less vulnerable by its greater size and considerable volume of non-EU trade) (2). Furthermore, there were real fears that Brexit making the Northern Irish border a new single market and customs union would endanger peace on the island.
31 January 2020 will go down in history as the date on which Brexit took place. Immediately preceded in the UK by the postelection adoption of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 (given royal assent on 23 January) – which gives domestic legal effect in the UK to the Withdrawal Agreement and enables the UK Government to ratify it - and by an (overwhelmingly favourable) vote of approval by the European Parliament on 29 January, as demanded by Article 50 TEU, the Brexit date is, however, doomed to end in disappointment for believers in British premier Boris Johnson’s promise to ‘get Brexit done’.
This latter issue requires brief elaboration: Ireland had beneted for two decades from the effective disappearance of border controls on the island as the combined result of both Northern Ireland and the Republic having been for years in (i) a customs union; (ii) a Single Market; and (iii) a common travel area; and having seen (iv) the elimination of security controls as a result of the 1998 Good Friday Northern Ireland peace accord. With Brexit, the Irish Government now declared its unwillingness to see controls on the Nort-
In reality, the Brexit process has miles to go before it sleeps: the (revised) Brexit Withdrawal Agreement (accompanied by an associated political declaration on the future relationship between the EU and the UK) has been, despite the slow and tortuous nature of its adoption – the easy part of Brexit. Agreement on the future relationship between the EU and UK (largely but far from exclusively, the future economic relationship) will be the difcult bit: the process of its negotiation and ratication will go on for years if not decades. The economic and political dangers of Brexit for Ireland – the only state with a land border with the UK - were never in doubt. As a
1. Professor Gavin Barrett is Head of Teaching and Learning, Sutherland School of Law, University College Dublin. 2. See e.g., F. Kelly, “Classied report shows Brexit will hit Ireland worse than UK”, Irish Times, 24 February 2018.
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negotiating process did not materialise. Meeting Ireland’s concerns for maintaining peace along the border between the Republic and Northern Ireland remained a permanent focus of the negotiations on the Withdrawal Agreement.
hern Ireland frontier with the attendant risk of alienation of Northern Ireland nationalists and a return to armed conict.
Although this was reasonable, it had huge consequences for Brexit. Since all four of the above elements were needed to maintain The triumph may prove to be a temporary the absence of border controls, it effectively one. Because of the provision for a transimeant that either the UK or Northern Ireland tion period in the withdrawal agreement, the would have to stay in the customs union, and economic consequences of Brexit have been in large part the single market for goods, to postponed until the end of 2020 (even if UK keep border controls suppressed. May’s soluformal membership and institutional particition - the so-called ‘backstop’ - envisaged pation in the EU of has ended on 31 JaNorthern Ireland remaining in the Single nuary). Thereafter – somewMarket for goods in major hat unbelievably - the threat respects, and the UK as a whole staying in a customs Ireland is economi- arises that most of the gains achieved by Ireland with the arrangement in the EU. Thrically more at risk hard-won Withdrawal Agreece rejected in the House of Commons, this deal, and Thefrom Brexit than ment concerning both peace and economic prosperity may resa May herself, were sucthe UK itself well be lost, since the econoceeded by Boris Johnson’s remic arrangements envisaged luctant effective agreement in the Agreement and associathat Northern Ireland remain ted political declaration rely for their execuin the single market in many respects for tion on a trade agreement being reached dugoods, and in effect if not in name, in the cusring the transition period. Ireland, in the toms union as well – thereby handing back words of its Deputy Prime Minister faces a to the EU a concession reluctantly given to fresh Brexit cliff edge (3). May of the UK as a whole remaining in an effective customs union, and (astonishingly) Moreover because of the limited nature of apparently successfully selling this act of the trade relationship the UK wants, even a economic self-harm domestically as a tactibest-case scenario can be expected to inclucal triumph. de serious economic disruption for a state that counts the UK as a major export/import Irish interests therefore prevailed because partner both of goods and services and as a EU solidarity held, making a small Member transit route for imports and exports of State’s bargaining power greater than that of goods to other EU member states (4). a far larger non-EU Member State. Predictions that support of Member States would The risks to Ireland can be categorised as (i) wither during the Withdrawal Agreement’s 3. Memorandum circulated to the Irish Government and reported in D. McConnell, “State Facing Brexit ‘Cliff Edge’”, Irish Examiner, 30 January 2020. 4. See P. Leahy, Ministers to be Warned UK Trade Faces ‘Considerable Disruption’ Irish Times, 29 January 2020.
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The risks to Ireland can be categorised as (i) risks to peace in Northern Ireland, (ii) dangers to trade, and (iii) more general dangers
risks to peace in Northern Ireland, (ii) dangers to trade, and (iii) more general dangers. Of course, the greatest risk is that no deal at all will be agreed during the transition period. The stated UK objective of reaching a comprehensive trade deal by the end of 2020 seems impossible to achieve. No trade deal (particularly one linked to nontrade objectives such as justice cooperation and security cooperation) has ever been agreed in such a short period. Moreover, by legislating domestically to prevent any extension to this period to the end of 2022, Johnson has made matters doubly difcult. Such domestic UK legislation can be repealed. But it renders politically impossible compliance with the legal requirement that the UK make any request to extend the extension period by the end of June of this year. What has been guaranteed is that if any agreement is reached it will be a ‘bare bones’ trade agreement, covering only free trade in goods
and little else. Even such an agreement faces considerable difculties, however. It is likely to be linked to the difcult issue of access to sheries (continental access to UK sheries grounds and UK access to continental markets), nancial services (in which the UK needs to protect the City of London), and the issue of enforcement, with the UK hostile to a role for the Court of Justice of the EU seen as necessary by the EU. Moreover, a quick free trade agreement ensuring tariff-free trade will only be granted by an EU fearful of being undermined competitively by the UK if the latter agrees to level-playing eld terms. Put another way, zero tariffs and quotas will only be agreed for the UK if zero dumping is also agreed (paralleling - but going beyond - similar provisions in free trade agreements with Canada and Japan). Theresa May committed herself at least to so-called ‘dynamic alignment’ with the EU (which itself is probably not enough), but the UK government is much more hostile to any alignment. (5)
5. See R. Khalaf, G. Parker and C. Giles “Forget Staying Close to EU after Brexit, Chancellor Tells Business”, Financial Times, 17 January 2020.
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the key gain of the Withdrawal Agreement and a key element of maintaining the fragile political stability in the region – seems far from guaranteed. The EU has always insisted that the Single Market must be protected. A radically competitive low-tax Singaporeon-the-Thames type UK, competing unfairly with State aid pouring its goods into Northern Ireland would clearly create pressures in this respect.
It seems doubtful that such matters can be resolved by the end of 2020, particularly given that there will only be four or ve negotiating rounds before the UK has to decide whether to extend the transition, and routes of somehow enabling the transition period to be extended are already being actively considered (6). Dangers to Peace in Northern Ireland. Although the Withdrawal Agreement is a stand-alone international agreement which remains binding even in the absence of any future relationship agreement, few guarantees are to be found in this. The implementation of the Withdrawal Agreement alone, without more, will bring real challenges in terms of setting up new structures and committees and even physical infrastructures at ports and airports, physical infrastructure which Unionist members of the Northern Ireland government (who oppose any restrictions on trade with the mainland) have little interest in assisting.
Dangers to Ireland-UK Trade The focus on the risks to peace in Northern Ireland of Brexit have sometimes tended to eclipse the major economic challenges Brexit involves for Ireland even apart from these risks. Among such challenges are that a no-deal scenario with the United Kingdom at the end of the transition period involves Ireland facing the challenge of a cliff-edge Brexit, involving controls and tariffs being imposed not just on goods originating wholly or partly outside the UK but goods produced inside the UK as well. Such controls and checks would create an immediate danger of major blockages at air and sea exits from the UK – with the added challenge for Ireland that such blockages would also interfere with goods transiting from elsewhere in the EU across the UK to Ireland. Even with a trade agreement, a UK backsliding towards a Singapore-on-the-Thames type approach would create real pressure not just on Ireland but on the EU as a whole not to raise social standards, and even to regress in relation to them. A UK lowering tariffs on agricultural imports from elsewhere in the world to compensate for raised prices deriving from tariffs on agricultural imports from the EU could have devastating conse-
Moreover, repeated denials by Boris Johnson of the reality that implementation of the agreement will lead to increased checks on goods travelling from the British mainland to Northern Ireland already raise questions of how committed the UK (which will be responsible for such checks) really will be to the Agreement. Moreover, unless a zerotariff regime is agreed, the restrictions on trade with the mainland envisaged under the agreement (in particular in the east-west direction) could be considerable. Even the absence of border controls between Northern Ireland and the Republic –
6. D. Boffey, “EU looks at extending Brexit transition period beyond 2020”, The Guardian, 14 December 2019.
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quences for the Irish agriculture and food industries. Other More General Challenges Brexit will leave Ireland with other challenges over and above the abovementioned issues. One of them will be the difculty of being pulled in two different directions economically and politically. The overriding importance of retention of Single Market membership will for the rst time have costs attached to it in terms of trade with Ireland’s closer and far bigger neighbour. Within the EU, Ireland will now face a range of challenges. Coping alone, and learning to stand on its own two feet both institutionally and intellectually with the challenges of integration is one, where before reliance on a neighbour with far greater resources was possible. Coping in an EU with a far less amplied voice for common law countries in an EU which integrates through law (including in the sensitive JHA eld) is another. Finding new allies within the EU is another – and one which has led Ireland to join, however incongruously, the
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new Hanseatic league of scally conservative EU states.To this may be added the dangers of regional instability. Given the unhappiness of the non-English nations of the United Kingdom, it seems far from assured that the UK can actually survive Brexit unscathed, and Brexit has added at least some economic incentivisation to the nonetheless politically complex prospect of a united Ireland. Nor is Brexit without its paradoxes. In terms of trade, Ireland’s interests lie in the UK securing a close trading relationship with the EU. Yet Ireland also faces the danger of being competitively undermined by a new ‘Singapore on the Thames’ and shares with the EU as a whole the need to demonstrate that EU membership comes with advantages which can not be secured by non-Member States. An economically unsuccessful Brexit risks inicting collateral damage on Ireland. An economically successful one risks amplifying the voice of EU opposition that is currently the preserve of farright extremists: Ireland like most other EU countries is now beginning to face the
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emergence of - as of yet - marginal anti-immigrant groupings. It should not be forgotten that Ireland, unlike most other EU countries faces the near-legal certainty of referendums should - as seems likely - current reections on the future of the EU lead ultimately to treaty reform. The Brexit referendum may have cured the Irish electorate of its occasional and highly risky predilection to vote ‘no’ to major European treaties, but this cannot be taken for granted.
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News Highlights 27 January - 2 February 2020 Concerns about the rule of law in Poland reach Commission’s competition policy Monday 27 January
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In an annulment action led by Sped-Pro against the European Commission (Case T-791/19) and published in the Ofcial Journal, the applicant challenges the Commission for failing to take into account the undermining of independence of the judiciary and competition authorities in Poland.
Preliminary reference on the reimbursement of lawyer’s fees under the Enforcement Directive Monday 27 January
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The Ofcial Journal published a request for a preliminary ruling (C-785/19) lodged by the German District Court of Saarbrücken, asking the Court of Justice the extent to which the Enforcement Directive entitles the holders of intellectual property rights to reimbursement of the lawyers’ fees, either as legal costs or in the form of damages.
CJEU’s research note on the CILFIT case law Wednesday 29 January
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The Court of Justice published a research note on the CILFIT case law, which deals with the duty to make a preliminary reference by national courts of last resort. The research note, dated May 2019, shows how the Court understands its own approach.
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CJEU to rule on scope of the principle of energy solidarity Monday 27 January
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The Ofcial Journal published an appeal (C-848/19 P) brought by Germany against a judgment of the General Court (T-883/16), in a case dealing with the content and the scope of application of the principle of energy solidarity in Article 194 of the TFEU.
Turkish system for settling football disputes condemned by the ECtHR Tuesday 28 January
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In its judgment in the case Ali Riza and Others v. Turkey, the European Court of Human Rights found that the system for settlement of football disputes in Turkey violates the European Convention on Human Rights and declared that the State should take measures to ensure the structural independence of the Arbitration Committee of the Turkish Football Federation.
Agreement for the Hosting of the EASO Operational Office in Greece Wednesday 29 January
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The European Asylum Support Ofce announced the ‘hosting agreement’ signed with Greece, which allows EASO to support the asylum and reception authorities in that country. This follows the Operating Plan signed by the EASO and Greece in December 2019.
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Council of Europe monitoring Poland for democracy and rule of law Wednesday 29 January
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The Council of Europe voted to start monitoring Poland for the functioning of democratic institutions and the rule of law, declaring in a resolution that recent reforms ‘severely damage the independence of the judiciary and rule of law’.
ECtHR condemns detention conditions in Ukraine and France Thursday 30 January
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In Sukachov v. Ukraine and in J.M.B. and Others v. France, the European Court of Human Rights found conditions of detention in Ukraine and in France to be in breach with the European Convention of Human Rights, and requested the incumbent States to adopt structural reforms on this area.
Strasbourg approves collection of data to identify users of pre-paid SIM cards Thursday 30 January
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In its judgment in Breyer v. Germany, the European Court of Human Rights found German legislation imposing a duty on a telecoms companies to collect and store the personal details of all their customers, including users of pre-paid SIM cards, to be in accordance with the right to privacy.
References to non-specific benefits and specific health claims must be visible and clear in food packaging Thursday 30 January
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In Dr Willmar Schwabe (C-524/18), the Court of Justice claried the terms in which consumers must be informed of general health claims made by manufacturers in food products.
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ECB Recommendation on Dividend Distribution Policies for Credit Institutions Wednesday 29 January
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The Ofcial Journal published the Recommendation of the European Central Bank (ECB) of 17 January 2020 on dividend distribution policies, a non-binding act adopted by the ECB’s Governing Council in carrying out its tasks of prudential supervision of credit institutions.
AG supports the applicability of public procurement rules to horizontal cooperation between contracting authorities Thursday 30 January
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In case ISE v Stadt Köln (C-762/18), Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona delivered his Opinion, advising the CJEU to rule that a cooperation agreement between the Land of Berlin and the City of Cologne is a ‘contract’ under Article 12(4) of the Public Procurement Directive.
CJEU clarifies competition rules in settlement agreements between holders of pharmaceutical patents and manufacturers of generic medicines Thursday 30 January
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The Court of Justice released its judgment in Generics (UK) and Others (C-307/18), setting how competition law must be applied to patent settlement agreements.
Brexit: Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration made official Friday 31 January
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The Ofcial Journal published the Withdrawal Agreement, the Notice on the entry into force thereof, Council Decision (EU) 2020/135 on the conclusion of the Withdrawal Agreement, as well as the Declaration on possible refusals to comply with EAWs from the UK: Germany, Austria and Slovenia. It also published the Political declaration setting out the framework for the future relationship between the EU and the UK
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This Week’s Analysis & Op-Eds AG suggests Giudici di Pace are judges under Article 267 TFEU and ‘workers’ under EU law By Daniele Gallo
ECB reviewing its monetary policy strategy By Marijn van der Sluis
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Analysis on AG Kokott’s Opinion in UX (C-658/18), concerning the status of Italian magistrates (Giudici di Pace) from the standpoint of EU law. A very interesting Opinion marking an inclusive interpretation of the concepts of ‘court or tribunal’ under Article 267 TFEU and of ‘workers’ under the Working Time Directive.
Analysis on the most prominent aspects of the recently announced review of the European Central Bank’s monetary policy strategy, which is scheduled to be completed by the end of the year.
Brexit and the future By Jonathan Faull
I.G.I v Maria Grazia Cicenia By David Ramos
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Can a Member State’s national court apply Civil Code remedies that may interfere with the ‘neat’ EU rules on corporate divisions? David Ramos analyses the Court of Justice’s reply to this question in the judgment in case C-394/18.
Editorial Opinion exploring some of the potential consequences of Brexit, regarding both the stress it will pose to UK unity and the risk of friction between legal orders in areas such as nancial regulation or competition
Library - Book Review IOANNA HADJIYIANNI
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By Marta Morvillo
Hart Publishing, 2019, 368 pp.
The EU as a Global Regulator for Environmental Protection: A Legitimacy Perspective READ ON EU LAW LIVE Review of a timely and systematic contribution to the study of the EU’s global regulatory power. A book on the legitimacy challenges posed by internal environmental measures with extraterritorial implications that carefully assess the role of both EU and WTO law in addressing them.
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