BullsEye 75

eds european democrat students

The magazine of European Democrat Students

BREXIT 4 UN MIGRATION COMPACT 5 RUSSIA 6 IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL 8 QATAR & OPEC 9 CATALONIA 10 BELGIUM 12

NETHERLANDS 13 LUXEMBOURG 14 CDU & MERKEL 15 GREECE 16 SLOVAKIA 17 EU & SAHEL 18 CENTRAL ASIA 20

GENDER EQUALITY 22 HUAWEI 24 CHINA & CORRUPTION 25 HEREDITY & EDUCATION 26 VIENNA UNIVERSITY 28 ACADEMIC FREEDOM 29

No. 75 | February 2019 | 57th Year | ISSN 2033-7809

Dear readers, I am pleased to introduce you to our Issue 75 of BullsEye, the newsmagazine of European Democrat Students. I have to admit it gives me some thrills when I consider the symbolism of the number, three quarters of 100 and I take a look back at the work achieved by our predecessors since 1976. I hope we will be worthy of their work and I wish to take an appointment with our successors as I am looking forward to read Issue 100 in a few years.

While developing the past Issue was an uphill road, with challenges at every stage of the preparation, I am quite relieved that Issue 75 was a more pleasant journey, and I will be happy to know the present Issue has reached Barcelona on the occasion of the Council Meeting. As EDS will gather in Spain to discuss the Dangers of Nationalism, we are glad to host Ramón Riera to present to us the situation and the results of the standoff between the Spanish government and the separatists in Catalonia. At the same time, we will continue our series on the European elections, and this time we will focus on the BENELUX, a region which has been at the centre of the European integration process, and has often anticipated it (as BENELUX was established in 1944). This is why Françoise Kemp, Frederiek Wesel and your humble servant delivered three articles on these countries, while Johannes Bürgin will discuss the future of the CDU and Angela Merkel, following the party congress. Vasilis Kesidis outlines some of the latest developments in Greece while Szilvia Zuber covers the situation in Slovakia.

As Brexit is coming, Ivan Botoucharov shared some thoughts on the ongoing process and what is at stake. Elie-Joe Dergham will discuss another topic which was the subject of heated debates, the UN Compact on Migration. Christie Maike and Elie Obeid prepared interesting analyses on ongoing issues in Middle East related to energy and geopolitics, namely the relations between Qatar and OPEC, and the Iran nuclear deal. With regard to the recent crisis on the Sea of Azov between Russia and Ukraine, Pavlina Pavlova discusses the bases of the Russian foreign policy. We will also take a look into Europe's farther neighbourhood, with the so called 'Neighbours of neighbours' by discussing Sahel with Mattia Caniglia and Central Asia with Fabio Rondini. Beyond Central Asia, we have two very interesting articles related to China, thanks to Santiago de la Presilla and Vladimir Milic. In the wake of the ongoing #MeToo phenomenon, Desislava Kemalova comes back on the question of gender equality.

Last but not least, Sabine Hanger, Johanna Gruber and Anna Mkrtchyan propose us very interesting articles related to Education, with discussions on the heredity of education and the question of academic freedom, while we visit the University of Economics in Vienna.

Julien Sassel BullsEye Editor-in-Chief

ISSN: Print: 2033-7809 Online: 2033-7817 EDITOR-IN-CHIEF: Julien Sassel VICE-CHAIR FOR PUBLICATIONS: Tommi Pyykkö EDITORIAL TEAM: Johannes Bürgin, Mattia Caniglia, Santiago de la Presilla, Elie-Joe Dergham, Beppe Galea, Johanna Gruber, Sabine Hanger, Desislava Kemalova, Vladimir Milic, Anna Mkrtchyan.

CONTRIBUTIONS: Ivan Botoucharov, Françoise Kemp, Vasileios Kesidis, Christie Maike, Elie Obeid, Pavlina Pavlova, Ramón Riera, Fabio Rondini, Frederiek Wesel, Szilvia Zuber

CONTENTS: CURRENT AFFAIRS 04 THE REALITIES OF BREXIT 05 UN MIGRATION COMPACT –

A STEP FORWARD IN MANAGING MIGRATION? 06 RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY:

THE CHOSEN AND THE GIVEN 08 IRAN AND THE EUROPEAN UNION:

A FUTURE DEAL 09 QATAR’S WITHDRAWAL FROM OPEC:

ADDING FUEL TO THE FIRE

THEME 10 CATALONIA – THE DANGERS OF NATIONALISM SERIES – EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 12

BELGIUM: BACK TO CHAOS?

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ARE THE NETHERLANDS ANNEXING THEMSELVES? AN INSIGHT INTO THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION

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A RETROSPECTIVE AND PERSPECTIVE ON THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN LUXEMBOURG

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CDU ELECTIONS – THE END OF MERKEL´S REIGN?

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GREECE! TURN OFF POPULISM AND KEEP YOUR EYES AHEAD

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THE SLOVAK PARADOX – WILL WE MANAGE TO BREAK IT?

BE ON 18 THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE SAHEL:

A LABORATORY FOR EU’S FOREIGN POLICY? 20 BACK ON THE SILK ROAD? THE EUROPEAN

UNION AND CENTRAL ASIA 22 STOP THE RANT –

A DIFFERENT TAKE ON GENDER EQUALITY 24 THE CASE OF HUAWEI –

CHINESE TROJAN HORSES? 25 CHINA'S FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION –

GETTING POSSIBLE OPPONENTS IN LINE? UNIVERSITIES 26 WHAT IS BEHIND THE HEREDITY OF EDUCATION? 28 THE UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS VIENNA 29 ARE THERE LIMITS TO ACADEMIC FREEDOM 30 BULLSEYE EDITORIAL TEAM 31 BUREAU

PHOTOS: Àkos Kaiser, Unsplash, Pixabay, EPP, Shutterstock.

DESIGN: Markus Konow PUBLISHER: European Democrat Students, B-1000 Brussels, Rue du Commerce 10 TEL: +(32) 228 541 50 FAX: +(32) 228 541 41 EMAIL: students@epp.org WEBSITE: www.edsnet.eu Articles and opinions published in the magazine do not necessarily reflecting the positions of EDS, the EDS Bureau or the Editorial team.

Publication supported by the Erasmus + Programme of the European Union and European Youth Foundation of the Council of Europe.

The European Commission support for the production of this publication does not constitute an endorsment of the contents which reflects the views only of the authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be made of the information contained therein.

Welcome to our third issue of BullsEye for this working year.

It will be a 2019 of great mobilisation for EDS, in support of our Spitzenkandidat Manfred Weber to the presidency of the European Commission. European elections will also renew the European Parliament, the place par excellence where European citizens are represented.

After the traditional first Bureau Meeting of the year hosted by our friends of AktionsGemeinschaft in the birthplace of EDS, in Vienna, we head for the Winter University in Barcelona where we will focus our attention with our colleagues from the Partido Popular and Nuevas Generaciones on the degeneration coming from nationalisms, in Spain as in Europe and in the rest of the world.

CHAIRMAN’S LETTER

Dear friends, This opportunity is also useful to remind that you can follow our daily activities through the social profiles of our organization on Facebook, Twitter and Instagram.

For now, please enjoy reading the new issue of BullsEye and keep in mind that the EDS Bureau is always interested in receiving feedback, hearing your ideas, and discovering more ways to proudly serve students across Europe.

With my best regards,

Virgilio Falco Chairman of European Democrat Students

The official magazine of European Democrat Students

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The realities of Brexit Two and a half years on and the realities of Brexit are more daunting than ever.

The uncertainty surrounding the future relationship between the UK and the EU has left businesses in the unenviable position of trying to guess the outcome of a convoluted political chess game which appears to have come to a draw. Many have decided to ‘up sticks and go’ by setting up headquarters in Ireland, Germany, France, The Netherlands and other EU member states.

Most recently Panasonic has announced that it is moving its European Headquarters from Bracknell to Amsterdam. They are just one of many Japanese companies which have taken the decision to move away. Among the major brands alone, massive retailer Muji is said to be organising a move of its European headquarters to Germany, while renowned banks Nomura and Daiwa are already setting themselves up in Germany.

But even more disturbing for those Brexiteers hoping to make the UK a tax haven, is the reason Panasonic has decided to move. As reported by the BBC, “Panasonic's decision was driven by a fear that Japan could start considering the UK a tax haven if it cuts corporate tax rates to attract business”, Mr

Abadie [Panasonic Europe's chief executive] told the Nikkei Asian Review newspaper.

If Panasonic ends up paying less tax in the UK, that could render it liable for a bigger tax bill in Japan.

Mr Abadie told the Nikkei Asian Review that Panasonic had been considering the move for 15 months, because of Brexit-related concerns such as access to free flow of goods and people.”

In addition, the realities of the situation have already exposed many of the misrepresentations of the Leave campaign.

Their unofficial tagline stating that ‘Once we have settled our accounts, we will take back control of roughly £350m per week’, was publicly derided as “a clear misuse of official statistics” by Sir David Norgrove, Chair of the UK Statistics Authority in a letter. The issue is that the £350m is a gross figure and it doesn’t take into account the money that Britain gets back from the EU or our rebate on top of that. Leaving that aside the negative influence on the economy from trade changes following Brexit will likely be much, much bigger than savings from our EU contributions.

In an even more dramatic turn of affairs, following a referral by the Election Commission the National Crime Agency is to investigate claims of criminal offences by

Arron Banks, the man who made the biggest donation in British political history to the Leave.EU campaign. The Electoral Commission stated that it suspects Mr Banks was not the "true source" of loans to the campaign and that the funds had come "from impermissible sources". In addition to Banks others being investigated are the Leave.EU campaign, Elizabeth Bilney, who chaired the campaign, and Better for the Country (the company used to finance Leave.EU), as well as other associated companies and individuals. Banks and Bilney have rejected any wrongdoing.

Meanwhile the British pound has lost over 10% of its value since the referendum. In addition various calculations state that the result of the referendum has already cost Britain between £20bn and £40bn. On top of all that the trade deficit rose to the second highest since records began.

British businesses and British people more than ever need stability, transparency and clarity on what the future holds. Taking into account the realities of Brexit we are now experiencing, it is no surprise that at least 53 MPs, including 8 Conservative MPs such as The RT Hon Dominic Grieve MP, have called for a second referendum. With Parliament deadlocked, the results of Brexit now more evident than ever and public opinion changing rapidly that may well be the best solution.

Ivan Botoucharov

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BullsEye

UN Migration Compact – A step forward in managing migration?

According to the Oxford dictionary, migration is the movement of people to a new area or country in order to find work or better living conditions. Throughout history, there were many examples of mass migration of cultures. Whether for economic or social purposes, people migrated and moved from country to country or from continent to continent.

According to the National Geographic Society, there are two main types of migration. The main types are internal and international migration. One main example of mass internal migration is Great Northern Migration. Millions of African Americans migrated from southern states up to northern states. This internal migration was caused due to the improved freedoms in the northern states for African Americans. One prime example of international migration is the Lebanese migration to Europe, North and South America. This mass migration was due to the dire economic conditions after the First World War and Lebanese Civil War. Migration has played an important part in history. Recently, mass migration of populations from war torn countries like Syria and Iraq have highlighted this issue on the international stage and the United Nation have moved in order to help member nations organize migration. With a clear lack of direction available to governments on what to do, the United Nations held a meeting to address how member nations could respond.

Migration is caused by several factors.

One of the most common factors that cause migration is natural disasters. Disasters such as droughts, earthquakes, hurricanes, and flooding. One of the most recent examples of migration caused by

natural disasters is the Haitian earthquake. A 7.0 magnitude earthquake hit Port Au Prince in 2010. This earthquake caused the migration of over 600,000 thousand Haitians to nearby countries.

This had a major effect on all countries involved. Another cause for mass migration is disease. When an outbreak of disease occurs, many people flee the area of the outbreak to nearby areas and countries.

The last major factor for mass migration are conflicts around the world. Syrian and Iraqi conflicts have highlighted the effect of war on the migration. More recently, the Rohingya crisis in Myanmar caused over half a million of the country’s Muslim population fleeing to neighboring Bangladesh in the wake of violence and ethnic cleansing. These factors have been increasing over the past years. This has caused migration to be a dividing issue among nations of the world. United Nations moved to put a framework in place in order to tackle this issue. The UN's Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration marks the first time the world body has agreed on a list of global measures to tackle the risks and challenges involved in migration for individual migrants, and at the same time to maximize benefits for the countries taking in immigrants. This agreement started in September 2016 when 193 countries met in order to tackle the refugee and migration issue. This agreement is made of 23 objectives for better managing the local, national, regional, and global levels. This agreement aims to decrease the risk and vulnerabilities migrants face during the migration process by respecting, protecting and fulfilling their human rights and providing them with care and assistance.

Secondly, the agreement aims to alleviate

the main factors that make people halt from building and maintaining sustainable livelihoods in their countries of origin.

Additionally, the agreement pursues to address the genuine concern of nations and communities, while identifying that communities are undergoing demographic, economic, social and environmental changes at different scales that may have implications for and result from migration.

Finally, the agreement motivates to produce conditions that enable all migrants to empower our societies through several capacities. This would ease their contributions in order to make the migrants develop at all levels. This agreement was reached after two years of intense negotiations. This agreement is a non-binding agreement to all member nation. This agreement represented a small victory for the millions of migrates around the world. However, there are many experts that find that this agreement is still insufficient to tackle this problem. Furthermore, many countries did not participate and pulled out in the final draft of the agreement. Countries like the United States, Austria, Hungry, Switzerland, Australia, and several others rejected the agreement out right. These countries stated that this agreement would surrender part of their sovereignty. This agreement was passed in December 2018. It represents as a cornerstone for future agreements for refugees.

The debate on how to deal with refugees still continues to this day; however, this agreement would help hosting countries to cope with this growing issue. This is only a small solution to a growing issue that might shape the future for generations to come.

Elie-Joe Dergham

The official magazine of European Democrat Students

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Russia’s foreign policy: the Chosen and the Given The crisis around the Sea of Azov caught the world’s attention as the latest example of Russian aggression, but a combination of transcendent ideology and uncompromising geography is needed to explain the complexities of Russian foreign policy leading into the current conflicts.

The new military crisis around the Azov Sea brought fears of open military conflict before everybody retired for the winter break.

Rising security tensions provided not only for bold headlines but led to martial law in Ukraine and a recurrent headache for Europe. Just six days before the incident occurred, EU foreign ministers met to discuss the militarization around the Kerch Strait but parted company in hope that the issue would be solved with official statements. The Sea forced itself onto the agenda now. This topic is highly sensitive for Europe, which is expected to take Ukraine’s side, yet the implication for the world could be far-reaching as the situation bears some parallels to the dispute over the South China Sea. The Sea of Azov is located northeast of Crimea and according to a 2003 agreement between Russian President Vladimir Putin and then-Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, these are shared waters of both countries. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 turned the tables and gave Russia de facto control of both sides of the Kerch strait connecting the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. Consequently, Russians started to build a bridge linking southern Russia with the annexed territory. Called the “Crimean Bridge” after an online vote, with "Kerch Bridge" and "Reunification Bridge" coming in as the second and third most popular choices, the bridge was opened in spring 2018 and gave Russia complete control over the sea traffic – threatening the viability of

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Ukrainian economic activity in the Eastern part of the country.

Russia has been stopping and delaying naval traffic, including commercial ships, over the summer. However, even by the Russian interpretation of Crimea’s status, the country still has no legal right to stop Ukrainian ships which have an irrevocable right to access their national ports on the Sea of Azov. Ukraine took the risk of deploying a very small share of their navy, resulting in the seizure of three Ukrainian navy ships and twenty-three sailors. The incident exacerbated to the further destabilisation of the region, which already has been shaky since 2015, and a massive response from both sides – Ukraine reacted by introducing martial law in ten regions and Moscow called for an emergency UN Security Council meeting, showing that both sides wanted this topic to be prominent.

A firestorm of finger-pointing followed next.

Russians accused Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko of escalating the situation for political credit in the upcoming presidential elections. His decision to push for martial law was indeed somehow controversial as such measures were not introduced back in 2014 or 2015 despite large-scale fighting in Eastern Ukraine. The accusations of exploiting the situation are not too far-fetched. Ukraine is preparing for both presidential and parliamentary elections to be held in March and October 2019 respectively, and they still have a very uncertain outcome. Two-time Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko is having one of

her more successful comebacks and seemed to be leading in opinion polls. Countering accusations of being too close to Russia, she is running with the slogan – yes to NATO, yes to the EU. Opposing her is Poroshenko taking a nationalist line with slogans like “Army!

Language! Faith!ˮ – And an opportunity has presented itself to prove his point.

The question remains why Russia would help a candidate running on an anti-Russian ticket. From Russia’s point of view, this conflict barely makes sense, yet by intensifying this conflict they gave Poroshenko additional credibility. Some find the answer in Putin’s rating problem. The President’s popularity has been plummeting to a five-year low as Russian voters rage over government pension reforms. The level of dissatisfaction is notable given that Putin had his biggest-ever victory in March 2018 elections with 77 per cent of the vote. Back in the days, it was the Crimean crisis that elevated his ratings, in similar way as the Russian-Georgian War in 2008, and it is hence understandable to suspect that he is trying to pull the same trick. At the same time, to assume that Putin is willing to risk negative international attention for a short-lived rating recovery seems somewhat short-sighted, notably because Putin doesn't have to go to the polls until 2024.

The motive, as in most cases, is probably as much in the economics and geopolitics of the situation, as it is a natural reaction to the rapidly changing situation while trying to secure the country’s political gains. For Rus-

BullsEye

sia, to cut off the trade from the Ukrainian ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk is one way to squeeze Ukraine’s economy, giving Kyiv only two options – to accept the new status quo, which would lead Eastern Ukraine deeper into economic depression by preventing trade – or to reject Russian blocking as a type of illegitimate behaviour. Ukrainians understandably did not accept such conditions and instead mobilised public and diplomatic channels to reopen their access to the Azov Sea. The Russian reaction of calling on an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council came as an inevitably loud answer to the negative coverage of the event.

Russian foreign policy has often been demonised but the basic line remains simple - just as the country itself – it is a mixture of almost romantic beliefs in its own exceptionalism, resulting in an unwillingness to compromise, and sober realpolitik owing more to the country’s vulnerability rather than actual power. None of these traits are unique in world history. Most, if not all, global powers suffered similar grandiose visions and claimed their heavenly mandate, as the examples of American and Chinese exceptionalism demonstrate. The sense of having unique qualities and a special mission has formed many national foreign policies and became an idealistic cover for unapologetic self-interest. Russia’s belief has been remarkably resilient and even strengthened by the harsh living conditions of Russian people, reaching all-time highs in the post-war

Soviet Union. The greater was the shock of the 90s collapse resulting in a nation-wide trauma from which Russians never entirely recovered. Coupled with recurrent phases of grandeur and inferiority, the country’s foreign policy demonstrated irreconcilable contradictions in its relations to the West and reluctance to join international bodies except those where it enjoys a dominant status. A supporting factor is a favourable view of a 'strong state' among many Russians, a belief rooted in influential interpretations of the country's history, which benefits authoritarian leaders and turns a blind eye towards the subversion of institutions – parallels of which we can see all around the world, with Europe being no exception.

While geographical weaknesses cannot fade away, Russian leadership could set the country on a less costly and more promising course of international cooperation. What we need is to go beyond the question of who benefits from any given situation, reach beyond theories, rumours and pre-conceived judgements, and try to find a workable solution. Opening up the Sea of Azov for international monitoring from the OSCE or UN could be one of the options to bring much-needed clarity and transparent rules on the Sea access. The standing international law is however very clear on this matter – any solution would have to be a bilateral agreement between Russia and Ukraine, and Russia is not open to any international mediator.

Still, another factor that has shaped Russia’s foreign policy like no other is the country’s unique geography. Russia is the largest country in the world by territory yet their only natural borders are the Pacific Ocean and the Arctic Ocean. Having been historically involved in conflicts on many fronts, Russia has come to an understanding of its vulnerability and has often displayed a kind of defensive aggressiveness. Foreign policy formed under such conditions could not avoid being based on an offensive moving outward as a way of preventing an external attack and this belief was only supported by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Smaller neighbours of Russia are thus perceived as “buffer zones”, making it a question of self-preservation to steer them away from Western influence.

The most probable outcome is the creation of the third frontline after Crimea and Donbas - two land front lines which have been consolidated and which will probably remain more or less stable in the upcoming years. Further incidents are very likely, but they will not escalate into war as the economics of the conflict are decisive. Putting aside international repercussions, Ukraine has no serious naval capacities and for Russia, it is much more sensible to drive Eastern Ukraine into crisis and corrode its stability with blocking their trade through the Azov Sea – a kind of frozen conflict which Moscow has mastered to play.

Pavlina Pavlova

The official magazine of European Democrat Students

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Iran and the European Union: A Future Deal The US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) , an agreement it had brokered back in 2015 , has created uncertainty regarding the fate of the deal as the European Union battles to salvage what remains. Today the future of the JCPOA hangs in the balance between US sanctions on one side, and a hopeful European Union on the other. Moving forward, although a deal can be of high importance and benefit to both Iran and the European Union, the EU must now seize the opportunity to develop a more comprehensive one.

In 2015, Iran and the P5+1 group - comprised of China, France, Russia, the UK, the US and Germany - signed the JCPOA, or, as it is commonly known, the Iranian Nuclear Deal . In 2018, United States President Donald Trump fulfilled one of his campaign promises of withdrawing from what he called a bad deal for the US. The period between Trump’s election and the official withdrawal of the US was very eventful, with both Israel and the US accusing Iran of pursuing its nuclear ambitions in secret; with information leaked suggesting that Israel had destroyed Iranian Nuclear Facilities years before the deal was even struck ; and a cyber-attack that had targeted the Iranian Nuclear Program using a virus called Stuxnet (which was supposedly only discovered years later following the release of a newer version targeting the centrifuges themselves ).

The US withdrawal from the nuclear deal and the re-imposition of sanctions, led international companies to review the status of their plans vis-à-vis the Iranian market, thus reversing their course on Iranian Business .

However, in an attempt to protect European companies against US sanctions, the European Union started working on needed legislature to avoid, or even mitigate,

US sanctions. The EU then went further, declaring the establishment of a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) , which is a mechanism aimed at facilitating financial transactions with Iran under the sanctions.

For years the European Union adopted a passive approach towards dealing with International Crisis (Syria and the Iranian Nuclear Program being key examples). Today, while there are many valid reasons for them to try to save the nuclear deal, there are also reasons to abolish it and set upon the development of a more comprehensive one.

First, the US withdrawal from the deal represents a golden opportunity for the Union to develop a policy for the future that showcases its leadership in the free world, while allowing it to safeguard itself from any future US-Russia agreement. It is likely that such a policy will prove useful in the future, especially when it comes to dealing with Russia and even China, taking into account Russia’s geopolitical influence in the region and potential economic collaboration with China.

Second, the size of the Iranian market represents a once in a lifetime opportunity for a struggling European economy, as investment opportunities across the different sectors of the Iranian Market could prove beneficial in improving the status of the economy in the European Union.

Third, Iranian gas reserves are among the highest in the world, falling second only to Russia. A new deal with Iran then, could be an alternative to the European Union’s dependence on Russian gas, allowing the EU to avoid suffering a surge in transportation cost, and subsequent higher prices locally.

On the other hand, the European Union the European Union needs to be very careful not to position itself in an adver-

sary position to the United States.

Although the Iranian Nuclear Program might pose a big threat to the world especially with Iran’s Regional and Power ambitions, only the Iranian Ballistic Missiles Program poses an equal or even greater threat .

It is also well known that Iran has been heavily subsidizing Regional and International Militias on the EU’s Terrorist list through financial and military support, while also being directly involved in notable Regional and International Crises.

Iran has carried intelligence and military activities across different countries of the European Union ranging from plotted attacks on Iranian opposition activists, political assassinations and bombing attacks such as the foiled one that targeted a rally organized by Iranian opposition in Paris in June 2018.

Although Iran agreed and signed the JCPOA, statements by high ranking Iranian officials show a lack of commitment to the agreement. Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, also recently stated that “the Europeans’ opportunity to execute their commitments to our country under the JCPOA, and particularly [with reference to] the special financial channel, has ended.”

Iran’s relationship with the west can be described as nothing but a love-hate relationship, with Iran always trying to enjoy as many benefits given by foreigners for as long as possible. The JCPOA represents yet another chapter in this story, and although an agreement can be of high importance and benefit to both Iran and the EU, a more comprehensive one is needed. At the end of the day if you are planning to sleep with the devil, at least make sure you do it on your own terms.

Elie Obeid

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BullsEye

Qatar’s Withdrawal from OPEC: Adding Fuel to the Fire

Qatar is set to leave the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in January 2019, becoming the first country to pull out since joining, more than half a century ago. Qatar plans to expand its role as the number one exporter of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and boost production by more than 50% to 110 million tons per year. The decision to quit OPEC comes just days before a crucial meeting of members in Vienna to discuss cutting supplies. So why now? And, what does it mean for the global energy market?

Founded in 1960, OPEC’s role was to help its members benefit from a steady rise in oil prices.

At present, the 15 OPEC members hold 82% of global oil reserves. Oil prices reached a fouryear high of more than $80 a barrel a couple of months ago, and now have dropped to about $60.

QATAR’S ROLE IN THE ENERGY MARKET

Qatar, with a population of 1.6 million people, is one of the smallest oil producers, but the world’s biggest exporter of liquefied natural gas. Since 2013, the amount of oil Qatar produced has steadily declined from about 728,000 barrels per day to about 607,000 barrels per day in 2017, ranking Qatar at the 11th place amongst the 15 OPEC members, with a total output of only 2%.

With its vast gas fields, Qatar is the richest emirate per head in the Middle East. It holds almost 14% of world natural gas reserves, making it the world’s third largest natural gas reserve following Russia and Iran. On the global market, Qatar has been expanding its grasp, veering towards the Asia Pacific region, and focusing on China which has been aggressively moving from coal to gas.

Qatari Minister of State for Energy Affairs, Saad Sherida al-Kaabi, has reaffirmed that the decision taken is aligned with strategic objectives and not political motivations. Nevertheless, the various political hints cannot be overlooked when analysing this decision.

OPEC+. That move left Qatar feeling its interests were being marginalized by the bigger players. Other members' interests have not always aligned with those of the Saudi-Russian axis, growing contentions inside OPEC. For example, Iraq, while agreeing to extend OPEC+ cuts into 2018, noted that it was doing so at personal cost, given the country's dire fiscal passages. Smaller OPEC members, including Venezuela, Kuwait, Nigeria, and Algeria, have also reported feeling marginalized by the Saudi-Russian decisions.

Members’ discontent has reinforced OPEC's sinking reputation in Washington, fuelled by perceptions that its actions have raised costs on American consumers. The Department of Justice began formally reviewing antitrust legislation against OPEC. The measure would make it illegal to set oil prices or curb its production, remove the sovereign immunity that has safeguarded OPEC members from US legal action, and enable the attorney general to sue the cartel for price fixing. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman cannot afford to alienate President Trump, perhaps his best and only western defender, but neither can afford to distance himself from Russia, after the tremendous collaboration efforts made through OPEC+. That being said, Saudi Arabia’s decision-making process has been neglecting the overall benefit of the organization by prioritizing the Saudi political agenda.

QATAR-GCC DIPLOMATIC CRISIS ESCALATION OPEC INTERNAL RIFTS

Since 2016, OPEC’s de facto leader, Saudi Arabia, has been leading the cartel’s landmark efforts to cooperate with a Russia-led group of 11 non-OPEC oil producers labelled as

Qatar’s exit may further fracture OPEC's most powerful bloc, the Gulf States, which can alienate any prospects for reconciliation between Qatar and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Known today as the Qatar Diplomatic Crisis started in June 2017 when

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and other GCC countries severed diplomatic and economic relations with Qatar. The Saudi-led coalition mentioned Qatar’s alleged support for terrorist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, as the main reason behind the embargo. The coalition set 13 demands on Qatar, including reducing diplomatic relations with Iran and Turkey, yet Qatar refused to comply. In fact, the blockade may have pushed Qatar into the hands of Iran and Turkey, for Qatar is now considering both countries as desirable markets for exporting LNG.

THE FUTURE OF OPEC

Throughout history, OPEC used to rise above Middle East tensions, and tried hard to separate politics from economy. For instance, two of OPEC’s members, Iraq and Iran, fought a bloody eight-year war in the 1980s yet both remained in OPEC throughout. Being the only Middle Eastern country to leave, Qatar’s move has not only increased tensions in the region, but has also undermined the value of OPEC as a political forum.

Today, keeping up with changing world trends has been an ongoing weakness for OPEC. The re-emergence of the United States as an oil producing and exporting country is challenging the organisation’s traditional approach of oil management. Relying on non-members such as Russia to strengthen power is a double-edged sword, for, it is reinvigorating oil prices yet reinforcing high competitors such as the United States. OPEC’s limitations in terms of capabilities, foreign relations, wealth, are growing more visible.

Qatar’s withdrawal is an inevitable indicator.

Christie Maike

The official magazine of European Democrat Students

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Catalonia – The Dangers of Nationalism There is no shortage of debate about how the situation in Catalonia is affecting the European Union, Spain and the region itself. A lot of topics could be covered regarding this issue, but I think it is interesting to show the danger of nationalism for democracy and for the rule of law and its negative economic consequences.

First, there is no doubt that the last events occurred in Catalonia have affected the region in several ways. Not only the so called “referendum of 1 October” has been a problematic situation for the rule of law in the region but also different incidents such as the one that occurred on 6-7 September in the Parliament of Catalonia. In that case the secessionist movement start-

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ed to move clearly against the Spanish courts and Constitution by passing two laws where the intentions were to repeal the application of the Spanish Constitution in Catalonia.

All of these movements, which are clearly explained in the “Third Report on Deficits of Democratic Quality in Catalonia” written by Societat Civil Catalana , were seen with concern by the business community and the whole society.

The secessionist movement has become a huge legal and political risk in the region, due to the creation of legal uncertainty. The huge uncertainty, as was expected, generated a “company flight” effect of several companies from the region, this effect has still not stopped, but luckily it has diminished during the last

months. Data shows that between January and July of the last year (2018), nearly 2.000 companies left Catalonia, some companies that have left the region are of such importance as the bank “Banc Sabadell” or the gas company “Gas Natural”. Also, as a matter of fact, Catalonia is the region that has destroyed more business fabric in the whole country. This data of course, has affected the growth of the region (below the average national growth) or tax revenues. All in all, it is impossible to hide how har mful the secessionist movement has been for the Catalan economy and all the business opportunities that have been lost due to the legal uncertainty.

Another key point that has damaged the Catalan econ-

BullsEye

»What unites us is more than what divides us, and that it is in everyone’s interest that we work together.« omy is that the political debate has not been focused on generating employment opportunities, support business or discussing the tax policies.

The political debate has been focused solely on the secessionist movement for months, whereas any other topic was considered “not important”.

This is an evidence of how nationalism has had as a consequence, the lack of discussion of any other issues, especially in a rational way, as there is no way to agree or to focus in different topics if politicians of other parties are considered “enemies” rather than colleagues with different opinions but a same goal: econom-

ic and social growth.

Having summarized some of the consequences in which nationalism has in one way or another affected citizens of Catalonia, here comes the positive part: What unites us is more than what divides us, and that it is in everyone’s interest that we work together. It is a loss of resources and time to fight between citizens of the same country, in a highly globalised world with so much competition out there. It is ridiculous to sacrifice our economic strength for a nationalist project that is driving a region to social confrontation and economic challenges. In

order to stop this, it is time to say loud and clear that the independence of a region is not possible. It is time to think about promoting the reconciliation of a deeply divided society and to take the responsibility to do so. It is time to stop hating each other and start working with each other to again be the locomotive of the Spanish economy. There should be no place for nationalist philosophies anymore, the rule of law and freedom must be the cornerstones of our societies. Let’s get back to work, we have no time to lose.

Ramón Riera Vice Chairman of Nuevas Generaciones Catalonia

The official magazine of European Democrat Students

11

Belgium: Back to chaos?

After years of relative calm, Belgium ended 2018 with a political crisis, as it was reaching the end of the legislature. The collapse of the government over disagreements between the coalition partners over the Global Compact for Migration was unexpected in terms of time, as elections were already scheduled in May 2019, and in terms of trigger as the non-binding UN agreement was not perceived as a major hurdle. The departure of the Flemish nationalists of the NV-A left the three other partners without a parliamentary majority, and a short-lived attempt to establish a minority coalition was met with scepticism by the opposition parties. This led Belgium to again be in the hands of a caretaker government.

THE LATE KAMIKAZE

The government led by Prime Minister Charles Michel was not born under the best auspices. In the aftermath of the 2014 Federal, Regional and European elections, the striking differences between the election results in Flanders and in the predominantly French-speaking regions of Wallonia and Brussels made the formation of a government extremely complex. The NV-A had secured 31 seats in the Chamber of Representatives (out of 87 allocated to the Dutch language group) while the French-speaking socialists of the PS won 23 seats out of the 63 seats composing the French language group. As the custom required securing a majority in both language groups, and NV-A and PS had reciprocated anathemas, any coalition would have excluded the main party of one of the language groups. In the end, the French-speaking liberal MR, the Flemish liberal VLD, the Flemish Christian-democrat CD&V agreed to form a cabinet with the NV-A, creating a rather unbalanced coalition, with three Flemish parties holding 63 seats out of 87 in the Dutch language group but only 20 among the 63 seats of the French language group. The coalition, led by Francophone Charles Michel, was nicknamed the Swedish coalition (based on the colours of the liberals, blue, and the yellow of NVA, with the cross representing CD&V) or dubbed the Kamikaze by the opposition.

The coalition partners agreed to form such an unprecedented government only to focus on a socio-economic, freezing NV-A separatist agenda of further diluting Belgian federal state in favour of the federated entities.

For this reason, many predicted

a short life to the coalition as it seemed impossible that NV-A would agree to renounce to its raison d’être for five years. In the end, the Michel government’s path was quite uneasy, navigating through a harsh opposition from left parties and the management of several crisis, including the March 2016 terror attacks in Brussels. Such a situation proved helpful to NV-A as it shed light on its ministers, especially Jan Jambon, Minister of Interior, and Theo Francken, the Secretary of State for Asylum and Migration. As such, NV-A platform shifted from its nationalist agenda to a strong focus on security and the control of migration. After several countries refused to sign the Global Compact for Migration, it did not come as a surprise that NV-A feared losing popularity, should it agree to sign the agreement.

WHAT NOW?

After failing to maintain his government as a minority coalition, Charles Michel had no other choice of resigning, effectively transforming his cabinet in a caretaker government. As it currently stands, no party is planning to trigger the Parliament dissolution and, de facto, excluding the scenario of early elections. The federal elections will therefore take place on the 26th of May, concurrently with the European and the Regional elections. However, the coalition building is scheduled to be very complex, based on the latest opinion polls and the trends coming out of October 2018 local elections.

On one hand, many leaders are considering to campaign on a double agenda, focusing on migration and security while also emphasising the need for further devolution with the aim of

transform the Belgium into a confederation.

This would secure the two different electorates of the party, Flemish nationalists and the more traditional right-wing electorate, as the latter is likelier to shift its vote in favour of other parties. However, any mention of further devolution has been strongly rebuked by all the other parties, with some pleading for reversing the trend in some policies and proposing to reassign competences such as energy and environment to the Federal state.

On the other hand, the latest elections and the polls suggest very different results in Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia. In Brussels, the PS has lost ground to the French speaking green party, Ecolo, which would take the lead in the capital. At the same time, PS is maintaining itself in Wallonia. In Flanders, NV-A cannot be circumvented if one wishes to form a coalition without the Flemish extreme right Vlaams Belang.

AN ADDICTION TO CHAOS?

As it appears, negotiations for the formation of a government are likely to take time and the current Michel cabinet will probably maintain its status of caretaker for a long period. While it is too early to assess whether Belgium will break its record of 541 days without a fully working government, it is predictable that this period will be determinant in defining Belgium’s future and the power share between the State and the federated entities. At the same time, any delay in the formation of the government will have an impact on Belgium’s role in the EU and its international stance especially as it will have its seat in the UN Security Council for the next two years.

Julien Sassel

12

BullsEye

Are the Netherlands annexing themselves?

An Insight into the Current Political Situation More than a year has passed since the Dutch general elections took place. How are the Dutch voters going to approach the upcoming elections of the European Parliament? How do they see the European Union and political change?

The current political situation in The Netherlands can be described as the frail political balance found after the earthquake caused by the 2017 general elections, in which the PVV, the Partij Van de Vrijheid (Party of Freedom) led

by Geert Wilders shook the country by becoming the second largest party in country. The PVV, known for its nationalistic, euro-sceptical and right-wing populist ideals, gained ground and became the second largest party thanks to the collapse of the former second largest party, the moderate left PvdA, Partij van de Arbeid (Workers party) which lost more or less 20% of its seats in the parliament and votes. The collapse of the left enabled the rise of smaller parties such as the already mentioned PVV, CDA, Christen-Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democrats), D66 (Democracy 66) and GroenLinks (Green left), who had been on the sidelines during the last government: Rutte II, as it is known in The Netherlands.

In all of this, the leading party, the VVD, Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s party for freedom and democracy) lost about 5% of its seats. The outcome in the general election was 83% which sees the following division of seats and votes (the Dutch system is direct proportional): Party

Seats (%)

Gain (%)

VVD

21.29

-5.29

PVV

13.06

+2.98

CDA

12.38

+3.87

D66

12.23

+4.20

9.13

+6.80

SP

GroenLinks

9.09

-0.56

PvdA

5.70

-19.14

Others (six parties)

17.12

+6.58

The government that emerged from this scenario is essentially an anti-PVV and anti-Wilders centre-right broad coalition, which sees VVD, D66, ChristenUnie and CDA, which is the only Dutch party member of the EPP, in government. This was somehow foreseeable from the electoral campaign, during which the leader of the VVD and this time, PM Mark Rutte made it clear he was not willing to form a coalition with the PVV in any case, although the failure of the centre-left was certainly not to be expected. In light of these results one could think of similar results when it comes to the European Elections of next year. By doing so, he or she would probably be quite off, due to a multitude of factors such as of course the two year gap in between the two elections, but most importantly due to the different type of voters which obey the call-up of the European elections. In this millennium in fact, the outcome of the European elections has never exceeded 40%, compared to Dutch general elections, which consistently attracted 80% of the population.

This lack of participation coupled with a different voter base yields very different results, as one can for instance see by looking at the differences in outcome of the 2012 general election and the 2014 European election.

The VVD, at the time the first party in the country with 26.60% votes, obtained a meagre 11.39%. In fact, most parties that had a clear anti- or pro- European attitude performed better at the European Parliament election than at the general election compared to parties having a more neutral stance. In this light, looking back at the last general election, it is not hard to foresee a success of the Greens, namely GroenLinks, very popular among students and the Dutch youth. At the same time, it will not be unlikely to see the Eurosceptic PVV gain ground

on the more moderate VVD. At the moment of writing (third of January 2019) all polls (latest of which dates 09-12-2018) still see the VVD as first party in the Netherlands (26%), PVV second (19%), and third GroenLinks (17%). The CDA fares well enough in par with all the other relevant parties (13%).

It is of course important not to rely too much on these projections and considerations, as there are many internal but mostly external factors that have already shuffled and will shuffle cards, for instance the “gilet jaunes” protests in France, the Brexit negotiations and the overall political situation in France and Italy. The Netherlands is in fact a rather small country which has traditionally adopted a culture based on tolerance and acceptance, partly because of on the need to conduct trade with many different foreign powers. Maintaining a solid economy is in fact the best card the country can play, as its political and cultural influence on European and extra-European level is very limited, due to its limited size. Dutchmen take pride in their work and economic success and whilst tolerant, are vulnerable to external critics and influences, as they are seen as forces which shift the paradigm in which the very mobile Dutch society lives in. Being able to adapt quickly to the change coming from outside is what has made the country and its citizens prosper. Bismarck once said: “Holland annektiert sichselbst”, the Netherlands are annexing themselves, referring the lability and fragility of the Dutch culture, language and politics. In this sense, the future of Dutch politics is probably already written, but somewhere else, and it is only a question of time before it becomes reality.

Frederiek Wesel

The official magazine of European Democrat Students

13

A RETROSPECTIVE AND PERSPECTIVE ON THE ELECTIONS IN LUXEMBOURG Can the Christian Social People’s Party (CSV) manage a comeback into government? What were the topics of the national election and what will be the crucial topics of the next campaign, the European elections in Luxembourg?

On 14 October, Luxembourg held their national elections voting for 60 representatives for parliament. The national elections take place every five years. This time, 10 parties started the battle in order to canvass the voters. In the last years, more and more small parties appeared, which led to a fragmentation and change of the political landscape.

14 October around eleven o’clock in the evening, the results of the national election were clear: CSV got 28.31%, Socialists (LSAP) 17.6%, Liberals (DP) 16.91%, Greens (déi Gréng) 15.12% and Pirates 6.45%, ADR 8.28%, déi Lenk 5.48%. The 60 seats in parliament are partitioned like the following over the different parties: CSV (21), DP (12), LSAP (10), déi Gréng (9), Piraten (2), déi Lénk (2) and ADR (4).

The goal of CSV was to achieve the comeback into government, meaning the so-called Gambia coalition (Red-GreenBlue coalition) could not have more than, or equal to, 30 seats in parliament (as they did!). Although CSV lost two seats in comparison to 2013, it still is the strongest party.

As the Gambia coalition had enough seats (31) to continue, they decided to do so.

The winners of this election compared to the election of 2013 are the Pirates (+2) and the Greens (+3). The campaign of the Pirates was based on topics like animal protection underlined by the slogan “animal protection is human protection”, protection of the e nv i ro n m e n t

and an upper limit for the rent for dwellings of 10 €/m2. These issues caught the actual spirit of the time.

WHAT ABOUT THE GREENS?

After being in the parliament for the past 34 years, the greens achieved their best score in the history of their party.

One of the possible explanations is the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) published a week before the elections which proclaimed a warning of the global temperature rise to about 3° C in the current level of commitments of the countries, played the Greens in the cards.

In 2013, the Greens were elected into the government for the first time. Furthermore, out of the 17 positions in government, the Greens set four ministers and one vice-prime-minister. The coalition agreement of 2018 caused a stir in the international press due to the intention to install free public transport and the legalisation of cannabis.

WHY IS THIS SOMETHING SPECIAL?

In the Luxemburgish history, the Gambia coalition is a particularity, because since the post-war period with exception of the social-liberal government headed by Gaston Thorn (1974-1979) and the Gambia coalition headed by Xavier Bettel (2013-), since 1945, the CSV always had the prime minister. Since 2013, it is the first time that 3 parties are forming a coalition and the Greens have for the first time been in government.

THE NEXT UPCOMING EVENT, THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS

On 26 May 2019, the European election is the next key date on the agenda of the CSV. Since the last European elections in 2014 have seen an increase in the significance of problems.

It is important that the trust of the European citizen in the Union as a guarantor for prosperity, peace and stability grows again. Therefore, the social Europe has to be strengthened. The European elections must give answers to the social, migration-related, terrorism-related, climate change and environment protection issues. The fight against the climate change and environmental protection is far away from being won like the troubles for achieving an agreement at the COP24 in Katowice proved.

Konrad Adenauer said the following quota in the context of a government declaration: “European unity was a dream of a few people. It became a hope for many. Today it is a necessity for all of us.” The need for a unified Europe is so crucial like never before in time, in the face of the difficult situation of the Union and its fundamentals especially through the rise of Europe populism and nationalism leading to Brexit, even if the reasons for Brexit have a more complex history. In the time of global crisis, like climate change, international terror crisis, the economic changes of the world market, the drama of refugees or the humanitarian catastrophe face the European Union with huge challenges which cannot be solved by a member state alone. Every country has to take its responsibilities and its commitments within the solidarity of our European community.

Françoise Kemp

14

BullsEye

CDU elections – The end of Merkel´s reign?

Since the beginning of the new millennium, Angela Merkel has been the chairwoman of the Christian-Democratic Union - CDU. In this time, she has evolved to one of the most reputable leaders in the world.

Now 18 years later, after weak results in the federal elections 2017 and big losses in the state of Hesse and the state of Bavaria, she decided, unsolicited, to not run again for chairwoman.

But Merkel is stressing she will not resign as Chancellor of Germany and will complete the term until the next elections in 2021.

The new leader of the party is Merkel’s preferred candidate, the former minister-president of Saarland and former secretary general of CDU, Mrs. Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (AKK), who is seeking a similar political direction with a little more focus on conservative issues. Critics say it equates to “carrying on as before” and is not representing a fundamental change.

After the announcement of the retirement, three key politician’s declared their candidacy. Jens Spahn, the current federal minister of health (conservative orientation), Friedrich Merz, former chairman of CDU/CSU parliamentary group (conservative and economic orientation) and as mentioned Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer.

Before the federal party conference was held in Hamburg, the three candidates could present themselves in advance at several regional conferences. After few presentations, it became apparent, that it was going to be a duel between Kramp-Karrenbauer and Merz.

On 7 December 2018, AKK has won the party-intern election after the second ballot with

517 out of 999 votes (51,7 %). Her opponent Friedrich Merz had a result of 482 votes (48 %).

and the day will come, when it is necessary to change something.

How did it come so far, that Merkel had to resign the chairwoman position while having just been reelected as German chancellor and what are the consequences for the next 3 years?

And it has some advantages for both, if the function of chancellor is separated with the function of chairman.

First of all, it is not the end of Merkel´s reign, the headline of the article might be a little bit exaggerated. But it can be seen as the beginning of her farewell tour. She has been leading the German government for 13 years now, and she is going to be, without unforeseeable change, reaching 16 years in office during the fall of 2021. Only Helmut Kohl has been chancellor for such a long time.

As Merkel has been the leading figure of CDU in the last two decades, many party members stated the wish of a renewal within the party.

After heavy inner political turbulences due to the immigration and refugee crisis back in 2015, many supporters wanted to have a more conservative and strict immigration and security policy. There has been a lack of confidence and many former CDU voters, elected the new right-wing populist party AfD in the federal elections 2017, others the liberal or the green party. Despite of a roaring economy and a flourishing labour market, CDU/CSU has lost 8,6 percent compared to the election in 2013.

After these results, the pressure rose, and Merkel has been confronted with an increasingly dissatisfied party base. Moreover, after the regional elections in 2018 the pressure got even stronger.

But to be honest, it is a normal development, that a party after such a long time, stresses the wish of renovation. 18 years is a long period

The chancellor can focus on the governmental affairs without being responsible for the party and on the other hand, the new party leader can focus on the party, without being responsible for a whole country. The content of the party´s policy can be outlined and there is more time for caring about and focusing on the ordinary members in the different regions of Germany.

And it also can be seen as an unselfish step of Angela Merkel, because she is now clearing the way for a new candidate with regard to the next elections in 2021. It is enough time for a competition and interested candidates can prepare their candidacy in advance.

Moreover, there will be two major women in CDU politics now and it could also affect media and public perception. It is a sign of renewal and Merkel can still focus on being the “Mutti” (mother) of the country, while Kramp-Karrenbauer is discussing policies and certain issues. So it might also be a strategic advantage, if there are two important players.

To conclude, this is the first step towards a new CDU. The party is going to start acting more independent and releasing from the central figure in German politics. It is not the end of Merkel´s reign in general, but Kramp-Karrenbauer wants to follow in her footsteps.

Johannes Bürgin

The official magazine of European Democrat Students

15

Greece!

Turn off Populism and Keep your Eyes ahead.

May is approaching and the European Elections 2019 also. But why do we have too many battles to win this year? 2019 will be a crucial political year for Greece because it will be the year of European, Communal, Prefectural and Parliamentary Elections. For this reason, Greece must decide which way to go after a very tough left-wing period. Greece should keep in mind what this period brings and what a new political era can offer.

Why do we accuse this government of being populist? First of all, we have to define what populism is "Populism is a range of political approaches that deliberately appeal to 'the people', often juxtaposing this group against a so-called 'elite'" in just a few words we can describe it like this.

But wait; we have to categorise it in two wings: the one of Left-wing populism and the opposite Right-wing populism. The first one is described as a political ideology that combines left-wing politics and populist rhetoric and themes, on the other hand the other one is described as the political ideology which combines right-wing politics and populist rhetoric and themes. Almost the same, right?

This comparison leads you to see it as one; that populism is an auto-catastrophical issue which result is skepticism, not matter from which wing comes but how it works.

For the history: "The term populism came into use in the late 19th century alongside the promotion of democracy. In the United States, it was closely associated with the People's Party, while in the Russian Empire it was linked to the agrarian socialist Narodnik movement. During the 20th century, various parties emerged in liberal democracies that were described as populist. In the 21st century, the term became increasingly popular, used in reference largely to left-wing groups in the Latin American pink tide, right-wing groups in Europe, and both right and leftist groups in the U.S.

In 2017 'populism' was chosen as the Cambridge Dictionary Word of the Year" Furthermore we have to underline that Greece is one of the countries most affected and beaten down by the results of populism and especially of left-wing populism. An example of this though, was the making of a new political word from the populist PM of Greece: «kolotoumba», indicative of a complete reversal in one’s thinking or policies.

It starts from the reversal of the PM after the results of the Greek Referendum (July 2015), where the PM was in favour of the disagreement on the Referendum text and suddenly turns to the best subordinate and «non recognisable» EU Country Leader.

If you want to make «populist» research do not forget to search for the biggest examples in Europe, the one of Greek: Syriza and Spanish Podemos.

Is very depressing to return to an era like the 19th century when populism was born, but the most depressing thing will be if we do not stop this with our message in this European Election. It is very important to reference that the Greek government party has only 3 seats in the total of 21 Greek MEP seats, this indicates how much populism can not resist in Europe and how much Europeans can not afford the ideology of populism. This will be the reason to keep our eyes ahead, and to keep the Euro-

pean way separated from Euroscepticism.

For this point it is very important to present some percentages under the theme of «Greeks, Friends of Europe or Eurosceptic?» to the hottest questions following: 1.

EU helping Greece? and 2. Is National Identity under threat? The percentages of «Friends of Europe» in favour for the question 1. is 75.4%, and for question 2.

It is 17,4%. On the other hand, the Eurosceptics’ answers are 11.1% for the first one and 78.2% for the second one (A research of diaNEOsis, a non-governative organisation of research and analysis). This research shows us that in a European Country in which populism acts, unfortunately creates Euroscepticism, this part of the society has to explain first to themselves what Euroscepticism is and what produced it.

All of these ideologies, definitions and the research teach us that we have to think about the new page of Europe, especially we; the youth, should choose which way will lead us to succeed, not only personally but in total. We are a European society of course, with rights, but we have responsibilities that can not be hidden under the facts of today or yesterday. Today is here now, tomorrow will be another page which is based on yesterday’s text. For this reason, May is the month of thoughts, facts and decisions for a Europe of tomorrow with the traditions of the past. We the European youth are keeping our eyes ahead! And you?

Vasileios Kesidis

16

BullsEye

The Slovak Paradox – Will we manage to break it?

Slovakia is the country that had the lowest voter turnout (13%) at the last elections to the European Parliament.

Nonetheless according to the latest Eurobarometer survey 51% of Slovaks perceive the country´s EU membership as a positive thing. Moreover, 77% of them think Slovakia benefits from the EU. Despite this, only 14% of the respondents claimed they will participate in the upcoming elections to the EP. This is the so-called Slovak paradox. Let´s explore the reasons behind this phenomenon and take a closer look at the ongoing campaign including the possible outcome of the elections.

THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF THE SLOVAK PARADOX

In general, people tend to take part in elections when they feel an immediate threat to their interests or have a strong passion for an issue. Unfortunately, Slovaks seem to take the EU-membership for granted and are not really worried about any European hot topics, including migration. In spite of the fact the UN´s Global Pact for Migration caused serious national turmoils almost resulting in the fall of the government, the migration crisis is a rather distant issue for ordinary people in Slovakia.

They have never had a personal experience with it, therefore they are not willing to participate in the EP-elections just because of this.

Besides the fact that Slovaks have the feeling that their 14 MEPs out of 705 can not do much. On the one hand it is a logical argument, on the other hand it depends on the initiative and political skills in building alliances of those elected. More so, the Slovak mentality is rather self-absorbed. Brussels seems to be far away, so European topics and decisions often remain unnoticed. Even when they get the necessary attention, they are often misinterpreted due to the complicated decision-making process.

Furthermore the Slovak political parties along with the parliament do not discuss European issues frequently. They prefer national topics, as those are the ones that are more appealing for the voters. In addition, Slovakia´s MEPs seem to be invisible in the media except for the campaign. The politicians blame the media, the media criticise politicians who tend

to complain about the voters. A vicious circle.

Besides that all national leaders love to hide behind Brussels when it comes to unpopular measures. However, they are exceptionally keen on taking advantage of the successful European projects and initiatives.

Another point to make is that a lower turnout can have more positive consequences in the end. It usually means that only the most informed and devoted voters participate, who really care about the European future. It could also mean that the less disciplined voters of extremist political parties stay away from the ballot box, preventing them from getting in to the EP. However, a higher turnout would mean more legitimacy for the elected and it would also send a signal to the EU that Slovaks have European matters close to their heart.

crisis was triggered by the issue of migration, during which the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Lajčák was banned from attending the Intergovernmental Conference on the Global Compact for Migration in Marrakech.

In March 2019 there will be presidential elections held in Slovakia, therefore the real campaign for the EP elections will only start after this. In spite of that we should mention the ongoing „This time I´m voting“ initiative launched by the European Parliament, which also operates in all member states including Slovakia. It is a non-political campaign primarily based on voluntary engagement of young people who could influence their peers to cast their vote. In Slovakia the three wisely chosen target groups are: young people aged 18-24, students and managers/influencers.

CONCLUSION THE CURRENT STATE-OF-PLAY

2018 can be labelled as a turbulent year in Slovak politics. The murder of two young journalists, alleged mafia ties of the government, scandals around public procurement and EU funds resulted in the demission of Prime Minister Fico. He was replaced by his young and loyal party member, Peter Pellegrini. His leading leftist party (SMER) was also affected, but still remained very strong. The regional elections held in November confirmed their losses. The real winners were independent candidates, not the current opposition consisting of various centre-right parties. The last

It is quite likely that the presidential elections will steal the show in March, therefore the decision about the Slovak MEPs in May will fade into the background. Unless political actors bring up European topics consciously, the turnout will be extremely low and the results will copy the actual situation in the polls and in the parliament.

To date that would mean status quo for the Socialists (4-4), twice as many MEPs for the ECR (2-4) and a huge loss for the EPP (6-2). A lot of work needs to be done by activists, politicians and the media to increase voter turnout and to break the Slovak Paradox.

Szilvia Zuber

The official magazine of European Democrat Students

17

The European Union in the Sahel: A laboratory for EU’s foreign policy?

Plagued by political instability and violence, poor governance, terrorism and a transit region for migration flow, the Sahel has emerged as the new EU’s security frontier. Over the last decade, the EU’s engagement in the region has dramatically increased, however, despite all the EU efforts, the Sahel remains a quagmire and is likely to continue to be for the next decade. To stop the dangers coming from the Sahel, the EU must harmonise its multiple approaches to the region and ensure the ownership of Sahelian states over what happens and what is being undertaken, notably through the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States.

WHY THE SAHEL MATTERS?

From the 2018 State of the Union Speech of Mr Juncker, to the more recent Angela Merkel’s address to the European Parliament of November 2018, the growing centrality of Africa in the future of the European Union’s security and stability has adamantly emerged. In the context of this greater and renewed EU focus, the Sahel represents a litmus test for the new approach to Africa of the European Union. The region is the “transmission belt” between the Mediterranean basin and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and it plays a central role in geographical terms and beyond. It is probably the area in Africa where the security–migration–development nexus – in which geopolitics, principles and “lines on a map”, are not enough to understand the reality on the ground – is at its most tangible.

Stretching from Senegal to Chad, including Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, this region has reached the top of many EU member states’ agendas and is widely seen as a source of high instability for the Maghreb and by extension for Eu-

18

rope. The Sahel has been suffering from a multidimensional crisis, such as poor governance, corruption, structural weaknesses and underdevelopment, while challenges such as droughts and famine affect all levels of society and can lead to strikes, revolts and violence.

One must also add criminality, illicit trafficking and the rise of Jihadism.

This being said, the EU has been intensifying its efforts in the region for 4 fundamental reasons: (1) in response to the security destabilization caused by the 2012 Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali, followed by the subsequent jihadist occupation and the proliferation of terrorist groups close both to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State; (2) the migration crisis that swept from 2015 onwards destabilizing the European political scenario and exposing the Sahel as the main transit region for migration flows;(3) the EU economic interests in the region as the Sahel is the EU’s top ore and mineral provider with around 24% of its imports coming from Mauritania and France having Niger’s uranium as a crucial supplier for its nuclear reactors; (4) the realisation by EU institutions, backed by some member states,

that the Sahel was the place to intervene in order to address the migration crisis and enhance the European security in the Mediterranean, applying the newly developed concept of the “externalisation of the EU borders”.

In addition, it is in the Sahel that some EU members believe they must fight a key battle for the future of the European project, viewing the stabilisation of the region – particularly through initiatives to curb migration and counter terrorist threats – as key to heading off populist nationalism at home.

This political stand coupled with the security necessities to intervene and the geographical proximity to the EU southern neighbourhood, for which some would define the Sahel as “Europe’s backyard”, made up of this region, the place where EU is experimenting on its foreign policy and its integrated approach bridging security and development.

THE EU FOOTPRINT IN THE SAHEL

As part of its work in western and central Sahel, the EU provides emergency aid to

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millions of people threatened by food insecurity; capacity building operations to the Malian and Nigerien security forces, under the auspices of the CSDP and the Alliance for the Sahel with three main missions (EUCAP Niger, EUCAP Mali and EUTM Mali); direct budgetary support and other security and development assistance through Niger and other countries; and increasing political and financial support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force, formed in 2014 by the governments of Mali, Mauritania, Chad, Burkina Faso and Niger to tackle terrorism and organised crime in the region.

The numbers of the EU involvement in the region are impressive: between 2014 and 2020, the EU and its member states will spend a projected €8 billion on development assistance in the Sahel and the Chad Basin, along with billions more on security, capacity building, and other programmes. Respectively 29.7 and 26.3 million euros were invested in capacity building in Mali and Niger for the year 2017-2018 (almost doubling the year 2016-2017), while 41.6 million euros were allocated from the EU Emergency Trust Fund to create mobile intervention groups across G5 countries.

With regards to non-security related support, data do not fail to impress either, with 1.3 billion euros received by the Sahel as the biggest recipient of the EU Trust Fund for Africa (almost 40% of the entire budget for Africa) with Niger and Mali biggest recipients in the region, while the EU Humanitarian funding in the Sahel has only hit a total of 234 million euros in 2017.

However, the EU had its eye on the Sahel even before the crises of 2012 and 2015. The 2011 EU Sahel Strategy laid out a vision of security explicitly linked to development. The EU’s 2015 Sahel Regional Action Plan maintains this approach, reiterating the importance of the four original pillars of EU activity in the region: preventing and countering radicalisation; improving economic and social conditions for young people; managing migration, mobility, and border issues; and fighting illicit trafficking and organised crime. The plan frames this activity around the nexus between security, development, and governance.

Meanwhile, the EU attempts to coordi-

nate the various regional and international actors that have launched security and development programmes in the Sahel in recent years.

Ever since it elaborated an initial Sahel strategy, the EU has made the region a top priority. Not only because of the recent series of crises there but also as a result of EU’s prevailing view of the region as a kind of laboratory for its foreign policy, aid, and capacity building programmes. Indeed, some EU officials describe the array of programmes in the Sahel as test cases for an integrated approach to security and development, as well as for new forms of capacity building within CSDP missions.

In this, the EU faces several challenges – and not just in managing its own programmes. The EU must also contend with member states’ competing interests and overlapping missions and contributions, which range from the trans-Sahelian, French-led Operation Barkhane, the UN MINUSMA Mission to the recent deployment of Italian soldiers to Niger to fight human smuggling.

A LABORATORY IN THE MAKING

The European Union’s effort in the Sahel are not only remarkable but unprecedented. Yet while its efforts to stabilise the Sahel have had some limited successes, the EU’s attempts to integrate security and development initiatives there may prove costly, unsustainable, and incomplete in the long term.

THE EU INVOLVEMENT SUFFERS FROM A VARIETY OF PROBLEMS AND LIMITATIONS

Although the EU has shown some encouraging flexibility in integrating its security, governance, and development goals, many of its programmes in the Sahel remain largely ineffective due to security constraints, an increasingly unstable security environment, flawed administrative structures, and poor coordination. A further harmonisation of its approach is much needed, notably by relying more on regional organisations - such as the African Union and Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) - and by involving countries like Libya and Algeria.

The second element of concern is the mismatching between the EU programmes in the Sahel and the Unions broader strategic vision. The EU has so far failed in identifying how to best contribute to the long-term regional stability allowing short-term thinking and conflicting political priorities of is member states to dictate its work.

In their drive to respond to political pressure from member states, EU interventions in the region sometimes fail to adapt to conditions on the ground, exacerbating local tensions and potentially contributing to instability in the long run.

For instance, the internal divisions among EU member states with regards to the migration issue have contributed in making it more difficult to exert pressure on governments in Niger, Mali, and other Sahelian countries, which realise that Europeans need their cooperation to tackle migration and counter-terrorism challenges. Niger’s president, Mahamadou Issoufou, has been particularly adept at using discourses on terrorism and migration to cement his position as an essential partner and a similar language has been used by Mali’s President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, therefore contributing in weakening EU’s position and diplomatic bargain power.

Finally, the EU’s integrated strategy for the Sahel is centred on the idea that security, development and governance are inherently intertwined, but the recently worsening security situation – the UN recorded a 200% increase in attack in the region in 2018 - made clear that a failure of governance is at the core of the regional violent instability. Therefore, the EU should move its focus to addressing governance challenges as they are crucial to peace and security.

In conclusion, “The Sahel is a dam. If it bursts, Europe will be submerged” Mali’s President once said. If he is right, the European Union will need to do better in order to address the tremendous challenges agitating this part of the world, while preserving its own security and stability.

Mattia Caniglia

The official magazine of European Democrat Students

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Back on the Silk Road?

The European Union and Central Asia Central Asia is attracting the attention of the international community. The concept of “New Great Game”, currently used to describe the race for oil and gas of the Caspian region and Central Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, takes origin from the XIX century “Great Game”, describing the struggle between the British and Russian empires for the influence on the region. Increasingly important from a geopolitical viewpoint, Central Asia is to acquire visibility in all the great powers’ political agendas. Its geopolitical location, its richness in terms of natural resources, its economic growth combined and the massive investment plan promoted by China with the One Belt One Road initiative (OBOR) have shed the light over this region, previously considered as exclusively dominated

by USSR and, after 1991, by Russia. A new European Union strategy for Central Asia is expected to be adopted by the first months of 2019, following the Ministerial meeting between the HRVP Federica Mogherini and the Central Asia Foreign Ministers held in Brussels on the 23rd of November 2018.

The EU has sought to gain visibility

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within the area, although Russia and China appear as the stakeholders mainly engaged in the region, owing their geographical proximity and political interests. However, today the EU has still not achieved a real influence on the region. What are the points of strength and weakness of its approach towards the 5 former Soviet Republics? To what extent should the EU be engaged in the future?

TWO HETEROGENEOUS REGIONS IN A COMPLEX DIALOGUE

Before answering such questions, some assumptions are necessary. Firstly, we will assume that the notion of influence is the result of a combination between two components: soft and hard power. It is evident that the EU could become an involved actor by exerting predominantly the first one, but not by providing a substantial assistance in the security domain.

Secondly, unlike China and Russia, the EU is an international organization, whereas the other actors involved in the region are national states. Such considerations might appear rather obvious, but it is necessary to remember to better un-

derstand the complexities characterising the EU foreign policy and decision-making process. Its external action is explicitly inspired by values, namely democracy and human rights promotion, and driven by interests at the same time. Nonetheless, the 28 EU member states do not share the same interests towards Central Asia. On one hand, Germany, France and Italy endorse a more structured cooperation and access to its energy resources; on the other hand, the Nordic countries are mainly focused on the normative aspects of the EU foreign policy.

Such contrasts is just an example of the challenges posed by finding a unique voice for the EU foreign policy towards Central Asia and how this condition can jeopardise a coordinated, coherent and unified approach. Emphasising the normative posture of the EU and basing the cooperation on the respect for human rights could constrain dialogue with many political regimes present in Central Asia, regularly blamed for breaches of human right laws, especially Turkmenistan. This could consequently generate a trade-off between energy interests and the need for protecting and promoting human rights. Evidence for supporting this statement can be identified in the

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tensions over the gas imports from Turkmenistan, the still pending Partnership Cooperation Agreement with Ashgabat and the debated textile protocol signed with Uzbekistan.

Thirdly, considering Central Asia as a monolithic bloc may lead to an oversimplification of the “stans’” different realities and characteristics that contribute to render the background even more complex and multifaceted.

Kazakhstan has a big geographical surface and its economy is boosting by exploiting its natural resources, similarly to Turkmenistan, which, however, is still suffering from an international and diplomatic isolation. Turkmenistan is the most authoritarian regime, with a personal cult for President Berdymukhamedov and it possesses the sixth largest gas reserves in the world, able to draw the attention of both China and the EU, even though the negotiations for the Trans Caspian Pipeline (TCP) project with the EU have been in stalemate so far, owing to the unsolved issue of the legal status of the Caspian Sea water borders. Experts argue that the TCP could bring up to 40 billions cubic meter of gas per year to Europe. Uzbekistan is facing a remarkable “opening-up” process promoted by President Mirziyoyev after the death of the former President Karimov. However, the respect for human and labour rights still remains a sensitive issue. Undoubtedly, Tajikistan is considered the most fragile country and it faces a dangerous presence of the Islamic State within its territory. Finally, Kyrgyzstan is the exclusive Parliamentary Republic of the region, but its economy is facing a serious downturn. In addition to the specific issues for each country, it is possible to highlight some common patterns among the 5 Central Asian republics: little respect for human rights, insufficient regional dialogue and cooperation, environmental issues dating back since the USSR era (e.g. the Aral Sea drying process), border disputes, corruption and an overall lack of democratic governance.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE EU STRATEGY FOR CENTRAL ASIA: BACK TO THE FUTURE?

Until today the EU has been paying much greater attention to other re-

gions of the world and issues of its foreign policy agenda. Evidence for this statement may be identified on the fact that the latest EU Strategy for Central Asia, despite stressing the importance of ensuring long-term stability, prosperity and promoting economic reforms in the region, dates back to 2007 and, therefore, it needs to be updated to the recent international and regional developments. Nonetheless, such a document was conceived as a tool for a comprehensive approach, considering Central Asia as a whole.

However, the promotion of democracy and human rights by the EU was perceived as a threat for many of the Central Asia Presidents. Moreover, the EU could not seriously compete with the two main competitors in the region, Russia and China, able to promote respectively regional economic integration mechanisms (such as the Eurasian Economic Union) and massive investment plans (OBOR).

The relative unsatisfactory result of this strategy have prompted a shift towards a bilateral approach in the following years, in order to better assist each country in facing its specific issues. The new Central Asia strategy of 2019 is expected to now propose a more comprehensive and region-to-region approach.

The new path of the US foreign policy with the emerging transatlantic discrepancies in terms of trade strategy, position towards the Iran Nuclear Deal (firmly promoted and endorsed by the EU) and environment constitute a top priority for the European foreign ministries. In addition to that, the migration issues and the challenging coexistence with Russia in the eastern neighbourhood are just some further examples of the core priorities the EU external action is called to address in the short run and clearly Central Asia is not ranked in the top positions. However, the OBOR initiative, the reinforcement of relations with Kazakhstan, the potential creation of the TCP pipeline, the gradual loss of influence of Russia on the region, the increased number of Ministerial meetings with the Central Asia countries might change the situation. The TCP project could constitute an important tool for energy diversification from Russia and contribute to

the EU energy resilience in case of a rupture with Moscow.

In the light of the aforementioned constraints and opportunities, the EU can rely on some tools in order to exert greater influence on the region in the next future. Trade and development cooperation appear as the important elements at disposal of the EU in this regard. The EU is the first trade partner for all the four Central Asian republics and it has recently concluded an ambitious Enhanced Economic Partnership Agreement with Kazakhstan and allocated EUR 124 millions in the entire region to foster sustainable development in various programmes tailored for private sector projects, trade & investment promotion, environment protection and rule of law. The new development investment plan will benefit especially Kyrgyzstan, which shall receive approximately EUR 36 millions for education policies improvement.

CONCLUSIONS

Briefly, the new political course of some countries (namely Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan), the role of OBOR, the chances of building the TCP and the relative withdrawal of Russia from the region contribute to make Central Asia particularly interesting for the EU. Undoubtedly, the TCP would definitely contribute to increase the geopolitical role of the EU in the region and constitute a real diversification of supply from Moscow. Additionally, investing in a stronger region-to-region dialogue would be recommended in a long-term perspective. Not being able to play a role as security provider, the EU should use the tools at disposal to differentiate its approach from the other actors involved in the region. In particular, it should continue to promote not only economic development, but also regional cooperation and stability by playing the role of a model for regional integration and by offering a soft-security approach aimed at tackling unsolved endogenous issues, namely corruption, authoritarianism and poverty.

Fabio Rondini

The official magazine of European Democrat Students

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STOP THE RANT – A DIFFERENT TAKE ON GENDER EQUALITY The 21st century is the century of tolerance. Europe has never been more protective of the right to be different in any sort of manner imaginable. For sure, we have come a long way from the Dark Ages but arguably the greatest leap was made in the span of a couple of decades, following the World Wars whose outcome shaped the continent and the whole realm of the European civilisation as we know it today. Concepts such as universal human rights sprang and flourished, ancient prejudices were altogether abandoned in favour of a new, accepting view of the world.

Along with the fight against racial discrimination (more notable in the US and less so on the European continent due to objective historical reasons) and the battle for the rights of LGBTQ+ minorities, probably the most symptomatic 20th century activist movement was the struggle for women’s rights. The laws that prohibited women from being active and fulfilled members of society were gradually abrogated, and one by one all paths to education and careers were open to women, and all civil rights were equally granted to both sexes. Since then women have made a mark in every sphere of public life, with countless examples of women assuming high ranking offices in the judicative power, in national governments, in the institutions of the European Union, and at the head of international organisations.

One would have thought that removing all and any legal impediments to women’s taking up any laic activity would have solved the problem and that the many achievements of women in politics, science and business has since then proven that. Alas; the topic is still being exploited to this day, by people who refuse to settle for equality of opportunities. Countless forums, roundtables, and discussions

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are being dedicated to emphasizing the importance of women’s participation in politics; different activists and organisations push for mandatory ‘pink quotas’ on party lists; on several occasions the European Commission has made attempts to compel businesses to maintain certain quotas for women on executive levels in companies.

While in Europe examples of legal, state-decreed gender quotas or any related obligations and restrictions are still rare, there is a dangerous tendency verging on the absurd, which should be addressed and checked before we are too far down the spiral.

It is extremely important to point out a fine distinction: it is beyond any doubt that lifting all restrictions to both sexes’ participation on all levels of public and political life was a great victory for democracy and arguably one of the most notable cultural achievements of Western society in the 20th century. Nevertheless, the continuing struggle to artificially equalise the percentage of men and women holding public office or high ranking positions on company boards, is inherently wrong, as are all appeals to support a candidate on the sole merit of her being a woman.

Policies devised to enforce an equal representation of men and women, or, for that matter, to secure any minimum amount of female participation whatsoever via legally mandated quotas, are harmful, unjust, undemocratic, and insulting.

First and possibly worst of all, introducing any sort of quota, based on a criterion completely unrelated to the nature of the job or public office (such as sex or race), almost certainly means that a candidate who performed better, has stronger credentials, or in the context of a democratic procedure and has greater

popular support, will be discarded in favour of one who merely fulfils the quota. Put in the simplest of terms, a society, in a broader sense, will prosper if it is governed by its wisest, most competent, just, and honest members – regardless of the ratio between men and women among them.

Whenever this ratio is artificially predetermined, or even partially so, the quality of the outcome will most likely be diminished. Quotas are a restraint on competition – both on the job market and in democratic elections. And untampered competition is the conditio sine qua non for a meritocratic society.

Probably the most obvious flaw of this sort of policies is that they are deeply unfair on several accounts.

Despite all valiant efforts to attribute an honourable motive to reverse discrimination, in its essence, it still involves putting the representatives of one demographic group at a disadvantage in favour of the representatives of another. Unfortunately we keep failing to learn one of the basic lessons of history – that one injustice cannot be remedied by another injustice. Excluding women altogether from active participation in public life for centuries was a wrong that we cannot undo, only rectify. And we have; currently Europe has forsaken all legal limitations to women pursuing any secular profession in the private or public sector. Repealing discriminatory laws was all that was needed. Continuing to introduce more and more measures in order to artificially boost the number of women who assume certain

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»An even sadder truth is that there are ruthless hypocrites who are willing to exploit any leitmotif in order to secure themselves an unwarranted advantage.« positions, means once again tilting the balance, and thus restoring injustice. Unfortunately this demonstrates the fundamental hypocrisy of this type of ideology – the fact that the ones advocating for such measures do not really fight to abolish discrimination – only discrimination which does not benefit them.

The rejected or displaced candidates aren’t the only injured party though.

Legally mandated quotas are a repression of the freedom of choice. A voter who is required to put forward the name of a candidate of one or the other sex, is stripped of their freedom of conscience; a business that is legally compelled to give preference to the applicants of one sex in the process of hiring new executives, for the sake of reaching a certain gender quota, is unnecessarily interfered with by the state, which is wrong in and of itself, and not only in the context of the topic in question.

Arguably the most underestimated and least addressed problem with affirmative action though, is that it is intrinsically humiliating to the people whom it apparently benefits. The pink quotas are an example of the most offensive type of condescension toward women. For decades women fought to be recognised as equal to men in terms of qualities, and to be given equal rights and opportunities.

Sadly, now some insist to be treated

as less capable of achieving certain goals. Because that is precisely what policies of this sort suggest – that women would do much worse than men if left to compete on an equal footing; that people wouldn’t choose a woman unless they were compelled to do so; that women are the underdog that needs to be patronised. From a personal point of view, few things can spoil an honourable person’s success more than the knowledge that they may have been preferred due to a legal obligation to choose a candidate or applicant pertaining to a certain demographic category.

In that regard, ironically, a privilege is just as bad as a handicap. Because as long as a woman has benefitted from preferential treatment on the mere basis of her sex, she will never be seen as an equal to men. Furthermore, all women who could and probably would have got the desired position entirely due to their personal and professional qualities, such as skills, talent, perseverance, and ingenuity, would be unjustly debased, if they were to be subjected to positive discrimination. So at the end of the day, gender quotas effectively rob women of the opportunity to prove that they can be every bit as successful as men in any given career – for their achievements would always be depreciated by the fact that they have received a head start.

Finally, instead of lamenting the fact that women are less represented than men in certain professions or career paths, and trying to attribute that fact to malice, prejudice, and injustice, perhaps we should allow for a more innocent, yet logical explanation, such as one taking into account the inherent natural differences between

the two sexes. Men and women may be equal in rights, but are not the same. Many women choose to stick to the role of homemaker and caretaker of children more actively – a choice that should be respected just as much as the choice to pursue a taxing career that pays handsomely but requires late nights in the office and eating take-away dinner at the desk. One can admire women who make sacrifices with their personal lives in order to dedicate themselves to public service, or to become one of the best in their professional field, as long as one does not ignore the fact that some women prioritise family and motherhood. Neither choice is the right one, nor is there a wrong one. There are simply objective facts of human nature that cannot and should not be ignored or denied.

Equality should not be absolutised.

We should advocate for equal opportunities and let things take their natural course from then on.

A sad truth is that decades and sometimes centuries of injustice often make people bitter and push them to seek some form of revenge for years after the source of injustice has been abolished. An even sadder truth is that there are ruthless hypocrites who are willing to exploit any leitmotif in order to secure themselves an unwarranted advantage.

Women who want to be treated like equal to men should start acting like they are equal to men. That would mean to stop demanding to be given more privileges on account of, effectively, not being men – it is impossible to have it both ways.

Desislava Kemalova

The official magazine of European Democrat Students

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Huawei: A Chinese Trojan Horse?

Chinese infrastructure comes at a price and it isn’t just money.

A few years ago, when an exchange student from Hong Kong told me he did not understand his European classmates. “They’re crazy for buying Huawei phones.” I laughed whilst his smile disappeared, “it’s not really funny.”

Huawei caving into requests by the Chinese government for information. Anyone who has ever done business in China knows Huawei wouldn’t even have an option.

Privacy has become a mainstream issue since the Cambridge Analytica scandal in early 2018, where it was revealed Facebook had gathered the personal data of millions of unwitting users that ended up being weaponised by both the pro-Trump and pro-Brexit camp. For Beijing, this is just another day at the office.

NOT YOUR TYPICAL COMPANY

Let’s just for a second forget the Orwellian Social Credit System in which Chinese citizens’ behavior is graded through massive data collection, which can result in the confiscation of your passport, longer hospital waiting lists, higher interest rates or barring from certain purchases for those who are deemed ‘bad citizens’ by the state.

Huawei, the giant Shenzhen-based telecommunications company worth €80bn (Slovakia’s total GDP), operating in 170 countries, has already begun development of both Europe’s and the Americas’ 5G networks. Infrastructure that will become key to the way countries are managed: healthcare, transport, education, you name it. The firm’s CEO? A former People’s Liberation Army officer with known ties to Chinese intelligence services.

Charges of possible espionage from Western countries are not tales from a Tom Clancy book. It’s not hard to imagine

“Huawei is one of the Chinese government's pet companies," said James Lewis, director of technology policy at the CSIS think tank to Axios. "They will retaliate and China will take hostages." What happened less than a week after the arrest by Canadian authorities of Huawei’s CFO, Wanzhou Meng, on charges she violated U.S. sanctions on Iran?

The Chinese government detained a former Canadian diplomat that remains in jail as of the writing of this article.

As the editor-in-chief of one of China’s foreign propaganda outlets put it via Twitter “Arresting Meng Wazhou is bringing terrorism to state and business competition.” He continued, “Piling pressure on a company and the country behind it by detaining a core executive, it is much worse than an ordinary human rights violation.”

Whilst signature companies usually enjoy favorable conditions in their home country, Europe being no exception to this rule, not every telecoms company has the weight of the second most powerful nation on Earth and its government behind it.

EXPORTING AUTHORITARIANISM

Another Chinese telecoms company that was fined $1 billion for violating U.S.

sanctions on Iran, ZTE, has given analysts a taste of what Beijing is capable of when given the opportunity.

ZTE provided the servers for Maduro’s government latest authoritarian trick: A new identity card used for food and medicine rationing in a nation ravaged by shortages of basic items. According to an extensive investigation by Reuters, the database stores details such as “birthdays, family information, employment and income, property owned, medical history, state benefits received, presence on social media, membership of a political party and whether a person voted.”

With over half of the population using the new identity card, the Venezuelan government has diversified its importing of authoritarianism by choosing China over Cuba.

Although harsh and undiplomatic, U.S. Senator Marco Rubio’s comments on Fox News on Huawei being “a Trojan horse” are accurate. After years of European naiveté on China, it’s time for the Old Continent to choose sides in this new cold war. Mixed messages to Western media from European governments threatening to ban Huawei are not enough. EU’s dovish giants like Germany and France, as well as Eastern European states should follow the UK’s lead by opening up audits on Huawei products and ban the company from doing business.

Chinese investment comes at a price, and it seems to be European sovereignty.

Santiago de la Presilla

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China's fight against corruption – Getting possible opponents in line?

Since taking power in 2012 President Xi has led a vast and popular anti-corruption campaign. Public perception of corruption in Party and State is very high and with good reason. According to data from the Hurun Report, China’s parliament has about 100 billionaires. People are very suspicious about this enormous wealth. They perceive corruption is widespread. Surveys show that in 2015 more than a third of companies report having to pay bribes to the public service sector. Such public opinion of the abuse of entrusted power for private gain shook the confidence of citizens, including in the party itself. In addition to economic growth, Xi’s government made the fight against corruption its main priority. The campaign has started seven years ago and it’s likely to continue, but the question concerning its effect remains open. To what extent has it been used to fight corruption and to what extent to put Xi’s opponents out of the political game?

UNRESTRICTED BY LAW OR GOVERNMENT

China`s enormous economic success, beside the great benefits for Chinese people, brought new problems such as corruption. In 2017, China was ranked 77 on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (out of 180), just slightly better compared to 2012. when it was ranked at 80. When the anti-corruption campaign started, it was largely carried out under the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, as an internal party agency, however, the regime wanted to expand its scope on more bureaucrats that are not members of the Communist Party.

Last year, the Chinese government established a new highest authority to oversee the ongoing anti-corruption campaign - the National Supervisory Commission (NSC). Holding a higher status than the Supreme Court, as well as being unrestricted by law or government, this new commission will help president Xi Jinping to absorb even more influence and power.

INVESTIGATIONS AND PURGES BECOME THE NEW NORMAL

After coming to power, Xi Jinping stated that corruption and factionalism are the greatest threats to the future of the party. He pledged to crack down on “tigers and flies” - meaning powerful leaders and low-level bureaucrats. China’s anti-graft watchdog said roughly 1.5 million lower-ranking officials, including former political opponents and senior military leaders, have been punished since 2013 under the anti-corruption drive. Stats show that if you have been investigated, it is very likely that you would be convicted.

NEW PARTY IMAGE

Since taking over his post in 2013, Xi Jinping's determination to root out his opponents and clean up the party's image was first illustrated in the arrest of Bo Xilai, the former Communist Party chief in Chongqing, once seen as a high-flyer tipped for top office. More recently, Xi used the anti-corruption campaign to remove his prospective successor and a rising political star in China, Sun Zhengcai, on charges of corruption, three weeks before the party congress in 2017. The number of officials implicated by the anti-corruption campaign sent a clear message to party members and Xi’s opponents that they could be next to be put on trial if he sees them as a treat to his power.

In 2018, the Tsinghua University PBC School of Finance from China published research which found that anti-corruption investigations are associated with credit reallocation from less productive state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to more productive non-SOEs. On the other hand, the Financial Times reported that businesspeople in China are complaining that their bribery costs have actually risen along with the greater risks facing corrupt officials, many of whom now demand backhanders paid in foreign currency directly into offshore bank accounts.

(NON)SYSTEMATIC APPROACH

The obstacles to rooting out corruption in China are partly systemic. Official salaries and benefits are minuscule, especially compared with the power that representatives of the state wield over all aspects of the economy. According to the New York Times, many Chinese assume that the vast majority of officials are tainted by corruption, and they have mostly welcomed the wave of detentions even as they acknowledge that some of the accused may have been swept up for political reasons. Most of the countries with low corruption have independent and depoliticized judiciary which doesn’t exist in China. The current regime under Xi is not motivated to change this in the foreseeable future. The reason is very simple - they don't want to give up any power. Defense lawyers and advocates of legal reform drafted open letters to the government in Beijing asking for a fair process for those accused of official wrongdoing. There is no doubt that the anti-graft campaign has helped Xi consolidate his rule and allowed him to end the presidential term limit last year after removing potential political opposition inside the party.

UNFINISHED BUSINESS

The Xi Jinping era marks a new stage in the country’s development. He started in 2012 with the anti-corruption campaign and it became one of his key signature policies. Observers say investigations, arrests and sentences, especially of high-level officials, have boosted Xi's popularity among ordinary people. Its results are very limited when it comes rooting out corruption but are very strong in removing opponents.

Some even describe existing campaign as a massive internal purge of political rivals, on a scale not seen since the days of Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution. Anti-corruption fight requires a systematic approach, including an independent judiciary and respect for rule of law, which are currently absent in China.

China's anti-corruption campaign is flexible enough to allow Xi to essentially go after anyone so it’s unlikely that he would willingly give that up.

Vladimir Milic

The official magazine of European Democrat Students

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What is behind the heredity of education?

Education is something that we often see as the main key to wealth and to the success of the western world. It is something self-evident: everyone needs to go to school, everyone can study if he or she wants to. Although we know that there are a lot of factors which influence the educational path one is taking, but apparently; the education your parents obtain is the main influence. This is different in every country in Europe which brings up the question; how you can influence the educational system to prevent educational inheritance?

INTELLIGENCE DOES NOT NECESSARILY DEPEND ON ONES DNA

An argument often misunderstood is the belief, that intelligence is only in your DNA and therefore it is obvious that parents with an academic background have more intelligent children then those without. Of course your DNA has an influence on it, but undoubtedly it is the support system behind each child which has the biggest impact.

Carol Dweck, a leading scientist on the field of study motivation, proved with a study that if you grade a student with “not passed yet” rather than “failed” it has enormous impact on the students improvement. Although there is a lot of validation that the school system can do a lot to get the full potential out of one student, it is certainly easier to blame DNA. EDUCATIONAL DISADVANTAGE STARTS FROM AGE 10

A Report from the OECD in 2018 showed that the academic performance gap between advantaged

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and disadvantaged children develops from as early as 10 years old and widens throughout the students life.

A strong link is found in the report between a school’s socio-economic profile and a student’s performance: those who go to more socio-economically advantaged schools perform better in PISA. Besides the result, 48% of disadvantaged students attend disadvantaged schools in 2015 without change in sight. Those disadvantaged students who attend advantaged schools perform way better.

This case is found in Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Hungary, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and the Netherlands. In Finland, Norway and Poland students from all social backgrounds do well.

“Too little headway has been made to break down the barriers to social mobility and give all children an equal chance to succeed,” said Andreas Schleicher, OECD Director for Education and Skills. “More

investment is needed to help disadvantaged students do better, including recognition of the critical role that teachers have to play.”

The OECD report also looks at the well-being of the students. Only one in four disadvantaged students are satisfied with their life and feel socially integrated at school. Pointless to say, that socially and emotionally resilient students tend to do better academically, which brings us to the conclusion, that helping disadvantaged students to develop positive attitudes and behaviours boost their academic development.

HOW UNIVERSITIES ARE CHALLENGED

Needless to say, that within the tertiary section the gap between students with academic background and those with non-academic background is growing. Since graduating university is not compulsory there are new factors which influence that gap. Starting from financial worries up to the pressure of staying within

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the given time to finish your studies, those are just added factors that increases the gap.

Coming from a working-class family, there is less tolerance for the struggles probably every student is facing during their studies. A Study from Germany showed, that students who are more educated than their parents often feel like they start to alienate from their family. At the same time, we are facing a new working environment in which a bachelor’s degree is something that is taken more and more for granted.

How can the tertiary sector deal with those given problems? And how is our society challenged to deal with it?

LET US GET RID OF THE BOX SYSTEM

First, although the article might come across differently, it is important not to create a box system in which you either are part of the “academics” or the “working class”, because at the end of the day, every student has the same books to study with and the same professors to deal with.

It is important though, and everyone needs to understand, that if one is willing to work hard to get

their diploma, it should not matter what your social background is.

This might seem odd, but creating a picture in which students with academic backgrounds are automatically judged as spoiled children who are simply too lazy to get a job, is not helping either.

Generally, the reputation of students in general has changed a lot over the years.

A generation ago, if you look at it in an exaggerated way, students were seen as a valuable part of society who most likely were creating the future. Studying nowadays has more become an implicit prerequisite for more and more jobs, yet students are more and more being criticised for living on state money while partying all the time.

Although, if you want Universities to become more open and available for every part of society, you again have to think of the main duties of a University.

If a bachelor’s degree is becoming more and more taken for granted and a requirement for more and more jobs, then it is important to acknowledge that and restructure the tertiary sector.

On the other hand, we should ask ourselves the question how a bachelor’s degree is losing more and more its value. Why is it that an apprenticeship is worth less than a bachelor’s degree? Why do so many young people feel pressured to attend higher education rather than fulfill their professional dream through other ways?

Some Universities of applied sciences combine apprenticeship training with an academic diploma and the students who attend these types of universities show a wider range of social background. These types of Universities build up on a very “school-like” system, that also gives students more security that with getting into it, the diploma is in your pocket by the time they graduate.

Of course, this type of University does not give an answer to all the problems Universities are challenged with in general. But maybe by understanding what factors students with “working-class” backgrounds embrace in their educational choice, small things can be done with a big impact, such as for example the phrase “not passed yet”.

Sabine Hanger

The official magazine of European Democrat Students

27

The University of Economics Vienna

If you aspired to a career within the business sector, the University of Economics in Vienna (WU) would not only prepare Austrians, but mainly foreign students for a future in economic and social science.

With young people from over 110 different countries, the university of economics hosts around 23.000 bachelor’s and master’s students. Its goal is to compete with leading institutions all over the world by offering a wide rage of English-taught master’s programmes. Additionally, within German bachelor studies, students may choose several courses to be held in English. The WU proves its international focus by being represented by 25% of its students on campus who come to study at WU from abroad.

ACADEMIC PROGRAMS

At WU, students can benefit from a broad spectrum of studies, courses and educational offers. Three different bachelor’s programmes give young people the possibility to get prepared for a future career within business, social sciences or business law. In every academic programme, basic business administration and a wide range of individual specialisations are offered. A new English-taught program (Business and Economics) gives students a profound understanding of business and economics in a global context. Also, this innovative programme should encourage foreign students to study in Vienna at a young age. The new bachelor had it’s first academic term in winter 2018. Before that time, it was only possible to do English-taught master’s programs.

After finishing their initial bachelor’s studies, students can choose from eight different English-taught master’s programs. Especially Master of Quantitative Finance, which was ranked #22 out of 130 international finance programmes according to QS World University Ranking in 2017, aspires students from all over the world to study at the

WU campus. Within the English-taught master’s programmes, the proportion of foreign students is huge. In some studies, nearly 80% of students are international. This proves the global focus of WU and their efforts in creating a broad spectrum of possibilities for their graduates. PhD programmes are mainly intended for the University’s academic staff.

WU’s academic identity is shaped from the great amount of research professors and predoc assistants do.

The excellent study quality is proven by several accreditations the WU has gained over the last decades. WU is one of the less than 1% of Universities worldwide that can claim accreditations from the three most well-respected accreditation agencies: EQUIS, AACSB and AMBA. Even more, only two German-speaking universities belong to this exclusive group of schools, including WU.

LIFE ON CAMPUS

WU has one of the most modern and complex campuses all over Europe. The library is lovingly called “Spaceship” by its students, due to the extraordinary architecture. Every single building on the 100.000m2 big campus is fully accessible for people with disabilities, such as students or teachers with vision impairments or who use wheelchairs. These standards encourage both young and older citizens to start an academic career without having to worry about the general framework and infrastructure on the campus.

Not only does the library allow students to get a stunning view over Vienna, but so does every classroom that has its windows towards the campus, so that students will not be disturbed by traffic. After class or work, three different restaurants on campus, two supermarkets and a library café

allow students, teachers, researchers and administrative staff to come together and connect.

Special “outside areas” were built for relaxation and to meet up with colleagues.

Only a few steps further a large pond with a sun deck offers a rural idyll in the middle of the megapolis Vienna. Green areas with sunbeds make it possible to rest, daydream and catch up in the shade. Everything is only a few meters away from the lecture rooms.

Several athletic facilities, just as a large gym for indoor sports, an outdoor basketball court and table tennis courts are offered.

But, most important of all, the famous Viennese Prater (also known as “Wurstelprater”) is next to the campus. After tough exams, students may enjoy themselves in the oldest amusement park in the world, first mentioned in a document in 1162.

AFTER WU

WU graduates can benefit from an attractive range of career prospects. Especially the ZBP Career center, which is not only the biggest university career center in Austria, but a job center located on campus only for WU students, provides over 2.500 jobs on their platform exclusively for graduates in the field of business and economics. Statistically, graduates from WU only need to send around five job applications until they succeed and find a solid job.

To sum it up, it shall also be mentioned, that keeping in touch with the WU is guaranteed by the WU Alumni Club. The club organizes meetings for WU graduates who want to continue a strong connection with WU and its former students. Special offers at the WU Ball every January and invitations to high class events all over Europe are only few of the countless benefits for WU Alumni Club members.

Johanna Gruber

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BullsEye

Are there Limits to Academic Freedom?

Freedom is the power to act, speak and think freely. Freedom is the opportunity given to the people by the fact of their birth and guaranteed by the current legal system. The limitations to that may occur in the specific cases providing a lot of evidential facts to legitimate the limitations. Freedom exists in various spheres of life. The constitutional and international laws help to maintain freedom. The academic freedom as a part of our life is not an exception.

Academic freedom is the freedom of teachers and students to teach, study and pursue knowledge and research without unreasonable interference or restriction from law, institutional regulations, or public pressure. This is one of the accepted definitions for academic freedom. However, the term “Academic Freedom” tends to be difficult to define because it has differences in practical approach and in methodology.

Due to the high technological society, changes become a way of life in every field. The thing that is not accepted in the current time period, is becoming necessary for the upcoming years. The same is in academic field. If you are not flexible, you will lose the advantage to learn and get new knowledge.

A limitation is the thing stated by the law. Limits are only provided in legal provisions, otherwise, the individual is free in his/her actions, no matter in which field. It includes the academic field as well, unless there is a legal act enforced which stands for the limitations of rights.

But this statement is not accepted without exceptions.

Due to the features of domestic legislations of different countries regulations on academic freedom may differ. As a result, the limitation and level of limitations may

differ as well. Complex viewpoint was expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States. It says that academic freedom means any university can “determine its policy on academic grounds for itself.

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Who may teach

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What may be taught

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How it should be taught, and

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Who may be admitted to study

The subject of debate is also launched between two categories.

Is academic freedom for a university, college or any other institution which provides the same activities?

Or, is academic freedom for the professor and student who has a direct impact on the teaching and learning process?

Opinions are divided into two viewpoints. In one case the, academic freedom is considered to be both inside and outside the classroom. It means the university, the professors as well as the students have to deal with academic freedom. Maybe the impact and perceptions are different, but academic freedom does reflect on all participants of an academic field.

The other theory for academic freedom is viewed as narrow. It is mainly about the idea of academic freedom owned by the institute

or the academic staff. Though this opinion has the right to exist, we cannot agree with the level of limitations of this theory.

The above mentioned definition of academic freedom states the world “unreasonable”, enabling us to conclude that limitations may be reasonable and unreasonable.

Going further to the legal formulations, it means that limitations may be legal and illegal.

No one can approve if the facts are the reason to limit freedom. It is generally impossible to write a complete list of reasons which are considered to be legal. One thing is not doubtful; the limitations should be based on a legal ground not to outgrow the subjective category. In other words, your rights end when mine begin. We can analogically state that the limitation of your academic freedom starts when the rights and freedom of society and the third person start. As the whole logic of the article shows, we have viewed and discussed academic freedom as a right also as a legal relation which is a guaranteed opportunity by the law.

Just to notice that we have to use the academic freedom for science and not against it.

Anna Mkrtchyan

The official magazine of European Democrat Students

29

EDITORIAL TEAM 2018/19

Julien Sassel (28) is a Belgian and Italian dual citizen and has been an active member in EDS since 2012.

He has a Master in International Relations from the Université Catholique de Louvain and a MA in EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies at the College of Europe, in Bruges.

Johannes Bürgin (21) is a German student from the city of Nuremberg.

He is member of the committee for international relations of the country’s biggest political student organization, RCDS. He is currently studying International Business Studies B.A at Friedrich-Alexander University.

Mattia Caniglia (30) has a Master in Strategic Studies and years of experience in international organisations that gave him knowledge of global geopolitics and economics. He is currently collaborating as a political and economic analyst with media like Foreign Policy, Fortune China and The Guardian.

Santiago de la Presilla (23) is a journalist and communications adviser with a focus on Russia, European affairs and finance. He previously worked for the American Chamber of Commerce and is now the Warsaw correspondent for Visegrad Insight.

Elie Joe Dergham (27) is a Lebanese and Canadian dual citizen and has been an active member in EDS since 2015. He has a Bachelor Degree in Banking and Finance from the Notre Dame University - Lebanon and is a certified anti money laundering specialist (CAMS).

Beppe Galea (22) lives in Gozo, Malta and is a European Studies graduate from the University of Malta. He served as Vice Chairman of European Democrat Students during the working year 2017/2018.

He is currently the Deputy News Manager of the church media organisation Newsbook.com.mt.

Johanna-Barbara Gruber (21) was born in Austria and is currently finishing her studies in business economics at the University of Economics in Vienna. She has been writing for student’s newspapers since her first semester. Her academic interest lies in gender studies and diversity management.

Sabine Hanger (22) studies Law in Vienna. Becoming member of the Aktionsgemeinschaft in 2016, she got elected 2017 to be the Chairwoman of AG Jus, offering a situation in which she is confronted with responsibility and political sensitiveness, but also opportunities to work with various people.

Desislava Kemalova (26) is from Bulgaria. She is currently doing a PhD in Law in Sofia University where she also teaches the discipline. She has work experience as a government official, and currently legal consulting. She has been active in EDS since 2015 and served as a co-chair of EU’19 WG.

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Vladimir Milic (28) has a BA in International Economics and Finance. He is currently working for a cultural centre in Belgrade, Serbia. He considers EDS as a platform on which to discuss issues on Europe's future. He is a supporter of EU integration interested in the future of EU – China relations.

Anna Mkrtchyan (24) is Armenian, and is an member in YRPA. She has a Master in Law and is in the first year of a Ph.D. course. She has been a member of Yerevan city council for a year. She is a legal adviser of the legal department of the National Assembly of Ar menia.

BullsEye

EXECUTIVE BUREAU 2018/19

Virgilio Falco (28) is EDS Chairman.

Graduated in Law and as a president of the Italian association StudiCentro, he worked on writing the reform of the school system in Italy. He has working experiences at the Italian Parliament and in private universities. He writes for the newspaper Il Foglio.

Sara Juriks (23) is from Oslo, Norway. She has a BA in Music, an MA in Politics and is currently studying Anthropology.

She has been active in politics since 2011, both nationally in Høyres Studenter and then in EDS since 2014. Currently she is the Secretary General of EDS.

Hubert Tadych (24) pursued a Master of Laws degree in Poland. He used to work not only as a paralegal, but also as an assistant to an MP and as a communication manager to the party.

A former Co-Chair and now with-in the bureau he is responsible for the communications and the EU Elections.

He also serves the EPP Group.

Tommi Pyykkö (29) lives in Helsinki, Finland. Newly graduated from the University of Helsinki, where he studied French, Europe-an Studies and Political Science. Currently in the bureau he is the Vice-Chairman responsible for pub-lications (BullsEye and the Annual Report) and he also runs the website.

Pantelis A. Poetis (24), from Cyprus is a Vice Chairman of EDS. He studied Law and International Relations - Global Political Economy at Middlesex University London. Pantelis holds the portfolios of Statutory Amendments, Member-Organisations and Website. He works at Dr Andreas P. Poetis LLC Legal Firm.

Gergely Losonci (26) is a Hungarian MBA student at Corvinus University of Budapest. He holds Bachelor degrees in Business & Management and Finance. Gergely worked in the European Parlia-ment and currently works as a business consultant in Budapest. As EDS VC he is responsible for the EU 2019 Elections and the 2018 EPP Congress.

Carlo Giacomo Angrisano Girau-ta (21) is an ESADE Law and Global Governance student. He is currently the International Secretary of NNGG (Spain). As EDS Vice Chairman his responsibilities consists of writing event reports and newsletters, as well as being responsible for Latin American relations.

Robert Kiss (29) lives and works in Sfan-tu Gheorghe, Romania. He holds a BA in Business & Management from Corvinus University of Budapest, and a Msc in Economy & Tourism. Currently he is doing his PhD in Economics. He is active in EDS since 2014. As Vice-Chairman he is responsible for the Permanent Working Groups and the Conference Resolutions.

Boyana Taneva (25) MGERB Bulgaria. She served as a Co-Chair of the Policies for Europe Working Group during 2017/2018 year.

Boyana was elected as Vice-Chairwoman of EDS in 2018. Currently, within the Executive Bureau she is responsible for communication, social media and event reports.

Zeger Saerens (23) is specialized inEuropean and Corporate Law. He holds academic degrees from the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (KUL) and Univer-sité Saint-Louis (Brussels). Zeger gained his work experiences in several law firms and public institutions. As a ViceChair he is entrusted in the Bureau with Fund-ing and the Statutory Amendments.

The official magazine of European Democrat Students

Libertas Ezako (26) lives in Namur, Belgium. She holds a Bachelor degree in Political-Sciences and pursues her Master’s degree in International Relations at the Université Catholique de Louvain. She has been a member of Jeunes cdH since 2015 andcurrently she works as Deputy Secretary General for EDS.

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