EUREKA Spring 2014/2015 by Eureka Magazine

Europe’s and the European Union’s involvement in, and experience of conflicts of all kinds, of those occurring internally or externally, is a central issue with which we as editors decided to deal in this 2015 spring edition of the Eureka magazine. There are all sorts of instances of conflict affecting Europe today, and we therefore find the topic not only centrally prevalent, but currently quite simply unavoidable in evaluating the social and political scene of Europe today. Whether these following analyzed instances of conflict be remnants of inner social strife and inter-communal unrest, issues concerning setting an appropriate foreign policy paradigm the EU can employ to confront conflict outside its borders, reconciling diverging inner political views on any number of events affecting Europe today, or simply a decisive investigation on how we view and come to talk about instances of conflict in the news or in our daily lives, these following articles comprise an extremely diversified and relatively exhaustive documentation of the many different issues currently affecting Europe that are linked in one way or another to a conflict of some kind. As always we would like to graciously thank all of the writers and photographers that have generously given of their time to think critically about, and capture images of, the current social and political reality of Europe today. We feature writers from a variety of different backgrounds both European and international, and without the immense array of voices we can draw on to consider certain themes affecting Europe today, we wouldn’t have a magazine as excellent nor as diverse and informed. Thank you very much for your contributions, and we do look forward to seeing your work again in next year’s editions of Eureka. Wishing you all a lovely Easter holiday and the best of luck in exams, Your editors, Hendrik Obelöer and Shane McGoldrick

Photo by Olga Lermontova Cover by Mats Barkow

Appeal and Proximity

The Linguistic Construction of Security Threats

It’s not you, it’s me

Understanding British reticence to anything European

Where am I from?

10 Memories of Conflict and Conflict of Memories 12 Manchester to Mosul

British citizens and the Islamic State

14 The potential of a 22 Lessons to be learned German interpretation of from Northern Ireland? “Leadership” Why Germany’s crisis management 24 UCL 2015 EU and Europe is special but yet a chance for an Careers Event diplomacy 16 Murdered by Politics

26 Who Will Guard the Guards Themselves?

17 On the present day relevance of Holocaust education

28 A Game Without Winners

20 Do good fences make good neighbours?

Trans-border cooperation and lived European reality in the Upper Rhine region

29 Germany’s Greece Policy

Or How to Fail Miserably

29 Syriza

The Frontal Assault

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Building on this foundation, the UCL European Institute works to stimulate new research and support multidisciplinary collaboration across the university. It acts as the one-stop access to UCL expertise on Europe and the EU, and provides a conduit between the university and policy-makers, civil society and the media. We offer a diverse programme of public events, provide expert analysis and commentary, build up networks and alliances and aim to provide an intellectually stimulating environment for researchers at all stages of their careers. For more information visit: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute

Appeal and Proximity

The Linguistic Construction of Security Threats Editorial by Shane McGoldrick

Amidst all this talk of conflict, “rising” tensions and “ever-advancing” spheres of influence, of “close” military exercises and “advancing” or more “frequent” armed flyovers, it becomes decidedly necessary to analyze the ways that this sort of information concerning the world outside of London is being crafted, shaped, and exported to us, as we glance distractedly at the daily headlines, trying to avoid that looming essay on that one week’s reading we actually took the time to consider. It is my very simple, but certainly important point in writing this article, that we truly take the time to consider the ways in which our perceptions of the outside world are linguistically fabricated, and thus prone to inherent interpretations that may deceptively block our ability to form objective opinions on world affairs. Likewise, it is also undeniably requisite to observe the way the presentation of certain “threats” affects our resultant discursive decisions in speaking to these threats either in daily life or formalized writing.

I should like to clarify that this is not an attack on how global events are portrayed via digital mediums, but rather a brief analysis on how we come to know or accept certain global events as veridical, how we come to know them as they purportedly are, or how in this case we come to accept any number of Putin’s actions in the past few months as imminent or growing security threats.

The way I would like to contextualize this analysis is by looking at the presentation of certain ongoing events along the Russian Federation’s western border. I shall assert that there are certain innate issues that media outlets must overcome to garner attention and readership, and explain how these proposed problems affect journalistic discourse on the whole, before engaging in a brief discussion of how we ought to think about reported events that are directly affecting important international policy decisions. The issues that any media outlet or even government policy maker must prevail against in speaking on global affairs can ultimately be reduced to proximity and appeal. They must win the proximity or magnitude of a certain issue, lest the public’s eye strays to a different more locally prevalent story. Whether we like it or not, there has to be a reason that one should care in reading a certain story, in considering a certain policy option. Thus secondly, a reported news event must have a kind of appeal, a kind of glowing allure which may excite the reader in one way or other and draw their attention further. In any news story covering events stringing from the advancement of troops into Crimea to NATO’s recent military training exercises in the Black Sea and the parading of US tanks through certain Baltic States, there is always a described sense of urgency and closeness to the events. The events are not only often described

Olga Lermontova

as ongoing or increasing in seriousness, but they are also often quite appealing in the imagined visual sense to the reader. In reading any story on NATO ships sailing swiftly into the Black Sea or large tanks being unloaded and driven around in a sort of pseudo-masculine display of muscle power, there is often this undertone of subtle sex appeal to such events, especially when portrayed in conjunction with linguistic instances of words such as “tension” and “confrontation”. Military exercises aren’t described in the ways they should be, as preparations for very real instances of conflict in which human lives are quite literally ripped apart in the name of security or ideal, but as “Black Sea manoeuvers”. War ships are described as “sleek grey frigates” and not weapons of very real destruction—troop movements are illustrated as “provocative” (an adjective repeatedly used and abused by art critics speaking about…art), and not as again, a very real display of the very organized and systematized way man goes about destroying his fellow man.

portrayed as rising or falling, is made out to be sexy and seductive, and not violent and destructive. The instances of journalistic discourse recounted and analyzed above should illustrate to us just how commonplace it is for situations of very real opportunity for conflict and death to be so described as to evoke feelings of excitement and a rise of bodily temperature, instead of disgust and critical evaluation of the reality of the conflictual event as a whole. We need to consider the very real prevalence of these notions of appeal and proximity that media coverage, and even everyday conversation deal with in speaking to world events somehow concerned with violence or conflict, and recognize that very often the only conception of the reality of these situations we have access to is going to be linguistically constructed. We create the atmosphere to these events in our minds eye, and react to them accordingly. At the end of the day, journalistic accounts of conflict often simply describe instruments of war being ordered by men and women behind desks to be used in some strategic way to achieve some goal of an often disputWhen we read such articles describing conflict or ed nature. The rest is all… well, just talk… isn’t it? conflict escalation, we need to be aware of how the So let’s become aware of how we use our words and portrayal of these events affects us internally and how others use there’s, because often they are all we then juxtapose these evoked feelings with the de- have, and they quite literally can create and shape cidedly less than glamorous reality of military exer- the world we live in. cises, military forces, and armed conflict in general. It is ridiculously simple to recognize that we too often become inured to the way conflict, whether

Mats Barkow

Itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s not you, itâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s me

Understanding British reticence to anything European Sebastian Spence

At a recent discussion at Chatham House, an International Affairs think-tank, a panel of four took turns to give their opinion about the financial implications of a potential British exit from the EU - or ‘Brexit’. Much of the argument has been well-rehearsed for years. Those favouring exit cite, amongst other things, the flexibility of organising bilateral free-trade deals with emerging economies (which EU membership prevents). Eurosceptics bemoan how EFTA nations, who belong to the single-market but aren’t a member of the union, have just signed a free-trade deal with India, whilst EU negotiations have stalled. Given Britain’s overlap of interests with India, this is frustrating. Yet the benefits of membership are equally stark. Access to the single-market is of course a huge advantage (nearly half our exports head to the continent). And there is much to be said for the economic clout that comes with negotiating as a continent of 500 million rather than as a small offshore island. In fact, no one really knows what the alternative to membership would be. Free trade deals might take years to negotiate (always supposing countries can be bothered to negotiate with us); although most experts think that would be a transitory phenomenon, rather than a fundamental conundrum of successful exit. It is unlikely Britain would be refused access to the single market, though we may face some tariffs. But if there are two things I took away from the discussion, it is that there are good arguments on both sides and whether we decide to leave or stay, economically Britain will be okay.

focussed on whether it is in Britain’s economic interest. But what needs to be understood is that British reticence to the EU is an entrenched historical phenomenon.

In this year’s shiny Winter Issue of Eureka one of my peers, Arthur Davis, asks ‘Will Brits ever be proud Europeans?’ He is right to raise the issue. Indeed, I think it matters more than anything else. He is also correct in saying that we in Britain feel as if we “don’t need Europe”. But why are the British (particularly the English) so anti-Europe? When you ask them, they might grumble about sending billions of pounds to the EU, although many didn’t seem as bothered before the financial crisis and the rise of UKIP. A more interesting point is the idea that ‘our laws are made in Brussels’, albeit this is obscured in mainstream debate by distortions and half-truths. I don’t think your average Joe fundamentally cares much about the fact that the EU banned fruit and veg that were too curvy (only to repeal the ban in 2008). The fact the law is made in Brussels - that alien, bureaucratic, soviet metropolis – even if British civil servants are party to the deliberations and the lawmaking - is what irks the British mindset. Of course some Germans, Swedes and French probably feel the same, but the hostility is far more profound and prevalent in this country.

So, I disagree with Arthur. I believe there is a case for saying British identity (as well as the sub-national and regional identities it encompasses) is particuIt seems strange, therefore, for so much of the main- larly at odds with the idea of a European one. There stream discussion regarding EU membership to be is something which makes us feel different from Euabout the economics. Our membership has always rope. The most obvious historical explanation for

this is how we view the Second World War. When European countries lost the war to fascism, Britain held its ground. Western victory was of course ultimately due to American intervention, but there is a sense in which ‘we’ won the war and all the founding members of the EU either lost it or were occupied for several years by Hitler’s forces. Even today, the English football hooligan reminds the German fan that we were victorious (before Klose and Müller finish off the game).

Looking further back in history, there is something in the political liberalism of the British Isles that has meant we never sympathised with extreme politics and the big state. Historically British institutions hugely shaped the bedrock principles of what we understand as the modern, market-based liberal democracy. And in the 20th century, unlike many European countries, Britain didn’t have a dictatorship (indeed, one would have to go back to Oliver Cromwell to find anything close). We have always been suspicious of the big state. Hence our dislike of supranational institutions and our European partners ready acceptance of it, seemingly feeling our commitment to the rule of law, habeas corpus and free markets is not for them.

So, there is a case for saying that if there is a European identity, it does not incorporate the British one. But does it matter? Practically speaking, the arguments for remaining a member seemingly outweigh those in favour of leaving - at least until a very compelling, unambiguous alternative is presented. The problem is that we Brits have never cared much about the EU; the NHS being the more salient acronym in modern

political discourse. The answer is: yes, it does matter. Euroscepticism is increasingly prevalent, and its ubiquity is exemplified by the rise of UKIP. But, it would be a mistake to think that the crisis is causing anti-European feeling. Certainly, it might be exacerbating it, but the underlying tensions are much more fundamental. The European question has always been divisive because it boils down to national identity rather than political ideology. The Labour for a Referendum group, which emerged after Cameron’s pledge to hold a referendum should the Conservatives win a majority, illustrates the extent to which this is not a party issue.

In fact, understanding why Britain feels different to Europe matters for one simple reason. Figuring out what kind of relationship we want with Europe cannot be debased to economic pragmatism. We have always been the reluctant, ‘awkward’ partner, and this doesn’t really suit us or the EU. Whether we fully commit to Europe as a member of the union, or decide to cooperate but not integrate as a neighbouring state, will be decided by our understanding of who we are. As the loss of colonial influence leaves a void in the British nation’s view of itself as a powerful leader, will we become part of a greater European identity? Or will we prefer to stand true to the historic albeit increasingly enfeebled institutions, while we figure out what it means to be British? Maybe the two are not mutually exclusive. Maybe we can maintain respect for our traditions without alienating ourselves from the continent? I will not pretend to have the answers, but these are certainly the questions we need to be asking.

Taisiya Shifrina

Shortly after moving to London I decided that when people would ask me “where are you from?” I would answer with a meagre “I was born in Barcelona”, moving the conversation swiftly towards safer grounds. The question, despite its intentioned innocence, stems from a metaphysical concept with which I do not feel comfortable dealing in a short chat inside a lift. To be from somewhere requires subscribing to and identifying with a specific “us”. It is based on confirming that you belong to those broad social and cultural groups we call nations. This topic often only precipitates conflict when posed to someone born and raised in Catalunya. Where am I from? I can only confirm I was born in Barcelona, at the “Virgen del Pilar” hospital. Or so have I always been told. Since the democratic transition in 1978, the most complex political issue in Spain has been dealing with the interests of the different national identities that compose the country. Despite being a serious threat to the integrity of the State, several governments have been unable, and most probably unwilling, to give the topic the relevance it deserves. The most recent upsurge of Catalan nationalism has been first neglected, then silenced, and now irrationally opposed by both conservative and social democrat governments. This is a consequence of the inherently conflictive nature of issues about nations and rights. The recognition of oneself bears the necessity to recognize the other. The existence of an “us” depends on the recognition of a “not-us” with which you can either cooperate or clash. “Catalonia is not Spain”. The core of the independentist’s arguments is based on two simple ideas. First, that Catalans are being exploited by Spain. “Espanya ens roba” (Spain robs us) is the usual motto to simplify the reality of fiscal imbalances be-

tween Catalonia and the Spanish State. As most rich regions in Europe, such as Lombardy or Bavaria, Catalonia contributes a disproportionate amount of resources if compared with those others. Conflict over taxation and redistributive powers has been at the core of Catalan politics, causing almost all major revolts in Barcelona over the last century. However, I do not believe this argument is the most important. It stems from the recognition that Catalonia is a nation with its own rights and sovereignty, which conforms to the second idea. Traditionally, mainly the Catalan republican left adhered to this belief, preferring to exalt irrational debates about collective identities rather than reaffirming

Where Nacho am I Arroniz from?

their Socialist ideology as a strategy to “fer país” (build the country). Within our context of neo-romanticism and idealistic post-Modern irrationality, addressing feelings and sentiments is hugely effective. “Som i serem” (We are and we will be). That is the radical ideological and cultural framework of independentists. Their concept of a nation is a very democratic one: a nation exists when its people decide to consider it as such. Nations are built by public sovereignty, and uphold public sovereignty. The combination of these two main arguments and their development have been key to the success of the independentist campaign so far. Madrid’s propaganda cannons have so far simply denied both of these arguments. First, they have tried to use the Consti-

tution as a hammer against independence. However, this strategy is unsustainable as it only alienates Catalans from the political system created in 1978 and provides the independence campaign with even more arguments. Second, they have aimed to propagate fear among property-owners and small bourgeoisie (very relevant in Catalan social structure) about the economic consequences of independence. It is true that engaging in an open discussion on these topics and the reality of fiscal imbalances can deter the movement’s strength, especially among the powerful urban middle classes. This was proven by the “No” campaign in Scotland, but it will never effectively tackle the feeling of alienation shared by many Catalans towards Spanish national identity. To solve the social and emotional conflict provoked by nationalism, Spanish culture needs to be freed from the hijacking of the central regions. Spain must stop being identified with a culture produced in Madrid and Castile and develop one with a more inclusive nature. To be Spanish must be an umbrella concept in which different national identities and cultures can strive towards. The country cannot sustain a national culture placed in conflict with other subcultures belonging to any of its communities. “Spanish” should not be the natural “other” of “Catalan” It should rather be elevated to be considered a product of the interaction between different cultures and nations within Spain, always in recognition of their particularities. I also believe that only then would a Spanish republican federation be a realistic alternative for the organization of the State and a new Constitution. A responsible intellectual and political leadership is key to create these new paradigms. I want to be able to say without remorse: “I am Catalan, and thus Spanish”.

Alberto Delclaux

Memories of Conflict Conflict of Memories and

Emma Nabi

There exist presidents who declare war and invade illegally, but ‘to protect international peace’. There are other presidents who deny desiring war but send troops. There are those even with enough ‘conviction’ to deny the occurrence of the holocaust. And there are governments that have made it impossible to research national massacres, even under the codename “May 35th”. History is sometimes distorted to fit frames or narratives, usually for political reasons. History is a science. It does not appear as rigorous as physics, or perhaps as accurate as chemistry. There is not one absolute, objective historical truth waiting to be discovered; human life is not so dualistic. There is a perpetual tension between factuality, interpretation, and argumentation. We don’t have the privilege of claiming to approach history completely objectively either. However hard we try, contemporary preoccupations will always influence our objectives and our analysis, and historians cannot exist outside society. Nevertheless that is not to say that there are no facts, nor that we can discard our historical responsibility under the pretence of relativism. It still happens that groups hold different ‘truths’, especially when it comes to armed conflict. If think of conflict in Europe, there is one striking example that more often than not comes to mind: the Yugoslav wars. Starting with the seceding of Croatia and Slovenia from what was then the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991. The conflict escalated until the Dayton agreements of 1995, and slowly picked up again until the Kosovo war broke out in 1998. The history of these wars is pervaded on all sides by the dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘they’, between ‘friend’ and ‘foe’, and between ‘victims’ and ‘aggressors’. In the 80’s, af-

ter the fall of Tito, it was out of this binary relation that the rising nationalist leaders constructed the identities of the different constituting ethnicities of Yugoslavia. It would not be an exaggeration to say that these wars were a case of ritual re-enactment of all the previous conflicts amongst ethnicities. Reclaiming symbols and national emblems, political leaders did not hesitate to appeal to memories of the First and Second World Wars to vilify and dehumanise the other ethnic groups. For instance, Serbs were told that the Croats had fed Serbian babies to a zoo’s lions, or that Muslims were trying to repopulate South Eastern Europe and evict Christians. Conversely, Croats, Bosnians, and Slovenes were told of Serbia’s aspiration to dominate Yugoslavia and subjugate them. After the war and the infamous ethnic cleansings, out of this unending tumult of genocide and rape, emerged the different accounts of the conflict, where everyone deems himself solely the victims and the others exclusively the perpetrators.

It isn’t rare to hear people heave in a resigned sigh that ‘there is too much history to the Balkans.’ True, there are many versions, many controversies, many ‘historical’ facts. But isn’t it rather that there is too little history, and too much memory? Memory simplifies. It can only account for one perspective. It only implies constancy. History allows for nuances. It allows for multiple perspectives. It is the record of change. The collective memories of the former Yugoslav peoples eclipsed history. But, perhaps a little paradoxically, these different historical narratives are part of history. Seeing what stories Serbs, Croats, or Bosnians ‘tell themselves about themselves’ gives us precious information about their identity, especially so soon after the conflict. There is no time-period so remote as the recent past; the memory of it is still burning, the social implications are daunting, and distancing ourselves is undeniably complicated. For this reason, some say amnesia and discontinuing the teaching of the histories recounted above would be the best remedy to the problematic history of the

Balkans-- diverging memories of Jose Hong the past would at least not be used to set the region aflame once again. These discordances stress the importance of historical narratives in wars. The Regimes of truths are expressions of a given culture, and revelatory of a group’s social imagination. The Yugoslav wars are an extreme example of this, but other examples may be found in most interstate conflicts, and almost all civil wars. The experience of conflict is unique, and peoples can’t be stripped of it for the sake of one absolute historical truth. Although belligerents can come to an agreement on a chronology, or particular events, controversies inevitably arise when politics demands that fingers be pointed at the responsible party. We can side with the Bosnian-Muslims and call it a war of aggression, or with the Bosnian-Serbs and call it a civil war. A version may prevail, but whichever it turns out to be, this will tell us far more about ourselves than it will tell us about the conflict itself.

Manchester to Mosul British citizens and the Islamic State Ali Arif

Manchester to Mosul, Rotherham to Raqqa, Birmingham to Baiji. Hundreds of British citizens have left the relative comforts of home to join the Islamic Stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (IS) struggle to establish a caliphate across the Middle East. Worryingly for the British government, this includes many young men who will become battle hardened and have their extremist worldview strengthened. The concern, then, is that these men may eventually return to the UK hoping to bring the battle to these shores. YetBut this does not givetell us the full picture. A state needs citizens, not just fighters. Many of the fighters have taken their young families in a permanent move to Iraq or Syria, and women and young girls have been enticed to move in order to marry Islamic State fighters.

So are these people simply misguided or dangerous criminals? In this article I will address some of their motivations for leaving the UK, and will consider measures that could be taken to stop the flow. According to figures from the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Violence at Kingâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s College, almost 4000 of the foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria come from Western Europe. Between five and six hundred are estimated to have left the UK to fight there, joining a myriad of militant groups. As previously mentioned, this figure excludes those who have gone to establish a domestic life. The pressing and puzzling question is simply: why?

Graeme Wood, in a recent article in The Atlantic, points out that IS are strategically committed to â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;returning civilisation to a seventh-century legal environment, and

ultimately to bringing about the apocalypse’. Wood argues that the followers of IS take a deeply literal and fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, and are committed with a fervour that is perhaps difficult for secular Westerners to understand. The concept of a caliphate, or Islamic type of ‘empire’, is central to the ideology.

counts of British peo- both photos by Ali Arif ple who have gone to Iraq and Syria, you may be surprised. Photos abound showing Pot Noodle and Cadbury Dairy Milk, large modern houses, fighters relaxing in swimming pools or posing with weapons. These all have the effect of normalising the conflict and obscuring the grim reality. Accompanied by exhortations to join the Islamic Whereas Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda did not expect to State in order to build a community, these posts are see a caliphate established in their lifetimes, IS are convincing to many. taking active steps to forge an empire through the most brutal means. Unlike Al-Qaeda, holding territo- What can be done to stop them? The British governry is crucial. Upon declaring a caliphate on the 29th ment may talk about censorship of social media and of June last year, Baghdadi, the leader of IS, implored confiscating passports. However, perhaps the change Muslims across the world to move there and help it needs to come from within communities themselves. grow. For IS followers, therefore, it is a spiritual ob- This can mean parents keeping a closer eye on their ligation and a ‘vehicle for salvation’ to move to their children, or community leaders condemning leaving territories. the UK in the strongest terms. Indeed, only last year a group of senior Islamic scholars in the UK issued The opportunity to fulfil these fundamentalist ide- a fatwa condemning British people joining the “opals holds an intoxicating sway over a tiny number pressive and tyrannical” Islamic State. of British Muslims, and provides their motivation. Mosul, Baghdad, Dabiq. These names echo through Unfortunately, many young British Muslims feel at history and are the setting for prophecies concern- odds with British society as a whole. Maybe in oring mythical battles said to usher in the apocalypse. der to foster a sense of belonging, the media needs to Fulfilling these prophecies is, sadly, irresistible for dial back some of the alarmist rhetoric and promote some. an inclusive vision of British society, where all religions and races are welcomed. The Islamic State’s mastery of social media is an important factor in attracting Western recruits. The Ultimately, people will leave no matter what measlick, well-produced videos of casual murder glamo- sures are taken. Nevertheless, it is an issue we must rise their crimes, giving a Hollywood feel to the con- confront head on, whilst making sure our wellflict. Monitoring of social media reveals that foreign earned liberties remain intact. Creating a general atfighters are excited by such videos, with many feel- mosphere of paranoia must be avoided at all costs, as ing that the West is getting what it deserves. it may well exacerbate the issue. If you were to look at the Facebook or Instagram ac-

The potential of a German interpretation of “Leadership” Why Germany’s crisis management is a chance for diplomacy Gwinyau Machona

Mats Barkow

It was at the 50th Munich Security Conference in 2014 when Germany’s President Joachim Gauck and the Minister of Defence, Ursula von der Leyen, declared with lofty words, that Germany, as a stable democracy with economic capability, was ready to take up more responsibility in conflict resolution. The international community appreciated those statements, having witnessed Germany’s past hesitation in that respect. However, is Germany really about to become the longed for loyal partner for the apparent hard-line policy of the United States, the UK and occasionally France? This essay seeks to briefly tackle this question and explain why it will take many more years until Germany openly accepts this European leadership, which it is regarded to have occupied already. I shall however argue, that it will define its own version of leadership, which can already be observed in the rather odd way Germany is “leading” Europe today. Exemplary are the continuing and desperate attempts by Germans to mediate and negotiate in the Ukrainian crisis. If it was for many US politicians, the “West” would supply the Ukrainian forces with weapons. If it was for German politicians, the “West” would negotiate with one voice, preferably with German views, and grant some successes to Russia and Putin for the sake of stability. One obvious advantage is the fact that one voice shared by 28 European states is more powerful than 28 different voices. Moreover, Germany could remain just one ordinary EU member. In Berlin this would be at least seen as a welcomed side-effect. Germany could represent the European Union and would not be the frontrunner, instead it could enjoy a shadow role in this sort of European peloton. Chancellor Angela Merkel has understood how unpopular Germany as a leader in conflict management would be; not so much abroad, but more at home. Subsequently, she has already qualified the apparent new role as “the leader” by introducing the rather odd definition of leadership being “directing the way out of the middle”. This is the position most Germans would like to see their country in: Determining the direction of European crisis management without running ahead. Why is the German population not prepared to lead Europe? The reason for this hesitation is not primarily the fear of running ahead in the wrong direction. The policy of mediating in endless conferences, rather than a policy of clear statements and action, is the result of Germany’s history. The First World War and the following years of extreme right wing nationalism had shown that Germany was capable, due to its size and popula-

tion, to cause devastating catastrophes in Europe, if it pursued a policy of confrontation. In addition to the Second World War, the communist period in East Germany and the Cold War followed. Consequently, the concept of strong leadership had completely lost its appeal and attraction, let alone any form of military action. Until today, from an early age onwards, Germans get told how their country carries the heavy burden of guilt on its shoulders resulting in a responsibility to avoid any form of military conflict in Europe. This traditional hesitation, perhaps rather to be called “policy of precaution and reservation”, is cemented into the German identity. Today the political establishment derives from a generation that was born at a time of military confrontation which separated their country and it was raised by a generation horrified by the Second World War. Germany will not be prepared to be a frontrunner in international politics, until its citizens are free of highly emotional experiences, direct or indirect, with totalitarian regimes and their consequences. It will not be today’s young generation that changes Germany’s role dramatically. This generation was raised by parents who experienced the Cold War, who were in turn raised in a society in which every political statement needs to survive the scrutiny of political correctness. Nevertheless, the direction for Germany is clear: The more distanced its citizens are towards Germany’s history, the more they will be prepared to accept the role of a leader. Though, its history will never be forgotten and Germans in general will remain deeply pacifistic and sceptical towards any form of military involvement. This can be a great potential for Europe and the World. In times of conflict and confrontation a commonly respected mediator, believably dedicated to peace, could be a key factor for more successful diplomacy. Theoretically Germany has the political and economic influence to hinder any military intervention or involvement of the so-called western countries, including the United States. If Germany spoke up against military actions, it became very difficult for others to morally justify any arms supply or military intervention, when other options are still available. Yet, the German voice cannot be one of hesitation or reservation, like in 2011 where Germany abstained from voting on the no-fly-zone in Libya. The German voice would need to be decisive, clear and predictable. This role has not been played properly by German politicians yet. If it ever will be, remains to be seen. Certain is that the potential for a German leadership in global diplomacy is real and existing.

Olga Lermontova

Murdered by Politics Roman Varum

On the last day of winter a political murder took place in Moscow, of the scale that has not been seen for years. Boris Nemtsov, the man who was murdered not a hundred meters away from the Kremlin wall, was one of the most consistent critics of Mr. Putin’s regime and one of the most popular opposition leaders in Russia. He was a politician of federal significance, boasting an untainted reputation and a very successful career in the past when he rose to become vice-president under Yeltsin, and was widely anticipated to succeed him, until the fateful decision was made in favour of Vladimir Putin instead. Despite the immense efforts of state propaganda, Nemtsov retained the sympathy and respect of anyone in Russia who has ever so much as made an effort to inquire about current news beyond the state-controlled media. Such a blatant act of political violence thus came as a shock and marked a new political reality in Russia.

The last politically motivated murder of comparable resonance happened 9 years ago in 2006 when journalist Anna Politkovskaya was shot dead in the elevator of her apartment house, on Putin’s birthday. Does that mean that these killings were personally ordered or sanctioned by Putin, like some commentators suggest? Probably not. To allow this would be absurd for at least two reasons. Firstly, Putin did not have a pragmatic reason to fear these opponents to such an extent as to need to remove them physically. The state controlled media already does a successful job of tarnishing opposition and blocking any dissent from the public’s discourse,

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while the loyal courts assist conveniently by jailing the opposition leaders on a regular basis, disrupting any effective organization. Secondly, however surreal this may sound, a national leader has to uphold some standards, befitting his status--being associated with political terrorism is not one of them. There is reason to doubt that anyone, including Putin, would like to see a contract killing happen on the doorsteps of their office. Does this mean that Putin is absolved from guilt on the account of this murder? The answer, again, is no. The fact that the shooting took place in one of the most heavily guarded and monitored places in the capital and that the killers managed to escape at all, tells us something about the political regime. It is clear that the operation could not be carried out without the complicity of state security – the FSB, which rose to a dominant position of influence under Putin. It is plausible that the killing was contracted by the people from those structures interested in the perpetuation of conflict in eastern Ukraine who might have had a direct clash of interests with Nemtsov, who was expected to release a detailed research on the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine. Among other things, the security structures contract and curate militant reactionary groups to provide “volunteers” in the east of Ukraine and help silence opposition at home. Just weeks before the murder took place, a pro-government rally “Antimaidan” gathered in Moscow to chant in support of the government policy and vow to physically deal with the “national traitors” if necessary to prevent “Maidan”

in Russia, waving portraits of Nemtsov as one of such The murder of Boris Nemtsov is an act of sabotage “traitors”. and could just as much be a signal to Putin as it is a threat to the liberal opposition, should its members The corporate, authoritarian nature of the state has attempt to expose those involved in the conflict or exposed itself at its new low, marking a new reality – obstruct their interests. Escalating violence at home that of open political violence. By letting the security is only a logical continuation of the current authoriservices loose, Putin has effectively lost control over tarian regime as its constituent groups try to assert the situation. Decentralized violence carried out in their power amid crumbling economy and violent the name of the Kremlin may prove difficult to stop. interference abroad. It is, however, more a sign of Even if Putin really wanted to find the culprit, as the fear than of control. Putin has done nothing to prostate media reports, the arrests will not extend be- vide security or stability in Russia in any reliable inyond the executor of the crime, for the investigation stitutional form. One is only left to wonder what the is sure to stumble into someone loyal to the regime future holds once this control slips. at some point.

On the present day relevance of Holocaust education Lukas B. Wahden

--- This text was inspired by the European Institute Event ‘Between Obsession, Routine, and Contestation: Remembering the Holocaust in Europe today‘ on the 24 February 2015. The event featured a panel debate of four renown experts on German history, the history of the Holocaust and Holocaust education. --The 27th of January 2015 marked the seventieth anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz concentration camp by the Soviet First Ukrainian Front. That day, more than three hundred camp survivors gathered at the Auschwitz site, sheltered by the flysheets of a large tent adjacent to the camp’s looming tower gate. As selected survivors addressed the world leaders present, silence fell over the marsh. Of the decision makers involved in the anniversary festivities, none were born before the end of the second world war. Although remembering the Holocaust seems to remain a relevant topic on the agenda of today’s political elites, for just how long will it continue to do so? A recent study by Germany’s conservative Bertelsmann Stiftung informed the public that 81 percent of today’s Germans say they want to ‘put the history of the persecutions of the Jews behind them’ and for their leaders to turn to ‘contemporary problems’. As the significance of keeping Holocaust education a part of national curricula is debated throughout Europe whilst the last surviving witnesses of Nazi atrocities perish in ever-growing numbers, how can their memory be preserved for future generations, and how can we deal with the conclusions deducted from their suffering?

With concrete social memory fading, the problems that arise from occupation with the Holocaust cease to be purely historical, assuming a philosophical character difficult to communicate to younger students who are unfamiliar with questions of ethics and the peculiarities of 20th century history. How could one of the most advanced nations of its time, within the time frame of a mere twelve years, descend into an abysmal barbarity unparalleled in all of human history? In the years leading up to 1933, German scientists had collectively accumulated more Nobel Prizes than their British and American colleagues combined. Austrian and German contributions to world literature and art were at an all-time peak. German cultural life was highly sophisticated, and in the decades since its unification in 1871, the country had experienced an astonishing economic rise, with industrial production increasing fivefold in the years between 1870 and 1914. What lead to this apparently stable and civilised nation to commit crimes of such unique brutality? In most of its contradictions and historical unclarity, the Holocaust remains completely incomprehensible. It seems that what disturbed and perplexed the first journalists and officials who arrived at the Dachau, Birkenau and Auschwitz sites in 1945 are the very same problems that continue to disturb and perplex modern day students of the Holocaust. The efficiency and bureaucratic accuracy attributed to the German nation as a whole had, for its civilising functions in Germany’s political and economical systems, often inspired awe

and envy in foreign observers. Yet in the barracks of Nazi prison camps, efficiency and bureaucratic accuracy had been thoroughly everted, vesting an industrial dimension to what would later become known as the materialised reverse image to European civilisation as a whole. The collected works of Weimar classicist poets, famous for their enlightened and rationalist moral principles, served as the bedtime reading of Auschwitzâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Lagerkommandant Amon Goeth. The sorting of new camp inmates into the forced labour barracks and gas chambers was often musically accompanied with pieces by Bach and Beethoven. In Auschwitz, high civilisation and unrivalled barbarism amalgamated entirely. This cynical contradiction tends to shock and disturb. It confronts those who study it with ques-

tions of ethical imperfection, and sparks doubt in regard to the concealability of the animalistic elements in human nature. How, for instance, could the population of Weimar, with its proud cultural history, ignore the obvious evidence of the crimes committed in the nearby Buchenwald concentration camp? How could a country with a tradition in universalist ethics and Christian morality remain completely indifferent to the removal and succeeding extermination of millions of people from its very midst? How could ideological constructs of such vapid one-dimensionality lead a nation of astonishing general education into a devastating discharge of all its inherent values? And what does this mean for us? Is indifference to crime and injustice a crime and injustice in itself? And if so, are we able to picture

ourselves,our families, friends and neighbours as guilty criminals, only because we also often remain indifferent to injustice for pragmatical or personal reasons? What is the ethical difference between a 1937 Berlin man’s ignorance of the deportation of his Jewish neighbours and a 2015 London man’s ignorance of the origins of his designer shirt “Made in Bangladesh”? If we know that the gradual de-humanisation of the Jewish people in 1930’s Germany lead into their eventual destruction, why do we still allow our Tabloid press to collectively stigmatise modern minorities such as immigrants or unemployed workers? It is questions like these that the study of the Holocaust provokes. No other historical event demonstrates the inherent fragility of human civilisation more effectively than the Holocaust. For this rea-

son anyone concerned with the preservation of modern civilisation must have a stark interest in educating young people about it.

Holocaust education remains relevant not because it delivers concrete historical answers, but because it inspires doubt and uncertainty. Its value does not lie in making people understand, but in making them question. I like to see social progress as product of constant doubt. Knowing about the atrocities committed by Hitler’s Germany causes young people to question themselves, their beliefs and ethical standards, enabling them to achieve progress whilst retaining a scepticism towards the progress achieved. For these very reasons, I believe Holocaust education to remain relevant. It should be made available to students of coming generations.

Olga Lermontova

Do good fences make good neighbours?

6 million people live in this region, which covers the French Alsace, parts of the German states of Rhineland-Palatinate, Trans-border cooperation and lived European reality B a d e n -Wü r t t e m b e r g and Hesse, as well as five in the Upper Rhine region Swiss cantons around the city of Basel. HistorInga Sagolla ically, a contested border On a sunny Saturday morning, Freiburg is buzzing. region. Today, a model for European trans-border The cobbled square around the old cathedral in the southwestern German city is packed with mar- cooperation? ket stalls, and the smell of freshly grilled sausages In his poem “Mending Wall”, Robert Frost meditates wafts alluringly through the air. It is no wonder that on the old adage that “Good fences make good neighthis market is popular with the town’s residents. bours” as he describes the dialogue between neighYet, what becomes evident immediately, as I listen bours who follow the annual ritual of repairing the to the many different voices in the crowd admiring wall which separates their farms even though the “la cathédrale magnifique”, or using “odr?” at the wall appears to serve no modern need. Tri-nationend of every other sentence, is that the market is in al cooperation in the Upper Rhine region has quesfact a meeting place for residents from all tioned the purpose of boundaries and fences from across the Upper Rhine region. Around the 1960s when societies and associations were

Mats Barkow

founded in all three countries with the purpose of advancing cooperation across borders. In the following years, structures increasingly developed and resulted in the Upper Rhine Conference in 1992, which provides an institutional framework for cross-border cooperation in the region. Today, it is not only the lack of lengthy controls at the borders and the touristic attractions of the region which make cross-border visits so numerous. Today it is rather the way in which cooperation in the region influences the day-to-day lives of the local population. For university students, there is the chance to spend time at a neighbouring country’s university through the tri-national EUCOR scheme, which allows every student inscribed in one of the five participating universities to freely attend courses at one of the other institutions. In the cultural sphere, a one-year museum pass opens the doors to 300 museums, castles, and gardens across the Upper Rhine region, while regular cross-border radio and TV shows with a focus on local topics of interest con-

tribute to a sense of regional trans-border identity. Moreover, the tri-national EuroAirport Basel-Mulhouse-Freiburg provides easy access to far-flung holiday destinations, while the local public transport system links towns and villages in the region without stopping at borders. Living in the German city of Lörrach, a friend of mine works in Basel, and makes a detour through France every evening after work to buy a baguette for the family dinner – a perfectly normal daily routine. Is everything perfect though? No, of course not. Borders remain in the minds of people and at the heart of administrative structures. Language, culture, and the differences in judicial systems all have possibly dividing functions, and the practical path across borders often continues to be paved with stumbling blocks. After the German town of Bergzabern and the French commune of Wissembourg jointly enlarged the swimming pool on the German side, pupils from Wissembourg were not allowed to have their swimming lessons at the facility because of insurance reasons. Moreover, the Alemannic dialect, which used to unite the region, is not only no longer spoken by many people, but learning French or German at school is also losing its appeal in favour of English or Spanish. Equally, crises originating outside of the region can easily overshadow the advances made in trans-border cooperation as the outcome of the most recent European elections demonstrates where the nationalist “Front National” was successful all across the Alsace region. And where do the large number of Roma adults and children in refugee camps on all sides of the borders feature in the regional cooperation? How do they, as Europeans, profit from open borders? Nevertheless, the successes of trans-border cooperation in the region should not be played down. What used to be referred to as a “border region”, considers itself today to be in the “heart of Europe” and part of a trans-national community. Go to the annual Museum Night in Basel or the Christmas Market in Strasbourg and a similar picture of cultural interaction to that of the weekend market in Freiburg will emerge. And cycling freely across the bridge linking Breisach and Neuf-Brisach, the twin cities, who used to see in each other nothing but a threat, never fails to evoke in me a profound feeling of excitement, gratitude, and freedom. Yes, walls, fences, and borders may serve to avoid conflict. Yet, the residents of the Upper Rhine region prove that it is possible not only to live by the proverb “Good fences make good neighbours”, but that through the abolishment of boundaries, trust and freedom can be won and neighbours can become friends.

Lessons to be learned from Northern Ireland? Stephanie Bruce-Smith

Unity in diversity. These three words are said to represent how Europeans have come together for peace and prosperity all while being enriched by the multiple cultures, traditions and languages that make up this continent. Yet, how far does this hold true? Has Europe managed this? The classical reply would be that, yes of course – over the course of a century Europe (or at least where the EU draws its boundaries) seems to have transformed itself from being one of the most bellicose continents to one of the most peaceful, where it is now inconceivable that any of the member states would declare war against another. This is not to say that conflicts since the birth of the EU are limited to conflicts of

interest or conflicts of opinion of Europe’s future. Conflicts stemming from national and even religious identity are not only becoming in many ways increasingly present in Europe today but are characteristic of Europe’s history. However, if they are so characteristic of Europe’s history then hasn’t the problem already been solved? But one need not look any further than the British Isles to see such an example taking place in a more modern context. Why was it that two groups, separated often by both religion and politics, from the same area within the same island, were at conflict with each other right up into the late 20th century, and perhaps are still at conflict today? What became known as “The Irish question” is long, complex and in many ways still in want of an answer. It was not only about religion. Likewise, it was not only political. The split of politics along the lines of religion occurred only in the late 19th century where, for the most part, Catholics found themselves aligned with the nationalist cause and Protestants with the unionist. What ensued was a number of clashes – fought both within the House of Commons and between the communities themselves. By the

Mats Barkow late 20th century, after a thirty-year period of intensified hostilities that burst out into terrorism (“The Troubles”) The Good Friday Agreement was signed, for many marking the end of the conflict and the beginning of a new age of power-sharing and tolerance. Aontaithe san éagsúlacht. The Irish translation is almost literal, but instead of “unity”, the word shifts to become “united” (aontaithe). It is a step already taken, something achieved rather than an ideal, concept or goal. Perhaps this is a rather fitting translation, and in some ways, better than the original in highlighting the key issue at hand. Yet the problem lies not in the sentiment behind the three-word slogan but rather in its practical application: is it at all possible to achieve such a feeling of unity all while maintaining those traditions and cultures held so dear and in many cases fought for so ardently ? Often religion cannot be separated from politics or extricated as something to be done only in private, especially once it becomes intertwined with identity. In Ireland, for example, the difference between Protestantism and Catholicism is much more than merely that of transubstantiation and consubstantiation or of which side believes that the Pope is the Vicar

of Christ and which rejects his authority. Indeed, religious affiliation often determines what sports are played; which newspapers are read and also, less now than before but still prevalent, which socio-economic class one belongs to plays a part in identity formation. So how was it that two communities so diverse in their outlook on politics and feelings of cultural identity came together to live in peace? One possible answer is that they haven’t. The Community Relations Council’s third Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report published in March 2014 shows how in a number of ways, although twenty years since the first ceasefires were concluded, Northern Ireland remains a much divided society. Perhaps rather than unity and diversity being linked to provide peace and prosperity, the 30 years of intense conflict led to a certain weariness for violence among the general populace – a trend perhaps reflected in the fact that at the grassroots level the desire for reconciliation remains strong, even if this is not seen on a political level. Rather than finding a solution of how to solve the problem of diversity but rather, the crux of the matter may well be that many “just don’t care that much any-

more” about their distinct identities. Is this a problem – or a solution? Rather than true diversity in a society could a lack of diversity have been the solution and the driver towards peace? Was Europe perhaps not created by the coming together of people with vastly distinct national identities but rather was driven by apathy towards patriotism, wearied by two world wars on their doorstep? Are community integration policies in Northern Ireland only accepted by those who value their diversity less, with divisions continuing among groups who value it more? If so, what happens when such patriotic or religious fervour reignites and becomes strong once again? Or perhaps when people lose faith in the idea that their identity can be maintained within the European framework? The economic downturn in Europe has seen a return to nationalist and separatist tendencies. Religion has jumped back up to the top of the political agenda. Economic revival will often mitigate these tensions but it does not provide a long-term solution. Rather than repeating with an almost religious fervour the words “unity in diversity”, it is time that Europe questioned what this really entails and whether or not this has really been achieved. Because if not, it is almost certain that internal conflict may come knocking once again on Europe’s door.

UCL 2015 EU and European Careers Event Event Report by Jorge González-Gallarza

The 24th of February was set to become a big date in the UCLU European Society’s 2014/2015 calendar as we held our annual EU and European Careers Event, jointly run with our institutional partner, the UCL European Institute, and the UCL chapter of EU Careers - the European Personnel Selection Office, the recruitment agency selecting staff for the EU institutions and agencies. With stalls and speakers from EU Careers, from most of the main standard institutional jobs in the EU and from an ambitious selection of private firms, the event - spanning the whole afternoon from 1pm to 5pm ought to give attendees a broad overview of possible career paths within the EU institutions and the related industries. Although a long-standing EuroSoc tradition now five years old, our annual careers event saw two transformative innovations for this year’s instalment. Firstly, a clear separation of institutional jobs and private-sector related industries into two different panels. Secondly, the addition of a stalls and networking session framing the event on both ends and in between the two panel sessions. Where previous editions of the event consisted only of one panel and a short follow-up networking session afterwards, 2015 saw a more resourceful and all-round careers event, modelled on any reasonably sized careers fair. On the first panel, looking at careers in the EU institutions, the

aim was to sit speakers from the few main career pathways that graduates are likeliest to look into. Traineeships in the European Commission, arguably the biggest internship programme in the world, couldn’t be missed: Lizzie Durham, a current trainee herself at the DG Justice having graduated last year from UCL’s MSc in European Public Policy, gave insights into the traineeship application process, the programme itself and career prospects upon completion. Concerned that UK nationals were disproportionately under-represented in the EU institutions (they still are), the UK Civil Service set up in 1991 its European Fast Stream with a selection procedure through “concours” very similar to that for most EPSO job openings - giving the chance to UK nationals to use the Civil Service as a stepping stone to a career in the EU institutions. A European Fast Streamer himself at the UK Department for International Development, Matthew Ashworth joined us for a presentation of the EFS and to share his do’s and don’ts as well as general career advice. Having 24 official and working languages, the wheels of the EU are greased by armies of linguists working in all institutions and agencies (more or less 5300 interpreters and translators combined), translating from and into all 24 languages. Paul Kaye, now the language officer of the European Commission’s Representation in London and former-

Tracker - one of our guest companies at the stalls fair - spoke second, giving a general overview of the different EU related industries operating in Brussels parallel to the institutions, from the legal sector (consultancies, law firms, legal monitoring…) and interest representation (NGO’s, trade associations…) to think tanks and the media. His do’s and don’ts warned against going down the slippery path of applying for everything - it is preferable to efficiently narrow down one’s interests to make fewer, more performant and better tailored applications - or underestimating competition, and praised networking and good preparation for interviews.

Thirdly, speaking on behalf of the media industry was Ian Hall, UK Director of Euractiv, a pan-European media network with a local-language presence in more than 10 countries and a leader in ly a staff translator at the Commission’s Director- EU news and policy debates. As nowadays press ofate-General for Translation, was there to talk about ficers and media attachés are needed across all intranslating in the EU institutions. Applicants to dustries and institutions, Ian’s presentation focused translation traineeships in the Commission and oth- on the analytical and communication skills as well as er EPSO job openings for linguists must be EU citi- the types of previous experiences that can put an apzens with good command of various EU languages plicant ahead of the competition when kickstarting a but don’t necessarily need a languages bachelor. career in the media. Zuzanna McClintock, whose job as UCL ambassador at EU Careers is to promote EU Careers opportunities among UCL students, was not only one of the organisers of the event but also spoke on the first panel, giving a broad overview of career starting opportunities for graduates, as well as the EPSO’s entry criteria, deadlines and selection procedure. As part of the EPSO application process, there are four computer-based tests - namely numerical, verbal, abstract reasoning and situation judgement - and an assessment centre stage with practical language tests, an oral presentation, a structured interview and a group exercise - much like in many of the standardised application procedures to big multinational firms.

Last of all, we heard Claudia Chwalisz, policy researcher at the progressive think-tank Policy Network and recent graduate of UCL’s MSc in European Public Policy, talk about the world of think tanks in general and her job as a young researcher, involving both the development of research projects and raising funds for Policy Network.

At the stalls and networking fair taking place next door, attendees had the chance to engage one-toone with stall-holders on a closer and more networking-type basis than at the panels, as well as to learn more about the internship opportunities and services offered. The stalls were held by EU Issue Tracker - the EU’s premium regulatory monitoring service -, Hubert Consulting, the European ParliaThe second panel aimed at pooling together repre- ment Office in the UK, Online EU Training - Europe’s sentatives from the main EU affairs related indus- #1 EPSO preparation site, owned by the e-learning tries in Brussels. David Hubert - an experienced company Arboreus and offering all sorts of materials public affairs professional having worked for various and practice for the EU institutions’ entrance exams organisations and the founder of Hubert Consulting, - and EU Careers. his public affairs startup operating in Brussels and London - took first to the stage to speak about his ex- The slides displayed by some of the speakers perience and about careers in EU political consultan- at the event - as well as further info about the speakcies and public affairs firms. Brussels hosting more ers and the fair itself - can be found on the official lobbyists than Washington D.C., the EU is a breeding webpage of the UCL European Institute at the followground for such businesses as interest representa- ing link: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/european-institute/ tion, lobbying and political consulting. analysis-publications/careers Geraint Edwards, the Head of Policy at EU Issue

Who Will Guard the Guards Themselves? Robert von K端gelgen

Andrew Vakal

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes is the original latin of the quotation above – This phrase was penned by Latin poet Juvenal and is decidedly still relevant as it is directly applicable to numerous moral and ethical questions we face today. The Frontex case is only one example. Frontex was established to guard the European borders and fight illegal immigration. In 2014 the EU registered 300,000 irregular border crossings with almost 75% of these people coming across the Mediterranean Sea,yet Frontex only reacted with their minimum budget programme “Triton”. This operation is simply not big enough to help the vast number of people fleeing towards Europe. Thus there arise questions of what the agency actually does, and how Frontex’s actions and operations are legitimated and controlled. So who does guard the guards themselves? When having a look at Frontex we find them accountable on four levels: Political (the European Parliament and National Parliaments), Managerial (Frontex’ Management Board), Financial (European Court of Auditors), Judicial (European Ombudsman, the European courts). It would seem that these institutions should be able to control an organisation like Frontex. However, Frontex was designed as a rather independent and autonomous agency with almost no obligation to transparency. Reports about human rights violations by Frontex officers towards refugees made critics raise their voices calling for better surveillance and more inspections of Frontex. The European Parliament reacted by installing two other bodies to control Frontex. The Frontex Fundamental Rights Officer (FRO) is supposed to suggest preventive and corrective measures to prevent human rights violations. The Consultative Forum on fundamental Rights (CF) is a merger of 15 organisations including UNHCR, Amnesty International and the International Catholic Migration Commission. The problem with these institutions is that they are only able to announce recommendations but do not exert pressure on Frontex. Despite the new bodies watching over Frontex, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International repeatedly shock the news with reports on human rights abuses by Europe’s frontier-guards. These violations mostly refer to life-threatening operational tactics called “push-back” or “diversion” which include pulling boats filled with refugees back to the open sea and abandoning them to their fate. Sabur Azizi is a refugee who survived a manoeuvre like that. According to him their cutter was only a few hundred meters away from the Greek island Farmakonisi when Greek coastguards “diverted” the

boat back to the sea. He says that when the wooden boat started sinking the Greek officers did nothing to help the drowning shipwrecked people. “They didn’t want to help us”, Azizi told the media. According to him only 16 people managed to enter the coastguards’ ship. Greek coastguard director Dimitrios Bantias later apologized to the refugees and the Greek nation. Yet, the GPS-data which could have clarified what exactly happened that night was lost. Afterwards the European Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmström, distanced Frontex from the accusations as the “responsibility for that incident lies with the Greek coastguards” who – according to her – do not represent Frontex. Ex Frontex Executive Director Ilkka Laitinen has a very similar approach concerning that topic which became clear during an interview with the Finnish newspaper FifiVoima. He indicated that Frontex was not able to violate human rights as any responsibility for joint operations between member states and Frontex lies with the member states’ coastguards. This legal grey area is shamelessly used as a means to escape responsibility and accountability. Reports localize other examples of push-back practices at the Eastern European borders to the Ukraine. The stories end quite similar: Innocent people whose only crime was to seek refuge from persecution, poverty and misery in their countries of origin are taken and brought far away from the European Union. This kind of deportation is against the Geneva Convention which states that applications for asylum are to be reviewed and examined in a hearing. Although the European Court of Human Rights declared pushback practices unlawful in early 2012, they have not been ended. This shows that the longed for principle of “non-refoulement” which should be a natural standard has not been implemented in the European’s policy on refugees. However, it seems that the new Executive Director could bring a refreshing change to our European border control agency as he openly criticized the “push-back-incidents”. He claims they conflict human rights and thus should not and will not happen in the future. Frontex and all operations supervised by it should primarily serve the purpose of saving refugees and asylum seekers at the borders of Europe and should not focus on cutting down illegal immigration by any means. The EU abandons human beings knowing that not giving them a fair opportunity to asylum and a chance to stay leaves them to discrimination, persecution or even death in their countries of origin. This is the wrong approach and a morbid statement by the European Union, the self-proclaimed defender of human rights.

The EU A Game Without Winners Editorial by Hendrik Obelöer

Frequently my friends and I gather around a small board game, shut all doors and don’t talk to anyone in the outside world. The game I am talking of is called Risk and It is highly strategic and usually lasts for one or two hours--however we like to play it for several more because we spend most of the time talking, bargaining, negotiating, ‘outsmarting’ each other.

Unfortunately, this perfectly encapsulates the current situation in Europe. Merkel, Tsipras and several other players are seeking to outmaneuver each other within the framework of some fixed rules. Particularly, everyone seeks to exploit the system for his or her own benefit at the cost of another. This is not what the EU was built for, this is not how the EU can sustain for long.

In the current financial crisis (this article actually argues that we should think of it as an institutional crisis), we can see Merkel and and her finance minister Schäuble perpetuating the image of a strong Germany. While the economic reasoning behind the austerity policy is widely contested, politically the finance minister experiences unprecedented support. Even Spain, Ireland and Portugal have signaled strong support for a hard line against Greece. At home, any other course would lead Merkel’s government into a strong schism, populist CSU and AfD only waiting for their chance. In Greece the atmosphere is just as politicised. Comparing the current German government to Nazi-Germany is not only historically and morally more than preposterous, it also serves no purpose in getting nearer to an economic solution, not to mention a common solution. It simply creates the image of an enemy in a last gasp attempt to try to keep voters’ support.

Jose Hong point of view, it is no more a matter of personal anonymities or economic rational thinking. One can rather see all these individual actors behaving most rationally considering their respective positions. Personally, I would not even expect to see any substantial change if Schäuble and Varoufakis were to change their positions with each other. In the end, both sides act more or less ‘like the game makes them play’. No side knows how far the other one is prepared to go. The ‘crisis meetings’ are marked by the bargaining of two opponents, or rather, of people who don’t know how the other is going to behave and therefore choose to behave like an opponent, for their own benefit. There is simply no person, no majority, no institution who forces them to work together. Consequently, Merkel, Tsipas, ‘the institutions’ etc. end up constantly playing against each other. So how to make this non-cooperative game a cooperative one?

An extremely strong (hegemonic) Germany might be able to streamline European action, but that is neither politically nor economically desirable. The real solution does not lie in a change of governments or attitudes, but in a change of rules. This means a federal restructuring of the EU, possibly a european parliament overlooking national financial affairs and a commissioner with larger authorities. What this would look like precisely is open for discussion. Its consequences would probably mean the end of Britain in the EU, and possibly a Le-Pen-France. But on the other hand, the current developments do not seem to lead into any better future.

When I play Risk with my friends we normally collectively give up at some point in the early morning and speculate who might have won, if we had played for The crisis has crystallised into ‘Germany vs. Greece’ two more days until the end. This is not what Merkel (and not only the Greeks have contributed to that!). or Tsipras or anyone else in the EU can do. Let’s talk Problematically, all sides pursue their own goals, act about a common solution. The European populace independently, they are playing a non-co- has to radically rethink the arena in which decisions operative game. Looking at it from this are made. It seems to be alternativlos.

Comments Germany’s Greece Policy Or How to Fail Miserably

Lennard

It is very difficult to do everything right, especially if it comes to economics. But it is equally difficult to do everything wrong. Germany tries exceptionally hard to reach the latter with its Greece policy.

strict austerity policy as promoted by German politicians – for example Volker Kauder, a prominent politician of Merkel’s party, pointed out that there will not be any margin for concessions to Greece. However, the fact that Greece suffers from 50% youth unemployment and has faced a GDP decrease of more than 20% within 5 years illustrates the absurdity of this position. If some politicians in Germany start cheering because a small growth of 2.5% is predicted for Greece in 2015, this is a slap in the face to those people who had lost their jobs or – in the case of young people – have been deprived the prospect of ever getting a job.

The true fact is that Germany has surrendered to the tabloid press and right-wing populism, which simplified the Euro crisis to the scenario “The Greeks want our money”. Listening to German politicians or a wide range of the media, you get the impression that the Greek population is not facing the most serious crisis of its modern history but that Greeks are just too lazy to work and relaxing on the money which Germany just granted them in Politically, the EU was not simtheir infinite generosity. ply created as an economic trade union, but a unique project to maintain peace on a Continent However, this perception is as which had been shaken by two economically wrong as it is polit- World Wars in the last century. ically disastrous. The EU is a project which has succeeded in creating mutual trust Economically, Germany failed to and common values where only sufficiently encourage Greece to a short time before bitter enmity implement sustainable, and cer- and hatred had been dominant. tainly necessary, reforms, but It is in these terms that the Eudemanded massive cutting of so- ropean Union is an impressive cial expenses. If an individual is story of success. in debt, it is a logical step to cut expenses, but it actually does not In the current debate as to require much intellectual effort whether Greece should receive to realise that a State is not the support, the fundamental role of same as an individual. If a State Europe’s EU, mutual respect and cuts its expenses people will earn European-wide solidarity, seems less money and spend less mon- to have been forgotten. It is only ey. Consequently, the tax reve- a hope that Germany – as well as nue will decrease and the State many other countries – become will be forced to cut its expens- aware again of what the EU truly es even more. This vicious circle is--this hope is all we have. reveals the principle failure of a

Syriza

The Frontal Assault

Alberto Delclaux

As of now Syriza has stepped back from most of its mad socialist proposals, which is a point in their favour. But let’s not forget that quite a short time ago, messianic Tsipras advocated for more public spending, more civil servants, and stopping privatisations. That is all very well if the resources come from within, but not if they come out of the European taxpayer’s pocket. Greece has had an abominable track record of public finances for more than a hundred years and it is due time that the economy modernizes. Things started improving slightly with Samaras –first current account surplus since 1948!– but as usual in times of crisis, the political extremists pop up to hinder progress. Most Europeans agree that German-led austerity has not been the best pathway out of the crisis –although moral hazard in Southern Europe was not that easy to circumvent. Yet Syriza, instead of approaching the issue sensibly, chose a frontal assault. Not only did they choose to remind Germany of its quite recent past; the flirtations with Russia are also quite ill advised. Unless it wants to follow the path of Correa and Maduro, two wise presidents that have sold off their countries to China. The start of Syriza on the European scene could hardly be worse, as it has managed to alienate the other 18 countries of the Eurozone. Mr Varoufakis might be an ace at game theory, but as a commentator said, you can hardly play poker with the opponent’s chips.