T
he “Future of Europe” is a theme that is undeniably present in the minds of Europe’s population today. As new trade agreements are developed, as wars continue to wage on, and as countries seek to rectify their respective pasts, national identities, and claims to various ideals of state sovereignty with the institution of the European Union, one cannot avoid considering how all these issues will affect the future of the institution, the future of the European population, and perhaps most importantly, the continued development of a European identity. As editors of Eureka, we possessed the unique ability to be able to draw on the diversity of views found in the European Society concerning the future of Europe and its individual states. As such, the number of viewpoints and individual stories available for all to consider and add to this theme of the future of Europe is astounding, and truly reflects the value of a society such as ours. We have sought to demonstrate the plurality of state and institutional-wide issues that plague the EU, but we assert that many of these problems individual states are facing are less unique than perhaps they seemed initially. What can be unique however is our individual responses to these institutional and state-wide problems, and we have portrayed here as well, the extent of policy options available to the EU and its member states in their efforts to confront political extremism, an appropriate balance of nationalism, relations with other global players, as well as a number of other issues covered in this winter edition of Eureka. We would like to thank all our writers for taking the time out of their hectic university schedules to sit down and truly consider this theme and how they find it embodied in their home countries or daily lives. We have assembled an excellent array of articles and this is thanks entirely to our contributors. We hope to have you write for us again next term. All the best, Hendrik Obelöer & Shane McGoldrick Editors
EUREKA Winter 2014-15 Kindly Supported by UCL European Insitute The European Institute is UCL’s hub for research, collaboration and information on Europe and the European Union.
UCL has an exceptional range of expertise in the key disciplines of European Studies. It covers the core subjects of European integration study, including law, politics, economics, and history, but adds to it an unrivalled span of research and teaching in European languages, literatures, philosophy and the arts, as well as on European geography and built environment, medicine and health, and the sciences. Building on this foundation, the UCL European Institute works to stimulate new research and support multidisciplinary collaboration across the university. It acts as the one-stop access to UCL expertise on Europe and the EU, and provides a conduit between the university and policy-makers, civil society and the media. We offer a diverse programme of public events, provide expert analysis and commentary, build up networks and alliances and aim to provide an intellectually stimulating environment for researchers at all stages of their careers.
Cover photo by Jose Hong
Table of Contents 2
A Continent that should know better
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How various news sources 22 Illusion and feasibility in contributed to the growing cul- Spanish politics: tural polarisation in Europe Podemos?
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Russia, the special path
8 European but not an EU-nion-an 10 EU 2014-2019: New Faces, Great Expectations
20 Warsaw—25 Years since the fall of Communism
24 How close is Russia to the EU? 26 Evolving US-EU Trade Relations: An In Depth Look at the TTIP Proceedings
12 Sakharov Debate Religious & Human Rights 14 Permanently Incomplete 16 Europe‘s phone number 18 Wil Brits ever be proud Europeans?
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A Continent that should know better Editorial by Hendrik Obelöer
25 years after the fall of the Berlin wall, the EU’s
“But we can’t afford to let them all in” - We can. There have been times with much higher numbers of asylum borders are again attracting focus. Europe, the conti- applicants and even if there weren‘t, we should change nent that often seeks to claim the moral high-ground ourselves so we CAN let them in. It is not a question of and which yearly celebrates the tearing down of a economic calculation but of political will and the powwall that divided a nation for years, is slowing erec- er to answer back those reluctant to share a very tiny bit ting new ones. In a globalised world with countless of their wealth. France and the UK especially have a lot problems, creating an effective international system more potential. But even for Germany as the industriafor asylum seekers is one of the most urgent and im- lised country with the highest number of asylum appliportant issues. But in this field where Europe should cations worldwide (in 2013 over 120,000), there is much be a role model, it gives a decidedly bad example . more potential. Most of the refugees are still waiting for their final decisions and to put the German numbers in I can see you point at the financial crisis leaving many relation: Sweden takes nearly 4 times as many asylum countries in a desolate state, at an unemployed youth, seekers per inhabitant. at environmental destruction. Yes, Europe also has its own problems, not too little and not too small. But Rethink Frontex: don’t build fences, but asylum seekers come from a position we as citizens of Europe cannot even grasp. No matter whether they bridges are politically persecuted, harassed by their society or Europe has been the witness of countless cruelties. It has living under constant suffrage, who could resent them experienced how a wall has separated societies, minds for their search for a better life? Europe and each and and peoples. And its fall has been the marking point of every nation in the EU has the power and wealth to our time. No other country like Germany has experienhelp these people and still be left with enough resour- ced this closer. Now in a time when movements like ‚Peces to tackle the aforementioned problems. Or diffe- gida‘ (patriotic europeans against the islamisation of the rently put: If we don‘t find the resources and will to west) and resentments against refugees grow again they help those in greatest need, we need to argue about do not shed a good light on it. Fear of the other has becowhat our societies want to stand for. This article is me the ‚leitmotif ‘ of much of the discourse. going to introduce three measures with which a good Agencies like Frontex are not only the product of this but step in the right direction is done. also amplify the problem. The EU builds fences and at the same time rightfully criticises Israel and the USA for Update Asylum policy: theirs. We do not need those fences to ‚save refugees from It has already been acknowledged that Europe needs to taking the riskful passage on the mediterranean‘. As abact as a community on this matter. Regulations have been surd as it might sound to some: refugees are not going unified and controls established. This can, however, only on a holiday. The EU has a nobel peace price, but obvibe the very first step. It goes without saying that countries ously not for its border policies. Cautious estimates say do not only need to treat refugees with solidarity but also that currently 20,000 people have lost their lives on EU all other nations. Often countries on the periphery like borders. In the GDR about 900 were shot or killed in their Italy or Greece are left alone thanks to Dublin II. A sysattempt to flee. tem regulating that every person needs to claim asylum in the first country of entry or respectively can be sent If the EU wants to genuinely save lives, it needs to build back to this. We need a system of shared responsibility. legal and effective alternatives: possibilities for asylum Countries need to take up a position appropriate to their seekers to claim asylum from abroad or effective ways to size and capabilities, not feel lucky about the geocross the mediterranean sea. 2 graphical position they are in.
Reinstall effective rescue missions in the trols. That‘s it with the humanist education. Italy’s Interior Minister once said: ‘Italy did its duty’. Eu- 3 mediterranean Only after too many catastrophies Italy started its ‚mare nostrum‘ mission. 130,000 refugees were saved! Europe was proud of this, but at some point Italy refused to carry on alone and now Frontex does the job. After many negotiations the 28 EU nations agreed to gather 2,9 million euros a month... the mare nostrum mission by Italy alone amounted to 9 million. And how is this mission with less ambition, less personal, less money called? First, Frontex Plus. But that was apparently too much gallows humour. At the moment it‘s referred to as the Greek god and messenger of the sea ‚Triton‘. Europeans always like to show off their humanist education.
rope doesn’t.
If Europe wants to relate to common values and a shared political consensus, then something has to change. After all, a Europe without a political and open vision would lack support from the public. Reducing the EU to its Economic functions, on power play and influence, there will be a diminishing reason for many countries to stick to it. For a long time Europe was a continent of war, in which its peoples tried to separate themselves from each other. Europe should know better what it lead to. If we want to But not only the name and budget differs. Frontex itself save the European project, let’s start by saving those that puts it in harsh terms. Whereas ‘mare nostrum’ was a se- risk their life believing in it. arch and rescue mission, Triton focuses on border conPhoto by Ali Arif
How various news sources contributed to the growing cultural polarisation in Europe Paul Weissenberg
Google the words « Merkel » or « lazy greeks » and a
many perceived as potentially unsuited for the job because of his Italian origins. In addition, this negasimple scroll through the suggested images is likely to tive nationalistically charged campaigning is not a trigger two reactions : an initial laughter followed by one way street. Similar to German newspapers, many a sense of disgust. The Eurozone crisis and the resul- Greek media outlets had a handful of cartoons and ting feeling of economic polarization (often referred articles at their disposal which did not exactly praito as the « North-South » divide) led to the emergen- se the policies of the German governments, known to ce of multiple political articles, cartoons and images many as “Merkel policies”. conveying strong opinions, all across Europe. Most of them target politicians but also other European peo- In 2012, the Greek newspaper Dimokratia run a phoples. toshopped image of the German Chancellor in Nazi Betrüger in der Euro-Familie (« Swindlers in the Euro family ») was the cover title of the German newspaper Focus in 2010 depicting the statue of the goddess Aphrodite (the Venus of Milo) presenting her middle finger to the viewer. The image introduced an article commenting on German concerns about a European Union bailout for debt-ridden Greece. Caustic sentences included, amongt others, the mention of « 2000 years of decline », referring to Greek civilization. Reaction on the Greek side resulted in the president of the Greek parliament summoning the German ambassador as well as a group of particularly offended Greek citizens taking legal action against the journalists involved. Sell your islands, you bankrupt-Greeks – and the Acropolis too !, read the headline in the German Bild newspaper in 2010. This sounds perhaps a bit over the top, even facetious, many would think, but the basic logic behind this media jibe was actually embraced by German politicians such as Mr Schlarmann (a then senior position-holder at the German Christ-democratic party, CDU) who stated that those who face insolvency must sell everything they have to pay their creditors. Of course it’s not all about Germans despising Greeks for their financial misconduct. Other criticisms were directed at Mario Draghi, an Italian, now Presi4 dent of the European Central Bank (ECB), whom
attire standing before a swastika. It also ran the word « Dachau » on the front page with the photo, referencing to a Nazi concentration camp. “Of course I aim to shock people with my drawings,” Stathis Stavropoulos, the author, told Der Spiegel. He often depicts German leaders, including Mrs. Merkel, in World War II uniforms. “But the initial agitation should be followed by reflection. That, at least, is my hope.”
Is the hope of Mr Stavropoulos defendable, though? This kind of media coverage has the potential to excite nationalistic beliefs whilst leading to a loss of faith in the EU and its ability to bridge nationalism. If so, it seems that such journalism might prove counterproductive and in fact lead to the creation of an artificial feeling of further cultural polarisation. Such popularising of clichés indeed leads to a sense of mutual hatred between EU citizens of different states. For those who believe in the « European dream », this is clearly bad news in the very sense.
One step forward would be to find a method which would put an end to this illusionary trade-off roaming in people’s minds between national identities and a European identity.
The EU is not perfect but it has the potential to unleash and cultivate a variety of benefits for all its people. The problem lies in the lack of understanding of the EU, it being a complex and still somewhat vague concept for most of its citizens. This is partly due to the fact that its large aspirations ought to be backed up by relevant, often complex institutions and mechanisms but, more importantly, because the EU is not a clearly defined concept. There are no clear If there is such a problem, it is reaso- guidelines, limits or a framework which nable to ask whether there is a soluti- states what, where and when exactly on. It seems that the solution might lie the EU should act. In order for the Euroin the adoption of a different approach pean idea(l) to be led and guided effecto shared and differing values amongst tively, policies which aim at promoting Europe’s people. Delanty best expres- EU awareness ought to be put forward. sed this : « European identity can be de- The study of the EU and its mechanisms fined as a cosmopolitan identity rather could be further integrated into educathan a supranational identity or an of- tion all across member sates, for instanficial EU identity that is in tension with ce. national identities. As [such], European identity is a post-national self-understanding that expresses itself within, as The kind of media discussed above is much as beyond, national identities ». fuelled by demand that results from human behaviour and feelings. In an ideal scenario the reader critically perceives what is being laid out in front of his eyes and realizes that the reality is far more complex than depicted. If citizens of Europe are able to recognise the EU as such with all its imperfections but also with its advantages, then the debate can effectively move forward in a constructive way and the views will look decidedly much different.
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Russia, the special path Roman Varum
International political developments always influen-
ce and are in turn influenced by the states’ internal politics. One familiar topic that always comes up in this discussion concerns the national cultures and how they reflect on cooperation with other states. People’s cultural and religious beliefs influence the actions of the state significantly. It is important to address this issue since it can help us understand certain developments more clearly and enable us to look for better practical solutions to the related problems. In light of the recently amounted tensions between Russia and the EU it is especially relevant to think more deeply about what’s happening inside Russia and better understand its regime.
their mentality and adhere by different values. Whereas the “European values” which are appealed to by the liberal opposition, centre around individual rights and freedoms and call for free and fair elections, respect for private property, rule of law and independent media, the proponents of a “unique” Russian path tend to cite such things as traditional family, spirituality and historical unity. The Russian president invoked these concepts repeatedly in his speeches in recent years. At the same time Putin does not formally shun democratic values – instead, he stresses the centrality of the state and its sovereignty supposedly backed up by the historical and spiritual unity of the Russian people. Thus he attains a way to slam at the opposition through aligning them with “foreign interests”, which, of course, serve to destabilize the country, “to tear out its [the bear’s] claws and fangs” to use Putin’s latest metaphor.
The authorities (or the authority) in Russia have recently revived the all-too familiar idea of a “special path” of the Russian people, who are, according to them, different to their European counterparts in The new formulation of Russia’s identity thus strives 6
to pay lip service to the most basic democratic values, while either reformulating them from a different perspective or stressing the importance of the particularly “Russian” values over them. So, according to the research carried out by the Levada Center, a respected sociological institute from Moscow, in September 2014, 62% of the respondents said that democracy is the suitable form of government for Russia, with 55% (former 34%) saying stated that it must be a very specific type of democracy taking account of the “national character”. The ongoing change in the public discourse, is further attested by the dynamics of answers to the question of whether the relations between Russia and the West can be “genuinely friendly” or “will always be built on mutual distrust”. The number of people who answered positively has decreased to a quarter in September 2014 when it was more than 50%, while the number who voted for the second option nearly doubled to 64%. The authors note further correlations between the respondents’ answers and their levels of education, knowledge of foreign languages and the experience of travelling abroad. The simplistic Orthodox values advocated by the authorities, says sociologist Alexander Levinson, tend to appeal more to people with low levels of education and little foreign experience. Considering that more than 70% of the population never travelled abroad and only 20% have attained higher level of education, this presents easy political capital for a populist platform.
Predictably enough, none of the politicians who advocate the conservative agenda adhere by it. Putin’s own daughters are rumoured to live in Netherlands and Germany, while the daughter of Sergey Lavrov, Russian foreign minister, is studying at Columbia Uni-
versity in the U.S. - the country, whose “departure 7 from its Christian roots” Lavrov has lamented. This, coupled with the state’s manipulation of public opinion through the media, suggests that there is little more to the ongoing revival of “traditional” values than politicking. Sergey Guriev, an economist who used to lead the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, writes that the government has no rational interest in changing the status quo as it secures their economic privileges. Guriev seems right, provided that the public’s perception of cultural values seems to change once it sees the benefits that an open, democratic system and the rule of law can bring as whole – including in the economic and social spheres.
Since a major debate is held around the supposed fact that Russia requires a “special type of democracy”, it is worth emphasizing that indeed, to quote the political scientist Dmitry Oreshkin, “insisting that our democracy needs to be a special one makes no sense, because democracy is always special and tailored to each country’s circumstances”. The question lies rather in the political will to build and uphold actual democratic institutions – and the authorities in place clearly lack it. Hence the substitution of the talk about “a unique Russian culture” for the talk about substantive socio-economic issues at hand. Russian culture is indeed unique, as is every other – this does not mean that it needs to be counterpoised to the Western one, when it can coexist and indeed benefit from it. European nations do not share identical cultures either and yet they develop peacefully within the EU, precisely because they appreciate the merit of the universal values, around which they are united. Cultural isolationism and pursuit of a “special path” does not lead very far - North Korea, the most “unique” nation on Earth, can attest to that. Photo by Lennart Gau
European but not EU-nion-an Stephanie Bruce-Smith The future of states that lie within Europe yet outside the EU
With a seemingly ever-expanding EU it is often easy to forget about those countries that exist outside the framework – that is, of course, unless a euro-crisis causes their currency to skyrocket or a war erupts causing speculation about the return of Cold War tensions. “European” has almost become synonymous with EU membership and although it has been argued that it is high time to come up with a new adjective, perhaps there is more at stake here. What sort of relationship is foreseeable between an ever-expanding EU and those outside the framework? And should the EU work to better its relations with these countries in order to expand even further?
it. Each state outside the EU framework has a unique, established affiliation to the Union – indeed, despite the comparison made above, stark differences exist in the agreements and depth of ties Norway and Switzerland have with the EU. Norway’s EEA membership effectively means that they accept EU legislation without having a say in how this is formed – a “passive recipient” so to speak – something that caused Switzerland to leave the EEA and an arrangement that countries such as the UK would be unlikely to accept if they were to leave the EU. However, although Eurosceptics (particularly in Britain) hail the Swiss model as their choice of preference, this unique relationship is in danger. The EU’s expansion towards the East is seen by some as making the EU even more insistent on the Swiss forming a relationship closer to that of its EEA partners rather than being an acceptable exception due to its cultural affinity to Western Europe. It is indeed unlikely that Britain upon exiting could hope for similar treatment, particularly when it seems that the days of such special treatment are coming to an end.
Candidate countries and those accepted by the EU as possible candidates have by definition shown some indication of where they wish to be – whether or not they’ll get there anytime soon is another matter. Their relationship with the EU hegemon does not seem so tricky to define as the ties between the EU and those geographically in Europe but either not wishing to join or for various reasons have been rejected as posSecondly, although it was sible candidate countries. one of these unique bilateral agreements that Being respectively financially rich and oil-rich, Switsparked unrest in Ukraizerland and Norway seem perfectly happy in their pone in 2013, one could also sition outside the EU. As associate members of Schenargue that it was the pergen, participants of various programmes (including spective of Europe being Erasmus) and having numerous joint or bilateral tradivided into those inside de agreements, neither of these countries seems that and those outside the fraun-EUnion-an after all. This comfortable yet perhaps mework that led to Russi“casual” relationship with the EU is one that some in an involvement. Indeed, UK would probably envy – but this special rapport can there is talk of a new hardly be applied to all non-EU states, nor could it be Eastern Bloc (as can be adopted by states unhappy with the current set-up seen in Angela Merkel’s and waiting to leave. condemnation of Putin in mid-November); the Iron But why not? Why can’t Europe’s outsiders develop a Curtain now being drawn relationship just as cosy as that between the EU and just a little more to the those countries who find themselves nestled in beteast. Consequently, we ween EU states? could deduce that any EU initiative of rapprocheFirst of all, despite what this article’s title may sugment to these European gest, Europe cannot be so easily divided into two countries is now expected 8 groups of those within the EU and those outside
to be met with hostility. This conclusion does, of course, ignore the aforementioned particularities of each of the states outside the EU framework – although it may be perhaps justified if Russia’s foreign policy is interpreted in such a simplistic manner. So if Norway and Switzerland carry on as before, if the countries wedged between Russia and Europe currently (and for the foreseeable future) are considered off-limits for further close ties with Europe –what about Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan? What is the future of the EU’s relationship with them?
To answer such a question we must look at the direction of the EU and also return somewhat to the age-old question of where Europe begins and ends. What the EU aims to be is a topic that seems much clearer after the appointment of Jean-Claude Junker as head of the EU Commission, who has expressed openly his hope for further integration along the lines of establishing some sort of United States of Europe. Which is why, perhaps, the idea of the EU extending to Europe’s geographical boundaries or indeed looking for a special relationship between the EU and all the countries wi-
thin this geographical region is beside the point or off the agenda – at least until a relatively tight-knit and secure federal Europe has been established.
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If the EU were to become a more integrated group of states becoming ever closer to a true federation, say, due to the exit of certain Eurosceptic countries, the role of the EU as a single actor could become stronger. A stronger EU means that neighbouring states outside the Union may find themselves overshadowed by such an entity, either wanting to join it (or regretting leaving it) or they may wish to join together in some way to counteract the combined economic and political weight of the EU (perhaps in the form of a stronger EFTA), thus leading back to a divided European continent. If, on the other hand, the drifting away of certain nations from the EU causes the unravelling of the union, relations between what is left of the EU will most likely become purely economic. Thus for now it seems that the future of the EU’s relationships with external European states is dependent on the EU’s future as an entity – which at the moment is looking as unclear as ever. Photo by Lennart Gau
Photo by Ali Arif
Looking at the Commissioner’s profiles, one obvious feature of the new 28 members is the record share of 18 former ministers and prime ministers in comparison to previous Commissions. The most important implication of such growing politicization of the institution is opportunity of commissioners with experience in leading large executive administrations to play an active role in shaping the course of the Union. President Juncker‘s strong personality and experience as a Prime Minister of Luxembourg for unprecedented 18 years also became a topic of criticism due Teodora Delcheva to the perceived possibility that the “old-fashioned federalist” would further alienate EU citizens skeptifter months of extensive discussion, interrogation cal about transfers of power to the EU. It is clear that and criticism, the European Parliament accepted Pre- the new Commission has the potential to break away sident-elect Jean-Claude Juncker’s team of commis- from the guardianship of the Council and re-create sioners and his call to breathe “new life into the Eu- the air of Europe but how the strong political profiropean project”. The exceptional media coverage that le of the first “parliamentarised” Commission in the the appointment attracted due to the perceived long- Post-Lisbon era will play out in EU policy-making reterm institutional and political consequences of the mains to be seen. process of Spitzenkandidaten was only the beginning of the controversy that arose around the new Com- Despite Juncker’s confidence that his team will not mission. As Europe wakes up to a new executive on 1 suffer any blows, attacks on individual commissioNovember, a chorus of reactions appeared over how ners were observed even long before their official the “make it or break it” team will meet the demand hearings. One of the problematic nominees was the of European citizens for a new course of the European Commissioner for Education, Youth, Culture and CiUnion. But does the political wrangling over the ap- tizenship. Controversial claims that the former Forpointments indicate that the next five years will bring eign minister for Hungary Tibor Navracsics was not fundamental changes? Who are the faces and what the most suitable person to promote European values given his close links to one of the most prominent criare the problems that they have to deal with? tics of the Union - the head of the Hungarian gover10
EU 2014-2019: New faces, great expectations A
Photo by Ali Arif nment Victor Orban - appeared to undermine popular trust. As the European Parliament‘s Culture and Education committee rejected to endorse him due to his record in a government accused of erosion of civil rights, Hungary‘s nominee was shifted out of the citizenship portfolio and given a new role within the Commission.
by announcing a 300 billion euro investment plan to create jobs and regain confidence of European citizens. However, while Juncker’s new team definitely indicates a shift in style, in substance the problem of the body’s decisions remains essentially the same economic regeneration is given a priority over social inclusion and well-being.
Beyond individuals, the structure of the new Commission made analysts wonder whether it will manage to achieve its promises in the context of ongoing crisis in the euro zone. Knowing that the first few months will be crucial for public perceptions, a rapid attack on sluggish growth and unemployment was launched
There is no doubt that a lot of possibilities lie in the next five years. Expectations are for change at a time when Europe needs it the most. Will this change ensue as predicted? Only time can show. 11
Another member that caused controversy was Spain’s commissioner for Climate Action and Energy Miguel Cañete. In addition to the concern of Green NGOs and MEPs about the idea of merging energy and climate portfolios, Cañete’s background as a former president of an oil company fuelled claims that for a role that is likely to be a target of a lot of corporate lobbying, Juncker’s choice of a commissioner shows a lack of ambition for efficient European climate agenda. Referred to as “an oil baron with a family fortune in fossil fuel”, Cañete’s appointment was compared to “putting a fox in charge of the chicken coup” and sparked a Stop Cañete online petition that attracted nearly 600,000 signatures in less than a week. Such a clear case of conflict of interests undoubtedly polluted Junker’s vision of making Europe a clean energy superpower.
On the other hand, further changes quickly came underway. To tackle the claim of lack of legitimacy, in what looks like a revolution in the way the Commission communicates with the public, Juncker introduced plans to post all contacts of Commissioners, cabinet employees and director-generals with lobbyists on the institution’s register. Also, significant moves towards improving the Commission’s efficiency were made with the creation of the post of First Vice-President with the task to evaluate the work of the Commission and report on how to approach better regulation. The second change was to enhance the role of the Vice Presidents in order to break down segmentation within the Commission and move away from static structures. But while such decisive initial attempts seem impressive, they are definitely not enough to prove that Juncker’s ambition for a team “open to change and ready to adapt” is entirely genuine.
Sakharov Debate Religious & Human Rights Mélody Barreau
Bringing together academics, politicians, lawyers,
and civil society activists, this year‘s Sakharov Debate hosted with the European Parliament Office in the UK discussed the challenges of religious diversity in our liberal democracies. Martine Croxall, BBC news journalist, set the background with a chronological history of religious law going back to Cyrus the Great’s general policy of religious tolerance in 550BC, she highlighted that religious freedom had developed on the principle that it must not infringe on public order in ways detrimental to societies, while progress made so far, notably with the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, had enabled the extension to specifically non-religious beliefs such as humanism. Still, she concluded, as less preferred religions still suffer from persecutions, can we find a way to reduce tensions between individual minority rights and common values? 12
The panel first tried to understand where religious disputes were centred. Responding to misperceptions that frictions between religious rights emerged with increasing Muslim migration flows, Can Yenginsu pointed that most cases from the UK brought up in the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) related to the infringement of rights of Christians, in work and education but also in commercial law and death rights. Dr Myriam Hunter-Henin also hinted that challenges to social consensus had been brought about as much by non-religious as religious people, since Article 9 of the European Convention covered the Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Cases of non-believers protesting against prayers at council meetings in Devon (see: Mr Clive Bone vs. Bideford Town Council) or an atheist mum questioning the presence of crucifixes in Italian classrooms (See: Lautsi vs Italy) are case in point that freedom from religion has become as important as freedom of religion.
In face of this widening of disputes, what legal framework are we equipped with for the resolution of religious rights? The 2000 Human Rights Act which included Article 9 of the EU Convention, dramatically and positively empowered individuals to make claims in ways a previously negative right did not. Yet the increase in litigation with the coming into force of the Human Rights Act was not equalled with an increase in protection of religious freedom. UK courts have failed to be responsive to claims notably because they had to have regard for, but not respect, the EU jurisprudence taken in particular contexts. Indeed, even if proclaimed legitimate by the ECtHR, the French ban on face coverings would be inappropriate in the UK because the constitutional background is different from that of the UK. Although the UK court had adopted a disappointing restrictive approach to Article 9 so far, a recent decision by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR (See: Eweida and others vs. UK) was likely to signal a more liberal approach. Internationally, little more than pressure and diplomacy was available to deal with religious rights: Ed McMillan-Scott criticised that the persecutions of religious groups in powerful states like China remained ignored on the world stage because of their sway in international politics.
In light of this, how do we strike the balance between common and individual values? Discussing some recent court decisions (see: Ladele case), the panel attempted to outline what best practice looks like, by taking into account questions of legitimate claim and proportion. The limit to accommodating individual requests in a way which undermines social cohesion, is the right of others: an individual’s claim for a right to segregated sitting at university would not be justified, because it would disproportionately impinge on the right of others by imposing segregated sitting across the university. On the legal side of the panel, the case on face covering in France presented a case in point of failed balance.
Seizing upon the question of Laïcité, Martine Croxall asked if it be preferable to follow the French model of Laïcité and abolish the Church Establishment? From a legal point of view, the panel agreed that Laïcité, the separation of the state and the church, fitted well , but was not the necessary condition for a human rights framework. France had in fact extended the 1901 principle too far, and turned secularism into more than a principle of neutrality. Even within a church establishment, the principle of neutrality could be respected by giving regard to a right to and from religion in public grants and contract for service provision. Per se, having a majority religious group did not present a violation of Human Rights. Ed McMillan-Scott, however, criticised the recent visit of Pope Francis in the European Parliament and generally warned against allowing religious representatives to influence politics. He encouraged to ‘follow France’ in matters of state/church separation and not let religion dictate politics. Catriona Robertson argued differently: she highlighted that the presence of religious representative enriched the conversation, so we should invite more of them to participate rather than look to purge the political sphere of values. The debate thus highlighted that a strong legal framework is in place to ensure the protection of and from religion. Yet, politically speaking, much remains to be discussed at the national level, and at the European and international level in order to see individuals’ aspirations be respected. Nationally, while practices from the Christian heritage have long been ingrained in our society, religious claims tend to be highly mediated, risking the stigmatisation of the Muslim population in particular. Internationally, the tendency has been to enforce human rights protection in weak countries while ignoring the biggest violator such as China because of their international position. Photos by Silvia Butti & Carlotta Kreuzburg
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Permanently incomplete Lukas B. Wahden
European politicians frequently embed political ap-
peals in somewhat decrepit notions of a ‘European community of shared values’. But is it even possible to determine those distinctively European values? And if so, why does no one seem to bother to free them from the widespread assumption of their self-evident nature? A historical analysis: ‘Community of shared values’ is one of the most well-tended catchphrases in the rhetorical repertoire of Angela Merkel. In her endeavours to defend an ever more fragile EU against sceptical forces both from within and without her political home base, the German chancellor does not seem to tire from exploiting a whole set of knockout arguments fed by the apparently self-evident historical, philosophical and political wellsprings of EU legitimacy. As with most catchphrases, the notion of a ‘community of values’ serves the purpose of comforting and unifying diverse critical audiences. What is holding a half-baked federation of 28 highly diverse nation states together if not the comforting assumption that they still stand united in their respective concepts of right and wrong? What happens if one makes the effort of de-constructing the notion of common European values? Could something like a set of concrete common values even be identified in a historically fragmented entity like Europe? In the concluding lecture of his academic career (Winkler, Heinrich August; “Was heißt westliche Wertegemeinschaft?” in Internationale Politik, 01.04.2007), the eminent German historian Heinrich August Winkler attempted to do so, and formulated a number of conclusions that we should take very seriously:
rical development of what we today understand to be Western values. The concept of the ‘Western world’, as has been preserved from cold war times, has nothing to do with the historical Occident as such. The old west is constituted by that part of Europe which identified with the Roman catholic church in the middle ages. The anglo-saxon democracies of North America, Australia and New Zealand, and even Israel identify themselves as part of a larger community under the umbrella of Western values, and participated significantly in shaping what is known as ‘the West’ today. Whereas NATO member states Turkey and Greece had never before the cold war era been seen as part of the historical west, the three Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary had - and continue to incorporate Western values into their respective political identities until the present day.
The French Baron de Montesquieu, one of the great classics of Western political thought, declared the necessity of separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers, The one country in which his writing sparked a most explosive political effect had not even come into existence during his lifetime. The United States of America were the first country in the world Firstly, Winkler constitutes that there is no such thing to practically implement an institutionalised separaas European, but only Western values. When we ad- tion of powers. In Thomas Jefferson’s world-famous dress the European community of values as such, we Declaration of Independence, a key paragraph exploare referring not to a group of nations united by a res those ‘self evident truths’ which had grown out common history of values, but a group of states who of many centuries of historical experience. Jefferson, stand united in their willing commitment to the over- who had enjoyed a classical humanist education in the arching values of the West. light of the ascending European enlightenment, had Large swaths of Europe, not to forget Germany her- recorded the world’s first modern revolution. Thereself, had hardly any or even no share in the histo- fore it is inevitable to see the development of Western 14
values partly as a product of transatlantic intellectual cooperation.
Secondly, Winkler outlines how it took several centuries to implement Western values in even their countries of origin. It took four decades for the United States to fully accept the term ‘democracy’ in connection to consciously elected representative governments and almost nine decades for American slavery to finally be abolished after a long and bloody civil war. In Europe, the horrors of the Jacobinian, Napoleonic and Bourbon regimes led much of the old world to resort to antirevolutionary tendencies and to reject the values promoted by the French revolution. Only slowly did the monarchies of countries such as Denmark, Sweden, Prussia or Austria yield to a systematical expansion of civil rights and civic political participation. Mostly, the implementation of democratic political structures in the West was not revolutionary but reformist. And in Southern Europe, the way to westernisation was much harder, and much longer indeed.
But in no other country of the historical occident did Western ideas of democratisation, liberalisation and enlightenment face as relentless a resistance as in Germany. Much unlike France, Germany had experienced a period of ‘enlightened absolutism’ in the second half of the 18th century. The German public had accepted the assumption that Germany did not require the import of ‘foreign values’ to flourish, and that the country would be best off in a system of authoritarian leadership of a popular sovereign in cooperation with an enlightened bureaucratic apparatus. The ubiquitous dogma of ‘Ordnung, Zucht und Innerlichkeit’ (order, discipline and inwardness) as was cultivated by imperial German intellectuals stood in crass contrast to the Western ideals of ‘liberté, egalité, fraternité’. After the military defeat of 1918, the myth of a German mission, of a German ‘Sonderweg’ that was to offer a superior alternative to Western democracy and eastern Bolshevism, prevailed. When in 1918 the Weimar Republic was declared, it rested on more than shaky grounds.Unlike other countries, where the introduction of parliamentary democracy had happened on a historical momentum of national unity and
self-empowerment, in Germany it fell into the complex response to a devastating military defeat. The beneficiary of this historical peculiarity was Adolf Hitler.
The defeat of Nazi Germany laid ground to one of the grand historical projects of our time, the reunification of the West. The admission of eight east central European states into the European Union was a logical consequence of Willy Brandt’s declaration to ‘let grow together what belongs together’. Like Germany, the three Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary have always been part of the historical occident, but were not able to fully embrace the political culture of the West until their recent admission into the European Union. Contrary to many people’s beliefs, the introduction of Western values into all of Western political reality is neither a completed process, nor are even Western core countries like the United States, France or Britain immune from taking backward steps away from fulfilling their own ideals. It is time to once more extend a hand over the Atlantic ocean and rediscover the relevance of transatlantic unity - even if the price to pay is the long quest of encouraging America to recall the values that lie at her own heart, and rebel when rebellion is due, as for instance against the highly undemocratic negotiations surrounding the controversial Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). What one can ultimately deduce from Winkler’s analysis is that the European Union is not, like federalists maintain, pre-determined to grow together because its member states are rooted in a common set of values. On the contrary, the very challenge of European unification is a struggle for the thorough implementation of these values! Pluralistic democracy, the separation of powers, parliamentary order, the rule of law, the implementation of human and civic rights and a culture of argument are goals worth fighting for. If Angela Merkel and her aides continue to use the notion of common European values as a political weapon, they are marginalising and hindering the necessary process of re-discovering what European values actually are and what they ought to be. We should not yield this field to politicians, academics and those who try to categorise and instrumentalise European values for political purposes, but strive towards public empowerment and a new Western and European democratic idealism. The ‘community of values’ is a political corpse, but it is one that is waiting to be breathed new life into. Values are no means to an end, they are an end in themselves. This, in my opinion, is all there is to be understood about the question of the European community of values. 15
Europe’s phone number Dimitri Cautain
H
enry Kissinger, former US Foreign Secretary, asked “Who should I call if I want to call Europe?” Well, the European Union (EU) has started write this number down. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty saw the beginnings of a new European institution under the fancy title of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS has been conceptualised to serve as “more than a foreign ministry – combining elements of a development and of a defence ministry,” in the words of Catherine Ashton (the first High Representative to head the institution). Five years after the creation of the EEAS it now stands at a crucial moment, with a change in leadership and an established institutional capacity. In my humble opinion, the defining challenge for the EEAS is to find its raison d’etre within the EU. The EEAS’ ‘Comprehensive Approach’ alongside its ambition to bring the EU’s collective weight united as player on the global stage. On institutional relevance
‘Another gazillion offices and bureaucrats’ I hear you grumble? Actually, the very objective of the EEAS is to coordinate and streamline the EU and the Member States’ multiple external portfolios and actions. 16
Photo By Sophie Aversa
The EEAS has taken on the role of a diplomatic corps, essentially giving European foreign policy a political and collective character. The grand political lines on European foreign policy are decided on a consensus decision-making process at the Foreign Affairs Council where all 28 EU Foreign Ministers are present. Similarly, political decisions at the level of delegations (the EEAS’ equivalent of embassies) are similarly consensus-based. Thus, decisions on political lines or on what responsibilities the EU will pursue, ultimately remain in the hands of Member States.
However, the EEAS has also a responsibility to coordinate actions taken by the European Commision. Issues such as environmental policy, energy policy, trade agreements, etc. all have an external dimension to them. Significantly, since his appointment Jean-Claude Juncker as President of the European Commission (November 2014) took the decision to allow Mogherini to preside the group of European Commissioners with portfolios affecting Europe’s foreign policy. Thus, Mogherini’s challenge to bring coherence to her role as both European Commission Vice President and High Representative (i.e. head of the EEAS) is tending towards a resolution.
Whose foreign policy? Yet, with more coherence and efficiency the EEAS takes on, a tension will grow between this new institution and Member States’ own diplomatic services. Firstly, there is a dynamic happening whereby smaller Member States’ are streamlining their diplomatic services and cutting down on their diplomatic presence worldwide. Thus, these Member States’ are relying more on EU delegations for information on developments and issues in countries where they no longer have representation; to smaller Member States, EU delegations are becoming an important tool for information and for implementation.
Yet, secondly, the EU is home to former imperial powers which struggle to shed their domineering tendencies (i.e. since the turn of the century, UK and France have been involved in almost as many interventionist wars and occupations as the USA, which is not a trophy to be proud of). The emergence of a fully-fledged European foreign policy making decisions on issues will inevitably lead to an erosion of the authority and autonomy of national foreign policies. For now these tensions are mediated by the consensus-based decision making process which is a the heart of EEAS decision-making (and also the EEAS own lack of historical significance in the eyes of its interlocutors). However, with more Member States investing greater importance into the EEAS, a difference of expectations from Member States themselves may accentuate the tension between a European foreign policy and disunited Member States’ national interests. What’s missing?
Most significantly, policies pertaining to the EU’s neighbourhood have been areas of great success, but others have been outsourced so to speak. Such a policy would be the EU’s border policy. Despite the EEAS’ responsibility to coordinate external action, it has no authority or scrutiny over the EU’s independent border agency, Frontex. Yet, Frontex has been involved in setting-up agreements with third-party states on Europe’s borders to facilitate its border management duties. The autonomy of Frontex is detrimental to the very values a unified European foreign policy seeks to promote and work by. Furthermore, the EEAS risks losing credibility if its raison d’etre can be eroded by Member States or the European Commission refusing to hand over issues that fall in the remit of the EEAS’ responsibilities.
The very existence of a European foreign policy is an opportunity for Europe to work towards rectifying centuries of reprehensible external action by some European states. Following centuries of subordination, today’s international system remains structurally skewed in favour of former (?) colonial and imperial powers. Take a look at the United Nations Security Council and its current composition for example. A European foreign policy can start to challenge such structural inequalities as it disturbs the relevance of having individual European states represented in these institutional arenas. Such institutional changes are not likely to bring substantive changes in the subordinating dynamic of the international system. But, the values-based approach of a European foreign policy that gains more clout internationally as well as internally, may serve as a vehicle for action on the awareness of Europe’s histories and actualities of domination (i.e. through reparations, debt cancellations, coordinating/amplifying educational exchanges, reforming subordinating structures in international institutions). Such sensitivities and objectives are unlikely to be acted upon and achieved by self-righteous national diplomatic corps. The Mogherini-era begins
In conclusion, the EEAS is heading for some turbulent waters ahead as it starts to challenge the relevance of certain national foreign services, whilst simultaneously becoming a crucial tool for many other Member States. With an established institutional framework, the Mogherini-era is set to start carving out a space for the EEAS both within the EU, but also on the international stage. Yet, it remains to be seen whether, next time Henry Kissinger tries to call Europe he gets straight through to Mogherini or first to an operator with various numerical options depending on the issue Kissinger wants to discuss.
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Will Brits ever be proud Europeans? Arthur Davis
T
he average Brit does not identify as European. ‘European’ is not even an option on most surveys of (supra)national identity, including the UK census. Because of this, the exact stats on European identity are hard to find, but as a Brit from Dover, there is no hiding from the general sentiment. This is Cool Britannia; we don’t need Europe. ‘European’ is the identity of the poncy, cosmopolitan elite with not just the income to travel to Europe, but also the cultural capital to appreciate it . And while some, such as broadcaster, Jon Snow claim that ‘Britishness’ is obsolete, filmmaker, Terry Jones claims: “I suppose an essential aspect of being British is not liking others very much. We are set apart by our lack of Frenchness, German-ness or Italian-ness”. Unsurprisingly, a 2002 study found an inhabitant of Bratislava around twice as likely to consider themselves European as an inhabitant of Edinburgh . Why are we in Britain so scared of Europe and will we ever take on Eu18 ropean identity?
Importantly, Britain will not Europeanise politically until its people have Europeanised socially. Top-down assertion of European identity on Brits, Italians or Swedes will not lead to the success of the European project. And if British society is ever to become European there are pre-conditions, namely “cognitive mobilization” towards Europe – increased exposure to foreign countries and greater linguistic proficiency. Bratislava, multilingual and encircled by its neighbours, has no trouble here.
Yet, sceptics have good reason to doubt the capacity of Brits to Europeanise.We sometimes forget that a British identity hasn’t always existed, and smaller regional identities which ‘British’ subsumed – such as Scottish or English – aren’t much older and for some still more relevant. A key question then: Why on earth would a Welshman who doesn’t even identify with London (Britain) identify with Brussels (Europe) instead?
I
Photo By Maria Gendelman
Indeed, rather than converging and unifying, identities across Britain and Europe are being challenged and fracturing. UKIP, Front National, Jobbik, AfD, among others, all pose institutional threats to the very existence of the EU, free movement of people and the European identity. And here in Britain, our Kingdom is far from United. In September, 45% of Scots, including a majority of young voters, voted to secede from the union. British, as well as European identity is crumbling. Individuals are dissenting from their prescribed identities. Sceptics also ask: what do we really have in common with a Greek or a Slovak? There are great divides across Europe, which extend far beyond differing social customs.These critiques rest on the idea that there is no intrinsic social glue holding the embodiment of Europe (the EU) together, but rather that it rests on an opportunistic and artificial unity aimed at promoting trade and preventing conflict. It is also a union by the rich, for the rich – the elite prosper as free movement creates cut-throat competition between labour and between nation-states. Of course we don’t identify, many say, with this instrument of capitalist exploitation.
But, according to Europhiles, we have already begun to Europeanise. Simply take your 2014 British man, with his gender ambiguity and his stylised stubble; he knows his way around Amsterdam and an overpriced chai latte. Compare him with the 1945 model. Is this not evidence in itself? And though this doesn’t represent every Brit, Europeanising is no longer the preserve of the elite. Nearly every Brit now holidays in Europe, has European friends or co-workers, daringly buys tapenade from the foreign foods section of Tesco – even though no-one quite knows what it is – and revels in the unpronounceable name of their latest IKEA purchase, with the cute diagonal line through the ‘o’.
And just as national identity evolves from subnational identities, they argue, so will supranational identity follow national ones. While after many years various regional tribes became ‘English’, so will the modern Brit tend towards European identity. In fact, some say that a Brit and a European are ostensibly the same thing. British values, they say, are quite the same as European values; the British state is, deep down, very similar to other European liberal democracies, resting on similar shared norms – the importance of the public sector, support for international institutions, non-use of the death penalty etc.
But maybe this talk of whether we’re British, European or something else entirely misses the point. May a Brit not also be a highlander, a Scot, a European, an African, a Christian, a Muslim, an atheist, working class or middle class? Surely these identities are not mutually exclusive. Identity is highly individual. We know that the British identity is challenged, like almost every European national identity, by smaller groups within its borders (like independence movements) and by groups which transcend its borders (like ISIS), but we do not dispute its continued existence amongst these new and myriad identities. The road to the average Brit identifying with Europe leads not through top-down imposition of an identity by Brussels, whose continued nudges have failed in the face of UKIP. It leads instead through “cognitive mobilization” towards Europe, as identity develops organically. Europe must be opened up to all and, as we become closer and more interconnected, we, like the people of Bratislava, may learn to appreciate what it is to be European. What must be made crystal clear, however, is that for European identity to develop, we must not attack identities subordinate to it – Kentish, English, British – but rather strengthen them, recognising our rich tapestry of identity. The standout feature of the European is their multitude of identities. We are, after all, united in diversity.
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Photo By Lenart Gau
Warsaw—25 Years since the fall of Communism Josephine Mizen
W
alking around Warsaw, it is not hard to see the scars that the Twentieth Century has left behind. From the Palace of Culture and Science given as a ‘gift’ to the Poles by Stalin that still dominates the skyline, to the Old Town that actually only dates back around fifty years after being rebuilt because of near total destruction in 1944, the signs are everywhere. But what, to me, is most impressive about the city is the amount of change it has gone through in the last twenty-five years. One of many Eastern European cities controlled by Communist regimes for forty years, Warsaw has the added issue of having been extensively bombed and emptied of its entire population after the failure of the 1944 Uprising. What was left was an opportunity to rebuild the city almost from scratch, and Stalin, with the assistance of the Polish government, knew exactly what he wanted: wide roads, imposing structures, and a hark back to Seventeenth Century Polish architecture when Poland was allegedly at its most ‘Polish’. Warsaw was to become a model for cities across 20 the Eastern Bloc.
However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, more and more town planners looked to the west for inspiration. What in 1989 was a roofless stadium built out of soil has now become the site of Poland’s sleek and shiny National Stadium, hosting major sporting and music events since opening in 2010. Whilst the Palace of Culture still takes precedent on the skyline, it is no longer so isolated, and its distinctive spire is being ever so slowly shrouded by glassy skyscrapers cropping up on all sides. Warsaw’s distinctive yellow trams, which have been running since 1866, now operate alongside a modern underground line, with the second line due to open over the 2014 Christmas period. The changes that have taken place in Warsaw don’t merely begin and end with architecture. Far more important, in fact, is the change in culture; from a city always looking east, subordinate under the watchful eye of Moscow, to a city that proudly stands as the capital of Poland, leading the way in bringing the country rapidly up to speed with the western Europe it once lagged behind as it stagnated under the rule of Communism. English has long since overtaken Russian as the favoured foreign language, and this once
isolated city, cut off from the western world, is now becoming part of a global network. Since joining the European Union in 2004, a number of Polish universities have joined the Erasmus Exchange programme. The University of Warsaw, consistently ranked among the top universities in the country, has begun teaching some courses in English as more and more international students flock to the Polish capital. Evidence of westernisation, sometimes almost amusingly forced, is everywhere. Large indoor shopping centres—another invention spreading east from the USA—now advertise their products on sprawling billboards not in Polish, but in English, which may leave the predominantly non-English-speaking elderly citizens of the capital somewhat confused. Sometimes the westernisation is almost excessive—every time I visit Warsaw another Starbucks or Caffe Nero seems to have popped up. But whether you love these mega brands or hate them, they’re nevertheless proof of the changes that Warsaw has gone through. Those who still sound surprised that McDonalds and Coca Cola really do exist in Eastern Europe are sadly behind the times—you can scarcely walk down a street without seeing one.
Of course Poland still has a way to go before it can completely shake off the burden of the Twentieth Century. With less than two per cent of the entire population being made up of immigrants, it is arguably lagging behind a number of the other ex-Communist states. If multiculturalism implies modernity, then the Czech Republic, with its 404,000 immigrants, is arguably modernising much faster. Much of Poland is still overwhelmingly rural, and emigration out of the country is causing a severe shortage of skilled workers. But the rapid changes taking place in Warsaw—from transport to culture to the number of souvenir shops cropping up all over the Old Town— prove that change is not merely possible; it is certain. The speed of the modernisation of this capital city, and of capital cities right across the former Eastern Bloc, which were isolated from the rest of the world for so long, shows positive signs of things to come.
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Photo By Hendrik Obelöer
Photo By Silvia Butti
Illusion and feasibility in Spanish politics: Podemos? David Sanchez Garcia Spain, with an unemployment rate of 24% and a youth unemployment rate of 53%, is also leader in the rankings of social inequality in the OECD and early school dropouts in Europe. Moreover, the population has suffered since the beginning of the crisis from huge social cuts in education, in health and service, and in R&D, while at the same time corruption has become a scourge affecting officials from virtually any party. The lack of measures to solve these problems has resulted in a general sentiment of impunity and political disaffectedness throughout Spain. This has been the breeding ground for a one-year-old political party, which now has reached the potential to compete with the two main long-established parties in Spain. This party is called Podemos (translated as “We can”). But who are they? How have they managed to gain support? And, more importantly, what role will they play in the future of Spain and Europe?
Since the restoration of democracy in Spain – following dictator Francisco Franco’s death in 1975 – the Spanish political landscape has been dominated by two parties: the right-wing People’s Party (PP) and the centre-left Spanish Socialist Workers‘ Party (PSOE), which used to get a combined share of about 80% of the turnout. Podemos’ origin is usual22 ly related with the so-called 15-M Movement
or the Indignants Movement which originated in the midst of the economic crisis aiming to promote a more participative democracy. This movement was defined by its ways of action and the citizens’ politicisation; however it lacked a specific party platform and avoided any political affiliation. In January 2014 then, Podemos was born. However it also fed from other organizations, such as the Anti-Capitalist Left. Podemos describes themselves as a “method for the popular and citizens’ power”, a “popular initiative” which goes beyond the party itself, with the goal of “transforming the silent and wretched majority into a force of change”. Podemos avoids identifying itself as left-wing, but the press generally categorizes it as left-wing or even far-left, frequently emphasising its anti-establishment view. They defend those down below and are united against those who Podemos calls “caste”, the privileged ones. Podemos has been able to effectively combine idealism and pragmatism, something essential to achieve real social change. The clearest example of this pragmatism is that, instead of trying to promote plurality also in the leadership of Podemos, it is strongly dominated by Pablo Iglesias, a 36-year-old political scientist and university teacher with an excellent academic
background. His media presence, his pedagogic style, his use of new political language mixed with his easy to comprehend argument style , often faulted as populist, have been the basis of Podemos’ success.
As a result, the Spanish political situation has changed. The threat posed by Podemos to the two-party system is inciting the traditional parties -PP, PSOE and IU- to redefine their respective platforms and start a process of image renewal, including the use of social networks and a higher presence of younger officials. Moreover, we can observe the population’s newly discovered politicisation: there is renewed public interest in politics, which is noticeable when looking at the audience in many TV programmes that Podemos members have attended. The hope of a change is the main instrument of the We-Can party. Nevertheless, many sceptics consider this new movement will lead nowhere. One of the many reasons for this view is the vagueness of the project-- yet perhaps the Spanish population wants a change irrespective of its nature. Regarding the Podemos programme, its viability has also been highly criticized, especially due to the huge investments required to fund some of its economic measures, such as the re-structurating of the European debtand the establishment of a maximum wage and basic income schemes for people without resources. Another of the most recurring criticisms against Podemos is its ideological link with Hugo Chávez’s regime in Venezuela. But Podemos is not so unique. Currently, all throughout Europe we can see a large increase of non-traditional parties which have also completely altered their national political landscapes; the most well-known are the Front National (France), The Five Star Movement (Italy), UKIP (UK) and Syriza (Greece). Some common features of these parties are their innovative speech and often a Manichean simplistic perceptions of reality: there is a clearly defined enemy to defeat, whether it is immigration, the EU or the “caste”, and this is something many can relate to. What does the future hold? In Spain there are Municipal Elections in May 2015 and then, in November, General
Elections are expected to occur. Recent opinion polls confirm that Podemos is already a consolidated party, so it will certainly play a major role in the elections. Furthermore, debates about hypothetical agreements between parties are the order of the day, although uncertainty about what might happen reigns over the society. Is the current political engagement promoted by Podemos something to last in the long-term? Is Podemos a feasible option to govern Spain? Only time will tell.
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How close is Russia to the EU? John Mair
N
ikita Khrushchev once memorably remarked that Russia “is both European and Asiatic – the largest part of our territory lies on the Asian continent.” Rather than emphasising the vast concentration of the country’s population on European soil, he chose to highlight the dominance of its non-European side. On the other hand, Peter the Great, Russian Tsar at the turn of the 17th century, taxed facial hair, as he believed the clean-shaven look to be more European. Where, in terms of Europe and the EU, does the colossal state of Russia thus stand today, on what many consider to be the eve of a second Cold War?
Some extent of Russian Europeanism can be recognized in its trade. Despite economic sanctions between the EU and Russia over the Ukrainian crisis, the EU is still Russia’s largest trading partner. Furthermore, there have been attempts at improving the cooperation between Russia and the EU since the end of the Cold War and this can possibly be considered a sign of the country’s growing desire for continental integration. In 1994, for example, The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was signed by both parties and the idea of cultural unity was included, meaning the two would work towards a connection 24 in the national sense; as one European people.
Photo By Lenart Gau
The establishment of the “Four Common Spaces” reinforced this nearly a decade later, which also emphasized the importance of cultural exchange as well as the EU’s ideals of freedom, justice and security. The more recent EU-Russian partnership for cooperation (2010) is also an example. These efforts were responsible for bringing Russia closer to Europe. Unfortunately this bridge was essentially burned by the Ukrainian crisis of the past year: the annexation of Crimea largely halted EU-Russian cooperation. The results included the deterioration of Russian trade relations that has undeniably created isolation from the West and harmed its European, and ultimately global, integration. Although European integration may have been on the Kremlin’s mind in the shadow of the Cold War’s aftermath, the idea of establishing a parallel force to “rival the EU”, as Jon Henley of the Guardian puts it, has always lurked in its vicinity. Now with the recent signing of the Ukraine EU Association Agreement, Russia is using what are allegedly “protective measures” to punish the Ukraine with exports and thus effectively criminalising this same Europeanisation.
This union indeed parallels the EU and consolidates Russia’s distance from it and its closer association with states, such as Belarus, of a strong dictatorial nature. This associational distance from democracy, combined with the questionable democratic credentials of Russia itself, is against EU principles, whose membership is conditional to a sufficient degree of democracy. The EEU also increases Russian influence in Asia, and naturally as the East becomes closer, Brussels is left behind. The Eastern union can be seen as a form of Soviet resurrection, and as Ukranian Kremlinologist Lilia Shevtsova argues, the EEU simply consists of “authoritarian leaders using each other to preserve their power”. It is important to note that the Four Common Spaces were also only set up after Russia rejected the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), for fear of being considered a “junior partner”. Isn’t being made a socalled “junior partner” what being a part of a greater entity, such as Europe, is all about? Indeed Russia seems disinterested in this, and sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf in fact claims that a “superpower [like Russia] has no place in their [medium sized European countries] midst”. As a result of the year’s turmoil, Russian public opinion has also become increasingly anti-European: a June poll demonstrated the highest level of anti-EU sentiment since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Photo By Lenart Gau
What was formerly a generally positive view towards Europe has become a decisively negative one. Does this mean that, to Berlusconi’s dismay, EU membership, or the epitome of Russian Europeanism, is not in sight? Vladimir Chizhov, Russia’s permanent EU representative, states that the country has no plans of joining the union.
The Europhobic nature of the country, when combined with its increased isolation in light of the Ukrainian crisis, has therefore not led the attempts at improved Russo-European relations to be capitalized. Putin seems to retain the now-ingrained Russian desire to create its own body separate from Europe, a sentiment represented by the government’s anti-Western rhetoric. For example, a statement from the Kremlin was just released, in reference to the West’s actions over the Ukrainian crisis, that warned Russia’s partners (including the EU) “not to mess with us”. Furthermore, Putin’s rhetorical “rattling [of] his nuclear sword”, as US navy admiral James Stavridis put it, further exacerbates the ice spreading from Russo-American relations to those between Russia and the EU. His speech to the Kremlin in March demonstrated the country’s disregard for international treaties and the EU’s voice as he confirmed Russia’s revanchist status vis-à-vis Eastern Europe. Hence, despite its formal partnerships and economic ties to the European Union, in practice Russia is only drifting further away from this body, see- 25 mingly in the hope of asserting one of its own.
Evolving US-EU Trade Relations: An In Depth Look at the TTIP Proceedings T
Editorial by Shane McGoldrick
he UCLU European Society recently featured chief EU negotiator for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership in a presentation and panel discussion with Dr. Alessandro Spano to discuss not only the processing of free trade agreements between the EU and other nations, but also the current progress on the current proceedings with TTIP. What is TTIP? It’s a relatively ground breaking free trade agreement between the United States and the European Union. TTIP has been in the working for the past few years, but during 2014 we have seen negotiations accelerate as increasingly more detailed aspects of the treaty are debated and established. TTIP has been claimed from its inception as beneficial on both sides of the Atlantic, raising respective GDPs by anywhere between one half and one percentage point, an increase that, especially for largely developed economies still shaking off the memories of a quite recent recession, is significant. TTIP is vastly intricate, and the caveats of the treaty provide us with a great deal of interesting and fruitful debate concerning, for example, the relationship between multinational corporations and the governments signed onto the treaty. However, this treaty also provides significant insights into how the political climate between the US and EU will develop for at least the next decade. The presentation hosted by the European Society unveiled for many how strikingly different the negotiation process with the US has been in comparison with previous encounters. The expansive and fundamentally unchangeable negotiations framework that the United States typically brings to the table in situations such as these was found decidedly absent, according to the EU chief negotiator. Does this seemingly more flexible, less hard-line approach from the States portend the development of a more even-keeled, cooperative relationship between the US and EU?—I believe a great deal of people on both sides of the Atlantic would certainly hope so. However, with a House and Senate which has just adjourned in the throws of Republican control, negotiations may not be as warm-hearted, or as easy to count on as the former Democratic controlled Senate afforded. Before we digress into an analysis of what this 135th congress will look like, and what that could mean for USEU relations, we need to survey the mechanisms 26
processing a treaty such as this on both sides of the Atlantic.
In the European Union, large scale trade negotiations such as TTIP are unsurprisingly difficult to negotiate quickly, the immense number of countries affected by the trade deal are testament to this. Thus, a representative committee is elected consisting of EU parliament members, who naturally also represent the interests of their home country. This committee will pre-approve the eventually agreed upon framework for the trade deal. Much later, the individual legislatures in each EU member state will embark on the extensive process of ratifying the deal. This same type of process roughly mirrors the ratification strategy of the United States when it comes to such large scale deals. In order for the Senate to overcome the difficulty of negotiating out fine-details of such an agreement, as its interests comprise those that of a variety of party platforms and individual states, the Senate will often grant “fast-track” negotiating capabilities to the Executive, namely Barack Obama. After the executive approves the eventually agreed upon framework, it will be sent to the floor of Congress to be voted on.
Photo By Carlotta Kreuzberg In the previous Congress, it was actually Senate democrats who did not grant Obama this trade negotiation capability, this so-called “fast track” ability. What remains to be seen is whether republicans deem granting this ability to the executive is in their best interests as a party. Many note the undeniable GDP and job number benefits of such a trade deal. Thus, the question is also whether the newly powerful republican faction will allow Obama the immense credit of being able to tie down such a deal. According to an article in Foreign Policy, the congressional “flip” in party dominance could be a boon for such a trade deal in the end. There exists now a great many congressional republicans on committees that could affect the smooth passage of a treaty like TTIP, and much of the republican party is decidedly pro free trade —despite the existence of that distinct minority infamously known as the Tea Party.
What does this mean for US-EU relations? Well it appears at this stage in the game decidedly positive if a republican controlled congress is more likely to pass TTIP, as resulting economic coordination could spell a more strongly cohesive relationship centred on shared economic gains. In addition, the White House has just announced plans for a new comprehensive privacy bill that would sure up the EU’s doubts about protecting consumer privacy. I think that the fact remains as per the usual, that US relations with the outside world simply cannot afford to be understood in terms of a narrow focus on the Executive brach. Indeed, what many do not realise is how strongly party interests affect the layout of foreign relations. It can often all depend on what agenda advances the interests of said party in the long run. This is unideal, but it is of course the reality of politics. If however, TTIP is deemed suitable for the republican agenda, perhaps we can expect the development of a relationship between the US and EU that is decidedly less temperamental, and that shows a more definitive awareness of the other institutions’ needs, and an ability to jointly work towards achieving those ends.
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