Rockingham County Sheriff’s Virginia Scandal

5/22/19 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA (Harrisonburg Division) ADAM ARMSTRONG

,

) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) BRYAN HUTCHESON, ) SHERIFF, ROCKINGHAM COUNTY, in His ) Personal Capacity. ) Serve: ) Bryan Hutcheson ) Rockingham County Sheriff’s Department ) 25 Liberty St. ) Harrisonburg, VA 22801 ) ) Serve: ) Thomas H. Miller, Jr., Esq. ) County Attorney – Rockingham County ) Rockingham County Administration Center ) 20 E. Gay St. ) Harrisonburg, VA 22802 ) ) ) -AND) ) DANIEL L. CONLEY, in His Personal Capacity.) ) Serve: Rockingham County Sheriff’s Department ) 25 Liberty St. ) Harrisonburg, VA 22801 ) ) -AND) ) BRADLEY SMITH, in His Personal Capacity. ) Serve: Rockingham County Sheriff’s Department ) 25 Liberty St. ) Harrisonburg, VA 22801 ) ) -AND) ) ) )

5:19cv00040 Civil Action No. ________________ JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

1

Case 5:19-cv-00040-EKD Document 1 Filed 05/22/19 Page 1 of 24 Pageid#: 1

THOMAS JAMES, in His Personal Capacity.

Serve: Rockingham County Sheriff’s Department 25 Liberty St. Harrisonburg, VA 22801-ANDKRISTY MARIE ROADCAP Serve: 1243 Bluewater Rd. Rockingham, Virginia 22801 Defendants.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )

COMPLAINT COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, Adam Armstrong (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Armstrong”), by counsel, and hereby files her Complaint against Sheriff Bryan Hutcheson (“the Sheriff”), Daniel.

Conley (“Conley”), Bradley Smith (“Smith”), Thomas James (“James”) (jointly, Conley, Smith, and James are the “Deputies”) and Kristy Marie Roadcap (“Roadcap”) (jointly, the “Defendants”) and in support thereof, Plaintiff states as follows: INTRODUCTION 1. This is an action for a violation of civil rights and conspiracy to violate civil rights protected by the Amendment IV to the United States made applicable against the states by Amendment XIV and made civilly actionable pursuant to 42 USC §§ 1983, and 1988 in which the plaintiff, Adam Armstrong, seeks relief for Defendants’ violations of these Constitutional rights and to vindicate him for personal injuries suffered under the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia. Mr. Armstrong seeks compensatory and punitive damages, an award of costs, interest, attorneys’ fees, and such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

2. A disgusting trend has emerged nationwide where law enforcement officers have engaged in an unprofessional, dangerous, and sometimes deadly, practice of abusing their authority, ignoring the clearly established mandates of the Constitution of these United States

2

Case 5:19-cv-00040-EKD Document 1 Filed 05/22/19 Page 2 of 24 Pageid#: 2

thus becoming not only judge, jury, and executioner, but legislator as well. On June 9, 2017 Mr. Armstrong became one of the many victims in this alarming and unacceptable trend.

3. The Deputies, armed and in uniform, and Roadcap, all acting under color of state law, in violation of court-orders, a custody agreement, contracts, and despite having been previously that day denied a search and seizure warrant by a Rockingham County Magistrate, unreasonably, unlawfully and illegally entered Mr. Armstrong’s home, without his consent and over his objections and demands that they leave, without reason to believe that his home contained evidence of any crime, or that a crime had just occurred, was occurring, or was about to occur, and without any indicia of any exigent circumstance or warrant exceptions necessitating or permitting entry or seizure, and seized Mr. Armstrong, detained him against his will, searched his property, and robbed him at gunpoint in violation of Mr. Armstrong’s clearly established right to be free from unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in violation of Va. Code § 19.2-59, and in violation of Virginia’s common-law torts of trespass, false imprisonment, conspiracy, and conversion.

PARTIES 4. Plaintiff Adam Armstrong is a natural person and citizen of the United States, domiciled in the Commonwealth of Virginia and in Rockingham County.

5. Defendant, Bryan Hutcheson (“the Sheriff”), at all times relevant to this complaint was the elected sheriff of Rockingham County, a constitutional officer of Virginia pursuant to Article VII § 4 of the Constitution of Virginia and is domiciled in the Commonwealth of Virginia and Rockingham County. For the state-law claims, Mr. Armstrong is suing Sheriff Hutcheson pursuant to the theory that, as a Sheriff and his Deputies are one person under law, a sheriff is liabile civiliter for all acts of his deputies taken under color of law. See, E.g., Mosby v. Mosby,

3

Case 5:19-cv-00040-EKD Document 1 Filed 05/22/19 Page 3 of 24 Pageid#: 3

50 Va (9 Gratt.) 584, 60 (1853); White v. Chapman, 119 F. Supp. 3d 420, 429-30 (E.D. Va. 2015).

6. Defendant Daniel Conley (“Conley” or “Deputy Conley”) is a natural person and a citizen of the United States, domiciled in the Commonwealth of Virginia and in Rockingham County and at all times relevant to this complaint Defendant Conley was a Rockingham County Deputy Sheriff and was acting under color of law. Deputy Conley is being sued in his personal capacity.

7. Defendant Bradley Smith (“Smith” or “Deputy Smith”) is a natural person and a citizen of the United states, domiciled in the Commonwealth of Virginia and in Rockingham County.

At all times relevant to this complaint, Defendant Smith was a Rockingham County Deputy Sheriff and acting under the color of law. Deputy Smith is being sued in his personal capacity.

8. Defendant Thomas James is natural person, a citizen of the United States, domiciled in the Commonwealth of Virginia and in Rockingham County and at all times relevant to this Complaint was a Rockingham County Sheriff’s Deputy and acting under the color of law.

Deputy James is being sued in his personal capacity.

9. Defendant Kristy Marie Roadcap (“Roadcap” or “Ms. Roadcap”) is a natural person, a citizen of the United States and domiciled in the Commonwealth of Virginia and in Rockingham County. Although not law-enforcement or a Rockingham County Sheriff’s Deputy she was, at all times relevant hereto, acting under the color of law. Roadcap is being sued in her personal capacity.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE 10. This action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States, including Article III, Section 1 of the United States Constitution and is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 4

Case 5:19-cv-00040-EKD Document 1 Filed 05/22/19 Page 4 of 24 Pageid#: 4

1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.

11. This Court also has supplemental jurisdiction over any and all state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) as such claims are so related as to form part of the same case or controversy. The Court has personal jurisdiction over the defendants pursuant to 18 USC 1965(a) as the defendants are found, reside and/or transacts their affairs in this district.

12. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391 and W.D. Va Civ. R. 2(5) as this is the district in which all relevant events and omissions occurred and in which Defendants maintain offices and/or reside.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 13. On June 9, 2017 around 05:30 am, Mr. Armstrong was asleep at his home when he was awoken by someone trying to break into his home (the “Residence”). Mr. Armstrong walked down the stairs and saw Roadcap in the basement stairwell, trying to break into the basement of the Residence.

14. Ms. Roadcap did not live at the Residence. She was not on the title, deed, or mortgage to the Residence. She was not on a lease to the Residence. She paid no bills and received no mail at the Residence. Roadcap had no legally enforceable interest in the Residence as she had expressly waived any and all rights, interests, or claims in or to the Residence under any common-law, state law or federal law prior to marrying Mr. Armstrong. Further, Roadcap had abandoned the Residence six-months prior and leased and moved into another domicile.

Additionally, pursuant to the laws of this Commonwealth, an executory separation agreement with Mr. Armstrong, as well as a Court Order and the law, was not permitted to enter Mr. Armstrong’s home without his express consent. Further, these same agreements, laws, and 5

Case 5:19-cv-00040-EKD Document 1 Filed 05/22/19 Page 5 of 24 Pageid#: 5

orders dictated that to the extent that Roadcap wanted to enter the Residence retrieve property from the Residence, Roadcap was required to schedule such retrieval through her attorney and Mr. Armstrong’s.

15. Roadcap, unsuccessful in her attempt to break into the basement of the Residence, walked to the Florida room of the Residence to try to break in there. Mr. Armstrong met her at the Florida room door and told Roadcap, several times, that she could not enter, that she had no right to be there, and that she needed to leave the Residence. Roadcap responded that she would just call the police and Mr. Armstrong replied that the cops had no right to or reason to be there either and that Roadcap needed to leave. Then Mr. Armstrong returned upstairs to the Residence and laid back down on his bed to bottle-feed his then 11-month-old daughter.

16. In the interim, on or around 06:17, Roadcap called 911 claiming that she wanted to retrieve her property from the Residence and that Mr. Armstrong would not let her in. Dispatch sent out Smith, Conley, and James.

17. Conley (who had been to Mr. Armstrong’s Residence previously and who knew, by virtue of that visit that the Residence was Mr. Armstrong’s, that the Residence was not Roadcap’s current residence, and knew that Roadcap did not live at the Residence), and Smith (who along with Conley had discussed with Roadcap where she actually resided and thus knew it was not the Residence) arrived at the Residence and agreed that they would (a) assist Roadcap in entering the Residence, (b) escort Roadcap into the Residence, (c) aid Roadcap in locating various items that, upon information and belief belonged to Mr. Armstrong inside Mr. Armstrong’s home, (d) aid Roadcap in removing these items from Mr. Armstrong’s Residence, (e) and to hold Mr. Armstrong inside his home to prevent him from interfering with their plans (a-e above are the “Plan”).

6

Case 5:19-cv-00040-EKD Document 1 Filed 05/22/19 Page 6 of 24 Pageid#: 6

18. However, prior to entering the Residence, Smith, Conley, and James contacted Magistrate James Allen Koblish, explained the circumstances to him as they had been relayed to them by Roadcap and/or dispatch, and sought a warrant to enter the Residence and execute the Plan.

19. Not only did Magistrate Koblish deny a warrant to execute the Plan, he expressly told Smith and Conley they had no reason to enter the Residence and expressly forbade Smith and Conely from entering the Residence. All this occurred prior to Smith and Conley arriving at the Residence.

20. The Conley and Smith proceeded to the Residence anyway and met Roadcap in the Residence’ yard. Around thirty minutes after that, Deputy James arrived.

21. When Conley and Smith arrived at Mr. Armstrong’s Residence, they were confronted with a clean, quiet, peaceful home; there were no signs of or any reason to believe that, at the Residence, inter alia, anyone was in distress or in need of any assistance, that anything was amiss, that any crime (other than the Deputies and Roadcap’s plan) was occurring was about to occur or had occurred, that evidence was about to be destroyed, that a fugitive was about to get away, that there was a domestic violence situation other than Roadcap wanting to get things from the Residence at 06:15 am in the morning, and they had no warrant as the Magistrate had just denied it to them.

22. Disregarding the Magistrate’s prohibition, and knowing that the Residence belonged to Mr. Armstrong, that Mr. Armstrong and Roadcap were in the process of a divorce, that Roadcap lived elsewhere, and the Residence was not Roadcap’s, Conley, Smith, and Roadcap approached the double doors leading from the outside of the Residence to the interior via the Florida Room.

They did not have a key to open the storm-door, only the interior door, so Roadcap, Conley, and

7

Case 5:19-cv-00040-EKD Document 1 Filed 05/22/19 Page 7 of 24 Pageid#: 7

Smith bypassed the storm door by cutting and removing the screen, lifting the window pane, and unlocking it from the interior. Having gained access to the locked interior door, Smith, Conley, and Roadcap used a key that Mr. Armstrong’s mother had hidden on the property and which Roadcap knew about to open the inner door and thereby the Residence.

23. On or around 0630 on June 9, 2017 Mr. Armstrong was bottle-feeding his 11-month-old daughter in his bedroom just waking up when he heard people in the Residence.

24. He walked out of his bedroom on the Residence’s second floor, looked down the hall, and saw uniformed and armed Rockingham County Sheriff’s deputies – Conley and Smith - and Roadcap in the Residence. They were all in the process of searching Mr. Armstrong’s home; Roadcap was rummaging through a room with Deputy Smith looking on and Conley looking about the upstairs of Mr. Armstrong’s home. James arrived twenty to thirty minutes later.

25. Mr. Armstrong immediately and correctly told Roadcap and Smith and Conley that they had no right to be in his residence and that they needed to leave. Roadcap muttered something inaudible and continued searching the room with Deputy Smith. Deputy Conley, despite just that morning having been denied a warrant by Magistrate Koblish and told not to enter, and now having been told by the owner of the Residence that they could not be in or search the property told Mr. Armstrong that they did, in fact, because this was a civil matter, Mr. Armstrong and Roadcap were still married, have a right to be in the Residence and there was nothing that Mr. Armstrong could do about it absent calling his attorney.

26. Mr. Armstrong again objected, and told Conley that Roadcap did not live there, and to check her drivers’ license. Conley responded that the license was just a piece of plastic and didn’t mean anything. Mr. Armstrong told Conley exactly where Mr. Armstrong believed Roadcap to live, and Smith began to respond that Roadcap’s address was different than either

8

Case 5:19-cv-00040-EKD Document 1 Filed 05/22/19 Page 8 of 24 Pageid#: 8

that of the Residence or what Mr. Armstrong told him; but Conley stopped him, realizing the statement was an admission that Smith and Conley knew where Roadcap lived and knew that it was not the Residence, and cutting Smith off Conley continued to argue with Mr. Armstrong as Mr. Armstrong demanded that they all leave. In fact, Conley and Smith had checked Roadcap’s license upon arriving at the Residence and had actual knowledge that the license did not list the Residence and that Roadcap resided elsewhere.

27. Mr. Armstrong objecting to Smith, Roadcap, and Conley’s presence and activities again and demanded that Roadcap, Smith, and Conley leave, and said that he was going to call his lawyer.

28. To this, Deputy Conley replied that Mr. Armstrong had better call his lawyer, and that Conley would tell the lawyer the same thing he told Armstrong , removed Conley’s cell phone and began to walk downstairs. In reality, Conley did not call or try to call Mr. Armstrong’s lawyer – this was just a further ruse to hide the fact that Conley, Smith, and Roadcap were knowingly and intentionally violating the law.

29. Mr. Armstrong began to follow Conley downstairs, asking him multiple times, what gave Conley the right to be in the Residence. First, Conley refused to answer, then Conley turned back around responded that it was the law that gave him the right. When Mr. Armstrong asked what part of the law, a warrant or a court order, Conley hung his head and lied to Mr. Armstrong stating that he had a warrant. When Mr. Armstrong demanded that Conley produce a warrant, Conley did not.

30. Later on in the interaction, and despite making multiple allegations that this was a “civil matter” Conley would again lie to Mr. Armstrong about the warrant, stating that he called the magistrate and that the magistrate told him that if Roadcap and Mr. Armstrong were still

9

Case 5:19-cv-00040-EKD Document 1 Filed 05/22/19 Page 9 of 24 Pageid#: 9

married, and that if Mr. Armstrong had let Roadcap in his home within the past days that she had the right to be in the property and they could enter. This is false, when Conley contacted the Magistrate the magistrate expressly forbade the officers from entering the property and refused to issue a warrant.

31. After pantomiming calling Mr. Armstrong’s attorney and lying to Mr. Armstrong about a warrant, Conley walked back downstairs; Mr. Armstrong, Smith, and Roadcap followed. As Conley and Roadcap went off to the left to gather trash-bags to put things in, Conley told Smith to keep Mr. Armstrong detained at the bottom of the stairs and Smith complied. When Conley and Roadcap re-appeared with the bags they began to head back upstairs. When Mr. Armstrong turned to follow, Conley again ordered Smith to keep Mr. Armstrong and his infant daughter detained at the bottom of the stairs while he and Roadcap went back upstairs to place the items that Roadcap had selected into plastic trash bags.

32. Mr. Armstrong objected stating that they couldn’t hold him in his own home, and Conley replied that he could. Smith, fully armed, complied with Conley’s orders and prevented Mr. Armstrong from moving from the bottom of the stairs in his own home while Conley and Roadcap finished searching the Residence and throwing into trash-bags whatever she wanted to take which included Mr. Armstrong’s passport and a key FOB to one of Mr. Armstrong’s vehicles.

33. Although Mr. Armstrong knew that Roadcap, Smith, and Conely had no right, Smith and Conley were uniformed, already showing a disregard for the law, and were armed with firearms, pepper-spray, and tazers, so Mr. Armstrong was afraid to disregard Conley or Smith – especially because Mr. Armstrong was holding his 11-month-old daughter in his arms, so Mr. Armstrong remined downstairs.

10

Case 5:19-cv-00040-EKD Document 1 Filed 05/22/19 Page 10 of 24 Pageid#: 10

34. As Conley, who was armed with a fire-arm, and Roadcap were packing things and loading them in Roadcap’s car, Mr. Armstrong objected, demanding to Conley to tell him how they knew that Roadcap was taking her things. Conley responded that he would allow Roadcap to take whatever she wanted and if Mr. Armstrong didn’t like it, Mr. Armstrong could complain to the court. Then Conley returned to help Roadcap remove the property from Mr. Armstrong’s Residence.

35. While Conley and Roadcap were upstairs packing, and Smith was holding Mr. Armstrong and his 11-month-daughter downstairs illegally against Mr. Armstrong’s will, Mr. Armstrong asked Smith “you know this is wrong and that this is illegal.” Smith, out of earshot of Conley and Roadcap, agreed that they were acting illegally and that their actions were wrong, and tried to appear apologetic saying that he was just following Conley’s orders.

36. Although throughout this incident Mr. Armstrong asserted his constitutional rights, and told Roadcap, Smith, and Conley that Mr. Armstrong was going to call his lawyer, and would bring this incident to the attention of the Courts, at no time during this incident did Mr. Armstrong physically or verbally threaten the Deputies or Roadcap with violence, yell at them, or place his hand on them.

37. About thirty minutes into the home-invasion, a third, Rockingham Sheriff’s Deputy arrived. This was James. Mr. Armstrong cordially greeted Deputy James, who stated that he was just there as back-up and did not really know what was going on. Mr. Armstrong replied that it did not matter, that Deputy James did not have any right to be in the Residence, and that Deputy James had to leave. Deputy James ignored Mr. Armstrong and continued upstairs where he spoke to Smith, Conley, and Roadcap and then promptly left.

11

Case 5:19-cv-00040-EKD Document 1 Filed 05/22/19 Page 11 of 24 Pageid#: 11

38. After Roadcap gathered what she wanted, she Smith, and Conley left, taking with them the items that Roadcap, Conley, and Smith had gathered up pursuant to the search of the Residence.

39. As a direct and proximate result of each Defendant’s wrongful conduct, Mr. Armstrong suffered substantial injuries. These injuries include, but are not limited to, deprivation of guaranteed rights under the Constitution of the United States, physical impairment, ongoing emotional distress, temporary loss of liberty, and a loss of his personal property.

40. Ms. Armstrong is entitled to compensatory damages from the Deputies and Roadcap for each of the enumerated injuries as well as from the Sheriff for each of the enumerated injuries occurring in violation of the laws of this Commonwealth.

41. An award punitive damages against the Deputies and Roadcap personally is appropriate for all claims alleged herein and against the Sheriff for all the alleged state-law claims to redress the Deputies’ and Roadcap’s willful, malicious, wanton, reckless, deliberately indifferent, and fraudulent conduct as well as to set an example for future law enforcement that such behavior will not be and is not tolerated in Rockingham County, the Commonwealth of Virginia or the United States of America.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF COUNT I 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS (Against the Deputies and Roadcap) 42. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs of the Complaint by reference or incorporation as if fully set forth herein.

43. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in pertinent part, that:

12

Case 5:19-cv-00040-EKD Document 1 Filed 05/22/19 Page 12 of 24 Pageid#: 12

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...

44. Mr. Armstrong is a citizen of the United States and Smith, Conley, Roadcap, and James are persons for the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

45. The Deputies, at all relevant times herein, were acting under the color of state law.

46. Roadcap was, at all relevant times herein, acting under the color of law and in concert with the Deputies.

47. At the time of the events complained of herein, Mr. Armstrong had a clearly established constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment, to be free from unreasonable searches and seizure of his property.

48. Any reasonable police officer knew or should have known, by virtue of his or her training and experience and the case law and opinions surrounding the 4th Amendment, of these rights at the time of the events complained of herein as they were clearly established at that time and that their conduct violated Mr. Armstrong’s clearly established 4th Amendment rights.

49. The Deputies and Roadcap’s acts and omissions, as described herein, were objectively unreasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them and violated Mr. Armstrong’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights.

50. The Deputies and Roadcap entered Mr. Armstrong’s Residence, seized it, conducted a search of it, and seized property belonging to Mr. Armstrong found within the Residence.

51. The Deputies and Roadcap failed to obtain a warrant a warrant to search or seize Mr. Armstrong’s home or seize any property found therein; in fact upon application for a warrant the magistrate refused them.

13

Case 5:19-cv-00040-EKD Document 1 Filed 05/22/19 Page 13 of 24 Pageid#: 13

52. Warrantless entry, seizure and search of a home without consent is presumptively unreasonable.

53. Neither the Deputies nor Roadcap had probable cause or reason to believe that they had the legal right to enter, search and seize Mr. Armstrong’s home of the property found therein as a neutral magistrate had, just prior to the Deputies and Roadcap entering into the home, denied a warrant the Deputies, and Mr. Armstrong – whom they knew owned the home – demanded that they leave.

54. Neither the Deputies nor Roadcap had probable cause to believe that their immediate, warrantless entry into Mr. Armstrong’s home was necessary to prevent death or serious injury or to prevent Mr. Armstrong from destroying any evidence. They admitted the matter was “a civil matter.”

55. Neither the Deputies nor Roadcap had probable cause or a reason to believe that Mr. Armstrong’s home contained contraband or evidence of any criminal offense. They admitted the matter was “a civil matter.”

56. Yet under these conditions, the Deputies and Roadcap entered Mr. Armstrong’s home, searched it, seized property found therein, and removed it from Mr. Armstrong’s Residence.

57. As the Deputies and Roadcap violated Mr. Armstrong’s clearly established constitutional rights, they are not entitled to qualified immunity for the conduct complained of herein.

58. The Deputies and Roadcap acted with conscious-shocking deliberate and willful indifference to Mr. Armstrong’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures of his property and knew that their conduct was in violation of Mr. Armstrong’s rights.

59. As a direct and proximate result of the Deputies and Roadcap’s unlawful conduct, Mr. Armstrong suffered a deprivation of his constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable search

14

Case 5:19-cv-00040-EKD Document 1 Filed 05/22/19 Page 14 of 24 Pageid#: 14

and seizure guaranteed under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, suffering, humiliation, and mental distress. Accordingly, the Deputies and Roadcap are liable to Mr. Armstrong for their deprivation of his rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

60. In addition to compensatory, consequential, and special damages, Mr. Armstrong is entitled to punitive damages against the Deputies and Ms. Roadcap under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in that their actions were taken maliciously, willfully or with a reckless or wanton disregard of Mr. Armstrong’s constitutional rights.

COUNT II 42 U.S.C. § 1983 – ILLEGAL SEIZURE AND FALSE IMPRISONMENT IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS (Against the Deputies and Roadcap) 61. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs of the Complaint by reference of incorporation as if fully set forth herein.

62. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in pertinent part, that: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...

63. Mr. Armstrong is a citizen of the United States and the Deputies and Roadcap are persons for the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

64. The Deputies, at all relevant times herein, were acting under the color of state law.

65. Roadcap was, at all relevant times herein, acting under the color of law.

66. At the time of the events complained of herein, Mr. Armstrong had a clearly established constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment, to be free from false imprisonment and an illegal seizure.

15

Case 5:19-cv-00040-EKD Document 1 Filed 05/22/19 Page 15 of 24 Pageid#: 15

67. Any reasonable police officer knew or should have known, by virtue of his or her training and experience, of this right at the time of the events complained of herein as it was clearly established at that time and a reasonable officer knew or should have known that their conduct as described herein would violate Mr. Armstrong’s clearly established 4th Amendment right to be free from an illegal seizure and false imprisonment.

68. Deputy Conley and Smith with Roadcap’s participation detained Mr. Armstrong in his own Residence, without a warrant or probable cause and and after illegally entering and searching Mr. Armstrong’s residence. They seized Mr. Armstrong at gun point in order to be able to continue their illegal activities and kept him detained for an unreasonable period of time after they knew or should have known that there was no reasonable basis or probable cause to keep Mr. Armstrong detained. Under these circumstances, no reasonable person would have felt free to leave. Deputy James, despite being properly apprised of the situation by Mr. Armstrong, decided to join Roadcap, Smith, and Conley in furtherance of the Plan.

69. As the Deputies and Roadcap violated Mr. Armstrong’s clearly established constitutional rights, they are not entitled to qualified immunity for the conduct complained of herein.

70. The Deputies and Ms. Roadcap acted with conscious-shocking and willful indifference to Mr. Armstrong’s right to be free from false imprisonment and with conscious disregard that their conduct would cause Mr. Armstrong’s severe physical and mental injury.

71. As a direct and proximate result of the Deputies and Roadcap’s unlawful conduct, Mr. Armstrong suffered a deprivation of his constitutional rights to be free from false imprisonment under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment, pain, suffering, humiliation, and mental distress.

Accordingly, the Deputies and Roadcap are liable to Mr. Armstrong for their deprivation of his rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

16

Case 5:19-cv-00040-EKD Document 1 Filed 05/22/19 Page 16 of 24 Pageid#: 16

72. In addition to compensatory, consequential, and special damages, Mr. Armstrong is entitled to punitive damages against the Deputies and Ms. Roadcap under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in that their actions were taken maliciously, willfully or with a reckless or wanton disregard of Mr. Armstrong’s constitutional rights.

COUNT III COMMON LAW FALSE IMPRISONMENT (Against All Defendants) 73. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs of the complaint as if fully set forth herein.

74. This is a Virginia common law claim of false arrest and imprisonment against the Defendants.

75. At times described herein, the Defendants falsely imprisoned Mr. Armstrong without legal justification or excuse.

76. At all times relevant herein, the Defendants acted with the intention of confining Mr. Armstrong within fixed boundaries, via words and conduct that Mr. Armstrong was afraid to ignore – the demands of armed law enforcement officers who had confined him in his Residence that he not move their conduct directly or indirectly resulted in in his confinement, and Mr. Armstrong was conscious of the confinement.

77. The Defendants, individually and jointly, imposed by force an unlawful restraint upon Mr. Armstrong freedom of movement, to wit refusing to permit him to move about the Residence.

78. At no time did the Defendants inform Mr. Armstrong that he was free to leave, and under the circumstances, no reasonable person would have believed that he or she was free to leave,

17

Case 5:19-cv-00040-EKD Document 1 Filed 05/22/19 Page 17 of 24 Pageid#: 17

effectively limiting Mr. Armstrong’s free movement under the auspices of unfounded and false legal authority.

79. At the time of this continual detention, the Defendants knew or should have known that they had neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause to believe that Mr. Armstrong had committed any crime or that he posed a danger to the defendants or any other person, or that they had a legal right to detain Mr. Armstrong. They admitted the matter was a “civil matter.”

80. In falsely arresting and imprisoning Mr. Armstrong, the Defendants acted intentionally, willfully, maliciously, wantonly, and recklessly.

81. As a direct and proximate cause of the Deputies and Ms. Roadcap’s acts of restricting Plaintiff’s freedom of movement, Plaintiff has suffered bodily harm, emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment and mental anguish.

82. Under Virginia law, the Sheriff is liable for all acts of his Deputies made under color of law.

83. Based upon the foregoing, the Defendants are liable to Mr. Armstrong for false arrest and imprisonment.

COUNT IV VIOLATION OF VA. CODE § 19.2-59 – UNLAWFUL SEARCH (Against the Sheriff and the Deputies) 84. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs of the complaint as if fully set forth herein.

85. This is a statutory claim of unlawful search pursuant to Va. Code § 19.2-59.

86. Code § 19.2-59 states, in pertinent part: No officer of the law or any other person shall search any place, thing or person, except by virtue of and under a warrant issued by a proper officer. Any officer or other person searching any place, thing or person otherwise than by virtue of and under a search warrant, shall be guilty of malfeasance in office. Any officer or 18

Case 5:19-cv-00040-EKD Document 1 Filed 05/22/19 Page 18 of 24 Pageid#: 18

person violating the provisions of this section shall be liable to any person aggrieved thereby in both compensatory and punitive damages.

87. As described herein, the Deputies searched Mr. Armstrong’s home without a search warrant.

88. At no time prior to the search did the Deputies have a reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe that evidence of any crime would be found in Mr. Armstrong’s Residence. They admitted that the matter was a “civil matter.”

89. At no time prior to the search did the Deputies have a reasonable belief that their search was legal – a neutral magistrate had already prohibited such a search.

90. At no time prior to the search did the Deputies obtain Mr. Armstrong’s consent to search his Residence or any other property belonging to him or located therein, in fact they conducted the search over his objections and demands that they leave knowing that the Residence was his.

91. Accordingly, at all times relevant hereto, the Deputies acted at least in a grossly negligent manner if not recklessly or intentionally and, without legal justification or excuse, and scienter with that their conduct was in violation of Virginia law and thus they are not entitled to sovereign immunity, and in any event sovereign immunity is waived for a violation of § 19.2-59.

92. As a direct and proximate result of the Deputies intentional, reckless, willful and wanton, and malicious conduct Mr. Armstrong was denied his right to privacy and right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and caused him to suffer mental distress, gross embarrassment, and humiliation.

93. The Sheriff is liable to Mr. Armstrong under Virginia law for all acts of his Deputies made under color of law.

94. The Deputies and the Sheriff are liable to Mr. Armstrong for the Deputies violation of Va. Code § 19.2-59.

19

Case 5:19-cv-00040-EKD Document 1 Filed 05/22/19 Page 19 of 24 Pageid#: 19

COUNT V COMMON LAW TRESPASS (Against All Defendants) 95. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in the preceding paragraphs of the complaint as if fully set forth herein.

96. This is a claim for common-law trespass.

97. The Defendants entered onto Mr. Armstrong’s property they did so without any lawful right, lawful authority, or an express or implied contract.

98. As the Magistrate refused their warrant, and as Roadcap knew that she had no right under law by virtue of, inter alia, the court orders, the separation agreement, and the prenuptial agreement and Mr. Armstrong’s refusal to permit her to enter. None of the Defendants had even a good-faith claim of right.

99. Intentional trespass is presumed on behalf of all defendants and each and every time that the Defendant’s ignored Mr. Armstrong’s rightful order to leave, they committed another instance of trespass.

100.

In trespassing upon Mr. Armstrong’s property as described above, the Defendants

acted intentionally, willfully, maliciously, wantonly, and recklessly.

101.

As a direct and proximate cause of the Defendants trespass, Mr. Armstrong has

suffered, inter alia, loss of bodily integrity, restriction of his freedom of movement, loss of his personal property, emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment and mental anguish.

102.

Under Virginia law, the Sheriff is liable for all acts of his Deputies made under

color of law.

103.

Based upon the foregoing, the Deputies, the Sheriff, and Roadcap are liable to Mr.

Armstrong for trespass.

20

Case 5:19-cv-00040-EKD Document 1 Filed 05/22/19 Page 20 of 24 Pageid#: 20

104.

COUNT VI CONVERSION (Against All Defendants) Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations set forth in the preceding

paragraphs of the complaint as if fully set forth herein.

105.

This is a common-law claim of conversion.

106.

The Defendants, in seizing Mr. Armstrong’s property from Mr. Armstrong’s

Residence and removing it therefrom, exercised and assumed authority over such property and deprived Mr. Armstrong of possession thereof wrongfully, and without any legal right, justification, or excuse.

107.

The Defendants acted intentionally, willfully, maliciously, wantonly, and

recklessly on seizing and removing Mr. Armstrong’s property from his Residence.

108.

As a direct and proximate cause of the Defendants conversion, Mr. Armstrong has

suffered, inter alia, a loss of his personal property such as his driver’s license and his key-fob.

109.

Under Virginia law, the Sheriff is liable for all acts of his Deputies made under

color of law.

110.

Based upon the foregoing, the Defendants are liable to Mr. Armstrong for

conversion.

111.

COUNT VII COMMON LAW CONSPIRACY (Against All Defendants) Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs

of the complaint as if fully set forth herein.

112.

This is a common law claim of conspiracy against the Defendants.

113.

On or about June 9, 2017 at some time prior to 06:30 in the morning, and after

being denied a warrant and prohibited from entering and searching Mr. Armstrong’s residence

21

Case 5:19-cv-00040-EKD Document 1 Filed 05/22/19 Page 21 of 24 Pageid#: 21

and seizing property therein, the Deputies and Roadcap, knowing they had no probable cause, exigent circumstances, or consent from Mr. Armstrong, agreed to ignore the magistrate, and enter the Residence seize it, and detain Mr. Armstrong inside the Residence while the Deputies and Roadcap searched the Residence and seized property found therein and removed it from the Residence.

114.

In furtherance of this common scheme, the Deputies and Roadcap entered the

Residence seized it, and detained Mr. Armstrong inside the Residence, searched the residence, seized property found therein, and removed the property.

115.

Based on the foregoing combination, under the circumstances of the Deputies and

Roadcap’s action, the Deputies and Ms. Roadcap are liable to Mr. Armstrong for the commonlaw torts of: a. Conspiracy to commit trespass; b. Conspiracy to falsely imprison Mr. Armstrong; c. Conspiracy to violate Virginia Code § 19.2-59; d. Conspiracy to commit Conversion. e. Conspiracy to violate Mr. Armstrong’s civil rights.

116.

The Deputies and Roadcap’s conduct demonstrates actual malice towards and

wanton disregard for Mr. Armstrong’s rights.

117.

As a direct and proximate cause of the Deputies and Roadcap’s conspiracy, Mr.

Armstrong has suffered, inter alia, loss of bodily integrity, restriction of his freedom of movement, loss of his personal property, emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment and mental anguish.

22

Case 5:19-cv-00040-EKD Document 1 Filed 05/22/19 Page 22 of 24 Pageid#: 22

118.

Under Virginia law, the Sheriff is liable for all acts of his Deputies made under

color of law.

119.

Based upon the foregoing, the Deputies, the Sheriff, and Roadcap are liable to Mr.

Armstrong for conspiracy.

COUNT VIII GROSS NEGLIGENCE (Against all Defendants) 120.

Mr. Armstrong repeats and realleges the allegations set forth above complaint as

if fully set forth herein.

121.

This is a claim for common-law negligence in addition to and/or in the alternative

to counts I - VII. 122.

Smith, Conley, James and Roadcap owed Mr. Armstrong various duties including

but not limited to not acting in such a way that would reasonably lead to unjustified, unexcused injury to Mr. Armstrong.

123.

By entering into the Residence, searching it, removing property therefrom, and

seizing Mr. Armstrong as described above the Smith, Conley, and James breached these duties, they failed to act as a reasonable person, and such acts were negligent and/or grossly negligent and /or constituted an utter disregard of and complete neglect for Mr. Armstrong’ safety, rights, and life.

124.

As a direct and proximate result of the Smith, Conley, and James negligence

and/or gross negligence, Mr. Armstrong suffered damages including but not limited to economic loss, loss of liberty, severe mental distress, a loss of bodily integrity and property damage.

125.

Under Virginia law, the Sheriff is liable for all acts of his Deputies made under

color of law.

23

Case 5:19-cv-00040-EKD Document 1 Filed 05/22/19 Page 23 of 24 Pageid#: 23

126.

Based upon the foregoing, the Smith, Conley, and James, and the Sheriff are

liable to Mr. Armstrong for negligence and/or gross negligence.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF WHEREFORE, the above premises considered, Plaintiff respectfully prays that this Honorable Court: 1. Enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against the Defendants on all claims of relief asserted herein.

2. Award Plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages on all claims of relief as asserted herein in the amount of $7,600,000.00 or in such sums as the jury may award.

3. Award Plaintiff reasonable expenses incurred in this litigation, including reasonable attorney fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. ยง 1988.

4. Award Plaintiff pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.

5. Grant any and all further relief the Court deems necessary, just, and proper.

6. Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable herein.

Dated: May 22, 2019 Respectfully submitted, Adam Armstrong By:___/s/ Jonathan M. Arthur, Esq.________ Counsel Jonathan M. Arthur, Esq. VSB # 86323 Thomas H. Roberts, Esq. VSB # Thomas H. Roberts & Associates, P.C. 105 South 1st Street Richmond, VA 23219 (804) 783-2000 (telephone) (804) 783-2105 (facsimile) j.arthur@robertslaw.org. tom.roberts@robertslaw.org Counsel for Adam Armstrong 24

Case 5:19-cv-00040-EKD Document 1 Filed 05/22/19 Page 24 of 24 Pageid#: 24