Russia and Allies Towards Post-2014 Afghanistan by EastWest Institute

When the West has mostly departed from Afghanistan after 2014, the East, i.e. Russia and its allies, will have to continue to cope with the Afghan security situation and its overflow to the Central Asian region. Russia, although not directly adjacent to Afghanistan, is affected by Afghan narcotics and terrorism. Afghanistan borders China and the Central Asian states of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. These states, as well as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are partners of Russia, bilateral but also multilateral, as members of the military alliance Collective Security Treaty Organization CSTO and/or the regional organization Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Much has already been said about post-2014 Afghanistan, but not enough about the consequences for Russia and its allies. This work deals with that largely untouched area, by explaining the security challenges; the mind-set of the Kremlin towards Afghanistan; the statements of CSTO and SCO on Afghanistan; the views of NATO and the EU on cooperating with these Eastern institutions; as well as the policy action towards post-2014 by Eastern and Western actors. In preparation for post-2014 Afghanistan, different parties have different approaches. Russia, China and CSTO have no wish to deploy armed forces in Afghanistan. Russia is expanding its military presence in Central Asia (bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan); strengthening the borders with Afghanistan of the states with a fragile security, i.e. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan; as well as supplying CSTO with modern weapons and equipment, hence reinforcing its rapid reaction force. These actions are taken to counter terrorism and drugs trafficking. The Central Asian states give priority to strengthening border security. Furthermore, in addition to their military cooperation with Russia (bilateral and through CSTO), these states have also demonstrated—to the dissatisfaction of Moscow—an interest in military cooperation with the West, by obtaining arms and equipment, which the U.S. and NATO intend to leave behind after their retreat. Regarding direct aid to Afghanistan, Moscow’s assistance lies mainly in the military realm, by supplying arms and training. China mostly cooperates economically with Kabul, with financial aid and investments, especially in mineral exploitation. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the strongest Central Asian states, are also involved in bilateral military and socio-economic cooperation with Afghanistan. CSTO supports Afghanistan by training its military and law enforcement agencies and by realizing socio-economic projects. The SCO lacks joint actions, such as CSTO’s collective counter-narcotics operations, but primarily supports the actions of its individual members. The U.S. financially supports reinforcement of the border security capacity of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In addition to the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) -projects like counter-narcotics training of Afghan and Central Asian personnel, the (Afghan air force) Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund, and the Action Plan on Terrorism, NATO has mainly concentrated on the reverse transit route through Central Asia and Russia, to get its arms and equipment out of Afghanistan. With regard to post-2014, the lack of cohesion of the mentioned parties is particularly stunning. A deficiency of unity, consistency and cooperation is visible, within the East (Russia, China, Central Asia, CSTO, SCO) and West (U.S., NATO, EU). Each of these actors has its own national or organizational objectives and corresponding agenda. However, time is running out. The East and West face the same threats: terrorism by the Taliban and Al Qaida, as well as drugs production and trafficking. Both sides will remain involved in and around Afghanistan after 2014, hence, cooperation is essential. After its formal declaration rejecting Moscow’s alleged privileged interests in Central Asia, NATO has the possibility of opening a path to engage in joint action with CSTO/SCO. A division of labor could be established whereby CSTO and NATO carry out military and security teamwork and SCO and the EU handle socio-economic cooperation.

CSTO-NATO military cooperation could entail exchanging liaison officers between their headquarters; information sharing by military intelligence services of both sides; joint CSTO-NATO-NRC training of Afghan (and Central Asian) law enforcement officers; border guards and military; coordinated delivery of weapons and maintenance to the Afghan army; as well as Russian-US-CSTO strengthening of border security capacities of the Central Asian states. Socio-economic cooperation by the EU and the SCO could be conducted in areas such as direct relief and assistance (water and food supplies), good governance, state-building, police training and reconstruction projects (building schools, hospitals, roads, railways, bridges, etc.). Such a mutual East-West approach would benefit all parties.

Map 1: Central Asia Source: United Nations Cartographic Section, New York, U.S..

Map 2: Afghanistan Source: United Nations Cartographic Section, New York, U.S..

CICA CIS CSTO EU FPC ISAF MFA MoD MoU NATO NDN NRC NSS ODKB OFP OSCE PfP RF SCO SCRF SG UN

Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia Commonwealth of Independent States Collective Security Treaty Organization (Organizatsiya Dogovora o Kollektivnoy Bezopasnosti, ODKB) European Union Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Defence Memorandum of Understanding North Atlantic Treaty Organization Northern Distribution Network NATO-Russia Council National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation Organizatsiya Dogovora o Kollektivnoy Bezopasnosti (Collective Security Treaty Organization, CSTO) Overview of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Partnership for Peace (NATO) Russian Federation Shanghai Cooperation Organization Security Council of the Russian Federation Secretary General United Nations

On June 22, 2011, President Obama announced the withdrawal of American troops in Afghanistan. The withdrawal would be gradual—10,000 troops by the end of the summer 2011, an additional 23,000 at the end of summer 2012. Following that, U.S. troops would continue to return and Afghan security forces would move to the lead. The mission of the U.S. military that remained would change from combat to support. By 2014 this process of transition was to be complete, with the Afghan people responsible for their own security. He also stated that in May 2012 the U.S. would host a summit with its NATO allies and partners in Chicago to shape the next phase of this transition (‘Obama on Afghanistan’ 2011). When the U.S. announced its retreat from Afghanistan, NATO was sure to follow. Deployed in 2001—initially under the lead of individual NATO Allies—the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), mandated by the United Nations, was tasked to assist the Afghan government in maintaining security. NATO took command of the force in August 2003. ISAF’s primary objective in Afghanistan was to enable the Afghan authorities to provide effective security across the country and ensure that the country could never again be a safe haven for terrorists. NATO’s Lisbon Summit of November 2010 decided that as of July 2011, a transition to full Afghan security responsibility would be started, due to be completed at the end of 2014, when ISAF’s mission would end. At NATO’s Chicago Summit of May 2012 it was agreed to a follow-on, NATO-led mission to continue supporting the capacity-building of the Afghan security forces (‘NATO and Afghanistan’ 2013). This new NATO-led mission, known as “Resolute Support,” not for combat, but to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces after 2014—comprising 8,000 to 1 12,000 military—was endorsed in June 2013 (‘NATO/Defence’ 2013). When the West will largely leave Afghanistan, the East—Russia and its partners—remains, and will have to deal with the security environment of Afghanistan and the Central Asian region. Russia is the regional hegemon, and although not directly adjacent to Afghanistan, is affected by Afghan narcotics and terrorism. In addition to Iran and Pakistan, not to be discussed in this work, Afghanistan borders China and the Central Asian states of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (see: Maps 1 and 2). With the exception of the non-aligned Turkmenistan, the other three aforementioned states, as well as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan—also disturbed by Afghani developments—are allies of Russia, bilateral but also multilateral, as members of the military alliance CSTO and/or the regional organization SCO. Much is already written on post-2014 Afghanistan but not much on the consequences for Russia and its allies. This work hopes to shed light on that neglected domain. First, to address what the security challenges are for these regional actors, on the way to post-2014 Afghanistan; secondly, to analyse the mind-set of the Kremlin on Afghanistan, as illustrated in Russia’s security documents and formal statements by Presidents Medvedev and Putin. This report will examine the policy towards Afghanistan of the key organizations in the region, CSTO and the SCO. Next, it will determine how NATO and the EU perceive cooperating with these Eastern institutions where Moscow 2 has a leading position. It will include specific policy actions post-2014 by Eastern and Western entities. With all this data assembled, I will conclude with an assessment and policy recommendations.

In June 2013 the total strength of ISAF was: 97,920 (NATO and Afghanistan [2013]). In the Tables 1-4 the periods of entries from formal documents, statements, and of international organizations and summits, vary between 2007-2013, due to the diverse availability of data. 2

Given the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2014, how has the security situation in and around Afghanistan developed for Russia, China and Central Asia?

The Kremlin has considered illicit drugs from Afghanistan as a rapidly increasing threat to Russia’s national security. Moscow has criticised the Western forces in Afghanistan for failing to eradicate narcotics production in this country, which has increased almost tenfold since the invasion against Taliban-Afghanistan in 2001. Beijing, too, has expressed its concerns about the increase of Afghan drugs entering China, which allegedly escalated tensions in its Islamic Xinjiang Uyghur region (‘Russia, China concerned’ 2010; Weitz 2012d). The Afghan drug business has been targeting Tajikistan as the primary transit country for narcotics entering Russia and Eastern Europe. After the withdrawal of Russian border troops in 2005, Tajikistan has received support from Russia, the U.S., the OSCE and the UN to improve its border forces. However, Dushanbe’s border security capacity has not been strengthened very much, due to a political unwillingness but especially because of widespread corruption with Tajik government officials involved in the drugs trade (Sodiqov 2012).

In April 2012, Russia's Foreign Minister Lavrov complained that NATO’s timetable of withdrawal from Afghanistan was artificial, since the Afghan army would probably not be capable of maintaining security after 2014. NATO’s Secretary General Rasmussen ensured that the Afghans had agreed to this and called upon Russia and China to make financial contributions to strengthen the Afghan military in the light of NATO’s departure (‘NATO/Afghanistan’ 2013). Central Asian governments are concerned that several thousand militants from their countries, fighting in Afghanistan, will come back to destabilize their home states. Central Asian insurgent groups in Afghanistan have already been involved in or planning for attacks in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Russia and China (Zenn 2013a). Recently, Taliban fighters have been taking control over parts of Afghan provinces bordering Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Since they cooperate with Central Asian militants, this also threatens the security of these Central Asian states. However, to a certain extent Central Asian governments are overstating the Taliban threat on their borders, in order to get more military support from Moscow and Washington. The actual border threat is as yet hard to estimate (Rotar 2013).

9 Socio-political and economic conditions in Central Asia are volatile. Low-intensity confrontation is possible, as a result of corruption, rising unemployment, sloppy security and creeping ethnic rivalry (Baimatov 2013: 5). Tensions at the Central Asian borders with Afghanistan could easily escalate to violence inside these states. This situation also applies to China, given the Taliban’s ties with Islamic extremist groups, advocating independence for the Xinjiang province (Weitz 2012d).

Russia’s basic security document is its National Security Strategy (NSS), drafted by the president of the Russian Federation (RF). From this political or grand strategy, the other two vital documents are derived: the Foreign Policy Concept (FPC) of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA); and the Military Doctrine of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). In addition to these basic documents, the RF Foreign Ministry has also published an Overview of Foreign Policy (OFP). From the collection of the aforementioned documents, the following contain entries with regard to Afghanistan: OFP 2007; FPC 2008 and FPC 2013. In this respect it is remarkable that only official documents of the MFA comprise arguments on Afghanistan. Since Afghanistan is a major security concern of Moscow, it is surprising that neither the MoD’s Military Doctrine nor the President’s NSS pay any attention to the situation in and around this country, and its possible consequences for Russia’s security. In Putin’s first term as RF President (2000-2004), Afghanistan already received attention in the 2000 FPC, by stating that its internal conflict created a threat to the security of the southern CIS borders and subsequently directly affecting Russian interests. During Putin’s second term in office (2004-2008), the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and its consequences for Russian security resulted in more unease in Moscow and consequently in more entries in the security documents on Afghanistan. Since 2008, Medvedev and Putin’s security papers have paid even more attention to the situation in and around Afghanistan (see Table 1). Concerning the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, the 2007 OFP stated that a failure and subsequent withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO from this country would result in the confrontation of Central Asian states and Russia with the Afghan threats of narcotics, terrorism, fundamentalism and destabilization. The OFP distinguished a 3 role for the Eastern military alliance CSTO to counter these threats. The political, economic and security institution 4 the SCO was also mentioned in this regard. The OFP stated that Russia has repeatedly put forward CSTO as a counterpart for the Western military alliance in Afghanistan. Specifically, joint NATO-CSTO guarding of the TajikAfghan border, possibly also involving Iran, was suggested. Furthermore, the OFP pointed out that the SCO, together with CSTO, could play a positive role in promoting stabilization around Afghanistan and in Central Asia in general. As to Western involvement, the OFP demonstrated ambivalence. NATO’s support for a pilot project to train regional antinarcotics officers was appreciated. But at the same time, Moscow reluctantly recognized that the U.S. was establishing closer ties with the Central Asian states, Pakistan, India and Afghanistan, probably out of fear of competition in Russia’s backyard.

The 2008 FPC was, to a large extent, a repetition of the entries in the OFP of the previous year. Again (the spread over the CIS borders of) terrorism and narcotics were brought up, as well as the contributions that CSTO and the SCO could make to defy these threats. In this document no mention was made of cooperation with Western security institutions. The next edition of the FPC, in 2013, clearly showed a deeper concern for the emanating threats from Afghanistan, both in type and size. In addition to terrorism and drugs, this document also cited extremism, transnational crime and illegal migration as threats. Furthermore, Russia was now well aware that the forthcoming withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan would pose a great security threat to Russia and other CIS members. Hence, yet another time a call was made for joint action by CSTO, the SCO and NATO.

The CSTO is a Russian-led military alliance with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as the other member states. Just like NATO, the CSTO has a military assistance provision (Article 4), which states that aggression against one party will be considered an attack on all parties. The main responsibilities of the CSTO are defence cooperation, the manufacturing of weapons, training of military personnel, and peacekeeping activities, a common integrated air-defence system, and the fight against terrorism and narcotics, especially in Central Asia (Haas 2013: 35). 4 The SCO is a regional international organization with China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as member states and Mongolia, Iran, Pakistan, India and Afghanistan as observer states. The SCO provides cooperation in political, military, economic, energy and cultural fields. Important ingredients of economic cooperation are (conventional) arms trade and energy (Haas 2013: 36).

The following shows the development of thinking and action of the RF Presidents Dmitry Medvedev (2008-2012) and Vladimir Putin in regard to Afghanistan, listed in specific areas (see Table 2). Counterterrorism: Medvedev emphasized Russiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s support for the efforts of Americans and its allies aimed at preventing the terrorist threat coming from Afghanistan. In May 2013, Putin stated that, considering the Western withdrawal of forces in 2014, Afghan army and police were not yet capable of ensuring security and fighting terrorism. Furthermore, terrorist and radical groups had become increasingly active. To counter the increased terrorist threat, Putin suggested reinforcing the security system in the southern strategic direction, including the military component. Russia is not alone in these efforts. CSTO and the SCO have made similar statementsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;beefing up protection of the state borders, tightening the migration control system and speeding up work to equip the Collective Rapid Reaction Force with modern arms and equipment. Counter-narcotics Efforts: Besides terrorism, Medvedev recognized drugs (production and trafficking) as a vital security threat, not just for Afghanistan but for all countries in the region, including Russia. In December 2010, in the fight against drugs, Medvedev launched a joint operations group with the U.S., Afghanistan and Tajikistan to seize drugs and uncover laboratories. In September 2012, President Putin criticized the West for lack of action against drugs. The amount of drugs produced in Afghanistan had increased by 60 percent in 2011. More than 20 percent of the Afghani drugs were marketed inside Russia. Drug revenues were partly used to finance terrorist activities. But even the fact that Europe was flooded with Afghan-made drugs was, according to Putin, not enough to encourage the Western partners to seriously tackle this issue. However, in March 2013, Putin was much more positive. Successful anti-drug operations, carried out with U.S., Tajik, Kyrgyz and Afghan support, had reduced the amount of heroin arriving in Russia. But two months later, in May 2013, Putin reiterated that the international forces were doing almost nothing to eradicate Afghani drug production, in spite of a substantial increase in drug production in Afghanistan. Military Cooperation: Medvedev was not willing to cooperate with the West in the military field. Nevertheless, he did allow civilian and military transit of U.S. and NATO forces across Russian territory. On the other hand, he stated in June 2010 that the U.S. air base in Kyrgyzstan (Manas) should finish its operation in due course. In September 2012, Putin indicated that he would assist ISAF in withdrawing troops and hardware from Afghanistan through Russian transit routes. Cooperation with Afghanistan: In August 2010, Medvedev declared that Russia was ready to build up economic ties with Afghanistan. In November 2010 the RF President stated his willingness to supply Kabul with weapons, too. In January 2011, Medvedev signed an agreement with Kabul on trade and economic cooperation. Russia was to participate in building new hydropower plants in other Afghan provinces. Moreover, civilian Afghan students but also military personnel of the Afghan armed forces and law enforcement agencies, and of the police, would be educated in Russia. In June 2012, President Putin made clear that the bilateral cooperation had deepened: the Russian Emergencies Ministry had provided assistance to Kabul on a number of occasions, Afghan servicemen were being trained in Russia, and Moscow was ready to provide support in establishing and upgrading Afghan security forces and military equipment. Russia was now delivering Mi-17 helicopters to Kabul, and Afghan Air Force technical personnel were trained in Russia. Regional Cooperation: Medvedev proposed regional energy projects: a gas pipeline connecting Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India (December 2010) and an electricity transmission line from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan (September 2011). In January 2011, Medvedev invited Afghanistan as a guest participating in the work of the SCO. In June 2012, at the annual SCO summit, President Putin proposed granting SCO observer status to

Afghanistan. In May 2013, Putinâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s view on post-2014 Afghanistan was to promote stable regional economic and social development. Russia was ready to provide its neighbours and partners with assistance, such as joint economic projects, military technical aid, building up cooperation in the humanitarian sphere, including training personnel and specialists. Putin and his counterparts discussed at the May 2013 CSTO meeting post-2014 Afghanistan, strengthening the Tajik-Afghan border, and measures to combat drug trafficking and extremism.

CSTO has repeatedly declared its willingness to help stabilize the situation in Afghanistan and address the challenges and threats emanating from Afghanistan (see Table 3). In 2010 CSTO declared countering the growing threat of drugs as a primary target, for instance by creating a "belt" of anti-drug security around Afghanistan. In 2011 CSTO proposed an action plan in the case of worsening situation in Afghanistan after 2014, when NATO troops withdraw. The plan provided securing Western transit out of Afghanistan, countering terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime. To do so, contacts with the authorities of Afghanistan and Pakistan were to be established to curb the activities on their territory of training camps of militants from the CIS countries, and to provide assistance to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in ensuring border security. In 2012, the tone of CSTO had become even more distressed: it now considered Afghanistan a zone of instability, a source to spread ideas of Islamic fundamentalism, territorybased militias and extremist terrorist organizations and militant training camps, including citizens from CSTO states. It also concluded that Afghan national armed forces and law enforcement agencies were not ready to fully ensure the security. To thwart these threats, in addition to the aforementioned measures, CSTO anticipated developing a CSTO mechanism of protecting the borders with Afghanistan; the training of specialists of the counter narcotics agencies of the CSTO member states; and to enhance the military capabilities of the CSTO states. CSTO invited the SCO to join its efforts on post-conflict rehabilitation of Afghanistan. According to CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha, CSTO, together with China and the SCO, were to prevent the Taliban from coming back to power. In July 2007, CSTO called for joint action with the SCO on Afghanistan (‘CSTO proposes’ 2007). In 2009, the SCO expressed its commitment to enhance cooperation with the UN, EU, CIS, CSTO, OSCE and NATO, on combating terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime in Afghanistan (see Table 3). The SCO further acknowledged the important role of ISAF to help Afghanistan provide security. The SCO appreciated the cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan on combating terrorism, including denying sanctuaries and dismantling the extremist and terrorist network and ideological centers. Moreover, the SCO considered establishing a regional anti-drug centre and a SCO training center for anti-narcotics officers of Afghanistan, SCO member states and observers. The SCO also engaged SCO observers, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan in the creation of “anti-drug and financial security belts.” To fight the threats of terror, drugs and instability, the SCO also made use of its existing organs, i.e. the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure and the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group. In 2010, the SCO noticed a continuing escalation of confrontation in Afghanistan. Terrorism, drug trafficking and transnational organized crime rooted in this country remained a significant source for threats in the region. The SCO called upon ISAF to cooperate in the sphere of anti-drug efforts. In 2011, the SCO acknowledged the impossibility of settling the Afghan conflict solely through military means, and to pay priority attention to sorting out the socioeconomic issues in Afghanistan. The SCO supported the efforts of its member states involved in the implementation of economic reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. In 2012, the SCO declared to play a bigger role in troubled Afghanistan. It agreed to accept Afghanistan as an observer. China, an SCO member, announced it would provide a 23.8 million-U.S. dollar grant to the Afghan government to continue to expand bilateral trade and investment and deepen economic cooperation.

Since 2007, the EU (European Council) has annually affirmed, with regard to the mandate of the EU Special Representative for Central Asia, to develop appropriate contacts and cooperation with the main interested players in the region and all relevant regional and international organisations, including the SCO and CSTO (see Table 4). In relation to Russia, since 2007 dedicated agencies of the EU and Russia have exchanged information on drugs problems. Since 2008, the EU has engaged with Russia on Afghanistan, with the aim of developing common views and approaches. In 2009 the European Parliament called on the EU authorities to increase cooperation with Moscow in dealing with Afghanistan. The following year, in 2010, the European Parliament reiterated this call by stating that the rapprochement with Russia on Afghanistan illustrated the enhanced climate of dialogue with Moscow on different aspects of foreign and security relations. In 2007, NATO (NATO-Russia Council, NRC) announced that it would continue the NRC Pilot Project for counternarcotics training of Afghan and Central Asian Personnel. Furthermore, the NRC decided to develop a NATO-Russia Framework Agreement on Air Transport. In 2008, the NRC stated that a mechanism had been defined to facilitate land transit through Russian territory of goods to ISAF. In 2010, the NRC described revised arrangements aimed at further facilitating railway transit of non-lethal ISAF goods through Russian territory. The NRC Project on CounterNarcotics Training welcomed the inclusion of Pakistan as a participant along with Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Moreover, in support of the Afghan air force to operate its helicopter fleet, the NRC tasked the development of a Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund, to be effective in 2011. With this fund Afghan technicians were trained in Russia and helicopter spare parts were provided to the Afghan air force (Litovkin 2011). In 2011, the NRC launched its Action Plan on Terrorism, with which NRC nations would contribute to stability in and around Afghanistan, and thus forestall the spread of terrorism. In 2012, the foreign ministers of NATO welcomed that the NRC had trained 2,000 counter-narcotics personnel from Afghanistan and its neighbours; that Afghan helicopter technicians were being trained and spare parts would be provided in support of the Afghan Air Force; as well as that the two-way transit arrangements with Russia and other states were carried out. In April 2013, 30 Afghan technicians had been trained for the maintenance of their 47 Mi-17 and Mi-35 helicopters (‘NATO/Ministerial’ 2013).

As to NATO-CSTO cooperation, CSTO (since 2004) and Russia (since 2005) have repeatedly invited the Western military alliance to cooperate vis-à-vis Afghanistan. In December 2005, for instance, Russia’s Foreign Minister Lavrov, proposed cooperation between NATO and CSTO, to fight narcotics together with NATO’s ISAF contingent in Afghanistan (‘Foreign minister pushes’ 2005). In 2012, NATO SG Rasmussen stated regarding CSTO that NATO cooperated with individual members of CSTO, for instance on counter-narcotics. The NATO SG rejected cooperation between NATO and CSTO as organizations (see Table 4). NATO, and especially the U.S., have been reluctant to cooperate with CSTO because of: the dominant role of Russia in this military bloc; CSTO’s occasional negative statements towards the West, as well as—according to CSTO SG Bordyuzha—to avoid recognizing that CSTO has its own zone of responsibility (in Central Asia in particular), just like NATO (‘NATO side steps’ 2013). The U.S. Administration has rejected cooperation with CSTO on the same grounds. The U.S., too, refuses to recognize Moscow’s zone of privileged interests, the dominating Russian stance in CSTO, which supports Moscow’s foreign policy tool of being a regional superpower (McDermott 2010). Concerning NATO-SCO cooperation, a similar reluctance of NATO was noticeable. In 2005 at its annual summit the SCO called for withdrawal of foreign forces (i.e. ISAF and US) from Afghanistan (Haas 2007: 9). But gradually, due to the deteriorating security developments in Afghanistan, the SCO changed this negative attitude towards Western military involvement in Afghanistan into a positive one, and sought cooperation. Accordingly, at the SCO March 27, 2009 Afghanistan conference in Moscow, NATO and the EU were invited. This was the first formal sign of cooperation. But in spite of the presence of NATO and the EU at this SCO conference, the reference to this

conference in the SCO summit declaration of that year did not mention these Western organizations as actors involved in Afghanistan. Consequently, the SCO was not yet ready to engage NATO and EU as cooperation partners. Whereas the 2009 SCO summit refrained from stating cooperation between SCO and NATO, a month later NATO created an opening. NATOâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Security Forum in Astana, Kazakhstan, from July 2425 2009, was also attended by Bolat Nurgaliev, secretary-general of the SCO. Although this seemed to be a small step forward in closer ties between the two organizations, NATO SG De Hoop Scheffer denied that the alliance wanted to establish formal relations with the SCO (Haas 2010: 113).

In addition to making policy statements, the Eastern and Western actors around Afghanistan have also taken concrete steps, anticipating the withdrawal of US/NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2014. All parties are concerned with the prospect of instability, chaos and the worst case scenario—the Taliban returning to power in Afghanistan and the spread of volatility and terror into Central Asian states. (Yelensky 2013).

Moscow’s policy towards post-2014 lies mainly in strengthening its own military presence and that of CSTO and SCO in Central Asia, as well as in reinforcing the Central Asian borders with Afghanistan, to prevent cross-border terrorism and narcotics. The Kremlin is especially concerned with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan’s weak security capacities.. Hence, in addition to the joint arrangements of CSTO and SCO, for instance in exercises and in constructing CSTO rapid reaction forces, Moscow has been eager to upgrade its military bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In September 2011, Russia and Tajikistan agreed to extend the Russian military base, founded in 2005 with some 6,000 troops, for another 49 years. The Kremlin had the same extension in mind for its airbase Kant in Kyrgyzstan, which was opened in 2003 for a period of 15 years (Marat 2011). In December 2012, Bishkek ratified an agreement with Moscow for a period of 15 years, as of 2017, with which the four separate Russian military facilities in Kyrgyzstan (a weapons test range, a signals center, a radio-seismic laboratory, and the CSTO airbase at Kant) were united into an integrated Russian military base (‘Kyrgyzstan okays’ 2012). Allegedly, Moscow would support these efforts by supplying weapons. This unification of bases solidified Russia’s military assets against political upheaval in Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, Russia has supported Dushanbe and Bishkek in modernizing and equipping their defence forces, by spending more than $1.5 billion on the Tajik and Kyrgyz armies (‘ODKB ne budet’ 2012; ‘The future of Russia’s involvement’ 2012: 4). The Kremlin has been very concerned about the impact of Afghan drugs, which to a large extent are smuggled into Russia through Tajikistan. Moscow removed its border troops from Tajikistan in 2005. However, because of the narcotics threat and the fear of intrusion of Islamic insurgents after 2014, as of 2010, Russia started pressing Dushanbe to have 3,000 border guards back at the Afghan-Tajik border (Sodiqov 2011). So far Tajikistan has rejected Moscow’s request for the return of Russian border troops (Yelensky 2013). Another threat for Moscow is the radicalization of Islamic youth by Islamic-extremist leaders in Russia’s larger cities. Russia’s law enforcement agencies are paying close attention to this threat(‘Zagraditel’naya strategiya’ 2013).

Russia’s bilateral cooperation with Afghanistan is in the economic and military field. Moscow exports foods, machines and minerals, and Kabul’s export is rather limited. Russia invests mainly in restoring infrastructure (power plants, tunnels, factories) dating from the Soviet legacy, but could do much more than their current limited contribution. In the military realm, the Kremlin is much more active, not surprising with the Afghan top brass trained in Russia and a defence armed with Russian weapons. With the consent of NATO, from 2002 to 2006, Moscow had already provided more than $200 million in weapons, training and military assistance. Since 2011, Russia has supplied small arms and MI-17 helicopters and has trained Afghan pilots and security forces (Laruelle 2011: 9-10). Nonetheless, Kabul and Moscow agree that due to the heritage of Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, Russian troops are not likely to be deployed to Afghan territories (‘The future of Russia’s involvement’ 2012: 6).

After 9/11, China, started to show interest in NATO, since Afghanistan was a security concern for Beijing too. China has given NATO political support within the UN Security Council. Likewise, NATO SG Rasmussen has expressed the wish to establish a more structured dialogue with China. At an international Afghanistan conference in December 2011 in Bonn, China’s foreign minister called for the SCO to play a bigger role in Afghanistan. Moreover, he stated that the UN should continue to play a leading role in coordinating the assistance to Afghanistan (Zhang 2011). China has been active in Afghanistan since the Western military deployment of 2001. For instance, it has trained police forces and the Afghan military in demining, but its main effort has been in the economic realm (Zhang 2011). Sino-Afghan bilateral relations have deepened in recent years. China has established an economic presence in Afghanistan, through aid and investment, especially in minerals. In 2009, China provided $180 million of aid to Afghanistan and dismissed all Afghan debts. In June 2012, both parties issued a strategic partnership declaration, with another some $24 million of Chinese aid for Kabul. In total, China has offered at least $2.5 billion in aid to Kabul since 2002. As to socio-economic projects, Beijing has built hospitals, schools and irrigation systems. Moreover, from 2007-2008 China has trained more than 200 Afghan officials in diplomacy, human resource management and leadership (Zhang 2011). Concerning economic cooperation, since 2007,China has mined the biggest Afghan copper deposit (Zhang 2011). In December 2012, Beijing and Kabul agreed to allow China to exploit the oil reserves in northern Afghanistan (Voloshin 2012). Given their common border, China and Afghanistan are linked in terms of railway transport of goods, as well as oil and gas pipelines from South and Western Asia. (Fallon 2013). China and Afghanistan also envision a pipeline to deliver Turkmen gas—via Afghanistan’s north and through Tajikistan—to China. However, this pipeline could become a rival to the U.S.-backed Trans-Afghanistan Gas Pipeline (TAPI) (Socor 2012). Thus, China wants to make Afghanistan part of its energy-resource base, alongside its efforts to gain more economic influence in Central Asia. With Afghanistan as another ally—besides Pakistan, Sri-Lanka and Bangladesh—China opposes India (Baimatov 2013: 5).

In light of the security challenges of post-2014 Afghanistan, the Central Asian republics have been strengthening their border security (Smith 2012; Yelensky 2013). Uzbekistan, as was evidenced by its withdrawal from the Russianled CSTO military alliance in June 2012, has been conducting its own policy towards Afghanistan. Known for his antiradical Islam stance, Uzbek’s President Karimov would probably support northern anti-Taliban forces in case of a post-2014 civil war in Afghanistan (Chayes 2012). Furthermore, Uzbekistan—like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan—has entered bilateral agreements with the U.S. and UK, from which it is to receive military equipment and arms as Western forces withdraw from Afghanistan (McDermott 2013). Uzbekistan, allegedly, has been demanding more in return for U.S.-NATO use of its rail and road network for the transit of goods and equipment out of Afghanistan. Apparently, Tashkent is interested in acquiring free military equipment, which the Allies are leaving behind. (‘NATO/Afghanistan’ 2013). The Central Asian states have traditionally maintained military cooperation with Russia, especially by receiving discounted arms from Moscow. However, continuing their military ties with Russia, they are also eager to enter into closer military cooperation with the West and the U.S. in particular (Baimatov 2013: 1). Moscow does not like this development but is not capable of preventing this. Kazakhstan has a history of military cooperation with NATO. In 2010, NATO and Astana opened a regional training centre under NATO’s PfP (Partnership for Peace) program. Furthermore, Kazakhstan has been supplying facilities for transit of NATO goods to and from Afghanistan, in 2011 even more by extending the Caspian Aktau seaport’s transit capacity for ISAF’s withdrawal. Aktua had already been used as a transit hub for NATO since 2009. Moreover, in spring 2013 Astana invited the Alliance to enhance its contribution to the annual Kazakh military exercises (Voloshin 2013). Although Kazakhstan does not border Afghanistan, Astana has expanded its cooperation with Kabul. In the security field, both parties have discussed Kazakh support for the repair and modernization of Afghan military equipment, Afghan observers at Kazakh war games, and training of Afghan military in Kazakhstan. In the socioeconomic field, Astana cooperates with Kabul in providing subsidized food, fuel, and other vital supplies, and by financing the construction of bridges, roads, schools, hospitals and water supplies. Furthermore, Kazakhstan seeks

to increase bilateral trade and investment (Weitz 2013). In addition to military cooperation with Russia and the West, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have engaged in bilateral teamwork in the light of post-2014 Afghanistan. Both parties have expressed their commitment to contribute to the socio-economic reconstruction of Afghanistan, e.g. with Astana providing scholarships to Afghan students and Tashkent involved in the construction of Afghan infrastructure, such as its railway network (Weitz 2012c).

Russia has called for CSTO to take a larger role in Central Asian security after ISAF’s withdrawal. Although the record of CSTO as a regional security actor is not impressive, the common threat of post-2014 Afghanistan might convince CSTO members to intensify joint security efforts, such as its Collective Rapid Deployment Force (‘The future of Russia’s involvement’ 2012: 4). But so far, this Rapid Reaction Force has essentially been a Russian-dominated military command with minimal contributions from the Central Asian states. To a large extent, CSTO’s primary function is providing legitimacy to strengthening Moscow’s military and political grip on Central Asia, binding those states with a supply of military hardware, Russian military bases, and offering a security umbrella (Jackson 2013). In November 2012, a CSTO working group convened to discuss coordinated action to prevent Afghan problems spilling over into the Central Asian states after 2014. One of the contingencies was the possible return to power of Taliban and its consequences for neighbouring countries such as Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. CSTO SG Bordyuzha remarked that the situation in northern Afghanistan, on the CIS border, was already growing complicated (‘CSTO discusses’ 2012). He further made clear that there was no intention of deploying CSTO troops on Afghan soil (‘ODKB ne budet’ 2012). In May 2013, at a CSTO summit in Bishkek, concrete decisions were weighed regarding Afghanistan’s security: on the one hand, by supporting the Afghan authorities in providing security, training its military and law enforcement agencies and by realizing socio-economic projects; on the other hand, by reinforcing the military power of CSTO, i.e. its Collective Operational Reaction Force, and by securing the state borders (‘Zagraditel’naya strategiya’ 2013). Other measures considered were the strengthening of border control, supplying CSTO’s Collective Rapid Reaction Forces with modern military equipment, as well as cooperation in countering extremism (Nechepurenko 2013).

Central Asian fighters have been extending their operations to northern Afghanistan. China and Russia—targets of the militants—are aiming to reinforce their security posture in Central Asia in light of the Western withdrawal, and consider the SCO as a fitting instrument. A recent example of this was the SCO antiterrorism exercises in Kazakhstan of June 2013 (Zenn 2013b). However, the SCO lacks the military capacity as well as financial means for operations in Afghanistan (Laruelle 2011: 10). Furthermore, each of the (direct or indirect) neighbouring actors—Russia, China and the Central Asian states—has its own national objectives and corresponding agenda. There is a lack of common ground to act jointly on Afghanistan. Consequently, until the end of 2012 the SCO was only focussed on narcotics trafficking (Weitz 2012d). However, with the upcoming threats after the withdrawal of ISAF, the discussions in the SCO on post-2014 Afghanistan have intensified. In April 2013, in Bishkek, the heads of the anti-drugs agencies of the SCO decided to form an international operational command for the annihilation of narcotics production in Afghanistan, but without the commitment of any troops. Furthermore, in June 2013 the border guard services of the SCO met in Yekaterinburg to improve coordination also in this field (‘Zagraditel’naya strategiya’ 2013). But unlike CSTO, the SCO has not engaged in collective counterdrugs operations, nor has it trained Afghan counter narcotics or other law enforcement officers, as NATO (NRC) and OSCE have done (Weitz 2012d). Hence, the only explicit action of the SCO has been to accept Afghanistan as an observer, at its June 2012 Summit in Beijing. Apparently, SCO members will mostly continue to cooperate in a bilateral instead of a common SCO way with Afghanistan—as CSTO endeavors with China—due to its economic leverage with Kabul on the forefront.

Since 2004 the US has conducted ‘Regional Cooperation’, a multilateral exercise in the Central and South Asian State region. ‘Regional Cooperation 2012’ was conducted in June 2012, in which Afghan, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tajik border, emergency and interior troops trained with US forces for emergency situations and disaster relief (McDermott 2012b). The U.S. has realized that the removal of its forces from Afghanistan could well cause a deterioration of the security environment of Central Asia. To counteract this, in 2012 Washington decided to finance reinforcement of the border security capacity of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, by building facilities and a training centre for its border guards, but without the stationing of US troops (Smith 2012).

The alliance has continued the NRC-projects of counter-narcotics training of Afghan and Central Asian personnel, the Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund and the Action Plan on Terrorism. Moreover, in 2008 NATO, in order to avoid attacks on its convoys to and from Afghanistan via Pakistan, it decided to create an alternative transit route, the so-called Northern Distribution Network (NDN). In addition to Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have delivered a major contribution to this alternative route (Weitz 2012a/b; Vladykin 2012). As transport hubs for the NDN, in 2011, Astana proposed the seaport of Aktau; in 2012, Moscow provided the airport of Ulyanovsk; and in 2013, Russia also offered the seaport of Ust-Luga, in the Baltic Sea, to be used for this reserve transit route (Reisinger 2012; ‘Russia/NATO/Afghanistan’ 2013).

In light of the impending extraction of most of the US and NATO forces from Afghanistan in 2014, the security situation for Russia, China and Central Asia has not developed in a favorable way. The production of narcotics in Afghanistan and their entrance into Russia has increased rapidly. Central Asian borders, especially of the weaker states, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, are not secure and thus not capable of blocking Islamic-extremist insurgents. The combination of drugs trafficking, activities of terrorist movements and socio-economic problems within the Central Asian states, are creating a breeding ground of instability, which may also affect Russia and China. The entries on Afghanistan in Russia’s security documents, i.e. the Overview of Foreign Policy (2007) and the Foreign Policy Concepts (2008 and 2013), provide the following picture. Moscow has unmistakably acknowledged that the major “Afghan” threats of narcotics, terrorism and destabilization will increase after the withdrawal of most of NATO’s forces in 2014. Moreover, the Kremlin has more or less admitted that its own organizations, SCO and CSTO, are not capable of opposing these threats, and that on-going support of the Western military alliance, NATO, is essential. RF Presidents Medvedev (2008-2012) and Putin (2012- ) have made a number of statements on Afghanistan, especially on the topics of counterterrorism, counter-narcotics, military cooperation, regional cooperation and bilateral cooperation with Afghanistan. Both presidents realized that terrorism has not declined and that this threat is growing post-2014. To counter this threat, Putin ordered that Russia, together with CSTO and the SCO, would boost protection of the state borders, tighten the migration control system and speed up work to equip the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force with modern arms and equipment. As a result of a considerable increase in drugs production, President Putin repeatedly criticized the West for a lack of action against this development. As to military cooperation, Medvedev and Putin were reluctant to cooperate with Western forces, only approving transit rights through Russia. Initially, this served as a supply route for the NATO forces, more recently as a route for withdrawal of the Western military from Afghanistan. Bilateral cooperation with Kabul was especially envisaged by the two presidents in the areas of energy, education, training of Afghan military and the supply of weapons to Kabul. Military cooperation with Afghanistan had become more and more important. Regionally, both presidents regarded energy cooperation as a good opportunity. Furthermore, they regarded the SCO and CSTO as important players for the future of Afghanistan and the region. Through the years, both presidents had become more involved in dealing with Afghanistan, in their cooperation with their allies in CSTO and the SCO, with the West and with Kabul itself. Medvedev and Putin were well aware that a vulnerable post-2014 Afghanistan could develop into narcotics and terror threats for Russia and its neighbours, demanding thorough and concrete action.

CSTO and SCO considered the threat of drugs (production and trafficking) as imminent for Russia and Central Asia. Hence, both organisations became very active in taking measures against it, such as the formation of an “anti-drugs belt” around Afghanistan and the training of anti-narcotics officers. The two Eastern organizations also shared concern about post-2014 Afghanistan, given the expected rise of terrorism, likely affecting their territories. SCO and CSTO were convinced that the Afghan military and law enforcement agencies were not ready to fully ensure the security. To counter these threats, CSTO would provide assistance (especially to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) in ensuring border security. Whereas CSTO called mainly on the SCO and NATO to cooperate, the SCO had a larger scope, by approaching the UN, EU, CIS, CSTO, OSCE and NATO on combating terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime in Afghanistan. Other than the purely military approach of CSTO, the SCO gave priority attention to solving the socio-economic problems of Afghanistan, by supporting economic reconstruction projects of its member states and by accepting Afghanistan as an observer. A comparison of the formal documents of the Western institutions EU and NATO regarding cooperation with Russia, CSTO and the SCO on Afghanistan, leads to the following conclusions. First, that both organizations only provide a small number of entries on this cooperation. Secondly, that the remarks in EU documents are quite vague and general, whereas those of NATO emphasize concrete action together with Russia. Thirdly, the EU at least declares itself in favour of cooperation with CSTO and the SCO, while NATO refrains from cooperation with CSTO as an

organization—only with individual CSTO member states—and does not mention cooperation with the SCO at all. Nevertheless, developments such as NATO, EU, CSTO and SCO attending the same or each others’ conferences on Afghanistan, demonstrated a gentle rapprochement between East and West in cooperation on Afghanistan. This was out of necessity since the security environment in and around Afghanistan was deteriorating. Both EU and NATO express a great interest in cooperating with Russia on Afghanistan. But as mentioned before, the formal documents of the EU remain vague on the actual contents of this cooperation. NATO, on the contrary, cites specific NRC projects, such as counter-narcotics training of Afghan and Central Asian personnel, transit arrangements for ISAF over Russian soil, a Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund, as well as an Action Plan on Terrorism. Actors of East and West are taking policy action on post-2014 Afghanistan. Russia’s strategy is found in reinforcing its military presence (and that of CSTO and SCO) in Central Asia, and strengthening the Central Asian borders with Afghanistan, to prevent terrorism and drugs trafficking. A corresponding advantage is that this binds Central Asia to Moscow, instead of to Washington. Nevertheless, not Washington but Beijing has its own economic way of detaching Central Asia from Russia, by acquiring Central Asian energy resources and investing in infrastructure. The response of the Central Asian republics towards post-2014 Afghanistan has particularly been in strengthening border security. Also, to the dissatisfaction of Moscow, the Central Asian countries have demonstrated an interest in obtaining arms and equipment, which the U.S. and NATO intend to leave behind after their retreat. Similarly, Moscow disapproves of NATO’s PfP activities in Central Asia, considering this region as its own backyard, also in military cooperation. The Eastern actors not only support Afghanistan collectively, via CSTO and the SCO, but also directly, in bilateral cooperation with Kabul. Due to its Soviet history, the emphasis of Russia’s assistance lies mainly in the military realm. Conversely, China’s cooperation with Afghanistan is especially focused on the economy and energy, in extracting minerals, which is in line with Beijing’s overall policy towards Central Asia. China has supported Kabul with financial aid too. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the strongest Central Asian states, are also involved in bilateral military and socio-economic cooperation with Afghanistan. CSTO supports the Afghan authorities in providing security, training its military and law enforcement agencies and by realizing socio-economic projects. Moreover, by reinforcing its own military power, the CSTO Rapid Reaction Force, and also by securing the state borders. However, CSTO lacks an integrated military-political infrastructure, such as NATO has, and is still dominated by Russia, with minor contributions by its other members. As such, it mainly serves Moscow’s objectives. The SCO lacks common ground to act jointly; Russia, China and the Central Asian states have their own national objectives towards Afghanistan. Hence, joint actions, such as CSTO’s collective counterdrugs operations, or NATO’s training of Afghan law enforcement officers, are absent within the SCO. Russia, China nor CSTO wish to deploy armed forces in Afghanistan. To avoid a collapse of security in and around Afghanistan, post-2014, Washington has decided to finance reinforcement of the border security capacity of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Moscow, undertaking similar border security support, probably regards this action too, in addition to the transfer of remaining weapons and PfPexercises, as competition in its backyard. With regard to post-2014, in addition to a number of NRC-projects supporting Afghanistan, NATO has mainly concentrated on acquiring and maintaining the reverse transit route through Russia and Central Asia, the NDN, to get its equipment out of Afghanistan. In summary, a lack of cohesion exists when considering the various policy actions of all stakeholders. A deficiency of unity and consistency exists within the East (Russia and China on their own, leaving the Central Asians behind) and within the West (U.S. and UK following their own objectives, besides those of NATO), as well as between the East (CSTO/SCO) and West (NATO/EU; only some NATO/Russia NRC projects).

The time of “luxurious” reluctance in mutual cooperation for East (Russia, China, Central Asia, CSTO, SCO) and West (U.S., NATO, EU),no longer exists. Time is running out for both sides with 2014 upon us. Regarding Afghanistan, East and West face the same threats: terrorism by Taliban and Al Qaida, as well as drugs production and trafficking. With the U.S. and NATO withdrawing most of their forces from Afghanistan in 2014, Russia and especially its Central Asian friends are becoming increasingly nervous, since they will be the ones that will have to cope with terrorism and narcotics from Afghanistan. Likewise, the U.S. and other actors in the West do not want the Taliban to return to power in Kabul, and return to a time where a possible repetition of the 9/11’ could occur. Hence, East and West will continue to be engaged in the security of Afghanistan and the Central Asian region, and cooperation between them is therefore inevitable and essential. Russia, as the leading member state of CSTO and together with China on the forefront in the SCO, could promote a joint effort of these two Eastern security organizations to cooperate with NATO and the EU in Afghanistan. The Kremlin and CSTO have called for many years for NATO to cooperate. Recently, Kazakhstan, a member state of the SCO, has also called for cooperation with NATO (Haizhou 2011, McDermott 2012a, ‘Kazakhs urge NATO’ 2013). Moreover, since spring 2009 NATO/EU and CSTO/CSTO have attended the same conferences on the future of Afghanistan. But NATO still continues to reject cooperation with CSTO and the SCO, emphasizing cooperation with individual states, instead of between organizations. However, should Russia’s dominating role in CSTO and an unwillingness to recognize Moscow’s privileged interest in Central Asia be the major arguments to prevent such cooperation—as has been the case considering U.S. and Alliance statements in recent years—then NATO should make it publicly clear that it does not recognize the aforementioned status of Moscow, but only wants to cooperate to mutually engage the shared threats. After such a formal statement, there’s an opening for NATO and the EU to start joint action with CSTO and the SCO.

In conducting joint East-West organizational action, a division of labor could be established: CSTO-NATO carrying out military and security teamwork, with SCO-EU to handle socio-economic cooperation. As to military cooperation, Russia, China and CSTO have excluded the option of dispatching troop contingents to Afghanistan. However, military cooperation could be achieved in other ways.. First, an exchange of liaison officers of East and West to their mutual headquarters, in order to improve coordination of military action should occur. Furthermore, military intelligence services on both sides could share information on the opposing forces. Also, CSTO and NATO could combine their unilateral efforts of training Afghan (and Central Asian) law enforcement officers and border guards, as well as Afghan military personnel by supplying weapons and maintenance to the Afghan armed forces. Further cooperation could be found in joint demining actions on Afghan territory, since this would not mean permanent deployment of Eastern armed forces but incidental operations. NATO could also support Russia and CSTO in strengthening the border security capacities of the Central Asian states. In this manner other ways of military cooperation could be open for consideration as well. Military teamwork between NATO and CSTO-SCO, bearing in mind that East and West face the same threats, could also reduce mutual suspicion and distrust and improve stability and security in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the Central Asian region. Non-military options of cooperation of CSTO/SCO with NATO/EU are feasible in socio-economic domains. In this case the EU and SCO are on the forefront, cooperating in Afghanistan in areas such as direct relief and assistance (food supplies), encouraging good governance, state-building, police training and reconstruction projects (building schools, hospitals, water wells, roads, railway, bridges, etc.). If NATO continues its unwillingness to cooperate with CSTO and the SCO, this might have serious consequences for the security of Afghanistan and the Central Asian region. Is that really what NATO wants?

EDD EDM ITAR-TASS NVO RFE/RL RIAN

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Europe Diplomacy & Defence Eurasia Daily Monitor (The Jamestown Foundation) Informatsionnoye telegrafnoye agentstvo Rossii Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Russian Information Agency Novosti / RIA Novosti

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Smith, M.G. (2012) ‘Border hardening throughout Central Asia in anticipation of NATO pull-out’, EDM, 29 May. Socor, V. (2012) ‘Beijing proposes Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline through northern Afghanistan’, EDM, 19 June. Sodiqov, A. (2011) ‘Moscow blackmails Dushanbe to return to the Afghan border’, EDM, 16 August. Sodiqov, A. (2012) ‘Porous border and corruption keeps drugs flowing through Tajikistan’, EDM, 28 June. Vladykin, O. (2012) ‘Transgranichnyy transit gruzov NATO’, NVO, 22 June. Voloshin, G. (2012) ‘Central Asia prepares for post-2014 Afghanistan’, EDM, 10 December. Voloshin, G. (2013) ‘Kazakhstan proposes to expand its transit facilities on the Caspian to facilitate NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan’, EDM, 20 May. Weitz, R. (2012a) ‘Logistics and the Afghan endgame’, EDM, 16 April. Weitz, R. (2012b) ‘Kazakhstan pledges support to NATO’s Afghanistan transition strategy’, EDM, 1 June. Weitz, R. (2012c) ‘Nazarbayev-Karimov Summit imparts new momentum to Kazakhstani-Uzbekistani relations’, EDM, 14 September. Weitz, R. (2012d) ‘The SCO and Afghanistan: Challenges and opportunities’, Afghanistan Regional Forum, No. 3, Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University, December. Weitz, R. (2013) ‘Kazakhstan expands security and economic cooperation with Afghanistan’, EDM, 19 April. Yelensky, O. (2013) ‘Nepredskazuemost’ faktora-2014’, NVO, 5 July. Zenn, J. (2013a) ‘Militants threaten to return to Central Asia after NATO’s withdrawal from Afghanistan’, EDM, 14 January. Zenn, J. (2013b) ‘Central Asian leaders wary of post-2014 IMU threat’, EDM, 12 July. Zhang, H. (2011) ‘SCO can play “bigger role” in Afghanistan’, China Daily, 6 December.

Lieutenant Colonel (Royal Netherlands Army, ret.) Dr. Marcel de Haas (1961) is a Senior Research Associate on Russian security policy at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ in The Hague. He is also a Senior Researcher at the Russian Studies Centre of the University of Groningen. As a Russian studies scholar, he holds a PhD of the University of Amsterdam (2004) and a MA in Soviet Studies of Leiden University (1987). Dr. De Haas is a regular commentator for Dutch and international media outlets. He has lectured at American, Baltic, Belgium, British, Bulgarian, Chinese, Danish, Dutch, Georgian, NATO, Romanian, Russian and South-African defence colleges, universities and think tanks. He is author of the books Russia’s Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century: Putin, Medvedev and Beyond (2010); Russian Security and Air Power 1992-2002 (2004); and Soviet policy towards Southern Africa (1988; in Dutch). He has published more than 200 works, for the Clingendael Institute, UK Defence Academy, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Baltic Defence Review, Europe’s World, Russian Analytical Digest, Moscow Times, the Russian military-political weekly Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, as well as for Dutch journals and daily newspaper

Neutralization of the threats of international terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, transnational crime and illegal migration coming from Afghanistan and the prevention of destabilization of Central Asia and Transcaucasia. The on-going crisis in Afghanistan and the forthcoming withdrawal of international military contingents pose a great security threat to Russia and other CIS members. Russia together with CSTO, SCO and other multilateral institutions including Russia-NATO projects, will make consistent efforts to find a just and lasting political solution to the problems of Afghanistan. Measures are taken to reduce terrorist threat from Afghanistan and eliminate or reduce illicit drug production and traffic. Russia is committed to further intensifying international efforts aimed at helping Afghanistan and its neighbouring states to meet these challenges.

February 2013

Foreign Policy Concept

The citations are mostly not literally derived from the different security documents, but adapted by the author. The citations in bold are accentuated by the author. Sources: OFP 2007: http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/3647DA97748A106BC32572AB002AC4DD; FPC 2008: http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/nsosndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/869c9d2b87ad8014c32575d9002b1c38!OpenDocument; FPC 2013: http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/76389fec168189ed44257b2e0039b16d!OpenDocument.

Elimination of terrorist and drug trafficking threats emanating from Afghanistan and prevention of destabilization of Central Asia and Trans Caucasus. The deepening crisis in Afghanistan poses a threat to the security of the southern CIS boundaries. Russia together with CSTO, SCO and others makes consistent efforts to prevent export of terrorism and drugs from Afghanistan and find a lasting political solution to its problems.

July 2008

March 2007

A pilot project of the NRC to train on Russian bases antinarcotics officers for law enforcement organs of Afghanistan and Central Asian states. After the war in Afghanistan a dissemination of terrorist elements to other countries shall start, which will be a serious factor of destabilisation. Continue to support the reconstruction of Afghanistan, to solve its social-economic problems and to build its army. CSTO and SCO can play a positive role in the fight against narcotics and terror and in promoting stabilization around Afghanistan and in Central Asia. In Central Asia the U.S. seeks a new structure by uniting these five states, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, with finances and technology. However, a failure and subsequent withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO from Afghanistan would confront the Central Asian states and Russia with the Afghan threats of narcotics, terrorism, fundamentalism and destabilization. Russia has repeatedly offered NATO to cooperate with the CSTO around Afghanistan. NATO and CSTO could jointly guard the Tajik-Afghan border with Russia and Tajikistan.

Foreign Policy Concept

Overview of Foreign Policy

Table 1: Russiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s security documents â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Entries on Afghanistan (2007-2013)

RF PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV (interviewed by Der Spiegel): If the alliance forces do not help the country to gain statehood, then any attempts from outside to stabilize the situation will fail, no matter how many thoU.S.nds of soldiers of the international contingent are present there.

RF PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV (interviewed by CNN): putting an end to the massive heroin traffic from Afghanistan. That is our common burning problem. Practically all hard drugs in Europe are of Afghan origin. So, we are interested in an overall success there.

RF PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV (Joint Press Conference with US President Obama Following Russian-American Talks): We have signed an agreement on military transit, that will allow the transit of lethal military equipment through Russia to Afghanistan. This is a substantial contribution by Russia to our international effort, and it will save the U.S. time and resources in giving our troops the support that they need. The subject of U.S.-Russian cooperation in Afghanistan is extremely important. As to Afghanistan, progress is either not yet visible or is insignificant. US PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: Russia has its own concerns about extremism and terrorism. Russia also has deep concerns about the drug trade and its infiltration into Russia. And Russia has extraordinary capabilities when it comes to training police forces, training armies. We need to further discuss both the military efforts in Afghanistan but also the development efforts and the diplomatic efforts so that we can make progress. But I just want to thank again the Russian government for the agreement for military transit.

RF PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV (Interview to RAI and Corriere della Sera): Concerning Afghanistan, of course we are ready to cooperate with alliance forces, not in the military sense, but in the field of counter-terrorism. We have allowed civilian and military transit from a number of European countries across our territory. We will be talking with President Obama about transit to Afghanistan when he comes next week. And I think that this is our contribution to solving the problem of terrorism, including in the Afghan region. Russia has been at the forefront of defending against a number of different threats: the terrorist threat because of the gunmen infiltrating Central Asia to get to Russia, and the drug menace that uses the same route to get into Russia and is of course intent on getting to Europe.

RF PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV (Interview with BBC): Initially, we have supported the efforts of Americans and the Allied States aimed at preventing the terrorist threat coming from Afghanistan. Moreover, a few times we have simply rendered an open assistance when we were asked whether it was possible to deploy these or those forces or bases. Our response was simple: these are antiterrorist measures and we recommend to our friends, to our partners, including from the Central Asia, to help in this respect. I believe that today a number of threats are still there. And in that sense we are ready to participate in the efforts directed at putting things in order, at preventing terrorist attacks.

Statement

The citations are mostly not literally derived from the texts, but adapted by the author. The citations in bold are accentuated by the author. Source: http://eng.kremlin.ru/news; http://oldsearch.kremlin.ru/kremlin_en/.

7 Nov 2009

20 Sep 2009

6 July 2009

5 July 2009

2009

29 March

Date

Table 2: RF Presidents Medvedev and Putin â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Statements on Afghanistan (2009-2013)

21 Jan 2011

20 Nov 2010

18 Oct 2010

18 Aug 2010

RF PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV (News conference following Russian-Afghan talks). Another important practical step was the agreement we have just signed on trade and economic cooperation between our two states. Examples of such joint projects include the results of our cooperation in energy sector; such as for Russia to participate in building new hydro power plants in other Afghan provinces. As to educational projects in Russia, quotas for civilian students but also military personnel for the Afghan army and law enforcement agencies, and for the police, will increase. We hope that Afghanistan will integrate itself into regional associations more actively with every year, we are happy to welcome Afghanistan as a guest participating in the work of the SCO.

RF PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV (News conference following NATO-Russia Council meeting): As to cooperation with NATO on Afghanistan, we looked at the various options for transit of supplies, including military supplies, via Russia. We are continuing our cooperation in combating the drugs trade. This is a crucial issue for the Russian Federation because, unfortunately, almost all of the heroin and opiates produced in Afghanistan comes first of all into our country and then goes further into Europe. We are ready to supply various types of equipment to Afghanistan, and weapons too if needed, and we are doing this. We are ready to work in economic areas too.

RF PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV (Speech at presentation by foreign ambassadors of their letters of credence): We take further our cooperation with the Afghan leadership, including through the Russia-NATO Council, and the OSCE, and to build up more active and closer efforts to combat the spread of terrorism and drug trafficking. We are ready to look for promising opportunities for economic cooperation with Afghanistan.

RF PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV (Meeting with the Presidents of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan): Drug trafficking is a common problem. We need to have one joint response to the threat of drug trafficking, rather than isolated ones, and we must work together to tackle it.

RF PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV (Meeting with President of Afghanistan Karzai): Russia is ready to build up economic ties with our Afghan partners. Today, we will examine a number of specific issues. As to counterterrorism, we will continue to support the Afghan Government’s efforts to fight terrorism and will do everything we can to help in this respect. We continue our joint efforts in preventing drugs trafficking which is a common problem. This is not just Afghanistan’s problem, but is a common problem for all countries in the region, including Russia.

US PRESIDENT OBAMA (Joint News Conference following Russian-American Talks): Russian transit routes now play a vital role in supplying American and NATO forces in Afghanistan. RF PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV: The US are helping the people of Afghanistan to fulfil their long-cherished dream of making their country an effectively functioning and independent state and rebuilding their civil society and economy. In this respect we support the US’ efforts.

RF PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV (interview by the Wall Street Journal): the US military base in Kyrgyzstan should fulfil specific tasks and finish its operation, it should not be there forever. In any case, we cooperate with the U.S. on Afghanistan. We provide the maximum support to the mission of establishing order in Afghanistan that is performed by the US and other countries.

18 June 2010

24 June 2010

Statement

Date

6 Sep 2012

2 July 2012

7 June 2012

RF PRESIDENT PUTIN (Interview to Russia Today TV Channel): The US and then its allies went into Afghanistan, and now they’re all looking forward to getting out of there. Russia will assist ISAF in withdrawing troops and hardware from Afghanistan through our transit routes. The Soviet Union in 1979 sent its troops to Afghanistan. At that time, our current partners supported a rebel movement there and basically gave rise to Al-Qaeda, a US pet project that later targeted its creator. As to the drugs problem, the situation has not yet improved – instead, it has deteriorated. The amount of drugs produced in Afghanistan has increased by 60 percent in the past year. For Russia, this is a very serious threat to our national security that cannot be overstated. More than 20 percent of the overall drug traffic coming from Afghanistan is marketed inside Russia. Drug revenues are partly used to finance terrorist activities. But even this awareness and the realisation that Europe is being flooded with Afghan-made drugs are not enough to encourage our partners to seriously tackle this issue.

RF PRESIDENT PUTIN (Meeting of the Commission for Military Technology Cooperation with Foreign States): As part of the contract for delivering Mi-17 helicopters to Afghanistan’s armed forces, our specialists are training Afghan Air Force technical personnel.

RF PRESIDENT PUTIN (Meeting with President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai): As to bilateral cooperation, in the humanitarian sphere continues to develop: we have Afghan students studying in Russia. In the event of acute crises, the Russian Emergencies Ministry has provided assistance on a number of occasions. Afghan servicemen are being trained in Russia, and we are ready to provide support in establishing and upgrading Afghan security forces and military equipment.

RF PRESIDENT PUTIN (Address at the meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State): We have always advocated closer cooperation between the SCO and Afghanistan. President Karzai has been taking part in our annual summits since 2004. The International Conference on Afghanistan was held in Moscow in March 2009 under the SCO aegis. SCO consultations at the level of deputy foreign ministers focused on the Afghan problem take place on a regular basis, twice a year. Today, we will discuss the issue of granting SCO observer status to Afghanistan. We hope that this will allow our Afghan friends to make an even greater contribution to the development of regional cooperation.

RF PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV (Press statement following a meeting with the Presidents of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan): Concerning the energy sector project, CASA-1000, building an electricity transmission line from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Russia is ready to take part in this project and invest considerable money in it. There are also plans for big gas transit projects, in particular, the Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline project, in which Russia is also ready to take part.

RF PRESIDENT MEDVEDEV (Meeting at the Federal Drug Control Service’s Moscow office): From December 2010 until March 2011 we created a joint operations group with the U.S., Afghanistan and Tajikistan, and carried out four operations to seize drugs and uncover laboratories that were targeting supplies to Russia. This had impact on the supply of heroin to Russia; the supply did not increase last year, but fell slightly.

20 Apr 2011

2 Sep 2011

Statement

Date

28 May 2013

08 May 2013

11 March 2013

Date

RF PRESIDENT PUTIN (At an informal meeting of the CSTO member countries’ heads of state). Particular attention was paid to measures aimed at combating threats emanating from Afghanistan, in view of the upcoming withdrawal of international forces in 2014. The summit participants also talked about strengthening the Tajik-Afghan border, and measures to combat drug trafficking and extremism. PUTIN: I very much hope that we will confer about the developments in Afghanistan and the steps we must take to respond to any changes in the situation there and ensure the security of our nations.

We have every reason to expect that the upcoming period will bring further complications in the situation. For these reasons we are to have a clear action strategy to be able to reliably protect Russia’s interests no matter what turn circumstances take: 1. First, we should reinforce the security system in the strategic southern direction, including the military component. We are to use the full arsenal of preventive measures, and also the potential offered by the CSTO and the SCO. We have to beef up protection of our state borders, tighten our migration control system, speed up work to equip the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Force with modern arms and equipment, and make our work to suppress drug trafficking channels far more effective. 2. Second, solidly established sovereignty and stable economic and social development are the guarantees of stability in the region. We are ready to provide our neighbours and partners with all necessary assistance. This includes carrying out joint economic projects, military technical aid, building up cooperation in the humanitarian sphere, including training personnel and specialists.

Next year, 2014, will not be easy for Afghanistan. The bulk of the foreign military contingent there will be withdrawn. The Afghans themselves will shoulder a much greater share of the responsibility for ensuring security and fighting terrorism. But Afghanistan’s army and police force are still in the process of formation and have a lot of problems. Terrorist and radical groups have become increasingly more active of late. Added to this is the substantial increase in the amount of drugs being produced in Afghanistan and the formation of stable drug trafficking channels to other countries, including Russia. The international forces are doing almost nothing to eradicate drug production in Afghanistan. Russia’s proposals in this area have unfortunately been ignored.

RF PRESIDENT PUTIN (Meeting of the SCRF). Afghanistan is a matter of direct concern for our national security. We must ensure stability along Russia’s southern borders in general and in the Eurasian region in particular. We are helping Afghanistan to train civilian, military and police specialists, and we provide humanitarian assistance.

RF PRESIDENT PUTIN (Working meeting with Director of the Federal Drug Control Service): We have succeeded in putting in place effective international cooperation over the last year to suppress the supply channels bringing hard drugs from Afghanistan into Russia. This is especially true of our cooperation with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Our successful operations to suppress heroin supply channels and the operations we have carried out in Afghanistan with the support of our American partners and the Afghan drug control authorities have reduced the amount of heroin arriving in Russia.

Statement

There is a negative impact from outside and especially from Afghanistan on the situation of CSTO member states. This country is now a zone of instability, a source of spread of the ideas of Islamic fundamentalism, territory-based militias and extremist terrorist organizations and militant training camps, including citizens from CSTO states.

Action Plan of the CSTO to address the challenges and threats emanating from Afghanistan. Intention of an action plan in case of worsening of the situation in Afghanistan after 2014, when NATO troops are to leave this country. Of particular concern is the complicated situation in Afghanistan, which is directly adjacent to the zone of responsibility of the CSTO. The achievement of peace and stability in Afghanistan is one of the main factors of ensuring regional and international security. In Kyrgyzstan is a U.S. Air Force base, placed in Bishkek in 2001, at Manas International Airport as part of "Operation Enduring Freedom" in Afghanistan. Later it became a key point of the transfer of equipment and U.S. troops to the battlefield in Afghanistan. At a CSTO Council meeting in the Kremlin a CSTO action plan will be discussed in case of aggravation of the situation in Afghanistan after 2014. Joint measures will be worked out in the event of deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of most of the Western coalition troops (ISAF) from the country. In order to respond to possible changes in the situation in the region and anticipation of negative consequences for the CSTO. In particular, the plan provided for negotiations on securing transit to Afghanistan, countering terrorism, drug trafficking, organized crime and other threats emanating from Afghanistan, under the auspices of, or on behalf of the CSTO. To realize contacts with the authorities of Afghanistan and Pakistan to curb the activities on their territory of training camps of militants from the CIS countries, and to provide assistance to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in ensuring border security.

CSTO reaffirms its commitment to the establishment of Afghanistan as a peaceful, stable and independent state. In order to strengthen security and stability in the region around Afghanistan, including Central Asia, the CSTO will continue to provide assistance to the process of stabilization, management and restoration of peace in Afghanistan. The CSTO wants to step up joint efforts of the international community to counter the growing threat of drugs, better coordination in the fight against the penetration of drugs from Afghanistan, including through the creation around of a "belt" of anti-drug security around the country, strengthening of national institutions, struggling with drug trafficking, and the training of related specialists. Decision regarding "The expectation of the situation in Afghanistan until 2015 and measures to tackle the threats from that country.”

Draft plan of joint action to help stabilize the situation in Afghanistan and address the challenges and threats emanating from Afghanistan. Decision regarding "The expectation of the situation in Afghanistan until 2015 and measures to tackle the threats from that country.”

The citations are mostly not literally derived from the different security documents, but are adapted by the author. The citations in bold are accentuated by the author. Sources: http://www.odkb-csto.org/session/; http://www.sectsco.org/EN123/index.asp.

Moscow

2011

20 Dec

Moscow

10 Dec 2010

Moscow

14 June 2009

Moscow

CSTO

Table 3: CSTO and SCO Summits – Declarations on Afghanistan (2009-2012)

2009

Moscow 27 March

2012

19 Dec

Interaction between the meeting of heads of anti-drug agencies of the SCO Member States and relevant Afghan authorities. The SCO considers establishing a regional anti-drug centre and a SCO training centre for officers of SCO Member States, Observers and Afghanistan, responsible for taking measures against illicit trafficking in drugs, psychotropic substances and their precursors.

Acknowledged the important role of ISAF to help the Government of Afghanistan provide security (…) and increasing effectiveness of counteracting illegal production and drug trafficking. Encouraged by growing dialogue between the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan aimed at strengthening of mutual trust, and at combating terrorism, including denying sanctuaries and dismantling the extremist and terrorist network and ideological centres. Underlined the need for sustained joint efforts to train Afghan experts in the field of countering drug trafficking, customs service and police. Welcomed the initiative of G8 to facilitate development projects aimed at social and economic development in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Statement, Declaration and Plan of Action of SCO and Afghanistan on combating terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime Welcomes efforts of the Afghan Government to decrease cultivation of opium, express concern about the continued cultivation and production of narcotics drugs as a source of financing terrorist activities in Afghanistan, the region and abroad, Supports the efforts of the Afghan Government and ISAF to improve law enforcement and combat the production and trafficking of narcotic drugs and curtailing the flow of precursors. Supports creating and reinforcing the “anti-drug and financial security belts” in the region and further improvement of the SCO drug control cooperation mechanism. Calls for wider cooperation between the SCO, CSTO and CIS on the anti-drug and counter-terrorism tracks, and stress the importance of the multilateral preventive operation named Operation Channel carried out under the CSTO auspices. The SCO expresses its commitment to enhance cooperation with all relevant States and international and regional organizations, namely UN, EU, CIS, CSTO, OSCE, NATO and CICA on matters of common interest on combating terrorism, illicit drug trafficking and organized crime in Afghanistan.

SCO

CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha submitted a forecast of the situation in Afghanistan in the medium term to 2015. The situation in Afghanistan continues to be tense and slightly predictable. Terrorist activities by the intransigent armed opposition have not waned, and in some areas of the country has become even more active. Virtually no results in the fight against drug production, a very high level of corruption, and the Afghan national armed forces and law enforcement agencies are not ready to fully ensure the security. Measures have been foreseen to counter threats from Afghanistan and to reduce their negative impact on the situation of the CSTO states, after the withdrawal in 2014 of the main part of the ISAF contingent. Cooperation to manage the reverse transit of goods from Afghanistan in supporting ISAF through the CSTO area of responsibility, by developing a CSTO mechanism of protecting the borders with Afghanistan. The creation of an anti-drugs security ‘belt’ around Afghanistan. The training of specialists of the counter narcotics agencies of the CSTO member states. To enhance the military capabilities of the CSTO states, considering the changes in the geopolitical situation as a result of the forthcoming reduction of ISAF in Afghanistan.

Tashkent 11 June 2010

16 June 2009

Yekaterinburg

Declaration of the Tenth Meeting of the Council of the Heads of the Member States of the SCO A continuing escalation of confrontation in Afghanistan, terrorism, drug trafficking and transnational organized crime rooted from this country remain a big source of threats in the region. Achieving peace and stability in Afghanistan is a crucial factor in ensuring security that promotes sustainable social and economic development of the region. Member States reaffirm the central role of the UN in coordinating international efforts in resolving the situation in Afghanistan. They believe that it is not possible to resolve the Afghan problem by only military means and support the continuation of the negotiation process under the UN auspices with participation of Afghans themselves. The SCO supports the establishment of Afghanistan as a peaceful and stable country, and proceeds from the importance of full respect to the rich historical and ethno-demographical roots of the multi-ethnic nation of Afghanistan and its traditional and religious values. The SCO supports the efforts of the Member States participating in implementation of the projects on economic reconstruction of Afghanistan, in collaboration with international institutions and other interested parties. The SCO Member States call upon the international community to intensify the efforts on countering the drug threat from Afghanistan in the whole chain of production and distribution of drugs. In this context, the Summit Participants express their readiness to cooperate with other international and regional structures, call upon ISAF to cooperate in sphere of anti-drug efforts with the SCO Member States.

Yekaterinburg Declaration of the Heads of the Member States of the SCO The SCO expresses grave concern over the complicated situation in Afghanistan related to illicit drug trafficking, terrorism and transnational organised crime which pose a threat to the whole international community. The SCO acknowledges the need to increase interaction with the SCO observer states, Afghanistan and other states concerned, as well as with regional and international organisations, first and foremost, the UN and its specialised institutions, to establish anti-narcotic and financial security belts in the region.

Engage SCO Observers, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan in the creation of "anti-drug and financial security belts". The SCO will continue efforts to expand the mandate of ISAF in Afghanistan in combating illicit drug trafficking and drug cultivation. In the fight against terrorism efforts will be focused on the following areas: border control; conducting joint operations to counter terrorist threats; involving Afghanistan in a phased manner, in the SCO-wide collaboration in fighting terrorism in the region; mechanisms to prevent and suppress terrorist activities; joint efforts to obtain information regarding terrorist organizations; setting up an expert consultation mechanism on the basis of the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure and Afghan relevant authorities; providing assistance in apprehension and transfer of terrorists; inviting Afghan bodies for joint SCO law enforcement exercises against terrorism. advance cooperation with relevant Afghan authorities to fight illicit trafficking in weapons, munitions and explosives and other forms of transnational organized crime. The SCO considers raising the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group to the level of directors of departments of the MFAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s of SCO Members and Afghanistan and considers interaction with CSTO MFAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Working Group on Afghanistan, to jointly combat terrorism, drug production and trafficking, and organized crime. The SCO will further develop their bilateral trade and economic cooperation with Afghanistan, engagement in international efforts to provide assistance in its economic recovery.

Beijing 7 June 2012

Astana 15 June 2011

SCO Summit in Beijing The SCO member states agreed to accept Afghanistan as an Observer. China announced that it will provide a 150-million-yuan (23.8 million U.S. dollars) grant to the Afghan government during 2012. A joint Declaration between China and Afghanistan was made on establishing Strategic and Cooperative Partnership. On the basis of the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation of 2006, they will continue to expand bilateral trade and investment and deepen economic cooperation. The SCO declared to play a bigger role in troubled Afghanistan. An action plan for Afghanistan was launched as a key issue of the agenda. The SCO stressed that the situation in Afghanistan has a direct impact on the entire region. The detailed plan envisages reconstructing that country and bringing stability to the region.

Joint CommuniquĂŠ of meeting of the Council of the Heads of the Member States of the SCO, commemorating SCO 10th anniversary The member states stated that the unresolved situation in Afghanistan coupled with the continuing tension and confrontation in the country remains one of the key sources of threats to the regional security and stability. Whilst underlining the impossibility of settling the Afghan conflict solely through military means, the member states are unanimous about the need to pay priority attention to sorting out the socioeconomic issues in Afghanistan, including the reconstruction of communications and public infrastructure. In this regard the SCO supports the efforts of the member states involved in the implementation of economic reconstruction projects in Afghanistan in conjunction with international institutions and other interested parties.

Astana Declaration of the 10th Anniversary of SCO The SCO calls for Afghanistan to become an independent, neutral, peaceful and prosperous country. The achievement of peace and stability in Afghanistan is one of the main factors in ensuring regional and international security. The SCO member states will continue to assist the friendly Afghan nation in its reconstruction efforts.

In the Common Space on External Security, political dialogue is frequent and takes place at many levels. The EU engages with Russia on (…) Afghanistan, (…) with the aim of developing common views and approaches. Russia is a key geopolitical actor, whose constructive involvement in international affairs is a necessary precondition for an effective international community.

Calls on the Swedish Presidency, the Council and the Commission to use the Summit to clearly express the EU’s concern (…) where Russia's constructive cooperation is crucial, due to its position in international politics, and on the need for increased cooperation in dealing with (…) Afghanistan (…).

The citations are mostly not literally derived from the different security documents, but are adapted by the author. The citations in bold are accentuated by the author. Sources: EU: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm; NATO: NATO – http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm.

Joint Action or Decision of the On the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for Central Asia: develop appropriate contacts and cooperation with European Council of 1 Oct 07; 12 Feb the main interested players in the region and all relevant regional and international organisations, including the SCO and the CSTO. 08; 16 Feb 09; 22 Feb 10; 11 Aug 10; 18 July 11; 25 June 12 and 24 June 13

European Parliament resolution of (…) the rapprochement on (…) Afghanistan (…) illustrate the enhanced climate of dialogue with Russia on different aspects of 17 June 10 on the 31 May EU/Russia foreign and security relations. summit

European Parliament resolution of 12 Nov 09 on the preparations for the EU-Russia Summit on 18 Nov 09

European Parliament (…) cooperation between the EU and Russia is beneficial for international stability; whereas, in addition, Russia has a responsibility recommendation to the Council of 2 to contribute to financial and political stability and a sense of security in Europe and in the world, (…); whereas the EU already April 09 on the new EU-Russia engages with Russia on Afghanistan (…). agreement

Communication from the Commission to the Council of 5 Nov 08: Review of EU-Russia relations

Commission staff working document A Memorandum of Understanding between the European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drugs Addiction and the Russian Federal from the Commission to the Council Drugs Control Service was signed in 2007. The MoU facilitates exchanges of information between the two agencies. Combating drug - Review of EU-Russia relations trafficking is high on the Russian agenda, particularly as regards precursors, synthetic drugs and heroin coming from Afghanistan. pursuant to the Extraordinary European Council of 1 Sep 08

Source

Table 4: EU and NATO – Statements on cooperation with Russia, CSTO and SCO concerning Afghanistan (2007-2013)

The NRC agreed that the success of international efforts in support of the Afghan Government in promoting peace and stability in and around Afghanistan is of utmost importance. Towards that end, a mechanism has been defined to facilitate land transit through Russian territory of goods to ISAF. Recognising the threat of narcotics trafficking in the region, the NRC today also decided to make the NRC Pilot Project for Counter-Narcotics Training of Afghan and Central Asian Personnel an on-going NRC initiative.

NATO-Russia Council Foreign Ministers meeting – 15 April 11

NATO-Russia Council at Heads of State and Government level – 20 Nov 10

NATO-Russia Council Action Plan on Terrorism. NRC nations will contribute to international efforts to promote stability in and around Afghanistan and thus, inter alia, forestall the spread of terrorism in the region.

The revised arrangements aimed at further facilitating railway transit of non-lethal ISAF goods through Russian territory are of particular value. Building on the success generated by the NRC Project on Counter-Narcotics Training, we welcome the inclusion of Pakistan as a participant country along with Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and we have agreed to expand the scope of the Project to provide further direct assistance to institutional capacitybuilding (…). With the aim of contributing to the ability of the Afghan Air Force to operate its helicopter fleet more efficiently, we have also tasked the development of an NRC Helicopter Maintenance Trust Fund in 2011.

Ministers expressed strong common interest in the establishment of peace and stability in Afghanistan. They welcomed toward that Meeting of the NATO-Russia Council end arrangements to facilitate land transit through Russian territory of goods in support of ISAF, and the decision to make the NRC in Defence Ministers session – 13 Project for Counter-Narcotics Training of Afghan and Central Asian Personnel an on-going initiative. June 08

NATO-Russia Council at the level of Heads of State and Government – 04 April 08

Ministers agreed that all NRC member states share a fundamental interest in the success of international efforts to promote peace Meeting of the NATO-Russia Council and stability in and around Afghanistan, and resolved to continue co-operation in support of those efforts. They welcomed the at the level of Foreign Ministers – 07 successful conclusion of the initial phase of the NRC Pilot Project on Counter-Narcotics Training of Afghan and Central Asian Dec 07 Personnel, and the launch of the Project’s second phase in January 2008.

Ambassadors remain concerned over the threats posed by trafficking in narcotics, including its links to the financing of terrorism. Meeting of the NATO-Russia Council Building upon the successful implementation to date of the NRC Pilot Project for Counter-Narcotics Training of Afghan and Central – 26 June 07 Asian Personnel, they agreed to extend this project to 2009. They also tasked experts to carry forward work in other areas that would enhance our ability to promote peace and stability in Afghanistan, including the development of a NATO-Russia Framework Agreement on Air Transport.

NATO

Meeting of the NATO-Russia Council at the level of Foreign Ministers – 19 April 12

Foreign ministers agreed that the stability of Afghanistan remains vital for all of us. They welcomed that the NRC has trained 2,000 counter-narcotics personnel from Afghanistan and its neighbours, and that Afghan helicopter technicians are being trained and spare parts will be provided in support of the Afghan Air Force. The two-way transit arrangements (…) are an important contribution to the ISAF mission. Ministers looked forward to further cooperation on Afghanistan, including by taking into account the activities of relevant regional actors.

On CSTO, we don’t think we need new institutional frameworks, but we, actually NATO very often meet with individual members of Press conference by NATO Secretary CSTO and we cooperate with individual members of CSTO also when it comes to counter-narcotics, which I think is a very important General Anders Fogh Rasmussen project. So we cooperate with individual nations. We don’t think it’s necessary to build new institutional structures between with Moscow-based journalists – 26 NATO and CSTO as an organization. March 12