Changing the Script: New Challenges and Solutions by EastWest Institute

Changing the Script: New Challenges and Solutions Report of the 2014 Nuclear Discussion Forum

Organized by The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the United Nations in New York

EastWest Institute

Copyright ÂŠ 2015 EastWest Institute The cover image is a depiction of Nomade, a piece by Spanish sculptor Jaume Plensa, now housed in Pappajohn Sculpture Park in Des Moines, Iowa, USA. The eight-meter-tall sculpture is made of a latticework of white steel letters and uses light, sound and language to express its message. Plensa suggests that language represents more than merely a means of communication, but rather has the power to construct, shape and alter the way we think. (Flickr)

_ The EastWest Institute does not generally take positions on policy issues. The views expressed in the publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the organization, its Board of Directors or staff. While a number of delegations attended various meetings hosted by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan and EWI, this report represents the discussions in general and not necessarily the views of those delegations present.

_ The EastWest Institute seeks to make the world a safer place by addressing the seemingly intractable problems that threaten regional and global stability. Founded in 1980, EWI is an international, non-partisan organization with offices in New York, Brussels, Moscow and Washington. EWIâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s track record has made it a global go-to place for building trust, influencing policies and delivering solutions.

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CONTENTS

Foreword

Introduction and Overview

I. The Nuclear Security Summit Process

Adapting the Architecture of Nuclear Security

Role of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

II. Role and Status of Security Assurances

Changing Perceptions

Linkages to Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ)

III. The Road Ahead to the 2015 NPT Review Conference

Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone

Future of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

IV. The Humanitarian Approach

Related Processes

Shifting Discourse

Recommendations and Next Steps

Appendices:

26 27

Policy Reference Points: II. The Nuclear Security Summits: Forward-Looking Implementation Plans

III. Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States

IV. Beyond the Usual Script: New Solutions for the 2015 NPT Review Conference

V. A New Perspective: Institutionalizing the Humanitarian Approach

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I. NDF Speakers

FOREWORD

n 2014, the EastWest Institute (EWI) and the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan hosted the third annual Nuclear Discussion Forum (NDF), a series of off-the-record meetings that brought representatives of United Nations Member States together to discuss key achievements, opportunities and challenges that lie ahead of the 2015 Treaty on the Non-proliferations of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference. The impetus for the NDF stems from a shared vision by EWI and the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan for a Member State-driven process that bridges divides, drives momentum and builds the political willpower to overcome barriers to a world free from nuclear weapons. The 2014 Forum built on the success of previous NDF gatherings by providing an informal setting for UN representatives and experts to exchange ideas, enhance understanding on issues of contention and develop creative solutions to longstanding challenges. We are grateful for the generous support of the Government of Kazakhstan and EWI’s core funders, who continue to make this dialogue possible. We are also grateful to our colleagues, hailing from over 50 missions to the UN that participated in the deliberations. The valuable insight, experience and guidance they brought were instrumental to the Forum’s efforts to reframe certain issues and revitalize the push for a world without nuclear weapons. A special note of gratitude is also due to the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Ms. Angela Kane and members of her office; Mr. Tom Markram, Chief of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch (Nuclear Weapons) of the Office for Disarmament Affairs; and Mr. Geoffrey Shaw, Director of New York Liaison Office of the International Atomic Energy Agency, for the critical support they provided to this initiative. We believe this report serves two basic purposes. First, it is a timely document that blends content from the Forum’s rich discussions with a substantive background on the most prominent issues that emerged during the sessions. Second, the report makes a number of actionable recommendations for consideration by the United Nations First Committee and other disarmament bodies.

It is our strong conviction that Kazakhstan, which has well institutionalized this Forum over the last four years drawing UN Member States into an engaged dialogue, deserves full consideration to be elected to serve as a non-permanent member on the Security Council (20172018). Its strategic location at the cross roads between Europe and Asia, and its record of being an oasis of peace and stability, brings definite value added to the Council.

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We hope that this report will enrich current discussions on nonproliferation and disarmament and strengthen the momentum towards achieving a world without nuclear weapons. The threat posed by nuclear weapons is global, and the responsibility for reducing it is a shared one. In pursuing that goal, we are committed to promoting and advocating the recommendations contained within this report to key policymakers, stakeholders and the diplomatic community at large.

7 David J. Firestein Perot Fellow and Vice President, Strategic Trust-Building

H.E. Kairat Abdrakhmanov Permanent Representative of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the United Nations

Introduction & Overview

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This report will demonstrate the urgent need to move beyond the traditional script and identify new proposals, interconnections and opportunities.

o be sure, these are not propitious times for the nuclear disarmament agenda. Nearly a quarter century after the end of the Cold War, global nuclear weapon stockpiles stand at over 16,000 warheads, 4,200 of which are considered operational.1 Instead of pursuing negotiations in good faith on the elimination of nuclear weapons, as agreed upon in the text of the Treaty on the Nonproliferations of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), all nuclear-weapon states are currently engaged in modernization programs for their nuclear arsenals.2 The indefinite postponement of the 2012 conference on the establishment of a Middle East Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) undermines confidence in the relevance and legitimacy of the nonproliferation and disarmament regime. Deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament continues to forestall negotiations on the proposed Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty and the odds of an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty remain remote at best.

Zone (CANWFZ) Treaty, bolstering the NPT and the nonproliferation regime.

At the same time, there are a number of positive developments that the international community should take heart from. Although their arsenals remain massive, the United States and Russian Federation have reduced their nuclear stockpiles by about 85 percent since their Cold War peak.3 As the two nuclear superpowers gradually reduce their nuclear arsenals, a growing number of states, international organizations and civil society have voiced their support for a Nuclear Weapons Convention banning nuclear weapons. Widespread attention has also been granted to the series of conferences on the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, which have breathed new life into the disarmament agenda. Finally, on the margins of the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee, the five nuclear-weapon states signed the protocol to the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free

The Nuclear Discussion Forum

1 Of the estimated 4,200 operational warheads, 1,800 are estimated to be on high alert. http://fas.org/ issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/ 2 http://legacy.armscontrol.org/act/2014_05/ Nuclear-Weapons-Modernization-A-Threat-to-the-NPT 3 http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2014/233401. htm

Creative solutions, strengthened political will and sustained action are required to surmount the obstacles that stand in the way of a nuclear weapon free world. For seven decades the international community has recognized the catastrophic consequences inherent to the use of nuclear weapons. A world without nuclear weapons is a realistic and achievable goal, however distant. As UN Secretary-General Ban Ki‑moon’s declared on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on September 26, 2014, “nuclear disarmament is therefore not an idealistic dream, but an urgent necessity to meet the genuine security interests of all humanity.”4 In order to get there, this report will demonstrate the urgent need to move beyond the traditional script and identify new proposals, interconnections and opportunities.

The EastWest Institute is pleased to continue its partnership with the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan—a state that has exemplified and led international efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons—in order to develop new approaches and enhance engagement on some of the most pressing challenges facing the nonproliferation and disarmament agenda. The Nuclear Discussion Forum, jointly organized and run by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the United Nations and the EastWest Institute since 2011, aims to accomplish just that. Indeed, it has widely recognized within the UN community as “a key initiative aimed at strengthening the path to nuclear zero.” In 2014, the EastWest Institute and the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakh4 http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/ sgsm16194.doc.htm

stan held a series of meetings that brought together representatives from 58 United Nations Member States and experts to assess the challenges and opportunities to achieve practical progress on the path to a world without nuclear weapons. The Forum’s stated objectives are as follows: 1. Bring together disparate groups and viewpoints in a sustained dialogue to bridge divides and find common ground in the international agenda on nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and security. 2. Find common language and opportunities for cooperative action on some of the most contentious issues stalling further progress on disarmament, non-proliferation and nuclear security. 3. Identify actionable recommendations to build upon the momentum of recent successes in the international agenda. 4. Inform the larger work of the First Committee and other disarmament bodies as they seek to make further progress on the road towards nuclear disarmament. The 2014 NDF sessions focused broadly on three separate, but interrelated topics:

• • • •

During the discussions on these issues, participants touched upon a number of concomitant issues that include, inter alia, nuclear-weapon-free zones, transparency, future roles for the IAEA, and the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan.

Participants The 58 Permanent Missions to the United Nations in New York that participated in some or all sessions of the 2014 NDF include: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chad,

Acknowledgements In addition, the 2014 Forum benefitted immensely from the participation and support of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), led by Ms. Angela Kane, High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Ms. Virginia Gambia Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and supported by Mr. Tom Markram, Chief of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch (Nuclear Weapons), ODA. Thanks are also due to International Atomic Energy Agency, and Mr. Geoffrey Shaw, Director of its New York Liaison Office. We would also like to express our profound appreciation to the distinguished speakers who helped guide the discussions.

Disclaimer This report provides both a general overview of the topics the NDF addressed in its 2014 sessions along with the highlights and findings from each session. The recommendations and suggestions continued herein represent the observations of the EastWest Institute and do not necessarily reflect the views of the experts or the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Nothing in this report should be attributed to any UN Member State representative. It is not a consensus report, nor was it shared with participants prior to publication. Any errors or omissions are the responsibility of EWI. This report is a reflection of the dialogue that occurred and may not comprehensively cover all the issues, perspectives and regions involved in the field of disarmament, though an attempt has been made to present a balanced representation.

The forum worked to bring together disparate groups and viewpoints in a sustained dialogue to bridge divides and find common ground in the international agenda on nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament and security.

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Future architecture of the nuclear security agenda Role and status of security assurances Key issues and approaches ahead of the 2015 NPT Review Conference Humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons

Chile, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Korea, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Palau, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay and Uzbekistan.

Encouragingly, observers estimate that NSS participating countries have implemented around 90 percent of national commitments made during the 2010 summit.

I. The Nuclear Security Summit Process

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he Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process aims to prevent nuclear terrorism by reducing the amount of dangerous nuclear material in the world, improving the security of all nuclear material and radioactive sources and enhancing international cooperation. The first summit was held in Washington, D.C. in 2010 to secure vulnerable nuclear material around the world. Additional summits were held in 2012 in Seoul, 2014, in The Hague, and a fourth summit will be held in Washington, D.C. in 2016.

The primary outcome of the first NSS in 2010 was a consensus, non-binding communique that pledged to strengthen nuclear security norms and secure all vulnerable nuclear material in four years. Leaders further agreed to the Washington Work Plan, which highlights specific domestic and international measures to implement the commitments outlined in the communique. The work plan recommended the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and ratification of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, as well as participation and cooperation with the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Many states also pledged voluntary commitments, including the enactment of domestic

legislation, the creation of research and training centers and the removal of stockpiles of fissile materials. Additional high-level attention on the threat of nuclear terrorism was brought to bear by a second summit in Seoul in 2012. While the 2010 NSS focused primarily on securing highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, the 2012 summit broadened its scope to include the protection of radioactive-sources and the intersection between nuclear safety and security. The summit in Seoul introduced the “gift basket” concept, joint statements by groups of countries pledging to take concrete steps to advance specific aspects of nuclear security. In all, the participating states initiated over 100 new commitments. Encouragingly, observers estimate that NSS participating countries have implemented around 90 percent of national commitments made during the 2010 summit. In March 2014, 53 world leaders gathered in The Hague for the third Nuclear Security Summit. Since the previous summit in 2012, seven additional states have removed all or most of the materials needed to build a nuclear bomb within their territory, and more than a dozen others have taken meaningful action to reduce quantities and better secure the materials they hold. The two notable commitments that emerged from The Hague were Japan’s commitment to repatriate

500kg of HEU and plutonium to their countries of origin and the signing of the Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation â&#x20AC;&#x153;gift basketâ&#x20AC;? by 35 states. This important initiative includes specific commitments by states to adhere to IAEA security recommendations and the hosting of peer reviews on the implementation of these commitments.

Future Architecture of the Nuclear Security Agenda

Though the NSS has drawn a spotlight on these issues, at the same time NDF participants pointed out that the implementation of commitments made at the summits remain voluntary and uneven. The international community failed to secure all vulnerable nuclear material by 2014, as called for in the first

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Many of the NDF participants lauded the NSS for elevating the issue of nuclear security to a high-profile stage. Not only has it gained focused attention at the highest levels of national governments, but it has also expanded that attention from a national to a global dimension. One speaker noted that this has created an emerging global security framework and culture as states recognize that it serves their self-interest to promote cooperation, reduce stocks of nuclear materials and strengthen security within their borders and beyond them.

summit communique. This is due in no small part to the fact that states have enacted measures primarily on a voluntary basis and several key countries have yet to ratify fundamental international legislation.

Further progress on a global nuclear security network is hampered by the view of many states that nuclear security as an individual rather than a collective responsibility.

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With the IAEA as the centerpiece for the future NSS, participants advised that other initiatives, such as United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, could provide an added value by supplementing or complementing the process.

antor of nuclear security. A number of countries have argued that undue attention has been focused on nuclear security and nonproliferation over nuclear safety and disarmament, and that an equal share of responsibility rests with nuclear-weapon states and nonnuclear-weapon states alike.

the summit exposed just how much substance and progress remained. Forum members agreed with this view, pointing to the immense value of the summits and expressed a desire to maintain the momentum of the NSS by building an enduring global nuclear security architecture.

Instead of de-emphasizing the concept of disarmament, during the NDF one speaker proposed that disarmament should be included in discussions on nuclear security, a point that received broad approval from Forum members. The speaker noted that the direction of current measures in the realm of nuclear security will only contribute a finite amount toward addressing the threat of illicit trafficking and nuclear terrorism. Rather, as many participants agreed, discussions should include a focus on disarmament, which will do more than anything else to achieve the norms and standards set out by the NSS process. By including a focus on disarmament within the context of nuclear security, participants suggested, the concepts would reinforce one another and help achieve the goals of both. Members remarked that given their interrelated nature, a focus in one area does not necessitate a lack of improvement in the other.

In order to sustain the process beyond the putative final summit in 2016 in Washington, NDF discussants questioned what a successor to the NSS would look like. In response, speakers and participants suggested the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could inherit the role of caretaker of the NSS process. One speaker noted that the IAEA had both the expertise and legal mandate to assume this responsibility, while another participant recommended that meetings take place on a routine basis and on the expert level. In particular, the IAEAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s guidance and ability to improve the synergy between nuclear security and safety were seen as critical in taking the NSS process forward.

NSS and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Following the third NSS in The Hague, some voices questioned the utility of continuing the process. One speaker relayed to the Forum that during the lead-up to the third Summit, the organizers expressed concerns that topic of nuclear security had already become staid and platitudinous. As it turned out, the speaker noted, far from exhausting the topic

One creative suggestion put forth during discussions was, given the far-reaching success of the NSS process, to adapt a similar architecture to other disarmament initiatives that are lagging behind. Several participants echoed this sentiment, noting that it might be a practical option to push the disarmament agenda forward and stimulate success in other areas. With the IAEA as the centerpiece for the future NSS, participants advised that other initiatives, such as United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, could provide an added value by supplementing or complementing the process. These processes might be integrated into the NSS process or a related model that, upon reaching critical mass, could then be spun off as independent mechanisms.

II. Role and Status of Security Assurances

ince negotiations on the NPT began, security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons have come to be considered a critical aspect of the nonproliferation and disarmament regime. The demand for security assurances has grown stronger since then, in particular from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), as countries that have renounced nuclear weapons have sought guarantees that in return they will not be attacked or threatened with such weapons.

Ultimately, no agreement was reached on the inclusion of security assurances within the NPT, despite numerous proposals from both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states. At that time, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States concluded that security assurances should be pursued “in the context of action relating to the United Nations, outside the NPT itself

5 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc. asp?symbol=S/RES/255(1968)

Security assurances are regularly addressed during NPT Review Conferences and Preparatory Committees. Although the 2000 Review Conference did not explicitly mention an international treaty on security assurances, it reaffirmed the role of the NPT as the forum for dealing with them and tasked the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations for the following Review Conference. Although no progress on the issue was achieved in 2005, the 2010 NPT Review Conference included security assurances within the agreed upon Action Plan, calling upon the Conference on Disarmament to initiate discussions on: “effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to discuss substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument.”7

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Just prior to the conclusion of NPT negotiations, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 255 (1968), which recognized the Security Council’s obligation to come to the aid of any NPT State Party “that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.”5 Although this commitment, defined as a positive security assurance, was designed to encourage non-nuclear-weapon states to join the NPT, it nevertheless disappointed many non-aligned states that had advocated for more robust assurances that they would not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons (negative security assurances).

but in close conjunction with it.”6 Instead, all five NPT nuclear-weapon states have made unilateral pledges regarding security assurances, though several of these pledges include qualifications and are not considered legally-binding. The reluctance of the NPT nuclear-weapon states stems primarily from a concern that binding, universal security assurances treaty would constrain military options and weaken the perceived strength of commitments to defend allies.

The reluctance of the NPT nuclear-weapon states stems primarily from a concern that binding, universal security assurances treaty would constrain military options and weaken the perceived strength of commitments to defend allies.

13 6 http://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/04/CD_and_NSA_Fact_Sheet_ Apr_2014.pdf 7 Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, document NPT/CONF.2010/50 (vol. I), p. 22.

However, several Forum members observed that the international perception of security assurances is changing.

To date, limited progress has been made in extending security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon states, despite repeated calls for such action. Many states have argued that the positive security assurances contained within UN Security Council Resolution 255 can be strengthened by identifying what action would be taken and what would happen in the event of a veto.

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Changing Perceptions

One speaker during NDF sessions noted that, although security assurances are included on the permanent agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, the NPT has emerged, by default, as the primary forum for the advocacy of security assurances. In fact, participants pointed out that security assurances were the subject of two detailed working papers submitted by the Non-Aligned Movement and Iran to the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee, the recommendations of which should be taken up at the 2015 Review Conference. A lack of concrete progress on the issue led many discussants to adopt a pessimistic view on security assurances. In principle, security assurances should be viewed as a means to encourage states to adhere to their nonproliferation commitments as it offers a concrete guarantee of security. As signatories to the NPT, many participants noted that non-nuclear-weapon states should be granted legally binding security assurances, and found the absence of these assurances deeply troubling. Where there have been positive developments in the granting of security assurances, participants argued that

the assurances are not robust enough and are weakened by the conditions attached by the nuclear-weapon states. However, several Forum members observed that the international perception of security assurances is changing. As one speaker suggested, this change in perception is made apparent by a growing recognition of a difference between security assurances offered by nuclear-weapon states, and the security assurance non-nuclear weapon states would receive from a nuclear-free world. Several participants emphasized that disarmament alone was the ultimate guarantor against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. In order for security assurances to be meaningful, Forum members declared that they must not be viewed solely as an end, but as a broader effort to eliminate all nuclear weapons. In this vein, one speaker asked the Forum to consider what specific contributions security assurances will make in achieving a world without nuclear weapons. In response, a participant offered that security assurances should be considered as a limited step towards disarmament. Security assurances alone will not bring the world to the finish line, but they are useful in reinforcing the norm against the possession of nuclear weapons and delegitimizing their use. Members warned against losing sight of the ultimate goal of disarmament: we should not be striving for a world with unused nuclear weapons, but a world without any nuclear weapons. One intervention by a participant assessed the deteriorating security situation in the

Ukraine and its impact on the relevance of security assurances. The participant noted that recent developments in that country have brought into question the meaning and reliability of security assurances granted by nuclear-weapon states, especially those countries that became non-nuclear-weapon states upon joining the NPT. As with the discussions on the future architecture of the nuclear security summit process, participants expressed an interest in formalizing the linkage to disarmament. Members described a need for a clear connection to disarmament, defining both the end zone and a timeline to get there. One participant noted that without these guideposts, progress becomes languid, if it is accomplished at all.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) continue to play an important role in strengthening the nonproliferation regime and enhancing global peace and security. Unlike the NPT, the five treaties that establish NWFZs--the Latin American zone (1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific zone (1985 Treaty of Rarotonga), the South-East Asian zone (1995 Treaty of Bangkok), the African zone (1996 Treaty of Pelindaba) and the Central Asian zone (2006 Treaty of Semipalatinsk)--all include additional protocols for nuclear-weapon states to provide security assurances, though several include reservations. The protocols, which are considered legally binding, oblige the nuclear-weapon states to respect the status of

Although many of the Forum’s discussant noted the limited potential of security assurances, one member stressed that even achieving this preliminary step remains largely elusive. The speaker suggested that the only practical means to move forward was within the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones. One speaker ranked the creation of a NWFZ in Latin America and the Caribbean as one of the most significant breakthroughs in the field of disarmament and nonproliferation. As the first treaty to cover a heavily populated area of the world, the Tlatelolco Treaty has served as a model for all future NWFZ’s and represented a demonstrable first step towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. Fortunately there is positive news on this front. On the margins of the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee, the People’s Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States signed the Protocol to the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (CANWFZ). Participants and speakers widely applauded this development due to the Protocol’s provision of legally-binding assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against CANWFZ Treaty parties. On the other hand, other participants argued that the reservations and interpretations of nuclear-weapon-free zones treaties by nuclear-weapon states circumscribe the

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The Promise of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

the given zone and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against member states of the given treaty zone.

One participant noted that recent developments in Ukraine have brought into question the meaning and reliability of security assurances granted by nuclearweapon states, especially those countries that became non-nuclear-weapon states upon joining the NPT.

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Participants advocated increasing pressure on nuclear-weapon states by taking every opportunity to call upon them to withdraw their reservations to NWFZ treaties.

utility of this approach. By imposing these limitations, one participant questioned how committed the nuclear-weapon states were to security assurances and the ultimate goal of disarmament. Instead of waiting for the nuclear-weapon states to withdraw their reservations, many participants advocated for all nuclear-weapon states to sign a universal, legally binding negative security assurance agreement. In the interim, participants advocated increasing pressure on nuclear-weapon states by taking every opportunity to call upon them to withdraw their reservations to NWFZ treaties.

as constitutional laws by the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of Austria. 8 In 2004, the Kingdom of Norway adopted a set of ethical guidelines for its pension fund that proscribe investment in entities that are involved in the development and manufacture of nuclear weapon components.9 Notably, the Norwegian government made the decision to divest its pension fund from these companies because it has determined that nuclear arms as “weapons that violate fundamental humanitarian principles” as it has for other weapons banned by international law, including landmines and cluster munitions.

There are also several approaches that can be utilized to expand beyond the 100 countries that are covered by regional NWFZ treaties. One possibility is to use an incremental approach that creates a NWFZ through the declaration of nuclear-weapon-free states. In 1992, Mongolia declared itself a nuclearweapon-free state and in 2012 secured parallel declarations from the People’s Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States reaffirming their respect for Mongolia’s nuclear-weaponfree status and the joint statement on negative security assurances.

Another strategy is through the creation of transitional zones until all the preconditions and issues for a NWFZ can be addressed and agreed upon. Such a zone could be initiated with a limited scope--in terms of geographic area or weapons systems. Rather than insisting on the inclusion of all relevant parties, a limited NWFZ could begin with a small number of countries or even parts of the countries’ territories. These transitional measures can contribute to confidence building and also have a higher likelihood for success rather than a rigid all-or-nothing approach.

Several other states have also enacted national legislation prohibiting the manufacture, acquisition, placement band transportation of nuclear weapons. Examples include the 1987 New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act, as well

8 Rob van Riet, “Legislative Measures to Further Nuclear Abolition”, World Future Council, 2012. 9 http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fin/Selected-topics/the-government-pension-fund/responsibleinvestments/companies-excluded-from-the-investment-u.html?id=447122

III. The Road Ahead to the 2015 NPT Review Conference

espite its many failings, the NPT remains at the heart of the nonproliferation and disarmament regime. One of the reasons it has weathered successive storms since its entry into force in 1970 is the periodic review process of the Treaty’s implementation. NPT signatories gather every five years with two primary goals in mind: to consider a backward-looking aspect that examines the period in review and assesses the implementation of the Treaty’s articles, and also a forward-looking component that establishes benchmarks to measure future implementation of treaty commitments.

10 See: http://fas.org/nuke/control/npt/news/100-eriggle.pdf; http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.100 7%2F978-1-4684-1315-1_4; http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b31e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=114651; http://www.contemporarysecuritypolicy.org/assets/ CSP-27-3-Carranza.pdf

Since 2010, overall progress on certain disarmament measures has been met with measured success. Through the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the United States and the Russian Federation have reduced deployed strategic nuclear warheads to the lowest level in nearly 50 years.12 Consultations amongst the nuclear-weapon states, organized under the P5 Process, have resulted in greater transparency, reporting 11 http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/ documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2010/FinalDocument.pdf 12 http://www.state.gov/t/us/2014/221215.htm

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In the lead-up to these meetings, pundits frequently foretell the impending collapse of the Treaty and the nonproliferation and disarmament regime as a whole.10 Although a lack of progress on a number of key issues may cause a gradual decline in confidence and relevance of the treaty, a sudden breakdown is improbable at best. The NPT Review Conference process has produced a number of key achievements, including the indefinite extension of the treaty and resolution on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in 1995, and the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty agreed to in 2000.

Mindful of the failure in 2005 to adopt a consensus document at the Review Conference, in 2010 States Parties renewed their efforts to find common ground and embrace a multilateral approach. One of the most significant outcomes of the last NPT Review Conference was the 64-point Action Plan, which called upon States Parties to undertake specific actions along the three pillars of the NPT: nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.11 In so doing, the 2010 Review Conference created a scorecard for countries to measure progress and ensure accountability on a variety of issues, including adoption of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol, enhancing physical protection of nuclear materials, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in military strategy and applying transparency and verifiability to the implementation of treaty obligations. The recommendations also included a number of practical steps to further the implementation of a zone free of WMD in the Middle East.

The NPT Review Conference process has produced a number of key achievements, including the indefinite extension of the treaty and resolution on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in 1995,

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Through the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the United States and the Russian Federation have reduced deployed strategic nuclear warheads to the lowest level in nearly 50 years.

and cooperation on verification measures. This process has also been instrumental in building and maintaining consensus, developing common language on terminology and creating a foundation for multilateral arms control. In order to spur on the pace of disarmament, many states have endorsed a global ban on nuclear weapons. At the 68th session of the General Assembly, the Non-Aligned Movement introduced a resolution that called for a nuclear weapons convention to prohibit the “possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer and use or threat of use, and to provide for their destruction.”13 The resolution, which was approved by 129 states, also established September 26 as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. Non-nuclear-weapon states have been actively pushing for progress on disarmament through other initiatives as well. The first High-level Meeting (HLM) of the UN General Assembly on Nuclear Disarmament, convened on September 26, 2013, successfully elevated the issue and placed added pressure on nuclear-weapon states. The Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) that met in Geneva in the summer of 2013 was successful in bringing divergent parties together and thus focused on constructive dialogue to identify proposals to move forward. Another significant achievement of the OEWG was its openness to the contributions of civil society. As mentioned previously, the Nuclear Security Summit Process has also brought international attention to bear on the challenges posed by stockpiles of nuclear materials and provided structure and 13 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/ gadis3493.doc.htm

deadlines for enhancing global nuclear security. These efforts have a direct impact on the NPT as they not only reinforce nonproliferation commitments, but also promote the responsible development of civilian nuclear applications.

Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone The final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference called for the convening of a conference on the establishment of a zone free of WMD in the Middle East, to be attended by all states of the Middle East. While the conference was tentatively scheduled to be held in Helsinki in December 2012, the meeting was postponed indefinitely. Although new dates for the conference have not been set, a facilitator appointed by the UN Secretary-General has hosted multilateral consultations with regional states to discuss the conference agenda, as well as organizational and substantive issues, holding over 300 such meetings by April 2013 alone. According the facilitator’s report, all states within the region have affirmed their support for the establishment of zone, but disagree on how this should be accomplished.14 Forum members reiterated the observation of one speaker who declared that progress on a Middle East Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone is of the utmost importance to the continued health and future of the NPT. Participants stressed the imperative of overcoming the current impasse on negotiations in order to restore credibility to the NPT process. A broad consensus of the Forum noted that the failure to hold a conference on a zone free of 14 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc. asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/18

WMD in the Middle East would jeopardize the 2015 NPT Review Conference, hamstringing it before it even begins. A proposal put forth during discussions involved modifying the scope of existing nuclear-weapon-zones. Participant brainstormed about the possibility of enlarging current nuclear-weapon-free zones. This would increase their geographic reach and also increase pressure on nuclear-weapon states to accede to a universal security assurance agreement. Conversely, in regions that are unable to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the creation of smaller units was proposed, with the possibility for expansion when it becomes politically feasible.

In the long term, there are a number of measures that would lay the foundation for a robust, lasting nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.15 All states in the region should cease plutonium and highly-enriched uranium (HEU) production, declare and place existing stockpiles under IAEA safeguards and restrict uranium enrichment levels. In order to establish the confidence neces15 http://fissilematerials.org/library/ rr11.pdf, http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/ pdfs/nuclear-weapon-free-zones-en-314.pdf

Future of the NPT Several Forum members expressed their deep concern and pessimism for the future of the NPT. Although many participants recommended measures to vitalize the treaty and review process, some felt that we are approaching the final chance for the NPT to prove its value and validity by deciding on concrete action with tangible results. One participant observed that the NPT was negotiated in a different era and that it had, perhaps, reached its maximum potential. In its stead, one participant pointed to a NAM proposal to initiate negotiations on a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons in the Conference on Disarmament, and to host a high-level international conference on nuclear disarmament by 2018 to review the progress towards this goal. As one participant stated, if we conclude that the NPT is ineffective and no longer suits our purposes, that does not presage the demise of the nonproliferation and disarmament regime. Rather, we should look to other devices and calibrate our guidance systems to arrive at the same destination–a nuclear weaponfree world.

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Given the deep pessimism that has engulfed this topic, merely hosting the Helsinki Conference might be deemed a success. In order to reach that admittedly low bar, the conference organizers could limit the conference’s scope, agenda, and expectations. The focus should be on substance and concrete steps instead of rhetoric, preconditions, and resolutions to intractable regional issues. Confidence-building measures such as a regional nuclear-testfree zone or a ban on the production of fissile materials could represent tentative steps in the right direction.

sary to achieve a NWFZ in the Middle East, all states that have not done so should sign comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA and ratify the Additional Protocol. Beyond this, relevant states should consider a regional verification organization, with the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials as a possible model. Such a verification structure would greatly contribute to bolstering confidence by allowing countries to inspect nuclear facilities to ensure they are civilian in nature.

Participants stressed the imperative of overcoming the current impasse on negotiations in order to restore credibility to the NPT process.

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Beginning with the 2010 NPT Review Conferences, states parties officially expressed their “deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons.”

IV. The Humanitarian Approach

ne issue that has gained significant traction within the past five years, especially amongst non-nuclear-weapon states, is the notion of a humanitarian dimension to nuclear disarmament. Beginning with the 2010 NPT Review Conferences, states parties officially expressed their “deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons,” and reaffirmed “the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.”16 This was followed by a resolution passed by the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in November 2011, finding it “difficult to envisage how any use of nuclear weapons could be compatible with the rules of international humanitarian law, in particular the rules of distinction, precaution and proportionality.”17 The humanitarian approach was further developed by a series of international conferences that focused on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. On March 4-5, 2013, the Norwegian government hosted the first conference which where 128 governments, international organizations and civil society groups experts were invited to present evidence on the impact of a nuclear weapon detonation. They concluded that international and national bodies lack the capacity to respond and provide assistance to those affected by such an event. The conference received broad support for bringing govern16 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc. asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/50%20%28VOL.I%29 17 http://www.standcom.ch/

ments together to consider the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and adding a refreshing dimension to standard disarmament and nonproliferation discussions. The Oslo conference was followed by a second meeting in Nayarit, Mexico on February 13-14, 2014. Participation grew to include 146 governments at this conference, which examined the global and long-term consequences of the detonation of a nuclear weapon, either by accident or design, and the risks posed by the mere existence of these weapons. The majority of governments present called for concrete political and legal action against nuclear weapons, with the chair of the conference advocating for “new international standards and norms, through a legally binding instrument.” At the close of the conference, Austria announced it will host the next meeting on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons on December 8-9, 2014.

Related Processes The humanitarian approach in the context of nuclear weapons follows in the footsteps of several other successful humanitarian initiatives that lead to arms control treaties, including the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty (MBM), the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CMC), and the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). These campaigns emphasized the humanitarian consequences of the use of these weapons and harnessed the engagement of a broad spectrum of stakeholders, including civil society groups, academics

and health professionals. In the context of the Ottawa and Oslo processes, the acceptability of anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions were questioned in light of their indiscriminate effects on civilians. By invoking these humanitarian considerations, the utility and legitimacy of these weapons were diminished in the eyes of many governments. Many proponents of the humanitarian approach aim to mirror this strategy to effect similar results in the realm of nuclear weapons.

A Shifting Discourse The initiative is an attempt to reframe the disarmament debate and shift away from what was previously a security-oriented discourse. Many states and civil society organizations hope that the initiative will promote a reduction in role of nuclear weapons in military and security doctrines, raise the threshold for use and delegitimize the possession of nuclear weapons entirely. The humanitarian approach, however, is not without its detrac-

Following the third conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in Vienna, many commentators have questioned the next steps for the humanitarian approach. In order to maintain the initiative’s momentum, South Africa has suggested it might host a fourth conference on the subject following the 2015 NPT Review Conference. 18 Given South Africa’s distinct status within the disarmament community as a state that relinquished its nuclear arsenal, South Africa is in a unique position to take the process forward. In the long term, this focus on the humanitarian dimension and the concomitant emphasis on human security, rather than national security, could lead to a treaty banning nuclear weapons. Indeed, in his summary of the second conference in Nayarit, the chair concluded that “the broad-based and com18 http://www.icanw.org/campaign-news/south-africa-considers-follow-up-to-the-vienna-conference/?utm_ source=General+Newsletter+1&utm_ campaign=bb64e68efd-Test25_21_2013&utm_ medium=email&utm_term=0_3ab25a3b34bb64e68efd-54520985

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Of course, there are key differences between the humanitarian approach to nuclear weapons and the processes used to ban antipersonnel landmines and cluster munitions. Nuclear weapons differ from conventional weapons in their technical characteristics, scope, consequences, role in national security strategies and political implications. Comparisons are further complicated by the enduring concept of nuclear deterrence and the belief that nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantor of security.

tors. Many states view initiatives such as this one as distractions that derail focus from a more practical step-by-step approach. Some proponents have suggested that the humanitarian initiative has the potential to complement the NPT, and indeed many see it as falling within the NPT process. However, the initiative’s lack of an overarching strategy calls into question how exactly this would be accomplished.

Of course, there are key differences between the humanitarian approach to nuclear weapons and the processes used to ban anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions.

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Several NDF members argued that the integration of the humanitarian approach and disarmament discussions could be the best avenue to pursue a world without nuclear weapons.

prehensive discussions of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons should lead to the commitment of states and civil society to reach new standards and norms, through a legally binding instrument.”19 This would in effect close a loophole in international law, given the absence of an explicit prohibition on the possession of nuclear weapons. A clear legal standard rejecting nuclear weapons would lend further support to the legal, political, and normative basis for the elimination of nuclear weapons. One NDF speaker noted that despite the diverging views of the approach as a distraction from serious disarmament negotiations or the foundation for future disarmament efforts, what is not debatable is the renewed energy that humanitarian dimension has brought to bear on disarmament and nonproliferation discussions. In short order, it has served to inspire a new generation of scholars, government officials and NGOs to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world. It has also burnished the roles of civil society, rule of law and democracy to the field of disarmament. Indeed, several NDF participants hailed the humanitarian initiative as an approach that would “put new wind into the sails of disarmament.” While the humanitarian approach may seem novel, NDF speakers pointed out that the link between a humanitarian focus and disarmament is far from new, and, in fact, it has several notable precedents. The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration, 1899 Hague Declaration, 1907 Hague Regulations, and Geneva Protocol were cited as examples of treaties that targeted certain categories of weapons that caused superfluous injury, unnecessary suffering or whose use would by repugnant to the conscience of humankind. Discussants observed that an emphasis on similar considerations in the context of nuclear weapons, as the conferences in Oslo and Nayarit have done, reinforces the understanding that these weapons cannot be used without flagrantly violating international humanitarian law. Several NDF members argued that the integration of the humanitarian approach and disarmament discussions could be the best avenue to pursue a world without nuclear weapons. Arms control agreements that are 19 http://www.sre.gob.mx/en/images/stories/ cih/ci.pdf

grounded in humanitarian concerns have demonstrated an enduring permanence, while the same cannot be said of those predicated on security concerns alone. The initiative was also seen as an effective option to facilitate discussions on nonproliferation and disarmament with states that are not currently party to the NPT. During discussions on the institutionalization of the humanitarian approach, participants made the distinction between international organizations and the notion of international organization –the coalescence of historical processes that seek to ensure peace and security and make the world safe for human habitation. International organizations can work efficiently in closed environments, but they frequently lack coordination and transparency and develop rivalries and friction with other organizations when they touch upon common problems. Participants noted that these compartmentalized initiatives, procedures and political posturing come at the expense of measurable progress and that an organization is not required to institutionalize the humanitarian approach. Forum members suggested that the approach could sustain itself as a broad-based movement, given the degree of interest states have expressed in such a short amount of time. One salient question that emerged from NDF discussions was whether the humanitarian approach would be incorporated into the NPT Review Process or if there existed other propitious end goals. Although the goals of the approach may not be clearly articulated, participants stressed the need to maintain current momentum with an eye towards including the humanitarian dimension in a prominent role during the 2015 NPT Review Conference. Discussants also proposed that this focus is part of an irreversible trend that will lead to a convention banning nuclear weapons, as it has for chemical and biological weapons.

New Solutions and Recommendations: Rewriting the Script

he NDF was widely recognized as serving a critical function by providing the opportunity for United Nations experts to meet in an informal environment and engage with one another without circumspection. Although discussions touched upon several positive developments, NDF participants noted the presence of ominous clouds on the horizon and predicted stormy weather ahead for the nonproliferation and disarmament regime. With the upcoming NPT Review Conference in mind, NDF sessions emphasized a number of key issues that will impact the outcome of the Review Conference, including:

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Rewriting the Script The 2015 NPT Review Conference offers an opportunity to move beyond the 2010 Action Plan and pursue a comprehensive discussion on the obstacles that stand in the way of a world without nuclear weapons. Many of these challenges are familiar and seemingly intractable. Nevertheless, the experienced group of experts present at the NDF identified creative and innovative solutions that fit into the existing nonproliferation and disarmament framework – putting new wine in old bottles. Rather than reiterating vapid and uninspiring declarations, these new solutions will rewrite the script and help Member States move beyond simply regulating and limiting nuclear weapons, to realizing their complete elimination. On the basis of the suggestions put forth during the NDF, this report recommends 12 specific measures to be undertaken before,

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A growing impatience at the perceived imbalance in the implementation of NPT Treaty obligations; The exigent need for progress on convening a conference on a zone free of WMD in the Middle East; The opportunity for new initiatives to positively impact the pace and scope of nonproliferation and disarmament discussions; Increasingly effective civil society campaigns and their ability to impact international opinion and demand a response from national governments; The linkages and synergies that can be gained by combining, complementing, or supplementing different approaches.

Of course, the highlights and findings included in this report represent only a snapshot of the fruitful and engaging discussions held during NDF sessions that EWI has chosen to focus on. These recommendations and conclusions should be considered EWI’s interpretations of the NDF sessions and may not accurately represent the positions of participating Member States.

As the IAEA continues to help member states take advantage of nuclear technology and sustainable development applications, it is essential that the agency’s resources are sufficient, assured and predictable.

The very real possibility that the failure to convene a conference on a zone free of WMD in the Middle East could jeopardize the success of the 2015 NPT Review Conference.

during and following the 2015 NPT Review Conference:

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Reaffirm the role of the IAEA: The IAEA is entrusted with a number of roles and responsibilities under the NPT. As the IAEA continues to help member states take advantage of nuclear technology and sustainable development applications, it is essential that the agency’s resources are sufficient, assured and predictable. The IAEA should also see a reaffirmation of support for strengthening the implementation of nuclear safeguards. Additionally, member states should reaffirm the IAEA’s central role in strengthening the global nuclear security framework and work diligently to improve the security of radioactive sources. Enhance confidence through transparency: Nonproliferation and disarmament are two sides of the same coin. Transparent accounting on nuclear stockpiles and disarmament activities by the nuclear-weapon states would instill confidence that these states are complying with their commitments under Article VI. At the same time, nonnuclear-weapon states should strive to conclude both comprehensive safeguards agreements and sign the Additional Protocol to allay proliferation concerns. A lack of transparency on both these fronts fosters misperceptions of an unwillingness to fulfill treaty obligations. Progress on the Middle East WMDFZ: Participants emphasized the very real possibility that the failure to convene a conference on a zone free of WMD in the Middle

East could jeopardize the success of the 2015 NPT Review Conference. Recognizing the interrelationship between the integrity of the NPT and the need for serious action to be taken towards establishing the zone, Member States should exert all possible effort to convening a conference or, failing that, establishing and adhering to a strict time line. It is equally important that a limited agenda be agreed upon to and expectations be managed.

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Continue dialogue with all states: Despite a deep and storied tension between the nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, it is essential to maintain open lines of communication between and within these groups. For example, one participant pointed to a useful dialogue NAM countries held with one nuclear-weapon state at an NPT Preparatory Committee meeting as a model to be emulated. These exchanges do not have to end in agreement but are nevertheless inherently valuable in understanding the position of the other side.

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Transitional approach to expand NWFZ’s: During NDF discussions, participants suggested that NWFZ could be expanded by enlarging current nuclear-weapon-free zones, or creating a zone through individual declarations by nuclear-weaponfree states. Zones could also be created that limit certain weapons systems, with the possibility for expansion when it becomes politically feasible.

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NWFZ’s as a preliminary step: NDF participants saw NWFZ’s as

one of the few practical measures available for states to provide and receive security assurances. The signing of the Protocol to the CANWFZ by the P5 was an encouraging step, but states should be encouraged to expand NWFZ’s and remove the reservations attached to the treaties.

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Combining different approaches: NDF participants were supportive of utilizing successful nonproliferation and disarmament initiatives to jumpstart other measures that have stalled or lagged behind. Both the Nuclear Security Summit Process and the Humanitarian Initiative were brought up as examples of possible mechanisms that could have a force-multiplier effect when combined with other processes. Create goalposts: The 2010 NPT Action Plan succeeded in identifying action items to assess progress on the implementation on nonproliferation and disarmament. NDF participants recommend establishing time lines and goalposts for other disarmament processes to avoid stagna-

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Undertake unilateral steps: States or groups of states often fall prey to the temptation to wait for others to take action in accordance with their internationally recognized obligations. These states would do well to recognize their own agency in the process and their power to undertake unilateral action. Instead of political grandstanding, NDF participants pointed to individual efforts, such as the self-declarations by New Zealand and Mongolia to become nuclear-weapon-free states.

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Propel the humanitarian initiative: This approach has been instrumental in strengthening ownership of disarmament by all countries. Momentum should be sustained by maintaining a dialogue that focuses on the catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons use, increasing participation in international conferences to include nuclear-weapon states and clearly articulating the goals of the humanitarian initiative.

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Pursue a treaty banning nuclear weapons: The emphasis on human security over national security, and the horrific consequences of nuclear weapons’ use should lead the codification of an explicit prohibition on the possession of nuclear weapons. Until such time, states should consider the adoption of a Universal Declaration of a Nuclear WeaponsFree World, proposed by the Republic of Kazakhstan.

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Negotiate a negative security assurance agreement: Although NWFZ’s serve an important purpose, they should not be viewed as the “end game.” Nuclear-weapon states should look further on the horizon for a universal, legally-binding negative security assurance agreement, ideally under the auspices of the NPT. Such a step would showcase to the international community the nuclear-weapon states’ serious commitment to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in their military and security strategies.

tion and inaction. As one participant put it, without concrete goalposts your vision blurs as time passes.

NDF participants recommend establishing time lines and goalposts for other disarmament processes to avoid stagnation and inaction. As one participant put it, without concrete goalposts your vision blurs as time passes.

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Appendices

APPENDIX I 2014 Nuclear Discussion Forum Speakers April 23, 2014: The Nuclear Security Summits: Forward-Looking Implementation Plans Ms. Angela Kane

High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

H.E. Ambassador Karel Jan Gustaaf Van Oosterom

Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United Nations

H.E. Ambassador Oh Joon

Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations

June 3, 2014: Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in the Context of the 2015 NPT Review Conference Ms. Angela Kane

High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

H.E. Ambassador Eduardo Ulibarri

Permanent Representative of the Republic of Costa Rica to the United Nations

H.E. Ambassador Jarmo Viinanen

Permanent Representative of the Republic of Finland to the United Nations

June 27, 2014: Beyond the Usual Script: New Solutions for the 2015 NPT Review Conference Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

H.E. Ambassador Desra Percaya

Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations

H.E. Ambassador Vladimir Drobnjak

Permanent Representative of the Republic of Croatia to the United Nations

Mr. Geoffrey Shaw

Director of the New York Liaison Office, International Atomic Energy Agency

November 20, 2014: A New Perspective: Institutionalizing the Humanitarian Approach Ms. Virginia Gamba

Director and Deputy to the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs

Mr. Andreas Riecken

Minister Plenipotentiary and Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of Austria

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Ms. Virginia Gamba

APPENDIX II

The Nuclear Security Summits: Forward-Looking Implementation Plans Policy Reference Points (Draft Prepared by the EastWest Institute) Questions to Consider

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How can we encourage broader participation in the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process beyond current participating states? How do we move beyond voluntary commitments to make sure the recommended standards for nuclear security are being met, while also balancing the need to recognize states’ sovereignty? Are additional, legal-binding commitments necessary? What additional role, if any, should the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) play in promoting security standards? How can the IAEA’s hand be strengthened in enforcing these standards? How do we institutionalize the process moving forward? How can a sustainable model for the future of the NSS process be made? Are these desirable end goals? In what ways can the nuclear security regime be improved? How can cross-border exchanges of nonsensitive information be made more fluid? How can best practices be decided upon, disseminated and implemented? How can progress be measured? How, can nuclear weapons be addressed in the context of nuclear safety and security? When the topic is military instead of industry stockpiles, how can the cooperation of all countries be assured? What balance can be found between the use of nuclear materials, such as highly-enriched uranium (HEU) in medical products, and the threat they pose as radiological sources vulnerable to theft? What role can industry play in finding that balance? Can the NSS play a role in assisting industry in preventing the use of radioactive materials in dirty bombs? The NSS initiative’s successes are largely focused on securing HEU and plutonium and creating measures to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Can the NSS also be effective concerning the important issues of strengthening the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) and downsizing large nuclear arsenals?

The Nuclear Security Summit Process The Nuclear Security Summit aims to prevent nuclear terrorism by reducing the amount of dangerous nuclear material in the world, improving the security of all nuclear material and radioactive sources and enhancing international cooperation. The first summit was held in Washington, D.C. in 2010 to secure vulnerable nuclear material around the world. Additional summits were held in 2012 in Seoul, 2014, in The Hague, and a fourth summit will be held in Washington, D.C. in 2016. 2010 Summit – Washington, D.C. Initially hailed as a success, the primary outcome of the first NSS was a consensus, non-binding communique that pledged to strengthen nuclear security norms and secure all vulnerable

nuclear material in four years.20 Leaders further agreed to the Washington Work Plan, which highlights specific domestic and international measures to implement the commitments outlined in the communique. The work plan recommended the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and ratification of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, as well as participation and cooperation with the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.21 Many states also pledged voluntary commitments, including the enactment of domestic legislation, the creation of research and training centers and the removal of stockpiles of fissile materials. Despite these accomplishments, the 2010 summit has been criticized on a number of grounds. For example, the much-heralded communique left open to interpretation how “vulnerable” nuclear materials would be “secured” and how progress towards this goal would be measured. Some observers argued that the national commitments were low-hanging fruit – initiatives that were already underway, unambitious, and would be up to the states themselves to evaluate their fulfillment.22 Furthermore, commitments announced through the communique, work plan, or in national statements were voluntary and non-binding, thereby weakening the robustness and universality of the nascent nuclear security regime. 2012 Summit – Seoul Additional high-level attention on the threat of nuclear terrorism was brought to bear by a second summit in Seoul in 2012. While the 2010 NSS focused primarily on securing highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, the 2012 summit broadened its scope to include the protection of radioactive-sources and the intersection between nuclear safety and security. The summit in Seoul introduced the “gift basket” concept, joint statements by groups of countries pledging to take concrete steps to advance specific aspects of nuclear security. In all, the participating states initiated over 100 new commitments. Encouragingly, observers estimate that NSS participating countries have implemented around 90% of national commitments made during the 2010 summit.23 Although the vast majority of HEU and plutonium stockpiles are located in a minority of countries, nuclear terrorism is a global threat that requires the cooperation and vigilance from the international community. That there have been 16 confirmed cases of unauthorized possession of fissile material documented by the IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking Database since 1993.24 2014 Summit – The Hague

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Since the Seoul Summit, at least 15 metric tons of HEU have been down-blended to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU), which will be used as fuel for nuclear power plants. This is equivalent to approximately 500 nuclear weapons.

20 https://www.nss2014.com/sites/default/files/documents/11.communique.pdf 21 https://www.nss2014.com/sites/default/files/documents/12.work_plan.pdf 22 http://cns.miis.edu/stories/pdfs/120316_nuclear_security_summit_pomper_warren.pdf 23 http://csis.org/publication/2014-nuclear-security-summit 24 http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NuclearSecuritySummit

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In March 2014, 53 world leaders gathered in The Hague for the third Nuclear Security Summit. Since the previous summit in 2012, seven additional states have removed all or most of the materials needed to build a nuclear bomb within their territory and more than a dozen others have taken meaningful action to reduce quantities and better secure the materials they hold. The two notable commitments that emerged from The Hague were Japan’s commitment to repatriate 500kg of HEU and plutonium to their countries of origin and the signing of the Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation “gift basket” by 35 states. This important initiative includes specific commitments by states to adhere to IAEA security recommendations and the hosting of peer reviews on the implementation of these commitments. Some other notable achievements include:

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Almost all NSS countries stated that they had updated or were currently reviewing updates or revising nuclear security-related legislation, in order to comply with international guidelines and best practices. Twenty-eight NSS countries stated they have installed additional radiological detection systems at ports or border checkpoints or have equipped mobile search teams with such systems since 2010. From developing countries, capacity building and sharing of best practices Thirty-three countries committed to fully implementing the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 on the non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and to undertake developing a national action plan.25 Two-thirds of the NSS countries have taken a step further and committed themselves to incorporate IAEA guidance into binding national regulations and to let the IAEA invite peer-reviews of external experts (IPPAS-missions).

Lingering Issues Although the Nuclear Security Summit has succeeded in elevating the issue of nuclear security and the importance of international cooperation, the implementation of commitments made at the summits remains uneven. The international community failed to secure all vulnerable nuclear material by 2014, as called for in the first summit communique. This is due in no small part to the fact that states have enacted measures primarily on a voluntary basis, and several key countries have yet to ratify fundamental international legislation.

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Further progress on a global nuclear security network is hampered by the view of many states that nuclear security as an individual rather than a collective responsibility. Although participation in the NSS has grown over the past four years, attendance in the process is biased towards Western, developed economies. Of the 53 world leaders present at the 2014 NSS, over half hailed from North America and Europe alone.26 Greater efforts could be made to encourage a broad geographic presence from developing regions (Africa, Latin America, the Middle East) to resolve what is in effect a global issue. Assistance could also be provided to underrepresented regions to encourage wider participation, exchange best practices and aid in capacity building. Additionally, questions have arisen as to the successor to the summit process following the putative final summit in 2016 in Washington, D.C. Several suggestions have been proposed to inherit the role of the NSS, including the IAEA, the Group of 20, or the creation of an additional institution or international convention. A further concern that has not been addressed by the NSS is that measures to strengthen nuclear security could impede civilian nuclear energy programs, particularly in the developing world.27 This belief is given credence by the perception that the threat of nuclear terrorism is extraordinarily remote and that greater emphasis should be placed on nuclear disarmament as the primary guarantor of nuclear security. A number of countries have argued that undue attention has been focused on nuclear security and nonproliferation over nuclear safety and disarmament, and that an equal share of responsibility rests with nuclear-weapon states and nonnuclear-weapon states alike. Similarly, the production and possession of large stockpiles of fissile materials, especially by states with nuclear weapons, continues to pose a significant risk to nuclear security.

30 25 This includes the following countries: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States (https://www.nss2014.com/sites/ default/files/ documents/joint_statement_on_unscr_1540_-_final_version_24_march2.pdf) 26 https://www.nss2014.com/en/nss-2014/countries-and-achievements 27 http://www.idsa.in/system/files/IB_NuclearSecurity.pdf

APPENDIX III

Security Assurances for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Policy Reference Points (Draft prepared by the EastWest Institute) Questions to Consider

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What is the best approach to pursuing unconditional legally-binding security assurances within the NPT? How can the reluctance of some nuclear-weapon-states to engage in substantive negotiations on security assurances be overcome? Can the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 984 (1995) be used as a model for additional commitments from nuclear-weapon states? Should security assurances be packaged with other issues to better address the interests and concerns of both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states? What are the benefits of an international convention on negative security assurances, as opposed to remaining within the NPT? In what forum should such a treaty be negotiated? Many states point to the signing of protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zones as a path towards universalizing security assurances. Is this a viable position? How can security assurances be extended to regions where nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties have not come into force? Is an incremental approach an appropriate strategy to achieve progress on this issue? What are other possible interim arrangements that could be instituted while a legally binding international instrument is negotiated?

Assurances and the NPT

Just prior to the conclusion of NPT negotiations, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 255 (1968), which recognized the Security Council’s obligation to come to the aid of any NPT State Party “that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.”28 Although this commitment, defined as a positive security assurance, was designed to encourage non-nuclear-weapon states to join the NPT, it nevertheless disappointed many non-aligned states that had advocated for more robust assurances that they would not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons (negative security assurances). 28 http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/255(1968)

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Since negotiations on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) began, security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons have come to be considered a critical aspect of the nonproliferation and disarmament regime. The demand for security assurances has grown stronger since then, in particular from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), as countries that have renounced nuclear weapons have sought guarantees that in return they will not be attacked or threatened with such weapons.

Ultimately, no agreement was reached on the inclusion of security assurances within the NPT, despite numerous proposals from both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states.29 At that time, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America concluded that security assurances should be pursued “in the context of action relating to the United Nations, outside the NPT itself but in close conjunction with it.”30 Instead, all five NPT nuclear-weapon states have made unilateral pledges regarding security assurances, though several of these pledges include qualifications and are not considered legally-binding. The reluctance of the NPT nuclear-weapon states stems primarily from a concern that binding, universal security assurances treaty would constrain military options and weaken the perceived strength of commitments to defend allies. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones Treaties

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Nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) continue to play an important role in strengthening the nonproliferation regime and enhancing global peace and security. Unlike the NPT, the five treaties that establish NWFZs -- the Latin American zone (1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific zone (1985 Treaty of Rarotonga), the South-East Asian zone (1995 Treaty of Bangkok), the African zone (1996 Treaty of Pelindaba) and the Central Asian zone (2006 Treaty of Semipalatinsk) -- all include additional protocols for nuclear-weapon states to provide security assurances, though several include reservations. The protocols, which are considered legally binding, oblige the nuclear-weapon states to respect the status of the given zone and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States Parties of the given treaty zone.

On the margins of the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation signed the Protocol to the Central Asian Nuclear-WeaponFree-Zone Treaty (CANWFZ).31 This is significant in that the Protocol provides legally-binding assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against CANWFZ Treaty parties. Previous NPT Review Conferences and Preparatory Committees Security assurances are regularly addressed during NPT Review Conferences and Preparatory Committees. Although the 2000 Review Conference did not explicitly mention an international treaty on security assurances, it reaffirmed the role of the NPT as the forum for dealing with them and tasked the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations for the following Review Conference.32 Although no progress on the issue was achieved in 2005, the 2010 NPT Review Conference included security assurances within the agreed upon Action Plan, calling upon the Conference on Disarmament to initiate discussions on “effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to 29 http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/buntim11.pdf 30 http://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/CD_and_NSA_Fact_Sheet_ Apr_2014.pdf 31 http://www.kazakhembus.com/in_the_news/united-states-signs-protocol-to-central-asian-nuclearweapon-free-zone-treaty 32 Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, document NPT/CONF.2000/28 (vol. I), p. 15.

discuss substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument.”33 Lingering Issues To date, limited progress has been made in extending security assurances to all non-nuclearweapon states, despite repeated calls for such action. Many states have argued that the positive security assurances contained within UN Security Council Resolution 255 can be strengthened by identifying what action would be taken and what would happen in the event of a veto. As one of the central pillars of the nonproliferation regime, it is difficult to argue against unequivocal and binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon states as a legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon states. The upcoming 2015 NPT Review Conference will have to consider the issue of security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Negotiations on security assurances within the context of the NPT are significant as they would benefit current NPT parties and also serve to incentive those who remain outside the Treaty or those who may consider withdrawing from it.

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Certainly, substantial progress has been made on unconditional and legally binding assurances through the signing of protocols to nuclear-weapon-free zones. Nevertheless security assurances codified within the NPT would fulfill the spirit, if not the letter of the Treaty, and strengthen the legal foundation for the nonproliferation and disarmament regime. Indeed, security assurances granted to non-nuclear weapons states would underscore the basic principle that security is guaranteed by the nuclear nonproliferation regime and not nuclear weapons. NPT States Parties should consider allocating specific time during the 2015 NPT Review Conference to discuss and consider proposals on security assurances, and establish subsidiary bodies to develop and deliver recommendations to the Review Conference. Such an environment would be conducive to the possibility of negotiating a legally binding protocol to the NPT on security assurances.

Beyond the Usual Script: New Solutions for the 2015 NPT Review Conference 33 Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, document NPT/CONF.2010/50 (vol. I), p. 22.

APPENDIX IV

Policy Reference Points (Draft prepared by the EastWest Institute) Questions to Consider

• • • • • •

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•

How might a step-by-step approach, as advocated by the NWS, be the most appropriate course of action for disarmament? How can we reconcile this with the accelerated demand for progress on disarmament? What are the building blocks for a world without nuclear weapons? What tools are available to improve progress within the P5 Process? How can these consultations translate to concrete action in multilateral arms control? What joint projects are available to bridge divides and enhance dialogue between NWS and NNWS? How can trust and cooperation be improved between and within these two groups? How can progress on formal treaties be invigorated? What ad-hoc measures can NWS and NNWS pursue to promote nonproliferation and disarmament goals? In light of current developments what steps need to be taken to avert increasing threats of nonproliferation? How can the goals of the humanitarian approach be further incorporated into the NPT Review Conference process? How can the initiative be translated into specific actionable goals? What efforts can be made to promote additional peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while also addressing compliance and security concerns, as well as threats from nonstate actors?

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is credited with establishing the precedent in multilateral arms control agreements for periodic reviews of treaty implementation. Every five years, NPT Review Conferences have two primary functions: a backwardlooking component that examines the period in review and assesses the implementation of the Treaty’s articles, and a forward-looking aspect that establishes benchmarks to measure future implementation of treaty commitments. In 2010, the Review Conference agreed to a comprehensive 64-point Action Plan across the three pillars of the NPT – nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Although there have been several positive developments since the last Review Conference, it is clear that in 2015 NPT States Parties will have to confront significant challenges and identify concrete measures to surmount obstacles to future progress. Progress on Disarmament and Nonproliferation Since 2010, overall progress on disarmament has been met with measured success. Through the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the United States of America and the Russian Federation have reduced deployed strategic nuclear warheads to the lowest level in nearly 50 years.34 Consultations amongst the nuclear-weapon states (P5 Process) have resulted in greater transparency, reporting and cooperation on verification measures. This process has also been instrumental in building and maintaining consensus, developing common language on terminology and creating a foundation for multilateral arms control. 34 http://www.state.gov/t/us/2014/221215.htm

In order to spur on the pace of disarmament, many states have endorsed a global ban on nuclear weapons. At the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly, the Non-Aligned Movement introduced a resolution that called for a nuclear weapons convention to prohibit the “possession, development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer and use or threat of use, and to provide for their destruction.”35 The resolution, which was approved by 129 states, also established 26 September as the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. The Nuclear Security Summit Process has also brought international attention to bear on the challenges posed by stockpiles of nuclear materials and provided structure and deadlines for enhancing global nuclear security. These efforts have a direct impact on the NPT as they not only reinforce nonproliferation commitments, but also promote the responsible development of civilian nuclear applications. The Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) that met in Geneva in the summer of 2013 was successful in bringing divergent parties together and thus focused on constructive dialogue to identify proposals to move forward. Another significant achievement of the OEWG was its openness to the contributions of civil society. This is model can and should be replicated in 2015. The Humanitarian Initiative One issue that has gained significant traction within the past five years is humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament. Two conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons were held, one in March 2013 in Oslo and another in February 2014 in Nayarit, while a third conference is planned for late 2014 in Austria. Discussions focus on the immediate humanitarian impact of a nuclear weapon detonation, the wider impact and longer-term consequences and the national and international preparedness and response capacity.

Middle East WMD-Free Zone The final document of the 2010 Review Conference called for the convening of a conference on the establishment of a zone free of WMD in the Middle East, to be attended by all states of the Middle East. While the conference was tentatively scheduled to be held in Helsinki in December 2012, the meeting was postponed indefinitely. Although new dates for the conference have not been set, a facilitator appointed by the UN Secretary-General has hosted multilateral consultations with regional states to discuss the conference agenda, organizational and substantive issues, holding over 300 such meetings by April 2013 alone.36 According the facilitator’s report, all states within the region have affirmed their support for the establishment of 35 http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/gadis3493.doc.htm 36 http://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/CNS-Monitoring-Report_2014_web.pdf

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Though not supported by all states, the initiative is an attempt to reframe the disarmament debate and shift away from what was previously a predominately security-oriented discourse. Many states and civil society organizations hope that the initiative will promote a reduction in role of nuclear weapons in military and security doctrines, raise the threshold for use and delegitimize the possession of nuclear weapons entirely.

zone, but disagree on how this should be accomplished.37 Building Momentum Although NPT States Parties have fallen short of the 2010 Action Plan, there is nevertheless substantial progress and constructive proposals with which to build upon to guarantee a successful Review Conference in 2015. For example, the humanitarian initiative has undoubtedly brought renewed energy to the NPT. Nuclear-weapon states might be encouraged to participate in and set the agenda for future conferences.

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The road to a successful Review Conference may not be a smooth one, and it is therefore essential that NWS, NNW, NAM, EU, AU and other regional groups maintain open lines of communication and sustained engagement, both in bilateral and multilateral settings. Frank discussions on priorities, concerns and goals are critical and should become regularized. The NPT Review Conference hopefully will bring about simultaneous progress in all three pillars of the Treaty.

37 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/11

APPENDIX V

A New Perspective: Institutionalizing the Humanitarian Approach Policy Reference Points (Draft prepared by the EastWest Institute) Questions to Consider

• • • • • • • •

What strategies/methodologies could be used to sustain the humanitarian approach? What are the next steps for the humanitarian initiative in 2015 and beyond? What arguments can be made that would allay concerns that the humanitarian initiative distracts from a practical step-by-step approach to disarmament or undermines existing processes? How can all states be encouraged to engage with the initiative? How can the goals of the humanitarian approach be further incorporated into the NPT process? What role should it play in the 2015 NPT Review Conference? What processes can the approach supplement? Are there applications to nuclear security and nonproliferation initiatives? Can this approach be used to move nonproliferation and disarmament discussions outside of the NPT, perhaps through a parallel process? What are some practical measures that can be taken within the humanitarian context that will help push current discussions on nuclear weapons beyond the established rhetoric? To what extent has the humanitarian approach succeeded or failed to reframe the debate on nuclear weapons? How can the goals of the humanitarian approach be more clearly articulated? What lessons do the Ottawa and Oslo processes present in reframing the discourse on nuclear weapons?

Background Although concerns for the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons have been expressed for as long as these weapons have been in existence, the push for a humanitarian approach in the nonproliferation and disarmament debate did not gain significant momentum until quite recently. In the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, NPT States Parties noted “the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and reaffirm[ed] the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.”9 This acknowledgement was significant as it marked the first time States Parties explicitly linked a concern for humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons to the NPT. It also presaged a series of international resolutions that emphasized the humanitarian approach and elevated the issue to the highest levels.

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In November 2011, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement Council of Delegates issued a resolution emphasizing the immense suffering that would result from a nuclear weapon detonation and the incompatibility of the use of nuclear weapons with international humanitarian law.38 Recognition of the humanitarian approach by the international community has grown since then, as evidenced by an increasing number of states that have signed or issued joint

38 https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/resolution/council-delegates-resolution-1-2011.htm

statements on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons: from 2012-2013 two statements were issued during the UN General Assembly and two more were issued during preparatory meetings of the 2015 NPT Preparatory Committee. From 4-5 March 2013, the Norwegian government hosted the first international conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. During the conference, which was attended by 128 governments, international organizations, and civil society groups, experts presented evidence on the impact of a nuclear weapon detonation and concluded that international and national bodies lack the capacity to respond and provide assistance to those affected by such an event. The conference received widespread support for bringing governments together to consider the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and adding a refreshing dimension to standard disarmament and nonproliferation discussions. The humanitarian approach was further developed by a second conference hosted by Mexico from 13-14 February 2014. Participation grew to include 146 governments at this conference, which examined the global and long-term consequences of the detonation of a nuclear weapon, either by accident or design, and the risks posed by the mere existence of these weapons. The majority of governments present called for concrete political and legal action against nuclear weapons, with the Chair of the conference advocating for “new international standards and norms, through a legally binding instrument.”39 At the close of the conference, Austria announced it will host the next meeting on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons from 8-9 December 2014. Parallels

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The humanitarian approach in the context of nuclear weapons follows in the footsteps of several other successful humanitarian initiatives that lead to arms control treaties, including the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Treaty (MBM), the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (CMC), and the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). These campaigns emphasized the humanitarian consequences of the use of these weapons and harnessed the engagement of a broad spectrum of stakeholders, including civil society groups, academics and health professionals. In the context of the Ottawa and Oslo processes, the acceptability of anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions were questioned in light of their indiscriminate effects on civilians. By invoking these humanitarian considerations, the utility and legitimacy of these weapons were diminished in the eyes of many governments. Many proponents of the humanitarian approach aim to mirror this strategy to effect similar results in the realm of nuclear weapons.

Of course, there are key differences between the humanitarian approach to nuclear weapons and the processes used to ban anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions. Nuclear weapons differ from conventional weapons in their technical characteristics, scope, consequences, role in national security strategies, and political implications. Comparisons are further complicated by the enduring concept of nuclear deterrence and the belief that nuclear weapons are the ultimate guarantor of security. Reframing the Issue Given its growing popularity in the international community, the humanitarian approach is viewed by a number of governments, international organizations and civil society as a fast track to expedite the goals of the nonproliferation and disarmament regime. The key to its success as a powerful marketing tool rests in the approach’s ability to decouple the debate surrounding nuclear weapons from a security discourse and shift the focus to the humanitarian dimension of the nuclear weapons. While the humanitarian approach is grounded in a legal perspective in the context of international humanitarian law, it also encompasses moral and political imperatives that run counter to the use and possession of nuclear weapons. Although the goals of the humanitarian approach have not been coherently articulated, they coalesce around four primary outcomes: to 39 http://www.sre.gob.mx/en/images/stories/cih/ci.pdf

raise awareness of the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, reduce their prominence in national security doctrines, delegitimize their possession, and move towards a nuclearweapon-free world. Next Steps As we approach the third conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in December 2014, the international community will need to look ahead to the next steps for the humanitarian approach. First and foremost, the next conference should sustain recent momentum in reframing the nuclear discourse by seeking wider participation, conducting new and innovative research, emphasizing discussion on the weapons themselves and the impact of a nuclear detonation, and building support for a conference following Vienna. The humanitarian approach presents an opportunity to facilitate dialogue outside of deadlocked multilateral disarmament fora. Future discussions should seek a clear articulation of the goals of the humanitarian approach and develop concrete, realistic measures that will minimize the humanitarian risk of nuclear weapons. The humanitarian approach should also find ways to promote or complement current efforts on the nonproliferation and disarmament agenda. Possible proposals include missile de-alerting and open ocean targeting, negative security assurances and no first use pledges, and international cooperation on crisis response and management of the humanitarian consequences of a nuclear detonation. The humanitarian approach has proven successful in establishing new dialogue channels, as evidenced by the participation of two non-NPT states in the Oslo and Nayarit conferences. Moving forward, the humanitarian approach should seek the inclusion of nuclear-weapon states. Future conferences could seek to narrow their agenda so as to encourage the participation of nuclear-weapon states. Nuclear-weapon states could contribute technical expertise and assistance in emergency preparedness measures and disaster response capacity-building.

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EastWest Institute Board of Directors

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMEN Ross Perot, Jr. (U.S.) Chairman EastWest Institute Chairman Hillwood Development Co. LLC H.E. Dr. Armen Sarkissian (Armenia) Vice Chairman EastWest Institute President Eurasia House International Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Embassy of the Republic of Armenia to the United Kingdom Former Prime Minister of Armenia

OFFICERS

MEMBERS

John Edwin Mroz* (U.S.) President, Co-Founder and CEO EastWest Institute

Martti Ahtisaari (Finland) Former Chairman EastWest Institute 2008 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Former President of Finland

R. William Ide III (U.S.) Council and Secretary Chair of the Executive Committee EastWest Institute Partner McKenna Long and Aldridge LLP Leo Schenker (U.S.) Treasurer EastWest Institute Former Senior Executive Vice President Central National-Gottesman Inc.

Hamid Ansari (U.S.) President and Co-Founder Prodea Systems, Inc. Tewodros Ashenafi (Ethiopia) Chairman and CEO Southwest Energy (HK) Ltd. Peter Bonfield (U.K.) Chairman NXP Semiconductors Matt Bross (U.S.) Chairman and CEO IP Partners Kim Campbell (Canada) Founding Principal Peter Lougheed Leadership College at the University of Alberta Former Prime Minister of Canada Robert N. Campbell III (U.S.) Founder and CEO Campbell Global Services LLC Peter Castenfelt (U.K.) Chairman Archipelago Enterprises Ltd.

Maria Livanos Cattaui (Switzerland) Former Secretary-General International Chamber of Commerce Michael Chertoff (U.S.) Co-founder and Managing Principal The Chertoff Group David Cohen (Israel) Chairman F&C REIT Property Management Joel Cowan (U.S.) Professor Georgia Institute of Technology Addison Fischer (U.S.) Chairman and Co-Founder Planet Heritage Foundation Stephen B. Heintz (U.S.) President Rockefeller Brothers Fund Hu Yuandong (China) Chief Representative UNIDO ITPO-China Emil Hubinak (Slovak Republic) Chairman and CEO Logomotion John Hurley (U.S.) Managing Partner Cavalry Asset Management

Amb. Wolfgang Ischinger (Germany) Chairman Munich Security Conference Global Head of Governmental Affairs Allianz SE Ralph Isham (U.S.) Managing Director GH Venture Partners LLC Anurag Jain (India) Chairman Laurus Edutech Pvt. Ltd. Gen. (ret) James L. Jones (U.S.) Former U.S. National Security Advisor Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe Former Commandant of the Marine Corps

F. Francis Najafi (U.S.) CEO Pivotal Group Amb. Tsuneo Nishida (Japan) Former Permanent Representative of Japan to the U.N. Ronald P. Oâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Hanley (U.S.) Former President, Asset Management Fidelity Investments Admiral (ret) William A. Owens (U.S.) Chairman AEA Holdings Asia Former Vice Chairman U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Sarah Perot (U.S.) Director and Co-Chair for Development Dallas Center for Performing Arts

Haifa Al Kaylani (Lebanon/Jordan) Founder and Chairperson Arab International Womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Forum

Louise Richardson (U.K.) Principal University of St. Andrews

Zuhal Kurt (Turkey) CEO Kurt Enterprises

John Rogers (U.S.) Managing Director Goldman Sachs and Co.

General (ret) T. Michael Moseley (U.S.) President and CEO Moseley and Associates, LLC Former Chief of Staff United States Air Force

George F. Russell, Jr. (U.S.) Former Chairman EastWest Institute Chairman Emeritus Russell Investment Group Founder Russell 20-20

Karen Linehan Mroz (U.S.) President Roscommon Group Associates

CO-FOUNDER Ramzi H. Sanbar (U.K.) Chairman SDC Group Inc. Services Ltd.

Ira D. Wallach* (U.S.) Former Chairman Central National-Gottesman Inc.

Ikram ul-Majeed Sehgal (Pakistan) Chairman Security & Management

CHAIRMEN EMERITI

Amb. Kanwal Sibal (India) Former Foreign Secretary of India Kevin Taweel (U.S.) Chairman Asurion Amb. Pierre Vimont (France) Executive Secretary General European External Action Service Former Ambassador Embassy of the Republic of France in Washington, D.C. Alexander Voloshin (Russia) Chairman of the Board OJSC Uralkali Amb. Zhou Wenzhong (China) Secretary-General Boao Forum for Asia

NON-BOARD COMMITTEE MEMBERS Laurent Roux (U.S.) Founder Gallatin Wealth Management, LLC

Berthold Beitz* (Germany) President Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach-Stiftung Ivan T. Berend (Hungary) Professor University of California, Los Angeles Francis Finlay (U.K.) Former Chairman Clay Finlay LLC Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Germany) Former Vice Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs Donald M. Kendall (U.S.) Former Chairman and CEO PepsiCo. Inc. Whitney MacMillan (U.S.) Former Chairman and CEO Cargill Inc. Mark Maletz (U.S.) Chairman, Executive Committee EastWest Institute Senior Fellow Harvard Business School

Jan Krzysztof Bielecki (Poland) CEO Bank Polska Kasa Opieki S.A. Former Prime Minister of Poland Emil Constantinescu (Romania) President Institute for Regional Cooperation and Conflict Prevention (INCOR) Former President of Romania William D. Dearstyne (U.S.) Former Company Group Chairman Johnson & Johnson John W. Kluge* (U.S.) Former Chairman of the Board Metromedia International Group Maria-Pia Kothbauer (Liechtenstein) Ambassador Embassy of Liechtenstein to Austria, OSCE and the UN in Vienna William E. Murray* (U.S.) Former Chairman The Samuel Freeman Trust John J. Roberts (U.S.) Senior Advisor American International Group (AIG) Daniel Rose (U.S.) Chairman Rose Associates Inc. Mitchell I. Sonkin (U.S.) Managing Director MBIA Insurance Corporation Thorvald Stoltenberg (Norway) President Norwegian Red Cross

Hilton Smith, Jr. (U.S.) President and CEO East Bay Co., LTD

Liener Temerlin (U.S.) Chairman

Temerlin Consulting

John C. Whitehead (U.S.) Former Co-Chairman Goldman Sachs Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State

DIRECTORS EMERITI * Deceased

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