BRITISH POLICY IN THE RELINQUISHMENT OF ABADAN IN 1951 by Rohan Butler PREFACE This history of British policy in the relinquishment of Abadan in 1951 has been written in accordance with a decision taken by the Permanent Under-Secretary of State in 1959. This decision followed from a letter addressed to him and to other Heads of Government Departments on September 5, 1957, by Sir Norman Brook.1 Sir Norman Brook suggested that, as the work on the Civil Series of the Official Histories of the Second World War was drawing to a close, it might be possible to continue to ‘fund experience for Government use’ in a more modest way by preparing ‘departmental histories’ of particularly significant episodes of policy or administration. He believed that such histories, which would provide a consecutive narrative of administrative experience over a specified period, might enable the administrator to see current problems in perspective as regards both policy and administrative practice. It was a feature of our administrative system, wrote Sir Norman Brook, that we made many forecasts but few retrospects. More postmortems would, he thought, be salutary for an analysis of how initial judgments and forecasts had stood the test of time. The suggestion of Sir Norman Brook was followed up in the Foreign Office by the then Librarian, Mr C.C. Parrott, and by the Steering Committee under the chairmanship of the Permanent Under-Secretary of State.2 After consideration of various possibilities it was decided that I should undertake the present study. In selecting the Abadan crisis of 1951 it was hoped that it would provide a particularly instructive case-history. It was an outstanding episode of lasting significance in British foreign policy of recent years; it represented a complex concentration and critical balance of factors, political, economic, juridical and military. The expectations entertained of the subject have, I think, proved justified. By the same token, however, it has also proved to be a rather more than usually difficult history to write. In accordance with my understanding of the purpose of Sir Norman Brook and Lord Inchyra, the narrative of events often endeavours to explain not only what happened but why one thing was done rather than another, why in a particular way at a particular time, and what were the frequently conflicting considerations which underlay critical decisions. This inevitably renders the study more confidential—and long. As it is, the narrative is much concentrated from thousands upon thousands of original papers, often of rather an elaborate kind. To compress it further would have run serious risk of over-simplification and unfairness both to policies and to individuals. A long study, though, has obvious drawbacks for busy readers. In order to meet this so far as may be, two main devices have been employed. First, all the chapters 1 2
The footnotes in this preface are editorial. Cabinet Secretary from 1957 until late 1962. Sir F. Hoyer Millar (later Lord Inchya), PUS at the Foreign Office from 1957-62.
19
