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Preface
by Rohan Butler
PREFACE
This history of British policy in the relinquishment of Abadan in 1951 has been written in accordance with a decision taken by the Permanent Under-Secretary of State in 1959. This decision followed from a letter addressed to him and to other Heads of Government Departments on September 5, 1957, by Sir Norman Brook.1
Sir Norman Brook suggested that, as the work on the Civil Series of the Official Histories of the Second World War was drawing to a close, it might be possible to continue to ‘fund experience for Government use’ in a more modest way by preparing ‘departmental histories’ of particularly significant episodes of policy or administration. He believed that such histories, which would provide a consecutive narrative of administrative experience over a specified period, might enable the administrator to see current problems in perspective as regards both policy and administrative practice. It was a feature of our administrative system, wrote Sir Norman Brook, that we made many forecasts but few retrospects. More postmortems would, he thought, be salutary for an analysis of how initial judgments and forecasts had stood the test of time.
The suggestion of Sir Norman Brook was followed up in the Foreign Office by the then Librarian, Mr C.C. Parrott, and by the Steering Committee under the chairmanship of the Permanent Under-Secretary of State.2 After consideration of various possibilities it was decided that I should undertake the present study. In selecting the Abadan crisis of 1951 it was hoped that it would provide a particularly instructive case-history. It was an outstanding episode of lasting significance in British foreign policy of recent years; it represented a complex concentration and critical balance of factors, political, economic, juridical and military.
The expectations entertained of the subject have, I think, proved justified. By the same token, however, it has also proved to be a rather more than usually difficult history to write. In accordance with my understanding of the purpose of Sir Norman Brook and Lord Inchyra, the narrative of events often endeavours to explain not only what happened but why one thing was done rather than another, why in a particular way at a particular time, and what were the frequently conflicting considerations which underlay critical decisions. This inevitably renders the study more confidential—and long. As it is, the narrative is much concentrated from thousands upon thousands of original papers, often of rather an elaborate kind. To compress it further would have run serious risk of over-simplification and unfairness both to policies and to individuals.
A long study, though, has obvious drawbacks for busy readers. In order to meet this so far as may be, two main devices have been employed. First, all the chapters
1 The footnotes in this preface are editorial. Cabinet Secretary from 1957 until late 1962. 2 Sir F. Hoyer Millar (later Lord Inchya), PUS at the Foreign Office from 1957-62.
are divided into titled sections and these sections, together with a further summary of the main contents of each, are listed in the Table of Contents on pp. 22-35. Secondly, the political and administrative conclusions emerging from the narrative are here presented in front of it in Chapter XVI, placed immediately after the Table of Contents. This chapter, is, however, paged consecutively to the others and, if the study is printed, should follow them.3 The political conclusions are highly condensed. To facilitate their further elucidation and justification, the conclusions include page references to some of the main passages in the narrative to which they relate.
Mention of conclusions raises considerations of which the writer has been particularly conscious. Attempts to draw lessons from history can be of practical value since, as has been observed by my predecessor, Sir Llewellyn Woodward, while history does not repeat itself, historical situations do recur. The deduction of such lessons, though, always calls for caution. Because historical wisdom is always wise after the event. The historian most often, and inevitably, enjoys the two large if dubious advantages of hindsight and of residual authority, in so far as the subjects of his study are not alive to answer back. The present writer has been keenly aware of the rather salutary absence of the second, at least, of these doubtful privileges. Many people are still active who, unlike myself, had first-hand experience of the Abadan crisis.
A first thought was naturally to consult and learn from those who were concerned with the crisis. But after careful consideration, and in consultation with Mr Parrott, it appeared that in the present case such a course would be liable to raise considerable difficulties, besides rendering the work slower than it has in any case had to be. To mention but two of the difficulties, it seemed questionable how far it would be just to consult only members of the Foreign Service; and it would in any case have been difficult, indeed impossible, to consult all those who had been concerned; thus the personal testimonies would inevitably have been to some extent partial and incomplete, with obvious dangers for the historian. On balance it seemed preferable to forgo the advantages which personal interviews would have procured, in the interests of trying to prepare a case-history strictly from such archival and other written evidence as a historian could only use in examining a remoter period.
In these circumstances it is especially desirable that the narrative of events should be allowed to speak for itself, and this I have endeavoured to do throughout. It would have been evidently prudent, and easy, to leave it at that. In view of the expressed intentions of Sir Norman Brook, however, it seemed desirable to try to make the critical study constructive. I have on occasions ventured to ‘break the drowsy spell of narrative’ in order to assess a situation, suggest a question or pose a possibility. I have also sought to draw political and administrative conclusions, if not always quite so directly as might be strictly required by Sir Norman Brook’s proposed checks on the validity of initial assumptions. Such checks would indeed appear to be largely inherent in the history, and in a number of cases to be more or less clearly deducible, as I have tried to indicate. But to attempt to reduce this to too rigid an exercise would, I fear, be unduly mechanistic and unrealistic in view of the complexity of evershifting diplomatic problems, of their particularly high political content by comparison with the work of most other Government departments, and of the
3 Chapter XVI was placed at the end of the Report in the printed copy, as it is in the present publication.
tiresome fact that diplomacy deals with foreigners not subject to the authority of the Secretary of State.
The conclusions in Chapter XVI are also limited in another respect. They are historical conclusions. The direct relation of those regarding administration, for instance, is necessarily to the practice of about 1950. It may well be that the most valuable and practical conclusions remain to be drawn by those who, unlike the present writer, have a close knowledge of current political and administrative problems, enabling them to draw analogies and comparisons.
A further necessary limitation is that, as the title indicates, this is a history of British official policy in the relinquishment of Abadan in 1951. It is primarily based upon the archives of the Foreign Office (all file references are to files of the year in question unless the contrary is indicated); occasional use has also been made, as necessary, of the archives of the Cabinet Office. It would of course be possible to write histories of the crisis from other perspectives and other archives, for instance those of the then Anglo-Iranian Oil Company or of the Persian Government.
It is a natural regret to me, as an author, that my work should not see the light of day in the form of publication. I have fully accepted, however, that this is scarcely a current possibility, and this history, which had to be frank in order to be useful, was primarily written with a view, not to present publication, but to confidential official use. In these circumstances I must reluctantly conclude that for obvious reasons it would be best all round that the existence of this study should also not be publicised at the present time.
These recognised considerations against publication and publicity render it the more unfortunate that, as I have already represented elsewhere, my understanding of the basis upon which I undertook this large historical task has not proved wholly correct, in so far as I have not been permitted to see all relevant papers in the Foreign Office.4 A certain number of relevant telegrams and papers have been withheld from me. Apart from obvious personal considerations, I need not emphasise the gravity of this from a historical point of view. It compels me, as a matter of historical principle, to disclaim in advance all responsibility for all errors or omissions of fact or inference due to this cause.
I am specially sorry to be obliged to make this reservation in view of all the personal kindness and help which I have received in the Foreign Office from Lord Inchyra, Mr C.C. Parrott, Mr R.W. Mason5 and the staff of the Library and Reference Room. I further owe a deep and special debt to Miss M.E. Lambert, Assistant Editor of Documents on British Foreign Policy, who has been my sole and indefatigable assistant throughout the heavy labour of research, preparation and checking required for this history. It owes more than I can briefly indicate to her zealous accuracy and good judgment. Last but not least I would thank Miss F.L.J. Sturgess, who has typed and retyped the particularly long and complicated manuscript with expert care.
February 20, 1962
ROHAN BUTLER
4 Butler was not specific about the documentation he was not permitted to see, but it is likely that he was referring to the papers of the Permanent Under-Secretary’s Department, the liaison department between the Foreign Office and the UK’s intelligence agencies. 5 Librarian and Director of Research in the Foreign Office, in succession to Mr Parrott.
