Commentary by Lord Strang on Mr Rohan Butler’s study of ‘British Policy in the Relinquishment of Abadan in 1951’1 Secret (FO 370/2694) I. Introductory This case-history of British policy in the relinquishment of Abadan in 1951 is the work of a historian who has an almost unrivalled acquaintance with Foreign Office papers in the inter-war years, and can bring his profound understanding of these to the study of a post-war episode of lasting significance in British foreign policy. It is a postmortem, the purpose of which is to examine how far ‘initial judgments and forecasts had stood the test of time’, and to enable the present administrator ‘to see current problems in perspective as regards both policy and administrative practice’. His narrative of events ‘often endeavours to explain not only what happened but why one thing was done rather than another, why in a particular way at a particular time, and what were the frequently conflicting considerations which underlay critical decisions’. 2. The work comprises (1) a short introductory chapter giving the early history of British enterprise in Persia; (2) the main body of the work, being an analytical narrative of events from the negotiation of the Supplemental Agreement between the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and the Persian Government to the relinquishment of Abadan, October 1947 to October 1951; (3) a short concluding chapter bringing the story down to the solution of the Persian oil problem in August 1954; (4) a chapter of conclusions, political, personal and administrative. 3. The writer of the present memorandum was Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office from February 1949 to December 1953. He has been invited to read Mr Butler’s study and, from his personal knowledge of events during the material period, and from his experience of Foreign Office administration, to draw what lessons he can both as to the conduct of affairs in the circumstances of the time, and as to the possible bearing of these lessons upon the conduct of affairs in the circumstances of today. He feels more competent to attempt the first task than the second, since in the nine years since his retirement much has changed in the content and climate of international affairs and no doubt accordingly also in the organization and methods of the Foreign Service. 4. He proposes to examine and to test Mr Butler’s comments and conclusions, and in one important aspect—the personal aspect—to supplement them. Apart from making two general and most useful observations, Mr Butler refrains altogether from attempting ‘any ultimate judgments upon personal conduct in the bitter crisis for British policy towards Persia in 1951’ since he thinks that this would be ‘inappropriate and invidious’. His readers, if they should seek any conclusions, must, he says, ‘properly draw their own’. The present writer thinks it right to offer some 1
In a minute of 16 December 1962 Sir H. Caccia, Permanent Under-Secretary of the FO, wrote that with the agreement of the Foreign Secretary, Mr Butler’s Abadan memorandum was being sent to Lord Strang, who had been PUS at the time of the crisis. Circulating Strang’s comments on 7 February 1963, Mr D.R. Hurd, Sir H. Caccia’s Private Secretary, noted that the PUS had promised Lord Strang that his comments would not be ‘seen or referred to outside a restricted circle in the Foreign Office, and hopes that great care will be taken to ensure that this is so’. It is clear that his caution was due to the references in his text to officers who might still be serving.
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